… In my judgment, the 'proper price' is the price which the court in its discretion determines to be proper having regard to all the circumstances of the case."
14 In the application of this principle, the Court treats the order for the purchase of the shares as a means by which the minority shareholder is compensated for the oppression which has occurred. Thus, in Re Bagot Well Pastoral Company Pty Ltd; Shannon v Reid (1992) 11 ACLC 1, Cox J ordered that shares be valued on the footing of revised annual accounts and on certain assumptions, the adoption of which would put the shareholder in the position that the shareholder would have been in had the oppression not occurred. Another example is that a court may value a minority shareholding not on the basis that the minority shareholding would bring on the open market but on the minority holding's proportion of the total net asset value of the company. See In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] Ch 419; In re London School of Electronics Ltd [1985] 3 WLR 474. Moreover, although valuations usually occur as at the date of the commencement of the proceedings, other dates may be selected if to do so will exclude the financial effects of the oppressive conduct complained of. In Re O C (Transport) Services Ltd [1984] BCLC 251, it was held that the valuation should be made at a date earlier than the date of the petition, at the date when the unfair prejudice had occurred. In In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd, the valuation was made as at the date of the order that the shares be purchased. In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd (1971) 1 WLR 1042, the assets were valued as at the date of the Master's certificate.
15 In Coombs v Dynasty Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 915, these principles were discussed and applied by von Doussa J. At p 917, his Honour said that, "The Court must fix a price that represents a fair value in all the circumstances of the case" and that, "In the valuation exercise the oppressive conduct and the effects which it may have had on the value of the shares is to be disregarded". The principles were again discussed and affirmed on appeal in Dynasty Pty Ltd v Coombs (1995) 59 FCR 122.
16 On the basis of these principles and the events which had happened, counsel for Shirim and Dr Smith submitted before the Master that there was an estoppel in their favour resulting from the consent order that had been made on 14 March 1996 and the formation by the Court of an opinion that oppression had occurred. It was submitted that, as the Court had read the three affidavits of Dr Smith, the oppression found by the Court was necessarily explained in those affidavits. Counsel submitted that the defendants were estopped from denying that such oppression had occurred. Counsel asked for an order valuing the shares as at 30 June 1986, which, in counsel's submission, was a date before the oppressive conduct had reduced the value of Shirim's shares and units.
17 In the reference, the Master rejected the tender of Dr Smith's three affidavits as "artefacts", holding that he would not look at those affidavits to determine what was the oppression which the defendants were estopped from denying. The Master appears to have treated the consent orders of 14 March 1996 as having no effect other than to establish the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the inquiry into value.
18 I disagree with the Master's approach on this issue. The correct approach is explained in Spencer, Bower, Turner and Handley on Res Judicata. At para 39, the learned authors point out that it may not be clear from consent judgments and orders what questions were concluded, but that the court may examine the available evidence to ascertain what were the matters in dispute. The paragraph refers to para 204 which states, "The Court can consider the pleadings, particulars, evidence, the notice of appeal or cross-appeal, the reasons for judgment, the summing up, any questions put to the jury and its answers". The authors then go on to state in para 39, "Any issue which the parties recognised was the subject of the litigation and was fundamental to the judgment or order will be conclusively determined. Where, however, there are no such materials neither party is estopped from disputing anything but the actual judgment or order".
19 In my opinion, the defendants were estopped from denying that oppression occurred and that the nature of the oppression was to be found within the confines of the three affidavits of Dr Smith. The fact of oppression was not merely implicit in the order of 14 March 1996, it was made explicit by the note in the orders of 14 March 1996 that the Court was of the opinion referred to in s 260(2).
20 In this appeal, counsel for Dr Wenkart's interests submitted that the opinion formed by the Court could have been as to any of the matters referred to in s 260(2). In my opinion, it is clear from the affidavits which were tendered before the Master that the allegation was that the affairs of Fesena and ESPH were conducted in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against Dr Smith's company, Shirim. The present respondents, who were the defendants below, were and are estopped from denying that point.
21 I therefore disagree with the approach of the Master who, after examining the totality of the evidence before him, held that, "I am in agreement with the submission of the Defendants that in those circumstances there is no oppression in fact".
22 I agree with the Master, however, that there were so many detailed acts and complaints set out in the three affidavits of Dr Smith that it would be wrong to conclude that the defendants were estopped from denying any particular fact stated in those affidavits. I agree with the Master that the proper course was for him to consider the issue of oppression and its financial consequences in the light of the totality of the evidence which the plaintiffs and the defendants brought before him. Unless a court, when it makes its order referring the matter for inquiry as to value, specifies the principles upon which the valuation will occur, it is the task of the court undertaking that inquiry to examine the evidence as to oppression and its financial consequences and to ascertain, in light of the whole of the evidence, what is the fair and just value to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Indeed, the conduct of both parties in advancing material in addition to that contained in Dr Smith's first three affidavits made such an approach inevitable.
23 Having rejected the tender of Dr Smith's three affidavits as evidence of the oppression which had occurred, and having no further information at that stage about the case, the Master considered that guidance as to the nature of the valuation to be undertaken could be obtained from the terms of the Amended Summons which had sought an order that the first and second defendants should purchase the shares of the first plaintiff and Fesena and ESPH at "fair market value". Notwithstanding that the motion on which the consent orders had been made did not refer to either market value or fair market value and notwithstanding that the orders of 14 March 1996 did not refer to either market value or fair market value, the Master interpreted those orders as requiring an ascertainment of the fair market value of the shares and units as at 14 March 1996. For practical reasons, the Master substituted for that date the date of 30 June 1996.
24 In my opinion, as the orders of 14 March 1996 used the word "value", without referring to "market value,", and as the orders specifically noted that the Court was of the opinion that oppression had occurred, the orders should be interpreted as requiring that a valuation be made on the ordinary basis adopted in oppression cases, namely, as requiring that the oppression and its financial consequences be identified and that the value to be calculated be assessed so as to compensate the minority shareholder for the oppression which occurred. I reject the submission made by counsel for the respondents that the orders of 14 March 1996, having been drawn by counsel for Shirim and Dr Smith, should be read "contra proferentem". The orders were not ambiguous and did not use the term "market value" or "fair market value".
25 In approaching the issue of oppression, the Master considered that the central allegation of oppression asserted on behalf of the plaintiffs was that from 26 May 1987 Dr Smith was excluded from management of the hospital at all levels. The Master considered that the allegation put on behalf of the plaintiffs was as follows: -