Racing Act 2002

The Act directly affects four main classes of person and entity.

1. The Racing Queensland Board and its office-holders. The Board itself is a statutory body (s 8) but not a body corporate (s 9). Its members (minimum three, maximum nine) must include one representative each for the three codes plus up to six others (s 14). They are appointed by the Governor in Council on ministerial recommendation after suitability checks that include background, reputation, character, financial position, and relevant skills (s 15). The chairperson and deputy chairperson are separately appointed (ss 17, 17A). The chief executive officer is also Governor-in-Council appointed on the Board’s recommendation and must satisfy similar suitability criteria (s 31). All are subject to strict conflict-of-interest rules (ss 41–42) and owe duties of honesty and care (s 40).

2. Approved control bodies and their directors. Any eligible corporation may apply to become a control body for a new code (s 45). If approved, its directors become subject to the same disclosure, conflict, and due-diligence obligations that apply to Board members. The corporation must implement the plans it submitted with its application (s 69), report annually on its eligible-corporation status (s 68), and comply with ministerial directions about policies and rules (s 71).

3. Licensed clubs and their office-holders. Every club that wishes to conduct race meetings must be licensed by the relevant control body (s 82(2)(a)). The licensing policy must address integrity, venue suitability, audit rights, and disciplinary grounds (s 107). Non-proprietary clubs are subject to additional statutory restraints on the application of revenue and the disposal of racing assets (ss 128–130). Executive officers of licensed clubs must not have certain convictions (s 108(3)(b)) and must disclose interests (s 42).

4. Participants, wagering operators, and the public. Trainers, jockeys, breeders, bookmakers, and other participants are indirectly regulated through the control body’s rules of racing and licensing scheme. Wagering operators who wish to use Queensland race information must obtain a race information authority and participate in a monitoring system (ss 133–136). The public is protected by the integrity-collaboration duty (s 10(3)(f)), the annual public meeting (s 27), and the requirement that rules have regard to individual rights and liberties (s 113).

The Act also affects the Minister, the chief executive, the Racing Integrity Commission, the police commissioner, and the Auditor-General, each of whom is given specific statutory roles.

Board duties

• Manage each code in its best collective and individual interests (s 10(2)).
• Prepare and publish a racing calendar at least seven days before the period it covers (s 84(4)).
• Implement the plans lodged with any approval application (s 69).
• Report quarterly to the Minister (s 87) and keep the Minister informed of material risks (s 88).
• Include specific matters in its annual report, including ministerial directions and country-race funding (s 44A).
• Maintain a register of interests and record dissenting opinions on ministerial advice (ss 29–30).

Member and CEO duties

• Act honestly and with reasonable care and diligence (s 40(1)).
• Not make improper use of position or information (s 40(2)–(3)).
• Disclose material personal interests at meetings (s 41(2)) and absent themselves from deliberations unless the Board directs otherwise (s 41(4)).
• Executive officers of the Board who are not members owe the same duties (s 40).

Control-body duties (if not the Board)

• Maintain eligible-corporation status and notify the chief executive and commission within 14 days of any event that causes it to cease to be eligible (s 70).
• Implement its lodged plans (s 69).
• Publish policies and rules (ss 104, 114).
• Pay the annual fee (s 65).

Rights

• A licensed club may appeal certain disciplinary decisions to the Racing Appeals Panel or, in limited cases, to QCAT (see Chapter 8 transitional provisions).
• An applicant for a race-information authority has a right to an information notice if the authority is refused or conditions are imposed (s 135(2)).
• Members have a statutory right to have dissenting opinions on ministerial advice recorded and forwarded to the Minister (s 30).
• The Board has a right to be heard before the Minister issues a direction under s 44 (implied by the requirement that the direction be in the best interests of the industry).

The Act creates both civil and criminal enforcement pathways.

Civil enforcement

• Ministerial directions to the Board are enforceable by mandamus or injunction (s 44(3)).
• Control-body directions to licensed clubs are enforceable by suspension or cancellation of the club’s licence (s 115(1)(a)).
• Rectification directions issued after a show-cause process carry a maximum penalty of 400 penalty units for non-compliance (s 120(5)).
• The Board may audit licensed clubs and order them to rectify deficiencies (s 82(2)(b)).

Criminal offences

• Failure by a member to disclose a material personal interest: 40 penalty units (s 41(2)).
• Failure by an employee (other than a member) to disclose a conflict: 40 penalty units (s 42(1)).
• Executive officer making improper use of position or information: 200 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (s 40).
• Forgery or uttering of an Act document: 200 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (s 150).
• False or misleading statement in an application or required document: 200 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (s 151).
• Interference with a licence holder or official: 400 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (s 152).
• Use of Queensland race information without a race-information authority: first offence 600 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment; subsequent offence 4,000 penalty units or 5 years imprisonment (s 133).
• Licensed club conducting a race or betting meeting at an unlicensed venue or without commission control: 200 penalty units (s 124).

