Personal Violence Act 2016

In ForceACT

Jurisdiction

Australian Capital Territory

Act Number

43 of 2016

Collection

act

Plain English Summary

7/10 complexity

What this law does, who it affects, and how it works

This Act creates a system for preventing and responding to "personal violence" (not family violence). It lets people and certain organisations apply to the Magistrates Court for legally enforceable protection orders (interim and final) that restrain specified behaviour (physical, sexual, threatening, stalking, harassing or property damage) (see s 6, s 8).
Who can apply and who decides
- An affected person may apply for a personal protection order (s 12(1)). Police officers, litigation guardians and other people with a right to apply can also apply for an affected person (s 12(2)). Employers may apply for workplace protection orders for people at a workplace (s 13).
- The Magistrates Court decides whether to make interim or final orders, and has express procedural powers and discretions for hearings, preliminary conferences and review (see Parts 3–6 generally, e.g. ss 17–27, 39–46, 81–83A).
Types of orders and key consequences
- Interim orders (short‑term protective measures while the final application is decided) and final orders (normally 12 months, extendable) are available (ss 17–27).
- Orders may include a range of prohibitions—no contact, exclusion from premises, distance limits, prohibitions against locating or causing others to act, or conditions governing when contact is allowed (ss 28–33).
- Contravening an order is a criminal offence punishable by up to 500 penalty units and/or 5 years’ imprisonment (s 35).

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What it does

The Personal Violence Act 2016 (ACT) establishes a regime for protecting individuals from personal violence that falls outside the definition of family violence. The Act’s objects, set out in section 6, are to prevent and reduce personal violence, to facilitate the safety and protection of people who fear or experience such violence by providing a legally enforceable mechanism, to allow for conflict resolution without recourse to adjudication, and to encourage perpetrators to be accountable for their conduct. The Act aims to achieve these objects by giving courts power to make protection orders, creating offences for non-compliance, ensuring court access is as simple, quick and inexpensive as is consistent with justice, and recognising registered orders from other Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand (section 7). The Act specifically excludes family violence from its scope (section 8(3)), which is dealt with under the Family Violence Act 2016. The definition of personal violence in section 8(1) encompasses physical violence or abuse, sexual violence or abuse, threatening behaviour, stalking, harassing, intimidating or offensive behaviour, and damaging property. For workplace contexts, the definition is narrower in some respects: it includes behaviour of the kind mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) in relation to a person at the workplace, and property damage only where it causes reasonable fear to a person at the workplace (section 8(2)). The Act creates two main categories of protection orders: personal protection orders for individuals who are not in a domestic or family relationship afflicting personal violence, and workplace protection orders that can only be sought by an employer to protect affected persons at a workplace. The Act also provides for interim orders (general and special), final orders, and consent orders, each with distinct procedural rules and duration limits. The Magistrates Court is the primary forum for applications, but special interim orders may be made by any court where related charges exist. The Act mandates that procedures be as simple, quick and inexpensive as is consistent with achieving justice (section 9), and the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities (section 10) and need not comply with the usual rules of evidence (section 10A). It also contains reciprocal arrangements for the recognition and enforcement of corresponding orders from states, other territories and New Zealand.

Current sections

Direct links to the current provisions in Personal Violence Act 2016.

