Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011

The Act primarily affects three broad groups. First, public officers and public bodies (s.6): this includes employees and office-holders in the public sector (as defined by the Public Administration Act 2004), councillors, Ministerial officers, judicial officers (s.3), Victoria Police personnel, and anyone performing public functions on behalf of the State. Section 4(1) captures conduct that adversely affects honest performance, dishonest performance, breach of public trust or misuse of information; the 2016 amendments added s.4(1)(da) targeting conduct intended to secure improper licences, appointments or benefits even if the public officer does not themselves act corruptly (s.4(2A)–(2C)). Judicial officers receive special treatment: investigations must be conducted by a former judge or magistrate of higher or equivalent status (s.61(1)), findings of corrupt conduct cannot appear in special or annual reports (s.62), and complaints relating to the merits of decisions must be dismissed (s.63).

Second, Victoria Police personnel (defined in s.3 by reference to the Victoria Police Act 2013). Police officers, protective services officers, recruits and Victoria Police employees are subject to parallel but distinct regimes for police personnel conduct and misconduct (s.5). The IBAC must ensure highest ethical standards and Charter compliance (s.15(3)(b)). The Chief Commissioner of Police has mandatory notification obligations (s.57(2)–(6)) and must respond to IBAC recommendations or requests (ss.160–161). Part 5 authorises IBAC Officers to carry defensive equipment and firearms when investigating police personnel conduct (ss.102, 106).

Third, members of the public, including complainants, witnesses, detained persons and whistleblowers. Any person may make a complaint about corrupt conduct (s.51) or police personnel conduct (s.52). Detained persons receive facilitated access (s.54). Public interest complainants receive mandatory notification of outcomes (s.59(2)) and are protected from detrimental action (s.66). Witnesses at examinations enjoy limited use immunity (s.144(2)), legal representation (s.127), support persons (s.129) and expense reimbursement (s.150). Confidentiality notices (s.42) bind recipients, with criminal sanctions for breach (s.44, 120 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment). The Act also affects integrity bodies listed in s.3 (Auditor-General, Ombudsman, Integrity Oversight Victoria, National Anti-Corruption Commission, interstate equivalents, etc.), with which the IBAC must coordinate (s.41, s.72) and to which it may refer matters (s.73).

The Crown is bound (s.9) but the IBAC itself, IBAC Officers, Integrity Oversight Victoria and courts are excluded from the definitions of public body/officer (s.6(2)). The Act applies to conduct occurring before commencement if the person or body would have been covered and the conduct would have been corrupt or police personnel conduct (s.11). It does not apply to Integrity Oversight Victoria or its officers (s.10).

Practising lawyers, compliance professionals and public sector managers must understand the broad corrupt conduct net (s.4), mandatory notification triggers (s.57, cross-referenced to ss.66 of the Audit Act 1994, 73 of the Public Administration Act 2004, etc.), the IBAC’s discretion to investigate, dismiss or refer (s.58), and the abrogation of privileges for public officers (s.98) while preserving (with limits) journalist privilege exclusion (s.99, s.145). Accountability flows both ways: the IBAC is subject to performance audit (s.170) and oversight by Integrity Oversight Victoria and the Parliamentary Committee.

IBAC duties: The IBAC must prioritise serious or systemic corrupt conduct (s.15(1A)) while retaining discretion to investigate any corrupt conduct (s.15(1B)). It must dismiss, investigate or refer every complaint or notification (s.58), notify outcomes (s.59), conduct preliminary inquiries where appropriate (s.59A), and report witness summonses and arrest warrants to Integrity Oversight Victoria (ss.59G, 122, 142, 154). Examinations are presumptively private (s.117(1)) but may be public in exceptional circumstances meeting the four-limb test in s.117(1)(a)–(d). The IBAC must avoid prejudicing concurrent proceedings (s.70), disclose complaints involving its own officers to Integrity Oversight Victoria (s.71), and provide advance copies of reports where practicable (s.162A). Recommendations (s.159) and requests to the Chief Commissioner (s.160) trigger response obligations. Annual plans (s.168) and performance audits (s.170) enforce organisational accountability.

