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[2024] VSC 651
Supreme Court of Victoria
2024-10-25
Croft J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CORPORATIONS - Oppression - Whether the appointment of director and dilution of shareholding was unfairly prejudicial, discriminatory or oppressive - Whether remedy for oppression required order that defendants purchase shares - No basis for making order that the defendants purchase shares - Minimum relief appropriate to neutralise oppression - Court to grant 'least intrusive remedy' - Hylepin Pty Ltd v Doshay Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1370 - Fedorovitch v St Aubins Pty Ltd (1999) 17 ACLC 1558 - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 233.
EVIDENCE - Burden of proof - Party that bears onus must discharge onus - Standard of proof - Court 'must feel an actual persuasion' of a facts 'occurrence or existence' - Actual persuasion achieved where affirmative of an allegation is made out to Court's reasonable satisfaction - Mere mechanical comparison of probabilities cannot justify factual finding - Evaluation of witness evidence - Most compelling evidence is contemporaneous documentation - Assessment of credit - Indicators of unsatisfactory witness evidence - GJB Building Pty Ltd v AI&PB Property Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 782 - Webb v Getswift (No 5) [2019] FCA 1533 - Painter v Hutchinson [2007] EWHC 758 (Ch) - ASIC v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320 - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1305(1) - Evidence Act 2008, ss 140(1), (2).
EQUITY - Whether shares were the subject of a trust - Ordinary meaning of the words and actions the subject of relevant dealings between parties and the circumstances affecting the relationship between them - Oral agreement establishing trust with sufficient certainty - Future property in shares readily identifiable and would be impressed with trust obligations upon creation - Subsequent conduct of parties not relevant or admissible by way of an admission of the existence of the trust or its revocation - Whether equitable defences preclude relief - Unclean hands - Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253 - Pilmer v Duke Group [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR 165 - FAI Insurance Company Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] VicRp 76; [1993] 2 VR 343 - Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1962) 109 CLR 9 - Constitution Act 1975, s 85 _ - _ Supreme Court Act 1986, s 36.
1 Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd (Kegland) was incorporated on 8 December 2017, and conducts a business of selling 'home brewery' equipment and ingredients. The first plaintiff, LL UP Pty Ltd (LL UP) holds 50 ordinary shares in Kegland. The second plaintiff, Hong Rui Liu (Hong), is and at all relevant times was a director of LL UP, and a director of Kegland.
2 On and from the time of Kegland's incorporation, the directors of Kegland were Hong and the fifth defendant, Sam Jum Lie (Sam). At Kegland's incorporation there were 100 ordinary shares on issue in Kegland, of which LL UP held 50 shares, and Sam held 50 shares.[1] No further directors were appointed and no further shares were issued until late 2020 and early 2021 respectively.
3 This proceeding concerns the circumstances in which and the basis, if any, on which the second defendant, Kee Doery (Kee) was purportedly appointed as a director of Kegland on 7 December 2020, and 400 ordinary shares in Kegland were issued on 1 February 2021 to entities respectively controlled by Kee and by the second plaintiff by counterclaim, Ari Luo (Ari). The entities to whom the shares were issued were the third defendant, Team KK Pty Ltd (Team KK) which is owned by Kee; and the fourth defendant, LTWQ Pty Ltd (LTWQ), which is owned and controlled by Ari.
4 The Plaintiffs allege on various grounds, inter alia, that Kee's purported appointment as director was not valid, that the purported issue of 400 shares was void or voidable, and that the Plaintiffs neither consented to nor were aware of those matters until after the shares had been purportedly issued.[2]
5 The second to fifth defendants and plaintiffs by counterclaim in this proceeding (together the Defendants) deny those allegations by the Plaintiffs. They justify the purported share issue on the basis that in approximately late November or early December 2017, Kee and Ari entered an agreement with Hong. The terms of this agreement are claimed to include that Hong would hold 50% of the shares in Kegland on trust equally for Kee and Ari and would 'transfer them to each of them, or at their direction' and that Hong would 'resign as director of Kegland when asked to by Kee and Ari, most likely once the MCH dispute had resolved' (the Alleged Oral Agreement).[3] It is said that by reason of the Alleged Oral Agreement: 'Hong undertook to hold 50% of the shares in the proposed company on trust for Kee and Ari until the issues with Maggie and MCH[4] were over (Hong Trust) and Hong used the first plaintiff to assume the role of trustee under the Hong Trust on 8 December 2017.' Further, it is said that, subsequently, as against his own interest, and as against the interest of LL UP, Hong admitted the existence and/or the terms of the Hong Trust by conduct, primarily in the WeChat messages, after the Alleged Oral Agreement was made.[5]
6 Hong denied the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement and, consequently, that the shares were held on trust; hence Kee's appointment in 2020 and the share issue cannot be justified.[6]
7 On the basis of this position, the appointment of Kee and the dilution of the shareholding of LL UP is said by the Plaintiffs to be unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory or oppressive and LL UP is entitled to relief under s 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act). The Plaintiffs also contended that the purported appointment and the purported share issue involved misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Cth) (ACL), s 1041H(1) of the Corporations Act and s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act).
8 The Defendants, on the other hand, contend that at the heart of this case is the factual dispute as to whether a trust was established on the morning of 6 December 2017 - the Hong Trust. This, they say, is the threshold issue. They do, however concede, that if the Court rejects the trust claim, then the Defendants could not resist the Plaintiffs' entitlement to relief, the effect of which would undo the 2021 share issue and remove Kee as a director of Kegland (Reversal relief). If this position were reached, the Defendants say that the only issues that would arise for determination are: (1) whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief above and beyond the Reversal relief; and (2) if the Court decides to make a purchase order (that is, an order requiring Kee and Ari to purchase the first Plaintiff's shares in Kegland), the price for which the buyers are required to purchase those shares.
9 The position of the Plaintiffs is, at a high level, that the documentary evidence does not support the Defendants' claims, particularly the existence of the Hong Trust. As emphasised by the Plaintiffs in their oral closing submissions, they contend that there is no contemporaneous documentary evidence referring to the existence of the Hong Trust or its terms and, further, that there are many documents which negative its existence. Moreover, it is said that there is no written evidence that Kee and Ari ever sought to exercise their rights under the alleged agreement to call for Hong to transfer the shares to them, or to request that Hong resign as a director of Kegland. The Plaintiffs also emphasised that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) corporate records supported the position that Hong holds and, at all material times, held 50% of the shares in Kegland beneficially.
10 The Defendants, on the other hand, contend that a different picture emerges from the evidence, in particular the contemporaneous documentary evidence, viewed as a whole. On this basis it is said that a sufficiently clear picture emerges as follows:[7]
(a) In the period leading to late November 2017, MCH was threatening legal action against Kee and Ari, former employees (and then shareholders) of that company. Kee and Ari feared that MCH would seek and obtain an injunction shutting down the new business they had established and were then operating (Kegland Business).
(b) In early December 2017, Kee and Ari registered Kegland Hardware Pty Ltd (Kegland Hardware) to own and operate this business. The share register shows that Kee and Ari were connected with this company (tellingly, it also shows that Hong never was). Hence Kee and Ari decided to register a new company. They wanted to instal their friend and business associate, Sam Jum Lie, as a stand‑in director; and they wanted Sam to hold shares in the company on their behalf. In this way, they hoped to disguise their respective interests in the proposed company. But Sam lived in Jakarta Accordingly, he could not act as the sole director of the proposed company. This is something that Kee only learnt from his accountant on 4 December 2017. But Kee, Ari and Sam did reach an agreement under which Sam would hold 50% of the shares in the new company on trust for Kee and Ari.
(c) Against this background, with Kee's approval, Ari approached Hong on 6 December 2017.
(d) Prior to 6 December 2017, Hong was not involved in the Kegland business. Hong did not come up with the idea to form this business; he did not invest in this business; he did not own shares in Kegland Hardware Pty Ltd; and he did not help to run this business. Indeed, as he revealed in cross‑examination, Hong was unaware that Kee and Ari had registered Kegland Hardware. He was also unaware that, prior to the registration of Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd ... , this company was the owner and operator of the Kegland business.
(e) On 6 December 2017, Ari (with Kee's approval, albeit he did not know Hong) asked Hong to hold 50% of the shares in the proposed company for him and Kee until the disputes involving Maggie and MCH had ended. Ari did this because he and Kee wanted to disguise their respective interests in the proposed company (and, therefore, the Kegland business).
(f) Subsequently, Kee and Ari implemented an elaborate but naïve scheme to cover up their respective interests in the new company, Kegland Distribution. This scheme involved deception and dishonesty, some of which was egregious. Hong was an active participant in this scheme and, like Kee and Ari, he engaged in seriously dishonest conduct designed to mislead this Court, officers of this Court and MCH.
(g) In 2019 and 2020, on different occasions, Hong admitted the trust. These admissions occurred before the present dispute had arisen.
11 On this basis, the Defendants contend that this is not a case in which it is difficult or impossible to fit together almost all pieces of the jigsaw of evidence. Thus, it is said that no important pieces are missing; no important pieces are wrong; and no important pieces are distorted. It is said that the dishonest scheme to hide the Kegland arrangements from Maggie and MCH is an important piece in this puzzle. In relation to the picture for which the Defendants contend, this piece is said to be neither wrong nor distorted. Although the implementation and maintenance of that scheme involved deliberate dishonesty, it is said that the existence of such dishonest conduct does not necessitate the rejection of the picture. Nor does such dishonesty destroy or distort other pieces of the puzzle, particularly where those pieces rest on contemporaneous documentary evidence. Finally, it is said that, as problematic as the scheme clearly is, it is entirely consonant with the existence of the Hong Trust.
12 In relation to Hong's case on the threshold issue, the Defendants emphasise that the critical question is this: if no trust came into existence, how and why did his family company receive the shares in question? In this respect it is said that there are too many missing, wrong and distorted pieces in the puzzle to justify support for the picture for which Hong contends. Moreover, it is said that there are many actual pieces that prevent the emergence of the full picture for which Hong contends. As to the missing pieces that relate to the threshold issue, the Defendants say that they relate to the following matters: (1) Hong's alleged role in the creation of the Kegland business; (2) Hong's alleged role in registering Kegland; (3) Hong's alleged role in the allocation of the shares to his family company and Sam, a person whom he did not meet or speak with until after incorporation; (4) Hong's alleged role in organising initial funding for Kegland (and, therefore, the Kegland business); (5) the basis on which Hong's company acquired the shares; and (6) Hong's alleged role in the running of the Kegland business. As to (5), for example, there is no evidence that Hong or his family company invested in Kegland or the Kegland business; there is no evidence that Kee and Ari gifted shares to Hong or his family company (nor does Hong allege that they did); and there is no evidence that Hong or his family company entered into a subscription agreement. Apart from the creation of the trust (the Hong Trust), in light of the missing pieces, there is no rational explanation for how and why the shares were allocated to Hong's family company.
13 As to the distorted pieces, the Defendants refer to the evidence concerning the payment of $100,000 which is, they say, a central plank of Hong's case. However, it is contended that a close examination of the evidence shows that, contrary to his first witness statement, Hong did not provide $100,000 to Kegland as start‑up capital. The Defendants contend that he was, in fact, never out of pocket financially. Clearly, it is submitted, that when putting together his first witness statement, Hong was aware of this. Using the jigsaw metaphor, it is said that Hong was aware of this distorted piece. In the circumstances, the Defendants ask, why did Hong attempt to use this distorted piece to create a misleading picture? The answer, it is said, lies in the relief that the Plaintiffs seek - namely they want a buy‑out order.
14 Lastly, in this overview, the Defendants re‑emphasise the existence of dishonest conduct of key persons in this case. Dishonest behaviour on the part of Kee and Ari, it is said, does not prevent the acceptance of their trust case, or necessitate the rejection of their evidence. Similarly, it is said, dishonest behaviour on Hong's part does not prevent the acceptance his trust case, or necessitate the rejection of his evidence. Also, Kee and Ari confessed to lying, but said that they were no longer lying. Accordingly, 'the old conundrum' arises: whether one should believe an habitual liar when he or she asserts that he or she was lying.[8] In this case, notwithstanding these matters, the determination of the threshold issue hinges, it is submitted, on the following: (1) a close assessment of the available pieces of the puzzle, in particular contemporaneous documents; and (2) how those pieces fit together.
15 For the reasons advanced by the Defendants, they say that the Court should reject Hong's case in respect of the threshold issue, that this flows naturally from: (1) a careful consideration of the pieces of the puzzle, almost all of which rest on contemporaneous documents; and (2) a consideration of the overall probabilities of matters on which each side relies. Thus, it is said that a sufficient number of pieces fit together from which the trust picture emerges in favour of the Defendants.
16 Section 140(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Evidence Act) provides that, in a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. In this context the Defendants highlight the following principles:
(a) The fact that a witness is disbelieved does not prove the opposite of what he or she asserted.[9]
(b) The party that bears the onus must discharge that onus. However, where there are competing hypotheses, a court should assess which of these hypotheses is to be preferred (provided, of course, it always keeps in mind upon whom the onus lies).[10] In considering whether a party has discharged its onus, it will often be appropriate, or even necessary, for the judge to determine whether the alternative version of events put forward by the opposing party is to be accepted; for if that alternative version of events were to be positively accepted, then plainly the party that bore the onus would not have discharged it.[11]
17 As to the standard of proof, and as to the concept of actual persuasion, the Defendants emphasise two principles; principles not doubted by the plaintiffs.
18 The first is that each element of the cause of action must be proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the court, which means that the court 'must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence'. Such satisfaction is 'not ... attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved' including the 'seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding'.[12]
19 The second principle involves the relevance of s 140(2) of the Evidence Act which is relevant to the concept of actual persuasion. Under this provision, in deciding whether the court is satisfied that a case has been proved to the requisite standard the court must take the following matters into account: (1) the nature of the cause of action or defence; (2) the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) the gravity of the matters alleged.
20 Moreover, as the Defendants contend, when proof of any fact is required, the court must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of that fact before it can be found. Mere mechanical comparison of probabilities, independent of any belief in reality, cannot justify the finding of a fact. Actual persuasion is achieved where the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the court. However, it is stressed, reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations that must affect whether the fact has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the court. It follows that reasonable satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences.[13]
21 In the present case, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their case and the Defendants, having alleged the existence of a bare trust in respect of the Kegland shares, bear the burden of establishing the necessary facts to support this case.
Evaluation of witness evidence and assessment of credit
22 At the outset, the Plaintiffs make reference to the important and general proposition that their most compelling evidence that the court should rely on is contemporaneous documentation. As Lee J said in Webb v Getswift (No 5):[14]
... the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on the witnesses' recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts.
Gestmin has recently been cited with approval in this Court.[15]
23 In this context, the Defendants helpfully set out 13 propositions, with reference to authorities, applicable to the assessment of credit and character of the witnesses in this proceeding. These propositions are as follows:[16]
(a) An obvious difficulty with allegations and oral evidence based on recollection of events which occurred several years ago is human memory.
(b) Human memory is fallible. Two common (and related) errors are to suppose: (1) that the stronger and more vivid is our feeling or experience of recollection, the more likely the recollection is to be accurate; and (2) that the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely their recollection is to be accurate.
(c) Underlying both these errors is a faulty model of memory as a mental record which is fixed at the time of experience of an event and then fades (more or less slowly) over time. External information can intrude into a witness's memory, as can his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and both can cause dramatic changes in recollection. Events can come to be recalled as memories which did not happen at all or which happened to someone else.
(d) Memory is especially unreliable when it comes to recalling past beliefs. Our memories of past beliefs are revised to make them more consistent with our present beliefs. Studies have also shown that memory is particularly vulnerable to interference and alteration when a person is presented with new information or suggestions about an event in circumstances where his or her memory of it is already weak due to the passage of time.
(e) The process of civil litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases. The nature of litigation is such that witnesses often have a stake in a particular version of events. This is obvious where the witness is a party or has a tie of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to a party to the proceedings.
(f) Considerable interference with memory is also introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for trial. A witness is asked to make a statement, often (as in the present case) when a long time has already elapsed since the relevant events. The statement is usually drafted for the witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does nor does not say. The statement is made after the witness's memory has been "refreshed" by reading documents. The documents considered often include statements of case and other argumentative material as well as documents which the witness did not see at the time or which came into existence after the events which he or she is being asked to recall. The statement may go through several iterations before it is finalised. Then, usually months later, the witness will be asked to re‑read his or her statement and review documents again before giving evidence in court. The effect of this process is to establish in the mind of the witness the matters recorded in his or her own statement and other written material, whether they be true or false, and to cause the witness's memory of events to be based increasingly on this material and later interpretations of it rather than on the original experience of the events.
(g) There is no clear distinction between recollection and reconstruction - all remembering of distant events involves reconstructive processes. Such processes are largely unconscious and that the strength, vividness and apparent authenticity of memories is not a reliable measure of their truth.
In the light of these considerations, the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses' recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This does not mean that oral testimony serves no useful purpose - though its utility is often disproportionate to its length. But its value lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which cross‑examination affords to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge the personality, motivations and working practices of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the witness recalls of particular conversations and events. Above all, it is important to avoid the fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has confidence in his or her recollection and is honest, evidence based on that recollection provides any reliable guide to the truth.
Proposition 4: In light of Proposition 3, case law emphasises the importance of documentary evidence in assessing the credibility and reliability of witnesses. Courts should look to such contemporary evidence to see the extent to which it supports or undermines what a witness says. Such evidence often provides a valuable guide to the truth.
In Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403 at 431, having reviewed the various reasons that a witness's oral testimony might not be credible, Lord Pearce stated as follows:
... all these problems compendiously are entailed when a judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part.
Similarly, in Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1, 57 Robert Goff LJ made this observation:
It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence ... reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and to the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a judge in ascertaining the truth.
In Brookfield v Yevad [2004] FCA 1164 at [416], in relation to the importance of documents in terms of testing credibility, Lander J said relevantly as follows:
Often, especially in commercial causes, the best evidence of the events the subject of the inquiry in the trial is contained in the contemporaneous documents. Usually, documents are created in circumstances where parties do not expect the documents to surface in a trial. They often, therefore, contain the true account of the contemporaneous event.
In Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v Ahmed & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ. 610, Lady Justice Arden made an important point concerning the absence of contemporary documents. The judge said relevantly as follows (emphasis added):
[11] By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what has impressed the judge most in his task of fact‑finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings.
[12] There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge and he or she has to decide whose evidence, and how much evidence, to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary but it could be other oral evidence ...
...
[14] In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non‑production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence.
- Proposition 5: In the fact‑finding process, courts prefer evidence which is inherently probable in the circumstances. As to incontrovertible facts and probabilities, as a matter of common sense, the inherent improbability of an event having occurred will be a relevant factor in deciding whether it did in fact occur.[19] Proof of an improbable event may require more cogent evidence than might otherwise be required.[20]
- Proposition 6: In the fact‑finding process, in addition to the significance of contemporaneous documents, courts prefer evidence which is consistent with (1) facts admitted by the parties or (2) matters of common knowledge or experience.
- Proposition 7: Courts also prefer evidence that a witness gives against his or her interest.[21]
- Proposition 8: Evidence of independent witnesses - that is, persons who have no reason to be partisan - may be decisive in resolving the conflicting evidence of interested parties. In many cases, it is necessary for the court to assess the credibility and reliability of such witnesses.
- Proposition 9: There is an important difference between credibility and reliability. Credibility concerns honesty. However, reliability is different from credibility. A witness may be honest, but she may have a poor memory, or she may be mistaken. By way of example only, the Kegland parties refer to Ari's inability to recall the day of the week on which the 16 December 2017 meeting occurred ([T 719]). This inability does not support an adverse credibility finding against Ari. In any event, the day of the week is unimportant, and, even if it were important, it could be discerned with reasonable accuracy from a careful analysis of contemporaneous emails and other documents (see Proposition 4).
- Proposition 10: In terms of assessing credibility and reliability, an important factor is the inherent consistency of the account. If the evidence of the witness contains internal contradictions, it cannot be accepted as a whole. The question may be which part to reject.[22]
- Proposition 11: Further to Proposition 1, there are risks in making global findings about the credibility of any particular witness. First, if it is found that a witness has lied about one thing, that finding does not mean that other parts of his or her evidence are untruthful.[23] Where possible, an assessment should be made of the reasons for the untruthfulness in order to see if other aspects of the evidence are likely to be infected by the same concern.[24] Second, evidence may be rejected because it is apparently unreliable, possibly mistaken or deliberately untruthful.
24 Further to these matters relevant in considering the credibility of witnesses, there are also more specifically articulated indicators of unsatisfactory witness evidence. In Painter v Hutchinson,[26] Lewison J (as he then was) identified a non‑exhaustive list of indicators of unsatisfactory witness evidence. This list included the following: (1) evasive and argumentative answers; (2) tangential speeches avoiding the questions; (3) blaming legal advisers for documentation (statements of case and witness statements); (4) discovery and evidence shortcomings; (5) self‑contradiction; (6) internal inconsistency; (7) shifting case; and (8) selective disclosure of documents or information.[27] As submitted by the Defendants, I accept that the following additional indicators should be added in appropriate circumstances where they may be relevant, namely: (1) blaming a translator for a translation; (2) maintaining the reliability or accuracy of an informal translation notwithstanding the existence of a certified translation; and (3) adoption of the evidence of the opposing party, notwithstanding that such evidence is inimical to the case of the party who called that witness.
25 Finally, with respect to contemporaneous documentary evidence and its admissibility, reference should be made to provisions of an effect of s 1305(1) of the Corporations Act.
26 It should be stressed that the effect of these provisions is that a book kept by a body corporate under a requirement of that Act is admissible in evidence in any proceeding and is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in the book.[28] As to this, in ASIC v Rich,[29] Austin J said, relevantly, that this provision: (1) allows the admission of a company's books into evidence without any 'authenticating' evidence from a witness; (2) also allows parties to rely on books to prove transactions recorded therein; and (3) 'does not elevate matters contained in the books to a plane of probative value that requires the court to disregard the context in which the matters relied on appear in the tendered document'.
27 Similarly, in GJB Building Pty Ltd v AI&PB Property Pty Ltd,[30] Nichols J made statements to like effect. Her Honour said relevantly as follows:
Section 1305(1) does not make the company's books conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, in the sense of requiring the tribunal of fact to make a finding in terms of the content of the books in the absence of proof to the contrary by the opposing party. The books are prima facie evidence of the matters stated in them, but the weight of that evidence is to be measured in accordance with the common sense of the tribunal of fact. Other evidence may suggest that the books are unreliable, including where there are drafts, or contain matters that require explanation.
28 There are two methods of creating a non‑testamentary trust: (1) a trust arising from a transfer of property by a person having power to transfer it to another person to hold that property on trust (whether the transferee is an owner, donee of a power or otherwise); or (2) a declaration of trust in which a person declares that he or she holds, or will hold, property on trust and thereby assumes, or proposes to assume, the obligations of a trustee. Such a declaration is as much as a declaration of trust as one made by the beneficial owner of the property to be subjected to the trust. The existence of an express trust depends on three things: (1) certainty as to the subject matter of the trust; (2) certainty as to the beneficiaries, the objects of the trust; and (3) certainty as to intention.
29 Where there is an unambiguous statement of intention to create a trust which leaves no uncertainty as to the terms of the trust, it will not be necessary to look beyond that statement. In the absence of an expressed intention, however, the creation of a trust depends on an intention to create a trust. The test of intention to create a trust is objective.[31] The relevant intention is thus the outward expression of that intention, and not actual intention.[32] For all practical purposes, a person's undisclosed intention is immaterial.[33] Moreover, it is not necessary that the creation of a trust is communicated to the trustee.[34] All that is required is a clear, express declaration that it is intended to be binding.[35]
30 As made clear in Byrnes v Kendle,[36] issues as to whether a trust has been created and on what terms are to be resolved according to the ordinary meaning of the words and actions the subject of the relevant dealings. It is an objective enquiry, and one that requires an examination of the 'circumstances attending the relationship between the parties'.[37]
31 The Plaintiffs appear to be suggesting in their submissions[38] that there is some further constraint or reluctance on the part of the courts to find an express trust which is alleged to have been created orally. In this respect reference is made to the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Byrnes v Kendle, setting out the following passage:[39]
In Bahr v Nicolay [No 2] [(1988) [1988] HCA 16; 164 CLR 604, 618)] Mason CJ and Dawson J approved of the expression of the "traditional attitude" by du Parcq LJ that "unless an intention to create a trust is clearly to be collected from the language used and the circumstances of the case, I think that the court ought not to be astute to discover indications of such an intention".
Reference to this passage in this judgment, as quoted, does, however, omit the remainder of that paragraph which, in my view, makes it clear that enquiry whether or not an express trust has been created orally is an objective enquiry as the authorities, more generally, indicate and without any previous position or presumption against a finding that such a trust was created.[40] This appears to be supported by the remainder of the paragraph to which reference is made in the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ, as follows:[41]
In the present case there was no degree of informality, the trust being manifested and proved by deed using the technical term "upon trust". Accordingly, to adopt what was said in Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (In liq) [(2000) 202 CLR 588, 605 [34]]:
This is not one of those cases where the language employed by the parties for the transaction is inexplicit so that the court is left to infer the relevant intention from other language used by them, from the nature of the transaction and from the circumstances attending the relationship between the parties. (footnote omitted)
32 Turning to the authorities more generally, in Eumeralla Estate Pty Ltd v Chen,[42] the Court of Appeal said:
(pp) Fourthly, whether it will be possible to infer an intention to create a trust in a particular case will depend upon a consideration of the language of the parties, construed in context, including the matrix of circumstances.
(qq) Fifthly, whether an intention to create a trust exists must be determined by reference to the "outward manifestation' of such an intention, rather than to the subjective intention of the alleged settlor.
(ss) Sixthly, trust obligations arise where equity operates on the conscience of the holder of the legal interest. A person cannot be a trustee of property if that person is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect their conscience. That is, unless the putative trustee is aware that they are intended to hold the property for the benefit of others, their conscience will not be affected in a relevant way.
33 Further, in Korda v Australian Executor Trustee Co,[43] French CJ said:
[3] The question whether an express trust exists must always be answered by reference to intention. An express trust cannot be created unless the person or persons creating it can be taken to have intended to do so. Absent, as in this case, an explicit declaration of such an intention, the court must determine whether intention is to be imputed. It does so by reference to the language of the documents or oral dealings having regard to the nature of the transactions and the circumstances attending the relationship between the parties.
...
Finding an express trust
[5] It has rightly been observed that "many express trust are not express at all. They are implied, or inferred, or perhaps imputed to people on the basis of their assumed intent". The American Law Institute's Restatement Third, Trusts uses the term "trust" to refer to an express trust as distinct from a resulting trust or constructive trust and defines it as:
"a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee."
The seventh edition of Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia offers the usefully succinct observation that the creator of an express or declared trust will have used language which expresses an intention to create a trust:
"The author of the trust has meant to create a trust, and has used language which explicitly or impliedly expresses that intention, either orally or in writing. The fact that a trust was intended may even be deducted from the conduct of the parties concerned but if there is any uncertainty as to intention, there will be no trust."(Footnote omitted).
In the present case, neither text nor context could elevate the propounded intention to the level of certainty.
[824] Where an explicit declaration of trust is absent, as is the case here, the court must determine whether intention is to be imputed. In this task, the court must refer to the language of the documents or conversations, having regard to the nature of the transactions and the circumstances attending the relation between the parties.
...
[826] In Korda, Keane J referred with approval to the statement by Dixon CJ, Williams and Fullagar JJ in Kauter v Hilton that 'the established rule that in order to constitute a trust intention to do so must be clear and that it must also be clear what the property is subject to the trust, and reasonably certain who are the beneficiaries.'
...
[828] Where a trust is said to arise through an informal document, rather than through a deed or contract, then the court will assess the question of whether a trust was created by reference to all relevant circumstances. In Byrnes v Kendle, Gummow and Hayne JJ explained:
Where ... an express inter vivos trust of personality is said to have been created by information writing or orally, then a dispute as to the presence of the necessary intention, despite inexplicit language, is resolved by evidence of what the Court in Kauter v Hilton identified as '[a]ll the relevant circumstances.'
35 Intention to create an express trust may also be found in circumstances where there is 'a pattern of business dealings each in legal form intended to follow those before it, with a resulting abbreviation in attention to detail'.[46]
36 Clearly an unambiguous reference to a 'trust' in the words of the disposition of the relevant property gives rise to the presumption that the disponor intended to create a trust.[47] However, particularly in the cases to which reference has been made, there are cases in which the parties have used inexplicit language. In such cases, the court is left to infer the relevant intention from the following: (1) other language used by the parties; (2) the nature of the transaction; and (3) the relevant circumstances, including commercial necessity, attending the relationship between the parties.[48] In cases where no express or clearly implicit intention to create a trust is shown, such as where the parties give no actual thought to the matter, whether or not there was an intention that the subject monies be kept separate from the other general monies of the recipient is often decisive of the question whether the recipient is a trustee.[49] This, of course, is a particular circumstance, where the subject property of an alleged trust is money. It is, however, an example of the court directing its attention particular circumstances. Nevertheless, as the authorities make clear, '[a]ll the relevant circumstances must be examined in order to determine whether the depositor really intended to create a trust'.[50]
(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).
(ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience, i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his conscience.
Moreover, having regard to the approach and technique of equity, as applied in Westdeutsche, it follows that after‑acquired property may be subject to an express trust.[53]
38 As the Plaintiffs submit, in Byrnes v Kendle,[54] Heydon and Crennan JJ said:
On this basis, the Plaintiffs submit that to the extent that it is suggested that subsequent communications bear on the question of what agreement, if any, was made, means that they are not relevant or admissible. Conduct of the parties subsequent to the making of the contract is not relevant, or admissible, to the interpretation of a contract; referring in this respect to the decision of the Full Court in FAI Insurance Company Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd.[55] Relying on this decision the Plaintiffs contend that the principle also extends to 'so‑called' admissions. The issue of admissions in this context is discussed in this case by Brooking J where his Honour said:[56]
The construction of a written contract is a question of law. But it seems that a question of law may be made the subject of an admission: see Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669, at p.684, per Mahoney JA. Where, however, the question of law is one of the construction of a written contract that is before the court, it seems to me that the court will derive no as opposed to little assistance in determining that question from the fact that one party or his predecessor in title has made an informal admission on the question. As a matter of strict analysis I would venture the suggestion that the admission, while theoretically available for use, is not admissible because it could not be given any weight at all by the court in construing the contract. It could be given weight if the question for the court was that of the subjective intention of the parties, for a party knows what he intended, but that is not the question, as was pointed out in a different connection by Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540, at pp.550‑1. The fact of the admission is too remote to be admissible.
39 However, as the Defendants submit, evidence said to constitute admissions against interest may also be relevant in terms of establishing the knowledge, actual or constructive, of an alleged trustee. Thus in Herdegen v FCT,[57] Gummow J said on this point:
In some factual situations where the existence of an express trust is in issue, it will be against the interest of the alleged trustee to admit the trust. Thus evidence of acts by him subsequent to the date of the alleged declaration of trust will be admitted as admissions against (but not for) his interest. Shephard v Cartwright [1954] UKHL 2; [1955] AC 431 at 445; Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81; (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 262.
40 In my view, this is not at odds with the decision of Sifris J in Australian Excecutor Trustees (SA) Ltd v Korda,[58] with respect to the possibility of an admission that assets were held on trust. Rather, the statements by Sifris J in this context indicate that had his Honour found it necessary to determine the issue, this would have depended upon the particular communications said to raise the admission. Thus Sifris J said:[59]
[93] The defendants submit that the question as to the existence of a trust must be resolved by reference to the Relevant Documents. They submit that subsequent communications in the form of admissions can only be taken into consideration in deciding whether there is a trust and not in relation to the construction of a trust. I did not understand AET to contend otherwise.
[94] The defendants submitted further that properly construed none of the communications referred to above constitute an admission as to the existence of any trust. They submit that Mr Nguyen did not have the requisite intention of admitting or confirming the existence of the trust and in any event had no authority to do so as he was not a director of either company. The position taken by the defendants was that in negotiating with its lenders it wished to do the best for Covenantholders and put their case at its highest. Mr Nguyen gave evidence that the submission made reflected a contractual position or ambit claim on the issue. The managing director of the companies, Mr L'Estrange and Mr Frame, the Chief Financial Officer of the companies both held the view that the lenders took priority ahead of any liabilities owed to Covenantholders.
[95] I have decided that it is neither appropriate nor desirable to determine this issue. If there is a trust, as I have found, there is no need to resolve this issue. If I am wrong and there is no trust it is unlikely that the admissions, such as they are, would be capable of creating an express trust. Despite the authority cited by AET, there may be difficulty in a trustee admitting that assets are held on trust when they are not. It is unlikely that an admission can create an express trust with retrospective operation with all its ramifications involving numerous proximate and remote parties (with vested interests) where none was intended or found to exist.
41 The possible question as to whether a resulting trust arises flows from the defence and counterclaim where the Defendants seek a declaration that the shares are held on trust for them and that an order be made that they be transferred to them. In the Reply to Defence to Counterclaim, the Defendants contend that if the trust was insufficiently certain then the trust property reverts to donors, namely Kee and Ari, on an automatic resulting trust.
42 The nature of a resulting trust was described in Vanta Pty Ltd v Mantovani:[60]
[137] The remedy of a resulting trust applies in relation to real property in two circumstances. First, it may apply where the transferor or settlor of property is presumed not to intend to transfer or convey beneficial ownership to the transferee. In such a case, the holding by the transferee is qualified and conditional. Second, it may apply in other circumstances not dependent on intention and arises automatically, the most relevant of which, for our purposes, is the failure of an express trust. In such a case, the settlor or creator of a trust has failed to take a step that is essential to the creation of a trust in respect of the property in issue.
And in Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation,[61] Gordon and Edelman JJ said:
[93] Like a constructive trust, which arises by operation of law, a resulting trust sometimes describes a trust in favour of a transferor that is imposed independently of the manifested intention of the transferor to create a trust. But, like an express trust, which arises due to objective or manifested intention to create a trust, a resulting trust sometimes describes a trust that was objectively intended by the transferor of property. These disparate categories are treated alike as "resulting" trusts merely by the pattern of their effect. From the Latin, resalire or resultare, the equitable interest is said to "jump back" to the settlor or those taking through the settlor.
[94] Examples of resulting trusts that have been held to arise by operation of law, irrespective of any objective intention to create a trust, are trusts that arise upon the failure of an express trust or by a transfer of a person's legal rights without their consent or knowledge. Examples of resulting trusts that arise from objective intention to create a trust are trusts that arise in favour of a transferor of property ("voluntary conveyance resulting trust") or a contributor of purchase money ("purchase money resulting trust"). This appeal concerns only this latter category of resulting trust, namely those trusts that arise by objective intention.
43 In summary, an 'automatic resulting trust' arises by operation of law, automatically, where an express trust fails in recognition of the contributor's intention that the trustee/recipient does not take the trust property beneficially. Where an express trust fails, the trust property is returned to the person who contributed the trust fund such as the 'real' settlor.[62]
44 However, clarifying their position, the Defendants say that this is not a case where the express trust fails. It is said that given that the trust relied upon is a bare trust, it is one to which an automatic resulting trust would not ever be likely to apply as the resulting trust would necessarily be a bare trust on the same terms as the trust said to have failed. Rather, the Defendants say that this point is raised to demonstrate the fallacy in the Plaintiffs' attempts to impugn the trust insofar as it does not yield a different result.
45 The Plaintiffs did not advance an illegality defence and the Defendants proceeded on that basis. The Defendants submit that for various reasons, the non‑reliance upon the illegality defence is sound. They say these reasons are as follows: (1) Kee and Ari were entitled to allocate Kegland shares on the basis that they would retain the beneficial ownership of the shares;[63] (2) the alleged trust was not illegal; (3) the formation of the alleged trust did not involve the commission of a prohibited act; and (4) the relevant purpose - that is the concealment of the beneficial ownership of the shares - was not illegal in the Yango Pastoral[64] sense.
46 Notwithstanding these matters, the Defendants do, however, note the principles relating to the illegality defence. Moreover, the absence of illegality is relevant to the nature and scope of the unclean hands defence. In this case, it is contended that, in respect of the unclean hands defence, it is important to note that the alleged 'depravity' does not involve any form of alleged illegality.
47 In relation to the alleged 'depravity', the Plaintiffs submit that the MCH ruse[65] is at the heart of the supposed trust, and is the reason, on the case of the Defendants, that it came about or was needed or required. In Anaconda Nickel v Edensor,[66] it was said by Buchanan JA (quoting Attwood v Small[67]):
... that general fraudulent conduct signifies nothing; that general dishonesty of purpose signifies nothing; that attempts to overreach go for nothing; that an intention in design to deceive may go for nothing, unless all this dishonesty of purpose, all this fraud, all this intention and design, can be connected with the particular transaction, and not only connected with the particular transaction, but must be made to be the very ground upon which the transaction took place, and must have given rise to this contract.
In Anaconda, Buchanan JA nevertheless found that the principle was not to apply, concluding:[68]
In the present case the equity sued upon arose from the assumption induced in [Edensor] by Anaconda that it would not complete the purchase of the shares. Its promise to do so was not induced by any anterior wrongdoing on the past of [Edensor]. The variation agreement was directed, not to Anaconda, but to the bondholders. Further, even if the variation agreement was brought into existence with aim of deceit, in fact no deceit was practised. The unmeritorious conduct now relied upon by Anaconda did not bear the requisite necessary relation to the equity sued by [Edensor] to found refusal of relief.
48 In the present case, the Plaintiffs observe that Ari and Kee accepted that the reason for the alleged trust was to hide their involvement in Kegland from MCH and Maggie Hu. Hence they say it follows that the Court ought not enforce the alleged trust because to make good their claim and to obtain an order for the transfer of shares, Ari and Kee must prove and rely upon their own wrongful conduct which has an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for.[71]
49 As indicated, in the context of the possible relevance to the unclean hands defence, the Defendants refer to the illegality defence. As to each of the relevant types of illegality, they refer to the following passage in The Principles of Equity:[72]
Equity may refuse to grant relief with respect to an illegal transaction. A transaction may be illegal in at least three ways. First, it may be illegal because it consists in the formation of a prohibited contract or trust. Secondly, it may be illegal because it entails the commission of a prohibited act; for example, equity will not allow a claim in respect of an agreement to recover illegal gambling debts (Quarrier v Colston (1842) 1 Ph 147; 41 ER 587). Thirdly, a transaction may be illegal because, although entailing neither the formation of a prohibited contract or trust nor the commission of a prohibited act, it is "associated with or in furtherance of illegal purposes" (Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd [1978] HCA 42; (1978) 139 CLR 410, Jacobs J at 432, cited in Nelson v Nelson (1995) 132 ALR 133, Deane and Gummow JJ at 144). It is identifying and responding to this third type of illegality that the courts find most difficult and the law in relation to this third type is in a state of flux. [Defendants' emphasis added]
50 Concluding, in this context, the Defendants submit that the position as put by the Plaintiffs does not follow as they do not allege that: (1) the alleged trust is a prohibited trust; (2) the formation of the alleged trust entailed the commission of a prohibited act; or (3) the formation of the alleged trust was associated with an illegal or illegitimate purpose.
51 The maxim that 'they who come to equity must come with clean hands' goes to the very origins and nature of the equitable jurisdiction. Emphasising this position, is the following statement in On Equity:[73]
The rather picturesquely expressed maxim, 'they who come to equity must come with clean hands', reflects the origins and discretionary nature of equity, as does the maxim 'they who seek equity must do equity'. The two maxims complement each other, each looking to the conduct of the plaintiff, as it would appear that the 'clean hands' maxim is derived from the other maxim. However, while the maxim 'they who seek equity must do equity' looks to the plaintiff's future conduct, the 'clean hands' maxim looks to past conduct. The combined effect of the maxims is that: (i) a plaintiff must be prepared to do what is right and fair going forward; and (ii) their previous conduct with respect to the particular transaction must be 'clean', because 'he who has committed Inequity ... shall not have Equity'.
The maxim is capable of being applied directly as a 'discretionary defence'. In any case where a claimant seeks equitable relief, the court has discretion to refuse relief on the basis of the claimant's 'unclean hands'. It does so because '[n]o Court of equity could aid a man to derive advantage from his own wrong'. The principle is so fundamental to the equitable jurisdiction that it cannot be excluded by agreement between the parties.
A plaintiff is not necessary debarred from equitable relief by reason of unclean hands if the misconduct has either ceased or as the result of an accident and will not recur. The court 'declines to take the view that because the plaintiff's hands were once dirty they can never be washed'. However, the plaintiff's hands must be cleansed before the proceedings are commenced. Mere repentance expressed in counsel's closing address is insufficient: EDPI Pty Ltd v Rapdocs Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 195.
52 In order to establish the defence of unclean hands, a respondent must point to some type of impropriety on the part of the claimant which: (1) is 'depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense'; and (2) bears an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sought.[75] The defence is a discretionary one having regard to the nature of the equitable jurisdiction. In assessing whether the defence applies, the court must take into account all the circumstances of the case.[76]
53 In Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and others v Yuri Privalov & Ors,[77] Andrew Smith J described the 'unclean hands' defence in these terms:
The enquiry whether the maxim is to be applied is, of its nature, fact‑sensitive, and there is a danger in making any general statements about the limits of its application. However, the authorities do, I think, justify these observations: that the maxim is directed, at least typically, to conduct that is in some way immoral and deliberate; that not all misconduct deprives an applicant of equitable relief and the misconduct may be too trivial for it to import this consequence; and the court will assess the gravity and effect of misconduct cumulatively, so that, while the elements of misconduct taken individually might be too trivial for the maxim to be applied, they might be sufficient taken together.
