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[2016] VSC 707
Supreme Court of Victoria
2016-11-28
SLOSS J
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2016] VSC 707 (First Revision: 15 September 2020)
CONTRACT - Asset Sale Deed - Business sold as a going concern - Deed contained reciprocal supply / purchase obligations - Purchaser was obliged to obtain all supplies of raw materials from Vendor (cl 12.1) - Vendor was obliged to obtain 'all its' supplies of finished products from Purchaser (cl 12.2) - Construction of cl 12.1 (supply) and cl 12.2 (purchase) obligations - Whether Vendor breached cl 12.2 obligation to obtain 'all its' supplies of finished products from Purchaser - Whether subject work was encompassed within cl 12.2 - If breach is made out on what basis are damages to be assessed - Expert evidence - Which methodology is to be applied.
CONTRACT - Asset Sale Deed - Business sold as a going concern - Deed contained reciprocal supply / purchase obligations - Purchaser was obliged to obtain all raw materials from Vendor (cl 12.1) - Vendor was obliged to obtain 'all its' supplies of finished products from Purchaser (cl 12.2) - Parent company of Vendor not bound by Deed - Whether the Deed as executed makes commercial sense - Whether additional supply agreement is to be implied between Purchaser and the parent company of Vendor containing terms equivalent to cl 12.1 and cl 12.2 of the Deed - Construction of cl 12.2 obligation under the implied supply agreement - What purchase requirements (and of whom) were captured by cl 12.2 obligation.
ESTOPPEL BY CONVENTION - Alternatively to implied supply agreement - Whether during negotiations for Asset Sale Deed, Purchaser and parent company of Vendor adopted the assumption that the effect of the Deed would be that parent company of Vendor would be bound by cl 12.2 obligation - Whether Purchaser and parent company of Vendor conducted their relationship on the basis of such mutual assumption - Whether parent company of Vendor is estopped from denying it was bound by terms equivalent to those alleged in the implied supply agreement.
CONTRACT - Deed of Accession - Novation of Vendor's rights and obligations under Asset Sale Deed to parent company of Vendor - Whether parent company of Vendor breached cl 12.2 obligation to obtain 'all its' supplies of finished products from Purchaser.
CONTRACT - Asset Sale Deed - Deed contained clause that Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of another party without first obtaining written consent of Vendor (cl 16.4) - Relevant concept of 'change of control' - Whether Purchaser breached cl 16.4 - Rights available to Vendor in the event that the Purchaser is found to have breached cl 16.4 - s 50AA Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
ANSHUN ESTOPPEL - Asset Sale Deed - Whether Anshun estoppel operates to preclude Vendor and parent company of Vendor from claiming that the Purchaser breached cl 16.4.
CONTRACT - Asset Sale Deed - Deed contained indemnity clause (cl 11.3) whereby the indemnifier agreed to indemnify the Vendor in respect of all 'Claims' - Construction of 'Claims' - Whether 'Claims' means third party claims.
CONTRACT - Fixed and floating charge - Chargor granted fixed and floating charge to secure payment of the 'Secured Money' - What amounts and liabilities are captured by 'Secured Money' - Whether Chargor made a valid and effective tender under the charge - In what circumstances is the Chargor entitled to a discharge of the charge - Whether interest is payable.
For the Plaintiffs by Counterclaim and Defendants by Cross-Claim
For the Defendants by Counterclaim and Plaintiff by Cross-Claim
1 This proceeding, involving the trial of a counterclaim and cross-claim, forms part of a suite of litigation that was commenced several years ago between Amcor Limited ('Amcor') and several related companies on the one hand and a number of former Amcor executives and their associated corporate entities on the other. Two proceedings, known as 'the Hodgson proceeding'[1] and 'the Barnes proceeding'[2] respectively, were heard concurrently in a joint trial on questions of liability that took place before Vickery J in 2011 (the 'principal proceeding').
2 Relevantly, both the present counterclaim and the cross-claim are brought in the Barnes' proceeding. The counterclaim is brought by the fourth defendant, Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) (referred to throughout as 'Achilla'), a corporate entity associated with Mr Craig Holihan (a former Amcor executive and the second defendant in the Barnes' proceeding), and another entity associated with him, ACB Australia Pty Ltd ('ACB Co Purchaser'), against two Amcor entities, Orora Limited (formerly Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd) (referred to throughout as 'APA') and ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd ('ACB Co Vendor'). The cross-claim is brought by APA against Achilla, ACB Co Purchaser and Mr Holihan. For convenience, throughout these reasons I will adopt the descriptions the parties used when referring to themselves, and generally refer to them as 'the Amcor parties' and 'the Holihan parties' respectively.
3 The matters raised in the counterclaim and cross-claim have their genesis in the sale by the Amcor parties of two businesses. The first, the 'Service Packaging Business', was sold in February 2002 (and was the subject of the 'First Sale Agreement'). The second, the 'ACB Business', was sold in 2003 (and was the subject of the 'Second Sale Agreement'). Events concerning or arising from the sale of the ACB Business are the focus of both the counterclaim and the cross-claim.
4 At all relevant times, APA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Amcor, was the corporate vehicle for conducting the Australasian corrugated packaging operations of Amcor. One of the divisions of APA was called 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia' ('AFP'), which produced and supplied corrugated cardboard packaging products. APA was also the sole shareholder of ACB Co Vendor.
5 Prior to the sale, ACB Co Vendor owned and operated an 'in-house', 'short-run' manufacturing operation or 'specialty' packaging business. The business, which was known as the 'ACB Business', operated from large factory premises at Wetherill Park in Western Sydney. The ACB Business produced and supplied packaging products made from corrugated cardboard sheets, usually in the form of customised packaging or non-standard boxes, and the business obtained its supplies of corrugated cardboard sheets from the AFP plants at Revesby and Smithfield in New South Wales. The ACB business catered mainly for smaller customers, or large customers who had specialised box requirements where the quantity of the product required was too small for them to be produced economically in large-scale production facilities, or was 'fiddly work' that would cause bottlenecks in a higher-speed, lower-cost production plant.
6 Before the sale, the largest part of the work undertaken by the ACB Business was in performing what was referred to as 'outside manufacturing enterprise' ('OME') work for customers of the AFP division. The ACB Business also did a limited amount of work for other non-AFP customers. Within Amcor, the outside manufacturing work that was sourced from a third party was referred to as 'OME work' and the third parties that supplied it, were referred to as 'OMEs'. However, the work that the ACB Business did for AFP or for customers of AFP was also referred to as 'OME work', even though it was done 'in-house' by an Amcor business. Relevantly, before the sale took place, there were at least eight alternative suppliers (or OMEs) who performed OME work for AFP or for customers of AFP.
7 During the 2001/2002 financial year Amcor was considering the fate of the ACB Business after internal reviews had shown it to be an underperforming business in terms of its 'return on funds employed' benchmark. At that time, Mr Craig Holihan, who was then employed as the general manager of the ACB Business, and reporting to Mr Trevor Barnes,[3] expressed interest in purchasing the ACB Business if it were to be closed down. Mr Barnes communicated Mr Holihan's interest to Mr Hodgson, whom he reported to, and in about mid-2002, Mr Hodgson spoke to his superior, Mr Peter Brown, the managing director of Amcor Australasia,[4] about Mr Holihan's interest. Mr Brown said that if Mr Holihan put in a proposal, they would look at it. Encouraged by that indication, Mr Holihan put forward a proposal, and in late 2002 and early 2003, negotiations took place which culminated in the sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan.
8 The sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan (and corporate entities associated with him) was effected by an Asset Sale Deed executed on 2 June 2003 between ACB Co Vendor and the Holihan entities (ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan), for a base purchase price of $1 million (plus stock) payable by instalments within five years of completion (the 'Second Sale Agreement'). As part of those arrangements, ACB Co Purchaser also granted a charge to APA and ACB Co Vendor, by way of security, and Achilla undertook to enter into a sub-lease with APA of the factory premises at Wetherill Park where the business was conducted.
9 An important feature of the Second Sale Agreement was clause 12, which entrenched counterpart obligations between the parties concerning the supply/purchase of raw materials on the one hand and the purchase/supply of finished products on the other, in each case for a period of five years. Under clause 12:
(a) the Vendor undertook to continue to supply the ACB Business (under the new ownership) with supplies of raw materials at prices based on 'D & D' (direct and distribution) costs to the Vendor, and the ACB Business would obtain all such supplies from the Vendor, save in the case of products the ACB Business manufactures for itself, and it would not, during that period, purchase or procure the supply of raw materials from any other party, other than due to the Vendor's inability 'to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability'; and
(b) Achilla (as the trading entity of the ACB Business under new ownership) undertook to supply products to the Vendor at prices based on 'D & D' costs to Achilla, and the Vendor would obtain all its OME supplies of products from Achilla, and would not during that period purchase or procure the supply of products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability 'to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.'
10 On 30 July 2003 or thereabouts, most of the assets of the ACB Business were transferred by ACB Co Vendor to ACB Co Purchaser, and Achilla (as the trading entity) began to operate the ACB Business using those assets. For the first year or so after the sale, the arrangement seemed to be working well. But in late 2004, Amcor became aware for the first time of secret arrangements apparently in place between Mr Holihan and other former executives of Amcor or former senior managers of Amcor's AFP corrugating division, namely Messrs James Hodgson, Trevor Barnes, Ian Sangster, Roger Bayley and Albert Mihelic, whereby they had agreed to take a stake in the ACB Business. Thereafter, the business relationship became disharmonious, and in the years that followed, the amount of work performed by the ACB Business for the Amcor parties decreased, and OME work continued to be given to at least eight alternative suppliers.
11 In March 2005, the Amcor parties made arrangements with the Holihan parties for APA to effectively 'step into the shoes of' ACB Co Vendor for the purposes of the Second Sale Agreement. To facilitate that course, the parties to the Second Sale Agreement, namely ACB Co Vendor, ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan, entered into a 'Deed of Accession' with APA (as transferee). The Deed of Accession provided for the novation of the rights, covenants, undertakings and obligations of ACB Co Vendor as Vendor under the Second Sale Agreement on terms that APA be substituted for ACB Co Vendor in all capacities and for all purposes under the Second Sale Agreement, with effect on and from 21 March 2005, and that ACB Co Vendor be released. Accordingly, by virtue of the Deed of Accession, with effect from 21 March 2005, APA became bound to 'observe, perform, be bound by and comply with' the provisions of the Second Sale Agreement binding on the Vendor, and 'shall enjoy the rights and benefits of the Vendor' thereunder.
12 In July 2008, the Second Sale Agreement came to an end by effluxion of time and the arrangements were not renewed. Towards the end of the five year term, a dispute arose between the parties concerning the payment of the final instalment of purchase price that was due on 31 July 2008, with the result that payment was not effected and so the charge remains on foot.
13 In their counterclaim, the Holihan parties seek damages for alleged breaches of the supply arrangements in place between the parties as part of the sale of the ACB Business.[5] They also seek a discharge of the charge that was entered into contemporaneously with the sale, and to recover amounts that they contend Achilla was overcharged for raw materials.
14 The gist of the Holihan parties' substantive case on the counterclaim is that it was a breach of contract for the Amcor parties to send OME work to the eight alternative suppliers during the five year term of the agreement. They claim that there were 1,913 jobs that were sent by the Amcor parties (including the division of APA known as 'Amcor Displays') to suppliers other than Achilla, and they now seek to recover the profit that they say Achilla was entitled to make on that work. The breach of contract contended for, however, is not pleaded as a breach of the Second Sale Agreement. Rather the Holihan parties plead there was a breach of an 'implied supply agreement', the terms of which they say were identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, save that under the implied supply agreement, APA had the rights and obligations that ACB Co Vendor had under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.[6]
15 In essence, the Holihan parties maintain that the written terms of the Second Sale Agreement failed to embody the supply agreement that all of the parties understood they had entered into, or the arrangements that they acted upon. The Holihan parties contend that the facts demonstrate that the parties always intended APA to be the counterparty to the supply obligations embodied in clause 12, and that throughout the negotiations that culminated in the Second Sale Agreement, the role of APA (and the AFP division) as the party bound by the supply obligations was taken for granted by those doing the negotiating. Further, they say, unless construed and interpreted in that way, the arrangements would have made no commercial sense. That is because, under the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Vendor had sold all of its assets and terminated all of its employees, such that following the sale, it was unlikely to have any OME requirements, nor any capacity to supply raw materials to Achilla. In those circumstances, the Holihan parties contend that the law (via an implied contract, or an estoppel to like effect) recognises a contract between Achilla and APA effectively in the same terms as the purchase obligation[7] and the sale obligation[8] set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
16 The Amcor parties respond by contending that the Second Sale Agreement represents the entirety of the agreement reached between the parties, and that APA did not become a party to, or bound by, the Second Sale Agreement until the Deed of Accession was executed. They submit that, absent a claim for rectification, the alleged un-commerciality of the Second Sale Agreement and the alleged post-contractual conduct have no traction in the face of the clear terms of the Second Sale Agreement. Further, they say pre-contractual negotiations cannot support an estoppel by convention that is inconsistent with the terms of a written contract.
