Section 5 declares expired provisions as laws to which s.20A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 applies, but the definition of 'expired regulation' is circularly anchored to 'the commencement' — the very commencement of this regulation — creating a temporally self-referential definition that is redundant, since 'before the commencement' is the only state in which the expired regulation could have been in force.
The body text of section 5 and subsections 5(1) and 5(2) are verbatim duplicates, resulting in the same legal provision being enacted twice within the same section. This creates a structural absurdity where the operative text appears redundantly as both the section body and its own subsections.
Section 2 defines 'the commencement' as 1 September 2024, and section 5 uses 'before the commencement' to define the expired regulation's operative period. However, the TAFE Queensland Regulation 2013 expired by effluxion of time well before 2024 (likely upon the making of a successor regulation or its own sunset). Characterising it as being 'in force before the commencement' of the 2024 regulation implies it may have remained operative up to 31 August 2024, which is legally inaccurate and potentially misleading as to the gap period.
TAFE Queensland is required to 'exploit commercially' its resources as a function, but must simultaneously perform all its functions 'on a not-for-profit basis'. Commercial exploitation is inherently profit-oriented, yet the not-for-profit constraint makes meaningful commercial exploitation logically impossible.
Section 9(2) sets 'commercial success' as an objective of TAFE Queensland, subject to the not-for-profit constraint in s.8(2)(b). 'Commercial success' in standard usage connotes profitable operations. Qualifying it with a not-for-profit requirement renders the objective largely meaningless — you cannot be commercially successful in the ordinary sense if you are prohibited from making a profit.
The 'listing day' is defined as both a day AND a time, creating an internal definitional inconsistency. The section heading and body refer to 'the listing day' (implying a calendar day) but the definition specifies 'the day and time' — meaning the same defined term conflates two different temporal concepts.
Section 17 declares that Act Ministers must not be treated as directors or persons participating in TABQ's management, despite section 16 expressly granting them power to direct TABQ's board to do 'anything the Ministers consider necessary or convenient for the sale process.' The legal fiction that persons exercising broad managerial direction are not participating in management is logically absurd.
The legislation states it is 'current from 21/07/1949 to date' and was 'accessed 3 April 2026 at 15:44', yet the file was 'last modified 27 October 1997'. This means the legislation purports to be current and authoritative for a span of over 76 years without a single modification, while simultaneously claiming it is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change.'
The document provided contains no substantive legislative provisions whatsoever — no sections defining the incorporated body, its powers, membership, governance, or any operative legal effect. The Act purports to incorporate an association but the text as supplied consists entirely of website navigation elements, metadata, and status information. An incorporation Act with no operative provisions cannot legally incorporate anything.
The Act has been 'current from 31/05/1943 to date' with a single point-in-time version, yet the status page states legislation is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change.' There has been no change in over 80 years, rendering this update commitment perpetually meaningless in context.
The substantive content of the Act is entirely absent from the provided text. The document consists exclusively of website navigation elements, metadata, and status information. No operative provisions, definitions, or substantive sections are present, making it impossible to identify the legal obligations, rights, or mechanisms the Act purports to create.
Section 38A(1) grants the Trust a list of powers it may exercise before a plan takes effect, including paragraphs (a) through (f). Section 38A(2) then immediately states the Trust must not carry out, or allow to be carried out, 'any work other than the work mentioned in paragraphs (1)(d), (e) and (f)'. However, paragraph (1)(c) expressly grants power to 'grant leases and licences over the area in accordance with section 38B', and paragraph (1)(a) and (b) grant power to determine and use the area. Subsection (2) would thus appear to prohibit the very powers granted in (1)(a), (b) and (c), rendering those sub-paragraphs effectively inoperative — they are granted with one hand and taken away...