54 As observed by Andrew Smith J in Fiona Trust, the perennial difficulty in these cases is defining with precision the types of impropriety which amounts to 'depravity' in a legal as well as in a moral sense. The authorities do, however, disclose four types of impropriety that may enliven this defence:
(a) where the claimant has been guilty of some type of serious misrepresentation that has an immediate and necessary relation to the equity for which the claimant sues - for example, specific performance of a contract has been denied on the basis of misrepresentation even though in the circumstances the defendant has not rescinded the contract;[78]
(b) where the claimant has materially misled the court or otherwise attempted to abuse its processes;[79]
(c) where fraud, in its broad sense, is said to amount to 'legal depravity' - for example, the House of Lords refused to protect copyright where a book was written in breach of a fiduciary duty;[80] and
(d) where the 'legal depravity' is gross sexual immorality.
55 In relation to the second type of misconduct, there are three English cases in which the court has regarded attempts to mislead it as presenting good grounds for refusing equitable relief.[81] As to these cases, the Defendants submit there are three matters which arise from the cases as matters to be taken into account; the last of which is significant for the present case. First, in these English cases, such conduct was designed to set up a false case, or it was designed to bolster the truth with fabricated evidence. Second, in these cases, the connection between the misconduct and the claim to equitable relief was immediate. Third, these cases were ones where the misconduct was by way of deception in the course of the very litigation directed to securing the equitable relief.
56 In any event, the Defendants say, critically, that the unclean hands defence does not operate in proceedings where the claimant seeks only declaratory relief.[82] The court's jurisdiction to make a binding declaration of right without granting consequential relief is a statutory rather than an equitable remedy.[83] As the Defendants observed, there are numerous decisions to like effect.[84]
57 In the present context it is contended by the Defendants that the starting point is the nature and the extent of the substantive relief sought by way of counterclaim. The claimed relief is, it is said, purely declaratory relief, and so it follows that the unclean hands defence cannot apply. In their counterclaim, the relevant parties seek the following relief: (1) 'A declaration that LL UP holds the Kegland shares on trust for Kee and Ari'; (2) 'An order that LL UP transfer the Kegland shares held by LL UP to or at the direction of Kee and Ari'; (3) 'Costs'; and (4) 'Such other orders as the Court sees fit'.
58 Thus, the Defendants say, critically, the counterclaimants do not seek equitable relief and say as follows (referring to numbered matters appearing in the immediately preceding paragraph):[85]
(a) As to (1), the relevant jurisdiction of this Court arises under section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) read in conjunction with section 36 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). Declaratory relief is discretionary in nature. The discretion is to be exercised according to the facts and circumstances of the individual case, and the considerations that may be relevant to the exercise of the discretion are so numerous that it is not possible to enumerate them.[86]
(b) As to (2), the proposed relief is facultative only - it is designed to avoid further litigation, including a further action to rectify the register of members under section 175 of the Corporations Act. It is not "consequential relief" in the relevant sense. In any event, the Kegland parties no longer seek this relief.
(c) Lastly, as to (3) and (4), such relief is not "consequential relief" in the relevant sense. Further, as to (4), the Kegland parties seek no consequential or other relief.
(d) In these circumstances, by their counterclaim, the Kegland parties now seek purely declaratory relief, in which case the clean hands doctrine cannot apply (c.f. what is said in paragraph 348 of the plaintiffs' submissions dated 26 July 2024).
(e) Contrary to what is said in paragraph 347(i) of the plaintiffs' submissions dated 26 July 2024 ("... without it [a transfer order] the declaration does nothing and goes nowhere"), the declaration sought would quell completely and finally the controversy in respect of the threshold issue. The practical consequences are explained in the next subparagraph.
(f) If the Court makes the proposed declaration, all that will occur is that, as the declared beneficial owners of the shares, Kee and Ari will call a meeting of the company and pass a resolution to amend the share register to reflect the true position (and, presumably the directorship, assuming Hong has not already resigned), and thereafter write to ASIC to ask them to adjust their records to reflect the true position. This is simply an indoor management issue followed by ASIC being informed thereof.
Conversely (and again assuming the Court makes the proposed declaration), what could Hong and/or his company do to prevent this from occurring? Nothing is required of Hong and/or his company to give effect to such a declaration, and were either to attempt to stand in the way of this occurring (it is not clear how) then an application pursuant to section 175 of the Corporations Act or the Court's equitable jurisdiction will be made to rectify the register of Kegland Distribution's members. An unauthorised person registered as a member ought not appear upon the register as a member of the company.[87] It is difficult to see how or why Hong's company could sensibly resist an alteration of the register based on the declaration, assuming it were made.
(g) In each of these scenarios, Hong and his company could not resist the alteration of the company or ASIC's share register to remove the latter as the registered and beneficial owner of the shares in question.
Moreover, the Defendants make one further point, namely that it should be noted that Hong engaged in dishonest conduct in the MCH proceeding and, it is alleged, he gave false evidence on oath.[88]
59 The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the relief that the Defendants seek should be denied on the basis of the 'clean hands' defence. Further, they contend that the relief sought goes beyond mere declaratory relief, as put by the Defendants in their submissions. In support of this position, the Plaintiffs submit:[89]
In a proceeding in which purely declaratory relief is sought, as distinct from a proceeding in which a declaration is sought, for example, in aid of the grant of an injunction, which is of course itself a remedy in equity, a defence of unclean hands is no defence. This is so because the grant of a declaration is not the exercise of hands is no defence to any merely statutory remedy".
A mere declaration has legal effect, but otherwise does nothing: Ambridge at [66]. The principle that clean hands does not apply to purely declaratory relief does not apply where ancillary relief involving coercive orders of the Court are also sought: Ambridge at [65]. Vickery J then said [75], relying on Meyers v. Casey[92] at 93‑94:
On the other hand where a declaration is made which is ancillary to or part of equitable relief, the usual equitable defences may apply. Although the categories are not closed, two examples of such relief are: the grant of an injunction, where a declaration may be made in aid of the injunction; and secondly where a declaration is made as a means of imposing a constructive trust as an equitable remedy in the appropriate case.
Thus, the exception to clean hands also does not apply where the remedy of a constructive trust is sought. Vickery J said on [77]:
Accordingly, the imposition of a constructive trust by declaration being an equitable remedy should reflect the principles of equity, including where warranted, application of the classic equitable defences. The remedy of a declaration of a constructive trust may be lost by reason of the operation of such doctrines of equity, including unclean hands.
Here:
(i) relief beyond a mere declaration is sought, namely, an order to transfer the shares. That is necessary relief: without it the declaration does nothing and goes nowhere. The court would not make a declaration, without more, as it will not do so if that involves an academic question.
(ii) a resulting trust is claimed if the alleged trust not "completely constituted". The intervention of equity is needed to confirm, establish or extend that trust. This is discussed further below.
- Since an order for the transfer of the shares is sought, so as to enforce the alleged trust, the doctrine of clean hands applies. Since the Defendants did not have clean hands the relief they seek should be denied.
60 In my view, the proper conclusion with respect to the defence of unclean hands in the context of this proceeding is that this defence does not apply as, on the basis of the material and reasons relied upon and advanced by the Defendants, the relief sought is not equitable in nature but is, rather, merely declaratory. Moreover, for the reasons which follow, declaratory relief is meaningful rather than merely arid relief in the hands of the Defendants in the context of this proceeding.
61 The Corporations Act provides that the court may make an order under s 233 if:
(a) the conduct of a company's affairs; or
(b) an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or
(c) a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;
(d) contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or
(e) oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
63 In relation to the exercise of the court's discretion under these provisions, as observed in Auswild v Bergmuller:[103]
From a review of the authorities, the better and predominant view is that the sections are enlivened if the conduct occurs at any time and notwithstanding that it may have ceased at the time of trial. However this will be of relevance in determining whether and to what extent orders should be made. There may be no need or utility for any remedy. Any remedy will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.
64 The reference in Auswild v Bergmuller was to the Court of Appeal decision in Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd.[108] Although the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed by the High Court, the following passage in the judgment of Giles JA does not appear to be doubted or inconsistent with the approach of the High Court to the construction and operation of these provisions. It is, in the present context, apposite:[109]
65 For the purposes of s 232 of the Corporations Act, s 53 of that Act identifies the 'affairs of a body corporate' as including the 'promotion, formation, membership, control, business, trading, transactions and dealings of the body' (s 53(a)) and 'the internal management and proceedings of the body' (s 53(c)). The orders which may be made include, relevantly, an order for the purchase of any shares by any member (s 233(1)(d)) and an order that the company be wound up (s 233(1)(a)). Each subsection in s 232 has separate and independent operation, although the conduct, acts or omissions, resolutions or proposed resolutions relevant for the purposes of s 232(d) may overlap with those relevant for the purposes of s 232(e).[110] The expression 'conduct of the company's affairs' in s 232(a) is construed broadly and includes internal management and proceedings.[111]
66 The principles to be applied in an assessment of whether conduct is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory for the purpose of s 232(e) are helpfully summarised as follows and with reference to authorities:[112]
(a) The essential criterion of oppressive conduct for the purpose of s 232(e) is that of commercial unfairness.[113]
(b) Unfairness is assessed by reference to whether 'objectively in the eyes of a commercial bystander, there has been unfairness, namely conduct that is so unfair that reasonable directors who consider the matter would not have thought the decision fair' and can be established by wrongful exclusion from participation in a company's management or by conduct in breach of a shareholders or services agreement even if the person undertaking that conduct thinks he or she is acting properly.[114]
(c) Whether the treatment of one member was fair also needs to be assessed against the background of the fair treatment of the whole body of members. Fairness cannot be considered in a vacuum, and in relation to a family company can only be considered in the light of the history of the company and the family and the purpose for which the company was formed.
(d) The question is whether there has been unfairness. The test is objective, and it is viewed from the perspective of the commercial bystander. As the test is objective, whether or not the conduct is oppressive will not depend upon the motives for what was done. It is the effect of the conduct that is material.[115]
(e) The task is to be undertaken in the context of the particular relationship in issue,[116] and in the context of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the oppression.[117]
(f) The oppression need not be of a member in its capacity as a member, and may include conduct that impacts upon a member in his capacity as a director.[118]
(g) The doctrine is informed by equitable considerations.[119] However, there is no independent or overriding requirement that it should be just and equitable to grant relief or that the petitioner should come to the court with clean hands.[120]
(h) It is unnecessary for an applicant to prove that the respondent knew or believed that the impugned conduct was unfair.[121] A defendant may act oppressively even though its motives are honest.[122]
(i) The conduct of a company's affairs may be oppressive even though the conduct is otherwise lawful, and the person engaging in the conduct believes he or she is acting lawfully.[123] An exercise of a discretionary power under a company's constitution in a particular way may enliven s 232.[124]
(j) A single instance of oppression is sufficient to constitute a basis for relief.[125] Separate instances of conduct may, cumulatively, constitute oppression.[126]
(k) The oppression need not exist at the time of the application or trial.[127]
(a) The Court is not confined to a consideration only of conduct that can be characterised as 'commercially unfair'.[130]
(b) The test is objective and determined by reference to whether the conduct adheres to accepted standards of corporate behaviour, or is in accordance with how reasonable directors would act in attending to the affairs of the company, with respect to the interests of an individual hypothetical member.[131]
68 As indicated previously in Auswild v Bergmuller, with particular reference to the decision of Sifris J in Exton v Extons,[132] the court will exercise its discretion to order a remedy found to be appropriate depending on the particular circumstances of the case. With respect to remedies, the following appear from the authorities:[133]
(a) Once oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory conduct is established, the power of the court to make orders granting relief is set out in s 233 of the Corporations Act.
(b) Section 233 confers upon the court the power to make such orders as it considers appropriate, including but not limited to those set out in this provision. The wide range of exemplary remedies outlined in s 233, underlined by the unlimited discretion to make any other order, empowers the court to address the full variety of circumstances in which oppression may occur.
(c) The point of any remedy is to relieve the oppression in the most effective way in the particular circumstances.[134]
(d) Normally the court gives the minimum relief that is appropriate to neutralise the oppression.[135] In the first instance, the court should consider the "least intrusive" remedy that will eliminate the oppression.[136]
(e) In Fedorovitch v St Aubins Pty Ltd,[137] Young J explained the purpose of s 246AA of the Corporations Law, the predecessor of s 233. In this regard, His Honour said as follows:[138]
The section which is now s 246AA first appeared in the 1948 English Companies Act as s 210. Its purpose was to protect the minority, who, without such protection, were in a situation where their capital had been invested in a project which was being employed oppressively against them, yet they could not recover their capital because it was locked into the venture. The aim, accordingly, was either to stop the oppression within the company or else to wind the company up so that the venture's capital could be released.
Since its original appearance in the Act, the section has been reframed to allow other remedies, so that today the prime remedy is a buy‑out by one side of the other. Essentially, however, the aim still is to permit the minority to free its capital, even though it has locked its capital into a venture. The reason for this is that it is unfair that the capital should continue to be locked up if the circumstances are indicative of oppression. Accordingly, the prime thrust of the section is to either make the venture work so that the capital is properly employed, or to allow the capital to be removed. It is not for punishment or compensation or for making the profit that ought to have been made had the venture been successful.
69 As the authorities indicate, there is a question whether the court can order a non‑member to purchase a member's shares as a remedy in oppression proceedings. In Hylepin Pty Ltd v Doshay Pty Ltd,[139] the defendants argued that s 232(1) only contemplates orders for the purchase of shares by a member of the company under s 233(1)(d) or by the company itself under s 233(1)(e). O'Bryan J rejected this argument on the basis that, while paragraphs (d) and (e) of s 233(1) are limited in the manner stated by the defendants, those paragraphs are not expressed to be exhaustive of the kinds of orders that the court may grant under the section.[140] The principles to be applied with respect to the valuation of shares which are ordered by the court to be purchased as a remedy under s 233 are set out in Smith Martis Cork & Rajan Pty Ltd v Benjamin Corp Pty Ltd.[141]
70 As the authorities to which reference has been made indicate, in circumstances where the oppression has or will be brought to an end it is not appropriate for the court to make orders beyond those orders which will have the effect of ending the oppression. Thus, in the present context for the reasons which follow, there would be no basis for the Court to make an order that Kee and Ari purchase the first Plaintiff's shares in Kegland.
71 In light of the centrality of issues of credibility in this matter, before I commence my analysis of the evidence, I consider it prudent to make some observations as to credibility of the factual witnesses. First, this was a matter where key witnesses for both parties engaged in conduct which gave rise to very serious questions of credit and, in this sense, I consider that neither party came to the table with "clean hands". By way of example, over the course of the trial I was required to grant three certificates under s 128 of the Evidence Act - being certificates issued by the Court where the privilege against self‑incrimination is invoked - (s 128 certificate).
72 Second, I note that both parties have submitted, to varying degrees, that in light of what they say are fundamental issues with the credit of the opposing party's witnesses, the Court should rely, where possible, on the contemporaneous documentary evidence available. In this regard, the Plaintiffs say the Court should place primary reliance on the contemporaneous documents in evidence (which they say are the share certificates, minutes, accounts, and draft share sale agreement) over the evidence of the Defendants' witnesses, pointing in this regard to the observations of Lee J in Webb v Getswift (No 5)[142] and the principles summarised above taken from Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor[143] and as cited by approval by this Court.[144] Similarly, many of the 13 propositions advanced by the Defendants as the basis for how to approach the assessment of credit and character of witnesses relate to documentary evidence.[145]
73 I accept, as uncontroversial, that the documentary evidence provides the clearest basis to make many of the necessary findings in this proceeding. Although, as I discuss below, I do not accept the Kegland business documents, such as the share certificates, provide an accurate or complete picture of the incorporation of Kegland Distribution or the relationship between Kee, Ari and Hong. As such, in several key regards, such as the conversation between Ari and Hong on 6 December 2017 said to give rise to the Alleged Oral Agreement, it is not possible for me to rely on documentary evidence and I must make findings based solely on the witnesses account of the relevant events.
74 I turn now to the witnesses. As the Plaintiffs' main witness, Hong gave evidence in relation to the central issues in this proceeding including, critically, the conversation with Ari on 6 December 2017 said to give rise to the Hong Trust, the events surrounding the incorporation of Kegland Distribution, and the negotiations in the lead up to the share issue in early 2021. Much of that evidence directly contradicted the evidence of Kee and Ari. Hong's evidence‑in‑chief comprised of three witness statements sworn 2 September 2022, 26 April 2023 and 27 July 2023 and he gave evidence over four days on the second to fourth days of the trial, being 8 to 10 and 13 May 2014. On 9 May 2024, I granted Hong a s 128 certificate in relation to the matters set out below regarding his conduct in the proceeding with MCH. Ultimately, he maintained that his evidence in proceeding with MCH was true.
75 The Plaintiffs generally contend there is no basis upon which to impugn Hong's credit. In this regard they focus solely on evidence given by Hong in cross‑examination in this proceeding regarding his contribution to Kegland's customer list and what the Defendants say was false affidavit evidence on this issue that he gave in the course of earlier proceedings with MCH. The Plaintiffs say that this does not provide a basis to criticise Hong because, in short, Hong considered the contents of the affidavit to be true when it was sworn, the affidavit was prepared from material provided by Kee and Ari and, in any case, Hong's evidence in cross‑examination during this trial, when properly understood, was correct.[146]
76 Conversely, the Defendants submit the Court should find that, having regard to Hong's evidence in its totality and the Painter v Hutchinson[147] indictors, Hong was not a credible or reliable witness, that his evidence should not be relied on unless corroborated by indisputable contemporaneous documents, and that, where there is a conflict, Ari's evidence should be preferred over Hong's. They say, in particular, that he was an unsatisfactory witness in relation to the evidence he gave concerning the creation and operation of the Kegland business and when confronted with the implausible aspects within his own evidence.[148]
77 Hong was not an impressive witness. Although I consider the customer list evidence was untruthful, I do not consider that to be determinative in relation to his credibility. However, in cross‑examination, and simply by way of example, Hong consistently gave answers which were evasive,[149] disingenuous,[150] long‑winded in order to avoid responding to the question asked,[151] and sought pedantic clarification regarding simple and straightforward propositions.[152] At times, his written evidence contained internal inconsistences[153] and failed to make reference to contemporaneous documents uniquely within his knowledge.[154] Moreover, I consider the decision to maintain a privilege claim over the 'Fight the Landlord' messages,[155] in light of the content of those messages, weighs significantly against Hong's credibility.[156]
78 Further, and again by way of example, credibility issues were also said to arise in relation to translations contained in Hong's written evidence. The Defendants say this led to the misleading impression that a particular message, as set out in his witness statement, was a certified translation when it was not.[157]
79 Summarising at a very high level the Plaintiffs' submissions on this point, they argue this allegation is misconceived, saying Ari had access to the original audio WeChat message at all times, understood what had been said by Hong and thus was never misled as to its contents. Further, it is said that Hong's witness statement did in fact distinguish between the informal and certified translations and the affidavit did not assert the relevant message had undergone a certified translation. Moreover, according to the Plaintiffs, there was no substantive difference between the informal and accredited translation, nor was there any evidence that Hong knew of any difference between the two translations. Finally, the Plaintiffs say, in any event the witness statements of witnesses from both parties took a similar approach to the translation of messages, including both informal and certified translations due to the quantity of messages in Mandarin that were being dealt with, so if criticism is to be levelled at Hong then it should also be levelled at the other witnesses who undertook this practice.[158]
80 Notwithstanding my tentative view that there is a material difference between the informal and certified translation and that this conduct should weigh against Hong's credibility, I accept the thrust of the Plaintiffs' submissions in this regard that, in the context of the voluminous documentary evidence, and the conduct of the parties in relation to documentary evidence more generally, that I should decline to make any specific findings against Hong in this regard.
81 Nevertheless, when considering his evidence in its totality, as submitted by the Defendants, in my view Hong's evidence fell foul of the Painter v Hutchinson indictors that I set out at previously.[159] In the circumstances, I consider that Hong was a wholly unsatisfactory witness, who was inclined to give evidence which he considered supported his interests regardless of the truthfulness of that evidence. During his oral evidence, I also observed what I consider to be numerous and intentional attempts by him to frustrate the cross‑examination process. Thus I am satisfied that unless his evidence is uncontested, or supported by contemporaneous documents, Hong's evidence should either be rejected or given little to no weight. Of course, I will still consider the merits of his evidence on an issue by issue basis in my analysis of the evidence below.
82 Leon Yang (Leon), who at various times worked as a lawyer for Hong's companies or for law firms representing Hong, was the Plaintiffs' second witness. While Leon gave evidence in relation to a number of issues in dispute, his evidence is most relevant with respect to events from 2020 onwards, particularly a group chat called 'Fight the Landlord' involving him, Hong and Hong's accountant Jerry Man (Jerry). Leon's evidence‑in‑chief comprises of two witness statements, sworn 26 April 2023 and 27 July 2023, and he was cross‑examined over three days on 13 to 15 May 2024. As I understand their submissions, the Plaintiffs do not put forward any specific submissions in relation to any findings I should, or should not, make in respect of Leon's credibility.
83 The Defendants, in contrast, make extensive submissions on Leon's credibility.[160] I do not consider it necessary to set out the detail of those submissions. It is sufficient to confirm I have taken those submissions, in their totality, into account and consider the thrust of the submissions to be that Leon gave evidence which was, for example, evasive and attempted to obfuscate the truth,[161] failed to accept simple propositions,[162] and gave evidence that was illogical or implausible.[163] In effect, the Defendants say Leon was a 'shill for Hong, whom he clearly relied on for career progression' and that, at times, in cross‑examination he put himself forward as a commentator, attempting to provide meaning to documents or statements made by Hong and in doing so showed his desire to advocate for the position of his supporter. These matters, it is contended, are particularly serious in light of Leon's role as an officer of the Court.[164] As is, the Defendants say, the fact that, in the context of the privilege claim over the 'Fight the Landlord' messages mentioned above, Leon claimed he received the messages in his capacity as a lawyer but in cross‑examination in the trial resiled from the position to the extent he questioned whether he was in fact acting as a lawyer at the relevant times.[165] He is not, in the circumstances, credible.
84 In my opinion Leon was a less than satisfactory witness. In addition to the Painter v Hutchinson indicators[166] contended by the Defendants, which I accept were present, at times during cross‑examination Leon also took an unnecessarily and inappropriately combative approach to querying the certified translation of documents put to him. For example, he questioned the use of the word 'proxy' in a translation, suggesting instead that a better translation would be 'hold on behalf of'.[167] As I accepted in the context of the Painter v Hutchinson indicators,[168] blaming the translator for a translation is another indicator of unsatisfactory witness evidence. As observed by Leggatt J in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor, the nature of litigation 'subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases', and where a witness has a 'tie of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to a particular party in the proceeding', they often have a stake in a certain version of events.[169] In this case, having taken into account all of the factors above, I am satisfied that Leon's loyalty to Hong is such that it tainted his evidence, particularly that given in cross‑examination. In circumstances where much of Leon's evidence was given against the backdrop of contemporaneous documents, in the form of the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, his evidence was frequently implausible, if not dishonest, when held against that documentary evidence.
85 Before looking to the remaining witnesses, it bears noting that the Plaintiffs did not call Hong's accountant, Jerry, as a witness, despite his participation in several of the pivotal WeChat groups. The Defendants submit, very summarily in a footnote to their written closing submissions, that the failure to call Jerry means the Court should draw a Jones v Dunkel inference in respect of any evidence that Jerry might have given.[170] The Plaintiffs have made no submissions in this respect. In the circumstances of this case, including the limited submissions on this point and other the evidence available to me with respect to the issues in dispute, I consider it unnecessary to decide whether such an inference should be drawn.
86 The Defendants called Kee, Ari and Sam as witnesses. Due to the similar nature of the submissions, it is convenient to deal the credibility of all three together. This is because central to their credibility is their concession, made part way through the trial, that they lied in their written evidence regarding the timing of when the Share Option Agreement underpinning the share issue had been entered into. Their witness statements, as first sworn, stated that the Share Option Agreement had been entered into in January 2018, with their amended evidence being that the agreement had in fact been entered into in December 2020 and backdated to 2018. These are undoubtedly serious matters.
87 Ari was the first witness to be called by the Defendants. As to be expected, Ari gave evidence in relation to the breadth of matters in dispute, including but not limited to the nature of his conversation with Hong on 6 December 2017 said to constitute the Alleged Oral Agreement. His evidence‑in‑chief comprised two witness statements, sworn 10 November 2022 (revised 12 May 2024) and 30 June 2023, and he was cross‑examined over the course of three days on 15 to 17 May 2024. On 16 May 2024, I granted Ari a s 128 certificate in relation to matters connected to an affidavit he swore in the proceedings with MCH.
88 In short, the Defendants accept that Ari told serious lies about the Share Option Agreement and this is a matter that reflects poorly on his credibility. The Defendants also accept that Ari lied in the course of the proceeding with MCH but contend that Ari's motivations behind this lie, being that faced with threats from MCH he was naturally concerned about his ability to conduct the Kegland business and acted accordingly, explains but does not excuse his behaviour. This is a matter that also weighs against his credibility. Nevertheless, they contend the fact that he admitted to the lies, and apologised to the Court, reflects more positively on him. Moreover, they say the fact he told those lies does not require the Court to reject the remainder of his evidence, that the remaining evidence is consistent with the documentary evidence and is inherently plausible. They also say it is noteworthy that Ari was not challenged in cross‑examination on many of the issues underpinning the threshold issue. In sum, they contend Ari's evidence in cross‑examination was satisfactory and he did not demonstrate any of the Painter v Hutchinson indicators.[171]
89 Kee was the second witness called by the Defendants. Like Ari he gave evidence on each of the key matters in dispute including, in particular, in relation to the incorporation of Kegland Hardware and Kegland Distribution and the circumstances surrounding the backdated Share Option Agreement. Kee's evidence‑in‑chief comprised of two witness statements, sworn 10 November 2022 (revised 12 May 2024) and 30 June 2023. He was cross‑examined over the ninth and tenth day of the trial, being 17 and 20 May 2024. On 17 May 2024, I granted Kee a s 128 certificate covering matters relating to affidavit material he swore in the proceeding with MCH.
90 The Defendants' submissions directed to Kee's credibility largely mirror those made with respect to Ari. That is, in very summary form, they accept the lies Kee told in relation to the Share Option Agreement and during the proceeding with MCH are serious matters which tell against his credibility, however, like Ari, they emphasise that he admitted to those lies and apologised to the Court. Furthermore, they say his lies with respect to the Share Option Agreement are understandable, though not excusable, when viewed through the lens of the existence of the Hong Trust and Hong reneging on their agreement. The Defendants also contend that Kee's manner of giving evidence was satisfactory and did not give rise to any Painter v Hutchinson indicators[172] and, crucially, he was not challenged on the essential elements of his written evidence.[173]
91 Sam was the Defendants' third witness. Sam's evidence was primarily directed towards the events surrounding the incorporation of Kegland Distribution in December 2017, the Partnership Agreement, and the Share Option Agreement in the context of the share issue. His evidence‑in‑chief comprised of one witness statement sworn 10 November 2022 (revised 13 May 2024). He was initially scheduled to give cross‑examination for half a day on 21 May 2024. However, part way through cross‑examination on that day, a medical event necessitated an adjournment. Ultimately his cross‑examination was resumed via videolink in Jakarta on 17 July 2024.
92 At the outset, the Defendants accept that Sam was not an impressive witness, they concede he gave repetitive answers to simple questions and this was likely borne from a desire to help his friends, Ari and Kee. However, they contend that it must be recognised that Sam gave evidence that was against his interests because, if accepted, his evidence would have him lose 80% of the shares registered in his name. Moreover, they say the manner in which Sam gave evidence, namely his lack of ability to grasp detail or deal with matters in a coherent, structured way, bolsters the evidence of Ari and Kee that Sam was a stand‑in director with a limited role in Kegland.[174]
93 On the other hand, the Plaintiffs focus collectively on Ari, Kee and Sam's conduct in both the proceeding with MCH and in this proceeding, particularly as pertaining to their written evidence and what the Plaintiffs say were failures to undertake proper discovery in both proceedings. They contend that, in the context of this conduct and lies, Ari, Kee and Sam's evidence should be treated with a high degree of scepticism and should only be accepted where it is supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence or constitutes an admission.[175] In this regard, they assert that the backdated Share Option Agreement 'formed the basis of the Defendants' case until it was conceded (as it had to be)' and that the assumption the Share Option Agreement was valid infected the presentation of the written evidence of the Defendants' witnesses as a whole.[176]
94 In supporting these overarching submissions the Plaintiffs also contend, in summary:
(a) that little weight should be placed on the witness statements of Kee, Ari and Sam in circumstances where those statement were drafted by lawyers. In this respect, they rely on the fact that, as discussed below, Mr Amos' witness statement failed to address events in late 2020 because the lawyers, ignorant of Kee, Ari and Sam's lies in relation to the Share Option Agreement, had not considered the period to be important as a basis to argue that the portrayal of events in the witness statements, in general, is not fair or accurate;[177]
(b) that a striking feature of the case is the admission of Kee and Ari that they had deliberately misled the Court in the proceeding with MCH by maintaining the position that they had no stake in Kegland (which they now claim to have) and that, in contrast Hong maintains he told the truth in that proceeding. Further, they say it is telling that in explaining their lies in the MCH proceeding they lied to this Court insofar as their evidence regarding the Share Option Agreement. Further, in maintaining the lies in the proceeding with MCH they filed false pleadings and failed to provide proper discovery, for example by failing to discover the Partnership Agreement or relevant WeChat messages;[178]
(c) that by maintaining the Share Option Agreement had been signed in 2018, the Defendants filed false pleadings and written evidence in this proceeding, that they only admitted to their lies in the face of overwhelming documentary evidence in circumstances where they resisted amendments to pleadings which was egregious conduct, and doubled down on the lie by falsely instructing their solicitors in relation to the metadata of the Share Option Agreement document. In this regard, they say it should be inferred that the Defendants would have persisted with their lie had the balance of the documentary evidence not been against them. Further, like in the proceeding with the MCH, the Plaintiffs say that the Defendants knowingly failed to provide proper discovery in this proceeding, including, by way of example, failing to discover emails from late 2020 between Kee and Elysium Accounting regarding a draft share sale agreement such that the emails were produced under subpoena from Elysium and the late discovery of skype messages between Kee, Ari and Sam in late 2020 regarding the Share Option Agreement;[179]
(d) that the Defendants' explanation for the absence of documents supporting their case is implausible;[180] and
(e) that the Defendants, in this proceeding and the proceeding with MCH, committed serious and extensive breaches of a number of their overarching obligations under the Civil Procedure Act 2010.[181]
95 The lies of Kee, Ari and Sam in this proceeding and in the proceeding with MCH are serious matters which must weigh against them in my consideration of their credibility; as is accepted by the parties. These were deliberate lies intentionally maintained, as contended by the Plaintiffs, through the filing of pleadings and evidence in both proceedings which were not true. I also generally accept that the Defendants' discovery and production of documents was imperfect, which must also weigh against them. Although, as I observed above in relation to the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, in this regard poor conduct was not solely in the purview of the Defendants. I note that elsewhere in these reasons I find that I am satisfied that Ari and Kee were, as they now concede, lying during the proceeding with MCH; hence, it follows that Hong's evidence in this trial that he was telling the truth in the earlier proceeding is, in itself, a lie. Again, without understating the significance of Ari and Kee's lies, I do not consider Hong's conduct in this regard to be unimpeachable. Similar observations could be made with respect of Hong's obligations under the Civil Procedure Act 2010. In any case, I do not consider it necessary to express further views on these particular submissions.
96 Further, as I discuss in more detail in other parts of these reasons dealing with particular findings of fact, while it does not excuse the lies told, I am satisfied that these lies, both in relation to the MCH proceeding and the Share Option Agreement, occurred where Kee and Ari (and therefore Sam) found themselves caught in various schemes of their own making and were clumsily trying to extricate themselves. While unsophisticated, these lies reflect the circumstances within which Kee and Ari were operating including their need, first with Maggie and later with Hong, to engage in a manner which was sufficiently respectful in light of their standing in the Chinese community.
97 Moreover, I consider the written and oral evidence of Kee, Ari and Sam, for the most part, to be broadly consistent with the narrative which emerges from the contemporaneous documentary evidence and, as such, that it is inherently plausible. Thus I decline to adopt, as a matter of course, the approach advocated by the Plaintiffs whereby I only accept the written evidence of these witnesses where it is expressly supported by documentary evidence. Nor do I accept that the lies told by Ari, Kee and Sam infect their written evidence to such an extent that the written evidence must be rejected in its entirety. The proper approach in the circumstances is to consider Ari, Kee and Sam's evidence in its component parts and assess it accordingly.[182] Recognising the risks in making global findings as to credit,[183] for the avoidance of doubt, I confirm that is not to say I accept the totality of Ari, Kee and Sam's evidence as preferred over Hong's. The evidence is to be considered on its own merits, issue by issue.
98 As a final observation with respect to Sam's evidence specifically, as conceded by the Defendants, Sam was not a convincing witness. His presentation throughout cross‑examination was, at best, that of a very nervous witness and his answers were often repetitive and incoherent. I am satisfied that, again as properly conceded by the Defendants, he was motivated by a desire to assist Kee and Ari. However, I also accept that Sam was giving evidence against his own interests and this is relevant as courts prefer evidence given by a witness gives against their own interests.[184]
99 Mr David Amos (Mr Amos) was also called as a witness for the Defendants. Mr Amos is the founding director of Elysium Accounting, the accountancy firm engaged by Kegland.[185] His evidence‑in‑chief comprised of a witness statement dated 9 November 2022 and he was cross‑examined for several hours on day 11 of the trial, 21 May 2024. His evidence was primarily focussed on advice he gave to Kee and Ari in late 2017 regarding the incorporation of the two Kegland companies and his firm's involvement in the appointment of Kee as a director of Kegland Distribution in December 2020 and the share issue in February 2021.
100 The Defendants submit that Mr Amos was an independent witness who, having not met Kee and Ari before November 2017, had no reason to give false or misleading evidence. They also say he made concessions during cross‑examination, where appropriate, and should be found to be both credible and reliable.[186] In contrast, in the context of submissions directed to the backdating of the Share Option Agreement, the Plaintiffs draw attention to a line of questions put to Mr Amos in cross‑examination that his written evidence failed to provide a fulsome account of the events in 2020 and a subsequent exchange between counsel for the parties regarding the role of lawyers in assisting Mr Amos in the preparation of his witness statement.[187] I do not understand this to be a submission that I should make credibility findings against Mr Amos, nor do I make such a finding. Mr Amos was an articulate and credible witness, who made appropriate concessions in cross‑examination.[188] I do not consider that his business relationship with Kee and Ari impacted on the evidence he gave.
101 The closing submissions of the Defendants, dated 12 August 2024, helpfully set out what they call a narrative of the facts and events which inform the determination of the threshold issue. This narrative sets out to provide, to the extent possible, a linear description of the various puzzle pieces said to bear on determining whether the Hong Trust arose as alleged by the Defendants by conveniently and coherently dividing the evidence into thirteen discrete periods of time or events.
102 Thus, subject to minor alterations, I have adopted this structure to setting out the evidence in these reasons. That said, in many instances the conduct of a witness in one period bears on events or conduct in another period and, as necessary, I have cross‑referenced between sections. Further, although framed as a narrative of the evidence, at various points in their submissions the Defendants invite the Court to make particular findings with respect to the evidence and, similarly, frequently the Plaintiffs' submissions contend for a different interpretation of events to that put forward by the Defendants. As such, what follows is a narrative of the evidence in this matter but also my subsidiary findings on the way to considering the threshold issue below. I note that where it makes sense for the purposes of providing the overarching narrative, I have summarised submissions which more directly go towards the threshold issue. Where that is the case, I have indicated that those submissions will be considered as part of the threshold issue.
103 The first time period broadly covers Ari and Kee's employment at MCH. This period is largely relevant insofar as providing context concerning Kee and Ari's departure from MCH and the establishment of Kegland. MCH, which was established by Maggie Hu (Maggie) in 2004, was initially involved in the importation and sale of cleaning products.
104 Throughout 2004 and 2005, Ari was employed as the general manager and operations manager of MCH and in early 2006 Maggie transferred 10% of MCH's shares to Ari, retaining 80% of the shares herself, with the remaining 10% being held by the superannuation fund of friends of Maggie. Maggie then introduced Kee to Ari at a party in 2006 and, sometime around this period, Ari suggested to Kee that he come work at MCH where they would use the MCH structure to commence their own importation and exportation business.[189]
105 In around September 2006 Kee commenced working at MCH. During this period, Maggie continued to import and sell cleaning products and packaging paper[190] while Kee and Ari commenced importing automotive parts and accessories and supplying those products to wholesalers (the automotive business line), using Maggie's warehouse to conduct their business. Relevantly in this regard, in 2007 Maggie transferred 10% of her shares in MCH to Kee, to reflect Ari's 10% stake in MCH and that the automotive business line was the most profitable part of the MCH business.[191] However sometime in 2007, having attended a trade fair in China, Kee and Ari developed a further business idea whereby they would manufacture and sell home brewing kits, keg dispensing equipment and parts, which were not available in Australia at that time (the home brewing business).[192]
106 The evidence of Kee and, albeit in less detail, of Ari is that:
(a) in January 2008 they met with Maggie to discuss the proposed home brewing business;
(b) Maggie was not interested in having 'any real involvement' in the home brewing business but was happy for it to be run by Ari and Kee through MCH;
(c) it was agreed that if the home brewing business was to be run through MCH, Maggie would transfer a further 20% of her shares in MCH to Kee and Ari, bringing their total shareholding to 39%, and in return MCH would hold distribution rights to the home brewing business and Maggie would be retained as bookkeeper; and
(d) Maggie agreed that should the home brewing business become self‑sufficient, she would either transfer the business to a separate company which Kee and Ari would hold 90% of the shares and Maggie 10% or, alternatively, she would transfer 41% of her MCH shares to Kee and Ari.[193]
107 As a result, in October 2008 the home brewing business was registered by Kee under the name 'Keg King', with MCH as the registered holder of the business,[194] and between late 2008 and late 2017 Kee and Ari operated the Keg King business through MCH, with Maggie, Kee and Ari dividing their various income streams to cover MCH's expenses.[195] At various times in this period Ari and Kee were directors of MCH, although both had ceased to be so by September 2017,[196] and by the latter part of the period, Keg King had become very successful while Maggie's clothing business was struggling.[197]
108 Two additional events in this period which warrant specific mention. First, in around 2010, Maggie, Kee and Ari purchased two neighbouring warehouses at 33-35 Smith Road Springvale (the Smith Road warehouses). Each of Maggie, Kee and Ari's family trusts held one third ownership of the Smith Road warehouses, and MCH and Keg King paid rent as tenants of the warehouses.[198]
109 Second, it was in this period that Hong was introduced to the Keg King business. In this regard, Ari's evidence was that he met Hong at a dinner party in around 2016, where they discussed Hong's interest in home brewing and Ari introduced him to Keg King, and over the following years they became friends, communicating regularly over WeChat - a Chinese instant messaging application - as Hong spoke Mandarin.[199] Hong's evidence is that he met Ari and Kee in around 2015 at a function hosted by a mutual friend after which his interest in home brewing grew and he visited Keg King on various occasions to purchase home brewing equipment, at which time he would usually speak to either Ari or Kee.[200] I do not consider that anything turns on the discrepancies in this evidence. It is sufficiently clear that, at the very least, Hong and Ari became acquainted at some point in this period. Further, the Plaintiffs accepted in closing submissions that Hong did not meet Kee until 16 December 2017.[201]
110 The evidence of both Kee and Ari is that from around 2015 or 2016 they started to discuss leaving MCH, as they were unhappy that Maggie worked limited hours performing bookkeeping and administrative duties while they 'did most of the work' and 'seemed to be bringing in all the income' and yet she received the same income as them.[202]
111 Kee and Ari's desire to leave MCH came to a head in 2017. In very summary form, Kee's evidence is that he suggested to Ari that they prepare an agreement setting out the terms of separating the Keg King business from MCH, in line with the agreement they say was reached with Maggie is 2008, but that Ari viewed that from a cultural perspective Maggie might consider this offensive and disrespectful and that they should instead raise the matter with Maggie in person, and that Kee deferred to Ari on this. Over a series of months, they then raised the prospect of separating the businesses on the basis that they had outgrown the current arrangement because, for example, the home brewing business and Maggie's clothing business had nothing in common. However, Maggie did not take these conversations well and the relationship between them became tense, with Maggie (and her husband Will) asserting that Kee and Ari were simply employees of MCH and that as majority shareholder Maggie could fire them both. Maggie and Will also made clear that Kee and Ari could not take the Keg King business with them if they left MCH and that she would not honour the agreement they say was reached in 2008.[203] Ari gave evidence to the same effect.[204]
112 The Defendants contend that the conduct in this period is relevant, when viewed as part of the totality of the circumstances, when considering whether the Hong Trust exists. They say the evidence relating to MCH explains why Kee and Ari went to the lengths they did to hide their involvement in Kegland and places the evidence relating to the Hong Trust in its correct context.[205] In contrast, as far as I understand their submissions, the Plaintiffs take a narrower view, contending the relevant temporal period should be limited to the period immediately preceding incorporation of Kegland Distribution.[206] The Plaintiffs did not make any substantive submissions with respect to the evidence in this period.