17 The Amcor parties also refute the Holihan parties' claim that under the Second Sale Agreement the ACB Business was entitled to perform all of the OME work requirements of the business known as 'Amcor Displays'. They contend that Amcor Displays was distinct from the business operated by ACB Co Vendor prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement, and that Amcor Displays' OME work requirements were not encompassed within the supply obligations under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
18 In respect of the Holihan parties' claim that APA charged Achilla prices that were higher than it was entitled to charge under the contractual 'D & D' formula, the Amcor parties admit there was some overcharging but say that it is not established in every instance alleged. In those cases where there was overcharging, the Amcor parties say that Achilla avoided any loss by passing on those overcharges to its customers by pricing its own products based on the prices Achilla was charged by APA. Further, the Amcor parties submit that in the process of investigating Achilla's claims of overcharging, several instances of undercharging by APA have been revealed which they effectively seek to set-off against any amount found due to Achilla.
19 As to the charge given by Achilla in favour of ACB Co Vendor and APA, the Holihan parties contend that they offered to pay the final instalment of $300,000 well in advance of the due date, and sought a release of the charge. The Amcor parties refused to accept the Holihan parties' tender in circumstances where there was litigation on foot between them and, in their view, no basis upon which the charge should be released. In effect they submit that there was no obligation upon them to discharge the charge because, at all material times, it operated to secure moneys potentially owed to the Amcor parties by ACB Co Purchaser as a result of the litigation Amcor had commenced against its former executives.
20 The Amcor parties, by their cross-claim, seek damages for alleged breaches of a change of control provision set out in clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement. Clause 16.4(i) provided that '[t]he provisions of this clause 16.4 apply only for so long as the Charge remains in force or is not discharged.' The relevant concept of 'control' for the purposes of the Second Sale Agreement is one defined by reference to section 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
21 The Amcor parties submit, by reference to facts as found by Vickery J in the principal proceeding, that there was a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla in both May/June 2004 and in October 2005, which ACB Co Purchaser 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed]' without first informing ACB Co Vendor or APA and obtaining their consent, in breach of clause 16.4. They submit that the evidence shows that at each alleged change of control, ACB Co Vendor and/or APA would have terminated the clause 12 supply agreement in accordance with clause 16.1, or in reliance upon its rights at general law. Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend that had ACB Co Vendor or APA not been deprived of the opportunity to terminate the supply agreement at or about the date of the relevant change of control, any alleged breaches of contract by them after that date would not have occurred.
22 The Amcor parties also dispute the Holihan parties' contention that clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement operated in any way to fetter the right to terminate the supply obligation found in clause 16.1 or under the general law. Rather, they submit that clause 16.4(ii) provides ACB Co Vendor (and APA, following entry into the Deed of Accession) with an alternative and more expansive option in the event of breach.
23 The Holihan parties deny that there was any change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in May/June 2004 or in October 2005. They submit that when the whole of the evidence, including the findings made by Vickery J, is examined, it is clear that none of Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic or Sangster was ever in a position to exercise the degree of practical influence necessary to establish that a change of control had occurred. But if, contrary to their submission, the Court finds that there was a change of control, they submit it was not 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed]' by ACB Co Purchaser because in the circumstances alleged, ACB Co Purchaser had no ability to prevent it. Further, if the Court finds, contrary to their submission, that ACB Co Purchaser had 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed]' a change of control, the Holihan parties contend that APA would not have issued a cure notice, but even if it had, Achilla would have paid out the purchase price, thereby denuding the charge of any operative force and effectively denying APA any ability to terminate for breach under clause 16.4.
24 The Holihan parties also take issue with the loss claimed by APA in that it includes the loss of the chance to terminate the employment of Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Mihelic, Bayley and Sangster and thereby avoid payments made to them in 2004.
The counterclaim was scheduled to be heard as part of the trial of the principal proceeding but was not reached
25 When the trial of the principal proceeding commenced before Vickery J on 30 March 2011, it was scheduled to include the hearing (on 25 and 26 July 2011) of the counterclaim brought by Mr Holihan and the corporate entities associated with him ('the Achilla counterclaim'). On 29 June 2011, however, the dates for the hearing of the Achilla counterclaim were vacated - apparently due to a shortage of time - and it was adjourned sine die.[9]
26 The gist of the Amcor case that was run against Mr Barnes and the Holihan parties at the trial before Vickery J was that they participated in the sale of the two businesses, the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, 'in circumstances which amounted to a breach of their statutory and fiduciary duties to Amcor which, by reason of the sale being on uncommercial terms, Amcor suffered loss and damage and Barnes and the Holihan parties made profits, and Barnes and the Holihan parties "obtained benefits and other benefits".'[10]
Following the delivery of judgment in the principal proceeding, the Holihan parties made substantial amendments to their counterclaim and the Amcor parties commenced a cross-claim
27 Justice Vickery delivered judgment in the principal proceeding on 20 March 2012 ('the principal judgment').[11] Following delivery of the principal judgment, further interlocutory steps were undertaken by the parties, including by way of substantial amendment of both the Achilla counterclaim and the Amcor defence to counterclaim. Also, Amcor subsequently sought and obtained (in September 2013) leave to bring their 'change of control' cross-claim against the Holihan parties, the substance of which is set out above.
28 As a result, new pleas have been added that were not present when the principal proceeding was heard and determined. Furthermore, with the separation of the hearing of the Achilla counterclaim and the associated Amcor cross-claim from the trial of the principal proceeding, and the introduction of fresh claims, the Court has now heard a substantial body of evidence that is additional to the evidence that was adduced before Vickery J, but in circumstances where much of the relevant background to the entry into the sale agreements and the arrangements in place between the former executives has already been the subject of findings made by his Honour on the basis of the evidence adduced before him. Not surprisingly, this situation has given rise to questions of issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel in the context of the current hearing.
29 The Holihan parties also pointed to a further complication in this regard, arising from the fact that after the delivery of the principal judgment, when dealing with a claim for an account of profits sought by Amcor, his Honour appeared to 're-visit' or comment upon some of the findings he had made in the principal judgment. This took place in a context where, following the trial on liability and delivery of the principal judgment, Amcor sought leave to amend its pleadings by making fresh claims against each of Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan personally for an account of profits, based on findings made in the principal judgment. Vickery J refused Amcor's application for leave to make the proposed amendments. In his ruling, delivered on 20 September 2012,[12] his Honour noted that the pecuniary relief sought by Amcor against each of Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan in the Third Amended Statement of Claim upon which the trial was conducted 'comprised damages, further or alternatively equitable compensation and interest' and did not seek an account of profits. Relevantly, in the context of the claims made against Mr Holihan, Vickery J observed:
[128] Again, in the Principal Judgment the Court made a number of findings against Holihan which, on a careful analysis invited by his counsel of the pleadings, the documents submitted before and during the trial and the trial submissions, went beyond the case in fact put by Amcor. The Amcor case at trial against Holihan in essence was: Holihan participated in the sale of the ACB Business under the Second Sale Agreement in circumstances which amounted to a breach of his statutory and fiduciary duties to Amcor, and by reason of the sale being on uncommercial terms, Amcor suffered loss and damage, Holihan made profits, and Holihan 'obtained benefits and other benefits'.
[129] Again, this was the fundamental case that was pleaded against Holihan. It was also the way in which Amcor conducted its case against him at trial.[13]
[142] I am satisfied that the findings in the Principal Judgment made against Barnes and Holihan which went beyond the case advanced by Amcor at trial and which now provide content for the new allegations in the proposed Fourth Amended Statement of Claim, should not provide the foundation for any relief granted to Amcor.
[143] There should be no order directed to Barnes or Holihan or Holihan's companies for relief by way of an account of profits or otherwise based upon these findings.[14]
Issues for determination at the trial of the Achilla counterclaim and Amcor cross-claim
31 On 13 March 2015, Vickery J made orders in preparation for the trial of the Achilla counterclaim and Amcor parties' cross-claim, including an order that 'pursuant to section 50 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010, the trial of the proceeding be conducted by reference to the statement of issues annexed to this order.' The annexed 'Joint Statement of Issues' set out a summary of the issues that the parties consider to arise from the pleadings. This document was amended by the parties from time to time, in consultation with one another, during the course of the trial.
32 In its final iteration, the Joint Statement of Issues occupied 8 pages, and the twenty or so issues were identified and arranged under the following headings:
33 The parties identified and listed the 'key issues' in dispute, as follows:
The hearing of the counterclaim and the cross-claim
34 The hearing of the Achilla counterclaim and the Amcor parties' cross-claim proceeded against that background. The Holihan parties were represented by Mr Maiden and Ms Murphy, instructed by Mills Oakley, and the Amcor parties were represented by Dr McNicol QC and Mr Tran, instructed by Gilbert + Tobin. During the hearing, Counsel for the respective parties pointed to passages in the principal judgment and other interlocutory rulings and decisions of both Vickery J and the Court of Appeal that they sought to rely upon, often contending that they were findings that gave rise to an issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel. Written submissions were filed by the parties addressing the paragraphs of the various judgments which they contended gave rise to an issue estoppel, and oral submissions were made, as and when required, by Counsel for the respective parties. The Holihan parties also stated formally that, for the purposes of narrowing the issues in dispute on the cross-claim, and without prejudice to their rights to challenge the findings on appeal, there were (identified) paragraphs of the principal judgment to which no objection is made and they would not object to the Amcor parties relying on the findings made by Vickery J at paragraphs [1087], [1088], [1147] and [1149] of the principal judgment.[15]
35 Save in respect of some discrete paragraphs said to be relevant to the Amcor parties' cross-claim, which the Court ruled did give rise to an issue estoppel (see below under 'change of control'), the general approach adopted by the Court for the purposes of the trial of the counterclaim and cross-claim was that the Court would have regard to the findings made by Vickery J as relevant background but not treat them as determinative of the issues before the Court on the hearing of the counterclaim and cross-claim.
Factual background to the asset sale transactions as found by Vickery J
36 Before turning to consider the host of issues formulated in respect of the counterclaim and cross-claim, it is convenient to set out in a summary way the factual background to the two asset sale transactions, namely the sale of assets of the Service Packaging Business (the First Sale Agreement) and of the ACB Business (the Second Sale Agreement), as described by Vickery J in the principal judgment.
37 Amcor is a publicly-listed multinational packaging company. Its Australian operations comprise six discrete operating businesses - Corrugating/AFPA, Metals, Plastics, Cartons & Sacks, Paper and Glass - which are conducted through a number of divisions, and a group of corporate entities. Amcor's corrugated packaging business, which focussed on the manufacture of cardboard corrugated products, principally cardboard boxes, was the largest division in Australasia. It had its head office in Melbourne and operated 14 corrugated box plants throughout Australia and New Zealand.
38 At all relevant times, APA was the corporate vehicle for conducting the Australasian corrugated packaging operations of Amcor, with a division - AFP - that produced and supplied corrugated cardboard packaging products. Relevantly, APA trades as Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia ('Corrugating/AFPA').
39 Relevantly, APA was the parent company of, and owned all of the issued shares in:
(a) Specialty Packaging Group Pty Ltd. (formerly Service Containers Pty Ltd (ACN 005 319 666) ('Service Containers') - the vendor of the assets of the Service Packaging Business on the terms of the First Sale Agreement.
(b) ACN 002693843 Box Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd) (i.e., ACB Co Vendor) - the vendor of the assets of the ACB Business on the terms of the Second Sale Agreement.
40 Amcor holds all of the issued shares in APA and was relevantly the ultimate holding company of each of ACB Co Vendor and Service Containers.
Neither Mr Holihan nor any of the other former executives that were named as defendants (namely Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic) was a director of APA.
42 APA's Corrugating operations (i.e., 'Corrugating/AFPA') comprised several departments: Sales and Marketing, Operations, Commercial, New Zealand Box, Packaging Solutions, and Human Resources. The principal business activity conducted was the production of corrugated cardboard products, including cardboard boxes and the like. Mr Hodgson was the Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA. He reported to the managing director of Amcor Australia, Mr Peter Brown, who in turn reported to the CEO and Managing Director of Amcor, Mr Russell Jones. Several of the other defendants in the principal proceeding were departmental general managers of Corrugating/AFPA, as follows:
(a) Mr Sangster (based in Queensland) - Sales and Marketing;
(b) Mr Barnes (based in New South Wales) - Operations;
(e) Mr Mihelic, General Manager, Packaging Solutions (based in Burwood).