Section 38A(4) prohibits the Trust from taking into account things done under subsection (1) when determining the content of draft plans. However, section 28(3)(a) requires a plan to contain 'a history and description of the plan area, including an identification of current land uses of the area'. If the Trust has been using the area pursuant to s38A(1), those uses are current land uses that must be identified under s28(3)(a), yet s38A(4) prohibits the Trust from taking those actions into account. This creates an impossible compliance situation: the Trust must both ignore and record what has occurred on the land.
Airservices Australia is mandated to monitor compliance with the maximum movement limit but is expressly prohibited from taking any action to enforce compliance. This creates a purely performative monitoring obligation with no consequence — a watchdog that is legally barred from barking.
A slot is declared to be 'not property' and to 'not create rights or obligations that are enforceable against any person', yet the Act imposes civil penalties (ss 15–20) on operators for failing to use, misusing, or improperly applying for slots. This creates the absurdity of penalising conduct in relation to a legal instrument that, by the Act's own terms, creates no enforceable rights or obligations.
Circular definition of 'master planned area': Section 6 defines the master planned area as the area 'identified in a master plan for the port as the master planned area', while section 7 requires the master plan to 'identify the master planned area for the port'. Each provision depends on the other for its meaning — the master planned area is what the master plan says it is, and the master plan must identify the master planned area — creating a bootstrapping problem where the area cannot be definitively established until the plan exists, but the plan requires an area to be identified.
The Minister must make a port overlay 'as soon as practicable' after the master plan takes effect, and the overlay 'must' implement the master plan. However, there is no mechanism to define what constitutes adequate implementation, nor any consequence if the Minister's satisfaction under s.19(3) is formed but later shown to be wrong. The obligation to act 'as soon as practicable' is effectively unenforceable given no deadline and no review mechanism specified in the Act.
The board composition requires '4 cadastral surveyors' under s3(2)(a) AND '1 other cadastral surveyor employed in the department' under s3(2)(b). The word 'other' in (b) implies the departmental surveyor is additional to the 4 in (a), yet it is unclear whether the 4 cadastral surveyors in (a) may include departmentally employed cadastral surveyors, creating ambiguity about whether the board has 4 or 5 cadastral surveyors in total.
Section 3(3)(b) requires that a surveyor mentioned in s3(2)(a), (b) or (c) must have held 'the registration endorsement mentioned in that subsection' for at least 5 years. However, s3(2)(a) refers to 'cadastral surveyors' and s3(2)(b) refers to 'other cadastral surveyor employed in the department' — neither subsection expressly mentions a 'registration endorsement'. The cadastral registration type may be a form of registration rather than an endorsement, creating a potential mismatch in the eligibility cross-reference.
The Act purports to bind all persons including the State, yet simultaneously exempts the State from prosecution. This creates a meaningless obligation: the State is 'bound' by the Act but faces no enforcement consequence for breach, rendering the binding effect on the State largely illusory.
Section 10 requires the board to act independently, impartially and in the public interest. Section 32(4) then says the board MUST comply with Ministerial directions 'despite section 10'. This creates a structural paradox: the board is legally required to be independent but also legally required to subordinate that independence to Ministerial direction.
The exception to mandatory boundary marking allows a client to opt out of having boundaries marked on the land, yet simultaneously requires the surveyor to comply with the 'relevant survey standard when marking the boundary'. This creates an impossible compliance scenario: the exception is triggered precisely when no marking is required, yet the exception's own condition requires that marking still comply with marking standards.
Section 18 permits a cadastral surveyor to prepare a 'plan of survey for a cadastral survey' without carrying out the survey. The regulation title calls this a plan of survey for a cadastral survey, yet by definition no cadastral survey has been carried out. This creates a self-contradictory document type: a plan of survey for a survey that was not conducted.
The Act purports to bind the Commonwealth and the State as 'all persons' but then explicitly immunises both from prosecution. This creates a situation where the Act binds these entities in name only — they bear obligations without any enforceable consequence, rendering the binding effect largely illusory for the two most powerful actors covered.