113 The second time period concerns Kee and Ari's departure from MCH and preparatory steps undertaken to set up the Kegland business. The evidence is as follows. Kee's employment at MCH was terminated in early October 2017 and on 4 October 2017 he was sent a letter of demand from Maggie's lawyers which, inter alia, alleged he had breached various duties owed to MCH and stated that, if he did not comply with the demands set out in the letter, legal proceedings would be commenced against him (the MCH proceedings or MCH dispute).[207] Ari received an equivalent letter of demand on 5 October 2017.[208]
114 The evidence of Kee and Ari is that in the weeks that followed there were multiple meetings between Kee, Ari, Maggie, Will, the new General Manager of MCH, Michael Langmaid, and their respective lawyers. No agreement was reached in these meetings and by mid‑November 2017, Will and Michael Langmaid had made it clear that if Kee or Ari were to open a business in competition with Keg King, MCH would immediately apply for an injunction to shut the business down. Ari ultimately resigned from MCH on 15 November 2017.[209]
115 During this period, and from around September 2017, Kee says he had begun to develop an 'exit strategy' for leaving MCH, with the plan being to set up a business which would sell beer in kegs direct to the public - a product which was not available through Keg King - and to this end registered the name 'Kegland' and an accompanying logo with IP Australia on 26 October 2017.[210] However, in around late October or early November, Kee and Ari decided not to progress this business plan and instead to use the Kegland name and logo 'as a competing brand to sell similar products as Keg King'.[211]
116 In this regard, on 8 November 2017, Kee and Ari met with David Amos, an accountant at Elysium Accounting & Financial Solutions Pty Ltd ('Elysium'). In an email sent the following day, Kee wrote to Mr Amos stating:
... Thanks for your time yesterday. As discussed we would like to setup the company like this with the unit trust structure that you recommended.
I have attached a diagram which i think is what you are talking about.
Our good friend Tony is also happy to be the director and secretary for the trustee company so i have included his details in this email ...[212]
117 Ari's evidence was that 'Tony' was Qinqing Zhang, and Mr Zhang had agreed to be a stand‑in director because Ari and Kee were worried that MCH and Maggie would initiate injunction proceedings if they were registered as the directors of the new company.[213] Mr Amos' evidence was that at an initial client meeting in early November 2017 Kee and Ari told him, inter alia, that they were in a dispute with their business partner, that they wanted to incorporate a new home brewing company, and that as a result of the dispute they wanted to install a friend as a director of the new company until the dispute was resolved.[214] ASIC records show an application to register the new company, Kegland Hardware Pty Ltd, was lodged on 14 November 2017. Qinqing Zhang was registered as the director and secretary of the company and the shares held equally by Kee's family trust and Ari's family trust.[215]
118 However, Kee and Ari gave evidence that shortly after Kegland Hardware was incorporated they decided that they would have to abandon the company and establish a new company which they had no connection to, either as directors or shareholders. This was due to their concern that MCH's lawyers would be able to identify Kee and Ari's connection to Kegland Hardware if they conducted searches on the family trusts which held the shares in that company.[216]
119 Notwithstanding this decision, from mid‑November 2017 Kee and Ari operated their new business (the Kegland business) from Ari's house, including having stock delivered there, while they were in the process of locating and leasing a warehouse. By way of example, Ari's evidence is that in November 2017 he organised $100,000 worth of carbon dioxide cylinders to be shipped from China, and in early November Kee coordinated an order of second hand kegs. According to Ari, in this period they used friends to place the relevant orders and Ari's friends and family in China paid for the stock, totalling approximately $250,000.[217]
120 Documentary evidence also shows that in the days following the incorporation of Kegland Hardware:
(a) on 15 November 2017, Kee sent an email to Oliver Permezal (Oliver) (who worked at Keg King[218]) expressing an interest in hiring Oliver, explaining that there was stock being prepared in China ahead of the launch of the company, and stating that Oliver would initially work with the web‑designer to develop the website and that Oliver could log his hours from home;[219]
(b) later that afternoon, Oliver contacted Kee on Skype. In those messages, Oliver agreed to work with Kee and Ari, although he requested a full‑time contract once the warehouse had been set up, and mentioned that Ari had called him that morning to tell him that he had left MCH 'and that Kegland was going ahead'. Kee replied that they were happy to employ Oliver through a full‑time contract and noted that, although the lease was still being negotiated, he anticipated it would commence from 1 December 2017. The remainder of the messages concerned the Kegland website and Oliver's timesheet;[220]
(c) on 22 November 2017, Elysium sent a letter of engagement addressed to Kegland Hardware Pty Ltd, thanking Kee and Ari for asking Elysium to act as their accountant and to inter alia provide tax advice for 'Kegland Pty Ltd'. That letter requested that Kee and Ari sign and return the letter of engagement;[221]
(d) on 21 November 2017, Kee sent an email to the designer who had developed the Kegland logo[222] confirming they would continue to use that logo and providing further detail about the potential to sub‑let part of the warehouse they were anticipating leasing;[223] and
(e) on 23 November 2017, Kee sent Ari an email asking him to send through 'a complete list of all the products that we are ordering between now and Jan/Feb' so that Oliver could focus on ensuring those products were on the website. Ari replied that he was waiting on the list from China.[224] Separately on 23 November 2017, an email chain shows that Kee and Oliver discussed the progress of the website design and how best to maintain a record of their product codes, including how to access the backend software through the www.kegland.com.au domain.[225]
121 Kee's evidence is that by around early December 2017, he and Ari were 'in a hurry' to incorporate the second Kegland company as there was stock due to arrive from China and it was therefore necessary for the company to be operational as soon as possible. They decided that because Mr Zhang was linked to Kegland Hardware they 'had to find someone else to 'sit in' as director and shareholder'.[226] They asked Oliver, however he declined as he was concerned about the risks in light of the legal threats from Maggie and MCH.[227] As such, Kee and Ari decided that Sam Jum Lie (Sam), who they knew as he had provided MCH with YouERP accounting software (the accounting software) before he left due a disagreement with Maggie and who had agreed to provide the accounting software to Kegland, was a suitable candidate.[228]
122 Consequently, in early December 2017 Kee spoke to Sam and asked if he would be prepared to act as director and shareholder while the MCH dispute was ongoing. Kee proposed that Kegland would pay Sam $50,000 to use the accounting software and a further $100,000 per year and would also allow him to retain 10% of the shares when the MCH dispute was resolved and Kee and Ari called for the shares to be transferred back to them. Kee says Sam agreed to this proposal, which once finalised was called the Partnership Agreement[229] but, on the advice of his brother, required a written indemnity for standing in as a director.[230]
123 Sam's evidence generally accords with Kee's recounting of events. In summary, Sam says that in around early December Kee told him that the new company needed a director who was not associated with him or Ari or their families until the MCH dispute was resolved, which sounded like it would happen within six months. He says that Kee asked him to come onboard as a temporary director and shareholder and that Kee thought he was a good candidate for the role because of his knowledge of the business and stock. Further Sam says, in discussions with Kee and Ari, they told him they would pay him $50,000 to use the accounting software, $100,000 a year as director and that he would be able to retain 10% of the shares after the MCH dispute but would transfer the remaining shares back to Kee and Ari.[231]
124 According to Kee, following this discussion with Sam, he spoke to Mr Amos at Elysium to explain that they would establish a new company with Sam as the sole director and shareholder. However, Mr Amos told him that as Sam primarily lived in Indonesia he could not be the sole director due to the need for at least one Australian resident director.[232] Mr Amos' evidence is that he spoke to Kee on 4 December 2017 and that (emphasis in original):
... Kee told me that he and Ari wanted to change the structure because they no longer wanted their family trusts as the shareholders and were organising for alternative directors and shareholders. Kee explained that they were concerned about a company search leading back to them through the shareholdings. Kee said that he had a friend in mind to stand in as director and shareholder called Sam. Kee said words to the effect that once the MCH dispute settled, Sam would resign as director and return the shares to him and Ari.
...
Kee called me later that day to give me Sam's details. Upon learning that Jum Lie (Sam) usually lived in Indonesia, I advised Kee that as a non‑resident, Sam could not be a sole director of their new company. Kee said he would talk to Ari about who else they could ask to stand in.[233]
125 Mr Amos also gave evidence that sometime in this period, between 8 November 2019 and early December 2017, he raised with Kee:
the possibility that a later transfer of shares back to him and Ari would likely attract a [capital gains tax] event, which, depending on the success of Kegland, might be substantial. I then suggested that Kee seek legal advice about whether an option might be the best way to minimise this.[234]
126 On Kee's evidence, he proceeded to tell Ari of Mr Amos' advice regarding Sam and that Ari suggested his friend, Hong Rui Liu (Hong), 'as a possible solution'. Further, Ari explained that he had already mentioned the MCH dispute to Hong and that Hong, who had an interest in home brewing, 'had expressed a willingness to help out' including offering to invest in the company, which Ari had told him they did not need.[235] According to Kee, he had not met Hong at this stage but trusted Ari's judgement and was happy to proceed on this basis as he was unable to think of an alternative director and shareholder.[236]
127 Separately, Kee and Ari also agreed that Sam would remain a director and shareholder as they wanted to utilise his accounting software and had already reached an agreement with him. However, he and Ari decided they:
...should also ask Hong if he would hold 50% of the shares for us too. The reason for this was that it would look odd for someone with no experience or knowledge of the industry, who would not play any active role, to be a director, unless they were more in the nature of an investor. Ari had told me that Hong was wealthy and that this would look plausible.[237]
128 Sam was informed of this change in approach and was happy to proceed on that basis.[238] Insofar as Hong's knowledge of the MCH dispute and involvement with Ari in this period, the evidence of both Ari and Hong is that following Ari's departure from MCH, Hong visited Keg King to purchase supplies and subsequently contacted Ari when he did not see him there.[239] Hong's witness statements say he was told that Kee and Ari stopped working at Keg King because of a dispute with MCH and that in late 2017 they told him of an idea for a new type of home brewery business which they proposed to start up, which would import equipment and sell it through an online sales channel.[240] Ari's evidence is that he told Hong that he and Kee (who Hong had not yet met but knew of as the co‑founder of Keg King) had a dispute with MCH and had set up a new company but that there was a shareholding issue which would be traced back to them.[241]
129 A series of translated WeChat audio messages from 22 and 23 November 2017 also show the following discussion between Hong and Ari:
Hong: How about it? Has the shareholder issue been settled? Is there still a shortage of shareholders? I'm very serious about this.
Ari: Liu, I just saw your message. Here's the situation: because the issue regarding the [inaudible] of the company hasn't been resolved yet, we haven't addressed this matter. We can discuss is once we've sorted out this issue.
Hong: If you need legal advice, let me know. I have a really reliable guy here. He used to be a lawyer at Norton Rose, and now he's been poached by the boss of the biggest project in the city to be an assistant to the General Manager.
Hong: This person is very diligent in his work. I think he's very reliable. If you're okay with it, I can create a group. Then you can get to know each other and chat between you two, and see how he can help you with advice, and such.
Hong: Basically, all of my reliable lawyers were introduced by him
Ari: [inaudible] outside. It is so noisy.
Hong: Was it not recorded? Or what?
Ari: That's not it, Liu. Right now, my company has some legal disputes so I can't establish this company now, so I'm not able to finalise the shares matter ASAP. I need to wait until the legal issues are resolved and everything is clear before we can consider the next step. That's what I meant.
Hong: No, I did not say that. I was talking about your legal issue. If you need legal counsel, I can ask a friend to help you and give you advice, because I think this young man is very good. He used to be a lawyer, and now he has gone to work as an assistant for one of the largest Chinese developers in Melbourne. All my reliable lawyers were recommended by him.
Ari: What industry is he in? I've also consulted several lawyers here. Oh man, once lawsuit is involved, it really becomes quite troublesome.
Hong: To file a lawsuit, you need a lawyer with experience in that field. He specialises in real estate; so he's not part of this circle. However, he knows indirectly which type of lawsuit to file for certain fields, or which lawyer is better for a particular case, so he could help with recommendations.
Ari: Currently, the first lawyer I found was for the shareholder dispute, and later, I might need to find a commercial law lawyer, a barrister specializing in commercial law right now.
Ari: And my partner, he's having another friend look for a tax law lawyer for his these couple of days.[242]
130 Hong's evidence with respect to these messages is that he understood that, as a result of the dispute with MCH, Ari was not in a position to establish a new company or seek any new investors.[243] Then on 26 November 2017, Hong sent Leon an audio message on WeChat which is translated as follows:
Leon, you might have met Ari. He's the guy who sells beer machines. Anyway, he said he's met you before. Remember the dispute with the shareholder a couple of days ago? Well, that was him. It's quite troublesome. I forwarded the messages you sent me to him. I'll let him talk to you directly, so I won't be the middleman anymore. If you have any good suggestions or can recommend a good lawyer for him, please do.[244]
131 Later that day, Ari and Leon proceeded to exchange a number of messages on WeChat, where Ari provided an explanation of, and his concerns about, the MCH dispute and they decided to meet in person to discuss the matter further.[245] On 29 November 2017, Kee and Ari also attended a meeting at the law firm Norton Rose, which had been set up by Leon. After that meeting, Kee provided a number of documents to Norton Rose including a chronology which set out, inter alia, the threats made by MCH, Maggie and Will.[246]
132 The Defendants' submissions with respect to this period emphasise that the conduct of Kee and Ari in this period demonstrate clear steps being taken to establish the Kegland business prior to Hong knowing of its existence and without his assistance or input.[247] Specifically, the Defendants submit that:
(a) Kee and Ari's meeting, and subsequent communications, with Mr Amos at Elysium in mid‑November regarding the incorporation of Kegland Hardware and the creation of the unit trust clearly relate to the operation of a new business which Kee had been working on since his departure from MCH in October;[248]
(b) the contemporaneous documents from November[249] are 'wholly inimical to Hong's evidence that he established the Kegland business';[250]
(c) Ari's comments in the WeChat audio messages on 22 and 23 November, in response to Hong's query about whether there was a shortage of shareholders, that 'the issue regarding the [inaudible] of the company hasn't been resolved yet, we haven't addressed this matter. We can discuss it once we've sorted out this issue' was inaccurate, as by this time Kegland Hardware was the owner and operator of the Kegland business, but this inaccuracy can be explained as Ari's way of rejecting Hong's proposal to become a shareholder without offending him in circumstances where he did not want to offend an important person in the Chinese community;[251]
(d) Ari's description of his concerns about the MCH dispute in the WeChat messages to Leon on 26 November and the description of the threats made by MCH in the chronology provided by Kee to Norton Rose after the meeting on 29 November, place Kee and Ari's subsequent actions to hide their interest in the Kegland business in the proper context;[252] and
(e) the evidence relating to Kee's initial discussions with Mr Amos on 4 December shows that, at that point in time, there was no suggestion that Hong would become a director or shareholder in the new company and the evidence indicates at this time Hong was unaware of plans to establish the company.[253]
133 In contrast, to the extent that the Plaintiffs addressed this period in their submissions, it was in relation to their broader submissions on how the Court should deal with the Alleged Oral Agreement[254] as it pertains to the Hong Trust, they deny it exists, but which the they accept 'requires consideration of the factual background of who said what to whom at the time'.[255] As this concession was followed by an outline of the evidence set out above, I understand the thrust of the Plaintiffs' submissions to be that this period is relevant to the court's consideration of the issues more generally. In particular, the Plaintiffs draw attention to the fact that Hong reached out to Ari on 22 November 2017 to ascertain opportunities to invest in the new business and that Hong remained interested in the business notwithstanding Ari's comments that they could discuss the query about shares after the dispute was resolved, such that Hong arranged for Leon, who was then an employee of the Ladence Group where Hong was a director, to assist Ari and Kee.[256]
134 I accept the overarching tenor of the Defendants' submissions in relation to this period. In particular, having had regard to the contemporaneous documentary evidence,[257] I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that sometime around October to November 2017 Kee and Ari decided to establish the Kegland business, in competition with MCH, and were actively taking steps to establish this business including by, but not limited to, hiring staff, acquiring stock, engaging an accountant, and developing the Kegland website. I accept that until around mid‑November 2017 the Kegland business was intended to be run through the company Kegland Hardware but that ultimately Kee and Ari decided that having their family trusts attached to the company was a risk in light of the MCH dispute and it was therefore necessary to establish a second Kegland company with no links to them whatsoever. In any event, I do not understand that this evidence is contested by the Plaintiffs. In this sense, I find that Hong was not involved in any of the steps taken in relation to the operation of the Kegland business as run through Kegland Hardware in October and November 2017, and indeed at this point in time he was unaware of Kegland Hardware's existence.[258]
135 Placing particular weight on the evidence of Mr Amos, who I find was a credible witness and who, as an independent witness had no reason to be partisan in the evidence he gave,[259] I accept that prior to being told by Mr Amos on 4 December 2017 that it was necessary to have at least one domestically residing director, Kee and Ari had intended for Sam to be the sole director and shareholder of the second Kegland company. In other words, looking holistically at these findings, multiple steps had been taken by Kee and Ari in this period to establish the operations of the Kegland business, to establish Kegland Hardware, and then to begin the process of incorporating the second Kegland company, which would take on operation of the Kegland business, before Hong was connected in any meaningful sense to Kegland. I make these finding without rejecting the evidence of Hong relating to his interactions with Ari in late November 2017 or his conduct in connecting Ari and Leon, and I consider them more broadly as part of the circumstances surrounding the Alleged Oral Agreement, I simply do not place any determinative weight on these factors raised by the Plaintiffs.
136 Separately, as will become important later in these reasons, I accept that sometime between 8 November and early December 2017 Mr Amos raised with Kee that a transfer of shares to him and Ari would likely attract capital gains tax and advised Kee to seek legal advice. Again, in this respect, I make this finding on the basis that Mr Amos was a credible witness. Flowing from this finding, is therefore that Kee (and most likely Ari) was on notice of the potential implications of capital gains tax from early December 2017 at the latest.
137 The third time period covers the days leading up to, and the incorporation of, Kegland Distribution. Most critically in this regard is a conversation Ari says he had with Hong on 6 December 2017, where he proposed that Hong stand‑in as director and shareholder of the new company, which on the Defendants' case forms the basis of the Hong Trust. In summary, Hong says he cannot recall the conversation and denies that a conversation in these terms occurred.
138 The Defendants refer to this conversation as 'the proposal'. The Plaintiffs refer to it as the Alleged Oral Agreement. Putting the issues of nomenclature to one side, for the sake of convenience, in summarising the evidence and submissions of the parties on this point I will refer to this conversation as the Alleged Oral Agreement.
139 In light of the significance of the day, it is necessary to set out the pleadings and evidence relating to 6 December 2017 in detail. Paragraph 8D of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim[260] provides:
8D. In or around early December 2017, Kee and Ari:
...
(b) agreed with Hong that:
(i) they would appoint him as a director of Kegland;
(ii) he would facilitate the appointment of Kee and/or Ari as director/s of Kegland as directed by them;
(iii) through his company, LL UP, he would hold 50% (fifty per cent) of the shares in Kegland on trust equally for each of Kee and Ari and would transfer them to each of them, or at their direction;
(iv) he would not be required to play any role in the business other than to execute occasional documents at the direction of Kee and Ari; and
(v) he would resign as director of Kegland when asked to by Kee and Ari, most likely when the MCH dispute had resolved.
Hong's agreement is oral and was constituted by conversations to the extent pleaded between Kee, Ari and Hong in or around late November/early December 2017.
On 6 December 2017, after Kee had told Ari about what David Amos had said regarding the need for an Australian resident as a director, Ari spoke with Hong and asked him whether he was prepared to help and sit in as a director and hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over. Hong agreed and Kee and Ari arranged for Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd to be incorporated with Hong's family trust company, LL UP, as the owner of 50% of its shares.
Further, after the MCH proceeding had settled, Hong made admissions against interest as to the existence and terms of the Hong Trust, and these are pleaded in paragraphs 8E.3 below.
(Sam's agreement and Hong's agreement will be referred to collectively as the true agreement)
140 Paragraphs 8E.1 and 8E.2 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim[261] then provide:
8E.1 By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraph 8D(a) above, Sam undertook to hold 50% of the shares in the proposed company on trust for Kee and Ari for 12 months (Sam Trust), and Sam assumed the role of trustee under the Sam Trust on 8 December 2017.
8E.2 By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraph 8D(b) above, Hong undertook to hold 50% of the shares in the proposed company on trust for Kee and Ari until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over (Hong Trust), and Hong used the first plaintiff to assume the role of trustee under the Hong Trust on 8 December 2017.
141 Relevantly, Ari's written evidence in relation to 6 December 2017, in full, is as follows:
On 6 December 2017, after Kee had told me what David Amos said regarding the need for an Australian resident as director, and after Kee had agreed with my suggestion that we approach Hong, I called Hong to see if he was prepared to help.
When discussing this with Hong, I also reassured Hong that he did not put in any money and just needed to sit in as a director and hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over. I suggested to Hong that we sign an agreement outlining this arrangement and including an indemnity to protect him (as we had done with Sam), but he said words to the effect of "if you don't want me, you don't want me, I do not need to sign". Both being Chinese, I could not push Hong to sign because it would be interpreted as not trusting the other person. As far as I understood at the time, the disagreement with Maggie was temporary and it would go away in a couple of month.
Later on 6 December 2017, Hong and I exchanged several voice messages through WeChat in addition to iPhone text messages in relation to appointing him as the director and shareholder of Kegland Distribution.[262]
142 Further, Ari's evidence in cross‑examination was that:
You asked him to be the shareholder and he agreed to be the shareholder?‑‑‑ I asked him to hold the, be a shareholder yeah, holding share for us. He agreed, he happy to, to do for us.
What he agreed to do was to be a shareholder and if the company did well, you'd talk later about what might happen about further people becoming involved in the company? ‑‑‑ We, I didn't specifically as early date say that. I just want to he can hold the share for us and be director to set up the company. I didn't specifically mention what the future, how many shares I give you or you can involve. I never specifically say that to Hong.
You didn't know at this time whether the company would be successful or not, did you?‑‑‑ At that time, I don't know, Is, everything uncertain. Too many pressures from different angles and ah, we, we just want to set it up and also we thought we might be able to um, solve the dispute, some type of agreement which is solve it. Then in short term, we can finish the issue. I don't you know, need Hong later on. I thought he's couple months, can be finished, finish the issues.
You needed him and Sam to be - or his company and Sam to be the shareholders so that Maggie and MCH wouldn't find out that you were involved?‑‑‑That, that's correct because we was under injunction ah, pressure that we so scared, we says, we saw that as the only way we can do, yes.
So I suggest to you, what you said to him was you be the shareholder and maybe in the future we can talk about what things might happen differently; words to that effect?‑‑‑ No, I never, I never, I never offer anything to him about share as at early date.
You never said to him that he just needed to sit in as a director and hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over, did you?‑‑‑ I did them ah, ah I never say I gonna give share to him because he said he interested but I didn't say we are gonna give any shares but I knew him to present to help us to set up a new company.
You needed his help so you'd shield all this from Maggie and MCH?‑‑‑ I needed his help because we needed Sam's help but Sam is not ah, resident. He, he not only ah, he can't able to do. That's why we needed one person being um, Australian citizen, then can set up company. That is only the reason I ask him to help.
You never sent a WeChat message to Hong to the effect that he just needed to sit in as a director, did you?‑‑‑ I can't remember, maybe I didn't say in the WeChat but over the phone clearly, I told him because I told him he help and also any costs, Kee and me gonna cover. He will not put any money out of from his pocket for his help.
You never asked him to sign or provide - withdraw that. You never said to him that you would provide an indemnity to protect him, did you?‑‑‑ I did. I did told ah, Hong we can sign agreement make sure you be fully protected. You will not cover anything, money holding share because we did this to Sam. We already signed this indemnity agreement with Sam. I, Kee suggest we have to do this with Hong as well. I say it to Hong but Hong - that's the time to be honest, I think Hong is really happy to help us and he said I don't need sign, sign anything. No problems. I didn't force him because, for , for the Chinese culture, if I said no, no, no you need to sign the holding share for us, sounds like we don't trust him. I, I, I can't keeping ask him to sign it. I suggest but he refused.
You didn't put it in writing because you thought it was - you didn't put it in writing that he was just going to be sitting in as a shareholder did you? ‑‑‑ I did talk to him over the phone. I said we can write down the agreement. We can write and sign and he refused. He said no that's why we didn't, we didn't write in paper.[263]
143 In contrast, Hong denies Ari ever had a conversation with him where he said words to the effect that Hong would be a stand in director or hold the shares until the MCH dispute was over, nor did Ari suggest that he sign any agreement or discuss an indemnity document. His written evidence is that he understood from the outset that he would be the director and 50% shareholder in the company, that he regarded himself a permanent director and he was well qualified to perform that role, and that Kee and Ari told him they did not want to be shareholders or directors in Kegland due to their fears relating to the MCH dispute and that they were also being pursued by the Australian Tax Office due to tax issues from their time at MCH.[264]
144 Relevantly, Hong gave the following evidence in cross‑examination:
... On the morning of 6 December, after 8:42 am, Ari telephoned you. Correct? ‑‑‑I can't recall.
I'm going to suggest that he telephoned you and he asked you if he could help with the situation regarding KegLand Distributions - if you could help with the situation regarding KegLand Distributions?‑‑‑ I can't recall.
I want to make myself clear. I may not have made myself clear for which I apologise. Ari called you - that is Hong - and asked if you - Hong - could assist him with the situation regarding KegLand Distributions?‑‑‑ I can't recall. Does that answer your question?
Next question. Ari told you in that conversation - I'm just putting this to you so you can agree or disagree or you can say whether you recall or not. In that conversation, Ari said that you were just needed to sit in as a director and hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over. What do you say to that?‑‑‑ Firstly, I do not recall the contents of our telephone conversations because we had many telephone conversations. Secondly, I clearly remembered that this was not discussed.
I want to suggest this to you next. Ari reassured you that you did not have to put in any money into the business or the company or both?‑‑‑ He didn't say that.
I want to suggest to you as follows. Ari suggested that an agreement could be signed outlining the arrangement. Agree or disagree?‑‑‑ Um, to sign what kind of agreement?
An agreement which outlined the arrangement for you to sit in as director and hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over?‑‑‑No.
...
I want to put some questions to you again because it's not entirely clear to me that we were all focused upon the phone call I was suggesting to you occurred, which occurred on 6 December 2017, understand?‑‑‑ I understand.
I'm going to put five or six propositions to you and invite you to agree, disagree or say something else if you think it appropriate but I want to move through this fairly quickly if that's all right with you.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, no, or don't remember.
MR HEATH: Yes, no or don't remember. Thank you, Your Honour?‑‑‑ Sure.
Ari called you on 6 December 2017 between 8:42 and 1pm. What do you say?‑‑‑ Can't recall.
Thank you. In that telephone conversation I suggest to you, Ari told you that he needed your help?‑‑‑ Can't recall.
In that telephone conversation I suggest to you Ari told you that you just needed to sit in as a director of a new company they were proposing to incorporate? ‑‑‑ I can't recall.
In that telephone conversation I suggest to you Ari told you that you would hold the shares in that company until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over, agree, disagree or can't recall?‑‑‑ Firstly, I do not agree. Secondly, I do not remember those conversations during this period.
Yes, no or don't recall? ‑‑‑ I don't agree.
Thank you. In that telephone conversation I suggest to you Ari proposed that you sign an agreement outlining the arrangement which I suggested just now. Agree, disagree, or don't recall?‑‑‑ I do not agree.
Thank you. Ari in that telephone conversation, I suggest to you, Ari also suggested the proposed agreement could contain an indemnity to protect you, agree, disagree, or don't recall? ‑‑‑ I can't recall.
In that telephone conversation I suggest to you, you responded to that suggestion by saying words to this effect, if you don't want me I do not need to see. Agree, disagree, or can't recall? ‑‑‑ I can't recall. However, can I ask, sign what?[265]
145 In the context of the competing evidence of the witnesses, the documentary evidence establishes the following timeline of events from around 5 December to 8 December 2017 (content translated where necessary):
(a) at 6:46pm on 5 December, Hong sent Ari a WeChat text message with a link to a warehouse on a commercial real estate website and Ari replied at 11:10pm that night asking about the warehouse;[266]
(b) between 7:01am and 8:42am on 6 December, Hong sent five WeChat audio messages to Ari where he inter alia explained that the warehouse was for rent, explained he was 'adding someone' for Ari who did injection moulding in Melbourne and had factories elsewhere in Australia, explained connections he had in China with a person who ran a refrigerator factory, suggested they look into running a 'brewery class', and told Ari he should 'go check out Glen Waverly as soon as possible. If that place is suitable then we can get started right away';[267]
(c) sometime between 8:42am and 8:56am on 6 December,[268] Hong sent Ari a WeChat audio message stating: 'This is also good. This incident offers an opportunity to carefully review your business model, identify what works well and what doesn't, explore new directions, and also undergo a transformation';[269]
(d) sometime between 8:42am and 8:56am on 6 December, Ari then sent Hong two audio messages saying 'Sam wants the 4 us to meet. I think it will be in the next couple of days. We can meet up and get acquainted, and then we can confirm it and start working on it' and 'Liu, from now on, you need to keep this relatively confidential. Because of that partner of mine, the woman, she's also Chinese, and she and the ... The circle of Chinese people is not big. So, we can't let her know. Because really, she and I will have to disappear from this industry for a while, so we really need to keep it a secret';[270]
(e) sometime between 8:42am and 8:56am on 6 December, Hong replied to Ari by audio message stating: 'Okay, no problem. I'll keep it strictly confidential. Just that you need to be mindful of some details. For example, the contact information, emails, and phone numbers for the new company, you need to provide them to me, or register a new one under my name, definitely not yours. Otherwise, if we get into a lawsuit, it'll be fatal';[271]
(f) at 8:56am on 6 December, Ari replied by audio message stating: 'Do it as soon as possible. If not tonight, we can meet up tomorrow and finalize it. We need to register the company first. Yes, that's right. So that's why I want to do it as soon as possible. If not tonight, we can meet up tomorrow and finalize it. We need to register the company first';[272]
(g) at 1:00pm on 6 December, Ari sent Hong a text message asking for 'Name, DOB, born place, address. Tax file number' and at 4:37pm that day Hong replied with those details;[273]
(h) at 5:20pm on 6 December, Kee emailed Mr Amos stating 'we need to setup a new company called KegLand Software PTY LTD' and that '[w]e have two new directors for this company' naming Hong as the first director with 50% shareholding, and Sam as the second director with 50% shareholding;[274]
(i) at 7:22pm on 6 December, Hong sent a further text message to the chat with Ari supplying LL UP's details;[275]
(j) at 9:51pm on 6 December, Ari emailed Mr Amos, copying in Kee, to give an update on the new company, stating that Hong preferred to use his family trust to hold the shares and providing LL UP's details;[276]
(k) at 5:03pm on 7 December, Ms Shauna Simcocks at Elysium emailed Kee attaching a document she described as 'the company order form re: KegLand Software Pty Ltd' and asking him to check all the information before they submitted the application;[277]
(l) between 5:30pm and 5:43pm on 7 December, Ari sent Leon three WeChat text messages asking 'Are you free Sunday evening? I'm inviting you and Liu to have dinner together', saying the dinner could be near Doncaster, and finally saying 'Secret Kitchen, 7:00 Sunday. I'll make the reservation';[278]
(m) between 8:16am and 8:47am on 8 December, Ari sent Hong two WeChat text messages and one audio message, those messages attached a PDF titled 'KegLand Software Pty Ltd', explained it was a document for registering the company, asked Hong to check the information was correct, and told him that he had made an appointment with Leon at Secret Kitchen on Sunday evening;[279]
(n) at 12:28pm on 8 December, Kee replied to Ms Simcocks at Elysium saying they wanted to make one change, which was to change the name of the company from Kegland Software to KegLand Distribution, ending that email saying 'If you can go ahead with everything else that would be great';[280] and
(o) on 8 December, Hong signed the Application to register Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd as a company,[281] Hong and Sam signed consents to act as Directors,[282] on behalf of LL UP, Hong signed the consent to become a member,[283] Sam and Hong signed the resolution of the directors,[284] and Sam and Hong signed Kegland's constitution.[285]
146 In the context of a line of questions regarding the WeChat messages between him and Hong on 6 December 2017, the following exchange took place between Ari and counsel for the Plaintiffs:
Now, there is no mention in there that he was standing in as a director or shareholder, is there?‑‑‑ So, in my memory, at that time he already accept. He already agreed.
I didn't ask that?‑‑‑ Oh, sorry.
There is no mention of that in any of these WeChat messages that he was going to stand in as a director and shareholder?‑‑‑ In this message, from the words ‑‑‑
Yes, the words don't say it, do they?‑‑‑ The words, well, didn't say - he didn't say exactly he'll be holding or standing by. He didn't say in that words. No.
It was never put in writing, was it?‑‑‑ I don't think so. I - only I told him over the phone, and also in the meeting.
I suggest you never said it to him?‑‑‑ Ah, sorry.
I suggest you never said it to him?‑‑‑ I said it to him.
By phone message or otherwise?‑‑‑ Ah, I never write - writing in the message. I never write it in the paper.[286]
147 The crux of the Defendants' submissions in this regard is that I should accept that the conversation between Hong and Ari occurred in the terms set out in Ari's evidence and that it gives rise to the Alleged Oral Agreement. In contrast, the Plaintiffs contend that the evidence said to give rise to the Alleged Oral Agreement is threadbare, was entirely unconvincing, and should be rejected. The Plaintiffs say Hong's evidence, that he never agreed to be a stand‑in director or shareholder, should be accepted, particularly having regard to the fact he remained firm in his evidence during cross‑examination.[287] With respect to Ari's evidence, the Plaintiffs contend that Ari only says that he told Hong he would be a stand‑in director and shareholder and that he 'reassured' Hong he would not have to contribute any money to Kegland and that his evidence is not that Hong agreed to this proposal. Moreover, the Plaintiffs say Ari's evidence in cross‑examination, that Hong did not say words to the effect that he agreed to be a stand‑in, and the absence of any written confirmation of, or reference to, the Alleged Oral Agreement, means the Court should find that no such agreement was reached on the basis there was no offer and acceptance. Further, they say the evidence is consistent with Hong and LL UP having an absolute interest in the shares because, otherwise, if the shares had been held on trust for Kee and Ari, then the MCH ruse would have been 'thwarted'.[288] The basis of the latter part of this submission is not entirely clear.
148 In submitting that there was no agreement reached between Hong and Ari (or Kee), they rely on the fact that the contemporaneous documents, such as the emails to Elysium from Kee and Ari regarding the registration of the new company, make no reference to Hong or LL UP holding the shares on trust for Kee and Ari or to the terms of the alleged agreement. Departing from Hong's evidence regarding the WeChat messages in this period requesting that Hong keep things 'confidential', the Plaintiffs accept that the messages concerned keeping Kee and Ari's involvement in Kegland secret.[289] However, as I understand the submissions, the Plaintiffs rely on this to contend that this supports a finding that the shares were not held on trust for Kee and Ari. Again, it is not clear how this follows.
149 In addition to their general submission, the Defendants contend that from the narrative which emerges from the evidence it is clear that by 8:42am on 6 December 2017 Ari had not yet put the Alleged Oral Agreement to Hong. In this regard, relying on Hong's evidence in cross‑examination that as at 8 December 2017 he was unaware of the existence of Kegland Hardware, had done no preliminary work in relation to Kegland Hardware, and had not been told about Kegland Hardware by Ari or Kee,[290] they say that Hong's messages on 5 December and the early morning of 6 December were sent in a context where he was unaware that Kegland Hardware existed and was already operating the Kegland business. Rather, they submit that (based on the sequence of the WeChat messages) the call Ari made to Hong, where he put the Alleged Oral Agreement to him, must have occurred between 8:42am and 8:56am on 6 December 2017.[291] In making this submission, they rely on Ari's evidence regarding his recollection of the events of that day and Hong's evidence that he could not recall the call. Having regard to the totality of the evidence in this regard, and in circumstances where the Plaintiffs accept that a conversation of some nature occurred, I accept that a conversation between Ari and Hong took place during this window of time on 6 December 2017.
150 In my opinion the evidence to which reference has been made establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the parties never agreed or contemplated that Hong or his family trust company, would hold the Kegland shares beneficially, or otherwise than as contended by the Defendants. Moreover the evidence shows, quite clearly, that the establishment of Kegland and the new business was well advanced and driven solely by Kee and Ari before any arrangements were discussed with Hong. So it cannot be said that it was other than Kee and Ari who established the new business, and certainly not Hong. Additionally, as discussed previously in the context of the "threshold issue", the Plaintiffs are unable to point to any reason or basis, commercial or otherwise, for the, substantially gratuitous, "conferral" on Hong of a potentially valuable beneficial interest in Kegland; as for the reasons which follow, I do not find that the Plaintiffs have established that Hong contributed anything of any significant value to Kegland's incorporation or to the setting up or operation of its business. In this context, I am also satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the conversation between Ari and Hong on 6 December 2017 discussed Hong's proposed role in Kegland in accordance with the matters I have found above.
151 The Plaintiffs also seek to distinguish between how the Defendants' pleadings and evidence treat Sam and Hong insofar as the manner in which it is said they hold the 50% shareholding in Kegland. The thrust of the argument appears to be that the Plaintiffs submit that the pleadings allege a trust arises with respect to Hong's shares, but not with respect to Sam's shares, but that the evidence does not make this distinction. In this regard, and in contending that no trust exists with respect to the shares held by Hong, the Plaintiffs rely on the fact that neither Sam nor Kee had any discussions with Hong prior to Kegland Distribution's incorporation on 8 December 2017.[292] To the extent these submissions contend that the Defendants did not plead a trust with respect to Sam's shares, that submission is misconceived as paragraph 8E.1 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim, as set out above,[293] expressly pleads a trust over the shares held by Sam.
152 To the extent the Plaintiffs are inviting the Court to find no trust exists with respect to Hong's shares because Hong did not speak to Ari or Sam prior to the incorporation of Kegland Distribution, I decline to make such a finding. Rather, as I discuss below, I consider the fact that Hong had not yet met, and thus had not communicated with Sam and Kee, in this period is a factor weighing against his case.
153 Relatedly, for the purposes of s 117 of the Corporations Act 2001, which deals with applying for registration of a company, the Defendants submit the documentary evidence shows that it was Kee who was responsible for supplying the information to Elysium that was used to register Kegland Distribution.[294] I accept that the documentary evidence shows that it was Kee (and on one occasion Ari) who, at all material times in the lead up to 6 December and then through to 8 December 2017, communicated with staff at Elysium regarding the registration of Kegland Distribution. I make this finding notwithstanding the fact that the Application to register Kegland Distribution, and associated documents, were signed by Hong and Sam. I do not consider that Hong's WeChat message on the morning of 6 December 2017 where he said, inter alia, 'For example, the contact information, emails, and phone numbers for the new company, you need to provide them to me, or register a new one under my name, definitely not yours. Otherwise, if we get into a lawsuit, it'll be fatal'[295] affects my finding. I consider it is reasonably clear from the evidence that Kee, and Ari, were already in the preliminary stages of, and had communicated generally with Elysium about, registering the new company.
154 The Defendants also submit that Ari's message between 8:42am and 8:56am on 6 December, where he told Hong that 'Sam wants the 4 of us to meet ... and get acquainted', can only reasonably be understood as a reference to Sam, Hong, Ari and Kee, which indicates that Hong had not yet met Sam and Kee (or Mr Amos), and that this is consistent with Kee and Ari's evidence that Hong was an 'outsider' they brought into the company to hide their involvement from Maggie and MCH. They say that it is plain from the totality of Ari's next message, where he told Hong he needed to 'keep this relatively confidential', that Ari had asked Hong to help them in order to prevent Maggie and MCH discovering their interest in the new company and that the message was inspired by a genuinely held fear that Maggie would seek an injunction to shut down Kegland if she found out. To this end, they seek that I reject, as implausible, Hong's evidence in cross‑examination that what he was being asked to keep confidential was that he had 'already started the company'.[296] This evidence, they say, ignores the MCH dispute being the obvious cause of Ari's request for secrecy, is not supported by contemporaneous documents which show Hong played no role in setting up the new company, and is contradicted by Hong's knowledge of the MCH matters as seen in reply to Ari's message where, inter alia, he noted that a lawsuit would be 'fatal' to the new company.[297] In my view, this evidence, and the evidence more generally, clearly supports the position put by the Defendants.
155 The fourth period covers approximately 9 to 13 December 2017 and concerns $100,000 which was deposited into Kegland's bank account. In overarching terms, the Plaintiffs submit that the $100,000 deposited by Hong into the Kegland account on 13 December 2017 represents Hong's contribution to the establishment of Kegland Distribution.[298] The Defendants dispute that Hong was the true source of this money.