146

Official source available

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Stated purpose: the Act is expressed to prevent and reduce personal violence, provide enforceable protection, facilitate safety for people who fear or experience personal violence, encourage accountability and let courts resolve conflict or enable resolution without adjudication (ss 6–7). Those are explicit purpose claims in the Act.
Testing those claims against mechanics, incentives and costs:
- Who pays: respondents bear most immediate compliance costs (abiding by prohibitions, possible loss of firearms licence, risk of criminal sanction for breach) (ss 35, 36–38). Applicants and protected people bear court attendance costs and possible legal costs, though each party generally pays their own costs unless the court orders otherwise in limited circumstances (s 67). The police and court registry carry administrative costs for application processing, service, enforcement and registration (ss 12(2)(a), 64C, 92). Employers who apply for workplace orders use their own resources to initiate proceedings (s 13).
- Incentives and behaviour change: orders restrict respondents’ movement and communication, and can exclude them from workplaces or homes (ss 30–32). Employers gain a route to seek protection focused on workplace safety (s 13), but the Act explicitly does not create new employment rights or obligations beyond the order (s 100). The firearms consequences (ss 36–38) create a direct disincentive for possession of firearms where orders are made.
- Compliance and administrative burden: the Act requires personal service of applications and deadlines for immediate interim hearings (ss 41, 64A). Registrars must serve documents on multiple recipients (s 64C) and manage timing notices (s 39). Police may be required to serve documents and can make applications (ss 64E, 12(2)(a)). These duties can increase workload for courts and police.
- Discretion and implementation risk: the Magistrates Court has broad discretion on interim/final orders, conditions, and whether to conduct preliminary conferences or grant adjournments (see s 11, ss 17–24, ss 39–46). That discretion supports tailored decisions but risks inconsistent outcomes and requires robust administrative practice to be predictable.
- Opportunity costs and substitution effects: where parties settle by consent or mediation (ss 25, 46), the order‑making process may avoid full hearings, saving resources. Conversely, broad consent powers (s 25) let orders be made without proof, which transfers reliance on voluntary agreement and court explanation rather than adversarial proof.
- Effects on private enterprise, competition and contract freedom: workplace protection orders let employers exclude people from workplaces (s 32), which can affect staffing and operations. The Act, however, says the availability of workplace orders does not itself change employment law rights (s 100). Firearms cancellation affects licence holders (ss 36–38) and may involve interaction with licensing/ownership markets.
- Speech and publication limits: criminal penalties and injunctions limit publication that would identify participants in proceedings (ss 98–99), constraining public reporting about these cases except in specified permitted ways (Schedule 1).

Main concepts

The central concept is personal violence, exhaustively defined in section 8(1) as physical violence or abuse, sexual violence or abuse, threatening behaviour, stalking, harassing, intimidating or offensive behaviour, and damaging property. Critically, section 8(3) excludes behaviour that constitutes family violence as defined in the Family Violence Act 2016. For workplace protection orders, personal violence is defined more restrictively regarding property damage (section 8(2)). A protection order is defined broadly (dictionary) to include interim and final personal or workplace protection orders, as well as orders about seizure of firearms and orders amending protection orders. Protection orders are divided into interim orders and final orders. Interim orders themselves are subdivided into general interim orders and special interim orders (section 19). A general interim order is made where no related charge exists; a special interim order is made where a related charge is outstanding against the respondent (section 19(1)). The related concept (dictionary) requires that the charge be against the respondent and the offence be against the affected person. General interim orders last a maximum of 12 months plus any extensions for non-service (sections 21, 24AA, 24AB), and only one general interim order (plus one further order in special or exceptional circumstances) may be made in relation to a final order application (sections 20, 24). Special interim orders end only on revocation, discontinuance or dismissal, making of a final order with respondent present, or service of a final order made in the respondent’s absence (section 24AC). Final orders remain in force for 12 months by default, or a shorter stated period, or longer only if the court is satisfied of special or exceptional circumstances; however, a consent final order cannot exceed 12 months (section 27). Consent orders may be made whether or not grounds are made out, without admission of guilt, and without needing to consider the mandatory matters in section 11 (section 25(2)). The affected person is the person against whom personal violence has been or is likely to be committed (dictionary). For workplace orders, an affected person is an employee, employer or any other person at the workplace. The protected person is the person protected under a protection order. The respondent is the person in relation to whom an application has been made or against whom an order is made. Importantly, a child under 14 years old cannot be a respondent (section 69), and transitional provisions for raising the age to 14 were introduced by the Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023 (Parts 23 and 24). The Act introduces a least restrictive principle (section 29) requiring conditions in orders to be the least restrictive of the respondent’s rights and liberties as possible while still achieving the Act’s objects and giving paramount consideration to the safety of the affected person (section 28). Conditions available for personal protection orders are extensive (section 30), including prohibitions on being on premises, contacting the protected person, damaging property, and prohibiting conduct through third parties. Exclusion conditions (prohibiting the respondent from premises where they live) attract additional considerations (section 31). Workplace protection orders have a narrower set of possible conditions (section 32). The Act also addresses firearms: an interim order automatically suspends the respondent’s firearms licence unless the court orders non-suspension (section 36); a final order automatically cancels it unless non-cancellation is ordered (section 37). The court may also order seizure of firearms and ammunition (section 38) and impose conditions on use or possession (section 38(2)).

