Ground one
25 Ground one of the appeal alleges as follows:
The Tribunal failed to discharge its task, in that it chose to consult superseded country information, and ignored up-to-date information from the same sources which indicated a material change in country conditions.
Particulars
The Tribunal relied principally on country information from 2014 and 2015 (see, e.g., [18], [55]-[57] of its reasons) in finding that the Appellant did not face a real chance or risk of harm from generalised or sectarian violence in his home region, and that the perceived decline in violence was likely to continue. However, the Tribunal overlooked or ignored more recent country information which differed materially from the country information consulted. It thereby failed to discharge its task.
26 Ground one is based in the Tribunal's reliance on what the appellant asserts was "outdated" or "superseded" country information. The appellant's claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution was in large part premised on the threat of harm from sectarian or generalised violence by anti-Shia extremists including the Taliban, in the FATA and his home region of the Kurram Agency. The Tribunal accepted the appellant's claim in relation to the violence and threats suffered by him and his family, that since 2007 there had continued to be incidents of sectarian and generalised violence against Shia Muslims in the FATA and in Kurram Agency, and that there was some level of risk to the appellant in the context of that violence. The Tribunal, however, considered that there had been a decline in sectarian and generalised violence in Kurram Agency, which it discussed with the appellant at the hearing (at [62]).
27 In his post-hearing submissions the appellant asserted that "the purported improvements in the current security situation for Shias, particularly those of the Turi Tribe originating from Kurram Agency, cannot be said to be durable." He submitted that the return of internally displaced persons to the FATA "cannot be taken to indicate more than a very basic, and possibly temporary, improvement in the general security situation."
28 The Tribunal expressly noted these submissions (at [36]-[37]), and said (at [53]) that it had considered them. But it said (at [54]):
However, as discussed with the [appellant] at hearing, there is credible country information that indicates that the situation has improved in the FATA, including Kurram Agency. This includes the following information.
29 The Tribunal then turned to consider the following country information (at [55]):
(a) a FATA Research Centre (FRC) report titled Annual Security Report 2014;
(b) a report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) dated 30 June 2014, titled Post-return monitoring in areas of return Sholzan Tangi, Upper Kurram Agency-June 2014 (June 2014 UNHCR Report);
(c) a FRC report titled Annual Security Report 2015;
(d) a South Asia Terrorism Portal FATA Assessment 2015;
(e) a UK Home Office report titled Country Information and Guidance Pakistan: Security and Humanitarian situation, November 2015;
(f) a report of the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) titled 2014, Pakistan Security Report; and
(g) an Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report titled Thematic Report Shias in Pakistan, 15 January 2016 (the 2016 DFAT Report).
30 The appellant notes that the Tribunal made its decision on 18 July 2016. He contends that the Tribunal's reliance upon these reports, largely dated in 2014 and 2015, shows that it fell into error by not relying on current country information.
31 The appellant notes that the Tribunal said (at [55]) that the 2014 FRC Annual Security Report states:
…Kurram Agency remained comparatively quiet among the seven tribal agencies in 2014 and that a total of two incidents, one bomb blast and one target killing, were recorded during the reporting period, killing three people and injuring one. The bomb blast was a roadside bomb and the killing was of a tribal elder on his way to Sadda Bazaar from Central Kurram Agency.
And the Tribunal said (at [57]) that the 2015 FRC Annual Security Report states:
…the year marked a significant decline in terrorism-related incidents in the tribal areas of FATA. According to that report, militancy and counter militancy incidents were recorded from all the seven agencies of FATA in 2015, and the year remained turbulent with armed conflict between non state militant actors and law enforcement and security agents remaining at its peak. However, the report also noted that militant violence declined by 40% compared to 2014. It is also reported that out of the total casualties in FATA in 2015 almost 65% were militants. From a security point of view, the FRC reported that the most turbulent area during the outgoing quarter (of 2015) in FATA remained North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies where military operations against local militants is ongoing.
32 In contrast to those descriptions of the security situation in the FATA and the Kurram Agency the appellant notes that, on 22 April 2016, approximately three months before the Tribunal decision, the FRC had published a report for the first quarter of 2016, titled FATA Security Report First Quarter 2016 (the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Security Report). That report states:
The security situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) remained turbulent during the first quarter - January to March 2016. An escalation in violence as a consequence of militant and counter militant activities has left deep impact on the local population inhabiting the region. With the exception of Orakzai Agency, almost every FATA agency witnessed a surge in militant activities. Compared to last quarter - October to December 2015 - militant activities have increased by 34 percent during the current quarter, i.e., January to March 2016.
