Country Circumstances
45 In the submission to the delegate, the agent submitted that "[t]he general security situation in Kabul renders relocation to the region unreasonable". The submission went through the rising casualties and incident rates which the agent submitted were apparent from the country information, and then made the following submissions:
Little speculation is required to appreciate the Taliban's current strategy. According to the UN Director for Human Rights in Afghanistan, '[t]he stepped-up transition of security responsibilities from international military forces to Afghan forces and closure of international forces' bases was met with increased attacks by anti-government elements'. Further, the Taliban have made these intentions plain, publically declaring that following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan they intend to retake Kabul 'in a week'.
Renowned experts on US military affairs Federick and Kimberly Kagen [sic] have flagged this exit strategy from Afghanistan as a 'dangerous mirage'':
Moving toward this long-term posture in 2013 will likely ensure its failure. As [the US] fall below 68,000 troops, [the US] will have to withdraw from important terrain and lose the ability to maneuver. [The US] forces won't be able to operate in most of southern Afghanistan, conduct offensive operations or help the ANSF consolidate and mature.
(Footnotes omitted.)
46 On review to the Tribunal and approximately a week before the Tribunal's decision, the appellant's agent filed a set of written submissions with the Tribunal. Those submissions went through the appellant's personal history, his tragic family history, and the necessary movement of the appellant and his brother to Pakistan to live with their maternal uncle following the death of his mother and the earlier disappearance of his father. The submissions then dealt with the way the appellant left Pakistan, arrived in Australia and what he has done since he arrived in Australia, none of which is necessary to set out in detail. Having identified the first issue as whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his race (Hazara) and or his religion (Shia), the submission then dealt with the position put on behalf of the appellant on that issue. The submissions contained a heading "Current Security Situation of Afghanistan" and under that heading a series of propositions based on country information some of which was footnoted and some of which was quoted in the submission. For example at paragraph [35] of the submission, it is said on behalf of the appellant:
DFAT has recognized the deteriorating security situation:
The significant rise in casualties in 2014 reflects an increase in the frequency and intensity of ground engagements across Afghanistan. Casualties from ground engagements increased by 52 per cent in 2014, coinciding with the withdrawal of international military forces and combat air support... The security situation across the country deteriorated significantly over the last 12-18 months, as anti-government groups intensified their efforts and the international military contingent gradually withdrew.
(Emphasis added.)
47 There then followed another subheading - "Security in the foreseeable future". Again, a number of extracts from country information are then reproduced. The principle part of the submissions on which the appellant relies in relation to the new ground of appeal appear at [44]-[48] of those submissions:
Despite these concerns, the United States had committed to reducing the number of troops remaining in Afghanistan from 9,800 to 5,500 by the end of the year. Barak Obama has very recently announced that he will leave 5,500 forces in Afghanistan beyond his departure from office in January 2017, stating that:
The bottom line is in key areas of the country, the security situation is still very fragile and in some places there is risk of deterioration.
Given the dramatic increase in civilian casualties since Western troops started to withdraw last year, it is likely that the casualty rate will continue to soar when the present force of 9,800 troops is reduced to 5,500 and again when the troops are withdrawn altogether. The real likelihood that the Taliban or other AGEs will regain effective control of larger areas of Afghanistan in the near future is of particular concern to the Shia Hazara community who have been historically persecuted by the Taliban and Pashtun majority in Afghanistan.
Abdul Khaliq Azad from the Afghan Strategic and Peace Studies in Kabul is recorded as stating that: 'If the Taliban come back they would annihilate the Hazara because of their staunch support for the foreign presence in Afghanistan.'
UNHCR considers that the withdrawal of international security forces, as well as a complex economic transition, is 'likely to affect peace, security and development in Afghanistan'.
In light of the above, the Tribunal should find that the there is a real chance the Applicant would be subjected to serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future for reasons of his race and religion.
(Footnotes omitted.)
48 The appellant's counsel submitted that the clearest articulation of the argument to be identified appears in [44] and [45] of these submissions.
49 It is clear, as counsel for the Minister submitted, the Tribunal paid general regard to both the submissions made to the delegate and the submissions made to the Tribunal: so much is apparent from [20] of the Tribunal's reasons. After dealing with the appellant's claim based on some of his family circumstances, which I need not set out in detail as they are not material to the proposed ground of appeal, the Tribunal turned to consider what it described by the subheading in its reasons as "Hazara Shia claims". It was common ground that in this part of its reasons, the Tribunal, as it was entitled to, placed considerable weight on reports produced by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and in particular the recent (at the time of the Tribunal's decision) report, produced in September 2015 concerning the situation for Hazara Shia people in Afghanistan and in Kabul in particular. The Tribunal reproduced in its reasons a number of passages from this report and from other recent country information.