Consultation before making a survey standard or survey guideline is entirely discretionary ('may consult'). Given that survey standards carry mandatory compliance obligations under s13 and can be tabled and disallowed by Parliament under s9, the absence of any mandatory consultation is a significant gap — Parliament may disallow a standard that was never tested with affected stakeholders.
Section 22(4) states that unless the board otherwise decides, an interested member must not be present when the board considers the matter. Section 22(5) then separately states the member must not be present when the board is considering the decision — with no qualification allowing the board to waive this. This creates an ambiguity as to whether the board can waive the exclusion under s.22(4) but not s.22(5), or whether s.22(5) is redundant, or whether s.22(5) imposes an absolute prohibition that overrides the board's discretion in s.22(4).
A person cannot become a member if they do not consent to the Minister requesting a criminal history report. However, there is no express obligation on the Minister to actually request such a report, nor a timeframe. A prospective member who consents may never have their history checked, while refusal to consent is automatically disqualifying. This creates an asymmetric and potentially arbitrary gatekeeping mechanism.
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 40 expires on 31 August 2004 'see s 40' — meaning the expiry provision refers to itself as authority for its own expiry. This is a self-referential provision: s 40 expires by operation of s 40.
Section 41(4) states the continuance of an industrial instrument is subject to the Industrial Relations Act 2016, while section 41(6) defines 'industrial instrument' by reference to the Industrial Relations Act 1999. The same term is governed by two different Acts from two different years, creating a potential definitional mismatch — instruments defined under the 1999 Act may not be the same instruments recognised under the 2016 Act.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The publication system asserts it updates legislation within 3 working days of any change, implying active and ongoing maintenance. Yet the file itself was last modified in October 1997 — nearly 29 years before the stated access date of 3 April 2026. These two statements are in direct tension: either changes have occurred and not been reflected (contradicting the update promise), or no changes have occurred in 29 years (rendering the update promise meaningless in context).
The document is certified as correct under s 45C of the Interpretation Act 1987, yet the 'File last modified 29 July 2008' notation indicates the certified version was last touched 65 years after enactment and 18 years before the access date of 3 April 2026. The certification asserts current correctness based on a file not updated for nearly two decades.
The metadata simultaneously asserts that (a) the site keeps legislation current within 3 working days of any change, and (b) this Act has had exactly one version since 31 May 1943 with the file last touched in 2008. These claims are not strictly contradictory but are in practical tension: the 3-working-day currency promise implies ongoing diligence that the 18-year-old file modification timestamp undermines.
Section 57(1) requires the Trust to establish a community advisory committee 'in respect of each plan area'. A 'plan area' is defined in s3 as 'the land covered by a plan under section 27', and a plan only exists after the draft plan process under Part 5 is completed and approved. However, s29(3)(b) requires the Trust to take into account advice from advisory committees when preparing draft plans — before a plan (and therefore a plan area) formally exists. The Trust is therefore required to consult committees that it has no obligation to establish until after the very process for which the consultation is needed.
Section 38B(2)(b) requires that a fixed-term lease over Trust land granted before a plan takes effect 'must expire within 18 months after the vesting of the land in the Trust'. Section 21(1) requires the Minister to specify vesting within 4 years of the Act commencing, and s26(1) gives the Trust a further 2 years to prepare a draft plan — meaning a plan could lawfully take effect more than 6 years after commencement. A lease that expires 18 months after vesting may therefore expire long before a plan takes effect, leaving a gap in occupancy management with no mechanism to extend the lease. The practical consequence is that the Trust may be unable to maintain any continuity of use during an...
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The Minister may issue directions to the Slot Manager that do not have to be consistent with the Slot Management Scheme (s 46(1)), yet the direction must be consistent with the maximum movement limit (s 46(3)). Meanwhile, the Slot Management Scheme itself must be consistent with the maximum movement limit (s 37(1)). The net effect is that a Ministerial direction can override the Scheme but cannot override the movement limit — yet the Scheme's primary constraint is also the movement limit. This creates a structurally redundant override power.
