Consideration
41 The applicant contends that the Tribunal's reasoning that there had been a marked decline in sectarian or generalised violence in Kurram Agency, that this trend was ongoing, and that the applicant would not therefore face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm if he returned to Kurram Agency, was irrational and could not be supported by the evidence on which the Tribunal relied. The applicant points in particular to the first and second sentences of paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons where the Tribunal refers to the 2014 and 2015 FRC Annual Security Reports.
42 Illogicality or irrationality sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error requires the decision to be one at which no rational or logical decision-maker could arrive on the same evidence: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ). In the present case, the relevant decision is the Tribunal's conclusion that it was not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee within s 36(2)(a) of the Act, or is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, for the reason that (amongst others) the level of generalised violence in Kurram Agency is not such that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm due to his religion, tribe, political opinion, membership of a particular social group or any Convention reason, or faces a real risk of significant harm. It follows, as observed by Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS at [130], that not every lapse in logic in a decision-maker's reasons will give rise to a jurisdictional error, and a court should be slow (although not unwilling) to interfere in an appropriate case. As their Honours further observed:
131 … If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
…
135 Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality or irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.
43 In considering the applicant's arguments as to irrationality and illogicality, it is important to keep in mind that the Tribunal's reasons are to be read fairly and as a whole and without an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
44 In the present case, the applicant seeks to impugn the Tribunal's decision largely by reference to two sentences within a lengthy examination of country information concerning the FATA generally and the Kurram Agency more specifically. It is necessary to consider, first, whether the two sentences of paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons impugned by the applicant reveal irrationality or illogicality and, second, if they do, whether that deficiency in the Tribunal's reasons is sufficient to support a conclusion that the Tribunal's decision is irrational or illogical.
45 To address the first step, it is helpful to reproduce again paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons, highlighting the first two sentences that are impugned by the applicant (footnotes omitted):
Among the reports discussed with the applicant were the 2014 and 2015 FRC Annual Security Reports, which both indicated a general decline in sectarian violence and incidents over recent years specifically in FATA and Kurram Agency. The reports note that, while Kurram Agency remained 'turbulent', incidents continued to decline and the majority of casualties were militants. The 2015 report noted that while incidents were registered in almost every agency, there was nevertheless a significant decline in militant incidents (40%) in the FATA region since 2014. The 2015 FRC report states that after a relatively peaceful 2014, there was a 'surge' in militant activity in Kurram in the first quarter of 2015 (17 incidents) but incidents (both militant and counter-militant) in the remaining three quarters numbered nine or less. Many of the reported incidents were in central/lower Kurram, as opposed to upper Kurram where Parachinar is located. A UNHCR report on a protection cluster mission to Kurram in April 2014 likewise concluded that it was evident that general peace had been restored in Upper and Lower Kurram.
46 At the end of the second sentence is a footnote reference to pages 18-19 and 46 of the 2014 Annual Security Reports and pages 5-6 of the 2015 FRC Annual Security Report. The applicant adduced the 2015 Report in evidence before the Court, but not the 2014 Report. The failure of the applicant to tender the 2014 Report undermines the challenge that is made to the first two sentences of paragraph 56. The applicant's arguments focussed solely on the 2015 Report and the trend in violence in Kurram Agency between 2014 and 2015, making reference to a chart at page 25 of the 2015 Report comparing the number of terrorist related incidents, deaths and injuries in 2014 and 2015 in Kurram Agency. Contrary to the applicant's argument, however, it is apparent that the first two sentences of paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons are not confined to the trend in violence between 2014 and 2015. The first sentence of paragraph 56 states that the 2014 and 2015 Reports indicate a general decline in sectarian violence and incidents over recent years. I infer that, like the 2015 Report, the 2014 Report would have included a chart comparing the number of terrorist related incidents, deaths and injuries in 2013 and 2014 in the various Agencies (including Kurram Agency) within the FATA. Reading the first sentence as a whole, I infer that the Tribunal's reference to "over recent years" is a reference to the years covered by the 2014 and 2015 Reports, which would have included a comparison back to 2013. Without tendering the 2014 Report, the applicant cannot make good its submission that the first two sentences are irrational. It is plausible that, when compared with 2013, each of 2014 and 2015 may have shown a decline in sectarian violence in Kurram Agency, even if 2015 showed a higher level of sectarian violence in comparison to 2014.