156 In very summary form, Ari's evidence is that in the days following the incorporation of Kegland Distribution, he and Kee decided that an initial[299] $100,000 in 'start‑up money' was required. However, they were aware that depositing money from accounts that could be traced to either of them would likely alert Maggie to their involvement in the business.[300] As such, knowing that Hong had family in China and a Chinese bank account, Ari thought he could ask Hong to transfer the money into Kegland's account. This would keep Ari and Kee's involvement in the business quiet and also provide an explanation as to why Hong, who had no previous experience in home brewing businesses, was involved in Kegland as it would give the impression that he was an investor and that was why he was a shareholder in the company.[301] Ari says he mentioned this plan to Hong in early December 2017 and at that time he told Hong that he and Kee did not want Hong to be out of pocket and so they had decided that, through Ari's father in China, Ari would arrange for overseas funds to be placed into an account nominated by Hong.[302]
157 Hong's evidence, as set out in his witness statement dated 2 September 2022, is that on or around 13 December 2017 he transferred $100,000 to Kegland 'by way of a loan' and that this money was to provide funding to Kegland.[303] Hong says this money was loaned in circumstances where Ari and Kee had informed him that they were not in a position to financially invest in the company and requested that Hong fund the commencement of the company.[304] In his later witness statement, Hong expanded on his evidence, stating that Ari never told him that Ari and Kee did not want him to be out of pocket or that he did not need to contribute any money to Kegland.[305] Rather, repeating his earlier evidence, Hong says Kee and Ari told him in December 2017 that they were not in a position to provide the start‑up capital for Kegland and requested that he provide the initial funding.[306] Further, Hong says that after he had agreed to pay the $100,000:
...Ari proposed that he would indirectly contribute to the initial $100,000 tranche of funding, by arranging for a person in China called 'Qinlin', who I did not know, to transfer 500,000 RMB by way of loan to Wang Jing, a cashier working in my family's company in China. I did not lack financial resources and transferred the $100,000 to Kegland from my existing funds in Australia, as shown by my bank statement at page 72 of HRL:3 (CB 1572). However, as Ari had made this proposal I did not reject it. Ari and I did not discuss the terms of the loan made in China, nor when the loan would be repaid. Nor did we have any discussion as to whether the loan would be repayable at all if Kegland went into insolvency and became unable to repay me the $100,000 I had lent to it.[307]
158 Hong was questioned on this evidence extensively in cross‑examination. Pertinently, when questioned whether by transferring the money from his Westpac account to the Kegland account he was repaying the loan he had received from Ari via his father, Hong's evidence was that they were 'two separate matters'.[308] In the context of questions interrogating how they were separate matters and specifically the WeChat audio message,[309] Hong then gave the following evidence:
But that contemplates two separate transactions lined to each other?‑‑‑ Ah, this is one matter.
It's one matter not two matters?‑‑‑ This was one matter when I borrowed money from Ari, Ari remit me 500,000.
Ari was giving you money to cover your proposed advance from an Australian account to the proposed ANZ bank account of Kegland Distributions, correct? ‑‑‑ No.
Who is the 'someone' in the second sentence? ‑‑‑ Ah, I wasn't very sure at the time.
You must have spoken with Ari before you sent him that message because you joined him to the char group you established? ‑‑‑ I did get 500,000 RMB from Ari but who actually gave it to me wasn't very sure what - and I still owe him 500,000.
Well, you paid it back by giving $100,000 to the company on 13 December?‑‑‑ They are two matters.[310]
159 Under cross‑examination, Hong conceded that Ari had never met Wang Jing, had never had any reason to do business with her and, in such circumstances, it was implausible that Ari would have made a loan to her.[311]
160 Against this backdrop, the documentary evidence establishes (reflecting, where necessary, certified translation of the material) the following:
(a) at 9:08pm on 10 December 2017, Hong invited Ari and Wang Jing to a WeChat group subsequently called 'New Company Establishment' by Ari;[312]
(b) at the same time as starting the WeChat group, Hong sent the following audio message:
Wang Jing, give me an account number. Someone wants to transfer the equivalent of AU$100,000 to my account in Chinese yuan, then I will give him Australian dollars at my end. See which account in convenient, and please give it to me;[313]
(c) at 11:18pm that night, Wang Jing provided details for a Chinese bank account of a person called Su Shuying;[314]
(d) at 7:24am on 11 December 2017, Ari replied in the WeChat group 'Got it! Thanks' and then at 3:11pm sent a screenshot and a message which read '500,00 [sic] has just been transferred. Please check received, thanks!'. At 3:44pm, Wang Jing asked: 'Excuse me, what is the payer's name? I cannot see it clearly' and Ari replied 'Qin Lin';[315]
(e) a WeChat audio message from Ari to Hong, where Ari stated, in relevant part, 'Liu, I just had 500,000 transferred from China. I just posted in the group' and Hong replied at 5:44pm on 11 December 2017 with a thumbs up emoji;[316]
(f) a series of messages between Ari and Wang Jing regarding whether the money arrived in the Chinese bank account, concluding with a message from Ari at 11:22pm on 11 December 2017 stating:
The remittance was returned today because the account number does not match the account name. Could you please double check and send me the correct one; the money will be remitted again tomorrow;[317]
(g) a handwritten IOU note signed by Ari and Qin Lin which stated, in relevant part:
IOU Note
ARI borrowed RMB500,000.00 from Qin Lin on 11 December 2017 and the money was transferred it to a designated account in China. The money is to be used as the start‑up capital for the establishment of a new Australian company. The plan is to repay the money in 2021.
The account number for repayment will be Qin Lin's bank account number in Australia designated by Qin Lin.
The repayment amount: AU$100,000.00;[318]
(h) at 12:19pm on 12 December 2017, Wang Jing sent to the WeChat group a picture of a credit card, along with a message stating 'There is something wrong with that card. Changing to another card', and provided details to a different Chinese bank account in the name of Xu Yan;[319]
(i) a China Industrial Bank Transaction Statement for an account in the name of Qin Lin with a remittance dated 12 December 2017 in the amount 500,000 to the account of Xu Yan;[320]
(j) a message sent by Ari to the WeChat group at 1:00pm on 12 December 2017 of a screenshot of a transaction, with a follow up message sent at 1:45pm stating 'Please check received', and a reply from Wang Jing at 3:10pm stating 'The 500,000' has arrived';[321]
(k) an Electronic Statement for Hong's Westpac bank account with a remittance of $100,000 dated 13 December 2017 and a transaction description of 'Pymt Kegland Di from hong';[322]
(l) an email from Westpac to Hong at 12:33 on 13 December 2017 confirming that Hong had transferred the $100,000 to Kegland Distribution;[323]
(m) an email sent on 18 April 2018 from hong.kegland@gmail.com to Sam stating:
Hi Sam
how is the communication between our accountant David?
the $100000.00cash I deposited to kegland for the starting the business, I would like to make it is the loan to the company. i do not care the interest , just make sure it is in the correct account category. also yours as well.
how is your sleeping recently? please take care!
Regards
Hong;[324] and
(n) a document titled 'Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd Notes to the Financial Statements for the year ended 30 June 2018' (the Kegland financial statement) showing, under financial liabilities, an entry for 'Loan - Hong Liu' in the amount of $100,000.[325]
161 The Defendants contend that the contemporaneous documentary evidence clearly explicates that Hong did not loan the $100,000 to Kegland. Rather, it submits the evidence shows that on 12 December 2017 Hong's agent received RMB 500,000 from Ari's father and that, only after that occurred, Hong transferred the AUD $100,000 to Kegland. As such, Hong was never left out of pocket and Kegland was never indebted to Hong for the $100,000 (notwithstanding the entry in the Kegland financial statement). On the Defendants' account, these transactions can be explained as being part of the scheme to hide Kee and Ari's interests in the company and were intentionally undertaken to give a false impression that Hong provided the start‑up money.[326] In the context of these submissions, the Defendants also specifically assert that Hong deliberately chose to ignore, in his first witness statement, the relevant WeChat evidence outlined above and that the only logical explanation for this omission is that he recognised the damaging nature of that evidence.[327] Further, they invite the Court to reject Hong's evidence given in cross‑examination that the two transactions were not linked, his evidence that Ari had in fact loaned money to Wang Jing (to any extent Hong maintained this position), and his evidence that Ari had loaned the money to Hong.[328]
162 Contrary to those submissions, the Plaintiffs submit that the evidence is in fact against the Defendants in relation to the $100,000.[329] They rely on the fact that Kegland's financial statement records the $100,000 as a loan from Hong, evidence given by Ari in cross‑examination which they say was to the effect that the money was lent by Hong to the company,[330] and, inter alia, on the email to Sam dated 18 April 2018,[331] to contend that this money was in fact a loan from Hong[332] or '[a]t the very least it was a back to back loan with money advanced from Ari's father to Hong or one of Hong's companies, and then Hong paid in to Kegland, but Hong may not have been out of pocket but the fact is Hong remained liable under a loan'.[333] In this way, the Plaintiffs argue that although the money originated from Ari's father, that money was advanced to Hong who paid the money into Kegland's account and therefore the money is from Hong. By analogy, they contend this is no different from paying money from an overdraft or borrowed monies.[334] On the submissions of the Plaintiffs, there is no reason to go behind the documentation recording the $100,000 as a loan from Hong to Kegland and this money reflects Hong's contribution to setting up the company.[335]
163 In this regard, and further to their submissions set out above, the Defendants invite the Court to find that the entry in the Kegland financial statement that Hong loaned $100,000 to Kegland is inaccurate. As set out above, in the context of s 1305(1) of the Corporations Act, which provides that a book kept under the requirements of that Act is admissible in evidence in any proceedings and is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in the book, the Defendants rely on observations of Nichols J in GBJ Building Pty Ltd v AI&PB Property Pty Ltd where Her Honour stated in relevant part:[336]
... Section 1305(1) does not make the company's books conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, in the sense of requiring the tribunal of fact to make a finding in terms of the content of the books in the absence of proof to the contrary by the opposing party. The books are prima facie evidence of the matters stated in them, but the weight of that evidence is to be measured in accordance with the common sense of the tribunal of fact. Other evidence may suggest that the books are unreliable, including where there are drafts, or contain matters that require explanation...
164 The Defendants also rely on the following statement of Austin J:
... s 1305(1) allows a company's books to be introduced into evidence as they are, without any "authenticating" evidence by any witness, and allows the books to be relied upon to prove transactions recorded in them. But it does not elevate matters contained in the books to a plane of probative value that requires the court to disregard the context in which the matters relied on appear in the tendered document. If, for example, there is some doubt as to whether a particular transaction is "recorded" in a book because of some uncertainty about the status of the document or ambiguity about what it contains, s 1305(1) does not overcome the problem.[337]
165 I accept the Defendants' submissions in respect of the $100,000 of start‑up capital paid into Kegland's bank account. I am satisfied that the documentary evidence set out above[338] makes it abundantly clear that Ari, through his father, deposited RMB 500,000 into a Chinese bank account linked to Hong's family and, once that had occurred, that Hong transferred the equivalent AUD$100,000 into the Kegland bank account. In this regard, and by reference to documentary evidence, I am satisfied that Hong's evidence on this issue must be rejected. By way of example, looking to the documentary evidence, it is wholly implausible that the transaction by Ari's father was not linked to the later transaction by Hong, or that Ari would loan such a significant sum of money to a cashier in China that he had not met, or that Ari had loaned money to Hong. Thus, when tested against the contemporaneous documentary evidence, Hong's evidence on this issue must be found to be unsatisfactory and, simply, untrue.[339]
166 In making this finding, I also accept, in accordance with the observations of Nichols J in GBJ Building Pty Ltd v AI&PB Property Pty Ltd,[340] that this is a circumstance where common sense in light of the preponderance of the other documentary evidence is such that I should find the Kegland financial statement, which shows a loan liability to Hong,[341] is incorrect, notwithstanding the operation of s 1305(1) of the Corporations Act. That is, contrary to the submission of the Plaintiffs, I am satisfied I should go behind the Kegland financial statement, and other records they say support a finding that the $100,000 was a loan from Hong. For the sake of completeness, I also reject, as unconvincing, the Plaintiffs' submission that Hong transferring $100,000 into the Kegland bank account following receipt of RMB 500,000 is analogous to, or no different from, paying money from an overdraft. The effect of these findings is that Hong's contributions, if any, to Kegland did not include the significant financial contribution of $100,000.
167 Very briefly, the other event of note in this period concerns the meeting of Ari and Leon at the Secret Kitchen restaurant in Doncaster, which was organised via the WeChat messages set out in the section above. Ari's evidence is that at Secret Kitchen on 10 December 2017, he gave Leon 'an update on where Kee and I had got to in setting up Kegland and the arrangement we had reached with Hong to sit in for us as a shareholder and director until the MCH dispute was resolved, when he would resign as a director and give the shares back'.[342] Leon, however, denies this conversation took place. His evidence was that although he could not 'recall precisely what was discussed at the dinner', at no stage did Ari, or any other person, say anything to the effect that an arrangement had been reached with Hong 'whereby Hong would merely 'sit in' for Kee and Ari as director and shareholder of Kegland' or that Hong would resign and return the shares once the MCH dispute was concluded.[343]
168 To the extent it is necessary to express a view in this regard for the purposes of later findings in relation to other evidence, in circumstances where it is accepted that Leon and Ari met at the Secret Kitchen on 10 December 2017, in light of my findings above regarding Ari's conversation with Hong on 6 December 2017 and the limitations in Leon's evidence due to his ties of loyalty to Hong,[344] I consider it inherently improbable that in a meeting, that was for all intents and purposes a work meeting between Ari and Leon only four days after the Alleged Oral Agreement that Ari did not tell Leon what he and Hong discussed, and agreed to, during that conversation.
12 to 15 December 2017 - the Hong alias email account and the ANZ bank account
169 The fifth time period, from 12 to 15 December 2017, covers two matters which provide context to this dispute but do not require me to make any specific findings at this juncture.
170 The first concerns emails sent from an email account - hong.kegland@gmail.com - referred to as the Hong alias account by the Defendants, and a term I adopt in these reasons. Kee's evidence is that, sometime before the Kegland domain was registered, he set up two email accounts: keghardware@gmail.com (the Keg Hardware email) and the Hong alias account. He used the first of these accounts, while Ari used the latter. This was done because he and Ari did not want MCH to see emails associated with their names and also because using the Hong alias account would create the impression that Hong was involved in the business.[345]
171 Similarly, Ari's evidence is that using those two email accounts allowed him and Kee to made decisions 'that would appear to have been made by a director, namely Hong, without requiring his involvement'.[346] Further, Ari says he gave Hong the details to the Hong alias account in case he ever needed to answer questions about the day‑to‑day operations of Kegland or, on rare occasions, in the event he needed to send an email.[347] On Ari's account, while he sent over 300 emails from the Hong alias account, Hong sent only a small number of emails from the account,[348] which can be identified by the inclusion of a 'sent by iPhone' and Hong's name in Mandarin at the conclusion of those emails.[349] Ari first sent the Hong alias account log‑in and password to Hong in a WeChat message on 12 December 2017.[350]
172 Hong's evidence was that he actively used and sent emails from the Hong alias account but that he was aware that Ari had access to the account and sent emails in his name from time to time.[351] Further, he says that he did not have an iPhone prior to mid‑January 2018 and he also sent emails from the Hong alias account from devices other than his phone. Where this was the case, emails that he sent would not have included the 'sent by iPhone' signature.[352]
173 The second matter concerns the Kegland bank account set up at ANZ Bank in Box Hill. The evidence establishes that on the evening of 12 December 2017, Ari sent Hong a WeChat audio message asking whether Hong had any acquaintances at the ANZ Bank because, if he did, he would open an account at a branch where Hong had connections.[353] Sam's evidence was that he was asked by either Kee or Ari to attend the ANZ Bank in Box Hill on 13 December 2017 to open a bank account for Kegland and to make Oliver a signatory to the account and, on that day, Sam introduced himself, his brother, who had driven him to the meeting, and Oliver to Hong and thanked Hong for helping Kee and Ari. He recalled Hong saying words to the effect that 'this is what friends are for'. After they completed the paperwork to set up the account, they went their separate ways.[354] In cross‑examination, Hong accepted he had no reason to disagree with Oliver's evidence that this was the first time they had met.[355] He also accepted that he met Sam for the first time at this meeting at the ANZ Bank.[356]
174 Over the next few days, activity continued in relation to the bank account. A WeChat audio message from the morning of 14 December 2017, shows Ari asking Hong to log onto the 'gmail account' as there were two more documents from the bank for him to sign and asking whether Hong was going to print the documents or whether they should meet somewhere later to sign the documents.[357] The signed documents were sent to Oliver and Sam from the Hong alias account later that day.[358] Ari's evidence is that then, on 27 December 2017, he and Hong attended the ANZ bank so that Hong could re‑set the security questions for the bank account.[359]
Meeting at Hong's house in Kew - the 16 December meeting
175 The sixth time period relates to a meeting at Hong's house on 16 December 2017 (the 16 December meeting). The parties agree that this meeting took place but dispute what was discussed at the meeting. Due to the significance of the matters and the parties contest what was discussed, it is necessary to set out the evidence of the witnesses in detail.
176 In summary form, Kee's evidence with respect to 16 December 2017 is that in mid‑December 2017 he and Ari had discussed having a get together with Sam, Hong and Oliver so that everyone could meet before Kegland commenced operations and to ensure that everyone was aware of their roles given the state of the MCH dispute at that time.[360] The meeting on 16 December 2017 was the first time Kee had met Hong, and the first part of the meeting included Kee expressing his gratitude to Hong for 'stepping in as shareholder and director' and discussing that because it appeared likely the MCH dispute would lead to litigation, it would be necessary for Hong and Sam to hold on to the shares until that dispute was resolved.[361] On Kee's evidence, prior to Oliver arriving at Hong's house, the following discussions took place:
(a) Sam and Hong were told that arrangements would be made for them to receive any documents they would be required to sign and that, in Hong's case, it should not take up much of his time as it was simply a matter of signing documents. Sam and Hong agreed to this.[362]
(b) Hong raised the prospect of involving Leon, and that because of the MCH dispute it would be useful to set up a WeChat group as he considered the most secure form of communication, and a WeChat group was set up including Ari, Hong, Leon and Kee.[363]
(c) Kee raised the issue of entering into a share option agreement between Kegland, himself and Ari because:
... if we were simply to have the Kegland shares transferred back to us this may attract sizeable capital gains tax, depending on when this happened (which was dependent on the MCH dispute settling). I said that what I intended doing was simply issuing new shares, thereby diluting Hong's and Sam's shareholding to 10% each, that the final amount transferred would be a much smaller percentage. I also reassured Hong that even if the share did attract capital gains tax he would not be out of pocket as Ari and I would pay anything owing. Hong brushed off dealing with this in detail and said words to the effect that as long as he did not need to sign anything and did not have to pay any tax, he did not need to concern himself with the arrangements.[364]
(d) Kee told Hong that he and Ari had agreed to give Sam a written indemnity for standing in as director and wanted to give Hong a similar indemnity but Hong said words to the effect that he did not need this as he trusted them.[365]
177 In cross‑examination, although he accepted that the Share Option Agreement was not entered into until 2020,[366] Kee maintained that it had been discussed at the 16 December 2017 meeting, saying 'at the time I'd discussed the share option agreement and I said that I would go and complete that agreement which I forgot to do.' When pressed on whether his evidence was that he had intended to create the share option agreement in 2017 or 2018 but had forgotten to do so, Kee said 'Yes, [he] didn't get around to doing that.'[367] Kee also maintained that he spoke to Hong about an indemnity at the meeting, saying that he offered it to Hong on multiple occasions both 'at his house' and 'later on' including each time they signed a lease.[368]
178 The following exchange between counsel for the Plaintiffs and Kee then took place in the context of a line of questions regarding whether the contents of the Partnership Agreement[369] were inconsistent with his evidence of what was discussed at the meeting:
That's a transfer, not issue of shares under the share option agreement, isn't it? ‑‑‑Um, yes, that's what was put in that agreement Your Honour.
That's inconsistent with what you say was discussed on 16 December 2017, isn't it?‑‑‑Yes, I would say that is inconsistent there, Your Honour.
Because, what you say you discussed on 16 December 2017 at paragraph 110 of your witness statement is no correct, is it?‑‑‑Ah, no, that's not correct. Um, I would just say that this is simply an inconsistency. That's all. Ah, we, for the simplicity of the writing this agreement with Sam, that's how we wrote it but essentially, the same thing has taken effect and did take effect and it, it's ‑‑‑
You got - under this agreement, you were going to get his 40 per cent, leaving him with 10 per cent by transfer, no by any other means, isn't that right? ‑‑‑ Um, yes. I mean that's what's written in this agreement but effectively, that's what we were putting in place. It didn't matter how we got there I guess but that's what this agreement you know, stipulated.
Wasn't going to be by a share option agreement, was it?‑‑‑Um, we discussed a share option agreement at the time and it was after I'd had the conversation with David Amos.
The conversation you had with David Amos you had in late 2020, didn't you? ‑‑‑ Ah no, there was another ah, conversation with David Amos in late 2017 ah, as well.[370]
179 Ari gave evidence which largely mirrored Kee's, except that he did not mention a discussion regarding the written indemnity and, with respect to the share option agreement, his amended written evidence was that:
Also at the meeting on 16 December 2017, Kee discussed the necessity of a share option agreement that would allow us to get out shares back. Kee had discussed this with me prior to the meeting, telling me that if the shares increased a lot in value there might be capital gains tax implications if we simply had the shares transferred back to us when the MCH dispute was over. He suggested that the best way to avoid this would be to dilute the shareholding. I do not know anything about capital gains tax and so left this to Kee.
Kee said at the meeting that if Sam and Hong were going to transfer their shareholding back to our respective family trusts after the MCH dispute had settled, this would trigger capital gains tax. Kee also told Hong that he had already discussed this with me and Sam and he would arrange a share option agreement, which would have the effect of diluting the shares to an amount that would attract less tax. Kee said he would arrange for it to reduce down to 5%, 10% or 20% (I cannot now remember which) so that only the reduced amount 10% then had to be transferred back to us and that we would make sure that Hong was not out‑of‑pocket for any capital gains tax that would follow the transfer of the of the final reduced amount 10%.
Hong said that he was not interested in seeing the share sale agreement and was not concerned about the share transfer as long as he did not have to pay capital gains tax. Hong said words to the effect of "Kee and you can organise this, I don't mind.[371]
180 In the course of being cross‑examined on the events of the meeting, it was put to Ari that his revised evidence in relation to the percentage of shares that would be held following the share dilution was inconsistent with the terms of the Partnership Agreement. Ari's evidence in response to this was: 'At that time Kee said the number. I can't remember the numbers Kee mentioned. But Sam's agreement we discussed with Sam and Kee together. That is in the writing (inaudible)'.[372] Later in cross‑examination, the following exchange occurred between counsel for the Plaintiffs and Ari:
... There was no discussion about a share option agreement was there? Was there?‑‑‑ Ah, I think we discussed because when we set up accounting, Kee was taking with our accountant, David Amos, and regarding some capital gain issues. That's why definitely we mentioned during the other meeting, because we don't want an out of pocket money from Hong. So, he - Kee mentioned that meeting.
There was no discussion about any shares being transferred to Kee or you, was there?‑‑‑ I think we mentioned at the time, so after dispute finished and we can get out shares back, and he doesn't need to be director.
You didn't raise that at this meeting of 16 December 2017, I suggest to you?‑‑‑ I think this is always - we - I can't remember, did I write it in the - I might write on - I can't remember right now. But that is always the case, we're talking about.
Even though there is no written evidence of any of that?‑‑‑ Well, with Hong we didn't write down, ah he didn't write it in the paper.
There was no mention in this social get together of the indemnity agreement, was there?‑‑‑ Well, ah, I don't think so we mentioned indemnity agreement in that meeting, because I said that to Hong in early December.
...
... 16 December was nearly seven years ago, wasn't it?‑‑‑Yes.
It's hard to remember things that happened that long ago, isn't it?‑‑‑ Yes, it's hard to remember.[373]
181 Sam's evidence is that he could not recall the specifics of what was discussed at the meeting but did remember that some time was spent discussing the importance of keeping Ari and Kee's involvement in Kegland quiet, in that it was important that staff did not reveal that Ari and Kee were the true owners and directors of Kegland Distribution, and that at some point in the meeting Kee raised the issue of capital gains tax being payable and that he 'did not understand the details of this and left it to Kee'.[374] Sam was also cross‑examined extensively on his recollections of this issue.[375]
... the meeting addressed matters related to communications systems within Kegland's business, and relating to stock issues, but the meeting was of a relaxed social nature, where alcohol was consumed. There was no discussion of detailed legal matters or tax issues, and such discussions would not have been appropriate at a meeting of that type.[376]
183 Further, Hong says that during that meeting neither Kee or Ari said any words to the effect that they would take back the shares and appoint themselves directors or that his role would only be to sign the occasional document. According to Hong, the indemnity document was not discussed (and if it had been he would have requested a copy and sought legal advice) nor was any share option agreement or capital gains tax raised at the meeting.[377]
184 Following the meeting, at 2:35pm on 16 December 2017, Kee sent an email from the Kegland Hardware email account to Oliver, Sam, Hong,[378] and a fourth person, with the subject line 'Meeting Minutes'. That email states:
Hey guys,
Just re‑capping from Todays meeting.
I will follow up Eric regarding second hand kegs
Sam, you asked me to remind you to do these things:
‑ Can you please make stock update in both directions from youERP to Magento
‑ Log failed log in attempts in youERP
I will
‑ investigate what we need to setup PO BOX.
‑ Setup mail addresses with google apps
‑ look into the differences between slack or zoom for communication[379]
185 In relation to that email, and the meeting more generally, the following exchange occurred between Kee and counsel for the Plaintiffs during cross‑examination:
I suggest to you, you can't distinctly remember what was‑ who said what to whom in the course of this meeting? ‑‑‑ It was a very important meeting Your Honour. It was also the first time they had met Hong face to face. It was quite memorable for me, Your Honour.
So important that you did a recap of the meeting in an email, the one we just looked at?‑‑‑ Yes, that's correct. Ah‑‑‑
In that recap, you made no mention did you of Hong's involvement in the company as a stand‑in director or shareholder? ‑‑‑ um, yes, I think you know, at the time, was trying to avoid creating you know, these types of documents which would be a problem for us later down the track with the MCH hearing. Ah, it's probably why I also didn't put my name at the end of the email, I guess Your Honour.
It's convenient for you to say you didn't put it in writing you can blame it on the MCH ruse, isn't that right?‑‑‑ I wasn't thinking that at the time but I guess if you can - if you're, if you're saying I'm, I'm finding that convenient now, I, I suppose that, that could, that could be correct, yes.
Yes, because these things, I suggest to you, were never said?
‑‑‑ That's not correct. They were said.[380]
186 The Plaintiffs contend this exchange reflects an admission by Kee that he found it 'convenient' to explain away the absence of any reference to Hong's supposed role as stand in director in this email by referring to the need to maintain the MCH ruse - this being conduct undertaken to obscure Kee and Ari's involvement in Kegland from Maggie and MCH.[381] This contention reflects a consistent theme throughout the submissions of the Plaintiffs, which is appropriate to deal with in general terms here, that the Court should reject the Defendants' narrative that the absence of relevant documentary evidence, or the absence of express references in the existing documentary evidence, relating to issues such as the Alleged Oral Agreement can be explained by the MCH ruse. The Plaintiffs say this explanation is unpersuasive, because if the Alleged Oral Agreement had existed, and been enforced, then simple ASIC searches would have unravelled the ruse. They also submit the Defendants' case is not tenable in circumstances where Kee accepted in cross‑examination that he 'had no problem putting things in writing in the MCH proceeding [and] would just not discover them or produce them to the other side'.[382]
187 Setting to one side matters relating to incomplete discovery and false pleadings and evidence, which I addressed above in the section dealing with the credibility of the witnesses, I am unwilling to accept, as a wholesale proposition, the Plaintiffs' submission that it is implausible that the MCH ruse explains why documents do not exist or do not refer to particular matters. My general observation, in line with my findings elsewhere in these reasons, is that, in circumstances where it is common ground between the parties[383] that Kee and Ari were attempting to hide their interest in Kegland, it is in fact entirely plausible that matters involving Ari and Kee were not put into writing due to the MCH ruse. In this regard, I distinguish the observations of Lander J in Brookfield v Yevad Products,[384] where His Honour held that contemporaneous documents often provide the best evidence of events in dispute as those documents are typically created in circumstances where the parties do not expect them to end up in a trial. The converse is true here with respect to documents created by the Kegland accounts (as opposed to private messages such as the 'Fight the Landlord' messages discussed below) in circumstances where the MCH proceeding was actively anticipated.
188 While these observations apply generally, where necessary I will separately address this submission with respect to particular documents. In the case of Kee's email recapping the 16 December 2017 meeting, I draw no inferences against the existence of the Hong Trust from the fact that email is silent on matters relating to the shares. Further, I do not consider that the content of the email weighs in any substantial way in favour of a finding that the Alleged Oral Agreement, the share option agreement, capital gains tax or indemnity documents were not discussed at the meeting.
189 Turning specifically to the 16 December 2017 meeting, the Plaintiffs submit the evidence given by Kee, Ari and Sam in relation to what was discussed at the meeting should be rejected.[385] The Plaintiffs' submissions in this regard particularly, although not exclusively, revolve around Kee, Ari and Sam's evidence that they discussed the prospect of diluting the shares to minimize capital gains tax at the meeting. The Plaintiffs contend this evidence is inconsistent with, and implausible in light of, the evidence given by the three witnesses regarding the terms of the Partnership Agreement, and the witnesses' evidence, and lies, regarding the share option agreement.[386] The Plaintiffs made detailed submissions on the specific evidence given by each of Kee, Ari and Sam in this regard.
190 In very summary form, the Plaintiffs say Sam has no recollection of the details of the alleged discussion about the proposed share option agreement.[387] I understand the thrust of this submission to be that the Court should therefore give no weight to Sam's evidence on this issue. Further, they contend Sam's evidence is implausible in circumstances where the Partnership Agreement reached between Sam, Kee and Ari in early 2018 does not refer to the share option agreement or to capital gains tax. The Plaintiffs say, had these matters been discussed in the 16 December 2017 meeting, the Partnership Agreement would include such a reference.[388] They make analogous submissions in relation to Ari's evidence and Kee's evidence. The Plaintiffs also contend that Ari's written evidence should be rejected in light of his answers in cross‑examination extracted above.[389] The Plaintiffs also make comparable submissions with respect to Kee's evidence, particularly inviting the Court to reject Kee's evidence that he raised the indemnity document with Hong at the meeting, in light of Ari and Sam's evidence on this point.[390] Furthermore, they say Kee's evidence is at odds with Kee's communications with Mr Mansour and Mr Amos in the lead up to the share issue as, had a share option been discussed at the 16 December meeting, Kee would have immediately requested documents for a share issue to be drafted in the first instance, rather than requesting documents for a share purchase.[391]
191 In contrast, I understand the Defendants to simply be inviting the Court to accept Kee and Ari's evidence of what took place at the 16 December meeting over that of Hong. Relevantly, they concede that Sam's oral evidence generally demonstrates that he does not have a strong capacity to deal with matters of detail, however, they say this in fact highlights the implausibility of Hong's evidence that, on the basis of two meetings with him (the 16 December meeting being one of those meetings), he was content for Sam to be a director and 50% shareholder in Kegland.[392] Further, the Defendants say that Sam was not challenged in cross‑examination on the validity and authenticity of the Partnership Agreement, the terms of which demonstrated the existence of a trust over shares he was a registered owner of - for formation the Partnership Agreement.[393] On the Defendants' submission, it is implausible that Sam's Trust would exist without Hong's Trust.[394] These latter two matters will be dealt with as part of the threshold issue.
192 As to what was said during the 16 December meeting, as with the discussion on 6 December 2017, my findings in this regard must be made by weighing the evidence of the witnesses without the assistance of documentary evidence, bar Kee's email discussed above. The evidence of Kee, Ari and Sam is wholly contradicted by the evidence of Hong. Having had regard to the evidence of each witness, I reject Hong's account of what was discussed on 16 December 2017 and accept, on the balance of probabilities, that at that meeting Kee and Ari discussed with Hong the nature of his role at Kegland, as a stand‑in director and shareholder. I am also satisfied that there was a general discussion regarding the transfer of the shares including the possibility of diluting shares to minimise capital gains tax. Nonetheless, in making this finding, I note it is the position, as observed by the Plaintiffs, that the document forming the Share Option Agreement did not exist at the time of the meeting.[395] In light of the evidence of Sam and Ari on this point, I am not satisfied that Kee raised the indemnity document with Hong at this meeting.
193 In reaching these conclusions I have taken into account my findings about Hong's credibility generally as a witness although, conscious of the risks of making global findings of that nature as set out previously,[396] I have specific regard to Hong's evidence on this topic and consider that it is unpersuasive within the matrix of other findings made up unto this point. I consider it entirely logical that the key matters, such as the nature of Hong and Sam's role at Kegland, would have been discussed at this first meeting between Hong and Kee, particularly in circumstances where Hong had only briefly met Sam on one previous occasion. Further, in line with my finding above that Mr Amos had raised the capital gains tax issue with Kee in the weeks before this meeting, I also consider that it is inherently plausible that at this meeting Kee raised the possibility of issuing more shares to dilute Sam and Hong's shareholding in order minimise the capital gains tax. It fits within the overarching puzzle pieces that make up the narrative of evidence. As such, I am satisfied that Kee and Ari's evidence should be accepted in this regard.
194 I also reject the Plaintiffs' submission that the fact the Partnership Agreement does not refer to any share dilution scheme, or to capital gains tax, supports a finding that these matters were not discussed at the 16 December meeting. In this regard, I accept Kee's evidence that the Partnership Agreement was, to paraphrase, drafted 'for simplicity' - I understand this to mean it was drafted to provide the overall gist of the of the agreement - and in enforcing the agreement it 'didn't matter how we got there'.[397] Albeit given in relation to a different document, I consider Sam's evidence in cross‑examination to the effect that, although he could not recall the details of the share sale or share issue, he 'trusted Kee and Ari to organise this. I just don't have the time to go and study this how share detail and share you know, like transfer or (indistinct) how they're going to organise this. I just trust them they're going to, you know, do the right by me, yeah' broadly supports this view of how Kee and Ari operated.[398] I consider that the picture that emerges from the evidence as a whole is that Kee, Ari and Sam were not sophisticated commercial operators. Indeed, this is apparent from the very premise of the MCH ruse. Thus, to the extent the Plaintiffs seek factual findings on technicalities or because of the absence of specific details in documents you would otherwise expect to see from established commercial entities or business people, those submissions are misplaced. Moreover, in accordance with my previous comments,[399] my opinion in this respect is not affected by the subsequent email 'just recapping' the meeting, which only refers to relatively minor operational items.[400] Such limited content in communications of this kind was not unusual and was perfectly consistent with the ongoing concern of Kee and Ari to avoid placing anything in communications which might alert Maggie and MCH to the true position with Kegland and their involvement in the business. Neither, in this context, is the fact of this meeting and its attendees, in any way inconsistent with the existence of the Hong Trust.[401]
195 In a similar vein, the Plaintiffs say Ari's evidence regarding the discussion of the share dilution at the 16 December 2017 meeting contradicts paragraph 8D(b)(iii) of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim,[402] which provides that in or around early December 2017 Kee and Ari agreed with Hong that he would hold the 50% shares in Kegland on trust equally for Ari and Kee and transfer them to each of them, or at their direction, and which makes no mention of any intention to dilute the shares.
196 I do not consider that such an inconsistency, as contended for by the Plaintiffs, exists. This submission, like many advanced by the Plaintiffs including those above in relation to the Share Agreement, seek to apply an overly narrow interpretation as to what was understood by the parties in relation to the 'transfer' of the shares. I consider it entirely plausible that in raising the possibility of a share dilution, Kee and Ari considered they were discussing, in general terms, how to effect the transfer of shares in conformity with the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement.
197 The Plaintiffs also contend, in like submissions to those they make regarding the events of 6 to 8 December 2017,[403] that the evidence given by Kee, Ari and Sam regarding the meeting on 16 December 2017 did not distinguish between the discussion as it pertained to Hong's shares and to Sam's shares and accordingly, even if their evidence is accepted, there is no basis for the Court to find that a trust arose with respect to Hong's shares and not Sam's shares. In making this submission, the Plaintiffs again assert that the Defendants allege that no trust arises with respect to Sam's shares.[404] As I found above, these submissions misconceive the pleadings.[405]
198 The seventh time period covers the first part of 2018 as Kegland Distribution began operations and MCH proceedings commenced.
199 Kee's evidence in relation to this period is that by the end of January 2018, Kegland had moved out of Ari's house and into a warehouse in Bayswater and the website had gone live. And, by around February 2018, a new product development manager had been hired.[406] Relevantly in this respect, Kee's evidence in relation to his role in Kegland more generally is that he is involved in the day‑to‑day operations of the company, including product development, marketing, hiring staff, and conducting meetings with suppliers and customers, whereas Hong's role in Kegland was limited to signing and executing documents.[407] Ari gave similar evidence regarding Hong's role at Kegland.[408] With respect to his own responsibilities in the company, Ari's evidence is that he is involved in duties such as maintaining the brew list, determining the pricing of products, overseeing freighting and accounts, processing invoices, and visiting China annually to meet existing and prospective suppliers.[409]
200 Contrary to the evidence of Kee and Ari, Hong's evidence is that he actively contributed to Kegland's operations during the period immediately following its incorporation. For example, his evidence[410] is that:
(a) he was actively involved in the process of finding and inspecting potential warehouses;[411]
(b) he offered up his outdoor furniture for use at Kegland;[412]
(c) his properties were used as a delivery address for several months after the incorporation of Kegland Distribution and during that time he spent time and effort dealing with letters and parcels and attending the post office;[413]
(d) in the weeks and months after Kegland's incorporation he helped to replace Keg King stickers on products and to unload stock and equipment;
(e) he visited Keg King to inspect its retail situation and purchase products for Kegland to review;
(f) he was involved in product research and development, for example in 2018 he purchased a prototype brewing quality tester in Yarraville and Kegland eventually developed and sold such a product;
(g) he used his social media platforms to advertise Kegland and its products and to advertise job openings at Kegland;[414] and
(h) he attended Kegland team events[415] and visited the Kegland warehouse on various occasions.
201 Further with regards to Hong's role in, and contribution to, Kegland in this period, the evidence shows that in July 2018 Kegland entered into a lease for a warehouse in Lascelles Street, Springvale. Hong and Sam signed the lease as directors. Hong also signed as guarantor.[416] In the course of negotiating the lease, Hong provided a list of assets (including properties in Kew and Balwyn North) and liabilities to the real estate agent.[417] As I explain below, I accept that Hong's role as guarantor constitutes a contribution he made to Kegland and, in fact, arguably is one of his most noteworthy contributions but not one that advances his position. I consider Hong's role as guarantor in more detail below.[418]
202 Separately, the evidence establishes that during the early part of 2018, inter alia, the Partnership Agreement between Kee, Ari and Sam was signed (backdated to 1 December 2017),[419] the Deed of Indemnity (which was not dated) was signed by Kee, Ari and Sam,[420] and employment contracts for Kee and Ari were entered into.[421] Sam's evidence is that Kee drafted these contracts and they were entered into to make Ari and Kee appear like employees, rather than the owners, of Kegland.[422] Ari also gave evidence to this effect.[423]
203 I accept that Hong's contributions to Kegland in this period include the matters set out above.[424] However, despite the tenor of the Plaintiffs' submissions being that these contributions were substantial, I am not convinced this is the case when you consider the resources available to Hong, including his standing as a businessman. Nor do I consider that these contributions of Hong are necessarily inconsistent with the evidence of Ari and Kee, that Hong's role in Kegland was broadly limited to executing documents. Regardless, the significance of these matters, and the weight to be given to them, are more squarely dealt with in considering the threshold issue below. To this end, to the extent it is necessary to express a view, I also accept, as uncontroversial, Kee and Ari's evidence regarding their responsibilities at Kegland.
204 However, the most notable event in this period is that MCH commenced proceedings against Kee, Ari and Kegland Distribution in around March 2018. Bar the limited matters set out below, it is not necessary to explain these proceedings in detail. Kee and Ari were represented by Mansour lawyers in the MCH proceeding and Kegland Distribution was represented by Stephen Earl at Earl & Associates. However, Ari's evidence is that they discussed with Hong that although he, as director of Kegland, would need to instruct Mr Earl, Kee and Ari would provide him with the instructions or would send written instructions themselves via the Hong alias account.[425] The Defendants contend, on the basis of WeChat messages[426] where Ari drew Hong's attention to an email from Mr Earl and Hong replied with a thumbs up emoji, that the evidence shows Hong agreed to this arrangement.[427]
205 The Plaintiffs contend that Kee and Ari's conduct in the course of the MCH proceeding is 'totally contrary' to the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement and, therefore, to the Hong Trust. In making this submission, in very summary form, the Plaintiffs rely on defences[428] filed by the various defendants in the MCH proceeding which, inter alia, denied an allegation in MCH's Amended Statement of Claim[429] that Kee had entered into an agreement or arrangement with Kegland's directors whereby he was entitled to become a shareholder of the company or to otherwise benefit financially from the operations of Kegland. They also rely on the fact that various affidavits (including those sworn by the solicitor retained by Kegland)[430] were filed in the MCH proceeding which repeated that denial. The Plaintiffs say this denial is consistent with Hong's evidence that there was no agreement for the shares to be held on trust.[431] Put another way, I understand this to be a submission that the Court should find that, notwithstanding their concessions to the contrary, Kee and Ari were in fact telling the truth in the MCH proceedings when they denied involvement in Kegland.
206 In this regard, the Plaintiffs also place weight on an absence of references to the Partnership Agreement in documents discovered and evidence filed by Kee and Ari in the MCH proceeding.[432] As I understand it, this is a submission directed to the fact that while the Kegland party witnesses have conceded they gave false evidence in the course of the MCH proceeding, that concession did not directly comment on the absence of any evidence in the MCH proceedings regarding of the Partnership Agreement. Alternatively, it may be a submission that the Court should find the Partnership Agreement did not exist at the time of the MCH proceeding as it is, in fact, a recent invention of Kee, Ari and Sam. In the face of such imprecise submissions, I do not find it necessary to make any findings. However, for the sake of completeness, I note that my tentative view is that, in either case, I would not be inclined to make such a finding. Although, for the avoidance of doubt, I confirm have I considered the Partnership Agreement more holistically in my consideration of the evidence.