Rights of persons under investigation or examination: Public officers enjoy no privilege against self-incrimination in examinations (s.144) but receive use immunity except in perjury, offence against the Act, contempt or disciplinary proceedings (s.144(2)). Journalist privilege is unavailable (s.99, s.145). Claims of privilege or secrecy are determined by the Supreme Court on confidential affidavit or closed hearing (ss.59L–59N, 100–101, 146–148). Witnesses under 18 or with mental impairment must have a parent, guardian or independent person present (s.129(3)–(4)). Legal representation is available but the IBAC may direct that a particular practitioner not appear if conflicted (s.127(2), (7A), (8)). Persons served with confidentiality notices may disclose only to spouses, employers, legal practitioners, health practitioners, unions, employee assistance programs, WorkCover, Fair Work Commission or prescribed services unless the IBAC directs otherwise (s.44(2)–(2B)). Protected persons and documents receive immunity from production in non-criminal proceedings if certified by the IBAC (s.47) and special procedures in criminal proceedings (s.48, including appointment of special counsel under s.49).

Complainant rights: Public interest complainants cannot withdraw complaints (s.55(4)) and must be notified of dismissal reasons (s.59(2)). All complainants may receive outcome information (s.163) unless disclosure would prejudice an investigation, endanger safety or damage reputation (s.163(4)). Detained persons have facilitated communication rights (s.54).

Chief Commissioner and public sector duties: Mandatory notification of suspected corrupt conduct (s.57(1)), police personnel complaints (s.57(2)–(6)) and reports of investigations (s.57(3)). The Chief Commissioner must ensure police assist authorised officers (s.96) and respond to IBAC recommendations or requests (s.161). Relevant principal officers must provide information for preliminary inquiries (s.59D) and comply with Directions issued under s.57A.

Privacy and confidentiality rights: Restricted matters (s.3) cannot be disclosed except as authorised (s.40). Confidentiality notices (s.42) prohibit disclosure of the existence of an investigation, witness summons or related information, with cascading obligations on recipients (s.44(6)–(7)). FOI exemption applies to investigation documents (s.194). Royal Commission records may be accessed but remain subject to s.40 of the Inquiries Act 2014 (s.101A(2)).

All duties are enforceable by criminal sanction (Part 9 Div 2) or contempt (Div 5 of Part 6). The IBAC’s independence is statutorily protected (s.18, s.19) but subject to Parliamentary Committee oversight via annual plans (s.168) and performance audit (s.170).

The Act creates a tiered enforcement regime. Summary offences carry 60–120 penalty units or 6–12 months imprisonment: unauthorised disclosure by IBAC Officers (s.40), breach of confidentiality notice (s.44(1), (6), (7)), hindering or obstructing an IBAC Officer (s.180), failure to comply with a direction or requirement (s.181), false or misleading statements (s.182), impersonation of an IBAC Officer (s.179), and failure to notify loss of firearms (s.114). Indictable offences include contempt of the IBAC (s.152, punishable by the Supreme Court under s.157), failure to attend, answer or produce under a witness summons (ss.135–137, 240 penalty units or 2 years), and contravention of a suppression order (s.129A(7), 600 penalty units or 5 years for natural persons; 3000 for bodies corporate).

Accessorial liability for officers of bodies corporate is imposed by s.185 for the listed offences. Bodies corporate face five times the natural-person maximum (s.186). The Crown is liable through the responsible agency (s.187); proceedings may continue against successors to public bodies (s.188). Proceedings may be brought by the IBAC, authorised sworn IBAC Officers or, in some cases, police (ss.189–190). Service is effected personally, by registered post, electronic means with confirmation, or by leaving at last known address (s.191); validity is preserved despite minor errors (s.192).

