Several provisions create traps for the unwary. First, section 18 absolutely prohibits the court from making a personal safety intervention order against a child who was under 12 years of age on the date the application was made. Any order made against such a child has no effect. This is a strict jurisdictional bar, not subject to exception. Transitional provisions from the Youth Justice Act 2024 (sections 200-202) set aside existing orders against 10-11 year olds and require dismissal of pending applications. This means practitioners must verify the respondent's age at the date of application, not at the time of hearing.
Second, the interaction with family violence intervention orders is critical. A final order cannot be made if there is an existing family violence intervention order or recognised non-local DVO covering the same parties (section 62). An interim order is similarly barred if there is an existing family violence intervention order or recognised non-local DVO where both parties are covered (section 36(1)). However, an interim order can be made if the existing order is an interim family violence intervention order where the respondent is the protected person and the affected person is the respondent (section 36(2)). This complex interaction means applicants must check for existing orders under both Acts.
Third, police applicants face restrictions if the affected person does not consent. A final order made on a police application without the affected person's consent may include only conditions prohibiting prohibited behaviour, prohibiting stalking, prohibiting causing another person to engage in prohibited conduct, and revoking or suspending weapons approvals or firearms authorities (section 67(2)(a), (b), (f), (g), (h)). Exclusion from residence and contact prohibitions cannot be imposed without consent unless the affected person is a child with no adult affected person included, the adult affected person consents, the affected person has a guardian who consents, or the affected person is cognitively impaired (section 63).
Fourth, a respondent seeking to vary or revoke an order must first obtain leave. For interim orders, the court must be satisfied of a change in circumstances and that it is in the interests of justice to determine the application immediately rather than waiting for the final hearing (section 86(2)). For interim orders made in the respondent's absence, there is a special 21-day window to seek leave, and the court may set aside the order if there are exceptional circumstances (section 86(3)-(5)). This 21-day period can be extended if exceptional circumstances exist (section 86(5)).
Fifth, rehearings under section 99 are available only in narrow circumstances: if the application was not personally served and not brought to the respondent's attention under substituted service, or if there are exceptional circumstances and a rehearing is fair and just. This means a respondent who was properly served but failed to appear cannot easily obtain a rehearing.
Sixth, costs are generally not recoverable. Section 111 provides that each party bears their own costs, except in exceptional circumstances or where an application was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. This is a significant departure from the usual civil costs rule. Practitioners should advise clients accordingly.
Seventh, publication restrictions under Part 6 are strict. Section 123 prohibits publishing a report of proceedings that identifies a child party, witness, or person subject to the order, or a picture of a child concerned in the proceeding, unless the court orders otherwise under section 125A. The court may allow publication only if it is in the public interest and just to do so, after considering the views of any parent or guardian of the child. Penalties are substantial: 100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment for natural persons, 500 penalty units for bodies corporate.
Eighth, the Children's Court is not required to apply the principles of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (section 128). This means the usual welfare and best interests principles do not apply in personal safety intervention order proceedings, even where the respondent or affected person is a child. However, the court must still consider the child's ability to understand and comply with the order (sections 35(4)(a), 61(2)(a)).
Ninth, the Act allows for electronic applications (section 13(3)), and a registrar cannot refuse an application from a police officer (section 16A(2)). However, for non-police applicants, a registrar may refuse if the application is frivolous, vexatious, without substance, or would be more appropriately dealt with by mediation. This is a gatekeeping function unusual in civil proceedings.
Tenth, the Act does not apply to conduct engaged in for law enforcement, administration of an Act, execution of warrants, or protection of public revenue (section 11). Additionally, the court cannot make a final order if the prohibited behaviour or stalking was engaged in without malice in the normal course of a lawful business, trade, profession, or enterprise; for the purpose of an industrial dispute; or for the purpose of engaging in political activities or discussion or communicating with respect to public affairs (section 61(4)). This creates a defence that may be relevant in disputes involving media, unions, or political activists.