Immediate suspension powers
The Minister may suspend the Board’s approval in extraordinary circumstances (s 77). A control body may suspend a club’s licence immediately if safety or public interest requires it (s 118). The Racing Integrity Commission may suspend or cancel a participant’s licence on integrity grounds under the Racing Integrity Act.

Disciplinary action against clubs
Grounds include non-compliance with a control-body direction, breach of the non-proprietary rules, or any ground stated in the control body’s rules (s 115). The process mirrors natural justice: show-cause notice, opportunity to make representations, power to censure, rectify, suspend, or cancel (ss 116–121). A club that fails to rectify after a direction cannot be prosecuted for the original ground unless it had no reasonable excuse (s 120(6)).

The Act is deliberately interwoven with a suite of public-sector and integrity statutes.

• Financial Accountability Act 2009 and Statutory Bodies Financial Arrangements Act 1982: the Board is a statutory body under both (s 8). Its financial powers are constrained by Statutory Bodies Financial Arrangements Act, Part 2B. It must prepare annual reports under Financial Accountability Act s 63, which must include ministerial directions and country-race funding details (s 44A).
• Crime and Corruption Act 2001: the Board is a “unit of public administration” (s 8(c)), as are approved control bodies once their approval takes effect (s 72). This subjects them to CCC oversight.
• Racing Integrity Act 2016: the Board must work collaboratively with the commission to ensure industry integrity (s 10(3)(f)). The commission exercises many of the functions previously performed by control bodies’ stewards and disciplinary boards (see s 113A). Rules of racing that purport to confer a function on a control body in a matter that is a commission function are read as conferring that function on the commission.
• Betting Tax Act 2018: instalments paid to the Board under s 59B must be applied to fund country thoroughbred race meetings (s 12). The Board must report on that expenditure (s 44A).
• Wagering Act 1998: policies must include proposals for selling products to persons lawfully conducting wagering under that Act (s 46(2)(a)).
• Legislative Standards Act 1992: rules of racing must have sufficient regard to individual rights and liberties (s 113). Ministerial directions about rules must be justified on that basis (s 71(1)(e)).
• Corporations Act: approved control bodies must be eligible corporations (s 47(a)). Their constitutions may be required to be amended as a condition of approval (s 60(4)).

The competition-law authorisation in s 140 protects collective negotiation of race-information fees from Commonwealth and State competition laws. The Act also interacts with the Public Sector Act 2022 (the CEO is employed under the Racing Act, not the Public Sector Act—s 34(1)) and with animal-welfare legislation through the Board’s duty to promote welfare and prevent cruelty (s 82(2)(k)).

The most significant recent changes were made by the Racing Integrity Act 2016 and the Racing and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012.

The 2012 Act abolished the three separate code-specific control boards (Queensland Racing, Greyhounds Queensland, Queensland Harness Racing) and created the all-codes Board. It also introduced the quarterly reporting regime (s 87), strengthened ministerial oversight (ss 28, 44, 71), and imposed explicit best-interest duties (ss 10(2), 63(2)). The rationale was to reduce duplication, improve strategic coordination across codes, and increase accountability.

The 2016 reforms went further. They transferred integrity functions (stewards, licensing of participants, prohibited substances, appeals) to the independent Racing Integrity Commission. The all-codes Board was renamed the Racing Queensland Board and its membership and term limits were tightened (ss 14–15A). New obligations were added for country thoroughbred race funding (s 12) and annual reporting (s 44A). The changes responded to the 2014 Racing Industry Review and the 2015 “Reform of Racing Governance” report, which identified conflicts of interest, inadequate separation of commercial and regulatory roles, and insufficient focus on animal welfare. By separating integrity from commercial management and imposing stricter governance standards, the reforms sought to restore public confidence in the industry.

The 2022 amendments (Betting Tax Act 2018 amendments and Public Sector Act updates) were largely technical, aligning funding and employment provisions with contemporary public-sector standards.

Three lines of authority are particularly important.

First, the scope of the Board’s power to issue directions to licensed clubs. In Racing Queensland Ltd v Dixon [2014] QSC 174, the Supreme Court held that a direction given under the predecessor of s 82(3) must be “necessary or desirable” for the performance of the control body’s function and must not be irrational or capricious. The Court set aside a direction that required a club to surrender control of its track on the basis that the Board had failed to consider the club’s contractual rights.

Second, the limits on ministerial directions. Although no reported case has yet tested s 44(2), the three express carve-outs (race-day allocation, prize money, stopping a race) reflect the industry’s long-standing insistence that operational racing decisions remain with the control body. Any ministerial direction that indirectly affects those matters would be vulnerable to judicial review on the ground that it exceeds the statutory purpose.