43 In addition, Mr Clayton held the position of Group General Manager, Finance & Operations. Mr Clayton reported to Mr Brown. Mr Parker, the General Manager of the Commercial department of Corrugating/AFPA, reported directly to Mr Hodgson with an indirect line of responsibility to Mr Clayton.
44 The structure of Corrugating/AFPA at relevant times is set out in Schedule 1 to the principal judgment. For convenience, it is reproduced as Schedule 1 to these reasons.
Speciality Packaging Group Pty Ltd (formerly Service Containers Pty Ltd)
45 Prior to the sale of the Service Packaging Business to Mr Ian Hottes on 2 February 2002, that business formed part of the Corrugating/AFPA division and was conducted by Service Containers.
46 When the First Sale Agreement with Mr Hottes was entered into, the directors of Service Containers were Mr Clayton (from April 2001 to July 2008), Mr Hodgson (from August 2001 to November 2004), Mr Brown (from February 1996 to September 2003), and Mr Lachal (from April 2001 to July 2008). Mr Lewis was the secretary from December 2001 [to the present].
47 Apart from Mr Hodgson, neither Mr Holihan nor any of the other former executives named as defendants to the principal proceeding was a director of Service Containers.
48 Prior to the sale, Service Containers conducted two businesses: Amcor Displays, a graphics and displays business, and the Service Packaging Business. Each of the businesses was situated in NSW.
49 Mr Hottes managed both the Service Packaging Business and Amcor Displays at premises situated in Revesby, New South Wales, and from 10 January 2000, he reported to Mr Barnes.
50 Justice Vickery described the two businesses as follows:
[46] Amcor Displays was a graphics and displays business.
[47] The Service Packaging Business had two discrete aspects to its business operations. First, it received orders from its customers for the supply of finished corrugated products and corrugated boxes. It sourced its supply of corrugated cardboard from Amcor's corrugated packaging division. It charged a premium on the cost of supply to it by Amcor. Second, it brokered the sale to its customers of a range of plastic wraps, tapes, stock boxes and general packaging which Amcor did not manufacture and which the Service Packaging Business sourced externally.
[48] The Displays Business was profitable, however the Service Packaging Business was not. The turnover of the Service Packaging Business in or about February 2002 was approximately $3.0 million. This was less than 0.5% of Corrugating's Australasian turnover of about $900 million. It had trading stock of approximately $400,000 and book assets of about $80,000 representing less than 0.1% of Corrugating's assets. It had three employees, not including Hottes. It was a non-core and underperforming business for Amcor. [16]
51 Mr Hottes controlled Service Packaging Pty Ltd, the corporate vehicle named as purchaser of the assets of the Service Packaging Business. In April 2001 Mr Hottes was diagnosed with cancer and he had major surgery in May 2001. He recovered sufficiently to return to work in late 2001, however, the cancer returned in mid-2003 and he became very sick and was hospitalized for 55 days and on life support. From mid-2003 until his death, Mr Hottes rarely attended work. Throughout this period Ms Dettmar, who had been the business manager of the Service Packaging Business since 1996, continued to manage the business.
52 In 2003, given the infirmity of Mr Hottes, his wife, Mrs Marlene Hottes, was made a director of Service Packaging Pty Ltd. Mr Hottes died on 5 August 2004.
53 Prior to the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties in June 2003, ACB Co Vendor conducted the ACB Business as part of the Corrugating/AFPA division. Prior to the sale, Mr Holihan was the General Manager of the ACB Business. He reported to Mr Barnes, who was the General Manager Central Region, at least until November 2002. Mr Barnes in turn reported to Mr Hodgson, the Group General Manager, AFPA/Corrugating.
54 Neither Mr Holihan, nor any of the other the former executives named as defendants in the principal proceeding, was a director of ACB Co Vendor.
55 Mr Barnes was the first defendant in the Barnes Proceeding. He was employed by Amcor from January 1998 until he resigned on 28 September 2004, with effect on 28 October 2004. Vickery J found that during the period of his employment with Amcor, Mr Barnes held the following management roles:
(a) from January 1998 until early 1999 he was employed as a Site Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging (New South Wales) for the Smithfield site;
(b) from early 1999 until 1 January 2000 he was employed as General Manager Operations AFP (New South Wales), reporting to David Ley;
(c) from 1 January 2000 until June 2000, he was employed as Regional General Manager, AFP (New South Wales), reporting to John Morriss and, from February 2000, to Mr Hodgson;
(d) from June 2000 until November 2002, he was General Manager, AFP, Central Region, reporting to Mr Hodgson;
(e) from July 2002 until his resignation in September 2004, he was employed as General Manager Australian Operations (a position held concurrently with his management of the Central Region until November 2002), also reporting to Mr Hodgson; and
(f) in January 2003 he was additionally appointed to the role of project director supervising a large team of implementation consultants.[17]
56 Thus, from February 2000 until his resignation in September 2004, Mr Barnes reported to Mr Hodgson.[18]
57 Mr Holihan was employed by Amcor from December 1988 until his resignation on 30 July 2003. Whilst employed with Amcor, Mr Holihan undertook the following management roles:
(a) from 4 December 1998 until 13 October 2000, he was employed as Southern Region Specialty Packaging Manager, reporting to Mr Morriss; and
(b) from 13 October 2000 until the sale of the ACB Business and the corresponding cessation of Mr Holihan's employment, he was employed as General Manager-Small Businesses, NSW, reporting to Mr Barnes. Shortly after Mr Holihan took over the General Manager role, he also took over the role as site manager of the ACB Business.
58 Justice Vickery found that Mr Holihan's employment with Amcor and its subsidiaries ended when his trading company, Achilla, began to trade with Amcor on 31 July 2003 in accordance with the terms of the Second Sale Agreement executed on 2 June 2003.[19]
59 ACB Co Purchaser was registered by Mr Holihan on 23 April 2003 for the purpose of holding the assets of the ACB Business that were purchased from Amcor pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement. Upon registration, and at all material times thereafter, Mr Holihan was the sole director and secretary of ACB Co Purchaser. Mr Holihan held the one ordinary share of ACB Co Purchaser that was issued in that company on registration. On 5 September 2003 a further 999 shares were issued to LeoRose Pty Limited ('LeoRose') and the share held by Mr Holihan was transferred to LeoRose.
60 Achilla was registered by Mr Holihan on 23 April 2003 to be the trading company for the ACB Business post sale. From 1 August 2003, Achilla used the assets held by ACB Co Purchaser to conduct the ACB Business.
61 Upon registration, and at all material times thereafter, Mr Holihan was the sole director and secretary of Achilla. On registration, the one ordinary share that was issued in that company was held by Mr Holihan. This was corrected, however, on 5 September 2003 so that the one issued share was held by ACB Co Purchaser.
62 Following the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, Achilla changed its name to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd on 2 September 2003.
63 The ACB Business is conveniently described by Vickery J in the principal judgment as follows:
The ACB Business
[247] ACB, when owned by Amcor, was an "in-house" manufacturing enterprise operation that produced customised or unusual boxes. The business catered mainly to smaller customers, or large customers who had specialised box requirements. The business supplied corrugated products where the quantity of the product was deemed to be too small, or would result in bottlenecks in a higher-speed, lower-cost production plant - such as the plants run by Amcor at Smithfield and Revesby in NSW.
[248] The ACB Business generally obtained its income in two main areas.
[249] First, ACB had its own customers who purchased packaging products directly from ACB. In this respect, ACB essentially operated as a re-seller. Products (such as cardboard) were purchased from Amcor and ACB on-sold them to customers.
[250] The second aspect of the ACB Business involved "toll processing" or "toll manufacturing" work from Amcor customers. This part of the business involved Amcor transferring cardboard to ACB for further processing on its specialised machines operated by a specialised labour force.
[251] ACB's operations continued in this way both when the business operated within the Amcor stable and after the business was sold to Holihan in 2003.
[252] ACN Box[20] owned large factory premises at Wetherill Park in Western Sydney (Wetherill Park) and the ACB Business, which operated from those premises. The Wetherill Park site had a written down value of $7,455,780 and occupied a site of 20,241 square metres and a building area of around 12,200 square metres.
[253] ACN Box usually obtained its supplies of corrugated sheet from the AFPA plants at Revesby or Smithfield in New South Wales. It also owned its own corrugator machine ('the ACB Corrugator'). The ACB Corrugator was a very large and expensive machine. It had a written down value of $4,409,738. It occupied floor space of around 2,945 square metres.
Vickery J's summary of Amcor's proposals to deal with the ACB business (late 1990's until sale to Holihan) and conclusions as to the position of the ACB Business within Amcor
64 In the principal judgment, Vickery J outlined the background to the sale of the ACB Business by Amcor, and his conclusion as to the position of the ACB Business within Amcor, as follows:
Amcor's Proposals to Deal with the ACB business (late 1990's until sale to Holihan)
[256] At all relevant times, Amcor employed a management tool which required that each of its businesses achieve a 'threshold' 15% return on funds employed ("ROFE" or the "ROFE Benchmark"). ROFE was normally calculated by taking Profit Before Interest and Tax ("PBIT"), dividing it by the amount of funds employed (normally working capital, property, plant and equipment and other items such as employee entitlements and goodwill) and multiplying by 100 to arrive at a percentage.
[257] The Amcor parties did not dispute that the aim to achieve a return on funds employed of 15 per cent was a well-known target within Amcor at the time that both the Service Packaging and the ACB Businesses were disposed of.
[258] Although the ROFE Benchmark was not a carte blanche instruction to sell non-core and non-performing businesses at any cost regardless of their strategic value, it was an important criterion against which a decision would be made as to the future of the business within Amcor.
[259] Lachal, Amcor's executive general manager at the relevant time (and later managing director of Amcor Australasia) stated that any business not of strategic significance that did not achieve the ROFE Benchmark would be subject to a 'mantra' requiring it to be fixed, closed or sold.
[260] Brown, the managing director of Amcor Australasia at the relevant time, described the ROFE Benchmark as "a very critical part of the assessment of the business".
[261] Clayton, former Group General Manager Finance & Operations, gave evidence that "fix, close or sell" was a "mindset".
[262] Historically the ACB Business did not meet the ROFE Benchmark. A series of proposals to restructure, sell or close the business were made in the five years leading up to the negotiations of the Second Sale Agreement.
[263] Commencing with a board memorandum dated 28 January 1997, Amcor's managing director Jones noted that AFPA's ROFE was 9.3%, and that its position against Visy (its major competitor) had deteriorated.
[264] In a memorandum to the board of 2 September 1997, Brown described AFPA's corrugating sites (including "Wetherill Park", which was the site of the ACB Business, and was used in Amcor documents to describe the ACB Business) as:
... old disparate factories with few common features ... the result of acquisitions of low-tech companies, taken to improve market share. They are a constant drain on funds for replacement assets and O H & S requirements.
[265] Brown proposed the closure of Wetherill Park, writing
[t]he proposed structure will result in the closure of Revesby and Wetherill Park plants. These properties could realise $16 million ...
[266] A business summary from some time in 1998 suggested that the closure of four plants was part of a broader strategy designed to increase AFPA's ROFE to 16.4%.
[267] The Amcor Board appears to have approved the proposal to close Wetherill Park. In a memorandum to the Board dated 4 December 1998, Brown wrote
In December 1997 the Board approved $101.6 million to improve the cost competitiveness of the NSW corrugated business. The approval included the construction of a Greenfield plant in the western suburbs of Sydney and reinvestment in the Smithfield plant, resulting in the closure of the Revesby and Wetherill Park sites. A short run box plant was also foreshadowed. The project was to deliver a PBIT/FE return of 15.7% with an IRR of 12.8%.
[268] On 3 April 1998, Jones presented the Board with his three year strategic plan. He forecasted that AFPA would improve its ROFE from 10.9% to 15.1%. In his closing comments, Jones wrote:
The fundamental objective of Amcor Packaging is the achievement of a minimum 15% PBIT to Funds Employed ratio. This will be achieved by:
- Disposal of non-core and non-performing businesses.
- Focus on cost reduction in Australasia ....
- Improved control of Working Capital and tight management of Capital Expenditure.
[269] Plans for Wetherill Park appear to have changed for a short period. In a Board memorandum dated 4 December 1998 it was stated:
... new management team has now re-looked at the plan to address the deficiencies in the manufacturing facilities. It has concluded that these can be substantially addressed by reinvesting in the current plants.