207 Further, the Plaintiffs point to two emails sent by Kee in the context of the MCH proceeding. I understand this to be a submission that the Court should find these emails also support a finding that the Hong Trust does not exist. The first email was sent by Kee on 9 May 2018 to Mr Earl, seemingly responding to questions set out in a letter from MCH's lawyers. At paragraph 3 of that email he stated:
Kegland Distribution PTY LTD was a business that is owned and was registered by Hong and Sam. I am only an employee in this business. My employment agreement states that i am the ambassador and also look after product development. So my employment requires me to establish the KegLand brand in whatever capacity I can as well as manufacture new and innovative products for us to sell. One of the great difficulties that we face in manufacturing in China is that we are not able to get the turnover requirement to meet minimum order quantities when we order from China and supplying goods to other customers overseas helps this issue.[433]
208 The second email was sent by Kee to the Hong alias account on 26 November 2018 and stated, in relevant part:
Hello Hong,
Thanks for forwarding me that information. It's good to be in the loop with what you are facing with this issue.
As you know you, Sam and myself have no agreements to pass shares onto me and I am really not sure why they keep suggesting this. There is no evidence because as you know no such agreement exists.
MCH keep harping on about this customer list and nothing has been stolen or taken from them.
For MCH to bring up these factors simply points out the fact that they are desperate to try and make a case that they simply don't have evidence to support.[434]
209 In conformity with my findings above regarding documents created by Kegland accounts in the express context of the MCH dispute, to the extent that drawing attention to these two emails is a submission that the fact these emails do not refer to the Alleged Oral Agreement supports a finding that there is no Hong Trust, I decline to make such a finding. If, conversely, the submission is that the content of these emails weighs against the Court finding that the Hong Trust does exist, I also decline to make such a finding. These were emails sent squarely in the midst of the MCH dispute and it is to be expected they would not include admissions regarding Kee and Ari's involvement in Kegland. In this regard, Kee and Ari admitted they provided false evidence in the course of the MCH proceeding and have broadly given evidence that the Hong alias account was being used to maintain the MCH ruse.
210 The Defendants accept that, contrary to their claim in this proceeding, during the MCH proceeding Kee and Ari maintained the position that they had no stake in Kegland. In this regard, the Defendants say that each of Hong, Kee and Ari gave false evidence in the MCH proceeding, and that Kee and Ari readily accepted that they had done so in cross‑examination in this proceeding.[435] The Defendants submit that this conduct can be explained as part of the MCH ruse being undertaken at the time to hide Kee and Ari's interest in Kegland.[436] Further, the Defendants submit that the position maintained by Hong throughout this proceeding, that the evidence given in the MCH proceeding was truthful, is 'wholly implausible'.[437]
211 Repeating again that it is common ground between the parties that at this point in time Kee and Ari were attempting to keep their involvement in Kegland secret from Maggie and MCH,[438] noting that Kee and Ari have conceded they were lying during the MCH proceeding, and having accepted that following their departure from MCH Ari and Kee set in motion the critical steps to establishing the Kegland business, I further accept the Defendants' submissions that Hong's evidence in these proceedings that he gave truthful evidence in the MCH proceedings[439] (and the correlative submissions of the Plaintiffs that Kee and Ari were also in fact truthful in the MCH proceedings) is wholly implausible. In doing so, I reject the Plaintiffs' submissions that Kee and Ari's conduct during the MCH proceedings is totally contrary to the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement.
212 The eighth time period concerns the sale and purchase of the Smith Road warehouses. In very summary form, as set out above, in 2010 the Smith Road warehouses were purchased by Kee, Ari and Maggie and occupied by MCH. However, following the breakdown of Maggie, Kee and Ari's relationship, MCH ceased paying rent and in around 2018 Kee and Ari commenced proceedings in the Victorian Civil Administration Tribunal (VCAT) seeking orders to evict MCH from the property. In December 2018, WeChat messages show Ari and Hong discussing the potential for Hong, Kee and Ari to jointly purchase one of the warehouses. Hong agreed to this proposition. On 14 March 2019, VCAT ordered the sale of the Smith Road warehouses and, at the auction on 9 May 2019, Hong purchased the larger of the warehouses for $2,010,000. Through a unit structure, the family trusts of Kee, Ari and Hong each hold equal shares in the warehouse.[440] In around 2020, Hong established a waste management business called Urban Waste which used the Smith Road warehouse as its premises for approximately six months free of charge. Relevantly, for the purpose of later findings, Hong had an email address linked to this business - 'hong@urbanwaste.com.au' (the Urban Waste email). Urban Waste vacated the Smith Road warehouse in the second half of 2020, at which point a tenant moved into the property.[441] I understand that the parties do not dispute this factual background.[442] At no stage did Kegland lease, or occupy, the Smith Road warehouse.
213 Several matters from this period are disputed and bear more detailed consideration. These matters broadly flow from a series of WeChat audio messages between Ari and Hong on 19 March 2020. The translations of those messages are as follows (numbered for convenience and set out in the order provided by the certified translation):[443]
Message 1 - 8:32am
Ari: Because once the auction is over, they're definitely going to have to move out, right? But the final settlement, as per the contract, is something that happens after the auction, right? For example, in the worst‑case scenario, of our cash, our sales money, gets frozen by the bank, if that happens, can we just cancel the purchase and negotiate with the second buyer? Our main goal is to get them to move out, right? That's our primary objective, so these are all factor we need to consider, right? We all need to consider these options, that's the safest way to go about it.
Message 2 - 9:03am
Hong: And another thing is, who's going to pay for this auction, I think what Kee said makes sense, he's got a point. Because if we really want to continue working together and move forward step by step, we should sit down and have a proper discussion about this matter, I have no problem with that. It's better to be clear, and I support that. Another thing is what? Last time when Sam was here, I wanted to ask as well, but I told Sam he didn't have to answer me right away. If all these matters are settled, is Sam going to continue to invest money and become a part of our team, or does he prefer to exist as a consultation providing technical assistance? I want to clarify this aspect of the operation first.
Message 3 - 9:03am
Hong: Another point I want to clarify on the operational level is this: because didn't I promise that after all these matters are settled, we'll redistribute the shares? At that time, we'll invest with cash, right? You can decide how many shares you want to give up. My principle is that I don't want to be a major shareholder because even though I love this industry, I don't have the energy to manage it every day. But I still want to participate. In participation, what I want is for the company's structure to be A and B shares in the future. And what this means is
Message 4 - 9:03am
Hong: Simply put, the A and B shares structure I have in mind is to make the core team, such as you, me and Kee, into A shareholders. This team would have 100% management control, but the dividend rights would be given to the B shareholders. For instance, if the company goes bankrupt or distributes dividends, B shares would have priority. However, B shares would not have management rights. This separation of A and B shares has benefits for future financing as well. I'm not sure about the actual financial situation and whether financing will be needed. If it is needed this would be a particularly good model. Anyway, these are just details and not something we can discuss in one or two days. I just wanted to bring this up today. Take a look at these points and see if there is anything specific to discuss later on. You can also discuss this with Kee beforehand. I think his ideas and approach are fine, and I support them.
Message 5 - 9:15am
Ari: Regarding the share structure issue, once we've resolved this matter, we can sit down and have a thorough discussion to see how we want to proceed with the overall direction. Currently, it doesn't seem like we urgently need funding, so the financial aspect isn't a major concern at the moment. However, once this is settled, we'll assess how we want to [inaudible] move forward. If we decide to expand on a larger scale or increase sales points to other countries, that might be a different story. We'll think about it when the times comes. So, once we've resolved the current issue, we'll analyse the situation and figure out how to proceed with this matter.
Message 6 - 9:15am
Ari: As to Sam, he definitely wants to continue working with us, and his strength lies in software maintenance. This is the main contribution he provides for our continued collaboration. This is how he's currently considering it from what we discussed earlier.
Message 7 - 10:17am
Hong: As for Sam's situation, my understanding is that he definitely wants to work with us, but I want to clarify whether he intends to invest real money or exist as a third party. That's what I want to figure out. As for the proportion, that's a separate matter and can be discussed later.
Message 8 - 10:17am
Hong: As for the issue of shares, the proportions and who owns how many shares, that's all negotiable. My thoughts align with yours. If in the future we need money, for instance, if there's potential for growth in the business and we need significant funds to quickly capture the market share, then the A and B share structure would be the best solution. This is a strategy, not specific detail. The specifics will have to be discussed after this period is over. This is all manageable; details like share proportions can be discussed later.
Message 9 - 8:09pm
Ari: Liu, I've just seen the message, I've been so busy. Tomorrow morning at 8:30, I have to go to the lawyers office to provide some new materials. Oh man, looks like I'll be staying late at the office again tonight.
Message 10 - 8:09pm
Ari: Sam's situation is like this: his software hasn't been launched yet, so it's not on the market. Once his software in on the market, he'll have income coming in. Currently, he's working on his software and providing platform support, including bookkeeper, financials, and invoice scanning. He categorises everything on his end. So, at the moment, he's mainly focusing on software updates and support.[444]
214 With respect to these messages, Ari's evidence is that the messages showed 'Hong was obviously serious about being involved' in the Kegland business and that he and Kee discussed Hong's proposal of restructuring the shares to have class A and class B shares and thought this was Hong's way of trying to contribute to Kegland without having any knowledge about how the company operated. However, they thought his proposal to receive shares with management rights was unrealistic. As they did not want to upset Hong in light of the MCH proceeding, they decided to focus on the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse in the hope that it would be a sufficient investment for Hong. They decided if he raised the issue again that would say shares were only available for those playing a role in the business.[445]
215 In cross‑examination, when asked about Message 3, Hong's evidence was that he could not recall what the 'promise' was that was mentioned in that message but that the context of the previous messages suggested that Message 3 was about the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse.[446] When it was put to him the statement in Message 3 that 'you can decide how many shares you want up give up' was not a reference to the warehouse, he stated that the conversation had been about the warehouse, and the warehouse had shares, but conceded when pressed on the fact the warehouse was held through a unit trust, that 'looking at it now, it is a structure that I do not understand'.[447]
216 Further, when it was put to him that the part of Message 3 referring to the redistribution of shares had nothing to do with the Smith Road warehouse, Hong stated he did not agree.[448] While Hong agreed with the proposition that his statement in Message 3 - 'my principle is that I don't want to be a major shareholder because even though I love this industry, I don't have the energy to manage it every day' - was a reference to the beer brewing industry and not the warehouse industry,[449] when it was put to him the whole of Message 3 therefore related to the company operating the beer brewing business (that is, Kegland) Hong's response was that:
In this particular paragraph there are many things mentioned. So the whole paragraph is open‑ended and discussing what's going to happen in the future.
You're thinking that refers to the warehouse. Is that really what you're telling his Honour?‑‑‑ In this particular paragraph, there are many issues mentioned. One was about the warehouse, one was about the shares in the future. They are all open‑ended.[450]
217 With respect to the part of Message 3 where Hong said 'you can decide how many shares you want to give up', Hong's evidence was that the reference to 'you' was plural in Chinese but conceded that it included Ari as he was the recipient of the WeChat audio message.[451] The following exchange between Hong and counsel for Kegland then occurred:
You were saying to him, he could decide how many shares he could give up or he and others could give up?‑‑‑ That was my way of being courteous and I was asking everyone in to discuss the future of the company. But again, is this a yes or no question?
I'm going to ask you another question. The language in that sentence suggests that they had something that they could give up in the redistribution you referred to earlier. Correct?‑‑‑ so yes or no question?
I'll let you answer it any way you see fit?‑‑‑ Whenever I wanted to work with someone collaboratively in a project, I always keep a low profile in a low position so that other people can feel free to express their ideas. It will be beneficial for future development.
Yes, I understand. Next question. I want to make a suggestion to you. In that sentence, 'You can decide', et cetera, this was you recognising that Kee and Ari were the beneficial owners of you 50 shares in KegLand Distribution; agree, disagree, can't remember ‑‑‑ Can I repeat what you said in my own words? Or can you put it in a simpler way?
I put it pretty simply. I'll put it again...
...
Excellent. All right. I'm going to refer to it in the question in that sentence. Suggestion, in speaking the words recorded in that sentence on the page, you were recognising that Kee and Ari were the beneficial owners in your 50 shares in KegLand Distribution. Pause. Agree, disagree, can't remember?‑‑‑ I do not agree.[452]
218 The final exchange of note in this regard was as follows:
... I'm going to ask His Honour to find that when you uttered those words recorded in the sentence, 'You can decide', et cetera, that was you admitting to Ari that you or your company rather were holding the shares on trust for him and Kee. Should His Honour make that finding or not? Yes, no or can't remember?‑‑‑ I don't agree with what you said.[453]
219 The Defendants contend that through Message 3, Hong admitted to the existence of the trust. In inviting the Court to make this finding, they submit that:
(a) the use of the word 'promise' by Hong recognises a self‑imposed obligation to return or redistribute the shares.
(b) there is a reference to Kee and Ari deciding how many shares they want to 'give up' and that this is a reference to Kee and Ari as beneficial owners of the shares and that this is consistent with Ari's evidence concerning the foundations of the bare trust as alleged. Further, they submit that Hong's company was the beneficial owner of the shares, Hong had no reason to make this statement, and would not have made this statement, as in that context Kee and Ari had nothing to 'give up'.
(c) the subsequent messages on 19 March 2019 support the admission of a trust, in that they demonstrate that Message 3 related to the redistribution of the shares in Kegland Distribution and not to any interest in the unit trust that owned the warehouse. In this regard, it is common ground that Sam had no interest in the warehouse. In particular, the Defendants rely on Message 5, which was sent by Ari at 9:15am, and Messages 7 and 8, which were sent by Hong at 10:17am.
(d) Hong made the relevant statements at a time where there was no suggestion of a dispute concerning the beneficial ownership of the shares and in circumstances where he did not anticipate them surfacing during a trial.
(e) Hong's evidence given in cross‑examination that Message 3 related to the sale of the warehouse was implausible. First, it is submitted that the balance of Message 3 undermines the warehouse explanation, as that message refers to Hong's love of the industry, being the industry in which Kegland operated, and his wish not to be a 'major shareholder', both were matters which related to the ownership of the Kegland shares and did not relate to the warehouse. Further, they contend that although Messages 1 and 2 relate to the warehouse, halfway through Message 2 Hong began to discuss Sam's role and whether he would become 'part of the team' and these statements go beyond the purchase of the warehouse and reflect Hong's understanding that Sam was not the beneficial owner of the shares registered in his name. In this regard, the Defendants emphasise that Sam had no interest in the warehouse. Finally, they say that Hong's explanation in cross‑examination ignored the fact the unit trust set up in relation to the purchase of the warehouse did not occur until August 2019, in circumstances where Hong's accountant and lawyer prepared the relevant documents months after Message 3 was sent. As such, Hong's explanation, as an experienced businessman, that he did not understand the structure was unconvincing and manifestly incorrect.[454]
220 The Defendants also make submissions directed towards whether evidence given by Hong,[455] which set out a non‑certified translation of Message 3, was misleading.[456] In circumstances where the certified copies of the WeChat audio messages are now before the Court and the witnesses were cross‑examined on the certified version of the messages, I do not consider it necessary to make specific findings with respect to these submissions beyond my observations in relation to credibility generally.
221 The Plaintiffs deny that these messages are an admission by Hong of the existence of the Hong Trust.[457] However, in large part, the Plaintiffs' submissions more squarely focus on the manner in which the Defendants plead this aspect of their case. In this regard, paragraph 8E.3(a) of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim provides in relevant part:
8E.3 Subsequently, as against his own interest, and as against the interest of the first plaintiff, Hong admitted the existence and/or terms of the Hong Trust as follows:
(a) On 19 March 2019, following the settlement of the MCH proceeding in February 2020, Hong sent a WeChat audio message to Ari in which he said as follows: [CB 2660] (the March 2019 WeChat message):
... because didn't I promise that after all these matters [the MCH proceedings] are settled, we'll distribute the shares?... You can decide how many shares you want to give up.[458]
222 The Plaintiffs contend that these pleadings include an obvious timing error as the MCH proceeding settled in February 2020, meaning the 19 March 2019 message was not sent 'following' the settlement of that proceeding. Further, the Plaintiffs say this error led the Defendants to insert the words '[the MCH proceedings]' after the words 'all these matters' in the extract of the message in paragraph 8E.3(b). The submission of the Plaintiffs on this point is that a review of the relevant messages makes clear that 'all these matters' is a reference to the pending auction of the Smith Road warehouses and not to the settlement of the MCH dispute.[459] My understanding of the thrust of these submissions is that the Plaintiffs are inviting the Court to accept Hong's evidence that Message 3 related to the purchase of the warehouses, and are not making a submission that the Defendants should be held to their case as strictly pleaded. I note that the Defendants did not press their submission that Message 3 was sent after the settlement of the MCH proceeding.[460]
223 The Plaintiffs also submit that Messages 1 and 2 refer to the auction, albeit erroneously attributing Message 1 to Hong and not Ari. With respect to Message 2, it is said that the message raised the question of who would pay for the auction and stated that 'if we really want to continue working together and move forward step by step, we should sit down and have a proper discussion about this matter'. This statement, along with the query about whether Sam was going to 'continue to invest money', is said to demonstrate that Hong understood he was working together with Kee and Ari and was not simply a 'stand in' director or shareholder, and further that Hong understood Sam was an investor.[461]
224 Further, the Plaintiffs contend that the Court should accept Hong's evidence that the reference to 'all the matters' in Message 3 was a reference to the purchase of the warehouse[462] and should reject the Defendants' suggestion that the reference to 'all the matters' was a reference to the settlement of the MCH dispute. Their interpretation, the Plaintiffs say, accords with the content and context of the messages where neither Messages 1 or 2 refer to the settlement of the MCH dispute and where, at that time, Hong could not have known when the proceeding would settle.[463]
225 The second aspect of the Plaintiffs' submissions in relation to the messages relate to the reference to 'distribute' in the extract of Message 3 in the pleadings. As pointed out by the Plaintiffs, the certified translation shows the correct word to be 'redistribute' and not 'distribute'. Again, I do not understand the Plaintiffs to be raising this error as the basis of a submission that the Defendants should be held to the incorrectly plead word. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend that Hong's use of the word 'redistribute' in Message 3 demonstrates that he regarded that the shares had already been distributed, to LL UP and Sam, and that Hong was raising the possibility that the shares might be redistributed so that shares would be issued to Kee and Ari for the first time. This, they say, was no admission of any trust but rather a proposal for a share redistribution which is a common part of commercial life.[464] I do not understand this to be made as a submission in the alternative, and I am unclear how this submission, which implicitly accepts that Message 3 concerns the distribution of shares in Kegland, can be reconciled with the earlier submissions that Message 3 (or at the very least the part of it which refers to 'all these matters') related to the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse.
226 In support of the submission that the messages, and particularly Message 3, are inconsistent with the admission of the Hong Trust, the Plaintiffs rely on the following:
(a) 'Hong's suggestion that at the time of the redistribution, he and others would 'invest in cash' in Kegland.'
(b) Hong's statement that although he did not want to be a 'major shareholder', he 'still' wanted to participate, which it is said demonstrates his understanding he was participating at that time.
(c) Hong's reference to Kee, Ari and himself being the 'core team', who would be Class A shareholders with '100% management control'.
(d) Hong's proposal that Class B shareholders would have dividend, but not management, rights.
(e) Hong's proposal that the above share structure would be 'a particularly good model' if future financing was needed.[465]
227 In making that submission, the Plaintiffs also relied on Hong's evidence in cross‑examination that the messages were expressed in a 'very colloquial'[466] manner, and that their content was connected. Further, the Plaintiffs state that although Hong had appropriately conceded that he had used a word in Mandarin which translated to 'promise' in English, he had said it in a context where he was being more open ended and was referring to the possibility of a share redistribution.[467] Having had regard to the relevant parts of the transcript put forward in advance of these submissions, I am unconvinced that the Plaintiffs' summary is reflective of Hong's evidence as given. I therefore decline to rely on these submissions in making findings.
228 Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that Ari's evidence of how he construed Hong's messages - being that the sending of the messages conveyed Hong was serious in his intention to be involved in Kegland - properly reflect the content of the messages and that this construction is inconsistent with an admission of the trust.[468]
229 Having regard to the various submissions put forward by the parties, the content of the messages, as well as Hong's and Ari's evidence (which the Plaintiffs contend properly reflect how the messages should be understood) on this point, I am satisfied that Hong's comments in Message 3 concerned Kegland Distribution and were not, as contended for by the Plaintiffs, about the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse. I particularly note, as pointed out by the Defendants, that Sam had no involvement in the purchase of the Smith Road warehouses and the references to Sam in Message 3 are therefore inconsistent with a finding that the message relates to the purchase of the warehouse.
230 Further, recalling my observations above,[469]including the proper construction of Sifris J's observations in Australian Executor Trustees (SA) v Korda,[470] in my opinion, in their proper context, these communications are, if not an admission of the Hong Trust, at least consistent with the existence of such a trust. They are also consistent with other evidence considered and discussed in these reasons which, in my view, establishes the creation of the Hong Trust and/or is consistent with and points to the creation of such a trust.[471] In this respect, I am unpersuaded by the various bases on which the Plaintiffs contend that the messages, properly understood, are in fact inconsistent with the existence of a trust. By way of example, I do not agree that, on a plain reading of the messages, the reference to 'redistribute' in Message 3 constitutes Hong proposing some kind of share redistribution in circumstances where the shares had already been beneficially distributed to LL UP and Sam. Nor do I consider Hong's reference to 'still' participating in Kegland should be given the meaning sought by the Plaintiffs.
231 The ninth time period is the settlement of the MCH proceeding on 11 February 2020, following a second mediation between the parties to that dispute. It is common ground between the parties in this proceeding that ahead of the second mediation Hong signed an Authority permitting Mr Earl at Earl & Associates to reach a settlement on Kegland's behalf.[472] The form of that Authority is, in relevant part, as follows:
I, HONG RUI LIU in my capacity as director of KEGLAND DISTRIBUTION PTY LTD, hereby authorise and direct Stephen Earl of my solicitors, Earl & Associates, Level 7, 410 Collins Street Melbourne, Victoria to settle the above mentioned proceedings and compromise my rights in relation thereto, in accordance with my instructions and otherwise on terms and conditions he considers just and appropriate in his sole discretion on the day of the mediation, being 11 February 2020, until I instruct him otherwise.
Stephen Earl has full authority to settle the proceeding without a need to consult with or otherwise revert to me.[473]
232 At the mediation on 11 February 2020, Stephen Earl reached a settlement with MCH whereby Kegland would pay MCH $1,000,000. In practice, of that total, $200,000 was paid from Kegland's existing funds and the remaining $800,000 was loaned to Kegland by Kee and Ari's respective family trusts.[474]
233 As detailed above regarding the events of 2018, Ari's evidence is that Hong had limited involvement in the MCH proceeding, including the settlement process. Ari says he was the person to inform Hong of the details of both mediations, including providing a copy of the Authority to Hong to sign, and that although Hong attended the first mediation, he did not play an active role.[475] Further, albeit more squarely in relation to the earlier part of the MCH proceeding, Ari's evidence is that aside from a limited number of communications with Earl & Stephens by Hong, all other communications from the Hong alias account were sent by Ari.[476]
234 In contrast, Hong's evidence is that he was actively involved in the MCH mediations. He says that he attended and participated in the first mediation but was unable to attend the second as he had recently returned from China and was undergoing home quarantine. Instead, in those circumstances, he signed the Authority described above and spoke to Earl & Associates by telephone and email before the mediation.[477] He asserts his involvement in the mediation process is demonstrated by:
(a) an email from Mr Earl to Hong and Sam on 13 February 2020, attaching the deed of settlement, where Mr Earl stated 'You both provided helpful instruction in the course of this matter and Hong, in particular, made a positive impact at the first mediation when discussing the matter with the mediator';[478] and
(b) translated WeChat audio and messages from Ari to Hong on the evening of 11 February 2020, where Ari stated 'Everyone praises you' and 'Last time during the mediation, you were asked to speak with that Paul ... It's the same mediator as last time, the same elderly man. He's quite nice, and he said you spoke well last time'.[479]
235 The Defendants submit that the evidence shows that neither Hong or Sam contributed to the settlement sum paid to MCH, and that there was no expectation that they would do so. Further, they contend that it is common ground that neither Hong or Sam had a say in the terms of the settlement, nor did they seek to, and these circumstances each tell against Hong's case.[480] As set out above, the Plaintiffs contend that the evidence shows that the Defendants' conduct in connection with the MCH proceeding in its entirety is 'totally contrary' to the existence of any agreement between Hong, Kee and Ari that the shares were to be held on trust.[481]
236 I am satisfied on the basis of the documentary evidence that Kee and Ari, through their respective family trusts, each loaned Kegland $200,000 to pay the settlement reached with MCH. Not that I understand this to be contested by the Plaintiffs. Further, I agree that no evidence was led in the proceeding to the effect Hong had been asked to, or offered to, contribute to the settlement fee. These are factors which weigh against Hong's case. However, the precise weight to be given to these factors, and the weighing process more generally, forms part of analysing in the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Alleged Oral Agreement in the threshold issue below.
237 I am also content to accept, notwithstanding Ari's evidence pertaining to Hong's limited involvement in the MCH dispute, that Hong attended and participated in the first mediation. However, I am not satisfied, on the balance probabilities, in light of my reservations about Hong's evidence more generally, that Hong's evidence establishes that he provided instructions to Earl & Associates on the telephone prior to the second mediation. In reliance of that evidence, Hong points to the email set out above.[482] However, my tentative reading of that email is that Mr Earl spoke to Hong after the mediation on 11 February 2020 to discuss the terms of the settlement reached and, at that stage, Hong instructed him that Kegland was content with the proposed deed of settlement and that he would discuss with Kee and Ari the apportionment of the settlement fee. In any case, if I am wrong in that regard, I do not consider anything turns on whether Hong provided those instructions or not.
Relevant events following the settlement of the MCH proceeding
238 The tenth time period concerns events in 2020 that followed the settlement of the MCH proceeding. The first is a series of WeChat audio messages between Hong and his accountant, Jerry, on 13 April 2020. The certified translation of these messages is as follows:
Hong: The second this is, when applying for the loan back then, Henry, who was originally Lele's accountant, helped my dad create a back up plan. In one aspect of this plan, he turned my dad into a director of Kegland's beer business, and this needs to be revoked. I'm not entirely sure about the specifics or the steps involved. You could ask Henry directly as you have his contact details. Or I could create a group and add Henry to it. See which is more convenient to you.
Jerry: I don't know much about Henry and Kegland. Do you remember we talked about this a few months ago? You lawsuit has settled, right? It that's the case, should we consider the situation with Kegland? Like starting afresh, transferring everything over, and getting back to normal. Or course, from this side, we also need to consider the other things like government subsidies etc. At least, from my understanding, the three shareholders should come to the surface later, and your father definitely shouldn't be involved anymore. It's you who should come up and do it for sure.
Hong: Yes, let's resolve the issue to do with my father first. How to withdraw him from this? Because I'm not quite clear about how it was initially set up, I only know he was to make my father a director, or both my father and me directors. I'm a bit confused about that. See if you can ask Henry about it, or what. Then, regarding my mother's side, I'll create a group and add all of us to it, and we can arrange a time for a meeting or whatever suits everyone. I think it's more convenient to discuss things face‑to‑face. If it's convenient for you, you can go to my parents' place.
Jerry: And, basically, I'm not sure what he has done with your brewing company. How about this: I'll send you an email. Currently the information of your brewing company should be with Ari, right? Send me one thing, and I'll get a sense of the situation. Alternatively, an easier way is that I'll have my assistant add it later as, like last time, an ASIC agent; we essentially become an agent. That was we can access some information, I think being an agent is a faster way.
Jerry: I need the company's full name.
Hong: okay.[483]
239 Hong's evidence with respect to these messages, and particularly the first message from Jerry, in cross‑examination was:
Yes, all right. Look at the third sentence commencing with the words, 'Your lawsuit has been settled'. Please read that sentence and obtain another translation if you need one? ‑‑‑ Ah, I don't need interpreting anymore.
Very well, that is a reference to the MCH lawsuit against Kegland and other, is it not?‑‑‑ Is this a yes or no question?
I'm just happy to let you answer it any way you see fit, Hong? ‑‑‑ I can't recall. Do you need me to explain?
Yes, please?‑‑‑ I can't recall during this period because um, during this period there were quite a few business started by me and I was trying to ask Gerry to become an accountant for my whole family and businesses because there were many business, businesses and there were some with lawsuits, some without so during this entire period, I can't recall whether this ah, lawsuit or not so I can't recall.
In the first few months of 2020, how many lawsuits was KegLand involved in? ‑‑‑ To me, there should have been only one.
That's right, isn't it?‑‑‑So you question is that ah, in my memory ah, four years ago in that point in 2020, as far as KegLand company is concerned, there was only one lawsuit, is that right.
It was the fact, wasn't it, that at the beginning of 2020, KegLand was involved in one lawsuit?‑‑‑ I'm not from a legal background but ah, to my understanding, there were two or three different matters. Firstly because Maggie's company sued KegLand where I was 50 per cent shareholder and I was one of the two directors. Because during that period, Ari, Kee and Sam, they were part of my company either being employees or shareholders or even directors and they also had lawsuit ah, with Maggie's company so my understanding of the law is that this has some relevance to my company and to me this um, two legal issues or two lawsuits because they are related to KegLand Distribution.[484]
240 Later in cross‑examination, Hong accepted that the third and fourth sentences of Jerry's first message were connected,[485] but denied that the reference in that message to 'transferring everything over' was a reference to transferring the 50 shares he held in the company to Kee and Ari and, further, maintained he could not recall what the 'everything' was that Jerry was referring to being transferred.[486] Hong also said he could not remember who 'Harry' was.[487] I understand this to be a reference to the 'Henry' mentioned in the messages.
241 In the context of submitting that Hong admitted the existence of the trust at various points in time after 6 December 2017, the Defendants contend, with respect to the first message sent by Jerry on 13 April 2020, the 'obvious inference' is that Hong told Jerry sometime prior to 13 April 2020 about the Hong Trust. They say that, notwithstanding the reference to Ari in Jerry's second message in this chain of messages, it is highly improbable that any other person gave the information to Jerry.[488]
242 Further, the Defendants submit that Hong's evidence in cross‑examination on this point, as extracted above, was manifestly evasive; he sought to delay and evade answering simple questions that a person with his business acumen should have had no difficulty answering; when pressed on issues his reflexive response was to claim he could not recall; he then proceeded to provide explanations which were nonsensical, disingenuous or implausible. They say he did so in order to avoid make any concessions with respect to these messages and to frustrate the process of cross‑examination, which demonstrates his understanding of how these messages undermine his case and, therefore, also reflect his awareness of the trust.[489] I accept these submissions and find that Hong's evidence in this respect was unreliable and cannot be relied on.
243 The Defendants particularly contend that the inference they invite the Court to draw is the only logical explanation available when Jerry's message is compared to Ari's evidence of what he and Hong discussed on 6 December 2017. The Defendants say, in this regard, that:
(a) Jerry's first message links the settlement of a lawsuit with the Kegland situation and it is plainly obvious, especially in circumstances where the message was sent within a few months of settlement of the MCH proceeding, that the reference to a lawsuit is a reference to the MCH proceeding;
(b) for the reasons above, the Court should reject Hong's evidence and conclude the reference to a lawsuit is a reference to the MCH proceeding;
(c) Jerry's first message linked the settlement of a lawsuit to 'transferring everything over' and that it is plain, from the entirety of the message, from the surrounding messages, and from the context in which the messages were sent, that Jerry's message relates to Hong's commitment to Ari on 6 December 2017 that he would return the relevant shares once the issues with Maggie and MCH were over. And, further, that in all likelihood this message was also addressing Hong's resignation as director;
(d) Jerry's first message linked 'the situation with Kegland' and 'transferring everything over' in such a way that did not suggest any other course of action was available with respect to Kegland, that is, it indicates that the transfer was the only option; and
(e) Jerry's reference in his first message to his understanding that 'the three shareholders should come to the surface later' indicates, in all likelihood, a trust scenario.[490]
244 In comparison, the Plaintiffs contend that Jerry's first message is unclear and nothing in the messages, including Hong's response to Jerry - 'Yes, let's resolve the issue to do with my father first' - could be regarded as an admission of a trust by Hong. In submitting Jerry's message is unclear, the Plaintiffs say that the interpretation put forward by the Defendants fails to account for who Henry is and does not explain the reference to Hong's father or to government subsidies. In such circumstances, they submit Hong's evidence that he does not recall what Jerry was referring to should be accepted. They say nothing in Hong's response to Jerry's message makes reference, or can be regarded as being in relation, to Kegland.[491] Finally, the Plaintiffs draw attention to the fact that paragraph 8E.3(b) of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim does not accurately set out Jerry's message.[492] In this latter regard, as with the other submissions made in relation to the form of the pleadings, I do not consider that anything turns on the transcription error in the pleadings. The wording being relied on by the Defendants was sufficiently clear at all times, as the pleadings included the relevant court book reference to the translation of the message and the witnesses were cross‑examined on the correct wording.[493]
245 In light of the matters pointed to by the Plaintiffs regarding the unexplained and incongruent references in the messages to Hong's father, government subsidies and 'Henry', I decline to expressly draw the inference sought by the Defendants that these messages show that Hong had admitted the trust to Jerry sometime prior to those messages being sent. However, in accordance with my findings above regarding the messages sent on 19 March 2019,[494] notwithstanding these uncertainties, in my opinion the overall content of these messages from 13 April 2020, in the context of the totality of the evidence, are broadly still consistent with, and forms part of, the narrative which points to the creation of the Hong Trust. To the extent that the Plaintiffs contended otherwise, I reject these submissions.
246 The second event in this period is a meeting between Hong, Kee and Ari on 11 August 2020 (the 11 August meeting) in the Kegland warehouse in Noble Park (see below). On Kee and Ari's written evidence, at this meeting they met with Hong to thank him for his assistance, and to explain that they would arrange for Kee to join Kegland as a director and for the shares in Hong's name to be transferred shortly after that. Kee told Hong he would be able to resign as director and that they would make sure Hong was not out of pocket for any capital gains tax to be paid on the transfer of the 10% shareholding, as discussed at the meeting at Hong's house in December 2017. They say Hong asked whether he could remain a part of Kegland and that they again told him again they only wanted people with a role in Kegland to be shareholders as they did not want to be in the same position as with Maggie at MCH. Hong was slightly upset by this comparison to Maggie, and said he was not interested in working at Kegland but he would think about possible ways he could otherwise assist Kegland and get back to them. Ari's evidence was that, on their understanding of the meeting, while he seemed disappointed, they did not consider that they had fallen out with Hong.[495]
247 In cross‑examination Hong denied that, at the 11 August meeting, he, Kee and Ari had discussed that Kee would come on board as director or that he would resign as director, or that he was told Kee and Ari would ensure he was not out of pocket for capital gains tax with respect to the transfer of the shares.[496] Hong agreed that at the meeting Kee and Ari said that they only wanted people who worked at Kegland to be shareholders but maintained this was the first time he had been told that Ari and Kee did not intend for him to be an ongoing shareholder.[497]
248 In cross‑examination, Hong was questioned extensively about the 11 August meeting. In many cases Hong failed to answer the question put to him; a representative example in this regard is the following exchange between counsel for the Defendants and Hong:
... It was their view that only people who actually worked in the Kegland business as employees would hold shares. That's the evidence you're giving?‑‑‑Yes, I can't recall the exact timeline but it was the first time Kee and Ari presented a shareholders shareholding structure change for the first time.
Yes. At that time, on your view of the world, you were boss Liu and these were two employees of Kegland. Correct? ‑‑‑ Yes.
Yes, here were two employees, upstarts, telling you how they would run your business? ‑‑‑ Yes.
That gave rise to some concerns in your mind about the potential for a future dispute; is that your evidence?‑‑‑(Direct)(Indistinct) yes, no ‑‑‑‑
No, no, you answer the question please?‑‑‑(Through interpreter) Ah Your Honour, I have many businesses to run and um, not all businesses that I put my hands of day to day management. I can give you examples ‑‑‑
No I want to as you ‑‑‑?‑‑‑ ‑‑‑ if you want to listen. ‑‑‑ one more question before the break.
HIS HONOUR: Well, do you want an answer to that question?
MR HEATH: I don't want you to give more examples. I want to ask you one more question before the break. Will you permit me to do that?‑‑‑Sure.
Why didn't you sack them on the spot for telling you how to run your business?‑‑‑ Why would I do that?
Because they were interfering with the - they were telling you how to run your business and how to structure shares in your business. They were seeking to exclude you as a shareholder in the future if you were not prepared to become an employee? ‑‑‑ So this is an open‑ended question. I can give you um, my answer with some examples.[498]
249 As I understand their case, the Defendants contend the significance of the 11 August meeting lies in the fact that, on their submissions and as Hong denies, from the point in time of this meeting, at the very latest, Hong was on notice that Kee would imminently be appointed as a director of Kegland.[499]
250 In contrast, the Plaintiffs submit that the 11 August meeting represents Kee and Ari commencing attempts to become shareholders in Kegland. The Plaintiffs contend that the fact Kee and Ari 'entered into a protracted period of negotiations with Hong' lies against the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement having earlier been reached between Hong, Ari and Kee because, had that agreement existed, all Kee and Ari would have needed to do was direct Hong to cause LL UP to transfer the shares and to direct him to resign as shareholder. The Plaintiffs also assert it is telling that Kee and Ari did not raise the Alleged Oral Agreement at the 11 August meeting and further maintain that Hong denies that there was any mention of Hong resigning or the shares being transferred at the 11 August meeting.[500]
251 In weighing these competing contentions, I consider the starting point to be that Hong's evidence in cross‑examination on this issue was evasive and, on many occasions, sought to provide rambling and irrelevant answers which did not respond to the question posed. For example, as set out above, when Hong was asked to explain why, if as on his case Kee and Ari were simply rogue employees suddenly demanding that he, the owner of the company they worked for, hand over his shares, Hong did not simply fire them, Hong sought to claim the question was 'open‑ended' and provide 'examples'. As explained above,[501] these are Painter v Hutchinson indicators of unsatisfactory witness evidence and, on this basis, I am satisfied that the entirety of Hong's evidence as to what took place at the 11 August meeting should be rejected.
252 Rather, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Kee and Ari's evidence of what was discussed at the 11 August meeting should be accepted. Namely, in summary, that Kee was to be imminently appointed as a director, that Hong was no longer required as a stand in director and shareholder, and that Kee and Ari would ensure that Hong was not out of pocket from a capital gains tax perspective when the shares were handed back. However, in making this finding it is important to highlight one aspect of Kee and Ari's evidence as originally given and then withdrawn which weighs against their credibility in this regard. In their witness statements as originally drafted, Kee and Ari's evidence was that at the 16 August meeting, Hong was told they would exercise the share option agreement in the coming weeks. In line with their evidence relating to the backdating of the Share Option Agreement,[502] they no longer give that evidence, in Kee's case instead saying that Hong was told Kee would be coming on board as shareholder.[503] As I discuss below, Kee, Ari and Sam's conduct in relation to their evidence regarding the backdating of the share option agreement is unsatisfactory and weighs against them in a Painter v Hutchinson[504] sense.
253 Nonetheless, as set out in Proposition 11,[505] just because a witness has lied in one part of their evidence does not mean I must find that other aspects of their evidence is also untruthful.[506] In the context of my findings regarding the various occasions when the substance of the Alleged Oral Agreement was discussed with Hong, and in circumstances where the 11 August meeting occurred reasonably shortly after the settlement of the MCH proceeding and at a time where it logically follows that Kee and Ari would be looking to enforce the Alleged Oral Agreement, I find it plausible that the other matters set out in Kee and Ari's evidence were in fact discussed. Indeed, in line with Proposition 10,[507] the balance of Kee and Ari's evidence regarding the 11 August meeting is inherently consistent with the picture emerging from the evidence. As this relates to the discussion of capital gains tax, I note my findings below regarding Mr Amos' evidence that he raised the capital gains tax issue with Kee in 2017. Again, it is inherently consistent with the evidence that Kee would raise this matter with Hong in circumstances where he knew it was an issue.
254 The third event in this period which, due to the Plaintiffs' submission on this point, bears mentioning is that in mid‑2020 Kegland moved to larger premises in Noble Park, under a 5 year lease, and that Hong and Sam each signed the lease as directors of Kegland and also as guarantors.[508] The Plaintiffs submit that the fact Hong remains personally liable under the guarantee[509] is entirely inconsistent with a finding he is only a stand in director or shareholder.[510] I do not consider that Hong being guarantor under the lease is incompatible with a finding that he was a stand in director at Kegland. While I consider that his role as guarantor does reflect a contribution he made to Kegland, in the context of his time as director, I accept, as put forward by the Defendants,[511] that Hong's evidence in this regard, that he has 'significant ongoing obligations and exposure as guarantor of Kegland's lease',[512] at best overstates the situation (and Hong's attitude to financial risk) in circumstances where, for example, Hong gave evidence that he had been willing to loan $3,000,000 as part of a real estate project without obtaining a loan agreement.[513]
255 The eleventh block relates to messages sent by Hong, Leon and Jerry in a WeChat group between called 'Fight the Landlord', the name of the group being a reference to a Chinese card game where two players join forces to fight a third player.[514]
256 Dozens of audio and text messages were sent by Hong, Leon and Jerry in the 'Fight the Landlord' group between 11 August 2020, the day of the 11 August meeting, and 28 November 2020. A significant number of these messages are directly relevant to the issues currently in dispute, translations of those messages are as follows (numbered and dated for convenience):
Message 1: 11/8/2020
Hong: Hey you two legends, I just remembered something again, I'll sort out Kegland first, so that's what Kee told me, so what he said was that for this company, only people who work there can hold shares in the company, so if I still want to take shares in the company, then I need to work there, I suddenly thought of something, I will take all the jobs as the accountant, then I will be working here, right? Then Jerry you just behave as me, and just take all the accounting jobs as well, that will be it, right?