33 The report also states:
Kurram is one of the most sensitive FATA Agency since it borders three Afghan provinces on its west. It has served as one of the key routes for militant movement in Afghanistan and is thought to be mainly used by the Haqqani Network as an operational base. Although military operations in the past have largely dismantled militant networks in the Agency, militants belonging to the TTP-South Waziristan chapter (also known as Shehryar Mahsud group) are operating in [a] few pockets of the Agency along the Afghan border. During the past three months of the current quarter, Shaheedano Dan area of lower Kurram and Qaimatey area of Upper Kurram remained disturbed.
Militants employed a variety of tactics for attacking their opponents in the Agency. On 7 January 2016, two civilians were injured in an IED planted by the TTP militants detonated in Shaheedona area of Lower Kurram. The TTP militants also destroyed a newly constructed military camp in Sharinao area of the Agency. Similarly, TTP militant based in Khost province of Afghanistan targeted security check-post in Qaimaty area of Upper Kurram, but no casualty was reported. Cross-border attacks remains the most effective tactics by the TTP militants to target security check post located near the Afghan border. It is feared that such attacks may escalate during the coming months.
34 The appellant also notes that the Tribunal relied upon the June 2014 UNHCR Report, which included a review in relation to displaced persons who had returned to a region in the Upper Kurram Agency. The Tribunal extracted the following parts of that report (at [55]):
General situation and security in areas of return
All key informants in the five villages showed satisfaction over the security situation in the area and they shared that they feel safe and secure currently in area of return. They unanimously stated that there is no restriction on their movement and they can freely move even though they also shared that for security purpose they are stopped at check posts by the security force staff where they are asked to show their identity documents such as CNIC. When entering to the area of origin, there are three checkpoints that the returnees have to cross before entering their area of origin. These checkpoints are guarded by the khassadar and Pakistani Army. It was shared that the military regularly checks identity documents of all those who pass through the checkpoints.
The majority of consulted groups stated that no major security incidents had occurred since their return to place of origin, nor harassment incident has been reported by the returnees.
35 The Tribunal also said the following in relation to that report (at [56]):
It is clear from the UNHCR advice that the returnees were genuinely satisfied with the security situation in the area and felt safe and that UNHCR had concluded that general peace had been restored in Upper and Lower Kurram.
36 The appellant contrasts that with a later report by a United Nations agency named the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Pakistan, titled Inter-Cluster Assessment Mission to Kurram Agency, 20-21 September 2015 (the September 2015 UNOCHA Report), which states that:
..over 60 to 70 per cent of the population has returned spontaneously to most of the villages except for [the appellant's home village] which is completely destroyed. … Some communities still feel the threat of being targeted by the opposite group and this is the reason that they do not stay overnight in their areas of origin but prefer to return to areas inhabited by people of their sect.
37 In relation to the appellant's home village the report states:
[The appellant's home village and another village] were highly populated areas of the Lower Kurram and consist of many small villages. The areas of [the appellant's home village and another village] had a mixed populated of Shia and Sunni sects while all Sunni were displaced from the area and Shia population were still present in their villages. Before the sectarian conflict in 2008, both Shia and Sunni communities were living together in the mentioned villages.
Sunnis are avoiding returning to those villages due to the following reasons:
• Security situation is not stable (sectarian conflict).
• Some houses are completely destroyed. The returnees will be facing problems including, privacy for females and harsh weather in the winter season.
• Some schools are not functional in the area, particularly girls' schools were destroyed. In Sunni areas, girls' and boys' schools are demolished.
• Livelihood opportunities are not available, due to non-availability of markets in some areas.
• Agriculture, livestock and water channels for cultivable land are also disrupted.
38 I should note in this context that the appellant's reliance on the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report and the September 2015 UNOCHA Report is somewhat selective, and the relevant differences between the security situation outlined in those reports and the country information upon which the Tribunal relied is not as stark as the appellant contends.
39 For example, the appellant relies on part of the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report which refers to a surge in militant activities by 34 percent across the FATA as a whole during the first quarter of 2016. But in relation to the Kurram Agency, where the appellant's home village is located, the report states:
Kurram Agency witnessed a reduction in militant incidents from January-March 2016. A total of five militant and counter-militant incidents were recorded in the Agency, which is 44 percent less than that of the previous quarter (October-December 2015). The militant attacks in the Agency during the current quarter comprised of one cross-border attack, kidnapping and an IED attack on the civilians. One search operation in one incident of drone strike was also recorded during the outgoing quarter of 2016.