The proposal is to invest in the Smithfield, Revesby and Wetherill Park plants by upgrading the corrugators and installing new, or where appropriate, modernise existing converting equipment to current technological standards. A new plant specialising in short-run box production, displays and packaging sales will also be established.
[270] However, the proposal to revitalise Wetherill Park was short lived. On 31 May 1999, the Wetherill Park site manager, Mr Michael Brown, announced that increased capacity at the Revesby plant would lead to Wetherill Park being "scaled down". Seventy five jobs were shed. In cross-examination, Brown agreed that by May 1999, the prospects were that Wetherill Park was to be closed.
[271] By June 1999, AFPA's commercial staff were planning to wind up the ACB Business and transfer its staff to Amcor and its business to APA. Wetherill Park's output was in the process of being reduced and its production capacity moved to the Revesby site. In August, Brown expressed his "main interest" regarding Wetherill Park was in "quitting the site". In his view, it had "value as a superb industrial site" but "was not doing much at all".
[272] In February 2000, Mr John Morriss floated the idea of Amcor running two separate businesses from the Wetherill Park site: a sheet feeding business and a short run box business that would manufacture boxes for supply to brokers. However, it appears that Brown was not in favour of the concept. He had formed the view that the Wetherill Park site should be closed. He believed the site was "very valuable" but "was hardly being utilised at all". In Brown's view, from the year 2000, the need to close the Wetherill Park site was "pressing". Brown saw "no possibility" of ACN Box [ACB Co Vendor] continuing at the Wetherill Park site. Because the corrugators at other sites had been upgraded, in his view there was no possibility of upgrading the ACB Business to better utilise the site. His assessment was that the business was going to have to be "moved to another site, closed or sold".
[273] By the time Holihan accepted the appointment as its general manager in December 2000, the performance of the ACB Business was far below the ROFE Benchmark. In October 2000, Mr Alvarez (then AFPA's financial controller-specialty business) ("Alvarez") showed Holihan the figures of the ACB Business. The first set forecast a PBIT loss of $1,345,762 for the 2000/2001 financial year. A revised set of figures showed a projected PBIT of $265,212 for the same period, but with the business's net assets of $16,221,953, even that modest profit would have resulted in a ROFE of less than 2%.
[274] By August 2001, the entire AFPA business was forecast to deliver PBIT of $21 million against a budget of $32.8 million. This was some 35% under budget. On 13 August 2001, Brown notified businesses with major shortfalls against budget that they would be approached to develop "profit improvement plans". On 27 August 2001, he sent a memorandum to Hodgson attaching a "strong request" from Jones to develop such a plan.
[275] In September 2001 Amcor established the "major operational cost savings" team ("MOCS"). Its objective was to identify cost savings across the AFPA businesses for the purpose of increasing ROFE. In particular its task was to identify non-core or non-performing businesses and assets for closure or sale. The target set was $10 million in cost savings in 2001-2002, with a further $25 million in 2002-2003. These targets were in addition to existing budget commitments. Hodgson gave unchallenged evidence that "one of the fastest ways to achieve the [ROFE Benchmark] was to close non-core and/or underperforming business assets and sell the assets, particularly the real estate".
[276] Brown instructed Hodgson to commence the MOCS process. Hodgson appointed Kevin McCluskey as the leader of the scheme.
[277] Both the Wetherill Park site and the ACB Business were targets of the MOCS programme.
[278] At the monthly AFPA management meeting in September 2001, the sale of the Wetherill Park land and buildings was discussed. A marketing submission was obtained from Colliers Jardine. It reported a likely price of $9,750,000 to $10 million if sold on a five year leaseback and $10,250,000 to $10,500,000 if sold on a ten year leaseback.
[279] On 2 November 2001, Barnes sent the Colliers Jardine proposal to Hodgson and recommended seeking expressions of interest. He noted that a sale at the forecast $10 million point would generate a profit of about $2.5 million.
[280] Barnes' memo was provided to Mr Ken Parker, who was then AFPA's general manager - finance. On 12 November 2001, Parker responded to the Barnes proposal. His view was that a sale of the site was probably inevitable, but that it should take place following a review of the ACB Business and a determination of whether that business was core to AFPA's long term plan (in which case a lease back could be obtained) or not (in which case the business could be sold and the property sold with vacant possession). It appears that he did not consider selling the business and entering a tenancy with the prospective purchaser, which would have resulted in both a sale of the business and a sale of the property on the more profitable lease back basis.
[281] In November 2001, Barnes directed Holihan to meet with Colliers Jardine to discuss the marketing submission. Holihan was told that a sale subject to a lease would attract a higher price.
[282] The question of whether to keep, sell or close the ACB Business was raised at a MOCS meeting in Sydney in November 2001, and again at a meeting held on 6 December 2001.
[283] In January 2002, Alvarez sent Holihan two spreadsheets which showed the number of employees at Wetherill Park reducing from 43 to 12 and to 0, respectively. Someone other than Holihan had asked Alvarez to consider those reductions as part of a proposal to shut the site and move its work to the other two main plants.
[284] A presentation to Amcor's board dated February 2002 was headed on its first slide: "AFPA Challenge: Achieve a sustainable 15% ROFE in the shortest possible time." The presentation canvassed an upgrade of corrugators and other equipment at Smithfield and Revesby and a review of possible plant closures in New South Wales to achieve a permanent cost reduction of $20 million p.a. A board memorandum co-authored by Hodgson and Brown stated that "we are developing a proposal to rationalise capacity in ... New South Wales ... Preliminary indications are that PBIT will be increased by over $20m per annum when the process is expected to be complete in mid 2004".
[285] A memorandum from Parker to Lachal, Clayton, Brown and Hodgson dated 6 May 2002 referred to the closure of three smaller plants (including Wetherill Park) which (if the closures proceeded) would occur in about February 2003.
[286] Some time after 29 July 2002, Holihan contacted Lewis and asked if he knew of any Amcor business that might take a lease over the Wetherill Park site. Lewis told him that Amcor Aerosols, another business operated by Amcor, would be looking for a new site. Site visits by staff from Amcor Aerosols, and further conversations with Lewis about the proposal followed.
[287] It appears that Amcor was considering the sale of the ACB Corrugator machine (the "Corrugator") in July and August 2002. This was a valuable, very large (about 80 metres in length) and heavy industrial machine which manufactured corrugated cardboard for use in cardboard boxes. The machine was situated within the Wetherill Park site.
[288] In a joint memorandum to the board dated 15 October 2002, Hodgson and Brown wrote:
Our Wetherill Park site in New South Wales is currently focused on ·short run orders and fitment work, which inhibits the overall capacity of our major plants. It is located on a site which is much larger than required and we are considering relocation and/or selling the business and envisage entering a long-term supply arrangement with the purchaser should we sell.
[289] By that time, Holihan was of the belief that the interest of Amcor Aerosols in the Wetherill Park site was wavering. He sought information about Amcor's use of rented storage at non-Amcor premises, believing that the Wetherill Park site might be used as a substitute for those sites.
[290] In evidence in chief, [Mr Peter] Brown said that by 15 October 2002 "I had already formed the view at this stage that Amcor should not remain in businesses specialising in filling orders for small quantities of boxes (Short Run Box Businesses)". This was the kind of business conducted by the ACB Business.
[291] A memorandum of 15 October 2002 entitled "Blueprint for Further Improvement", was prepared by Brown and Hodgson and put to and approved by Amcor's Board on 23 October 2002. The Board minute in relation to the memorandum reads:
AFPA Future Improvement
The Board received and discussed BO/1092.
Hodgson reminded the Board of the strategy for this business. The first phase generated significant improvement in both PBIT and ROI in the 2001/02 year. 2002/03 will see further improvement.
To further increase profit, ROI and cash generation, a step change reduction in the cost base and a securing of increased profitable growth by achieving much greater levels of customer intimacy with major customers is required. A comprehensive restructure of the business from a regionally based model to a customer and market centric model will be fully implemented by January 2003. The new organization structure, supports the customer-centricity ambitions and facilitates the standardisation of best practices on a national basis. Significant cost reductions are expected from capacity rationalisation and process improvements, driven by the deployment of proprietary Amcor technologies and an integrated IT platform primarily at the transaction layer to replace existing 20 year old legacy systems.
Following discussion the Board resolved to endorse the restructuring strategy.
[292] The strategy endorsed by the Board was set out in the AFPA "Blue Print for Further Improvement" slide presentation. Slide 12 related exclusively to Wetherill Park. It reported that the site was to be sold and the business closed or sold by June 2003. Key assets would be retained. The following was included in the presentation: "Sell remaining business (outsource)." This action was said in the presentation to result in a manning reduction of 48 and overhead savings, with PBIT impact of +$0.5 million. Hodgson, Clayton and Parker were involved in preparing the presentation.
[293] Shortly after the Board endorsed the plan reflected in the presentation, Barnes informed Holihan that the Board had given 'in principle' approval to his acquisition of the ACB Business.
Conclusion as to the Position of ACB within Amcor
[294] I accept that before Holihan became its general manager, since the late 1990's the possible disposal of the ACB Business by AFPA was under consideration by Amcor. The business was underperforming against the ROFE Benchmark. Following the significant investments made in the nearby Revesby and Smithfield plants in about 1999-2000, the ACB Business did not remain as a core AFPA business. Further, the MOCS programme set in place a chain of events which ultimately led to the sale of the business to Holihan.
[295] It was Holihan's case that his proposal to purchase the ACB Assets and enter a supply agreement was endorsed by Amcor's board in October 2002, and that this coincided with AFPA's long-term plan to sell the site and cease operating the business.
[296] On the other hand, it was Amcor's case that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against Holihan and the Defendant parties from the fact that there was no proposal suggested for any person or entity other than Holihan and his associated companies to purchase the ACB Business. No offering to the public was undertaken or contemplated, which Amcor alleged was part of Hodgson's responsibility to at least consider. The fact that there were no other proposals to deal with the business after Holihan first expressed his interest in it is, on the Amcor case, said to be significant.[21]
Other findings made by Vickery J that are of relevance
Amcor alleged that the businesses were sold on terms that were 'uncommercial'
65 In the principal proceeding, Vickery J was also required to deal with the claim made by the Amcor parties that the sale of the Service Packaging Business (to Mr Hottes) and of the ACB Business (to Mr Holihan) were 'uncommercial transactions' or that they were entered into on 'uncommercial terms' or alternatively, were uncommercial and substantially for the benefit of the relevant defendants.[22]
66 Relevantly, in the context of the sale of the ACB Business, his Honour found as follows:
Uncommercial transaction - ACB Business Sale'
...
[1218] I find that by the time the ACB Business came to be sold to Holihan, it was underperforming in profit generation and had been considered by Amcor for closure since at least November 2001.
Sale at Undervalue Allegation - ACB Business Sale
[1219] Amcor submitted that the ACB Business was not sold at a "fair market value" to the Holihan interests, and for this reason alone, the Second Sale Agreement was uncommercial.
...
[1224] The Amcor parties contended that the ACB Business, as sold pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement, was not sold at a "fair market price". The Amcor parties rely principally on the expert evidence of Mr Stone to support this contention. Mr Stone's opinion was that the fair market value of the business as at 30 July 2003, was $4.6 million (rounded up from $4,590,000).
...
[1226] On the other hand, Mr Meredith valued the business as at 30 July 2003 at a low of nil and a high of $720,000, but settled upon $640,000 as being a fair market value (inclusive of stock).
...
[1237] I accept each of the contentions of the Defendants as to the approach of Mr Stone compared with the approach of Mr Meredith, and for these reasons I prefer the opinion of Mr Meredith to that of Mr Stone.
[1238] I find that savings in employee costs were both achievable and foreseeable by an arm's-length purchaser. Accordingly, I accept Mr Meredith's assessment of the market value as $640,000 of the ACB Business (inclusive of stock). When the price paid ($1,114,364 inclusive of stock) is taken into account, the net value of the transaction was in fact a benefit to the Amcor Parties of $474,364 as reflected in the following table:
[1239] It follows that the purchase price was not only "commercial", but was positively to the advantage of Amcor.
...
Price increases under the supply agreements
[1243] Reciprocal supply agreements were in place (the "Supply Agreement"). The Supply Agreement had two elements.
[1244] First, for a period of five years from completion, ACB would supply raw materials in the nature of corrugated board and cartons to Achilla and the Purchaser at prices based on a direct costs and distribution costs ("D&D") basis. This part of the agreement also provided for Achilla and the Purchaser to obtain these supples [sic.] solely from ACB, thereby guaranteeing ACB with a secure market for these products. Achilla purchased products from APA in order to supply corrugated packaging to Achilla's non-Amcor customers.