Who it affects

The Act directly affects several categories of people. Affected persons , those who have experienced or fear personal violence , are the primary beneficiaries and may apply for a personal protection order under section 12. This includes adults and children. Children aged 14 and over can be respondents; children under 14 cannot be respondents (section 69). The Act was amended by the Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023 to raise the minimum respondent age from 12 to 14, with transitional provisions in Parts 23 and 24 discontinuing existing proceedings against child respondents under the new threshold. Police officers have standing to apply for personal protection orders on behalf of an affected person (section 12(2)(a)), and must inform the court whether the affected person consents (section 13B). Police officers may also be substituted as applicant or be represented in proceedings (section 65). Employers are the only persons who may apply for workplace protection orders (section 13), and the definition of employer captures engagements under contracts of service, contracts for services, apprenticeships, approved training contracts, and volunteer arrangements (dictionary). Employees are defined correspondingly. The Act affects litigation guardians appointed for parties with impaired decision-making ability (sections 72-75), and parents or guardians of child parties, who must be given documents (section 42) and may be joined (section 55C). Parties with impaired decision-making ability are defined in section 68 as those who cannot make decisions relating to the proceeding or who do not understand the nature and effect of the decisions they make. The Act provides for their representation (section 70) and restricts consent orders when such a party is not separately represented (section 71). Disability guardians are also recognised. Self-represented parties have a special rule protecting their address for service from disclosure without consent (section 64D). Respondents are subject to duties and rights including the right to be served personally (section 64A), the right to file a notice of grounds of defence (section 55A), and the right to apply for review of special interim orders on limited grounds (section 80A) or final orders with leave (section 81). Respondents with firearms licences must be aware of automatic suspension or cancellation consequences (sections 36-37). The Act also affects persons who are related to or associated with a party by restricting publication of identifying information about them (section 98). Reciprocal arrangement provisions affect persons who have obtained or are subject to corresponding orders from an Australian state, another territory, or New Zealand (Part 7). Registration of such orders makes them enforceable in the ACT as if they were final orders (section 93). The chief police officer and registrar of firearms receive copies of orders (section 64C). Third parties such as the public advocate may be notified of adjournments for parties with impaired decision-making ability (section 70(2)(c)). Finally, because the Act creates an offence for contravention of a protection order (section 35), it affects the criminal jurisdiction and police enforcement activities.

Key duties and rights

The Act imposes a central duty on respondents not to contravene protection orders. Section 35 creates an offence for a person against whom a protection order is made if the person was present when it was made or has been personally served with a copy of the order. The duty extends to conduct engaged in both within and outside the ACT (section 35(3)). A breach attracts a maximum penalty of 500 penalty units, imprisonment for 5 years, or both. The respondent’s duty to comply is reinforced by automatic firearms licence suspension or cancellation (sections 36-37) unless the court orders otherwise. Another key duty is on the Magistrates Court when making decisions. Section 11 sets out a non-exhaustive list of matters the court must consider in deciding whether to make any protection order, including the Act’s objects, hardship to the respondent or others, any previous personal or family violence, any previous protection orders or contraventions, and the need to protect property. However, failure to consider these matters does not invalidate the order (section 11(3)). The court must give paramount consideration to the safety of the affected person when deciding conditions (section 28) and must ensure conditions are the least restrictive of the respondent’s rights and liberties (section 29). The court must explain the order in simple language to the respondent and protected person (sections 60-61), though failure to do so does not invalidate the order. The court must record reasons for making a protection order (section 62), except for consent orders where the reason is the parties’ consent.