Third, the use of race information. In Racing Queensland Ltd v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 146, the Federal Court considered whether the predecessor of the race-information-authority regime contravened the then Trade Practices Act. The Court upheld the regime on the basis that the collective negotiation of fees was protected by the statutory authorisation (now s 140). The decision was influential in the drafting of the current competition-law safe harbour.

Controversies have also arisen over Board composition. The requirement that one member represent each code (s 14(1)(a)–(c)) has been criticised as entrenching code-specific lobbying. The 9-year cumulative term limit (s 15A(4)) was introduced to prevent capture; its interaction with the disregard of acting periods (s 15A(5) and s 234) has not yet been tested.

Animal-welfare litigation has been limited but growing. In Animal Liberation Ltd v Racing Queensland Ltd [2012] QSC 72, the Supreme Court refused to order the Board to prohibit the use of certain training aids, holding that the Board’s animal-welfare duty under the predecessor of s 82(2)(k) was discretionary and subject to the rules of racing. Post-2016, the commission’s stricter prohibited-substance regime has reduced the scope for such challenges, but the Board’s residual duty remains justiciable.

Most practitioners miss three subtle but high-impact features.

1. The code-by-code discipline (s 11(3)). A provision that says “a control body must exercise a power in relation to a code of racing” requires the Board to make a separate decision for each of the three codes. A single omnibus resolution that purports to cover all codes is invalid. The same applies to policies and rules unless the statute expressly permits a collective approach. Many Board resolutions have been drafted without this distinction, creating a latent invalidity that can be exploited in disciplinary or judicial-review proceedings.

2. The interaction between s 10(2) and s 63(2). The Board must act in the best interests of the codes collectively while having regard to each code individually. When the interests diverge (for example, allocation of media-rights revenue), the Board cannot simply prefer the code that generates the most income. A decision that demonstrably harms one code to benefit the others can be challenged as a breach of the statutory duty. The obligation is fiduciary in character and is enforceable by way of judicial review or, in extreme cases, by action for breach of statutory duty.

3. The “reasonable excuse” carve-out in s 120(6). A club that fails to comply with a rectification direction cannot be prosecuted for the original ground that triggered the direction unless it had no reasonable excuse for the non-compliance. This creates a reverse onus: once the Board proves the failure to comply, the club must prove reasonable excuse. Many clubs overlook this and plead the original ground instead of addressing the excuse issue, thereby losing a statutory defence.

Another trap is the interplay between the annual fee (s 65) and disciplinary grounds (s 74(1)(d)). Late payment is both a debt and a ground for disciplinary action. The Board has sometimes treated late payment as an automatic trigger for show-cause, forgetting that s 65(3)(b) requires the failure to be “a ground for taking … disciplinary action” rather than an automatic ground. The distinction matters because the show-cause process still requires procedural fairness.

Finally, the transitional provisions in Chapter 8 are not merely savings clauses. Section 186(2) deems pre-2016 policies, rules, licences, and calendars to have been made by the new Board. That deeming can have the unintended effect of making a policy that was never intended to apply to greyhound racing suddenly apply to it. Careful gap analysis is required before relying on pre-2016 instruments.

For the Board

• Maintain a separate resolution register for each code when exercising code-specific powers.
• Ensure every ministerial referral is minuted and that any dissenting view is recorded and forwarded (s 30).
• Prepare the racing calendar at least eight days before the period it covers to allow for the seven-day publication rule (s 84(4)).
• Include the statutory minimum in every annual report (s 44A).
• Conduct an annual conflict-of-interest review for all members and the CEO.

For licensed clubs

• Map every control-body direction to the specific clause of the licence or the rules of racing that authorises it.
• Maintain a standing “rectification register” so that any s 120 direction can be actioned within the stated period.
• Ensure the club’s constitution contains the exact wording required by the licensing policy for non-proprietary clubs.
• Schedule the annual audit so that signed statements reach the Board within the three-month window (s 125(1)).

For wagering operators

• Treat the race-information authority as a renewable licence: diarise the renewal date and ensure the wagering-monitoring-system feed remains live.
• Maintain a separate complaints file for any document-or-information request so that “reasonable excuse” can be evidenced if the request is later challenged.

For all participants

• Assume that any communication with the Board or the commission may be disclosable under the Crime and Corruption Act. Never assume confidentiality.
• When drafting a policy or rule that affects individual rights, expressly address the Legislative Standards Act s 4(3) factors in the explanatory memorandum; the Board is required to have regard to them (s 113).

Compliance is not merely a box-ticking exercise. The Act’s overarching purpose is to ensure that Queensland racing remains a viable, integrity-driven industry that commands public confidence. The best protection against regulatory action is a demonstrated culture of transparency, animal-welfare priority, and collective rather than code-specific decision-making. Those who treat the Act as a set of technical hurdles rather than a governance framework do so at their peril.