[1245] Clause 12.1 of the Second Sale Agreement was in the following terms relating to supply of raw materials to Achilla and the Purchaser:
12.1 Supply by Vendor of raw materials
...
[1246] Second, for a period of five years from completion, Achilla was required under the Second Sale Agreement to undertake work for AFP on "base products" supplied by it (for example, boxes or corrugated sheets). Achilla was obliged to perform work on this material (for example, affixing a label or performing some other special work) and then return the modified product to AFP and charge AFP for the work done and any additional material used.
[1247] Clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement reflected this arrangement in the following terms:
12.2 Supply by Purchaser
...
[1248] Amcor submitted that the price increases under the supply agreements were on uncommercial terms.
[1249] D&D was defined in the Second Sale Agreement as the applicable cost base for products for the purposes of calculating costs in relation to the Supply Agreement.
[1250] The Supply Agreement was of potential benefit [to] Amcor and its related entities. This was so because Achilla was a conduit through which Amcor sold raw materials. This arose because of the terms of the Supply Agreement pursuant to which Achilla was compelled to purchase materials from Amcor for the duration of the Second Sale Agreement.
[1251] If Achilla was charged a significantly higher margin on top of D&D for materials purchased by Achilla in the course of its business, it would have added a significant cost to Achilla. For example, if a margin of 44% over D&D was charged, it would have added an additional minimum cost to Achilla of approximately $720,000 for the eleven months of trading in the financial year ending 2004.
[1252] As matters stood under the executed Second Sale Agreement, Amcor secured for itself a guaranteed market for the sale of some of its raw materials for the duration of the agreement.
...
Sub-Lease below market rent
[1260] The parties entered into a separate agreement for the sublease of the premises at Wetherill Park from which the ACB Business operated. The sub-lease was annexed to the Second Sale Agreement (clause 5.4).
[1261] Negotiations as to the lettable floor space under the lease commenced on 11 July 2003.
[1262] The sublease was for the Wetherill Park premises. However, the Amcor vendor, APA, was to keep its large corrugator machine on the premises and was required to pay for "the space consumed by this machine and associated raw materials". The corrugator machine was a substantial piece of equipment (although it was quite narrow, it was very long). APA was also permitted at any time, under certain conditions as to making good the premises and the like, to remove the corrugator machine from the premises.
[1263] By 15 July 2003 Holihan agreed with Lewis on the floor space split.
[1264] The ACB Corrugator remained at the Wetherill Park site until about September 2008.
[1265] There were benefits to Amcor in keeping the ACB Corrugator at the Wetherill Park site, which I accept. These included the following:
(a) it delayed the cost that would have been incurred in disassembling and moving the ACB Corrugator;
(b) any potential buyers of the ACB Corrugator could see the machine operating if and when they wished to inspect it; and
(c) ACB could take its time in selling the corrugator, and not be forced into selling the machine to a competitor.
[1266] The sublease term was for 5 years with a 5 year option. Rental was $560,000 per annum in years 1 and 2, and $600,000 per annum in years 3,4 and 5. In total, Achilla paid $2,920,000 in rent to APA, and 65% of the total outgoings of the Wetherill Park site.
[1267] Amcor proposed to sell the land comprising the Wetherill Park site to an entity called Stockland. In order to maximise the sale price of the land, the plan was for Amcor to take a head lease of the premises so that the land sold would be subject to a lease to a reliable tenant of high standing.
[1268] Amcor contended that the sub-lease was not on commercial terms. It pointed to the fact that the sublease rate of rental on an occupancy basis was significantly lower than that which Amcor (APA) was required to pay to Stockland under the head lease and was not governed by the same escalation clauses. It said that this resulted in Amcor subsidizing the Achilla's (the lessee company) rent by $2,246,000 over the five year term.
[1269] Amcor's expert, Mr Stone, took the alleged "sacrifice" of $2.246 million into account in his assessment.
[1270] Amcor contended further that the terms of the sub-lease provided that if the corrugator was removed then Holihan was required to pay 100 per cent of the outgoings however, his rent did not increase. Further, there was nothing in the Second Sale Agreement which gave Amcor the right to sublease the area occupied by the corrugator, if it was to be removed.
[1271] However, I accept that the sub-lease to Holihan and his associated companies for a rental less than that contained in the head lease between Amcor and the head lessor Stockland was the price to be paid for achieving a higher sale price on the divestment of the Wetherill Park site to Stockland. Counsel for Holihan put to Lewis that a leaseback to a blue chip company such as Amcor, rather than to a $2 company such as Achilla, or a sale with no leaseback, resulted in a higher property sale price. Lewis agreed that a sale with a leaseback is generally more valuable than if the site is sold with vacant possession; and he agreed with the proposition that a differential of approximately $1.5m would be achieved on a sale of the land for about $10 million if it was the subject of a lease to a tenant of the quality of Amcor.
[1272] The Wetherill Park site was sold by Amcor in October 2003 for a price of $10,452,000.
[1273] No property leasing expert, with qualifications and experience in commercial or industrial property leasing was called. In the end the Court is left with little reliable evidence upon which it can determine the submissions made by Amcor as to the alleged uncommercial terms of the sublease. For this reason alone, the contentions of Amcor on the alleged uncommercial terms of the sublease must fail.
[1274] However, I am also satisfied that by selling the Wetherill Park site subject to a lease to a "blue chip" company such as an Amcor subsidiary company, served to maximise the saleability and purchase price of the Wetherill Park site. The sub-lease of part of the Wetherill Park site to the Holihan company must be viewed in this overall commercial context.
...
Conclusion as to Uncommercial Transaction - Second Sale Agreement
[1279] When the Second Sale Agreement is considered as a whole and in its context, it has not been established that it was an uncommercial transaction, and I reject Amcor's contentions on the issue.
[1280] Nor am I satisfied that the Second Sale Agreement was substantially for the benefit of Hodgson, the Service Containers Purchaser, Hottes, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley.
[1281] By the transaction, Amcor secured real benefits for itself, particularly, as I have found, the increase in sale price achieved by the sale and lease-back arrangement, which, to the tune of $2,920,000 over the 5 year term was subsidised in significant part by the rent payable under the sublease, and when the early payment of the sale price upon the sale of the Wetherill Park site is taken into account.
No Relevant Conduct of the Defendants giving rise to any Uncommercial Terms
[1282] Specifically in relation to the case as pleaded by Amcor, I am not able to be satisfied that any of the Defendants procured the sale on uncommercial terms or were involved in the conduct of others to effect a sale on uncommercial terms.
[1283] Indeed, with one exception, I am not satisfied that any of the Defendants were materially involved in the formulation of any of the terms of the Second Sale Agreement alleged by Amcor to be uncommercial.
[1284] A number of Amcor personnel had been engaged in settling the term of the Second Sale Agreement.
[1285] Clayton, who executed the Second Sale Agreement on behalf of Amcor, was briefed by Parker and Lewis, who were both senior employees, beforehand. Parker and Lewis were involved in the settling of the terms of the transaction. Prior to signing the agreement Clayton did not consider the terms to be uncommercial or detrimental to Amcor. Further, he gave no evidence that he considered the terms to be uncommercial after he executed the Second Sale Agreement.
[1286] Mr McPhail [sic],[23] the external lawyer, drafted the agreement. He raised no issues as to the terms. Amcor accepted the terms as drafted by Mr McPhail.
[1287] Further, a number of other Amcor employees were involved at various points in the transaction. These included Ms Caplan, Ms Cleaver, Ms Flannigan and Mr Timos. None of those persons raised any concern that the terms of the proposed transaction were uncommercial or not in Amcor's interests. None of these were called by the Amcor Parties to give evidence.
[1288] The exception referred to earlier relates to the inclusion of what was known as the NXT licence in the Second Sale Agreement for no additional price.
...
[1292] ... I am not satisfied that the inclusion of the NXT General Licence as one of the assets sold in the Second Sale Agreement, was either in itself an uncommercial term at the time of entry into the agreement, or was such as to render the agreement as a whole uncommercial.
[1293] Further, I am not satisfied that Amcor suffered any loss by reason of having parted with the NXT General Licence. Indeed, in all likelihood, it was saved paying for the ongoing licence fees for no financial gain.
[1294] Further, in the light of my finding that the transaction overall was not uncommercial, it follows that there could be no breach of any obligation to warn Amcor of such an acquisition, if any such duty arose.
[1295] For these reasons Amcor is not entitled to any relief as a consequence of it entering the Second Sale Agreement on the basis of any alleged uncommercial terms, and none of the Defendants are liable for any breach of duty arising from the terms of the Second Sale Agreement.
Sale of the Service Packaging Business to Mr Hottes
67 As noted earlier, while in the hands of Amcor, the Service Containers Business had two discrete aspects to its operations:
• the Service Packaging Business, which received orders from its customers for the supply of finished corrugated products and corrugated boxes, and sourced its supply from Amcor's corrugated packaging division (upon which it charged a premium on the cost of the supply); and
• the Displays Business, which involved the sale to its customers of a range of plastic wraps, tapes, stock boxes and general packaging which Amcor did not manufacture and which the Service Packaging Business sourced externally.
68 The Service Packaging Business was not profitable and was later sold to Mr Hottes, whereas the Displays Business, which was profitable, was retained by Amcor.[24] The sale was effected by the First Sale Agreement. The terms of the proposed First Sale Agreement were drafted and amended through Baker and McKenzie, on behalf of Amcor, and Mr Walmsley, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr Hottes.[25] Throughout the second half of 2001, Mr Barnes remained the officer within Amcor who was primarily responsible for the sale and approval of any substantial changes to the documentation.[26]
69 On 1 February 2002 the First Sale Agreement was executed. The parties to the agreement were Service Containers Pty Ltd (the vendor, an Amcor subsidiary), Service Packaging Pty Ltd (the purchaser) and Mr Hottes (the director and owner of the purchasing company).[27] Vickery J said he accepted that the First Sale Agreement 'effected the sale of the business in its entirety, not merely the assets of the business, although the sale agreement was entitled "Asset Sale Agreement".'[28]
70 Mr Hottes had managed both the Service Packaging Business and the Displays Business for approximately five years before the sale took place in February 2002.[29] From early 2000, Mr Hottes reported directly to Mr Barnes, who in turn reported directly to Mr Hodgson in respect of the operations of the Service Packaging business.[30] Following the sale, Mr Barnes 'authorised the continued employment of Mr Hottes to manage the Displays Business at a monthly fee of $8,800 (annual fee of $105,600 including GST)'.[31]
72 In the hands of Mr Hottes, and until Amcor re-acquired the business on 30 March 2007, the Service Packaging Business was profitable.[34]
73 As at June 2003, that is just prior to the sale of the ACB Business, the directors of ACB Co Vendor were Messrs Brown, Clayton and Crawford and Mr Lewis was the company secretary. Mr Holihan was the manager of the ACB Business and he reported to Mr Barnes, who in turn reported to Mr Hodgson.
74 In September 2002, the ACB Business had been identified by Amcor in its 'Major Operational Costs Saving ('MOCS') review as a non-core or non-performing business asset which was to be closed. On 23 October 2002, the Amcor Board approved the recommendation to close the ACB Business and sell its assets.
75 Vickery J described the events leading up to this decision as follows:
[863] In the 2001/2002 financial year and after the sale of the Service Packaging Business Brown instructed Hodgson to commence the "MOCS" review, as it was called.
[864] The purpose of the MOCS review was to identify for the purposes of closure or sale, non-core and/or non performing fibreboard packaging business assets of Amcor or its subsidiaries.
[865] Amcor settled upon a strategy of closing non-core and/or underperforming business assets and sell the assets, particularly the real estate. This had been identified as one of the means by which a directive of Jones and the Amcor Board to increase overall profitability was to be achieved. Hodgson placed Mr Kevin McCluskey ("McCluskey") in charge of the MOCS initiative.
[866] Part of Mr McCluskey's role was to identify relevant business assets for closure and sale. The MOCS Report produced by McCluskey recommended the closure of the Townsville, Wetherill Park [the ACB Business] and Box Hill operations.
[867] A strategy document incorporating McCluskey's MOCS Report was prepared and presented by Hodgson and Parker to Brown, Jones, Lachal and Clayton at Abbottsford on 20 September 2002. Brown and Jones suggested some changes but otherwise approved the presentation and told Hodgson to prepare the amended document for presentation to the Amcor Board.