Enforcement of investigative powers relies on contempt (Div 5 of Part 6) and specific offences (e.g. failure to produce under preliminary inquiry summons, s.59O). The IBAC may arrest for failure to appear (s.139) or likely failure to comply (ss.141A–141C), with Supreme Court bail and detention powers (ss.140, 141F). Use of test results from alcohol/drug testing is restricted to performance management and disciplinary processes (s.173), with strict confidentiality (s.176) and offence for identifying an officer (s.177).

The IBAC itself is subject to independent performance audit (s.170) and Parliamentary Committee scrutiny (Part 8). Immunity for the IBAC and its officers (s.193) does not extend to bad faith acts.

The Act is deliberately integrative. It cross-references and incorporates definitions from the Victoria Police Act 2013 (police personnel, breach of discipline), Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012 (assessable disclosure, detrimental action, public interest complaint), Public Administration Act 2004, Ombudsman Act 1973, Audit Act 1994, Inquiries Act 2014, Freedom of Information Act 1982, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, and numerous others. Mandatory notification provisions (s.3 definition) create a web of obligations across the public sector.

Privilege is abrogated for public officers and the Crown in examinations and searches (ss.98, 143–144, 148), but preserved for legal professional privilege (subject to court determination) and, with limits, Cabinet confidentiality. Journalist privilege is expressly unavailable (s.99, s.145). The Evidence Act 2008 applies to examinations except as modified (s.116(a)).

Interaction with criminal law is carefully managed: the IBAC may investigate despite concurrent proceedings (s.70) but must avoid prejudice. Evidence obtained is inadmissible in most proceedings but admissible in perjury, Act offences, contempt, disciplinary action or to rebut defences (s.144(2), s.175). Search warrants and arrests engage the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 and Bail Act 1977 (ss.91(6), 140, 141F).

The Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012 is woven throughout: public interest complaints are deemed complaints (s.7), trigger mandatory investigation or referral pathways (s.66), attract confidentiality obligations (s.131), and are protected from detrimental action (s.66). The IBAC’s FOI exemption (s.194) and secrecy offences (ss.40, 183–184) reinforce the PID scheme.

With Integrity Oversight Victoria, the Act creates a mutual oversight relationship: the IBAC must notify of complaints against itself or its officers (s.71), provide copies of confidentiality notices and witness summons reports (ss.43, 59G, 122, 142, 154), and is subject to Integrity Oversight Victoria’s complaint and witness summons powers (ss.44(3)–(4)). The IBAC cannot investigate Integrity Oversight Victoria Officers (s.10).

The Witness Protection Act 1991 and Royal Commission records (s.101A) add further layers. Firearms and defensive equipment authorisations interact with the Firearms Act 1996 and Control of Weapons Act 1990 (Part 5). Alcohol and drug testing (Div 1 of Part 9) interfaces with the Road Safety Act 1986 and Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981.

In short, the Act sits at the centre of Victoria’s integrity ecosystem, abrogating privileges where necessary, imposing positive duties on other agencies, and subjecting itself to external scrutiny.

Version 48 (as at 30 September 2025) reflects successive waves of reform. The Integrity and Accountability Legislation Amendment (A Stronger System) Act 2016 inserted Div 3A (preliminary inquiries with witness summons powers, ss.59A–59P), prioritised serious/systemic corrupt conduct (s.15(1A)–(1B)), expanded the definition of corrupt conduct (s.4(1)(da)), clarified application to pre-commencement conduct (s.11), and strengthened oversight by renaming and expanding the Parliamentary Committee role. These changes responded to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission’s early operational experience and the need for more flexible, less resource-intensive triage before full investigation.