The report also notes that "simultaneous military operations in various parts of FATA have dismantled terrorist infrastructure to a large extent."
40 In another example, while the September 2015 UNOCHA Report states that the security situation is "not stable", it found the conditions "generally conducive" for the return of displaced persons to the Kurram Agency.
41 The Tribunal decision records (at [62]) that at the hearing the Tribunal discussed with the appellant the indications in the country information that there had been a decline in sectarian and generalised violence in the Kurram Agency. In his post-hearing submissions, the appellant contended that the improved security situation in the FATA was not "durable" and any improvement was "very basic" and "possibly temporary". The Tribunal accepted that the security situation can "change and fluctuate" (at [63]).
42 On the basis that the improved security situation was not durable, the appellant argues that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by relying on "superseded" and "outdated" country information, including by ignoring up-to-date country information from the same sources. The appellant contends that approach led the Tribunal to a materially misguided or incomplete assessment of the risks of serious or significant harm that the appellant would face should he return to Pakistan, and thereby, the Tribunal failed to discharge its statutory task.
43 For the reasons I explain I am not persuaded that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error as alleged.
44 Deciding whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution involves making an assessment about the circumstances in the person's country of nationality at the time the person is likely to be returned there. It is a predictive exercise involving speculation as to circumstances in the future on the basis of material in the present and what has happened to the person in the past: Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 391, 432; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 571-573. Credible and up-to-date country information will often be central in making such an assessment, particularly when the risk that the visa applicant may suffer serious or significant harm on return to that country is a changing one.
45 As part of the lawful performance of its task and discharge of its duties under the Act to review the delegate's decision by reference to the situation in Pakistan as it stood at the time of the Tribunal's review. To perform that task it was required to examine and consider any relevant country information which reflected the likely situation to which the appellant would be returned. It is common ground between the parties that, if in making an assessment as to whether a visa applicant faces a well-founded fear of persecution, a decision-maker relies upon outdated country information where more recent country information is within the decision-maker's possession, a decision-maker may fall into jurisdictional error.
46 But the question in the appeal is one step removed from that. That is so because there is nothing to show that either the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report or the September 2015 UNOCHA Report were actually before the Tribunal; that the Tribunal was aware of them, or that the Tribunal had constructive knowledge of them. The appellant's argument relies upon establishing an obligation for the Tribunal to search out further country information where there is nothing to show that it had that information, was aware of it, or had constructive knowledge of it.
47 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Others (1986) 162 CLR 24 concerned the grant of land rights to an Aboriginal group in the Northern Territory. A mining company, Peko-Wallsend, had made submissions to successive Ministers claiming that there was a significant uranium deposit which fell completely within the proposed land grant and that it would suffer detriment. Its submissions were made to predecessor Ministers, prior to a change in government, and although the submissions were held by the relevant Department, they were not provided to and considered by the Minister who ultimately made the decision. Mason J said (at 44):
The second question, which lies at the heart of this appeal, is whether the Minister is also bound to take into account submissions made to him which correct, update or elucidate the Commissioner's comments on detriment. Once it is accepted that the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act indicate that the detriment that may be occasioned by a proposed land grant is a factor vital to the exercise of the Minister's discretion, it is but a short and logical step to conclude that a consideration of that factor must be based on the most recent and accurate information that the Minister has at hand.
His Honour went on to say (at 45):
It would be a strange result indeed to hold that the Minister is entitled to ignore material of which he has actual or constructive knowledge and which may have a direct bearing on the justice of making the land grant, and to proceed instead on the basis of material that may be incomplete, inaccurate or misleading.
(Emphasis added.)
48 The words "the most recent and accurate information that the Minister has to hand" and the requirement to take into account any material of which the Minister has "actual or constructive knowledge" are, in my view, important. The case concerned submissions which had been provided to previous Ministers and should have been put before the current Minister but were not. Mason J concluded that the Minister was required to have considered those submissions which were constructively before him.
49 SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1938; (2008) 172 FCR 563 (Rares J) concerned whether the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the most up-to-date country information when deciding an application for a protection visa. The Tribunal had a current Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report to which it referred in one context, but it only relied upon other older country information in reaching a finding as to the situation then pertaining in the applicant's country of origin. Rares J noted (at [29]) that the principle identified in Peko-Wallsend requires a decision-maker to make his or her decision on the basis of the most current material available to him or her at the time the decision is made, unless the legislation under which the decision is made excludes that duty. His Honour said (at [40]):
If the decision-maker has actual notice of a recent and significant matter affecting the question whether the applicant for a protection visa has a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of origin, the subject-matter, scope and purpose of s 36(2)(a) require the decision-maker to base his or her decision, as to whether the fear claimed is well-founded, on that information: Peko-Wallsend 162 CLR at 45.