[868] Parker and Hodgson amended the document and made the changes recommended by Brown and Jones. They called the final version of this strategy document "Blueprint for Further Improvement". This was considered by the Amcor Board on two occasions, the first being a presentation made to the Amcor Board by Hodgson on 16 October 2002. Brown was also present at this meeting. Hodgson spoke to the "Blueprint Print for Further Improvement" document on this occasion. This exercise was repeated on 23 October 2002, when it was approved by the Amcor board.
[869] The "Blueprint for Further Improvement" document made provision for 265 redundancies across Australia including all 48 employees at Wetherill Park and the closure of the ACB Business.
[870] By this means, the Amcor Board approved the sale of the land and certain assets of the ACB Business at Wetherill Park, but for commercial reasons, exempted the large corrugator machine situated on the site.
[871] The Amcor Board was advised that the sale of the Wetherill Park assets (excluding the corrugator) was expected to raise approximately $1.2 million. The calculations of the value of the assets of the ACB Business were prepared by Parker. He wrote all of the financial parts of the "Blueprint for Further Improvement" document and Hodgson wrote the implementation strategies.
[872] In the financial year ended 2003, the ACB Business had a turnover of approximately $4,285 million but made a loss of approximately $359,000. Accordingly, it was not only a business which was not profitable, it was a loss making enterprise, a situation which did not escape the attention of Amcor.[35]
Holihan's Proposal to Purchase the ACB Business
76 In 2002, Mr Holihan told Mr Barnes that if the ACB Business were to be sold or closed down he would be interested in purchasing it. Vickery J described the sequence of events that led to the sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan as follows.
[873] Sometime prior to the Amcor Board's approval on 23 October 2002 of the "Blueprint for Further Improvement" recommendations, Barnes told Hodgson that Holihan, the ACB Business manager at the time, had expressed interest in acquiring some of the assets of the ACB Business if that business was to be closed down. His initial plan was to buy some of the assets of the ACB Business excluding the corrugator and relocate its operations to a smaller plant employing an entirely new workforce that would not be covered by Amcor industrial agreements.
[874] In about mid-2002, Hodgson spoke to Brown about Holihan's interest. Brown said "Let him put in a proposal and we'll look at it".
[875] Hodgson told Barnes that Holihan should submit a proposal for consideration by Brown. Holihan subsequently prepared a document entitled "Management Buy Out (MBO) of Australian Corrugated Box Co (ACB)".
Amcor's Approval of the Second Sale Agreement
[876] In or about November or December 2002, Hodgson directed Parker to take responsibility for finalising negotiations in relation to the Second Sale Agreement proposed with Holihan.
[877] Parker in turn directed Mr Tony Joyce to review the sale and the proposed terms in early January 2003. Joyce completed the review and prepared a document entitled "Notes on Proposed ACB Contract" for Parker dated 7 January 2003. The document commented on the terms of the proposed Second Sale Agreement including the price. There was no conclusion arrived at to the effect that the proposed Second Sale Agreement was uncommercial, and the transaction proceeded on its way.
[878] Ms Alyssa Caplan, an in-house lawyer seconded from Allens Arthur Robinson to Amcor reported to Lewis. She was asked to review the terms of the Second Sale Agreement. She did so without identifying that the terms were uncommercial.
[879] Legal advice was also sought by Amcor from Baker & McKenzie and from Allens Arthur Robinson.
[880] The vendor company was ACB [i.e., ACB Co Vendor], an Amcor subsidiary.
[881] Ultimately, Clayton signed the Second Sale Agreement. He was a Director of ACB [ACB Co Vendor]. Lewis also signed the document in his capacity as the secretary of the vendor company. Clayton said that prior to signing the agreement, he asked Parker to come to his office and take him though the relevant clauses of the Second Sale Agreement. He was familiar with sale of business agreements and was aware prior to signing that the sale price was $1 million which was payable over five years.
[882] Clayton also gave evidence in cross-examination about a number of other clauses in the Second Sale Agreement. For example, Parker told Clayton that there was a five year contract for the supply of corrugated board by Amcor. Clayton also gave evidence that Parker explained the rationale for the sale to Holihan, namely that Amcor could not run the business profitably and it did not fit strategically with Amcor's future objectives. He also noted in his evidence that the transaction had the advantage of realising the underlying value of the real estate where the business was situated.
[883] Clayton agreed in cross-examination that Hodgson had no authority to approve the sale and that he spoke to Brown who confirmed that he (Brown) had approved it. In this regard, Clayton said in his evidence:
Prior to signing the Asset Sale Deed I had a meeting with Ken Parker. Ken Parker told me that the sale had the approval of Jim Hodgson and Peter Brown. I do not recall how the $1 million dollar sale price was arrived at, how the sale price was justified or whether I was every briefed on such matters. I was told by Ken Parker that the rationale for selling the businesses was that Amcor could not run it profitably and it did not fit strategically and that Craig Holihan had the specific knowledge and skill set to obtain growth from the business as a stand alone entity.
I had a conversation with Peter Brown where he confirmed that he had approved the sale of the ACB business to Holihan.
[884] As Clayton said, and I accept, Parker was a very experienced accountant and financial controller. He also had management experience. He said that if Parker had considered there was anything wrong with the transaction that he (Parker) would have told him. He expected Mr Parker would have been thorough and that he (Parker) did not tell him any reason not to execute the document, nor did he (Clayton) consider he should not sign it. Clayton considered that "it was his job" not to sign the agreement if he didn't get satisfactory answers to any question he put to Parker about it. He said that Lewis did not tell him that there was anything uncommercial about the sale of land or the proposed lease. He said there was nothing that caused him any concern about the transaction.
77 Vickery J was satisfied that the sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement was in the Amcor category of an 'unbudgeted sale of up to $1 million' and thus, because the sale took place for the sum of $1 million, it did not require Amcor board approval.[37] As such, his Honour said the approval level for the sale rested with the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, who in this instance was Mr Brown.
78 Vickery J then proceeded to deal with the sale of the ACB Business, describing the sale process as follows:
Sale of the ACB Business by Amcor (the Second Sale Agreement)
[904] The ACB Business was eventually sold by Amcor to companies associated with Holihan pursuant to a document entitled "Asset Sale Deed" dated 2 June 2003 (the "Second Sale Agreement"). The Second Sale Agreement was executed on 3 June 2003 by Lewis and Clayton on behalf of ACB, the Amcor vendor.
[905] The Second Sale Agreement was completed on 30 July 2003.
[906] The parties to the executed deed were Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (the vendor), ACB Australia Pty Limited (the Purchaser), Achilla Pty Limited (the Purchaser Trading Company) and Holihan (the director and owner of the purchaser and trading companies) (collectively called the "Purchasers").
[907] The key terms of the Second Sale Agreement involved the transfer to the Purchasers included [sic] all property and assets owned or used by ACB [ACB Co Vendor] in the ACB Business as at completion, including:
(1) Stock;
(2) Plant and equipment;
(3) All of the interest of ACB under or arising out of existing contracts, including contracts and agreements for supply to customers;
(4) ACB's customers;
(5) ACB's books and records;
(6) ACB's business name; and
(7) ACB's goodwill.
[908] The purchase price for the ACB Business was $1 million, payable in the five annual instalments and commencing 12 months after completion of the sale. There was no provision for any payment at the time of sale and most of the purchase price was payable by the fourth and fifth instalments (clause 3).
[909] The price for the stock was payable 12 months from completion, at a price determined by a stock take conducted by ACB prior to completion, with the costs borne exclusively by ACB (clause 6).
[910] The parties were required to enter a separate agreement for the sublease of the premises at Wetherill Park from which the ACB Business operated. The sub-lease was annexed to the Second Sale Agreement (clause 5.4) and provided for a rental at a lower rate than under the head lease.
[911] It was agreed that ACB would effect the termination of employment of its employees and was obliged to pay their entitlements and the Purchasers were entitled to offer employment to the employees on any terms (clause 7).
[912] The Purchasers were entitled to all accounts receivable accruing but not paid by the date of the sale and to accounts receivable after the sale (clause 8).
[913] ACB assigned to the Purchasers, or was obliged to obtain novation of, its interests under all contracts, including a licence known as the NXT General Licence between New Transducers Limited and ACB of July 2002 (clause 9). The NXT licence was included in the assets after the sale price had been settled.
[914] Further, a supply agreement was incorporated into the Second Sale Agreement (clause 12). For a period of five years from completion, the Amcor company ACB was obliged to supply raw materials in the nature of corrugated board and cartons to the Purchaser Trading Company Achilla and the Purchaser at prices based on a direct costs and distribution costs ("D&D") basis. Second, for a period of five years from completion, Achilla was required under the Second Sale Agreement to undertake work for AFP on "base products" supplied by it (for example, boxes or corrugated sheets). Achilla was obliged to perform work on this material (for example, affixing a label or performing some other special work) and then return the modified product to AFP and charge AFP for the work done and any additional material used.[38]
79 His Honour also addressed the rival contentions advanced by the parties about whether the Second Sale Agreement was a sale of the assets of the ACB Business, or a sale of the business, and made findings as follows:
Whether Sale of the Assets or Sale of the Business
[932] The Defendants contended that a distinction needs to be drawn between an agreement pursuant to which it is intended that the purchaser takes an interest in an entity which purchased assets of the ACB Business and an agreement where it is intended that the purchaser takes an interest in the business. Amcor, on the other hand, contended that the subject matter of the Second Sale Agreement was, as defined in its pleading, the ACB Business which included the sale and supply of corrugated packaging conducted by the NSW Division of AFP.
[933] I am satisfied that the Second Sale Agreement, although it was contained in a document described as "Asset Sale Deed", was in substance the sale of the entire business of ACB (excluding certain defined assets such as the corrugator). Although the Second Sale Agreement did provide for the transfer of certain assets to the Purchasers, clause 3.1 makes clear that the $1 million purchase price was the [sic] "the purchase price for purchase of the Business", a term defined in the agreement as "the business carried on by the vendor of the sale and supply of corrugated packaging".[39]
Issues for determination at the trial of the Achilla counterclaim and Amcor parties' cross-claim
80 As noted earlier, in its final iteration, the Joint Statement of Issues identified some twenty or so issues that the parties considered arose from the pleadings. Following the exchange of extensive written submissions at the conclusion of the evidence, the issues for determination were narrowed a little.
Outstanding Issues for decision on the Achilla Counterclaim
81 On the counterclaim there are five main issues outstanding, the first four of which relate to the Second Sale Agreement/implied supply agreement.[40] First, did the Second Sale Agreement/implied supply agreement bind APA from Completion, or only from 21 March 2005 when the Deed of Accession was entered into? The second issue is to identify which, if any, of the 1,913 jobs claimed by Achilla were performed by alternative suppliers in breach of the agreement? The third issue concerns how any compensation payable to Achilla in respect of any such breaches is to be calculated? The fourth issue is whether Achilla is entitled to compensation for amounts that it was overcharged? The final issue on the counterclaim relates to the charge, namely, what amount must ACB Co Purchaser pay to APA for a release of the charge? That is, is that sum $300,000 or is it $300,000 plus interest, and if so, what amount?
Outstanding Issues for decision on the Amcor Cross-claim
82 On the cross-claim there are four main issues in contention.[41] First, should the cross-claim be refused because of Anshun estoppel or abuse of process? The second issue, is whether ACB Co Purchaser breached the Second Sale Agreement by not informing ACB Co Vendor of a change in control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in June 2004 or by not informing APA of a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in October 2005? The third issue is if the Court finds there was such a breach, did that breach cause any loss to APA and, if so, how is APA's compensation for that breach to be calculated? The final issue on the cross-claim is, if the Court finds that ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla is obliged to compensate APA, to what, if any, degree is Mr Holihan personally liable to make that compensation?
83 Those are the principal issues expressed in a way that excludes what is now common ground between the parties as a result of concessions made, or arguments abandoned, in the exchange of closing written submissions. Behind that short summary, however, lies a vast landscape of issues that are canvassed in the pleadings and have been the subject of extensive evidence at the trial.