Applicants have the right to apply (sections 12-13), to discontinue proceedings before final decision (section 56), and to rely on additional information at hearing beyond the application (section 55B). An applicant may also seek review of a final order (section 81). Affected persons who are not the applicant may be substituted as applicant (section 65) and may also apply for amendment of protection orders (section 76). Police officers applying on behalf of an affected person have the duty to inform the court whether the affected person consents (section 13B).

Respondents have the right to be personally served with the application and timing notice (section 64A). They may file a notice of grounds of defence (section 55A) without waiving objections to jurisdiction. Respondents may apply for review of a special interim order but only on three limited grounds: identity of respondent, administrative defect or error, or whether there are outstanding related charges (section 80A). Review of a final order requires leave, and only the protected person or original applicant may apply without leave (section 81). The respondent may also apply for amendment of a protection order (section 76), and may appeal an appealable decision to the Supreme Court within 28 days (section 85). The court must explain the order and its consequences to the respondent (section 60), and in the case of consent orders, must explain applicable matters before making the order (section 60(3)). An important right is the ability of a respondent who was absent when an interim order was made to consent to it becoming a final order by returning the endorsement copy before the return date (section 24A).

The Act also imposes procedural duties on the registrar, including setting return dates, serving documents (sections 40-42, 64A-64G), conducting preliminary conferences (section 43), and giving copies of orders to parties, police, and the registrar of firearms (section 64C). The registrar must inform applicants of the right to seek review of certain registrar decisions (section 83B). Parties have a duty to attend proceedings; if the applicant is not present, the court must dismiss or adjourn (section 48); if the respondent is not present after service, the court must decide in absence or issue a warrant (section 49). Neither party present leads to possible dismissal without costs (section 49A). Public access to hearings is generally guaranteed (section 53), but the court may close hearings in special circumstances (section 55) and restrict publication (section 98). The court may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate (section 59) and need not follow evidence rules (section 10A).

Penalties and enforcement

The primary enforcement mechanism is the offence of contravening a protection order under section 35(2). This applies to a person against whom a protection order is made if they were present when it was made or have been personally served with a copy. The penalty is severe: a maximum of 500 penalty units, imprisonment for 5 years, or both. At the republication date, a penalty unit is valued at $160 for an individual and $810 for a corporation (see endnote), making the maximum individual fine $80,000. The offence applies to conduct inside and outside the ACT (section 35(3)). The court may also issue a warrant for the arrest of a respondent who fails to appear after service (section 49(2)(b)). Enforcement action includes execution of a warrant, arrest, and police custody (see definition in section 214(3) for transitional purposes). The Act also creates criminal offences for failing to comply with a closed hearing order (section 55(2), maximum 50 penalty units) and for publishing identifying information about proceedings (section 98(1), maximum 10 penalty units). The publication offence does not apply to certain permitted publications listed in Schedule 1, nor to a party telling someone about the order or giving a copy (section 99). Beyond criminal penalties, the Act provides for automatic consequences: an interim order suspends the respondent’s firearms licence unless the court orders non-suspension (section 36); a final order cancels the licence unless non-cancellation is ordered (section 37). The court may order seizure of the firearms licence, firearms, or ammunition (section 38). The court can also make civil enforcement orders regarding costs (section 67). Costs are generally borne by each party, but the court may order costs against an applicant only if the application was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith; costs may also be ordered against a respondent if appropriate. An order for costs is enforceable as a judgment debt (section 67(5)). The Act has transitional provisions for child respondents in Parts 23 and 24, which mandate discontinuance of enforcement actions and proceedings against respondents who are under the newly raised minimum age. Enforcement of registered orders from interstate or New Zealand is provided for in Part 7: a registered order is enforceable in the ACT as if it were a final order personally served on the respondent (section 93). The court may also amend or revoke registered orders. Where a recognised court notifies amendment of a registered order, the registrar must cancel the original registration and re-register the amended order (section 96). Breaches of the original order that would also breach the amended order may be enforced accordingly (section 96(4)). In addition to orders under this Act, the Crimes Act 1900 section 397(1) (recognisances to keep the peace) continues to operate unaffected (section 103).