(Emphasis added.)
50 His Honour referred to a requirement for the decision-maker to have "actual notice" of the relevant information, whereas Peko Wallsend referred to a requirement for "actual or constructive" notice, but the qualification remains. His Honour confirmed that (at [41]) when he said:
The trend of events throughout the world is one of constant change. A decision-maker charged with the important function of assessing whether Australia owes protection obligations to an applicant for a protection visa cannot ignore recent, up to date information actually before him or her and make a decision on earlier material which may be out of date.
51 Importantly, his Honour went on to say (at [42]):
… there is no unqualified obligation for the tribunal to search out country information which it does not already have before it. The potential sources of such information are vast and of varying degrees of relevance, reliability, (im)partiality and utility. The recent material may not be cogent, full, accurate or satisfactory. But those characterisations could only be arrived at as part of the decision-maker evaluating the recent material in the performance of his or her function of basing the decision on the most recent and accurate material that the decision-maker has at hand: Peko Wallsend 162 CLR at 45.
(Emphasis in bold added.)
52 In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431 (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ) the Full Court considered whether in that case the Tribunal's decision to refuse a protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error because of a failure to consider the most recent country information available. The Tribunal had before it pre and post-hearing submissions by the applicant in relation to how volatile and dangerous the situation would be "on the ground" in Zimbabwe for people who were or were perceived to be members of the MDC and therefore opponents of the Government, particularly when an anticipated election was announced, and in its aftermath. The Tribunal considered earlier country information in relation to the risk of harm faced by the visa applicant but its reasons disclosed no evaluation, as opposed to an acknowledgement of the existence of, the most current country information and material before it. The Full Court said (at [73]-[75]:
Whatever might be the general principle that administrative decision-making should be based on the most up-to-date information (see Peko-Wallsend 162 CLR 24 at 45) in the context of decision-making about s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act and Art 1 of the Convention, attention to current information is not merely preferable, it is a core aspect of lawful formation of a state of satisfaction. This is, as we have endeavoured to explain, because of the predictive and speculative nature of the task involved in determining whether a person's fear of persecution for a Convention reason on return to her or his country of nationality is well founded.
That is not to say decision-makers cannot rely on information which is several years old. They may do so lawfully as part of a weighing process after considering all information available to them, and deciding which information best and most reliably supports the prediction of future risk they are called on to make. Perhaps more recent information simply confirms older and more detailed information. Perhaps the older information is more specific to the visa applicant's circumstances. Perhaps more recent information is from less reliable, or tainted, sources. There are many possibilities about why a decision-maker may choose, lawfully, to rely on older information and still perform the task required by s 36(2)(a) and Art 1. In such cases, one would expect the Tribunal's reasons to disclose this kind of evaluation process, and the conclusion it reached would be within its jurisdiction.
We agree, with respect, with the approach taken by Rares J in SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 at [36]-[42].
53 The Full Court's approval of SZJTQ necessarily included approval of the finding that there is no unqualified obligation on a decision-maker to search out country information which it does not already have before it. The Full Court noted (at [76] and [77]) Mason J's observations in Peko-Wallsend and said that a decision-maker's consideration must be based on "the most recent and accurate information to hand", and "the most current material available" (emphasis added). By "available" I take the Full Court to mean material of which the Tribunal has actual or constructive knowledge at the time it made that relevant decision.
54 That is not the position in the present case. Unlike in Peko-Wallsend, SZJTQ and MZYTS there is nothing to show that the Tribunal actually had the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report or the September 2015 UNOCHA Report, that it was aware of those reports, or that it had constructive knowledge of those reports. In my view the authorities provide that the Tribunal was not under an unqualified obligation to search out those reports.
55 Further, it should be noted that:
(a) the Tribunal relied upon the annual 2014 and 2015 FRC Security Reports in relation to the security situation in the FATA, which each covered a 12 month period in relation to a security situation which the Tribunal found (at [63]) "can change and fluctuate". The FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report did not come into existence until 22 April 2016, approximately one and a half months after the hearing on 9 March 2016, after the appellant's post-hearing submissions, and about three months before the Tribunal made its decision. It relates to only a three month period in a fluctuating situation, which limits its value; and
(b) the September 2015 UNOCHA Report is not an update of the June 2014 UNHCR Report on which the Tribunal relied; being by a different United Nations secretariat, and it is not apt to describe it as 'superseding" the earlier report. Although the appellant now ascribes significance to the September 2015 UNOCHA report, it was in existence prior to the hearing and the appellant made no reference to it in either his pre-hearing or post-hearing submissions to the Tribunal.