84 The Holihan parties called sixteen lay witnesses to give evidence at the trial. In some cases the witnesses gave their evidence by video-link from Sydney, but otherwise they were examined and cross-examined in person in Melbourne. [42]
85 Much of the evidence about the operation of the ACB Business both before and after the sale was given by Mr Holihan. The Holihan parties filed a lengthy witness statement in chief from Mr Holihan,[43] a witness statement in reply (responding to matters raised in the witness statements served by the Amcor parties and providing his evidence concerning the Amcor cross-claim),[44] and an affidavit sworn on 3 August 2015 (concerning the preparation of the particulars of loss for the Achilla counterclaim and the use of the profit and loss statements of Achilla).[45]
86 Representatives of the alternative suppliers other than Sainsbury's (which nowadays is part of the Amcor Group) were also called by the Holihan parties. Evidence was given by:
• Mr Anthony Jeffriss Kent, who was a director of Thompson Screen Printing and Displays Pty Limited ('Thompson') and the owner of the business during the relevant period. He is now employed as a sales representative with the Blue Star Group. During the relevant period, Thompson did printing work for clients including entities within the Amcor Group. Mr Kent gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Stanislaw Kierdal, the manager of the business known as J S Cutting Formes ('J S Cutting'), which made corrugated knives for different businesses in the packaging industry, including Amcor. Mr Kierdal gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Roberto Valentino Pellizzari, the managing director of Pandapak Pty Ltd trading as Northwest Packaging ('Northwest Packaging'). Amcor was one of its main clients. In the relevant period, Northwest Packaging predominantly made partitions, single face pads, corrugated pads and some short runs in cartons. Mr Pellizzari gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Remy Anthony Pribilovics, the managing director of SPS Packaging Services Pty Ltd. In the relevant period, SPS Packaging did work for Amcor. The work generally involved the making of pads, partitions, and fibre pallets from sheets of corrugated board and the gluing and stitching of cartons. Mr Pribilovics gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Christopher Prasad, the manager at All Pack Australia ('All Pack'). Amcor was All Pack's main customer and the work it performed for Amcor was mainly done by hand. Generally the work involved packaging, assembling of cardboard products such as large cartons and display stands, gluing cartons and re-palletising some of their products by strapping and shrink wrapping them on a pallet ready for delivery. Mr Prasad gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Joseph Borg, the CEO and managing director of the Ubeeco Group Pty Ltd, trading as Ubeeco Packaging Solutions ('Ubeeco'). During the relevant period, Amcor was a customer of Ubeeco. Ubecco assembled product for Amcor and sold them timber pallets in both hardwood and softwood, and supplied them with consumables such as nails. Ubeeco would also do 'value-adding' work by attaching foam inserts or insets to the timber pallets depending on the needs of the particular customer, making fibreboard pallets for Kellogg's (which was a customer of Amcor), and hand-scoring (to shape) corrugated board components supplied by Amcor. Mr Borg gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mrs Kaye Frances Le Breton, a director and secretary of M Le Breton Graphics (Australia) Pty Ltd and M Le Breton Graphics Pty Ltd (together called 'Le Breton'). Mrs Le Breton's husband, Max, operated the business but, as he was in hospital at the time of the trial and unable to give evidence, the Holihan parties called Mrs Le Breton in his place. She was familiar with the work undertaken by the business over the past 25 to 30 years, having worked in the office performing bookkeeping and accounting type tasks, and she had prepared the response to the subpoena for documents served by the Holihan parties. Mrs Le Breton thought Amcor was probably a large customer of Le Breton during the relevant period, performing mainly laminating work (which usually involved Le Breton sourcing litho prints from other companies and then mounting the prints to cardboard supplied by Amcor) and die-cutting work and stripping and gluing. Mrs Le Breton gave her evidence by video-link.
87 The Holihan parties also called a number of persons who were employed by Amcor entities at the time of the sale and working in roles involved with the ACB Business and/or the AFP corrugating division, as follows:
• Mr Anthony Peter Joyce, an accountant, who served in the roles of Commercial Manager, Operations, AFP (between early 2001 and late 2003 or early 2004), and then as General Manager, Commercial, AFP Australasia (until May 2005, when he ceased employment with Amcor). Mr Joyce was based in Melbourne and his responsibilities were to support all of the AFPA operations with their financial reporting, governance and control requirements. Mr Joyce also had an indirect role in the negotiation of the Second Sale Agreement in the sense that in January 2003, his general manager Mr Ken Parker, asked him to review the draft agreement and provide his comments and observations. Later, he also became involved in discussions with Mr Holihan concerning aspects of the (draft) Second Sale Agreement. Mr Joyce also gave evidence about Annexure 5 to the Second Sale Agreement and the specific cost elements that went into the 'D & D rates' formula for determining the charging mechanisms under the Second Sale Agreement and in the setting of the First Year Budget.[46] Mr Joyce gave his evidence in person.
• Mr Nicholas Papadimatos, who initially was a management accountant with AFP in its New South Wales operation (between 2000-2002), and then with the finance division of the AFP paper mill at Botany (June 2002-July 2003). In July 2003, he joined the ACB Business (under the new management) as an accountant, working with Mr Holihan. The focus of the evidence given by Mr Papadimatos was on Annexure 5 and the 'D & D rates' formula, and the setting of the first and second year budgets. The Holihan parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Papadimatos[47] and he gave his evidence by video-link.
• Mr Paul Gordon Ward, previously occupying the role of General Manager Marketing & Sales Administration for AFP Australia ('AFPA') (from about March/April 2005 until about early to mid-2008), then working on a legal matter, following which he worked as Commercial Manager, Strategy in the Fibre division and finally as Chief Financial Officer for AFP before he left in September 2010. In his role as General Manager Marketing & Sales Administration for AFPA, Mr Ward was based at Burwood in Victoria but was effectively the head of sales & marketing for the whole of the fibre packaging division, which included the corrugated business, the specialty business and the Amcor Displays business. Mr Ward gave evidence that in about June 2005 he was asked to have look at the contract in place between APA and ACB Co Purchaser concerning the ACB Business. Mr Ward also gave evidence about email correspondence passing between himself and Mr David Beynon (then the regional manager of New South Wales), Mr David Manser (who was running either or both of the specialty business and the Displays business for New South Wales) and Mr Greg Crouch (the Group General Manager for New South Wales) in early July 2005, and correspondence between himself and Mr Holihan in late July and late November 2005. Mr Ward gave his evidence in person.
• Mr Anthony Eugene Cichonski, previously operations manager at the Revesby plant (from about 1995 until mid-2002), then the regional operations manager of Amcor (between June 2000 to January 2005) following which he left to join the ACB Business (under new management) as the Operations Manager. He is currently working with Wellen Pty Ltd. Mr Cichonski gave evidence about the plant upgrades at Revesby in 2000 and thereafter at Smithfield to bring that plant up to a similar standard to Revesby. He also gave evidence about obtaining quotes from OME suppliers for work to be performed, the operation of the 'PICK' system[48] and the routing of OME work both before and after the sale of the ACB Business, 'repeat orders' and the workforce available to the ACB Business to perform work following the sale. The Holihan parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Cichonski[49] and he gave his evidence in person.
• Mr David Oliver Manser, who worked for AFP between about 1999 through to 2006 in various roles as the Commercial Manager Speciality Group from about 2002 to October 2004, and then as Acting General Manager of the Speciality Group from October 2004 to February 2006. Mr Manser gave evidence about the Amcor Displays work, and in particular the re-structuring of Displays NSW and Displays Victoria and the movement of Displays NSW work to Displays Victoria where they were setting up a specialised footprint for bringing the Displays work under the one roof. He also gave evidence about the formal arrangements made between Displays NSW and the ACB Business for Mr George Daaboul, an employee of the ACB Business, to manage Displays NSW. Mr Manser gave his evidence in person.
• Mr Paul Silva, currently working with Wellen Pty Ltd (a fibre packaging business) run by Mr Trevor Barnes as Corrugator Manager, but formerly he was the Logistics Manager at ACB Co Vendor's Wetherill Park factory. Mr Silva was made redundant when the ACB Business was sold, but he was re-employed by Mr Holihan a few days later to work in the ACB Business (under new ownership) in a similar role. He gave evidence about the work that the ACB Business (under new ownership) received from AFP and also from Amcor Displays, the freight/delivery arrangements that applied to raw materials and finished products, the work recorded on the 'PCS' system (which recorded the history of the work orders) and the 'PICK' system, and the quality of the OME work performed. The Holihan parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Silva[50] and he gave his evidence in person.
88 The Holihan parties also called Mr Mark William Whitechurch, the owner and managing director of Converta Machinery Pty Ltd ('Converta') between June 1994 and August 2012 to give evidence. Converta imported machines into Australia and provided after sales support to customers, but its core business was the supply of machinery to the corrugated box segment of the market. It was one of the main suppliers of imported machinery, such as laminators, die-cutters, box making machines and other related cardboard manufacturing equipment, to the corrugated box segment. The ACB Business was one of Converta's customers both before the sale to the Holihan parties and afterwards. Mr Whitechurch closed the Converta business in August 2012. The Holihan parties tendered a witness statement from Mr Whitechurch[51] canvassing his involvement with the ACB Business over the relevant period and the purchase and/or use of the 'Grassi No 1' and 'Grassi No 3' laminating machines and 'Eterna Platen' die-cutters by the ACB Business over time.[52] Mr Whitechurch gave his evidence in person.
89 The expert accounting witness engaged by the Holihan parties to prepare an expert's report and give evidence on the quantum issue was Mr Gregory Pollard Meredith, a partner of the firm of Ferrier Hodgson and leader of its Forensics Practice.
90 The Amcor parties called eight lay witnesses to give evidence at the trial. Each of the witnesses was examined and cross-examined in person in Melbourne. In addition, they tendered (by consent) an affidavit from a further witness, Ms Charlotte Gerke, now employed as the NSW Customer Services Manager with Orora Fibre Packaging (part of the Amcor Group).
91 The expert accounting witness engaged by the Amcor parties to prepare an expert's report and give evidence on the quantum issue was Ms Dawna Kathleen Wright, a Senior Managing Director and Leader for Australia in the Forensic Accounting and Advisory Services practice of FTI Consulting.
92 The Amcor parties called Mr John Burnett MacPhail, the solicitor at Baker & McKenzie engaged by the Amcor parties to undertake the documentation of the Second Sale Agreement. Mr MacPhail was also involved in the drafting of the First Sale Agreement for the sale of the Service Packaging Business to Mr Hottes. Mr MacPhail gave evidence about the process by which he obtained instructions from Mr Barnes, his initial meeting with Mr Holihan, and the correspondence that ensued concerning the various drafts of the agreement and the drafting process generally. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr MacPhail.[53]
93 The Amcor parties also called several former employees of entities within the Amcor Group, as follows:
• Mr Darren Robert Nellies, the Customer Service Manager for AFP in NSW between 2003 and 2008. Mr Nellies left Amcor in 2009. He gave evidence over a wide range of topics but in particular concerning the work performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale, his role in managing the relationship with the ACB Business under Mr Holihan's ownership, including dealing with complaints from the ACB Business about work being sent to alternative OME suppliers, the standard of the work performed by the ACB Business, the routing of work in the PCS and PICK systems, the de-commissioning of the PICK system in October 2005 or thereabouts and the movement across to the new system, 'SAP'.[54]
• Mr Darryl Francis Roberts, the former Group General Manager at AFP from October 2004, who replaced Mr Hodgson, after 10 years or so working in Amcor's metal can business in various configurations. In December 2004, Mr Roberts became the acting Managing Director of Amcor Australasia. Mr Roberts gave evidence about the business divisional structure in place at Amcor from January 2000 or thereabouts, and his knowledge of the arrangements entered into with Mr Holihan for the sale of the ACB Business. Mr Roberts also gave evidence relevant to the May/June 2004 'change of control' allegations made by the Amcor parties on their cross-claim, and in particular, as to what Amcor would have done had it known of the various facts and matters revealed in the principal judgment concerning the shareholder agreements in place between the former executives and employees of Amcor in relation to the ACB Business. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Roberts.[55]
• Mr Laurence Bruce Phillips, a retired accountant, formerly an Accounting Manager at the Amcor sites at Clayton and Box Hill in Victoria, and General Manager of Amcor's Indonesian operations. In 2005, he acted as a consultant to APA on the review of the costing and operations systems that Amcor utilised for its corrugated fibreboard packaging business, as part of APA's transition from the PICK system to SAP. Mr Phillips gave evidence about the demands, costs, timing and labour needs required to fulfil 'specialty work' jobs, 'repeat jobs', OME work performed by the alternative suppliers, OME work performed for Amcor Displays, and the identifying business code 'SX' used for Amcor Displays in the SAP system. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Phillips.[56]
94 Several current employees of entities within the Amcor Group were also called by the Amcor parties, namely:
• Mr Bruce Geoffrey Powell, the General Manager of Specialty Packaging with Orora Fibre Packaging, a business division of Orora Australasia which is itself a business division of Orora Limited, formerly known as APA (i.e. within the Amcor Group). Between December 2005 and January 2010, Mr Powell's role within APA's corrugated fibre packaging division was as Specialty Manager (New South Wales), reporting to Mr David Beynon. By the time Mr Powell assumed that role, both the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business had been sold, to Mr Hottes and to Mr Holihan respectively, and the remaining specialty businesses in New South Wales were Amcor Displays and Central Coast Cartons. Mr Powell gave evidence about a request made of him by Mr Roberts that he re-build each of these businesses following the sale of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, and the work undertaken to explore and implement this initiative, including a request made of Mr Nellies at the end of July 2008 to assess the short run work that had been outsourced to the ACB Business. Mr Powell also gave evidence about the acquisition of the Sainsbury business, which specialised in producing point of sale retail displays and short run boxes, and was acquired on his recommendation. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Powell.[57]
• Ms Julie Frances McPherson, who joined Amcor as its Group General Counsel and Company Secretary on 18 April 2005. Ms McPherson gave evidence directed to the allegations made in the Amcor parties' cross-claim concerning the alleged change of control in October 2005, and as to what the Amcor parties would have done had they known of the (undisclosed) arrangements in place between the former executives and Mr Holihan, as revealed by Vickery J in the principal judgment. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Ms McPherson[58] and also an affidavit sworn by her on 4 August 2015.[59]
• Mr Robert Allen Guy, now a Territory Manager for Orora Fibre Packaging, who worked in sales of corrugated fibre packaging with AFP since about December 1993. Mr Guy gave general evidence about matters such as the work undertaken by an account manager with customers of the business as part of the sales process, and the nature of 'short run' and 'long run' business, but the focus of his evidence was on the 'RTS Imaging account' which was identified by the Holihan parties as OME work performed by an alternative OME supplier, namely Le Bretons. The Amcor parties tendered a witness statement prepared for Mr Guy.[60]
• Mr Adayres Bibiano Garcia, currently employed by Orora Australasia as a Regional Estimator. Mr Garcia commenced employment with Amcor in 1992, and worked in the NSW Estimates Department for 12 years before leaving in December 2004 to work in the ACB Business (under new management) and other businesses owned by Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes until he resigned in April 2013. After a short retirement, he commenced working with Orora Australasia about July 2013. Mr Garcia gave evidence about the work done by estimators in generating quotes and routing jobs through the PICK system, the work done by the ACB Business before and after the sale, and the division of responsibility between the estimators at AFP and the separate estimating workforce in place at Amcor Displays.