Message 2: 11/8/2020
Hong: But the premise is that I don't think there is much need to work together anymore, but it's a bargaining chip, a negotiating chip, and I don't want to go against him because we're not on bad terms yet. That is, they have put forward an offer, talking about their company's development vision, then I will follow the company's vision. I'm still in the company, so according to the company's vision, what work should I do? I'm going to do all the accountant related work. You guys, please see if you can give me any advice, let's kick the ball to their side of the court. So what is the benefit? The benefit is that I'm going to give him an offer based on what he had said, and whether we fall out with him or not, we can deliberate on the next step.
Message 3: 11/8/2020
Hong: they have shown their knives and they are gritting their teeth, so I don't think we need to be polite anymore.
Message 4: 11/8/2020
Hong: At the very least, if he is willing to let me keep my shares, then whatever he does, it's not a bad think for me to hold all the accounting things in my hand, to have all the accounting records.
Message 5: 11/8/2020
Jerry: Your move is quite interesting I think this as a negotiation technique, it's fine, they certainly will not agree, because the financial side of things is their lifeblood, he certainly wants to control it from beginning to end, so this can be used as a bargaining chip, to put it out there, no problems at all. To put it bluntly, what does it mean? Liu, we may have more or less predicted the end results already, what is left now is that we need a reasonable figure, it has been so many years, we've done so much work, we need to have a reasonable figure, this is fair.
Message 6: 11/8/2020
Leon: It can be raised. But ultimately, it will come back to a evaluation of the company. It is unlikely that the other party will agree to you continuing to hold a 50 per cent shareholding simply because of the accounting work.
Message 7: 11/8/2020
Hong: Yes, I just think that we should discuss how to get back to him in the first round, that is, in the next two days, I will not contact him for the two days and then wait for them to contact me, and how to get back to them after they contact me? Tentatively, this is what I am going to say. Because he will not agree, if he agrees, I would be very surprised, it's normal if he disagrees, but we have followed his statement, his planning, it is in accordance with the company, I also work in the company, right? Then I want to see how he will reply to me.
Message 8: 11/8/2020
Leon: Yeah, he wouldn't agree. [Chuckle]. Okay. I'm fine with this direction.
Message 9: 11/8/2020
Jerry: [Chuckle][Grin]
...
Message 10: 13/8/2020
Hong: It's been two days since we talked about it, and then today, there's a group chat that has Kee and Ari and Leon in it, and I'm going to add Jerry into that group, and just talk to them about my idea, just like the idea we talked about last time, what we were going to say to them in the first round.
Message 11: 13/8/2020
Hong: So we just pretend to be polite, I want to say this first of all, I particularly agree with Ari, not Kee's business proposal, that is, his philosophy is that only people who work in the company can have shares in the company, I would say that I particularly agree with this concept, and then I have thought about in the past two days, so what can I do in the company? So what I can do in the company is to bring this team in, to intervene in the company from the financial and legal side of things, so this is what I can do for the company, to make this company better.
...
Message 12: 13/8/2020
Jerry: Boss Liu, I have just listened to your voice message, you can say this first, you should say it is this way, directional wise, I think it has not changed from before, I reckon this is still no change, or according to the previous idea, but then if this is the case, when we talk to him, we should leave an opening. If the company, if he does not accept the terms, then we should leave this opening for him to put forward the idea, in this case we can then follow his ideas and move things forward.
...
Message 13: 13/8/2020
Leon: You're a director of the company now, right?
Message 14: 13/8/2020
Leon: I suggest you just say that I think I can retain my position as director of the company to co‑ordinate the company's finances and some of the legal matters, and that will do.
Message 15: 13/8/2020
Jerry: Then, Boss Liu, how about this, I am going to do a company search of KegLand company, and then after I've done the search, I will give the results to all of you to confirm the directors and shareholders, this is our starting point.
...
Message 16: 13/8/2020
Hong: First thing, I just called Ari just now, and I don't think there much more to talk about, so I decided to chat in WeChat right after the call, and that's the first thing.
...
Message 17: 18/8/2020
Hong: I'll say a text later and sent it to Kee and Ari in that group chat, and I'll also ask you both to help me review it first.
...
Message 18: 18/8/2020
Hong: [Bank account details] this is my bank account detail, please transfer $179, 725.69. And in future of the kegland, I'm really want to part of the business, but if you guys want me out of the business, I try to get out completely. By my understanding the factory part and Kegland is one. That's the reason I join the factory part.
Message 19: 18/8/2020
Hong: So this is roughly what I am going to say, or have I made myself clear? Do help me think, anyway, the idea is to tell him that I that I think the business is whole, and if wants me to withdraw then it should be a complete withdrawal, and he should make me an offer.
...
Message 19: 19/8/2020
Jerry: After reading their response, I feel like I need to be more clear with them and ask them to propose the conditions for us to quit.
...
Message 20: 19/8/2020
Leon: Jerry, do you know how much Liu has invested in kegland?
...
Message 21: 19/8/2020
Jerry: There's a Draft for 2019, there's a 100,000 loan on the books for Liu's side.
...
Message 22: 19/8/2020
Leon: Yesterday when we were talking about the rental, Ari told me that he had transferred RMB500,00 to Liu in China for this A$100,000, @liu hong riu is there such a thing?
Hong: yes
Message 24: 19/8/2020
Leon: @Jerry, if that's the case, maybe the main account is still on Smith Road.
Message 25: 19/8/2020
Leon: But we can say that kegland is where it is today, because of our contribution too, because we squeezed out the competition by buying Smith Road
Message 26: 20/8/2020
Leon: Hello everyone, I just thought of something else, KegLand company was established in December 2017, it has been almost three years till today, from the first day Hongriu LIU is the full‑time director, and is the only one in Australia to meet the requirements of the Corporations Act, there must be a local director. Should think of it this way, even if he did nothing for these three years and normally speaking, in the market, being a director means to bear all the obligations and responsibilities, so a director fee should be paid. We should think of it this way, this is a direction that can be explored, three years, we could say this, if you hired a person for three years, then three years of wages is a large sum, so this, I think, can be another direction to explore.
Message 27: 20/8/2020
Hong: [ThumbsUp]
...
Message 28: 20/8/2020
Hong: I don't think it's going to end up so badly, but let's prepare for the worst. I still think there is room for discussion. So if you are going to withdraw in the end anyway, I think my bottom line is to put the ... first I don't want to be involved in the factory with them, so just get the money back to me, and that we bit it, and according to their current way of lending, I think it will be quite easy, just get the money out of the loan and pay it back to me, that will be it. As for the interest and other costs, I was hoping to have it calculated and see if I can leave some share in it, this is my idea, if they insist on not giving the shares, then it is also okay for them to covert it into money and I will withdraw after payment.
...
Message 29: 20/8/2020
Leon: Where do you want your shares to be kept, Kegland?
Message 30: 20/8/2020
Leon: Or the Smith Road company?
Message 31: 20/8/2020
Leon: If it's the former, might as well take the money now. Because they have every means to make the company unprofitable or lose money.
Message 32: 20/8/2020
Jerry: Take the money, there's no point in taking shares any they can't be financially transparent with you for 5%. It's better to take the money and go.
...
Message 33: 20/8/2020
Jerry: This request is definitely possible, but we should see it this way. This will be a long story, they would say although you have 50% under your name, you actually only hold such and such, you are just a proxy and you hold such and such on behalf of other, because if you are not a proxy, we don't have this lawsuit. We should see it this way, regardless of how much shares you hold, you are definitely a shareholder, if a 1/3 of the shareholders ask for some financial transparency, that is to say, to understand the general situation, it's totally legit. But we should only do this if we cannot reach an agreement through discussion, then we will follow 1234567 to move forward.
Message 34: 20/8/2020
Hong: Yes, I'd better wait for them, see how they reply, anyway, whatever he says, I'm asking to be part of the business, or I'll withdraw completely, the first thing is, they must give back the money, as for the rest of the money and other input and how to calculate these, we can discuss it. My idea is that firstly give me back the cash I invested in Smith Road, and then we can calculate the rest of the money, whether it is my input, or others, if they do not count these for me, then I will not withdraw that shareholder and ‑ what is called - legal person, I will not withdraw as a director, that's it.
Message 35: 20/8/2020
Hong: In fact, there is another way, but this is we completely fall out with them. I can make preparations on both ends. Firstly, is to take Smith Road - because for Smith Road I am the sole director, although I am 1/3 share holder - I can absolutely take out the loan money, and then sell the shares over there, and be done with it, but I don't think there is a need to do that.
...
Message 36: 17/11/2020
Hong: The second thing is that this week I will go to Kee's house for a BBQ, and Ari and the people from their company will be there too, anyway, I will continue the discussion with them, do you guys have any ideas? Any ideas on how to communicate better? My idea is to insist on keeping some shares, but if I can't, then I'll withdraw completely, including the building and everything else. Also, as of now, I still owe the company a little money, I think there is no hurry, I will delay it for now, or do you guys think it's just a little money and I should just pay the company first? It's all kind of expenses.
...
Message 37: 17/11/2020
Jerry: Yes, the Smith Road account is with me, so it's very clear how much money should be refunded, so they can't run away from that, so we should move forward in that direction. I think if you want to quit, there are two ways to do it usually, one is to leave the shares for you, the other is not to leave the shares. If no shares are to be left to you, in that case, normally speaking, then you can see whether the company will pay you a fee for your hard work, after all, you have been a director of this company for a long time, right? Or this can be calculated another way, to have this ..... you can decline the payment, but the calculation and account should be clear.
Message 38: 17/11/2020
Leon: Of we talk about it, we can either co‑operate, or keep the shares, or we can all agree on a fixed return of capital for the previous investment.
...
Message 39: 17/11/2020
Leon: The fee for hard work is generally a fixed capital return.
Message 40: 17/11/2020
Hong: [Thumbs up]
Message 41: 17/11/2020
Leon: I don't think 8% ‑ 15% is unreasonable.
Message 42: 17/11/2020
Leon: every year
Message 43: 17/11/2020
Leon: or call it interest
Message 44: 17/11/2020
Jerry: or director fee
...
Message 45: 22/11/2020
Hong: The only progress made was that they wanted to ask me what I thought about the next step for the company and how I would position myself, and I told them that I hadn't actually worked at the company, and that if they wanted me to be involved, then I could go in one day and week and give then an answer then.
...
Message 46: 22/11/2020
Hong: Anyway, I was thinking that they weren't going to let me get involved at all, because we posted that golden ticket to the Kegland group group chat on Facebook, I wanted to try and see what happens, you know? So it was posted, and there were all kinds of comments, and then Kee called and asked me if I would recall it. And I said okay.
Message 47: 22/11/2020
Hong: The current situation has no changed much, they are still getting [inaudible] ready to kick me out, but they will not tell me directly, I think this is what upsets me the most. Let's just take it slowly, as they have not said it to me directly yet.
...
Message 48: 24/11/2020
Hong: Ari's coming over my house today too, so come on over and chat for a bit anyway, I think I've opened up quite a bit with that I've said.
Message 49: 24/11/2020
Hong: I said let's not talk about the future, what's the point of taking to me about things miles away, let's talk about the present. Are you going to let me get involved or not?
Message 50: 24/11/2020
Hong: Don't tell me all the rules if you want me involved. If you put all the rules down on paper, I can sort all of them out. If you don't want me to get involved, I'll just take all our inputs as a package deal and quit.
Message 51: 24/11/2020
Hong: I'll ask you two to help me then, I also told him, if you don't want me involved anymore, it's simple, I'll withdraw, I'll withdraw everything, you don't have to tell me whether to withdraw the factory first or later, I'll just withdraw it all and that's it. Then you just go straight to Jerry and Leon to talk about things, and I don't want to get involved, there's a price for everything.
Message 52: 24/11/2020
Hong: And then Kee... Not, it was Ari who old me that right now with these current full‑time employees that they have, they just don't want anyone else involved, they're in there every day working, blah blah, and I said what about my input from the very beginning, right? What about my risk? That doesn't count? I said to put it very bluntly, now that it's all over, you are basically telling me to just fuck off and be done with it.
Message 53: 24/11/2020
Hong: I said I genuinely like that thing, and I met a group of people who liked that thing, and my offer is still like this, I want to participate, I want to participate in the core business, whether I'm one or 100, we can discuss, right? But if you don't want to talk to me about that, let's talk about how to split it, and if you want to continue the discussion, we can pick it up anytime. Two days ago, I went to Kee's house for dinner, and I said, invite all these people to my house, and we'll have dinner again, right? Business is business, and even if we can't reach agreement, we can still have dinner and drinks, and that's fine.
Message 54: 24/11/2020
Hong: But let's be direct, no need to beat around the bush, if you don't want me involved at all then just say fuck off and we'll talk price and be done with it.
...
Message 55: 24/11/2020
Hong: I also told them my offer, I said it's ok now, if at the root of things, we are not making money, this is up to the operation team, but we must be divided into two groups, a group of people with the body of shares, the other group with the real value of this thing, you can have it valued, afterwards we can discuss whether I am 1% or 100%, this can all be discussed, so it is up to the operation to say we did not make money, if you did not make money you guys just get divided.
...
Message 56: 24/11/2020
Leon: I'll talk to Ari on the phone tomorrow.
...
Message 57: 24/11/2020
Hong: If you're going to talk to him, you can mention to him that when we were chatting, I said that I can re‑sell this 50% of shares to Keg king.
...
Message 58: 24/11/2020
Leon: Maybe they're thinking what you're thinking right now.
Message 59: 24/11/2020
Leon: At the time of the lawsuit,
Message 60: 24/11/2020
Leon: from an objective point of view,
Message 61: 24/11/2020
Leon: Keg King might have had a point.
Message 62: 28/11/2020
Hong: The second thing is that on the 18th, I have invited Ari's whole team, the four companies will get together for dinner, free standing dinner, and then after 9:30 we'll go to karaoke. I also wanted take this opportunity to talk to them, to make this clear to them, that it's easier to invite the devil in than send him away, if you want me out, it can be done, I still want to stay, but the premise of staying, first of all, I have realistically estimate the value of the company, and then find a reasonable price to add my money into it. Secondly, the accountant must be Jerry, they can find another accountant, it doesn't matter, the accounting work must be done by Jerry, and then the company must pay for it, that's what I think.
Message 63: 28/11/2020
Hong: Anyway, take you time to talk about it, I think this is something to talk clearly with them first, whether they still want me around or not, if they don't want me, then I'll trouble the two of you to settle the score with them and settle it until they want to take me on again.[515]
257 Hong and Leon were cross‑examined extensively on the 'Fight the Landlord' messages. In particular, it was put to Hong that his comment in Message 4 - '[a]t the very least, if he is willing to let me keep my shares' - was entirely consistent with what Ari says he discussed with Hong on the morning of 6 December 2017. In response to that exchange, and numerous questions in relation to the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, Hong did not directly answer the question put to him. However, the thrust of his evidence was that he did not agree with the proposition and that '[f]rom the very beginning of the company being set up to now, I have never held any shares for anyone'.[516] Moreover, in relation to the 'Fight the Landlord' messages in general, although again in the context of a question relating to Message 4, his evidence was that:
You answered it very quickly, didn't you. You did because you understand how dangerous that voice message is to your ability to oppose the trust case of Kee and Ari?‑‑‑ My understanding of the whole voice messages of this WeChat group is that I was discussing all sorts of possibilities with my professionals so that was just like a brainstorming - whatever come into my mind, I came out saying. You may have all your understandings, aLL UP to you but I have no doubts, no problems with those words in the ah, cells.[517]
258 Leon was also questioned about Message 4. At first, when it was put to him, Leon did not accept that the only way you could read Hong's statement 'if he is willing to let me keep my shares' was that it was not Hong's decision as to whether he kept the shares he held.[518] However, when pressed on whether that was a serious answer, Leon amended his position, saying '[i]f you merely ask me to review this one sentence, then I will say it has a very strong suggestion of that impression but based on my knowledge of the, of all the relationships, I didn't think he mean it and I don't think that's the precise word to use to be - that's the right word to use'.[519]
259 Further, when questioned about Message 6 - where he said, inter alia, '[i]t is unlikely that the other party will agree to you continuing to hold a 50 per cent shareholding simply because of the accounting work' - Leon denied this message reflected him recognising that Hong was not entitled to hold on to 50% of the shares in Kegland unless Kee and Ari wanted that to be the case.[520] A number of further questions on this evidence led to the following exchanges:
Your theory that you've suggested is that Kee made a demand of his - let me finish, please - made a demand of his boss that you can only hold onto your 50 per cent of the shares if you work in the business. Correct?‑‑‑ Ah, it was not a demand. But it's a statement he said to Hong.
And what Hong did with that was go away and think of a way that he could satisfy his employee about retaining his 50 per cent shares, correct? ‑‑‑ Ah, incorrect because he was not trying to find a way to satisfy him. He was finding a way to argue or put something in for discussion to the other side.
Why is he having a meaningful discussion with his employee? ‑‑‑ Because as I said ah, they are very critical employees of the company.[521]
...
... Hong was saying he met with Kee and Ari, they only want employees to be part of that, yes. To be part of Kegland, yes?‑‑‑ Yep, yes.
So two employees demand of their boss, you can't be a part of this unless you play a role in the business, yes?‑‑‑Yep.
Is that plausible to you?‑‑‑No.[522]
260 When questioned in relation to Message 14 - where he said to Hong 'I suggest you just say that I think I can retain my position as director of the company to co‑ordinate the company's finances and some of the legal matters, and that will do.' - Leon rejected that this showed him suggesting there was any form of agreement that Hong would not be retained as a director.[523]
261 Further, in the context of being questioned on the series of messages set out in Messages 20 to 24 - where Leon asked what Hong had invested in Kegland, Jerry had responded there was a $100,000 loan from Hong on Kegland's books, Leon then stated that Ari had told him that Ari had paid Hong RMB 500,000 for this money, and Hong had responded in the affirmative - Leon's evidence was that he 'wouldn't be able to tell just from this message whether Hong was borrowing money or he was lending money'[524] and later that his take on it was that it was 'either a repayment of the loan or it will be separate loan ah, Ari give it to Hong'.[525] Further, although Leon accepted that he believed the AUD $100,000 and RMB 5000,00 'were linked',[526] when asked whether, at the time of those messages, the best information available to him was that Hong had made no investment in Kegland, Leon's evidence was he could not draw that inference.[527]
262 Leon's evidence in relation to Message 24 - 'if that's the case, maybe the main account is still on Smith Road' - was that it was incorrect to suggest it should be understood as him saying if Hong's investment in Kegland could not be used as a strategy in negotiations they should focus on the Smith Road property as a strategy.[528] Instead, at first, Leon gave evidence that his response in Message 24 'most likely... means that I thought the 500,000 yuan transfer ah, was relating to Smith Road because ah, they, we were talking about the rent for Smith Road.'[529] However, later Leon accepted that his statement in Message 25 - where he said 'we can say Kegland is where is it today because of the contribution too because we squeezed out the competition buying Smith Road' - was suggesting they use the purchase of the Smith Road property as part of the negotiations with Kee and Ari.[530]
263 Moving to Message 33 - where Jerry stated, inter alia, 'they would say although you have 50% under your name, you actually only hold such and such, you are just a proxy' - there was the following exchange between counsel for the Defendants and Leon:
And you interpreted that and I would suggest to you the only interpretation is you Hong, are holding the shares for them, Kee and Ari, until the MCH lawsuit is concluded?‑‑‑Well, that, that will be you know ah, my impression by looking at this message.[531]
264 Although Leon took issue with the use of the word 'proxy' in the English translation of Message 33 on the basis that he did not see that term in the Mandarin version,[532] suggesting, the best I can understand his evidence, that the better choice of phrase would be 'on behalf of'.[533] I accept the translator's use of 'proxy' was appropriate but, in any event, I consider nothing turns on that difference in phrasing.
265 In relation to Message 41 - where he said 'I don't think 8%‑15% is unreasonable' - at various points in cross‑examination, Leon gave evidence that he remembered 'very clearly' the reference to 8‑15% was about the annual return of the capital investment,[534] he also suggested that the annual return for investment would relate to both any capital Hong had invested in Kegland but also a 'hard work fee',[535] and denied that the reference to 8‑15% not being unreasonable was made in relation to an offer made by Ari that Hong could retain 5%.[536]
266 The Defendants contend that the 'Fight the Landlord' messages are relevant to the assessment of whether the Hong Trust exists[537] on the basis that these messages are the most candid evidence available as to Hong's motivations and methods because he never intended for the messages to be made public.[538] They also say that they are the clearest indicator of the truthfulness of Kee and Ari's evidence, to the extent the 'Fight the Landlord' messages corroborate their written evidence, because that evidence was given at a time neither knew of the existence of the 'Fight the Landlord' chat, and that any evidence given by Hong or Leon which is contradicted by these messages should be rejected.[539]
267 In this regard, they say the 'Fight the Landlord' messages show in the clearest possible terms that Hong, Jerry and Leon each knew that the shares were held on trust for Kee and Ari, and that Hong wanted to retain an interest in Kegland after the settlement of the MCH proceedings or to obtain money from Kee and Ari, and that the purpose of the 'Fight the Landlord' chat was to explore and execute strategies to give effect to Hong's wish.[540]
268 To this end, the Defendants contend that Hong, Jerry and Leon developed nine 'ploys' through the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, these being:
(a) 'the professional services ploy' which involved suggesting that Leon and Jerry would provide legal and accounting services to Kegland.
(b) 'the $100,000 ploy' which used the $100,000 loan recorded in the Kegland financial records to suggest the money was a loan from Hong.
(c) 'the Smith Road ploy' where they said Hong believed that the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse was related to the Kegland business such that Hong was entitled to shares in Kegland.
(d) 'the director's fee ploy' which involved reminding Kee and Ari that Hong was the sole Australian resident director of Kegland and was entitled to the payment of director fees as a result.
(e) 'the money or shares exit ploy' where Hong sought to be paid out in respect of the Smith Road warehouses.
(f) 'the share retention ploy' which involved negotiating the retention of a portion of the shares.
(g) 'the share value ploy' which involved seeking access to Kegland's financial records.
(h) 'the MCH ploy' which involved selling the shares to MCH.
(i) 'the ultimate ploy' which, when Hong, Jerry and Leon had considered (and in some cases pursued) the earlier ploys but had not obtained the desired outcome, involved simply relying on the fact that the ASIC search and shareholder register reflected that Hong was the director and 50% shareholder in Kegland and, because of their attempts to hide their involvement in the business, Kee and Ari were in a difficult position to establish the true position with respect to the shares.[541]
269 Further, they submit that it is telling that, in the course of the discussions in the 'Fight the Landlord' chat, Hong, Leon and Jerry did not suggest raising the issues being discussed with Sam. Particularly, in circumstances where, on their case and the ASIC search they rely on, Sam was also a director and shareholder in Kegland, his involvement would have been necessary to facilitate the transfer of shares, and as a matter of course he was entitled to know if Kegland employees (namely Kee and Ari) were making unreasonable demands. The Defendants submit the logical conclusion is therefore that Hong, Leon and Jerry knew that Sam was a 'stand in' director.[542] This submission will be considered as part of the threshold issue below.
270 Additionally, they rely on the fact that, despite the Plaintiffs' position being that these were simply negotiations with 'critical employees', at no point did Hong, Jerry or Leon suggest that Kee or Ari be offered shares in the company or some form of financial compensation to placate them, instead the discussions in the 'Fight the Landlord' chat (and the negotiations pursued) revolved around ways for Hong to retain his shareholding. In this regard, the Defendants point to what they say is the implausible evidence given by Hong that Kee and Ari agreed to work in late 2017 and early 2018 without pay to 'prove themselves'[543] and that he had told them, in this period in late 2017 or early 2018, that after the MCH dispute was resolved he would 'be prepared to enter discussions with them about potentially becoming shareholders of Kegland. However, we did not discuss how many shares might be issued to them, nor how they would pay at that time for those shares'.[544]
271 Conversely, as I understand the Plaintiffs' submissions on the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, the Plaintiffs rely on the fact Hong did not refer in the chat (particularly in the messages sent on 11 August which included his summary of the 11 August meeting) to any comments from Kee and Ari telling him that he should resign as director or transfer the shares to invite me to make a finding that those matters were not raised at the 11 August meeting. In making that submission, the Plaintiffs say if the matters had been raised at the meeting, or if he believed that he held the shares on trust, Hong had no reason not to tell Jerry and Leon in the 'Fight the Landlord' chat.[545] In this regard, the Plaintiffs maintain the position that Hong sent these messages to 'his professionals, seeking legal advice'.[546] In line with my findings above that, in fact, these matters were discussed at the 11 August meeting, I decline to make a finding to the contrary here. Further, I observe that in circumstances where I have found that by this time Hong had multiple conversations with Ari and Kee regarding his role as stand‑in director and shareholder, it is fair to assume that Hong discussed these matters with his accountant and lawyer and it would therefore not bear repeating in his messages on 11 August 2020 in the 'Fight the Landlord' chat. Indeed, as I explain below, it can be inferred from the remainder of the 'Fight the Landlord' messages that Leon and Jerry were well aware of the matters relating to the Kegland shares.
272 Furthermore, the Plaintiffs contend the messages sent to the 'Fight the Landlord' chat, and particularly those on 11 August, do not constitute an admission of the trust.[547] Moreover, the Plaintiffs submit that, contrary to the position they say is taken by the Defendants, the discussion in Messages 20 to 23, where Leon asked whether Ari transferred RMB 500,000 for the $100,000, does not constitute Hong in effect acknowledging and accepting that he did not provide any start up capital to Kegland, or that he had no beneficial interests in the shares, or the existence of a trust. Instead, the Plaintiffs say that those messages can be construed, at their highest, as Hong acknowledging a loan liability to Ari of RMB 500,000 and, separately, that he was owed $100,000 from Kegland.[548] In this regard, they rely on evidence from Hong in cross‑examination which they say was to the effect that Hong understood Leon's message to be stating that Ari had transferred RMB 500,000 and that in his reply message he confirmed he had borrowed the RMB 500,000 from Ari.[549] They also contend that because the relevant messages concern the loans and did not mention the shares, they cannot amount to an admission by Hong of the existence of a trust.[550]
273 With respect to Message 33, where Jerry said, inter alia, 'they would say although you have 50% under your name, you actually only hold such and such, you are just a proxy', the Plaintiffs repeat their submission that this message does not constitute an admission of a trust, on the basis that Jerry's prediction in that message was not based on anything said by Hong, and instead say that when the message is read in its entirety and within context it is clear that it refutes the idea of Hong being a proxy and rather endorses that Hong as a major shareholder was entitled to financial transparency from Kegland.[551] For the sake of completeness, I note that the Plaintiffs also submit, in relation to Message 36, where Hong spoke of continuing the discussion with Kee and Ari, tells against the existence of a trust as there would be no need to have discussions had the trust existed.[552]
274 I accept, as submitted by the Defendants, that the 'Fight the Landlord' messages represent candid communications between Hong, Leon and Jerry in circumstances where the authors of those messages never intended for the messages to become public. In very general terms, I am satisfied that these messages demonstrate the evolving strategies contemplated by Hong to retain shares in Kegland in circumstances where he knew he did not have a right to the shares. The messages do not reflect, in tone or content, communications between an employer, his lawyer and accountant, considering how best to deal with rouge employees who were making unreasonable claims of their boss. That is, these are communications made after the fact of the Alleged Oral Agreement which are against Hong's interest and are relevant to my assessment of Hong's knowledge regarding the existence of a trust.[553] I do not consider it necessary to make findings with respect to each of the messages set out above, or in relation to the individual submissions made. In my view, considered holistically, the 'Fight the Landlord' messages, like my findings with respect to the 19 March 2019 messages and 13 April 2020 message, are consistent with the collection of puzzle pieces forming the evidence which together point to the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement and the creation of the Hong Trust. In reaching this conclusion I reject both Hong and Leon's evidence in cross‑examination as implausible and unreliable for the reasons discussed above in relation to credibility generally.
The continuation of the negotiations and Kee's appointment as director of Kegland
275 The twelfth time period covers negotiations which continued throughout 2020 between Kee, Ari and Hong regarding the future of Kegland, concurrently to Hong's discussions with Jerry and Leon in the 'Fight the Landlord' group.
276 On 13 August 2020, two days after the 11 August meeting, Hong sent a WeChat audio message in English to a group containing Kee, Ari, Leon and Jerry. In that message, he stated that they had met, that Kee and Ari wanted a 'different company structure ... from what we have now' where they wanted to only 'sell shares' to persons working in the company, and that he definitely wanted to be part of the company. In subsequent messages sent that day, Hong suggested that he provide legal and accounting services to Kegland through Jerry and Leon and stated that if his description of what he understood Ari and Kee wanted was incorrect then they should correct him or let him know if they had 'other idea of how to do next step'. Ari replied that saying they could speak the following day.[554]
277 Kee and Ari's evidence is that they discussed Hong's offer between themselves, agreed that they did not need him involved in the company and would tell him again that they only wanted people actively involved in its operations to be part of the company.[555] Therefore, on 14 August 2020, Kee sent the following message to the WeChat group:
Also, with regards to the Kegland shares/business and ongoing future of the company. This is an important subject. We really appreciate everything that you have done for us Hong and we will never forget your help. I think all of us have constructively been helpful to each other. We want to continue to assist your Waste business grow and have done what we can to assist. Likewise we have and will continue to make Smith rd available for you as security so you can borrow against this property as agreed. We also want your property development business enterprise to also succeed and will do whatever we can to assist with this. We all have respective skills in our own industries. We did all talk about working together in some other property development too but this is not our expertise and it's not how the Smith rd property has unfolded. Conversely Hong you did mentioned that you wanted to start a brewery and this has also not yet unfolded. With that said we do all have very good skills in our own professions and have found success in these industries and I wonder if it makes things simpler if we all do what we do best. This is not to say that we should not continue to support each other in any way we can. We still want to make sure that Hong you are happy with the outcome. Irrespective of what your ambitions are Ari and Myself are committed to helping you find success. If that is assisting your waste business or starting a brewery or another business we will always be here to support you in the same way you have supported us.[556]
278 Other messages were also sent between Hong, Ari and Kee over this period regarding money Ari and Kee owed Hong in relation to the purchase of the Smith Road warehouse. In the course of Hong providing his bank details for that purpose, he sent a message which said, inter alia, 'and in future of the kegland, I'm really want to be part of the business, but if you guys want me out the business, I can try and get out completely. My understanding is that the warehouse and kegland is one business, both with the purpose of resolving the dispute with Maggie. That's the reason why I participate in the factory part.'[557] In response to a further message from Hong where he said to let him know if they had other ideas about the future of the business, Ari and Kee each separately suggested that they all discuss it over 'a beer'.[558]
279 According to Kee and Ari, Kee's message on 14 August did not dissuade Hong and, on around 17 August 2020, Leon contacted Ari asking whether he and Kee could permit Hong to keep some shares in Kegland, saying words to the effect that if they did not do so then Hong would continue to hassle them as he was wealthy and was used to getting his own way.[559] Leon denies he said this.[560] On Ari's evidence[561] this was the first time that he and Kee got the sense that Hong would not simply transfer the shares to them and so, worried that they had offended Hong, he offered (via Leon) Hong 5% of his shares. However, when Leon suggested that they give Hong at least a 20% shareholding, Ari refused and reminded Leon of the agreement that Hong would transfer the shares once the MCH proceeding had concluded. Ari says Leon's response was that he did not know anything about such an agreement, which Ari told him was not true as they had spoken about it from the beginning.[562] I understand the reference 'from the beginning' to mean Ari says he told Leon about the agreement at the meeting at Secret Kitchen in Doncaster in early December 2017.
280 Leon's written evidence was that he never had a conversation with Ari where they discussed Hong being given 5% or 20% of Kegland's shares, he also denies there was any conversation where Ari spoke of an agreement to transfer the shares after the MCH proceeded ended.[563] In cross‑examination, Leon retreated somewhat from this position, instead giving evidence that Ari may have had a discussion with Jerry about percentages but he was not in that conversation and he was 'pretty certain we didn't discuss those portion at the time'.[564] However, he rejected the assertion that the conversation with Ari had taken place and that he was misleading the Court with respect to this evidence.[565]
281 As negotiations continued,[566] at a barbecue at Kee's house on 20 November 2020, Kee and Ari gave Hong a "golden ticket" inscribed with the words 'In honour of Hong Rui Liu - 100% discount'. Kee and Ari's evidence was that they gave Hong the "golden ticket" to thank him for his help and to show he would receive free Kegland goods for life. They say, from their perspective, they understood matters had been resolved with Hong after the barbeque. However, Hong later posted the "golden ticket" on Facebook, at which point Ari asked him to remove the post in case it alerted MCH, which Hong did although he was unhappy to do so.[567] In this regard, the 'Fight the Landlord' messages also show Hong candidly talking about this - 'we posted that golden ticket to the Kegland group group chat on Facebook, I wanted to try and see what happens, you know?'[568]
282 The next central event in this period was the appointment of Kee as a director of Kegland. Mr Amos' evidence is that in 2020, in the course of a semi‑regular discussions with Kee, they discussed issues relating to Kegland and, in those discussions, Kee would raise the topic of becoming a director and shareholder of Kegland, although he did not appear in a hurry to do so. Mr Amos says he told Kee that when he was ready Elysium would arrange the paperwork. Then, in early December 2020, Kee told Mr Amos he was ready to come on as a director. To this end, on 2 December 2020, Kee emailed Mr Amos asking him to commence the process of appointing him as a director and saying Sam would sign the documents as an existing director. A colleague of Mr Amos' at Elysium prepared the documentation and, once the relevant documents had been signed, on 3 December 2020 Kee became a director of Kegland and the ASIC register was updated accordingly.[569] Kee and Sam also gave evidence to this effect.[570]
283 Kee and Ari's evidence is then that, at the company Christmas party on or around 12 December 2020, Kee gave a speech to the guests, with Hong present, where he introduced himself as a director at Kegland and thanked Hong for his assistance over the past years. Further, they say they had a quick discussion with Hong at the Christmas party about the practicalities of arranging the share issue and transfer and his resignation as director and that a few days later Kee called Hong to follow up this discussion.[571] Hong's evidence is that he arrived late to the Christmas party and says he did not see or hear Kee give a speech, let alone hear Kee say anything about being a director at Kegland. He also denies that he had a discussion with Kee and Ari at the Christmas party regarding changes to Kegland's directors or shareholding.[572]
284 In cross‑examination it was put to Ari that the discussion with Hong at the Christmas party did not take place because, by that stage, Kee and Ari had decided to go down the path of preparing a share option agreement without Hong's approval. However, Ari maintained that they had discussed it in August (presumably a reference to the 11 August meeting) and 'also in the meeting in Kee's place, we did mentioned this time to transfer share back to us and resign the director'.[573] Similarly, in cross‑examination Kee maintained they discussed the share dilution at the Christmas party and rejected that he was giving false evidence in this respect.[574]
285 On 15 December 2020, Kee emailed Sam, Ari and Hong (to his Urban Waste email) stating (spelling as in original):
Hello Sam and Hong,
Just letting you know as of 3rd December I am now a director of KegLand also.
We very much appreciate all your assistance to date. Mansour Lawyers seem to think there is a high chance that ABL will be notified that I have become a director. As a result there is a possibility that they will attempt to start proceedings again. I don't think they have grounds to cause significant issues but given how letigeous Will Fiala is I think the chance of some type of claim is high.
Moving forward there is not any real point for you guys to stay on directors. As a result I will get Leigh from Elysium to send the necessary paperwork to you so you can both delist directors.
Thanks again for all your help guys. It's certainly been a longer and more expensive journey that we anticipated but worth it nonetheless.[575]
286 Sam replied to this email later that day, copying in Ari and Hong, saying:
Hi kee,
Great news. Thank you for taking over the helm, it will give us more time and opportunity to focus on our other investment. Look forward to more Kegland success in the coming years.[576]
287 Sam's evidence was that, from his perspective, the matters set out in those emails reflected 'what had always been agreed' when he 'took on the role as a stand in director and 50% shareholder'.[577]
288 It is necessary for me to make a number of findings in relation this period due to the contested evidence and the Plaintiffs' submissions in this regard. On my understanding of their case, the Defendants did not make submissions specifically directed to the events in this time period beyond their general submissions that the evidence of Hong and Leon should not be accepted.
289 In contrast, the Plaintiffs contend that in the WeChat messages from 13 August 2020 Hong invited Kee and Ari to correct him if his understanding of their position was incorrect and they chose not to do so. In particular, Kee and Ari did not raise issues they say were discussed at the 11 August meeting, including Hong's resignation as director, the share option agreement or the transfer of shares.[578] Although not framed as such, this appears to be an invitation to find that such matters were not discussed at the 11 August meeting. I have made already made findings in this respect.[579] I do not consider that the WeChat messages sent after the fact, or what was not said in those messages, alters any findings I have made in this respect.
290 Further, again in summarised form as in many cases these submissions repeat themes already raised and dealt with, the Plaintiffs contend:
(a) that Kee and Ari's evidence, that Hong was informed ahead of time that Kee was to be appointed as director, should be rejected in light of the lack of any documentary evidence to support such a finding. In this regard, they say that the opening line of Kee's email of 15 December 2020, where he said '[j]ust letting you know as of 3rd December I am now a director of KegLand also', makes clear Hong had not previously been told of the appointment, and say that Kee's general evidence that '[w]e did avoid putting a lot of things in writing where possible for as long as possible recording this particular topic ... trying to limit the amount of paperwork, I guess there would be connecting - you know, is to the MCH ruse'[580] is implausible considering a ASIC search would have shown he was a director and therefore should be rejected.[581] In line with my findings above regarding the plausibility of the MCH ruse explaining why certain matters were not put in writing, as well as my findings as to what was discussed at the 11 August meeting, I reject this submission. I do not consider that the email of 3 December 2020, which on an ordinary reading of the words could also be interpreted as Kee confirming knowledge Hong already had, requires me to make a contrary finding;
(b) that, in any event, when Ari and Kee did decide to inform Hong of Kee's appointment they did so by sending an email to his Urban Waste email, which was an email account he did not monitor, in circumstances where they had previously sent emails to a different account of Hong's.[582] I make no findings with respect to this submission at this stage but note the Plaintiffs press like submissions with respect to communications relating to the share issue. These are dealt with together in the section below dealing with the oppression claim;
(c) that the Court should find that the no director's meeting took place on 3 December 2020, attended by Hong and Sam - the minutes of that purported meeting forming the documentation relating to Kee's appointment as director.[583] As I understand it, this is not contested or, at the very least, is uncontroversial as Kee and Sam accepted this was the case in cross‑examination;[584]
(d) that the appointment of Kee as director without Hong's knowledge (rather than by him at Kee and Ari's direction) is inconsistent with the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement on the basis that a term of the agreement was that Hong would facilitate the appointment of Kee and/or Ari as director at their direction.[585] I decline to find that Kee's appointment as director was inconsistent with the Alleged Oral Agreement such that it necessitates a finding that agreement did not exist. As discussed in more detail below in relation to the threshold issue, in the circumstances that Ari and Kee found themselves, lacking commercial sophistication, tangled in the lies from the MCH ruse, and facing a recalcitrant Hong, their decisions in this regard, irrespective of whether or not the appointment was validly made, are reconcilable with, and fit within the puzzle pieces establishing, the existence of the Hong Trust; and
(e) that Hong's account of what was said and discussed at the Christmas party should be accepted (with particular emphasis on what the Plaintiffs allege are inconsistencies in, and implausible aspects of, Kee and Ari's evidence regarding, for example, the timing of events on the day of the Christmas party) over the evidence of Kee and Ari on those matters.[586] As a preliminary observation, I decline to place weight on those matters which the Plaintiffs contend support a finding that Kee and Ari's evidence regarding the Christmas party should be rejected. I consider that limitations Ari and Kee's recollection of specific details of the party[587] are readily explainable by the passage of time and do not bear of the credibility of their evidence in this respect more generally (see Proposition 3 and Proposition 9[588]). As such, on balance, and for the reasons discussed at various points in these reasons where I have accepted Ari and Kee's evidence over Hong's, I am satisfied that Ari and Kee's evidence with respect to Kee's speech at the Christmas party and the discussion they had with Hong afterwards should be accepted.
291 The final time period concerns the events surrounding the share issue on 1 February 2021, which the Plaintiffs contend is void or voidable. In setting out the evidence relating to the share issue, it is particularly necessary to first address one matter which looms large throughout the Plaintiffs' submissions, being the knowingly incorrect evidence given by Kee, Ari and Sam throughout a significant part of this proceeding regarding the timing as to when the Share Option Agreement, which underpinned the share issue, was signed.