How it interacts with other laws

The Personal Violence Act 2016 sits alongside a suite of related legislation. Most significantly, it is the counterpart to the Family Violence Act 2016. Section 8(3) explicitly excludes conduct that constitutes family violence from the definition of personal violence. However, the Act contains cross-over provisions to prevent injustice when an application under this Act is found to relate to family violence. Section 15 allows the Magistrates Court to make an order under the Family Violence Act 2016 if an application under this Act is based on conduct that could be restrained under that Act, provided the application was made honestly and the court could have made the order had the application been properly made. Section 16 goes further: if a protection order under this Act is purportedly made but later found invalid because the conduct constitutes family violence, the invalid order is taken to be validly made under the Family Violence Act 2016, provided the court could have made such an order. These provisions do not apply to consent orders (sections 15(3), 16(3)). The Act also interacts with the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), which is applied to all offences against the Act by note under section 5. This means Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code, setting out general principles of criminal responsibility, burdens of proof, and defences (e.g. intention, recklessness, strict liability), applies to the section 35 contravention offence and the publication and closed hearing offences. The Crimes Act 1900 section 397(1), which deals with recognisances to keep the peace, is expressly preserved by section 103. The Firearms Act 1996 is heavily integrated: sections 36-38 of the Personal Violence Act trigger automatic suspension or cancellation of firearms licences and contain provisions for seizure of firearms and ammunition. The Firearms Act definitions for ‘firearm’, ‘firearms licence’, and ‘ammunition’ are imported (dictionary). The Court Procedures Act 2004 is referenced throughout for approval of forms (sections 12, 13, etc.) and for mediation under Part 5A (section 46). The Magistrates Court Act 1930 is also relevant as the court’s enabling legislation, and the definition of ‘registrar’ includes powers under that Act. Section 83B provides for magistrate review of registrar decisions where the Court Procedures Rules 2006 authorise the registrar to exercise the Magistrates Court’s jurisdiction. The Legislation Act 2001 is the parent Act for republication, notes, and definitions; it also governs penalty unit values (section 133), the effect of notes (section 127), editorial changes (part 11.3), and transitional provision expiry (section 88). The Evidence Act 2011 is relevant to rules of evidence, but section 10A explicitly states that the Magistrates Court need not comply with the rules of evidence in proceedings under this Act. The Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 is referenced for swearing or affirming affidavits (sections 57A, 64G). The Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 is noted as applicable when sentencing for a section 35 offence. The Children and Young People Act 2008 is relevant through Schedule 1, which permits publication of information to the director-general responsible for care and protection functions. The Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 definition of ‘guardian’ is used (dictionary). The Legal Aid ACT 1977 is referred to in section 70 for arranging representation. The Electronic Transactions Act 2001 is noted in Part 7 for written communications. The Act also interacts with the laws of other jurisdictions through Part 7 (Reciprocal arrangements), which allows registration and enforcement of corresponding orders from states, other territories, and New Zealand, and provides for notification of amendments or revocations back to the originating court. The Act’s transitional parts (23 and 24) were introduced by the Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023, which raised the minimum age of criminal responsibility and correspondingly raised the minimum age for respondents under this Act to 14, with provisions discontinuing existing proceedings and preserving past lawful actions.