50 At [34] of its reasons, the Tribunal reproduced the following parts of the September 2015 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report:
DFAT also specifically reported in relation to Kabul in September 2015:
2.29 Insurgents regularly conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul. DFAT assesses that the primary targets for insurgent attacks are government institutions, political figures, Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), personnel from the Resolute Support mission (the NATO-led mission that replaced the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF on 1 January 2015), other security services, and international organisations. Such attacks often cause significant casualties amongst civilian bystanders in addition to those being targeted. Kabul has seen a marked increase in the number of incidents in 2015 compared to the corresponding period in 2014. According to a Resolute Support mission report for January-April 2015, insurgent attacks in Kabul have increased by around 60 per cent compared with the same period in 2014.
2.30 Representative examples include the series of bombings against employees (including prosecutors and judges) of the Ministry of Justice in May 2015, which killed at least 11 people and injured dozens more; an attack on the Park Palace guesthouse in May 2015 that killed five people, including foreigners; and a car bomb attack near the Ministry of Finance in Kabul which killed eight people and wounded 37 more. Kabul International Airport has been attacked on a number of occasions, with a rocket attack in 2014 landing on the runway apron. Attacks also occur in the vicinity of the airport, including in May 2015 when a European Union vehicle was hit by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, killing at least three people and injuring 18 others. On 22 June 2015, the National Parliament building in Kabul was attacked by the Taliban. A suicide vehicle detonated outside the building, followed by gunfire. Twelve people were reportedly killed, including six Taliban gunmen and the suicide bomber, with at least 21 more people injured in the attack. In August 2015, a series of attacks resulted in an estimated 355 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries), the largest number of civilian casualties in a single day since data collection started in 2009.
2.31 The ANDSF and international forces have put in place a range of counter-measures to prevent and respond to insurgent attacks in Kabul. There are numerous checkpoints along highways leading to Kabul, at major intersections and at government and international institutions within Kabul. These provide a deterrent to insurgent attacks by increasing the risk that insurgents will be detected prior to undertaking attacks in Kabul. ANDSF are quick to respond to insurgent attacks when they occur. Nonetheless, violent attacks within the city are common.
(Footnotes omitted.)
51 The appellant relied in particular on the fact that the Tribunal's reasons extracted paragraph 2.31 of this report, which noted that "ANDSF are quick to respond to insurgent attacks when they occur". The appellant submitted this indicated the Tribunal had been put on notice by the country information that the presence of international forces in Kabul was one of the mechanisms by which risks to Hazara Shias were kept in check. Nevertheless, the appellant submitted, the Tribunal failed to deal with the argument made on his behalf about what would happen when international forces withdrew. The appellant also relied on some earlier descriptions in this section of the Tribunal reasons about the security situation as the "current security situation".
52 Having referred to this country information the Tribunal concluded (at [36] and [37]):
I have taken into account the reports of regular insurgency attacks on Kabul taken place but these need to be seen in the context that Kabul has a population of four million and that the government maintains effective control of Kabul and has a range of counter-measures in place to prevent and respond to insurgent attacks. I have taken into account that the primary targets for insurgent attacks are government institutions, political figures, military, other security services and international organisations and that such attacks often cause significant casualties amongst civilian bystanders. I am of the view that the available country information considered as a whole indicates that the chance or risk of the applicant being seriously or significantly harmed in such a circumstance would be best described as remote, and not a real chance or real risk. Furthermore, on the available country information, I consider the risk of getting harmed in an attack by insurgents is one faced by the population generally and not the applicant personally: s.36(2B)(c) of the Act.
I accept that there have been some incidents where Hazara Shias have been targeted, and where ethnicity and religion would appear to be a factor and that ISIS have started operating in Afghanistan. However, I do not accept that all Hazara Shias in Kabul face a real chance of persecution or significant harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future from these Sunni groups or anyone else. I accept that the applicant is a Shia and will attend mosque and religious events; however, given the country information viewed overall, I find that the chance or risk he will be seriously harmed or significantly harmed is remote.
(Footnotes omitted.)
53 The appellant submitted these passages disclosed the error he identified: namely that the Tribunal was in effect looking at the short term situation for Hazara Shia in Kabul and was not at all turning its mind to what would happen to the security situation once the international forces left, the appellant's submission being that the security situation would rapidly deteriorate for that community.
54 The remainder of the Tribunal's reasoning, which follows these passages, deals with a number of factual matters particular to the appellant, which I need not set out as they are not material to the proposed new ground of appeal.
55 At the end of this section of its reasons, the Tribunal summarised its conclusions in the following way (at [44] and [45]):
Having regard to the country information concerning the overall situation for Hazara Shias and failed returned asylum seekers from western countries and the country information that indicates that the Government maintains effective control of Kabul and the applicant's individual circumstances, I do not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future in Kabul on account of being a Hazara Shia or an imputed political opinion or for membership of a particular social groups consisting of 'failed Hazara asylum seekers who have fled to the West' or 'Shia Hazaras with no family or tribal connections in Afghanistan' at the hands of the Taliban, ISIS, other insurgent groups, the state or anybody else.