292 In this regard it is useful to set out Kee's revised written evidence in full. In his amended witness statement dated 12 May 2024, Kee gave the following evidence with respect the Share Option Agreement:
True position with share option agreement
As noted above, I no longer wish to give evidence that the share option agreement was signed in late 2017 or early 2018.
On the afternoons of 11 and 12 May 2024, I told my lawyers of the matters set out below.
In December 2017, after my discussions with David Amos regarding CGT, I attempted to draft a share option agreement. However, I did not get any further than the contents of that rough draft and no share option agreement was executed in around December 2017/January 2018, nor at any time until around December 2020/January 2021, as addressed below. I do not have that rough draft.
Towards the end of 2020, it looked like Hong would not honour the arrangement to pass the shares back to us. I had begun to panic about this.
By this stage, Ari and I had poured our heart and soul into the Kegland business. We had staff that were relying on us for jobs; me and my wife had taken a loan against our house to pay for the business start‑up; and the thought of losing all this to Hong was really terrifying me. The thought of us not being able to take ownership of a business that was our really made me feel sick.
I came up with the idea of finalising and backdating the share option agreement. I thought that, if we signed a backdated copy of the agreement, it would help us to get the shares back from Hong. At that time, I thought this was our best option for dealing with this problem.
Sometime in mid‑December 2020, I spoke with Ari and Sam (via Skype) about this idea. I told them that the share option agreement had not actually been finished, as I had totally forgotten about doing it. I explained my idea to them. Ari and Sam said that they were happy to follow this plan.
At this time, I felt a bit guilty. I was the person who was looking after this share option agreement in late 2017 and I did not get around to completing it.
I created the share option agreement using the version sent from Mansour Lawyers on 15 December 2020. I edited the Mansour version in Microsoft Word. I contacted Sam via skype and transferred the file to him to sign. Sam signed the file and then sent the digital copy back to me. Once Ari and I signed a printout, I then scanned the print out, so we had a scanned copy that had three signatures, but it was still missing a signature for the person who was meant to witness my signature (the unwitnessed version).
I asked my wife, Kelly, to sign the unwitnessed version as the person who had witnessed my signature. I only printed the signing page of the unwitnessed version. She signed that page which I then scanned and created a new PDF document, using the Adobe Acrobat software by replacing the signature page of the missing witness version with the scanned page with Kelly's signature and saving it as a new PDF.
I edited the meta data of 'Binder_1.pdf'with some free software that I had found online. I cannot remember the name of the software. I used this software to edit the file; and this software also enabled me to change the metadata attached to the file. I did not keep the software and deleted it from my computer soon after I used it.
This is the document with the file name 'Binder1_1.pdf'. The file name 'Binder1_1.pdf' was not created by me. 'Binder1' is the default name which the Adobe Acrobat software gives to a merged PDF document and the '_1' was added with I edited the meta data to create the file called 'Binder1_1.pdf'.
Shortly afterwards, on 23 December 2020, I was at work and needed to send the signed / witnessed version of the share option agreement to David Amos to give effect to the share issue. I could not located the 'Binder1_1.pdf' document on my computer as it was not saved in any of the folders I checked, and the file name did not enable me to conduct a successful search for the document on my computer.
As a result, I printed off the unwitnessed version and had Henry Burke witness my signature. I saved this under the file name 'Scan of Option Agreement.pdf', which made it easier to find. I also edited the metadata to hide the real date on which the document was created. I sent this edited version of the share option agreement to David Amos.
In December 2022, my solicitor, Mr Hope, informed me that the plaintiffs had requested production of the Microsoft Word version of the share option agreement that was signed and witnessed. I located the Microsoft Word document referred to in paragraph 228 above, modified its content to make it look like an earlier draft and edited its meta data using the same free software. I then deleted the software again and provided the modified document with the edited meta data to Mr Hope (the modified word version).
Mr Hope located 'Binder1_1.pdf' amongst the documents that we had provided to him for the purposes of instructions in this proceeding. He discovered this document. He also recently produced the modified word version after receiving the plaintiffs' proposed amendments to paragraph 23 of the statement of claim. It was only on the afternoon of 11 and 12 May 2024 that I explained the above matters to my lawyers.
I regret my conduct (as explained above). I apologise to this Court and the plaintiffs for my failure to "come clean" in relation to the time at which the share option agreement was created and signed.[589]
293 Likewise, Ari and Sam also gave revised written evidence in conformity with Kee's evidence.[590]
294 The documentary evidence for this period establishes the following timeline with respect to the events leading up to the share issue on 1 February 2021:
(a) on 9 October 2020, an email was sent from the Hong alias account to Mr Mansour at Mansour Lawyers (although initially sent by mistake to Mr Earl at Earl & Associates) and Mr Amos at Elysium, which stated '[w]e are looking at an internal sale of shares as we would like to do some restructuring. David can you please discuss this with Stephen and Rachel at Mansour Lawyers so that we can work out an agreement that is tax efficient'. Mr Amos replied later that day stating that his team would organise a meeting the following week but that 'whilst it is an internal sale that the shares will still be required to be transferred at market value to avoid any tax avoidance issue';[591]
(b) on 19 October 2020, Kee sent an email to Ms Rachael Urbaniak at Mansour Lawyers which asked whether they were getting close with the contract between Sam and Kegland as '[w]e wanted to get the contract signed so we can finish the share transfer with Sam Lie'. Ms Urbaniak replied the following day, stating inter alia that she had spoken to Mr Amos at Elysium in relation to the share transaction and that Kegland would need to urgently obtain a valuation of the company and complete its 2020 financials;[592]
(c) an Elysium invoice records 'D.A' having a 'meeting and advice in regards to ownership and share transfer and CGT implications and Valuation. And advice on Tax deduction of start up costs' on 4 November 2020;[593]
(d) on 4 November 2020, Kee sent an email to Mr Mansour which asked whether it would be possible, for the purposes of the sale of the shares, for the valuation of Kegland to be based on the end of financial year in July 2020, rather than November 2020 as they had a 'lot more stock and cash in bank account that will be more problematic'. In that email Kee also asked for a 'draft agreement ... to show Sam';[594]
(e) on 13 November 2020, Ms Urbaniak sent an email to Kee attaching two versions of a draft Sale of Shares Agreement, one version annotated and one clean. In that email she noted the purchase price of the shares would depend on the completion of the 2020 financials.[595] Relevantly, pursuant to clause 3.1 of the draft agreement, 'LL' was to transfer 45 shares to LTWQ and 5 shares to Team KK, while Sam was to transfer 40 shares to Team KK;[596]
(f) on 2 December 2020, Kee sent an email to Mr Amos, copying in Sam, which asked Mr Amos to call him regarding his appointment as director of Kegland. That email also stated that he was 'hoping to get a draft share purchase option agreement' from Elysium;[597]
(g) on 2 December 2020, Ms Urbaniak at Mansour Lawyers sent Kee and email attaching a document called 'Option to purchase shares agreement';[598]
(h) on 3 December 2020, Mr Amos sent Kee an email with the subject line 'Option Document' which stated inter alia '[j]ust for clarity I have not followed up on the document as you will be sourcing this yourself. Let me know if this changes';[599]
(i) on 7 December 2020, Kee sent an email to Mr Mansour at Mansour Lawyers which asked him to 'please draft a new option agreement for a new company that we have in mind' and, in explaining how the agreement should operate, stated '[i]f the individual is to exercise this option then the company would issue new shares to the individual which would subsequently dilute the existing shareholders';[600]
(j) on 11 December 2020, Ms Urbaniak sent Kee and an email attaching a draft Share Option Agreement his for consideration. That document was a PDF document;[601]
(k) on 14 December 2020, Kee requested a copy of the draft Share Option Agreement as a word document,[602] which Ms Urbaniak provided on 15 December 2020;[603]
(l) on 17 December 2020, Kee sent Sam a copy of the Share Option Agreement to Sam via Skype and asked him to sign the document and send it back. Later that day Sam replied saying he had read the option agreement but did not 'fully understand how it works' and asked whether there was another part to the agreement;[604]
(m) on 18 December 2020, Kee replied to Sam in a series of Skype messages, as follows:
That is the entirety of the agreement. Instead of purchasing shares from you we are going to issue another 400 shares
so it will look like this
This will not trigger a capital gains event for yourself or Hong and also it will avoid needing to do a valuation of the company.
Also the legal agreement that Mansour Lawyers put together will hold up to scrutiny when ABL request a copy.
Most likely ABL will get notified of any share change and probably would have been notified about the change in directors already. So we are expecting further legal correspondence to kick back up again.
Ari and myself will pay 20,000 each for the 200 shares (40k in total);[605]
(n) further messages between Kee and Sam that day culminated in a call that lasted approximately 25 minutes after which Kee messaged Sam to tell him that the agreement should be amended by Monday;[606]
(o) on 21 December 2020, Kee sent Sam the amended Share Option Agreement and noted that the amended agreement included a new clause at Sam's request which 'limits the share purchase option to 400 shares'. Over the course of the day Kee and Sam sent a series of messages clarifying the total number of shares. At 6:32pm that evening, Sam sent a message which stated 'if its okay, I will also get Aris confirmation and I will go ahead sign this document', then at 6:37pm he sent a message to confirm he had spoken to Ari who was 'cool with it'. Importantly at 6:43pm Sam sent a further message which stated 'on the header it says 2020, change to 2018, would that be right?' to which Kee responded 'Shit. Yes please change that. Sorry I am not sure how that one got missed. It should be dates 1st Jan 2018'. Sam then proceeded to send back the signed document and Kee said he would sign and get Ari to witness the document the next day;[607]
(p) on 23 December 2020, Kee sent Mr Amos the following email:
Hello David,
We would like to issue an additional 400 shares in KegLand Distribution.
When kegland distribution was setup I had a share purchase option agreement specifying that I was entitled to purchase 400 shares at $100 each.
I would like to exercise this option.
What is the procedure to get this underway? From an accounting perspective is there anything in particular that I need to do?
I have scanned a copy of the agreement so you can see what it says.
I am going to nominate our family trust and also Ari's family trust to receive the shares;[608]
(q) between 4 January and 13 January 2021, there were a series of emails sent between Kee and staff at Elysium regarding the paperwork required to issue the shares. One such email from Ms Emily Dawson on 12 January requested that Kee send her with Sam's email address as '[t]here needs to be an additional Director to sign the Share Certificates and they can be electronically signed, however we need to enter the email address of each recipient'.[609] Kee replied on 13 January providing the email addresses of both Sam and Hong - notably providing Hong's Urban Waste email - and noted that the date of the share issue should be 1 February 2021;[610]
(r) on 1 February 2021, Ms Dawson sent an email addressed to Kee, Ari, Sam and Hong which confirmed she had sent the relevant ASIC forms to their emails to be digitally signed.[611] Kee and Sam replied to Ms Dawson on 1 February and 2 February respectively confirming they had signed the relevant documents.[612] Kee signed, dated 1 February 2021: an application for shares, minutes of meeting of the directors (which stated Hong, Kee and Sam had each attended), a consent to be a member and hold shares, the share certificates, the declaration of trust and the change to company details form; Sam signed, dated 2 February 2021: the share certificates; and, Ari signed, dated 1 February 2021: an application for shares, a consent to be a member and hold shares, and a declaration of trust;[613] and
(s) on 3 February 2021, Ms Dawson sent Kee a copy of the ASIC company details which recorded Kee, Ari and Hong as the directors in Kegland, and recorded Sam and LL UP as each holding 50 shares, and LTWQ and Team KK each holding 200 shares in the company.[614]
295 In the course of being questioned on the draft Sale of Shares Agreement,[615]the following exchange occurred between Kee and counsel for the Plaintiffs:
You were going to the extent of getting lawyers to prepare this document because you wanted to effect a sale of shares from LLUP to you, weren't you?‑‑‑ Um, we had to make sure that there was some way to reflect the transfer of shares um and it was important from ah, Elysium Accounting's perspective to have a proper paper trail to value the shares at the time of the sale.
...
MR CAWTHORN: Sorry, purchase price, sum of TBC 50 and then there's the 40 and then there's as determined by valuation?‑‑‑ Yes, that's correct Your Honour.
It's 50 Hong shares though aren't there, not 10 shares - 50 fully paid LLU shares? ‑‑‑ Yes, that's correct Your Honour.
Not 10 shares?‑‑‑ Um, I think if I remember correctly, I would just have to remember the dates um, but we had not transferred the other - hadn't done the transfer of the 400 shares at that stage or issued the option agreement at that stage so I think at that stage, it was yeah, it was 50 and 50, correct.
If you never called for a transfer without any payment from Hong of his shares, did you?‑‑‑ Well, that was the problem Your Honour. Like Elysium Accounting said that if can't be for zero dollars. We would like to do that because we felt we owned the shares already and were the ones that financed the company but ah, from an accounting perspective, we have to do a valuation process so ‑‑‑
The answer to the question is no, isn't it. You never asked for a transfer of the shares, did you? The answer's no, isn't it?‑‑‑ To?
From Hong's shares to you?‑‑‑ We had discussed that with Hong on numerous occasions, yes.
And this - I suggest you didn't, what do you say about that?‑‑‑ No, it's not correct. Right from the start, the inception of the company, we had Hong hold shares on our behalf.
If that was the case, you could've called him to transfer the shares to you instead of going through the exercise of selling the shares to you are provided for in his agreement?‑‑‑ Well ‑‑‑
What do you say about that?‑‑‑ That was not what Elysium Accounting had told us. They said that the, if, if we transferred the shares at zero value on the books, then if that was to be looked in at a later date, they would look at the valuation at that time or they would calculate a valuation and then there would be a CGT implication based on the transfer.
When did they give you that advice?‑‑‑ On numerous occasions but ‑‑‑
When, when?‑‑‑ Well I first spoke to Davis Amos with respect to transferring shares before the inception of the company in December 2017 and then again later on, we had other conversations with David Amos around about this time as well.
Is that in writing? ‑‑‑ Um, we had a meeting face to face in his office.[616]
296 In cross‑examination, Kee agreed that they wanted the valuation of Kegland to be as low as possible for the purposes of buying the shares but maintained that at the time the draft Share Sales Agreement was being drafted, in early November 2020, 'we already knew that it would be 10 per cent of the shares from Hong, and there was no reason for us to be, you know, transferring that remaining 10 per cent from Hong of the shares to ourselves at a high valuation. However, for - for account keeping and bookkeeping, it was necessary for us to take a valuation when shares would make a transfer like that'.[617]
297 In responding to questions regarding the Skype messages sent between 17 and 21 December 2020 concerning the Share Option Agreement,[618] and particularly the messages where Sam queried the number of shares that were going to be issued, Kee agreed it was unclear how many shares were going to be issued as 'at that stage, I think the option agreement was pretty open‑ended'. However, he stated that it only made sense to issue 400 shares because that was the only number that diluted Sam's shareholding to the correct percentage, and maintained that although they had not discussed the precise number of shares to be issued with Sam in 2017 or 2018, they had discussed diluting his shares to 10% in those prior years. He denied that December 2020 was the first time he had spoken to Sam about the dilution of the shares.[619]
298 In a line of similar questions regarding the Skype messages, Sam gave the following evidence in cross‑examination:
Well, I'm suggesting to you that this is really - your message when you say, I've read it, I don't fully understand how it works, shows that you were really dealing with this question of the share option agreement for the first time then in December 2020, weren't you? ‑‑‑ No. I don't understand how like he's using all those figures, like, you know, how he's calculating and all that because like I don't actually like study share option agreement but I know there is like, you know, like you set up share option agreement and you don't have to pay capital gain tax.[620]
299 During cross‑examination Sam also gave evidence that the 'intricate details' of how the share option worked was explained to him by Kee during the call on Skype on 18 December 2020,[621] and that he had not specifically discussed the details of the Share Option Agreement with Ari prior to their discussion sometime between 6:32pm and 6:37pm on 21 December 2020.[622] When it was put to Sam that it was implausible that there had been any discussions about the share issue 'up to November 2020' and instead that any discussion had been in relation to a share sale, Sam's evidence was that he could not recall all the detail but he trusted Kee and Ari to 'organise this' and to do right by him and that he left the mechanism to Kee and Ari.[623]
300 Shortly after the issue of the shares, on 3 February 2021, Kee and Ari had a meeting with Hong at his wife's office in Rialto South Tower. Ari's evidence is that the mood at the meeting was tense, that Hong returned the golden ticket they had gifted him, that they offered Hong $100,000 which would be shown on Kegland's books as the purchase of the remaining 10% of shares held by Hong, and that Kee told Hong they would take care of any CGT implications for the transfer of the shares but emphasised again that if Hong wanted to hold shares in Kegland then he would need to be involved and working in the business. They say Hong said words to the effect that if he had no shares in the company then he would pass the matter on to his accountants and lawyers to work out the details, and they understood this to mean the lawyers and accountants would arrange for the transfer of the remaining 10% of shares.[624] Kee gave corresponding evidence.[625]
301 Hong's evidence with respect the meeting is that prior to the meeting Ari called him and insisted it was a private conversation and only the three of them should be present. According to Hong, he pressed Kee at the meeting on whether Kee wanted him in or out of the business, that Kee confirmed he did not want Hong involved and repeated the statement from the 11 August meeting that only employees in Kegland could be shareholders. Hong says he therefore said words to the effect that lawyers and accountants would calculate his 50% shareholding in Kegland and nothing from Kee or Ari indicated they did not regard him as being the shareholder of 50% of Kegland's shares. Further, Hong's evidence is that at no time during the meeting did Kee or Ari say Kee had been appointed as director of Kegland, or refer to the share option agreement, or suggest he had agreed to relinquish the shares and resign as director once the MCH proceeding was resolved.[626]
302 On 8 February 2021, Kee sent the following email to Leon, Jerry, Ari and Hong's Urban Waste email:
Hello Hong, Ari and Jerry,
As you may be informed Hong myself and Ari recently had a meeting and we have decided jointly that:
1. Hong is going to relinquish his 10% shareholding in KegLand Distribution PTY LTD.
2. KegLand
3. Kee and Ari have offered to pay 100k to purchase hongs 10% shares as a "directors fee" and as a way to say thanks for all the assistance
Hong has instructed us that Jerry and Leon you guys will work out the details on this topic as Hong's representative.
As Ari and myself have stated previously we both greatly appreciate what Hong has done for us and we are forever in debt to Hong for what he has done for us and this will not be forgotten.
Leon, I tried to call you regarding this last week but was unable to get you on the phone. To tie up these loose ends we can either have a meeting in person or do this over email or phone. Leon do you have a preferred time to tackle this?[627]
Hello Kee and Ari:
I am very surprised to see your emails. I have never agreed or made any decisions as stated in your emails. Sorry your emails do not make any sense, as I own 50% of the shares in the company, not 10%?
As director and the shareholder of the company, I would like to review the company's financial position statement this month. I will ask my accountant Jerry to make contact with you to request for the relevant information.
Hong[632]
304 Later on 9 February 2021, Kee replied to Hong, with that email stating inter alia:
Hello Hong,
I am not sure if you remember but when the company was incorporated Ari and Myself had a purchase option for 400 shares. This was executed only a few weeks ago so another 400 shares were issued. This purchase option was one of the conditions of our employment.
The reason for doing so is that we wanted to make sure we had a good exit plan for Sam and yourself and you were able to reduce the shares (proportionately) before sale so the shares could be done at a fair rate given the circumstances.
So at this stage the allocated shares are:
Hong‑ 50 shares - 10%
Sam - 50 shares - 10%
Kee - 200 shares - 40%
Ari - 200 Shares ‑ 40%[633]
305 It is readily apparent from Kee, Ari and Sam's concessions regarding the timing of the Share Option Agreement that Kee's statements in this email regarding the purchase option are not truthful.
306 Hong's evidence is that Kee's email on 8 February 2021 was the first time he became aware Kee had been appointed as a director of Kegland and that the 400 shares had been issued.[634] In direct contrast, Kee and Ari's evidence is that Hong's email on 9 February 2021 was the first time Hong had ever said he was the true owner of the Kegland shares and that Kee and Ari were not entitled to them.[635]
307 In the following weeks, following communications between Kee, Ari and Hong's lawyers, Ari sent the following WeChat audio message to Hong (translated):
As a friend, I feel caught in the middle, and I think a lot of things are not as they seem. It would be so good if we could sit down and talk things through clearly. At the start, everyone is on the same page, right? You help me, I help you, we help each other. But even though our thoughts might diverge at some points, we haven't really cleared these things up early on; what you think, what we think, or what he thinks. That's where the misunderstanding come in. Now I'm stuck in the middle, and it's really giving me a headache.[636]
308 Turning to the submissions, the events surrounding the share issue is central to the Plaintiffs' case in two ways. First, as the basis of their claim that the purpose of the share issue on 1 February 2021 was to dilute the shareholding of LL UP and this purpose was oppressive, prejudicial and discriminatory conduct within the meaning of s 232 of the Corporations Act.[637] By way of example, and without being exhaustive, in this regard they contend that Kee and Ari intentionally withheld information from Hong regarding the share issue, including by sending correspondence to his Urban Waste email which they knew was not monitored.[638] The oppression claim is dealt with below.[639]
309 However, I understand that the Plaintiffs also invite the Court to find that not only did Kee, Ari and Sam give false evidence regarding the timing of Share Option Agreement but also that the share issue had, in fact, never been discussed prior to mid‑December 2020 when Kee raised the matter with Sam via Skype and that it was never raised with Hong at all. In contending this, the Plaintiffs repeat their submission that the Court should find that the share dilution was not discussed at the meeting on 16 December 2017. The Plaintiffs rely on the absence of reference to a share issue in emails between Kee and Mansour Lawyers in November 2020, which concerned the share sale and not the share issue, and say that the Skype messages between Kee and Sam show this was the first time a share option and share issue had been raised. They also rely on the evidence of Kee and Sam in cross‑examination that at the time of their discussion on Skype the share issue was 'pretty open ended' and Sam had not yet discussed the Share Option Agreement with Ari at that point in time.[640] They also place emphasis on the Defendants' failure to discover documents relating to the share option until April 2024.[641] For all of the reasons previously discussed, including in the context of my findings regarding the substance of discussions on 16 December 2017 and 11 August 2020, I decline to make a finding to this effect.
310 Further, the Plaintiffs also contend that the manner in which the share issue came to be executed, and the knowingly false evidence given by Kee, Ari and Sam in regards to the Share Option Agreement, tells against there ever having been an agreement reached on 6 December 2017 and thus against the existence of the Hong Trust. In summary, the thrust of their submissions is that Kee and Ari's conduct from mid‑October to early December 2020 and the documentary evidence of that conduct - in instructing their lawyers and accountants to prepare for a share sale, rather than a share issue - is inconsistent with the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement, or the Hong Trust, on the basis that had such an agreement existed it would have been unnecessary for a share sale to occur (or for Kegland to be valued or for CGT advice be sought) as Kee and Ari could have simply directed Hong to transfer the shares. They say that the creation of the Sale of Shares Agreement, which was to be based on the valuation of Kegland in July 2020, has not been explained by the Defendants and is entirely inconsistent with the Alleged Oral Agreement having been reached. Instead, on the Plaintiffs' case, Kee and Ari sought legal and accounting advice following the 11 August meeting because Hong had not acquiesced to their demands at that meeting.[642]
311 The Defendants say they do not seek to underplay the seriousness of the concessions made by Ari, Kee and Sam that they lied with respect to their evidence regarding the Share Option Agreement and provided false evidence in the MCH proceeding. With respect to each Kee and Ari, the Defendants contend that both told serious lies, which reflects poorly on them, but say that they confessed to these lies and apologised to the Court which, in turn, reflects more positively on them. In this way, they contrast Kee and Ari's conduct with Hong, who they say maintained the truth of evidence for which he had been granted a s 128 certificate. Further, they submit that although Kee and Ari's lies regarding the Share Option Agreement are inexcusable they are explicable in the context of these proceedings, particularly the need for the MCH ruse,[643] the existence of the trust, and Hong's reneging on the agreement in this respect. Aside from the lies told and confessed to, the Defendants contend that Ari and Kee's evidence is inherently plausible and should not be rejected, particularly where that evidence is supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence. Importantly in this regard, they contend that, in any event, the backdating of the Share Option Agreement does not affect the formation of the trust three years earlier in 2017.[644] Similarly, the Defendants accept that Sam was not an impressive witness but say it is important to acknowledge that he gave evidence against his own self‑interest.[645]
312 As I discuss above in the section on credibility, Kee, Ari and Sam's lies with to the Share Option Agreement are serious matters and weigh generally against their credibility as witnesses. Where I have accepted their evidence over Hong's, I do not seek to minimise the significance of the lies they admitted to. However, nonetheless, I accept the thrust of the Defendants' submissions. While it does not excuse their lies, contextualised by the fact Hong was denying the Hong Trust, and in circumstances Hong's status in the community was considerable and Ari and Kee were cognisant of that, their conduct is comprehensible. Further, on balance, when viewing the broader evidence of Kee and Ari against that of Hong's, their evidence is inherently more plausible within the mosaic of the evidence that has emerged as a whole. Finally, in this regard, I accept the Defendants' submission that, in any event, the backdating of the Share Option Agreement in 2020 does not directly impact the alleged formation of the Hong Trust in 2017. Therefore, while their evidence regarding the Share Option Agreement as originally given was false, I do not conclude that I must reject their evidence relating to this period more generally.
313 As such, in line with my observations above,[646] I decline to make findings that Kee and Ari's conduct in the latter part of 2020, whether relating to a share sale or share issue, is inherently inconsistent with the existence of the Alleged Oral Agreement. That agreement, as pleaded and particularised, is that Hong would hold 50% of Kegland's shares on trust for Kee and Ari and would 'transfer them to each of them, or at their direction' and that he would 'hold the shares until the issues with Maggie and MCH were over'.[647] Although misconceived in many regards, I consider that Kee and Ari's conduct in this period is consistent with them attempting to practically implement this transfer. In this regard, I note Kee's evidence that he was given advice from Elysium that they could not transfer the shares for 'zero dollars' from an 'accounting perspective' even though they would have 'like[d] to do that because we felt we owned the shares already'[648] and that I have found that Mr Amos raised with Kee, in the context of the transfer of Kegland shares, the prospect of capital gains tax liability in around late 2017. I also consider broadly relevant in this regard Kee's evidence, given in relation to the terms of the Partnership Agreement, that the Partnership Agreement was drafted for the 'simplicity of writing' and 'it didn't matter how we got there'.[649]
314 The threshold question is, as indicated previously, whether the Hong Trust arose as alleged.
315 It follows from the preceding reasons that if the Hong Trust did arise as alleged, the Kegland parties are entitled to a declaration that Kee and Ari are the beneficial owners of the shares in question.
316 On the other hand, if the Hong Trust did not arise as alleged, Kee and Ari were not entitled to engage in the conduct on which the Plaintiffs' claims rest. In these circumstances, the Plaintiffs would become entitled to orders the effect of which would set aside (1) the share issue; and (2) the appointment of Kee as a director of Kegland. However, the Defendants submit that this is the extent of the relief to which the Plaintiffs would become entitled. For the reasons which follow, I accept this submission as, in my view, a buyout order would not be required. Indeed, as contended by the Defendants, such an order would not serve the purposes for which s 233 of the Corporations Act exists.
317 On the basis of the evidence, which has been considered in detail in the preceding reasons, the Defendants provide in their submissions, a summary of evidentiary matters in respect of the threshold issue. On the basis of the matters discussed and reasons given in the course of consideration of the evidence and in the course of the evidentiary narrative and findings which have been set out, I accept, with one reservation, that the following summary provide an accurate statement as to the picture which emerges on the basis of these matters:[650]
(a) Having regard to the relevant circumstances surrounding 6 December 2017, the alleged trust is inherently plausible.
(b) An overwhelming body of contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the existence of the alleged trust.
(c) To the extent that contemporaneous documentary evidence shows that Hong's company is and was the beneficial owner of the shares in question (for example, ASIC records, share certificates, and credit applications), such documents came into existence after the formation of the trust. It is clear, therefore, that such documents were created as part of the scheme to hide the respective interests of Kee and Ari in Kegland Distribution. This was a scheme in which Hong actively participated.
(d) Hong has admitted the trust. In two cases, he made this admission to Ari. In other cases, looking at the messages of Jerry and Leon, it is clear that Hong admitted the trust to each of them.
(e) For a variety of reasons, the contrary case is inherently implausible and, as such, it requires more cogent evidence than might otherwise be required ... [see above, [23], referring to [31] of the Defendants' submissions]. There is no such cogent evidence.
- Paying close attention to the detailed narrative (see section F ['analysis of the evidence' in these reasons above), and paying close attention to the contemporaneous documents on which that narrative is based (see the extensive references in section F above), the following picture emerges:
(a) Contrary to his written evidence (Hong 1 at [17], [PSCB 5]), Hong did not establish the Kegland business.
(b) Prior to 6 December 2017, Hong had no involvement in the operation of the Kegland business. Similarly, he did not provide funds to Kegland Hardware, the owner and operator of that business.
(c) Hong was not involved in the establishment of Kegland Distribution. He had no say in the allocation of shares in that company.
(d) Hong's company and Sam became shareholders in Kegland Distribution. This happened because Kee and Ari controlled the allocation of shares. Indeed, the only reason that Kee and Ari decided to "decant" their nascent business from Kegland Hardware to Kegland Distribution was because of the way in which they wanted the shares held (viz, by others).
(e) Hong did not meet with or talk to Sam until 13 December 2017 (after incorporation of Kegland Distribution). As at 6 December 2017, Hong knew nothing about Sam, his experience in the brewing business, his abilities in IT, his suitability in acting as a company director, his wherewithal, the utility of the YouERP system, nor indeed anything else about him.
(f) The shares were not allocated to Hong's family company by reason of an investment of some sort. Neither Hong nor his family company made any investment in the Kegland Business or otherwise.
(g) Neither Kee nor Ari gifted shares to Hong's family company.
(h) Contrary to his written and oral evidence, Hong did not loan $100,000.00 to Kegland Distribution. Hong understood that the provision of such working capital would support his case in respect of the threshold issue. Hence, he maintained that he provided such funding, and he did so in the face of contemporaneous documents wholly inimical to this evidence.
(i) Nor did Hong lend $100,000.00 to Ari (which Hong suggested, for the first time, in cross‑examination).
(j) Hong did not play any significant role in the day‑today operation of the Kegland Business. But he did play an active role in the scheme to disguise the respective interests of Kee and Ari in the company (and, therefore, the Kegland business).
(k) In 2018, 2019 and 2020, Hong admitted the trust.
The reservation is with respect to the admission of the Hong Trust as, for the reasons set out previously, my view is that the evidentiary matters relied upon by the Defendants are, in accord with authority, to be regarded as evidence consistent with such a trust rather than properly characterised as admission of the same.[651] In any event, the outcome is in substance the same as I have accepted the evidence with respect to the creation of the Hong Trust.
318 Further, with respect to the Hong Trust, the Plaintiffs raise issues with respect to the establishment of the terms of such a trust and uncertainty to the extent that terms are said to be identified.[652] The requirements for the creation of a trust and relevant authorities have already been considered.[653] Critical is the position as made clear in Byrnes v Kendle,[654] that issues as to whether a trust has been created and on what terms is to be resolved according to the ordinary meaning of the words and actions the subject of relevant dealings between the parties and the circumstances affecting the relationship between them. Applying this approach, I have found that the evidence supports the alleged oral agreement, as contended by the Defendants.[655] This agreement clearly establishes the essential terms of the Hong Trust, with sufficient certainty and without the need for the implication of terms on the basis there were critical 'gaps' in the terms of the Trust.
319 The Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendants' case with respect to the Hong Trust fails because the shares were never the property of Kee and Ari.[656] This is said to be because prior to incorporation the shares did not exist as property[657] - as they were only created or born on incorporation. It is hardly controversial that there can be no trust of future property and neither is it controversial that equity may find an enforceable contract to institute a trust when the property emerges.[658] The technique of equity in this respect is addressed in the following commentary in On Equity:[659]
[10.370] From time to time, equitable jurisdiction is exercised in connection with transactions that involve future property. Future property is property which (a) is not yet in existence; or (b) is not yet owned by a party: Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson.[660]
A person cannot own, either at law or in equity, what does not exist.[661] Accordingly, the common law does not recognise an attempt by someone to deal with future property. Equity also takes this approach to future property: "[a] man cannot in equity, any more than at law, assign what has no existence."[662] However, while a transaction involving future property is "completely nugatory" at law,[663] equity affords it some recognition. Provided that (a) the property is sufficiently described so that it can be identified or ascertained at a future time; and (b) consideration is given, an agreement to assign future property operates as an agreement to assign the property when it is acquired by the assignor - that is, "the moment the property comes into existence the agreement operates upon it." Equity treats dealings with future property in this way because it considers the conscience of the assignor to be bound from the moment the assignment becomes possible, thus applying the maxim that equity regards what ought to be done as having been done. In Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Windeyer J said:
In equity a would‑be present assignment of something to be acquired in the future is, when made for value, construed as an agreement to assign the thing when it is acquired. A court of equity will ensure that the would‑be assignor performs this agreement, his conscience being bound by the consideration. The purported assignee thus gets an equitable interest in the property immediately the legal ownership of it is acquired by the assignor, assuming it to have been sufficiently described to have been then identifiable.
The result is that an equitable assignment takes place at the time it is capable of being assigned without the need for the assignor to do anything more. The principle applies not only to assignments of property, but also to the giving of charges and declarations of trust over future property.
What must be remembered is that equity does not permit the assignment of future property - it simply recognises an agreement to assign future property as soon as the assignor obtained title to that property. As Maitland explained:
[L]awyers easily slipped into the way of saying that in equity one could make an assignment of goods hereafter to be acquired though one could not do so at law. This was a compendious way of putting the matter and was not likely to deceive any equity lawyer.
320 It follows that having regard to the approach in equity to future property the Plaintiffs' contention that there could be no trust of the shares fails because the Alleged Oral Agreement which, on the evidence,[664] I have found to have been established provides the agreement whereby the future property, the shares, are readily identified and so would on their creation be impressed with the Hong Trust.
321 The Plaintiffs also made the point that the ASIC documents and register with respect to the shares do not support the existence of the Hong Trust as the non‑beneficial ownership of the shares was not identified. I do not, however, regard this point as significant or in any way determinative in the circumstances of the company and the shareholders. First, though the state of the ASIC register may be significant in some circumstances, here it is not in the context of the weight of evidence, as discussed, in support of the evidence of the Hong Trust. Secondly, to have registered the shareholding as other than as beneficially owed would be at odds with and would have been likely to negate the MCH ruse - as Maggie and MCH would, in all the circumstances, have been alerted to what the true position was as to Kee and Ari's involvement by a simple search of the ASIC register.[665] Thirdly, a court of equity, having found that the Hong Trust was created and that the shares were impressed with such a trust would not see this state of affairs undone by what, in context, is to be regarded as procedural or administrative provisions of the Corporations Act - and, in terms of maxims one might have regard to 'Equity looks to the intent rather than the form'[666] or, possibly, 'Equity will not permit a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud'.[667]
322 The Plaintiffs in their submissions resisted submissions by the Defendants that Hong admitted the existence of the Hong Trust.[668] Many of these submissions have already been considered, particularly in the analysis of the evidence. As I have indicated previously,[669] I regard the matters relied on by the Defendants[670] in this respect as evidence not inconsistent with the creation of the Hong Trust; but not matters properly characterised as an admission of its existence.
323 The Plaintiffs also contend that the evidence of events after the company was incorporated, principally in late 2020 and early 2021, suggest that the shares were not held in trust.[671] As discussed previously,[672] the authorities on the creation and construction of trusts and the question whether admissions against interest may go to the creation of a trust and decisions such as FAI Insurance Company Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd[673] indicate that the subsequent conduct of the parties is not relevant or admissible in this context. Hence it follows, both on general principles and having regard to these particular matters, that where it is found, as here, that the Hong Trust has been created subsequent conduct of the parties will not detract from this position unless it provides evidence of revocation of the trust.
324 In the present circumstances, I am of the opinion that none of the matters relied upon which are said to be inconsistent with the evidence of the Hong Trust could be regarded as such a revocation. Moreover, having regard to the circumstances of this matter, I think they are not properly characterised as inconsistent matters. Rather, in my view, these matters show the Defendants seeking to give effect to the Alleged Oral Agreement, as lay people unaware of the niceties and technicalities of the law and the means that lawyers would likely, and more appropriately, seek to enforce the Alleged Oral Agreement and the Hong Trust. Additionally, the Defendants' overwhelming concern to maintain the MCH ruse was clearly a very powerful factor in the steps they took - a concern which really drove the creation of the Hong Trust and certainly not a concern or factor inconsistent with that trust. Neither, for these reasons, do subsequent communications with third parties affect the position I have indicated.[674]
325 The Plaintiffs also submit that Sam was not a stand‑in director or shareholder of the company as is said to be evident in the arrangements he made with Kee and Ari, particularly in terms of the Partnership Agreement.[675] The evidence with respect to arrangements between Kee, Ari and Sam has already been considered.[676] In my opinion, none of the matters raised by the Plaintiffs in this respect detract from or are inconsistent with the existence of the Hong Trust. Moreover, it is accepted by the Plaintiffs that the Partnership Agreement and other matters relied on were events subsequent to the Alleged Oral Agreement and, consequently after the creation of the Hong Trust. For the reasons set out previously, I do not accept that these events, properly construed, could affect the finding that this trust was created and nor would they be regarded as evidence of revocation of this trust. Moreover, I am of the view that arrangements such as contained in the Partnership Agreement either go to matters and arrangements to take effect after resolution of the MCH dispute or for services and accounting software which Sam would provide in the meantime. None of these arrangements were inconsistent with the Alleged Oral Agreement or inconsistent with the Hong Trust - or, more generally, compromise or detract from Sam's 'stand‑in' capacities.
326 Finally, it is contended by the Plaintiffs that the Alleged Oral Agreement, hence the Hong Trust, is unenforceable as its purpose was to deceive MCH and, consequently the Defendants should be denied relief as they do not come to the Court with clean hands.[677] The relevance of an unclean hands defence (short of illegality) does, however, depend on the nature and basis of the relief sought, it being an equitable defence. In this case, I have accepted that the relief that the Defendants are seeking is not equitable relief and so this defence does not arise.[678]
327 For the preceding reasons, I am of the opinion that the evidence simply does not support the Plaintiffs' case in respect of the threshold issue. As discussed, at a very superficial level the ASIC searches support the Plaintiffs' case, some of the documents also provide superficial support. Nevertheless, these documents stemmed from the implementation of the scheme and were necessary products of that scheme, without which Hong would never have been involved in Kegland at all.
328 The following discussion of this issue proceeds on the basis that I had rejected the Hong Trust case on which the counterclaim rests. Consequently, having accepted the trust case as put by the Defendants, the discussion of this issue is only for the purpose of addressing possibly relevant issues in the event that this matter proceeds further. The Defendants accept that, in this scenario, the Plaintiffs would become entitled to orders setting aside (1) the share issue; and (2) the appointment of Kee as a director of Kegland.
329 The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs should in these circumstances be given no further relief than the 'setting aside' relief and, particularly, ought not be the beneficiary of a further order compelling Kee and Ari to purchase the first Plaintiff's shares in Kegland. For the reasons which follow, and having regard to the matters set out previously with respect to a nature of relief properly granted under s 233 of the Corporations Act, I am of the view that no such further order is necessary to remove any 'oppression'. Moreover, I accept, as also indicated in the reasons which follow, that were a purchase order to be made against Kee and Ari (or their family companies) requiring them to purchase the shares at a price beyond a nominal value, such an order would harm them, each of whom in this scenario is merely an employee of Kegland. As indicated in these reasons, there is no basis to inflict such an intrusive, and harmful, order in all the circumstances of this proceeding.
330 There is also the question which would have arisen had I thought it appropriate to grant an order for the purchase of the shares as to the value of the shares. For the reasons which follow I am of the opinion that the shares are, in the present circumstances, not of any significant value; although this would not appear to be the view of the Plaintiffs who pursued this proceeding on the basis of a determination to establish a beneficial entitlement to those shares.
No entitlement to relief pursuant to s 233 of the Corporations Act
331 As discussed previously, the purpose of the relief under s 233 of the Corporations Act is to bring to an end to the claimed oppression, and to do so by the least intrusive remedy available.[679]
332 As the Defendants emphasise, the Plaintiffs' primary relief all relates to financial remedies, whether damages or a buy‑out of the shares, but does not seek in any way to address the purpose of s 233 of the Corporations Act and, specifically, the task of removing the alleged oppression in the least intrusive manner. In my view, it is clear that if the Court found that Kee and Ari had no right to the shares, then what has taken place was not oppression by a fellow member or members of Kegland but, rather, an 'attempted coup'[680] by employees. Leaving to one side for the moment that such conduct does not fit within the broad purpose of s 233 - and the conduct on any analysis is not oppressive conduct by a member or members of company - the obvious solution to 'remedy' the position is for the Court to dismiss the counterclaim, meaning that Kee and Ari are not the beneficial owners of the relevant shares. As indicated previously, it necessarily follows that the appointment of Kee as a director and the share issue were not binding on Kegland and declarations to this effect can be made and the ASIC record amended to reflect this.
333 Not only does this course remove the 'oppression' - again, assuming that there can be oppression between an employer and employees - but this will mean that the Plaintiff has the benefit of two 'critical employees' operating the Kegland business for seven years. Any other 'remedy' would, in my view, not be aimed at curing any oppression, and would not be the least intrusive remedy available.