Amendment history

The Personal Violence Act 2016 (A2016-43) was notified on 18 August 2016 and commenced on 1 May 2017, alongside the Family Violence Act 2016. The Act has been amended multiple times. The first major amendment was by the Family and Personal Violence Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (A2017-10), which restructured significant parts of the Act: replacing Part 4 provisions for preliminary conferences, non-attendance, service of documents, and introducing the timing notice concept, substitution of police as applicants, and the right of a child to apply in the same application as a parent (section 13A). It also added sections on notice of grounds of defence (55A), additional information at hearing (55B), child and parent proceedings (55C), children as witnesses (55D), and affidavit evidence for interim orders (57A). The Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (A2019-23) made minor amendments including to section 57A and introduced section 64G (affidavit of service by police). The COVID-19 Emergency Response Act 2020 (A2020-11) inserted a temporary Part 22 allowing extended general interim orders, changes to presence and consent requirements, and acknowledgment of undertakings. This was extended by the COVID-19 Emergency Response Legislation Amendment Act 2021 (A2021-1) and expired on 29 September 2023. The Sexual Assault Reform Legislation Amendment Act 2023 (A2023-15) significantly restructured interim orders, replacing the previous single type with a two-tier system: general interim orders and special interim orders. It added subdivisions 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3, new sections regarding extensions for non-service (24AA, 24AB), new sections on special interim orders (24AC-24AE), and inserted review provisions for special interim orders (80A, 80B). It also amended definitions for ‘general interim order’, ‘special interim order’, and ‘interim order’ in the dictionary. The Justice (Age of Criminal Responsibility) Legislation Amendment Act 2023 (A2023-45) raised the minimum age for respondents to protection orders: section 69 was amended so that children under 14 cannot be respondents (previously under 12). This Act inserted transitional Parts 23 and 24, which provide for ending enforcement actions, discontinuing proceedings and appeals, revoking protection orders made against child respondents under the old age threshold, preserving validity of past actions, and providing protection from liability for officials. These transitional parts expire 5 years after their respective commencement days. The Sexual, Family and Personal Violence Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (A2024-40) amended several provisions: section 24AB (extension for non-service of final order), section 38A (protection order continues when child becomes adult), section 40 (interim order not sought), section 41 (interim order sought - substituted), section 43 (preliminary conferences), section 76A (amendment of protection orders - preliminary conferences - substituted), section 80 (extension of final orders), section 83A (review of orders - preliminary conferences - substituted), section 83B (magistrate review of registrar decisions - inserted), and section 84 (appealable decisions) and the dictionary definition of ‘related’ and ‘return date’. The Personal Violence (Transitional Provisions) Regulation 2025 (SL2025-12), made under the Act’s regulation-making power, retrospectively modified transitional Parts 23 and 24. The republication (R10, RI) reflects amendments up to A2024-40 and modifications by SL2025-12, effective 1 July 2025.

Litigation history

The Act does not itself record any cases or judicial decisions. The text of the republication contains no references to specific litigation. However, the Act provides extensive mechanisms for review and appeal that have been and will be used by parties. Section 84 lists appealable decisions: the making, amending, or revoking of a final order, refusal to make, amend, or revoke a final order, and decisions on review of a consent order. Appeals lie to the Supreme Court and must be filed within 28 days of the order or, if the respondent was absent when the final order was made or amended, within 28 days of service (section 85). The Supreme Court has broad powers to confirm, reverse, or amend the decision, make any appropriate order, or remit the matter to the Magistrates Court (section 88). The filing of an appeal does not stay the operation of the order (section 89). Additionally, section 83B provides for a magistrate review of certain registrar decisions: refusal to make an interim order, adjournment under section 49, or refusal to include a requested condition in an interim order (unless a condition of a similar kind was included). This review must be requested before close of registry on the same day the decision is made (section 83B) and is a rehearing de novo with a hearing set no later than two days after the request (section 83B). Interim consent orders are subject to review under section 83 on the narrow ground that the making of the order was induced or affected by fraud or duress of another party. Special interim orders can be reviewed by the respondent only on three limited grounds: identity of the respondent, administrative defect or error, or whether outstanding related charges exist (section 80A). Final orders may be reviewed on application by the protected person or original applicant without leave; the respondent or another person with sufficient interest requires court leave, granted only if there has been a change in circumstances or it is in the interests of justice (section 81). The Magistrates Court can revoke a final order if satisfied it is no longer necessary (section 82). Preliminary conferences, as an alternative dispute resolution tool, are mandatory unless the court is satisfied that holding one would create a safety risk or be unlikely to achieve its objects (sections 40, 41, 76A, 83A). Evidence of what is said at a preliminary conference is generally inadmissible (section 57). These procedural layers are designed to resolve disputes expeditiously, but they generate case law on procedural fairness, the standard of proof (balance of probabilities per section 10), and the interpretation of conditions. Practitioners should note that no specific appellate decisions are mentioned in the text, so any analysis of judicial interpretation must be sought from external legal databases. The amendment history reveals that the Act has been amended several times, suggesting that judicial interpretations or practical feedback have prompted legislative adjustments, especially to interim order types, the age of respondents, and procedural frameworks.