47 There is a further difficulty with the applicant's criticism of the second sentence of paragraph 56. The applicant's criticism assumes that the second sentence only concerns Kurram Agency, and the sentence conveys that incidents in Kurram Agency continued to decline and the majority of casualties were militants. However, reading the first two sentences of paragraph 56 together and in the context of the remainder of the paragraph, a reasonable interpretation of the second sentence is that the Tribunal was seeking to convey that, while Kurram Agency remained turbulent, incidents in the FATA continued to decline. That interpretation of the Tribunal's reasons is supported by an examination of the pages of the FATA Annual Security Reports that are given as a reference. As already noted, the applicant failed to tender the 2014 Report, so it is not possible to have regard to that source. Nevertheless, pages 5 and 25 of the 2015 Report, which is referenced, are consistent with that interpretation of the second sentence. Page 25 states that Kurram Agency remained turbulent during 2015 while page 5 states (in respect of the FATA generally):
Almost every agency of FATA faced subversive activities by the militants in one way or the other. However, compared to the previous year of 2014, a significant decline in militancy and counter militancy related incident were reported.
48 That interpretation of the second sentence is also consistent with the remainder of paragraph 56. The third sentence of paragraph 56 states that the 2015 report noted that while incidents were registered in almost every Agency, there was nevertheless a significant decline in militant incidents (40%) in the FATA region since 2014. The footnote to that sentence also references page 5 of the 2015 Report which contains a sentence to that effect. In context, the third sentence is an elaboration of the second sentence, which supports a conclusion that the second sentence is primarily concerned with the FATA generally (while also noting that the Kurram Agency remained turbulent).
49 The fourth sentence of paragraph 56 cites the 2015 Report as stating that, after a relatively peaceful 2014, there was a 'surge' in militant activity in Kurram in the first quarter of 2015 (17 incidents) but incidents (both militant and counter-militant) in the remaining three quarters numbered nine or less. The footnote to that sentence references pages 18-19 of the 2015 Report which contains information precisely to that effect. The fourth sentence is also an elaboration of the second sentence by reinforcing that the Kurram Agency remained turbulent.
50 The fifth sentence of paragraph 56 follows on from the fourth sentence and states that many of the reported incidents (in Kurram Agency) were in central/lower Kurram, as opposed to upper Kurram where Parachinar is located. Again, the footnote references pages 18-19 of the 2015 Report (as well as pages 18-19 and 46 of the 2014 Report which was not adduced in evidence) which contains information to the effect stated by the Tribunal.
51 The sixth sentence of paragraph 56 cites a UNHCR report from April 2014 that concluded that general peace had been restored in Upper and Lower Kurram. The UNHCR report was not adduced in evidence, but the applicant did not seek to impugn the Tribunal's summary of that report.
52 It can be accepted that the 2015 Report records that sectarian violence increased in Kurram Agency between 2014 and 2015. The comparison graph at page 25 of the Report shows that there was a large increase in the number of militants killed and injured between 2014 and 2015, although only a small increase in the number of security forces killed and injured. The number of civilians killed appears to have decreased in that period, although there was a large increase in the number of civilians injured. However, the Tribunal's reasons, read as a whole, do not contradict that information.
53 For the foregoing reasons, I do not accept the applicant's contention that the first two sentences of paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons are irrational or illogical.
54 Even assuming that those sentences reveal that a factual error had been made by the Tribunal, the applicant's contentions fall well short of establishing that the Tribunal's decision is irrational or illogical. As set out earlier, the Tribunal's reasons show a detailed consideration of extensive country information concerning the security situation both in FATA and Kurram Agency ([46]-[58]), and of submissions and country information advanced by the applicant ([60]-[65]). Apart from the criticisms made of the first two sentences of paragraph 56 of the Tribunal's reasons, the applicant did not seek to impugn the Tribunal's extensive factual findings made on the basis of that country information. Significantly, the Tribunal made the following findings that were not challenged by the applicant:
(a) In the most recent DFAT report titled "Thematic Report on Shias in Pakistan", dated January 2016, DFAT assessed that there was a low level of sectarian violence overall in the FATA, although the level of generalised violence varied throughout the FATA. The violence was greatest in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies because of ongoing military activity associated with Operation Zarb-e-Azb. DFAT assessed that there was a low level of generalised violence in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies (at [55]).