The exception to the civil penalty for applying for slots with no reasonable prospects of use (s 19(1)) is that the airline notifies the Slot Manager of its lack of plans at the time of applying. This creates the absurd situation where an airline can freely apply for slots it has no intention of using, entirely avoid civil liability, and still hold those slots — simply by being upfront about its bad-faith application.
9 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 36(3) declares that the deemed condition in s.36(2) — prohibiting deposit of dredge material in a restricted area — applies to approvals 'whether given before or after the commencement'. This retroactively imposes a condition on approvals already granted before the Act commenced, potentially making previously lawful conduct under those approvals immediately unlawful without any transitional relief or compensation mechanism.
The Act 'binds all persons, including the State and... the Commonwealth and the other States' but 'the Commonwealth or a State can not be prosecuted for an offence'. The Commonwealth and other States are bound by obligations but face zero enforcement consequences for breach, rendering the binding effect largely symbolic for those entities.
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The alternative registration period criterion for emeritus surveyor status — 'periods the board is satisfied are at least equivalent to the period mentioned in subparagraph (i)' — is circularly self-referential and confers effectively unlimited discretion. 'At least equivalent' to 25 consecutive years is defined solely by the board's satisfaction, with no objective standard, making it impossible to determine in advance what non-consecutive periods would qualify.
Section 7(1)(i) requires register inclusion of details of disciplinary action taken by a professional conduct review panel under s91 of the Act, but s7(2) sets out the duration for which details must appear in the publicly available register. Section 7(2)(a) only addresses the scenario where QCAT imposes a disciplinary condition, and s7(2)(b) addresses where a panel or QCAT decides a stated period. There is no default duration prescribed for panel disciplinary action that does not specify a period and does not involve a QCAT condition, leaving a gap as to how long such details must remain publicly visible.
6 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 15(1) states each member is appointed for a term of 'not more than 3 years'. Section 15(2) then provides that a member continues holding office after their term ends until a successor is appointed. This potentially extends tenure indefinitely beyond the 3-year maximum, rendering the maximum meaningless.
Section 18(3) requires the chief executive to destroy a criminal history report 'as soon as practicable after considering the person's eligibility for appointment to the board'. However, section 18(2)(a) permits the chief executive to authorise disclosure of the report to perform functions 'under or in relation to this Act'. If the report must be destroyed promptly after eligibility consideration, there is no mechanism to authorise disclosure for other functions after destruction — making the disclosure authorisation provision potentially unworkable.
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The obligation to keep survey records for at least 6 years is qualified by 'unless the cadastral surveyor has a reasonable excuse'. Permitting a 'reasonable excuse' to justify non-retention of legally mandated survey records undermines the entire purpose of the record-keeping requirement, since the records exist to protect third-party land rights and provide evidence of survey quality.
Section 19(2)(b) requires that primary consideration be given to existing survey marks 'unless there is other evidence to suggest that the existing marks are incorrectly placed or disturbed'. Section 19(2)(c) then separately requires that if a mark is incorrectly placed or disturbed, it must be reinstated in accordance with the hierarchy of reinstatement evidence. However, the regulation does not define 'hierarchy of reinstatement evidence' anywhere in the body of the regulation, leaving the operative compliance obligation for a criminal penalty provision (maximum 10 penalty units) undefined.
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
A survey standard takes effect on the day it is first published (s9(2)(a)), but ceases to have effect if not tabled within 14 sitting days (s9(4)). This means a survey standard can be legally operative and surveyors obligated to comply with it under s13, before it has been tabled — and it may subsequently cease to have effect retrospectively, leaving surveyors who complied in a legal limbo as to whether they were ever actually obligated.
Section 6(6) declares that a survey standard 'is a statutory instrument, but is not subordinate legislation.' Section 9(5) then applies sections 50 and 51 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1992 to a survey standard 'as if it were subordinate legislation.' The Act simultaneously declares the instrument is not subordinate legislation and then treats it as if it were, for specific purposes.
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.