Gotchas

Several provisions in the Act contain traps for unwary practitioners, applicants, and respondents. Minimum age for respondents: A child under 14 years old cannot be a respondent (section 69). Applications against such children are prohibited. The transitional Parts 23 and 24 automatically revoke existing orders made against child respondents and discontinue pending proceedings. This means any application against a child under 14 is void ab initio, and police and employers must be particularly cautious when considering applications involving adolescents. Consent final order duration cap: If a final order is made by consent, it must not be longer than 12 months (section 27(2)). There is no exception for special or exceptional circumstances as there is for non-consent final orders. Practitioners negotiating consent orders must ensure the duration is within this limit. Only one general interim order plus one further: Section 20 allows only one general interim order in relation to an application for a final order, and section 24 allows only one further general interim order (if special or exceptional circumstances exist). This curtails repeated applications for interim relief. Extension of interim orders for non-service is limited: A general interim order can be extended by the registrar for non-service of the application by no more than 8 weeks (section 24AA). Missing this deadline may require a further order under the strict special or exceptional circumstances test. Consent orders cannot be made with impaired decision-making parties without separate representation: Section 71 prohibits the court from making a consent order if a party appears to have impaired decision-making ability and is not separately represented. This applies even if both parties appear to consent. If the court suspects impairment, it must adjourn to allow separate representation. Review of special interim orders is very limited: The respondent may apply for review of a special interim order only on three grounds: identity, administrative defect or error, or whether related charges exist (section 80A). Merits-based review (e.g., challenging the necessity or strength of evidence) is not available at that stage. Appeal time limits: An appeal to the Supreme Court must be filed within 28 days (section 85(2)). For orders made in the respondent’s absence, the 28 days runs from date of service. The court has discretion to extend, but no power is given to extend before the period expires - the application must be made after the period if late. Publication restrictions apply even to parties: Section 98 prohibits publishing accounts or reports that identify a party, a related person, or a witness, with exceptions in section 99 and Schedule 1. However, a party may tell someone else about the contents of an order and give a copy (section 99(1)). This means parties cannot generally publish details on social media or in the press, even if they believe it would help enforcement. Failure to comply with court explanation requirements does not invalidate the order: Sections 60(4) and 61(4) explicitly state that the court’s failure to explain the order to the respondent or protected person does not affect the order’s validity. This means the order remains enforceable even if the court did not properly explain its terms or consequences. Applicant discontinuance is not prima facie vexatious: Section 56(2) provides that discontinuance does not prevent a further application and is not a defence to a later proceeding. Section 67(3) says that an application is not vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith merely because it was discontinued. Respondents challenging a discontinued application for costs must show independent evidence of bad faith. Address of self-represented party must not be disclosed without consent: Section 64D(3) prohibits giving any address for service given by a self-represented party to the other party without that party’s consent. This can create difficulties for service of documents if the self-represented party declines to provide a service address. Conditions can be shorter than the order: Section 34 allows a condition to have effect for a shorter period than the overall protection order. This can lead to a situation where some restrictions expire while the order remains in force. Parties must track individual condition expiry dates.