(b) The FRC's first quarter security report for 2016 recorded a reduction in militant incidents in Kurram Agency from January-March 2016 (44% less than in the previous quarter with a total of five casualties, being three militants killed and two civilians injured) (at [58]).
(c) The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) Security Report for April to June 2016 stated that there was no sectarian violence against Shias in FATA in the second quarter of 2016. While the most recent CRSS report (for the third quarter of 2016) noted an upsurge in violence in FATA, it does not refer to any reported incidents in Kurram Agency (at [59]).
55 On the basis of its extensive survey of the available country information, the Tribunal concluded that, although there continued to be sectarian and generalised violence in Kurram Agency and FATA, the weight of the country information indicated that there had been a significant improvement in the situation in Kurram Agency and that this trend was ongoing ([66]-[67]). Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm on his return to Kurram Agency, either due to his specific characteristics or to the generalised violence in that area of Pakistan ([71]-[73]). Having regard to the Tribunal's reasons as a whole, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion was not open to it, or that there was no logical connection between the Tribunal's conclusion and the evidence referred to by the Tribunal. It is not the task of this Court, nor was it the task of the primary judge below, to assess whether the Tribunal's conclusion was the most preferable of the conclusions open to it on the evidence.
56 For largely the same reasons, I do not accept the applicant's alternative formulation of ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal, that the Tribunal must have misapplied the tests for establishing a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for the purpose of ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. The applicant accepted that the Tribunal had correctly stated those principles at paragraph 12 of its reasons, which was as follows:
Fourth, an applicant's fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be a 'well-founded' fear. This adds an objective requirement to the requirement that an applicant must in fact hold such a fear. A person has a 'well-founded fear' of persecution under the Convention if they have genuine fear founded upon a 'real chance' of being persecuted for a Convention stipulated reason. A 'real chance' is one that is not remote or insubstantial or a far-fetched possibility. A person can have a well-founded fear of persecution even though the possibility of the persecution occurring is well below 50 per cent.
57 That statement reflects the principles stated in Chan at 389 (Mason CJ), 397-8 (Dawson J), 407 (Toohey J) and 429 (McHugh J), Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572-3 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), and SZQRB at [245]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ, with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at [297] and Flick J at [342] agreed).
58 The fact that the Tribunal correctly stated the principles is not, of course, the end of the inquiry. The substantive part of the decision maker's reasons, rather than recitations in introductions or conclusions, will provide a more reliable guide as to whether the Tribunal applied the correct test. The Court is concerned with the reality, not the appearance, of the Tribunal's reasoning: CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 268 FCR 362 (CGA15) at [26] (Murphy, Mortimer and O'Callaghan JJ).
59 For the reasons already explained, however, the Tribunal's reasons demonstrate that it considered in detail the evidence before it and, having regard to that evidence, undertook an assessment of the level of risk that the applicant would face on his return to Kurram Agency. The Tribunal formed the view that the situation had improved significantly in Kurram Agency and that the applicant did not have a profile that would put him at particular risk of harm (especially in circumstances where neither the applicant nor his family had been personally targeted by militants). For that reason, the risk to the applicant did not rise to the level required. Contrary to the applicant's submission, that conclusion is not inconsistent with the Tribunal's substantial acceptance of the applicant's evidence that he and members of his family have witnessed or been the victims of violence against Shias in Parachinar and in Peshawar (in respect of which the Tribunal found that the applicant and his family were not personally targeted), nor with the Tribunal's finding that a level of violence continued to exist in Kurram Agency at the time of its decision in 2016. The applicant's disagreement with the Tribunal's evaluation of the evidence does not demonstrate that the Tribunal misapplied the tests for the grant of a protection visa.
60 For those reasons, I reject ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal. The primary judge was correct to dismiss those grounds of review.