Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009

Official stated purpose (what the Act says it aims to achieve)

• The Act’s declared purpose is to provide a scheme of financial assistance to certain victims of acts of violence. Objectives include helping recovery, giving primary victims and related victims symbolic recognition, and supplementing other government services. The Act expressly says grants are not intended to replicate common law compensation. (See sec.3.)

How it matters in practice — who pays, who decides, and the likely behaviour effects

• Who pays: the State (public funds) pays assistance and bears the bulk of cost. The Act also gives the State a subrogated right to recover amounts from convicted offenders and to offset other entitlements (secs.95, 107–120, 184–193).

• Who decides: a government assessor (or the scheme manager acting as assessor) decides eligibility and amounts, within caps and subject to legal principles and internal guidelines (secs.62, 127–130, 131).

• Behaviour changes and incentives created by the law (mechanisms):

  • Applicants are required to report certain offences and generally to assist police investigations; failing to cooperate or assisting an offender can disqualify a claim (secs.21, 81, 82). That creates an incentive to report and to assist prosecution where possible.
  • The Act offsets other payments (NIISQ, motor accident, workers’ compensation, court‑ordered compensation), so recipients who can access other schemes get reduced amounts here (secs.86, 36B, 36H, 77). This reduces duplication of public payment and channels recovery towards primary liable sources.
  • Recovery from offenders and arrangements with corrective services and SPER (debt registration) mean the State can recoup money in some cases; that creates an incentive to pursue offenders’ assets but reduces net fiscal cost to taxpayers when recoveries succeed (pts 16 and secs.114–120, 191–193).

Costs, trade‑offs and implementation risks (summary with section references)

• Concentrated benefits vs diffuse costs: benefits are concentrated on eligible victims (secs.38–50); costs are dispersed to the State budget (sec.3 purpose). Recoveries from offenders offset some cost but depend on convictions and collections (secs.107–120, 188–193).

• Compliance and application burden on victims: applicants must provide consents and documentation, potentially undergo medical examinations, and may need to coordinate across police, courts, insurers and health agencies (secs.52, 64, 73–77). That can be a substantial burden for vulnerable people.

• Bureaucratic discretion and implementation risk: scheme manager and assessors have broad discretion (e.g., to extend time limits, to decide "reasonable excuse", to defer decisions when other claims/proceedings are pending). That discretion aids flexibility but raises risk of inconsistent outcomes and requires clear guidelines (secs.34(4), 54(2), 36D–36J, 84A–84C, 131).

• Cross‑system complexity and substitution effects: the Act explicitly interacts with workers’ compensation, motor accident insurance and NIISQ (secs.31–36, 36A–36J, 36G–36J, 77). Applicants may need to choose or sequence claims across schemes; the Act defers or offsets payments, which reduces the total paid but increases administrative coordination.

• Recovery and fairness trade‑offs: the State can recover assistance from convicted offenders (secs.107–120) and may reduce victims’ grants if other entitlements are received (sec.86). Those mechanisms protect public finances but require accurate information flows and can produce delays (notice, dispute, and review steps built into secs.115–117; 189–191).

• Privacy and information sharing: assessors can obtain police, court, SPER, health and corrective services records (secs.65–77, 67A, 67B, 68, 106C, 114–114B, 114A). The Act authorises disclosure despite other laws but includes limits on further disclosure and criminal penalties for misuse (sec.133(3)). Implementation depends on secure information‑sharing arrangements (secs.134–135).

• Timing and time bars: numerous time limits, exceptions and transitional provisions apply (secs.54, 58, 110A, and transitional divisions). Applicants and administrators must track competing limitation periods and special rules for children and impaired persons.

Where the law concentrates power or benefit (capture and rent‑seeking risk)

• Concentrated benefit: individual recipients receive significant sums (up to $120,000 for primary victims), which can create high incentive to qualify for assistance. Eligibility checks, offsets and recovery provisions aim to limit unjustified grants (secs.38, 86, 107–120).

• Concentrated enforcement power: the scheme manager and assessors hold strong investigatory and decision power (secs.62, 65–77, 127–131). That centralisation can speed decisions but demands transparent guidelines and review rights (secs.88, 124–125).

Net practical effect (mechanical):

• Creates a structured, capped, administrated financial assistance scheme for victims, with defined categories of recipients, specific components, time limits, cross‑scheme coordination, recovery powers from offenders, and broad information‑gathering powers for assessors. It is designed to sit alongside (not replace) common law remedies and other statutory compensation schemes (sec.3, sec.22, secs.31–36).