56 In my view this is not a case in which the Tribunal exclusively relied on old, out of date or superseded information in relation to whether there is a real chance that the appellant faced serious or significant harm on return to the FATA and the Kurram Agency. The Tribunal relied on a range of country information, and in particular the 2016 DFAT Report published in January 2016, to which it expressly gave weight (at [63]). Pursuant to Ministerial Direction No 56 of 21 June 2013, made under s 499(1) of the Act, the Tribunal was required to take that report into account: see BMP15 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 1291 at [33] (O'Callaghan J).
57 The 2016 DFAT Report stated that there "is a low level of sectarian violence overall in the FATA" and "a low level of generalised violence" in the Kurram Agency. The Tribunal somewhat inaccurately characterised that (at [63]) as an assessment that there is "a low risk of sectarian violence and low risk of generalised violence" in Kurram Agency. In relation to this report the Tribunal said (at [61]):
Significantly, this report records a change from the previous report of April 2015 in DFAT's assessment of both the risk of sectarian violence in the FATA (from moderate to low) and the level of generalised violence in the FATA (from high to variable throughout the FATA but low in Kurram Agency). The Tribunal has given consideration to the fact that the Tribunal decision of 25 May 2015 referred to by the applicant's representative drew on the findings of the April 2015 report but did not have the benefit of the subsequent significantly altered assessment contained in the most recent DFAT report of 15 January 2016.
Given its date I do not accept that it is appropriate to characterise the 2016 DFAT Report as old, outdated or superseded, and the Tribunal gave this report weight.
58 The Tribunal went on to say (at [63]):
The Tribunal has had regard to the applicant's concerns regarding the durability of the improved security situation as well as the representative's submissions relevant to this issue, and the applicants [sic] concerns that the Pakistan government is doing nothing to get the Taliban out of Kurram Agency, seeks to conceal civilian casualties, and that his village is in a particularly dangerous area. The Tribunal finds that the weight of the country information discussed above does not support a conclusion that the Pakistan government has done nothing or is doing nothing to get the Taliban out of Kurram Agency. The Tribunal also finds the reporting on casualties from sectarian and generalised violence in Pakistan, including the reporting of DFAT, is drawn from a variety of independent sources, both government and non-government, many of which are independent of the Pakistan government. The Tribunal considers that the totality of these sources provides an accurate picture of the security situation and overall level of casualties. The Tribunal also gives weight to the fact that DFAT's assessment that there is a low risk of sectarian violence and low risk of generalised violence applies to Kurram Agency as a whole, including the area of Kurram Agency in which the applicant's home village of [redacted] is located. The Tribunal acknowledges that the situation can change and fluctuate, as indicated in the FRC's annual security report for 2015 cited above for example, and that there is an element of vulnerability in the government security measures, as illustrated by the December 2015 attack in Parachinar.
(Emphasis added.)
59 The Tribunal accepted (at [64]) that there continue to be incidents of sectarian violence in the FATA and in the Kurram Agency, but said (at [65]) that it:
…accepts DFAT's assessment regarding the risk of generalised violence in the FATA and accepts that there is some level of risk to the applicant in the context of generalised violence. However, the Tribunal finds on the basis of all the evidence before it that the risk is remote and does not accept that there is a real chance that he would be targeted for harm for reasons of his Shia religion, Turi ethnicity, imputed political opinion of opposition to the TTP and/or other extremist Sunni groups (because of his Shia religion, Turi ethnicity, his origins from Parachinar and his extended presence in Australia (a western country with a Christian heritage) as an asylum seeker), and/or because he is seen to be a member of a particular social group comprising Turi Shias from Kurram Agency, or any other Convention reasons.
60 It was appropriate for the Tribunal to give weight to the 2016 DFAT Report, as the most recent report before it and having regard to Ministerial Direction No 56, and for it to rely on the suite of other country information to which it referred. Given the fluctuating security situation in the FATA and the Kurram Agency it would have been preferable for the Tribunal to check that it was relying on the most current information available, but I do not consider that by not searching out the FRC 2016 First Quarterly Report and the September 2015 UNOCHA Report, and instead relying upon other country information including the 2016 DFAT Report, the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error as alleged.