334 In relation to the valuation question, being a question relevant to the fixing of a purchase price for the purpose of an order requiring Kee and Ari to purchase the first Plaintiff's shares in Kegland, the Court has received detailed expert evidence from Mr George Kompos and Mr Owain Stone.
335 For the preceding reasons, I am of the view that the Court should adopt Mr Stone's valuation opinions in preference to the valuation opinions of Mr Kompos. More particularly, it emerged in cross‑examination that Mr Kompos did not conduct a market‑based valuation in accordance with his instructions and in accordance with the applicable accounting standards (viz. APES 225).[681] Initially, as the transcript shows, Mr Kompos was reluctant to accept that he had not conducted an arm's length, market valuation.[682] Ultimately, after the Court's intervention, Mr Kompos accepted what was plain.[683] Mr Kompos also accepted that, in preparing his valuations, he had not complied with APES 225.[684] In my view, such matters do, as contended by the Defendants, substantially undermine the opinions by Mr Kompos which were put forward as those of an independent expert whose first duty was to the Court. Other matters emerged in cross‑examination that undermine the opinions of Mr Kompos. By way of illustration, he failed to give any weight to key person and supplier‑related risks that Mr Stone identified, whether in his reports or in cross‑examination.[685]
336 Lastly, there was the question of the date of the valuation. Mr Stone valued the shares as at 30 June 2022. On that basis, the Plaintiffs invited the Court simply to ignore Mr Stone's opinions in their entirety.[686] What this information does, as submitted by the Defendants, is ignore completely the reasons why Mr Stone selected this valuation date.[687] In regard to these matters, Mr Stone valuation date should, in my view, be accepted.
337 For the preceding reasons, I am of the opinion that the threshold question is made out in favour of the Defendants and that, consequently, the shares in question were and are the subject of the Hong Trust in favour of Kee and Ari beneficially. Had the position been otherwise and the evidence established that Kee and Ari had no beneficial entitlement to the first Plaintiff's shares, the only necessary remedy required to remove the 'oppression' is the claimed 'setting aside' relief which would avoid the share issue and the appointment of Kee as a director of Kegland. Such relief would remove the claimed 'oppression' and so there is no basis for making an order that Kee and Ari purchase the shares. This assumes, however, that relief is available under s 233 of the Corporations Act in circumstances such as the present where neither Kee nor Ari were at any relevant time a member or members of Kegland, a position which, fundamentally, follows from the basis upon which the Plaintiffs' case has been put. It is not, however, necessary, given the position reached in these proceedings, to address this issue further.
338 It follows that orders will be made as sought by the Defendants (as the first and second plaintiffs by Counterclaim), save that the question of costs is reserved. The parties will be heard on the quantum of costs as required.
LL UP PTY LTD (ACN 620 485 994) ATF THE LL UP INVESTMENT TRUST
LL UP PTY LTD (ACN 620 485 994) ATF THE LL UP INVESTMENT TRUST
[1] Plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim dated 8 May 2024 (SOC), [1], [8] (PSCB‑211-213), Defendants' Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 13 May 2024 (DCC), [1], [8] (DSCB‑7-8).
[2] SOC [9-15], PSCB‑213-217; Plaintiffs' Second Further Amended Reply and Defence to Counterclaim dated 19 May 2024 (Reply), [8-14] (PSCB 760-764).
[3] DCC [8D(b)], [8E.2], [8E.3] (DSCB 11-14); and see Plaintiff's Amended Closing Submissions (16 August 2024), [48]-[49].
[4] The reference to "Maggie" refers to Maggie Hu (a director of MCH) and "MCH" refers to "MCH Australia Pty Ltd".
[5] DCC [8E.2], [8E.3] (DSCB 12-14).
[6] Defendants' Outline of Opening Submissions, [112].
[7] Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland parties) (12 August 2024), [5].
[8] In Re Petera Pty Limited v EAJ Pty Limited [1985] FCA 277; (1985) 7 FCR 375 at [17], Wilcox J referred to 'the old conundrum'. In that case, the respondents had kept two sets of restaurant accounts. These accounts were mutually inconsistent, and there was no dispute that the respondents had deceived the applicants (who received one set of accounts) or the ATO (who received information based on the other set of accounts). The fundamental question was which set of accounts was correct. Wilcox J resolved this question in favour of the respondents on the basis of their discovered documents showing actual takings of the restaurant (see [22] to [25]).
[9] Steinberg v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 63; (1975) 134 CLR 640, 694; Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363, [60]; and Timeless Sunrise Pty Ltd v BigJ Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 10) [2023] VSC 524, [288].
[10] Melbourne Orthopaedic Group Pty Ltd v Stamford Aus‑Trade & Press Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 150, [109] (Santamaria JA), a point with which the other members of the Court agreed.
[11] Eumeralla Estate Pty Ltd v Chen [2022] VSCA 78, [54].
[12] Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20; (1940) 63 CLR 691, 712.
[13] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-2. Section 140(2) of the Evidence Act is the statutory embodiment of the Briginshaw rule.
[14] [2019] FCA 1533, [17]-[18].
[15] See White v Woodward [2020] VSC 258, [14], per John Dixon J; 3 Apples Childcare Centre Pty Ltd v MMC Pacific International Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 21, [144]-[145] per M Osborne J.
[16] Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland parties) (12 August 2024), [22]-[39].
[17] Muyepa v The Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 2648, [11] (and the cases cited therein).
[18] Muyepa v The Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 2648, [11] (and the cases cited therein).
[19] For example, see Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20; (1940) 63 CLR 691, 712 and Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), [22].
[20] Jones v Birmingham City Council [2023] UKSC 27, [51].
[21] Maria Saravinovksa v Krste (Chris) Saravinovski; Chris Saravinovski v George Saravinovski (No 6) [2016] NSWSC 964, [467].
[22] Pell v The Queen [2019] VSCA 186, [56].
[23] Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78, [155]. Indeed, the court is not bound to accept or reject the evidence of a witness in its entirety: Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2000] FCA 1084; (2000) 103 FCR 1, [118].
[24] Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78, [155].
[25] King v Collins [2007] NSWCA 122, [44].
[26] [2007] EWHC 758 (Ch), [3].
[27] These indicators are also listed in Rancom Security Ltd v Girling & Ors [2023] EWHC 1115 (Ch), [33]. In the balance of these submissions, the defendants refer to these indicators as the 'Rancom indicators'.
[28] ASIC v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417; (2005) 216 ALR 320, [223]-[228].
[29] [2009] NSWSC 1229; (2009) 75 ACSR 1, [400].
[30] [2023] VSC 782, [669].
[31] Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253; Legal Services Board v Gillespie‑Jones [2013] HCA 35; (2013) 249 CLR 493, [119]; In re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust [1991] FCA 344; (1991) 30 FCR 491, 505; and Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 44; (1988) 165 CLR 107, 121.
[32] Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, [59].
[33] Twinsectra Limited v Yardley & Ors [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164, [71]; and Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Jolliffe [1920] HCA 45; (1920) 28 CLR 178 at 190-192 (Isaac J - in dissent on other grounds).
[34] Middleton v Pollock [1876] UKLawRpCh 9; (1876) 2 Ch D 104; Rose v Rose (1986) 7 NSWLR 679, 686; Hyhonie Holdings Pty Ltd v Leroy [2003] NSWSC 624.
[35] Consequently, the defendant contends that whilst the discussion between Ari and Hong is central to the trust issue, this was arguably merely the appointment of Hong as a trustee of an already constituted trust, which was created when Kee and Ari determined to (a) decant their nascent business (Kegland Hardware) into a yet to be incorporated vehicle, (b) as promoters, incorporate Kegland Distribution for that specific purpose and (c) put 100% of the soon to be established Kegland Distribution shares (future property) into Sam's name (later Sam and Hong's names). The evidence of Kee and Ari regarding their intention to create a trust was not challenged.
[37] Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, 286 per Heydon and Crennan JJ; and Braham Investments Pty Ltd v Wantrup [2018] VSCA 291, [279].
[38] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (16 August 2024), [226].
[39] [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, [49].
[41] Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, 272 [49].
[42] [2021] VSCA 78, [83].
[43] (2015) 255 CLR 62, [3]-[5].
[45] [2018] VSC 711, [824], [826], [828].
[46] Herdegen v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1988] FCA 419; (1988) 84 ALR 271 at 277. Accordingly, earlier dealings can explain the absence of express language or stipulations in subsequent dealings.
[47] Re Lamshed (deceased) [1970] SASR 224, 239.
[48] Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (in liquidation) & Anor (2000) 202 CLR 588, [34]; Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 44; (1988) 165 CLR 107, 121; and Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, 277, 288-290. As to the breadth or scope of relevant circumstances, the Kegland parties refer to Re Tresdar Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 179, [4]-[9] ('the Court may have regard to events which occurred after the alleged creation of a trust as either confirming or denying the existence of the trust' - at [9]). See also Trustees of the Property of Cummins v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278, [65]. As to the proposition stated in [230] of the plaintiff's submissions dated 26 July 2024, it is incorrect (see the cases cited in Re Tresdar Pty Ltd, for example), and the contents of [33] and [34] in Associated Alloys do not support this proposition.
[49] In re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust [1991] FCA 344; (1991) 30 FCR 491, 505-506.
[50] Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (in liquidation) & Anor (2000) 202 CLR 588, 605 [33], [34] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); referring to Kauter v Hilton [1953] HCA 95; (1953) 90 CLR 86, 100.
[52] [1996] UKHL 12; [1996] AC 669, 705.
[53] For example, see Palmer v Simmonds [1854] EngR 331; (1854) 61 ER 704, a case in which Kindersley VC upheld a trust in respect of a person's 'residuary estate at death'. See also Re Bowden [1936] Ch 71, a case in which a settlor settled any property to which she might become entitled upon the death of her father. Ultimately, the trustees received the settlor's interest under her father's will, and such property as received was impressed with the trusts contained in the earlier settlement.
[54] [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253, 286 [102], [103].
[56] FAI Insurance Company Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] VicRp 76; [1993] 2 VR 343, 351; see also Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407; (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 where Campbell JA analysed a number of cases concluding that subsequent conduct cannot be used to interpret a contract.
[57] [1988] FCA 419; (1989) 84 ALR 271, 276 [17].
[59] Australian Excecutor Trustees (SA) Ltd v Korda [2013] VSC 7, [93]-[95].
[60] [2023] VSCA 53, [137].
[61] [2022] HCA 34; (2022) 275 CLR 37, [93]-[94].
[62] In this context, the Kegland parties refer to Mantovani v Vanta Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] VSC 771, [108]-[112]. In this case, due to loss of the trust deed, it was impossible to ascertain the terms of trust. In these circumstances, McMillan J decided that the trust failed for uncertainty, in which case the trust property returned to the contributor.
[63] As to the ability to hold shares beneficially or non‑beneficially, see section 169(5A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
[64] See Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia [1978] HCA 42; (1978) 139 CLR 410.
[65] This being conduct undertaken to obscure Kee and Ari's involvement in Kegland from Maggie and MCH: See below, [186], [187] and [194].
[70] [2012] VSC 140, [33].
[71] Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (recvr app'td) v Baker [2010] VSC 59.
[73] Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (LBC 2009), 180-1 [3.320] (footnotes omitted).
[74] Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (LBC 2009),182 [3.340] (footnotes omitted).
[75] As to proposition (1), see Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318; 29 ER 1184, 320. As to proposition (2), see Meyers v Casey [1913] HCA 50; (1913) 17 CLR 90 and Black Uhlans Inc v NSW Crime Commission [2002] NSWSC 1060, [181].
[76] For example, see Tinsley v Milligan [1993] UKHL 3; [1994] 1 AC 340.
[77] [2008] EWHC 1748 (Comm) (Fiona Trust), [19].
[78] Cadman v Horner [1810] EngR 494; (1810) 18 Ves Jun 10; 34 ER 221.
[79] Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384, 397 per Lord Evershed MR.
[80] A‑G (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.
[81] Fiona Trust, [20]. In this paragraph, Andrew Smith J referred to the following authorities: (1) Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; (2) J Willis Son v Willis [1986] EGLR 62; and (3) Gonthier v Orange Contract Scaffolding Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 873.
[82] Lodge v National Union Investment Co Ltd [1906] UKLawRpCh 161; [1907] 1 Ch 300; Chapman v Michaelson [1908] UKLawRpCh 141; [1909] 1 Ch 238; Langman v Handover [1929] HCA 42; (1929) 43 CLR 334; and Mayfair Trading Co v Dreyer [1958] HCA 55; (1958) 101 CLR 428 (Mayfair Trading).
[83] Mayfair Trading, 450; AWB Ltd v Cole and Anor (No 2) [2006] FCA 913; (2006) 233 ALR 453, [45]; and XX v WW [2014] VSC 564, [45].
[84] Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106, 259; Mayfair Trading, 454.
[85] Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland parties) (12 August 2024), [75].
[86] AWB Ltd v Cole and Anor (No 2) [2006] FCA 913; (2006) 233 ALR 453, [45], [46] (Young J).
[87] Kathleen Investments (Australia) Ltd v Australian Atomic Energy Commission [1977] HCA 55; (1977) 139 CLR 117.
[89] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (16 August 2024), [342]-[348].
[90] Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334, 356.
[94] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, 330-331 [59]-[65].
[95] [2007] NSWSC 161; (2007) 61 ACSR 144, 184-185 [110], 186 [116], 187 [121], [124]; [2007] NSWSC 161; 25 ACLC 302, 340, 341, 342.
[96] United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (1945) Cmd 6659, p 95, Recommendation II.
[97] United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (1945) Cmd 6659, p 30 [60] in which the Committee recommended that the discretion be unfettered as it would be impossible to lay down a general guide to the solution of essentially individual cases.
[98] Companies Act 1958 (Vic), s 94, Companies Act 1931 (Qld), s 379A, Companies Act 1959 (Tas), s 128.
[99] The latter uncertainty appears to have been generated by the definition of 'oppressive' as 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful' in Scottish Co‑operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at 342 per Viscount Simonds. See United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749 (the Jenkins Committee), [203].
[100] United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749, [204], invoking and agreeing with a 'fair dealing' and 'fair play' statement enunciated by Lord Cooper in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd (1952) SC 49, 55.
[101] The history and operation of s 320 were briefly discussed by Brennan J in Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd [1985] HCA 68; (1985) 180 CLR 459, 470-471. The need for caution in the section's application, in order to avoid unwarranted assumption of management responsibilities, was mentioned by Mason A‑CJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 467.
[102] Australia, House of Representatives, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum, [6.132]. See also Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, 359, 360 [172]-[177] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Keifel JJ).
[103] [2023] VSC 589, [79]-[80](Croft J).
[104] Campbell v BackOffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95, [120].
[105] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95, [122] (Giles JA); see also BAM Property Group Pty Ltd as trustee for BAM Property Trust v Imoda Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1192, 89; Re a Company No 002612 of 1984122; Rankine v Rankine (1995) 18 ACSR 725; Smith Martis Cork & Rajan Pty Ltd and Others v Benjamin Corporation Pty Ltd; Shirim Pty Ltd v Fesena Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 10; United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd and Ors [2003] NSWSC 910; (2003) 47 ACSR 514; Vadori v AAV Plumbing [2010] NSWSC 274, Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304; 83 ALJR 903; 73 ACSR 1; 257 ALR 610; [2009] HCA 25, [180]-[182]. Re Hollen Australia Pty Ltd [2009] VSC 95, [87], citing Re Cumana [1986] BCLC 430 and Re a Company [1985] UKHL 11; (1986) 2 BCC 99,453.
[106] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 25 (French CJ at [68]-[72]; Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ at [182]) adopting the approach of Giles JA in the Court of Appeal).
[107] [2017] VSC 14; (2017) 53 VR 520, 530.
[109] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95; (2008) 66 ACSR 359, 386-387 [120]-[123].
[110] KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 712; (2015) 110 ACSR 379, [27].
[111] Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd [2016] FCAFC 133, [13].
[112] See Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland Parties) (12 August 2024), [82].
[113] Wayde v NSWRL Ltd [1985] HCA 68; (1985) 180 CLR 459, 468, 472-3; Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692, 704; and Hillam v Ample Source International Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 73; (2012) 202 FCR 336, [4].
[114] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, [176].
[115] Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55, [9].
[116] Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited [2016] FCAFC 133, [14].
[117] Strategic Management Australia AFL Pty Ltd v Precision Sports & Entertainment Group Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 303; (2016) 114 ACSR 1, [147].
[118] Smith Martis Cork & Rajan Pty Ltd v Benjamin Corp Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 153; (2004) 207 ALR 136, [105].
[119] Walker v New South Wales Bar Association [2016] FCA 799, [91].
[120] Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210, [136]; Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158, [139].
[121] Joint v Stephens [2008] VSCA 210, [138].
[122] Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited [2016] FCAFC 133, [12].
[123] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, [176].
[124] Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, [251].
[125] Spence v Rigging Rentals WA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1158, [137], citing Re Norvabron Pty Ltd (No 2) (1986) 11 ACLR 279, 289.
[126] Aqua‑Max Pty Ltd v MT Associates Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 104; (2001) 3 VR 473, [61]; Endoline Pty Ltd v Drapac [2012] VSC 156, [272]; and Zomojo Pty Ltd v Hurd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1458; (2012) 299 ALR 621, [509].
[127] Strategic Management Australia AFL Pty Ltd v Precision Sports & Entertainment Group Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 303; (2016) 114 ACSR 1, [147].
[128] Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Limited v Australian Institute of Fitness (Vic/Tas) Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1639; (2015) 109 ACSR 369, [82] (AIF).
[129] See Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland Parties) (12 August 2024), [83].
[130] KGD Investments Pty Ltd v Placard Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 712; (2015) 110 ACSR 379, [31]; and Corbett v Corbett Court Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1176; (2015) 109 ACSR 296, [127].
[132] [2017] VSC 14; (2017) 53 VR 520, 530.
[133] See Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland Parties) (12 August 2024), [84].
[134] Fedorovitch v St Aubins Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 776; (1999) 17 ACLC 1558, [4] (Young J).
[135] Fedorovitch v St Aubins Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 776; (1999) 17 ACLC 1558, [2].
[136] R. P. Austin & I. M. Ramsay, LexisNexis Butterworths, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, 109 [10.490].
[138] [1999] NSWSC 776; (1999) 17 ACLC 1558, [8], [9].
[141] (2004) FCAFC 153; 207 ALR 136, [71]-[77]; and see above, [22].
[142] [2019] FCA 1533, [17]-[18].
[144] For example, see: White v Woodward [2020] VSC 258, [14]; Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [10].
[146] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [38]-[47].
[148] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [215] and [224].
[149] For example, when asked about his understanding of a WeChat message sent to him by Leon, Hong first responded that he could not know what Leon was thinking and then, when pressed, would only answer that the translations of the messages were correct: T218/3-9 (XXN of Hong).
[150] For example: in being questioned regarding the MCH proceeding, Hong gave evidence that there were possibly five separate proceedings on foot because there were multiple parties involved: T331-332 (XXN of Hong).
[151] For example: when asked why he did not refer to certain transactions in his witness statements, Hong provided a rambling response about how his company was a body corporate: T214/15-31 (XXN of Hong).
[152] For example: when asked about a WeChat message where Hong replied 'yes' to a question from Leon about whether it was the case that Ari 'had transferred RMB500,00 [sic] to Liu in China for this A$100,000', Hong asked for the question to be clarified on several occasions, including asking 'When you say that I'm qualified to answer, what do you mean by that?': T221/20-31 (XXN of Hong).
[153] For example, in his witness statement dated 2 September 2022, at paragraph [21] (PSCB 6) he gave evidence that Kee and Ari informed him in late 2017 or early 2018 that they were willing to work for free at Kegland and then at paragraphs [46]-[50] (PSCB 10-11) that Kee and Ari entered into employment contracts dated 1 January 2018 under which they were paid $55,000 per annum.
[154] For example, in his witness statement dated 2 September 2022, at paragraph [43]-[45] (PSCB 10) Hong addresses the $100,000 transferred into the Kegland bank account but did not refer to any of the WeChat communications between him, Ari and Wang Jing in China (see: CB1561-1566).
[156] See, for example: Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [194] and [327]-[328].
[157] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [194] and [309]-[311].
[158] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [281]-[303].
[160] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [194] and [225]-[266].
[161] For example, Leon gave a series of responses stating he was unable to recall matters, or form a view on matters, relating to simple matters concerning a conversation he had with Ari ahead of a meeting in November 2017 and that meeting: T411-412 (XXN of Leon).
[162] For example, in the context of questions regarding a Fight the Landlord message he sent about Hong being the only director of Kegland living in Australia, he failed to accept that the only reason he raised this was because he knew there was a non‑resident director, being Sam: T524-528 (XXN of Leon).
[163] For example, in the context of Fight the Landlord messages between him and Jerry regarding whether Ari had paid RMB500,000 for the AUD$100,000 deposited by Hong in the Kegland bank account, Leon was not willing to accept the two transactions were linked and suggested it was unclear who owed who money: T484-489 (XXN of Leon).
[164] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [225], [229] and [243]-[244].
[165] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [195] relying on CB 346-353 and T478-479 (XXN of Leon).
[169] [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), [19]; referred to previously in the statement of Lee J in Webb v Getswift (No 5) [2019] FCA 1533, [18]; see above, [22].
[170] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [223].
[171] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [267]-[274]; See above, [24].
[173] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [275]-[281].
[174] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [282]-[285].
[175] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [15] and [37].
[176] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [15].
[177] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [12]-[13].
[178] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [16]-[21].
[179] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [22]-[29] and [33]-[35].
[180] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [30]-[33]; matters addressed in more detail below, [186].
[181] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [36].
[182] C.f Muyepa v The Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 2648, [11] (and the cases cited therein).
[183] Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78, [155].
[184] Maria Saravinovksa v Krste (Chris) Saravinovski; Chris Saravinovski v George Saravinovski (No 6) [2016] NSWSC 964, [467].
[186] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [288]-[289].
[187] T1173-1176; Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [12]-[13].
[188] For example: T1181/13-17 (XXN of Mr Amos).
[189] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022) [10]-[12]; CB 526-527.
[190] Later switching to the importation of clothing: Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [12]; DSCB 500.
[191] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [10]-[11]; DSCB 500.
[192] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [13]; DSCB 500.
[193] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [14]-[16]; DSCB 500-501;See also: Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [16] and [19]; DSCB 546-547.
[194] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [19]; DSCB 501; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [17]; DSCB 547.
[195] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [19]; DSCB 501; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [22]-[23]; DSCB 548.
[196] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [22]; DSCB 502; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [22]; DSCB 548.
[197] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [24]; DSCB 502; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [24]-[25]; DSCB 548.
[198] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [20]-[21]; DSCB 501; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [21]; DSCB 547-548.
[199] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [56]-[58]; DSCB 554.
[200] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [10]-[12]; PSCB 4.
[201] See: Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [72].
[202] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [25]-[26]; DSCB 502; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [24]-[25]; DSCB 548.
[203] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [27]-[29]; DSCB 502-503.
[204] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [26]-[29]; DSCB 548-549.
[205] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [91].
[207] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [30]-[31]; DSCB 503; CB 1171-1174.
[209] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [31]-[35]; DSCB 549-550; Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [31]-[32]; DSCB 503-504.
[210] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [34]-[35]; DSCB 504; CB 1968-1969.
[211] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [36]; DSCB 504; See also: Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [36]; DSCB 550.
[213] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [41]; DSCB 551; Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [41]; DSCB 505.
[214] Witness statement of David Amos (dated 9 November 2022) [8]-[11]; DSCB 621-622.
[216] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [43]-[44]; DSCB 552; Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [44]-[45]; DSCB 506.
[217] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [81]-[85]; DSCB 560-561.
[218] For example, see: Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [48]; DSCB 552.
[220] CB 1202; Oliver's timesheet records hours worked in the latter half of November 2017: CB 1313.
[226] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [62]-[63]; DSCB 509.
[227] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [64]; DSCB 509.
[228] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [65]; DSCB 509.
[229] CB 1307-1309; See below [202].
[230] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [49]-[50] and [62]-[68]; DSCB 506-507 and 509-510.
[231] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [23]-[26]; DSCB 609-610.
[232] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [70]; DSCB 510.
[233] Witness statement of David Amos (dated 9 November 2022) [15] and [17]; DSCB 623- 624; CB 1317-1318.
[234] Witness statement of David Amos (dated 9 November 2022) [23]; DSCB 624.
[235] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [72]; DSCB 511.
[236] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [73]; DSCB 511.
[237] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [71] and [76]; DSCB 511.
[238] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [74]; DSCB 511.
[239] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [60]; DSCB 555; Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [4]; PSCB 5.
[240] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [4]; PSCB 5; Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [6]; PSCB 22.
[241] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [60]; DSCB 555.
[243] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [8]; PSCB 23.
[246] Reply Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 30 June 2023) [4] and [5]; CB 666.
[247] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [91].
[248] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [111].
[250] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [117].
[251] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [119].
[252] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [121]-[122].
[253] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [129].
[255] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [49].
[256] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [54]-[55].
[258] For example, see: T195/17-25 (XXN of Hong).
[259] See above, [23] (Proposition 8).
[262] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [67]-[69]; DSCB 556.
[263] T693/2731, 694/1-31, T695/1-31 and T696/1-4 (XXN of Ari).
[264] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Riu Liu (dated 26 April 2023), [19]-[22]; PSCB 25.
[265] T239/27-31, 240/1-24, T245/10-31 and T246/1-12 (XXN of Hong)
[268] CB 1322. Noting, the translation at CB 1341 erroneously states these audio messages were sent on 5 December.
[283] CB 1376 (See: CB 1375 for Sam's consent to become a member).
[287] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [58], [61] and [240].
[288] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [63] and [65].
[289] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [66] and [68].
[290] T194/24-31 and T195/1-25 (XXN of Hong).
[291] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [133]-[136].
[292] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [69] and [72].
[294] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [149].
[296] T248/28-31 and T249/1-3 (XXN of Hong).
[297] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [140]-[141] and [150].
[299] As matters eventuated, in early 2018 Kegland required further capital and Ari gave $10,000 to Sam in cash, who deposited the money in the Kegland bank account on 5 and 8 January 2018. This money is recorded as a loan from Sam in the Kegland financial statements: Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [122]; DSCB 568; Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [45]; DSCB 614; CB 3879.
[300] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [107]; DSCB 565-566.
[301] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [108]; DSCB 566.
[302] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [109]; DSCB 566.
[303] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [42]; PSCB 10.
[304] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [20]; PSCB 5.
[305] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [36]; PSCB 29.
[306] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [37]; PSCB 29-30.
[307] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [39]; PSCB 30.
[312] CB 1523. Wang Jing was an employee at one of Hong's family companies in China and Ari did not know her: T208/14-23 (XXN of Hong).
[325] CB 873. For example, see also for 2019: CB 2925.
[326] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [167].
[327] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [216].
[328] T1548/16-31, 1549/1-31 and T1550/1-31 (XXN of Hong).
[330] Relying on T744/1-22 which involved a series of exchanges between counsel for the plaintiffs and Ari concerning whether, where a person borrows money from a bank and uses that money is used to pay a debt it is the borrower's money or the bank's money.
[332] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [125].
[334] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [125].
[336] [2023] VSC 782 at [669].
[337] ASIC v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; (2009) 75 ACSR 1 at [400].
[339] C.f. Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403 at 431; Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1, 57.
[340] [2023] VSC 782 at [669].
[341] This finding applies equally to the record of the $10,000 loan from Sam, see footnote to 288 to [156] above.
[342] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [79]; DSCB 559.
[343] Reply Witness Statement of Leon Yang (dated 26 April 2023) [18]; PSCB 87.
[344] C.f Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) at [19].
[345] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [89]; DSCB 514.
[346] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [93]; DSCB 562.
[347] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [100]-[105]; DSCB 563-564.
[348] The total number of emails sent by Hong is unclear, Hong's evidence is that he sent as least 10 emails himself: Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [52]; PSCB 33.
[349] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [105]; DSCB 564-565.
[351] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [37]; PSCB 8.
[352] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [53]-[54]; PSCB 33.
[354] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [33]-[34]; DSCB 610-611.
[355] T200/16-31 and 201/1-5 (XXN of Hong).
[356] T258/25-31 and 259/1-6 (XXN of Hong).
[359] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [130]; DSCB 569; CB 1677-1678.
[360] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [104]; DSCB 516.
[361] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [105]; DSCB 517.
[362] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [106]; DSCB 516.
[363] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [108]-[119]; DSCB 516-517.
[364] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [110]; DSCB 518.
[365] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [135]-[143]; DSCB 570-572.
[367] T1066/25-31 and T1067/1-13 (XXN of Kee).
[369] The terms of the Partnership Agreement provide that Sam was to retain 10% shareholding in the company after transferring the other 40% of his shares to Ari and Kee after holding them for 12 months: CB 1307.
[370] T1072/30-31 and T1073/1-25 (XXN of Kee).
[371] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [146]-[148]; DSCB 572-573.
[372] T701/23-31 and T702/1-3 (XXN of Ari).
[373] T724/14-31 and T725/1-5,24-26 (XXN of Ari).
[374] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [40]-[42]; DSCB 613.
[376] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [45]; PSCB 32.
[377] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [46]-[48]; PSCB 32.
[378] It is not evident from the email whether it was sent to the Hong alias account or some other of Hong's email accounts.
[381] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [31].
[382] T1079/5-15 (XXN of Kee); Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [30]-[33].
[383] See, for example: T 703/30-31 and 704/1-12.
[385] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [99].
[386] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [75]. And see above from [71]; below from [291].
[387] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [76]-[77].
[388] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [78].
[389] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [80]-[84] and [87].
[390] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [86]-[87] and [94].
[391] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [89]. And see below [294](a)-(h).
[392] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [282]-[285].
[394] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [287].
[395] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [315].
[398] T1412/29-31 and T1413/1-12 (XXN of Sam).
[400] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [316].
[401] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [314].
[404] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [95]-[101].
[406] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [119]-[121]; DSCB 519.
[407] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [122]-[127]; DSCB 520.
[408] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [161]; DSCB 575.
[409] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [152]-[160]; DSCB 573-575.
[410] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [152]-[174]; PSCB 54-62.
[411] For example: CB 1323-1324, 2015.
[419] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [32]; DSCB 611; CB 1307-1309; T701/23-27 (XXN of Ari).
[420] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [68]; DSCB 510; CB 1156-1160.
[422] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [46]; DSCB 614.
[423] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [152]; DSCB 573.
[425] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [163]-[165]; DSCB 576.
[427] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [180].
[428] For example, see: CB 2086-2087 and 2109.
[429] See: paragraph 57(b) of MCH's ASOC - Not shown in Tender List but a Court document nonetheless.
[431] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [106]-[115].
[432] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [112].
[435] T733/14-22, 789/20-31 and T790/1-24 (XXN of Ari); T971- 979 (XXN of Kee).
[436] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [181].
[437] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [181].
[439] For example, see the exchange from T300 to T312, particularly T309/11-31 to T312/1-26.
[440] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [139]-[145], [148], [150]-[151]; DSCB 522-525.
[441] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [65]-[66] and [77]; PSCB 13 and 15; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [219]; DSCB 585.
[442] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [129]-[133]; Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [182].
[443] The parties' submissions made some errors in the attribution of the sequence and author of these messages. In the following passages setting out the submissions, I have adopted what I understand to be actual message being referred to.
[445] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [201]-[202]; DSCB 580-581.
[450] T290/27-31 and T291/1-7 (XXN of Hong).
[452] T291/28-31, T292/1-18 and T293/15-20 (XXN of Hong).
[454] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [295]-[308].
[455] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [68].
[456] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [309]-[311].
[457] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [249].
[459] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [242]-[245].
[460] See: Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), strike through of [299].
[461] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [246]-[247].
[463] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [251].
[464] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [249].
[465] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [252].
[467] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [252] citing T285/17-31 and T286/1-24 (XXN of Hong).
[468] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [253]-[254].
[471] See also, [317]; and see [132]-[150].
[472] See for example: Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [186]; Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [118]; Although, Hong took issue with the evidence of Kee and Ari on this point to the extent that their evidence failed to state that the Authority authorised Stephen Earl to settle the proceeding in accordance with his instructions, as well as otherwise on terms and conditions that Mr Earl considered appropriate: Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [72]; PSCB 38.
[474] Witness statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [138]; DSCB 522; Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [194]; DSCB 579; CB 3759-3769, 3793-3795, 3840-3841 and 3880.
[475] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [189]-[193]; DSCB 579.
[476] Witness statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [193]; DSCB 579.
[477] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [70]-[72]; PSCB 38.
[479] CB 3435; Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [72]-[75]; PSCB 38-39.
[480] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [189].
[481] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [119].
[484] T330/23-31 and T331/1-27 (XXN of Hong).
[486] T341/12-31 and T342/1-26 (XXN of Hong).
[488] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [294], [313] and [316].
[489] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [222] and [317].
[490] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [313]-[314].
[491] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [256]-[258].
[492] DSCB 12; Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [255].
[493] See, for example: T339/30-31 and T340/1-5 (XXN of Hong).
[495] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024), [233]-[237]; DSCB 587; Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [163]-[166], DSCB 527-528.
[497] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [107]; PSCB 45.
[498] T350/3-31 and T351/1-5 (XXN of Hong).
[499] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [206].
[500] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [137]-[141].
[503] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [160]; DSCB 526; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [233]; DSCB 587.
[506] Sangha v Baxter [2009] NSWCA 78, [155]; Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2000] FCA 1084; (2000) 103 FCR 1, [118].
[509] The Plaintiffs contrast this to the position of Sam who signed the indemnity document with Ari and Kee.
[510] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [135]-[136].
[511] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [217].
[512] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [31]; PSCB 7.
[516] T368/26-31 and T369/1-31 (XXN of Hong).
[518] T449/30-31 and T450/1-4 (XXN of Leon).
[519] T451/3-8 (XXN of Leon). Also see: T450/6-31.
[523] T466/25-31 and T467/1-7 (XXN of Leon).
[524] T489/7-9 (XXN of Leon). See also: T482-490 and T502.
[525] T508/24-31 and T509/1 (XXN of Leon).
[526] T510/16-17 and T513/ 5-8 (XXN of Leon).
[528] T519/21 and T520/1-5 (XXN of Leon).
[529] T520/6-16 (XXN of Leon). See also: T521-522.
[530] T521/23-31 and T522/1-7 (XXN of Leon).
[535] See, for example: T581/3-21 (XXN of Leon).
[536] T581/22-29 (XXN of Leon). And see below, [279]-[280].
[537] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [199].
[538] In this regard the Fight the Landlord messages were the subject of a protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful, privilege claim. The Defendants also contend the fact that the Fight the Landlord messages were intended by Hong to be private is to be contrasted against other communications which the parties knew, and where drafted on the basis they, may be seen by MCH.
[539] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [318]. The Defendants also submit that Hong and Leon intentionally sought to mislead the Court in circumstances where they did not anticipate the messages would come to light.
[540] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [196].
[541] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [197] and [198].
[542] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [320]-[323].
[543] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [21]; PSCB 6.
[544] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [324]-[326]; Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 2 September 2022) [28]; PSCB 7.
[545] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [142], [263]-[265].
[546] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [263].
[547] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [265].
[548] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [266]-[271].
[549] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [268]; T218-221 (XXN of Hong).
[550] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [271].
[551] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [275]-[276].
[552] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [277]-[280].
[553] C.f Herdegen v FCT [1988] FCA 419; (1989) 84 ALR 271, 276 [17].
[555] Witness Statement of Ari Lui (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [240]; DSCB 589; Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [167]; DSCB 528.
[559] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [170]-[171]; DSCB 529; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [244]; DSCB 590.
[560] Reply Witness Statement of Leon Yang (dated 23 April 2020) [37]; PSCB 91.
[561] Kee's evidence was that he recalled Ari telling him of this conversation: Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [171]; DSCB 529.
[562] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [252]; DSCB 591-592.
[563] Reply Witness Statement of Leon Yang (dated 23 April 2023) [41]; PSCB [42].
[566] See, for example: Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [172]-[186]; DSCB 529-530.
[567] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [177]-[180]; DSCB 530-531; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [262]-[267]; DSCB 594.
[569] Witness Statement of David Amos (dated 9 November 2022) [35]-[38]; DSCB 626- 627; CB 4247-4248.
[570] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [185]-[187]; DSCB 532; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [49]-[50]; DSCB 614.
[571] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [274]-[276]; DSCB 596-597; Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [188]-[191]; DSCB 532.
[577] Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [53]; DSCB 615.
[578] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [144].
[581] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [180]-[185].
[582] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [194].
[583] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [182].
[584] T1011/15-24 (XXN of Kee) and T1425/26-31 (XXN of Sam).
[585] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [183].
[586] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [186]-[193].
[587] Such as, for example, regarding whether Hong bought a bouncy castle to the party (T908-909) or the timing of his arrival at the party or whether there was a microphone at the party (T1105-1106).
[589] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [222]-[238]; DSCB 540-542.
[590] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [315]-[319]; DSCB 604-605; Witness Statement of Sam Jum Lie (dated 10 November 2022, revised 13 May 2024) [62]-[64]; DSCB 617-618.
[616] T993/2-8 and 31-31, T994/1-28 (XXN of Kee).
[619] T1083/31-31 and T1084/1-31 (XXN of Kee).
[622] T1446/22-31 and T1447/1-13 (XXN of Sam). And see above, [294] (n)-(o).
[623] T1412/29-31 and T1413/1-12 (XXN of Sam).
[624] Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [296]-[300]; DSCB 600.
[625] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [203]-[209]; DSCB 535-536.
[626] Reply Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [144]-[149]; PSCB 53-54.
[634] Witness Statement of Hong Rui Liu (dated 26 April 2023) [150]; PSCB 54.
[635] Witness Statement of Kee Doery (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [215]; DSCB 528; Witness Statement of Ari Luo (dated 10 November 2022, revised 12 May 2024) [310]; DSCB 603.
[637] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [203].
[638] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [196]-[202].
[640] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [89]-[94].
[641] See, for example: Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [164]-[174]; T991/1-4.
[642] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [150]-[162].
[643] See above [186], [187] and [194].
[644] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [267]-[270],[272](c), [275]-[278].
[645] Closing Submissions of the 2nd to 5th Defendants (dated 12 August 2024), [282]-[285].
[650] Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland parties) (dated 12 August 2024), [332], [333].
[651] See above, [40], [230] and [245].
[652] Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [45]-[240].
[654] [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253; and see above, [30].
[655] See above, [317]; and see [132]-[150].
[656] Plaintiffs' Closing Submissions, [233].
[657] Citing in support of this proposition: FCT v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 4; (1981) 146 CLR 336, 427; and Pilmer v Duke Group [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR 165, 179, [20] (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Aicken and Callinan JJ).
[658] See PW Young, CE Croft and ML Smith On Equity (Law Book Co, 2009), 396 [6.200].
[659] PW Young, CE Croft and ML Smith On Equity (Law Book Co, 2009), 718 [10.370].
[660] [1951] HCA 6; (1951) 82 CLR 477 at 484.
[661] Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 21; (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 24.
[662] Collyer v Isaacs [1881] UKLawRpCh 236; (1881) 19 Ch D 342 at 351 (CA).
[663] Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson [1951] HCA 6; (1951) 82 CLR 477 at 484.
[664] See above, [317]; and see [132]-[150].
[665] A concern evident in the matters referred to in the Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [328].
[666] Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (LBC 2009), 186-9 [3.410]-[3.440].
[667] Young, Croft and Smith, On Equity (LBC 2009), 194-7 [3.510]-[3.550].
[668] See Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [304]-[310].
[669] See above, [230]; and also [38]-[40].
[670] Including the matters set out in the Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [236]-[241].
[671] See Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [218]-[223] and [311]-[317].
[674] See Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [327]-[328].
[675] See Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [318]-[326]; and see also [327]-[328] (and above, [323], [324]).
[676] See above, [121]-[128] and [202]-[210] particularly.
[677] See Plaintiffs' Amended Closing Submissions (dated 16 August 2024), [329]-[336].
[680] Closing Submissions of the 2nd - 5th Defendants (the Kegland parties) (12 August 2024), [340].
[682] T1271-1279; "That could be correct" at T1271/29.
[686] Plaintiffs' Closing Submissions (26 July 2024), [369].
[687] Expert Report of Owain Stone, s 1.6; CB 797-798; and s 4.1 of the Joint Report, DSCB 692.
LL UP Pty Ltd
Kegland Distribution Pty Ltd [2024] VSC 651
(2005) 216 ALR 320
(2011) 243 CLR 253
(2001) 207 CLR 165
(1962) 109 CLR 9
(1985) 160 CLR 548
(1988) 18 NSWLR 540
(1984) 155 CLR 242
(1978) 139 CLR 410
(1995) 132 ALR 133
(1990) 20 NSWLR 588
(1985) 7 FCR 375
(1975) 134 CLR 640
(2004) 220 CLR 363
(1940) 63 CLR 691
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2000) 103 FCR 1
(2013) 249 CLR 493
(1991) 30 FCR 491
(1988) 165 CLR 107
(1920) 28 CLR 178
(1986) 7 NSWLR 679
(2015) 255 CLR 62
(1988) 84 ALR 271
(2000) 202 CLR 588
(2006) 227 CLR 278
(1953) 90 CLR 86
(2009) 76 NSWLR 603
(1989) 84 ALR 271
(2022) 275 CLR 37
(1913) 17 CLR 90
(1929) 43 CLR 334
(1958) 101 CLR 428
(2006) 233 ALR 453
(1977) 139 CLR 117
(1999) 198 CLR 334
(2009) 238 CLR 304
(1985) 180 CLR 459
(2017) 53 VR 520
(2012) 202 FCR 336
(2004) 207 ALR 136
(2001) 3 VR 473
(2012) 299 ALR 621
(1981) 146 CLR 336
(1951) 82 CLR 477