How to comply

Compliance with the Personal Violence Act 2016 falls broadly into two categories: compliance by persons subject to protection orders, and compliance by institutions (courts, registries, police) and applicants with the Act’s processes.

For respondents: Once a protection order is made, the respondent must strictly obey all conditions. Section 35(2) creates a criminal offence for any conduct that contravenes the order. The maximum penalty is severe. The respondent should ensure they fully understand the terms and conditions of the order. The court is required to explain the order in plain language (section 60), but if the explanation is incomplete, the order remains valid (section 60(4)). The respondent should therefore ask for clarification if any condition is unclear. The respondent must immediately comply with automatic firearms consequences: an interim order suspends their firearms licence (section 36(2)), and a final order cancels it (section 37(2)), unless the court orders otherwise. The respondent should surrender any firearms and ammunition as directed. If the respondent wishes to avoid or challenge the order, they should attend all court hearings and consider filing a notice of grounds of defence (section 55A). For special interim orders, the only immediate challenge available is an application for review on limited grounds (identity, administrative error, or existence of related charges) (section 80A). For final orders, the respondent needs leave to apply for review (section 81) unless the order is a consent order affected by fraud or duress (section 83). The respondent may also apply to amend the order (section 76). To avoid a warrant being issued, the respondent must attend the court when the application is returned (section 49). If the respondent consents to the order, they can avoid a contested hearing; interim orders may become final orders by returning the endorsement copy (section 24A), or the court can make a consent order without admitting guilt (section 25).

For applicants and protected persons: The applicant should file a properly completed application with the Magistrates Court. If an interim order is sought, the court must set a return date within 2 days (section 41(1)). The applicant must attend all return dates; failure to attend may result in dismissal of the application (section 48). The applicant should cooperate with service requirements; the registrar arranges service on the respondent (sections 40-42), but if self-represented, the applicant’s address will not be disclosed to the other party without consent (section 64D). The applicant may discontinue at any time before final decision (section 56), but should be aware that this does not prevent a fresh application. If the protected person is not the applicant, they may be substituted as applicant (section 65). The applicant should provide all relevant information to the court, as they may rely on additional information at the hearing beyond what was in the original application (section 55B). The applicant should also ensure the court has their current contact details for service of notices and orders.

For employers: Only the employer for a workplace may apply for a workplace protection order (section 13). The employer must identify the affected person (an employee, the employer, or another person at the workplace) and the respondent. The application must be based on personal violence as defined for workplaces in section 8(2). The employer must attend proceedings and may need to arrange representation. The Act does not create new employment rights or obligations (section 100), so the workplace protection order operates separately from employment law remedies.

For legal practitioners: Practitioners must be aware of the strict timeframes: interim order hearing within 2 days (section 41(1)), review of registrar decisions must be requested same day (section 83B(3)), appeals within 28 days (section 85(2)). Preliminary conferences are mandatory unless safety concerns or futility apply (sections 40, 41, 76A, 83A). Practitioners should ensure that parties with impaired decision-making ability have separate representation before consent orders are made (section 71). When filing documents, the address of a self-represented party must be protected (section 64D). Publication of proceedings is restricted (section 98), but practitioners may share order details with third parties if done lawfully. Finally, practitioners should note the interaction with the Family Violence Act 2016; if an application is mistakenly made under this Act but should have been under that Act, sections 15 and 16 provide saving provisions.

For police officers: Police may apply for personal protection orders on behalf of an affected person (section 12(2)) and must inform the court whether the affected person consents (section 13B). Police may be substituted as applicant or represented (section 65). Evidence for interim orders may be given by affidavit sworn before a sergeant or above (section 57A). Police are responsible for serving documents if directed by the court (section 64E) and may swear affidavits of service before a fellow officer sergeant or above (section 64G). Police must also enforce protection orders and take appropriate action for contraventions, including arrest and bringing the respondent before the court (section 49(2)).