Having regard to the country information concerning the overall situation for Hazara Shias and failed returned asylum seekers from western countries and the country information that indicates that the Government maintains effective control of Kabul and the applicant's individual circumstances, I find that there are not substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Afghanistan that there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm in Kabul on these bases.
56 The Minister made two submissions, in the alternative, in answer to the merits of the proposed new ground of appeal. The first was that the appellant's argument concerning what was likely to occur on withdrawal of international forces was dealt with by the Tribunal in its reasons in the sense that it was subsumed in the Tribunal's reasoning about the overall security situation in Kabul including the Tribunal's preference in terms of weight for what was said by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in its September 2015 report. In making this submission, the Minister relied on the Full Court's decision in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593 at [45]-[47] (French, Sackville and Hely JJ):
45. In conducting its review the Tribunal must have regard to the criteria for the grant of a protection visa and in particular the criterion that the applicant for a visa is:
… a non-citizen in Australia to whom the [Tribunal] is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol;
(s 36(2)(a) read with s 415(1))
The critical question which ordinarily will have to be addressed in applying this criterion is whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the Convention reasons. If the Tribunal fails to consider a contention that the applicant fears persecution for a particular reason which, if accepted, would justify concluding that the applicant has satisfied the relevant criterion, and if that contention is supported by probative material, the Tribunal will have failed in the discharge of its duty, imposed by s 414, to conduct a review of the decision. This is a matter of substance, not a matter of the form of the Tribunal's published reasons for decision.
46. It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]-[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised 'with an eye keenly attuned to error'. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.
47. The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.
57 The Minister relied in particular on the passage in [47] of the Full Court's reasons where the Full Court said it may be unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because that matter is "subsumed in findings of greater generality". Here the Minister submitted that the Tribunal's choice to rely on the September 2015 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report, read with its conclusions at [44] and [45], gave rise to the inference that as matter of fact finding the Tribunal did not see the foreshadowed departure of international forces as something that was likely to lead to a qualitative deterioration in the security situation in Kabul and a correlative rise in the risk of significant harm to Hazara Shia such as the appellant.
58 The second response given by the Minister to the new proposed ground of appeal was that even if the Tribunal had overlooked this specific argument, it was not an argument of sufficient cogency or substance as to attract the principles set out by Griffiths J in SZSSC. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal performed its task without error by asking itself the right question: namely whether the appellant would be at risk of significant harm in the "foreseeable future" should he be compelled to return to Afghanistan. Overlooking the appellant's argument that there would be a significant change in the security situation on the departure of the international forces was not, in the context of the very recent country material before the Tribunal and on which it placed great weight, something that was capable of affecting the discharge of its task on review. This situation was, the Minister submitted, quite different from the one with which the Full Court dealt in MZYTS at [52].
59 In my opinion, the prospects of success of the proposed new ground of appeal depend in part on the understanding of what is meant by the now well-established and orthodox approach to the determination of risk of harm to a person occurring in the future: that is, is there a real chance a person may suffer serious harm on return to her or his country and nationality: see generally Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 389 (Mason CJ), 398 (Dawson J), 407 (Toohey J), 429 (McHugh J). To make that assessment, there must be speculation about the future, and the period of time throughout which that speculative task must be carried out has been expressed to include so much of the future as is "foreseeable" or "reasonably foreseeable": see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 279 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13]; Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [27] (Heerey, Moore, Goldberg JJ); SZQXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1292 at [7] (Flick J).
60 The "reasonably foreseeable future" is something of an ambulatory period of time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection to the reality of what that person may experience. The purpose of the "well-founded" aspect of the Art 1A test is, after all, to be an objective but realistic and accurate assessment of what risks a person may face in the practical "on the ground" circumstances she or he will be living in. Using "reasonably foreseeable" also carries with it a rejection of an assessment which becomes too remote from a person's expected life circumstances. These are not matters which can be expressed sensibly with any more precision.
61 In my opinion the Tribunal appropriately addressed its task of determining, in relation to the criteria in s 36(2)(a) and (aa) and their components drawn from their respective international treaties as interpreted by Australian courts, whether there was either a real chance of persecution or substantial grounds for believing there was a real risk of significant harm to the appellant, were he to be returned to Kabul.
62 I do not read the Tribunal's reasons as confined in time in the way the appellant submitted. Where the Tribunal used the word "current", in my opinion, the Tribunal should be taken to mean the situation likely to face the appellant on return to Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. To read "current" literally, as referring only to the time immediately after the appellant would be returned to Kabul, or a period even before this, would not be to read that small part of the Tribunal's reasons in its larger, and proper, context.
63 In my opinion it is clear, particularly from [44] of the Tribunal's reasons, that the Tribunal focused in its fact finding on the control exercised by the Afghan government over the security situation in Kabul. It did so on the basis of country information then recently available in the September 2015 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report, which the Tribunal clearly found persuasive, as it was entitled to. In that sense the appellant's arguments about the impact of any reduction in the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, on the security situation in Kabul were subsumed in the Tribunal's findings about the security situation in Kabul in the foreseeable future. I consider this was clear in the Tribunal's reasons as expressed.