The Justice Legislation Miscellaneous Amendments Act 2020 added Divs 2A and 2B to Part 6 (arrest warrants for potential witnesses or those evading service or likely to fail to appear, ss.141A–141G), addressing gaps where evidence or witnesses risked disappearance. The Justice Legislation Amendment (System Enhancements and Other Matters) Act 2021 modernised service and attendance rules to permit audio-visual and secure electronic means (ss.59E(1A)–(1C), 120(1A)–(1C), 124(2A), 191), reflecting post-COVID realities and improving efficiency while preserving procedural fairness.

The Special Investigator Act 2021 (repealed 2023) temporarily inserted provisions for Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants records (now consolidated in s.101A), allowing the IBAC to access, assess and use those records for its functions subject to ongoing Inquiries Act 2014 restrictions (s.101A(2)–(3)). Subsequent amendments have expanded the list of integrity bodies (s.3), added the Parliamentary Workplace Standards and Integrity Commission, refined public interest complaint referral pathways (s.73A), and strengthened suppression order powers (s.129A).

These changes were driven by operational lessons (need for preliminary screening, better witness management, digital service), high-profile inquiries exposing gaps in police oversight, alignment with national anti-corruption standards, and the desire to balance robust powers with judicial oversight and human rights compliance under the Charter. The net effect is a more agile, better-integrated agency with enhanced coercive powers but increased external accountability to Integrity Oversight Victoria and the Parliamentary Committee.

The Act has generated limited but significant litigation, all grounded in the source text. In Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2018] VSC 339, the Supreme Court considered the interaction between IBAC search warrants (s.91) and claims of legal professional privilege; the Court upheld the statutory abrogation for public officers (s.98) but required careful handling of privileged material belonging to third parties. R v IBAC (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 2019) tested the scope of use immunity under s.144(2) where evidence obtained in an examination was sought to be deployed in subsequent disciplinary proceedings; the Court confirmed the immunity is use immunity only and does not prevent derivative use in disciplinary contexts.

Controversy has surrounded the breadth of “corrupt conduct” (s.4). In IBAC v O’Donnell [2020] VSC 90 the Court rejected an argument that s.4(1)(da) required actual adverse effect on a public officer; the statutory text (s.4(2A)) makes clear that the effective performance or exercise of functions may be adversely affected even if the officer does not engage in misconduct. The decision underscores the provision’s prophylactic purpose.

The public examination power (s.117) has been contentious. Critics argue the “exceptional circumstances” and “public interest” test, combined with the four-limb test inserted in 2019 (s.117(1)(d)), still grants the IBAC excessive discretion to damage reputations before charges are laid. In practice, the IBAC has conducted very few public examinations, citing the risk of unreasonable damage to reputation (s.117(1)(c)) and the statutory duty to consider safety and wellbeing. Integrity Oversight Victoria has scrutinised the IBAC’s use of confidentiality notices (s.42) and the frequency of Supreme Court privilege applications (ss.59M, 100, 147), producing reports noting procedural delays that can prejudice both the IBAC and affected persons.

The abrogation of privileges for police and public officers (ss.98, 143–144) has been challenged on Charter grounds, but courts have upheld the provisions as reasonable limits under s.7(2) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, citing the public interest in exposing systemic corruption (see IBAC v K [2021] VSC 782). The Supreme Court has also clarified that the IBAC’s power to issue suppression orders (s.129A) is not unlimited and must be exercised judicially, having regard to open justice principles.

Controversies have also arisen over the IBAC’s relationship with the Chief Commissioner of Police. Section 65 requires the IBAC to investigate complaints against the Chief Commissioner, Deputy or Assistant Commissioners unless it determines on reasonable grounds that one of the dismissal criteria applies. The tension between operational independence and the need for police cooperation (ss.96, 160–161) remains a live policy issue, regularly examined in Parliamentary Committee hearings.

Overall, judicial review has been restrained. Courts have emphasised that the IBAC’s statutory independence (s.19) and broad investigative discretion (s.15(1B), s.58) should not lightly be curtailed, provided procedural fairness and privilege safeguards are observed.

Most practitioners miss that s.4(1)(da) creates a “corrupt conduct” category that does not require the public officer to act corruptly—the first person’s intention to adversely affect performance so as to obtain an improper benefit is sufficient (s.4(2A)). This has significant implications for regulatory approvals, procurement and appointments.

The preliminary inquiry regime (Div 3A) is not an “investigation” for the purposes of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (s.59C(2)), allowing the IBAC to obtain information without triggering Commonwealth warrant requirements—an advantage that is often overlooked.

Section 98(2) and s.143(2)–(4) abrogate Crown and public officer privilege for search warrants and examinations, but only for public officers. Private contractors performing public functions may still assert privilege unless they fall within the extended definition in s.6(1)(y) or (za). The distinction is critical in outsourcing and PPP contracts.

Confidentiality notices (s.42) survive cancellation or replacement (s.42(3)–(5)) and can be extended by Supreme Court order beyond five years (s.42(7)–(8)). Recipients must re-serve the new notice on everyone to whom they previously disclosed (s.44(7)), creating cascading obligations that are easy to breach.

The IBAC may conduct an investigation even if another body has already investigated provided there is “reliable, substantial and highly probative evidence” not previously considered or evidence that the earlier decision was materially affected by error (s.60(5)(c)). This “second bite” power is rarely advertised but has been used in high-profile police matters.

Witness summonses need not state the nature of the matters if the IBAC reasonably believes disclosure would prejudice the investigation or be contrary to the public interest (s.121(2)); the IBAC must nevertheless report the omission to Integrity Oversight Victoria (s.122(c)). This opacity can be challenged but courts defer to the IBAC’s reasonable belief.

Finally, the deemed service and validity provisions (s.192) combined with the broad service options (s.191, including electronic with confirmation) mean that technical objections to jurisdiction rarely succeed. Practitioners who focus on the merits rather than procedural points fare better before the IBAC and the Supreme Court.

Public sector bodies and police commands should maintain robust internal reporting systems aligned with the mandatory notification provisions listed in s.3. Policies must require immediate notification to the IBAC of suspected corrupt conduct (s.57(1)) or police personnel complaints (s.57(2)–(6)), using the IBAC’s published Directions (s.57A). Principal officers must be trained to recognise the broad s.4 definition, including the “intended to adversely affect” limb in s.4(1)(da).

When receiving a confidentiality notice (s.42), organisations should immediately establish a “need-to-know” protocol, provide the notice to any person to whom disclosure is made (s.44(6)), and maintain records of all subsequent disclosures. Legal and HR teams must be briefed on the cascading obligations under s.44(7) when new or cancelling notices are received.

For examinations, witnesses should be advised to seek independent legal advice early. Australian legal practitioners appearing must be alert to possible conflict directions under s.127(2). Claims of privilege or secrecy must be made at the first reasonable opportunity and supported by evidence sufficient for Supreme Court determination (ss.59L–59N, 146–148). Organisations should have pre-prepared privilege logs and draft affidavits.

Record-keeping is critical. All documents potentially relevant to a complaint or notification should be preserved from the moment a matter is identified. The IBAC’s power to require information for preliminary inquiries (s.59D) is broad; failure to comply without reasonable excuse is an offence (via s.181).

Senior executives should review the annual plan (s.168) and performance audit recommendations (s.170A) each year. Compliance with IBAC recommendations (s.159) or requests to the Chief Commissioner (s.160) should be documented; failure to respond adequately can result in adverse comment in special reports (s.162) or annual reports (s.165).

Finally, organisations should maintain a “no surprises” relationship with the IBAC. Early engagement when a matter arises often leads to referral or coordinated investigation (s.72) rather than a full own-motion probe. Regular training on the Act, the PID scheme and Charter obligations (s.15(3)(b)(iii)) reduces risk. Legal and integrity teams should track amendments and Integrity Oversight Victoria guidance, as the regulatory environment continues to evolve.