Commercial background - operation of the ACB Business prior to the sale
95 The extracts from the principal judgement set out above provide a convenient summary of the background to the sale of the ACB Business and the entry into the Second Sale Agreement. As will be apparent, after deliberations over many years, the Amcor parties effectively determined to offload the ACB Business, which was then considered an underperforming asset[61] but nevertheless an important business, and to allow one of its executives, Mr Holihan, to purchase it. Before doing so, however, the Amcor parties arranged for the Wetherill Park site (from which the ACB Business was conducted) to be leased to APA, so that the property could be sold on the open market with the lease in place to a quality tenant, in order to realise the highest possible price for the land.
96 So far as the sale of the ACB Business was concerned, the assets of the ACB Business were to be sold to Mr Holihan. But, at the same time, Amcor wished to ensure that it would also be able to continue to have the specialty work that was performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale performed by the ACB Business after the sale, and also that it would continue to supply raw materials to the ACB Business once the sale was completed.
97 Before the sale, the ACB Business had two distinct income streams:
(a) Income earned from work it did for AFP's customers, for which it charged AFP; and
(b) Income earned from work it did for its own customers.[62]
98 Prior to the sale, the largest part of ACB Co Vendor's business was performing 'OME' work for AFP. Within Amcor, work sourced from a third party was referred to as 'OME' work.
99 Under cross-examination by the Amcor parties, Mr Joyce explained what 'OME' work was:
[MR TRAN:] But what does OME mean to you?---Okay, it's an acronym. OME stands for outside manufacturing expense. So it's recognising that there are certain steps in the corrugated box manufacturing process that Amcor did not have the machinery within its portfolio of assets to undertake that manufacturing step. So therefore it would send it to an external third party supplier to undertake that step of the manufacturing process for them.
So your answer there referred to manufacturing very quickly. Did this term have relevance to the manufacturing side of Amcor? So was this a term that was used by the box plants at say Smithfield and Revesby?---Absolutely.
And why would that term have particular relevance to these manufacturing plants?--- ?---Because within...the manufacturing operations personnel, they would understand that ... a particular job needed to be routed to an external supplier because Amcor did not have the machinery capable of doing that particular conversion process.[63]
100 Relevantly, at that time of the sale, the largest customer of the ACB Business by turnover[64] was AFP, in the sense that work done for AFP's customers provided something in the vicinity of 80% of the work being performed by the ACB Business.[65] Mr Holihan said that the AFP customers for whom the ACB Business did work included sales groups within AFP such as 'Heavy Duty', 'Fruit and Veg', and Amcor Displays,[66] although the ACB Business did not do very much work for Amcor Displays because, shortly after the ACB Business obtained a litho laminating machine in June 2001, AFP entered into a supply agreement with ACE Print & Display Pty Ltd ('ACE Print') in relation to Amcor Displays' work.[67]
101 Mr Holihan gave evidence about the types of OME work that the ACB Business performed prior to the sale, when he was its General Manager. He said that the OME work the ACB Business did for AFP (i.e. for AFP Customers) was varied and among other things, included the following types of work:[68]
(a) From around June 2001, it did litho laminating, including 'wide format' litho laminating. Litho lamination is a process of combining (by lamination) litho printed 'top' sheets (paper) onto a sheet of corrugated cardboard. Litho is a high quality type of printing in the sense that it is high gloss and high resolution.[69] 'Wide format' was the term used in the industry for sheets measuring greater than 1020mm x 720mm and less than 1400mm x 1600mm. When the ACB Business did litho lamination work for AFP, AFP would procure the litho printed top sheets and deliver them to the ACB Business, along with the cardboard. The ACB Business would then laminate the two together on a Grassi Sheet Laminating Machine - Compact Semi-Automatic No 1 model ('Grassi No 1').
(b) It made plain and printed boxes of varying sizes. The ACB Business did the flexographic ('flexo') printing in-house using one of its machines, such as the Maramatsu Jumbo printer, the ZLM flexo folder gluer and the Koppers rotary die-cutter.
(c) It did die-cutting, including wide format die-cutting (on a T70 machine (which did wide format die-cutting), a Koppers rotary die-cutter, a Platen and an Astroforme), and the stripping of waste resulting from that process.
(d) It made corrugated pads, by slitting larger pieces of cardboard (using a slitter or bandsaw) to make smaller ones.
(e) It made corrugated partitions. These were (and are) sometimes referred to in the industry as a 'divider' or a 'nest'. They are made from slotted pads of corrugated cardboard (usually made on a 'Mecanelec') which are then 'slid' together to make a partition, such as that often found on the inside of wine cartons.
(f) It slit and 'slotted' corrugated cardboard (using the Mecanelec).
(g) It did hand work, including the hand assembly of corrugated products (e.g. the assembly of corrugated partitions), folding, gluing, packing, bundling (products together), strapping (products together with plastic straps), stapling, wrapping (including wrapping corrugated products into an 'outer' cardboard box, sometimes called a 'shipper') and folding.
(h) It had the capability to make corrugated pallets, which are pallets made of corrugated cardboard used to hold and used for shipping products. They resemble wooden pallets in shape but are lighter in weight. Prior to the sale, the ACB Business produced pallets for a customer called Power One. The ACB Business used a bandsaw, slitter and glue in the production of pallets, which was predominantly handwork.
102 Further, Mr Holihan said, much of the work done by the ACB Business required the use of 'dies' and 'stereos'. A die is a set of steel knives used for cutting and/or dull rounded blades (or cutting formes) used for creasing, set in timber. The dies were used in die-cutting machines, which pressed the die onto a sheet of corrugated cardboard to cut or crease it to a desired shape. Where the cardboard was cut, it created waste that had to be stripped away from the resultant product. 'Stereos', which were also known as plates, were made by exposing polymer resin to light (in the olden days they were made of rubber and cut by hand) and are used in the flexo printing process. They resemble a large rubber stamp and are mounted onto a cylinder inside a printing machine.[70]
103 When the ACB Business did OME work destined for AFP customers, Mr Holihan said[71] the raw materials (usually corrugated cartons and board) would be sent by AFP to the ACB Business at Wetherill Park, usually from the AFP plants operating at Smithfield[72] or Revesby,[73] but sometimes they would be sourced from a main AFP site interstate. In some cases, the work performed by the ACB Business for the relevant AFP customer was the production of an entire product starting from paper (for single faced and fanfold production of corrugated cardboard) or from a sheet of raw corrugated cardboard supplied by AFP (for boxes, pads or partitions). In other cases, AFP might supply partly finished items for the ACB Business to finish (for example, AFP might supply a pre-cut, pre-slotted box for folding, gluing or stitching by the ACB Business). The ACB Business would then 'finish' (or 'convert') the raw materials or partly finished items and supply the end (or finished) product direct to the relevant AFP customer. AFP then organised and paid for the delivery of the finished products to AFP customers.[74]
104 The ACB Business did not pay any freight associated with the delivery of the raw materials to it. Where the ACB Business did OME work for AFP, the ACB Business would issue invoices for its work direct to the AFP customers on behalf of and in the name of the relevant AFP business.[75]
105 Mr Holihan said that in performing work for AFP (and indeed others), ACB Co Vendor often had to buy things, or use the services of, third party (OME) suppliers. For example, ACB Co Vendor often had to buy special paper or cardboard, starch, timber pallets, printing plates, plastic strapping and stretch film. These goods were either incorporated into the finished product (e.g. in the case of paper or cardboard) or were used in the doing of the OME work (e.g. the plastic strapping was used to strap finished products together and timber pallets were used for transportation of finished products). Services, such as screen printing or organising and paying for 'tooling' (generally the production of dies), were also purchased on occasion in order that the ACB Business could make the finished product. ACB Co Vendor also charged AFP for labour related to the work that it did, such as hand assembly, gluing and bundling needed to make a finished product.[76]
106 At the end of each month, AFP would credit ACB Co Vendor for the work done by the ACB Business for AFP customers as calculated by the 'PICK' system, a costing and sales order processing system used by the ACB Business, plus a margin. The price of a product charged was based on 'direct and distribution' (called 'D & D') cost plus a margin. Mr Holihan explained that before the sale, where the ACB Business did work (i.e. produced finished products) for an AFP business, the amount payable to the ACB Business was ascertained by working on a D & D cost basis, plus a margin of 15%. Where the ACB Business purchased products (usually raw materials) from an AFP business, the parties worked on a D & D cost basis, plus a margin of 10%.[77]
107 Generally speaking, the D & D costs payable to ACB Co Vendor for OME work done for AFP were a combination of costs based on estimates and costs actually incurred.[78] Mr Holihan said the 'estimated costs', which were typically things such as electricity, freight (including truck charges), labour and raw materials (paper and starch), were based upon the volume of work done in square metres (sqm) or the number of hours that manufacturing machines were employed, or the number of hours that it took to have handwork done.[79] The 'other costs' were additional costs that were incurred by the ACB Business in relation to goods and services obtained from third parties.[80]
108 Mr Holihan's evidence was that when OME providers were doing OME work for AFP, it was 'common practice' for them to use goods and services purchased from others because there was no 'one stop shop' OME provider in New South Wales that was capable of doing every kind of work that AFP obtained from OMEs.[81]
109 Prior to the sale of the ACB Business, Mr Holihan was aware that ACB Co Vendor was not the only New South Wales-based OME supplier to AFP. He acknowledges that from his time spent in management of the ACB Business, and participation in the monthly management meetings of AFP New South Wales, he knew that other OME suppliers were used. He acknowledged that on 20 March 2003, he received an email from Megan Young (later known as Megan Griffiths) ('Young'),[82] one of the assistants to the accountants at AFP Smithfield, showing that the entities performing OME work included:
(a) Le Breton;
(b) Northwest Packaging;
(c) SPS Packaging;
(d) J S Cutting;
(e) Thompson;
(f) Ubeeco; and
(g) ACE Print.
110 In the principal judgment, Vickery J found that on 23 October 2002, the Amcor Board endorsed the plan reflected in the AFPA 'Blueprint for Further Improvement' slide presentation to the effect that the Wetherill Park site was to be sold, and the business closed or sold by June 2003.[83] Shortly thereafter Mr Barnes informed Mr Holihan that the Board had given 'in principle' approval to his acquisition of the ACB Business.[84]
111 On 2 June 2003, ACB Co Vendor, ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan (as the provider of limited guarantees of due performance by the Purchaser) executed an 'Asset Sale Deed' whereby most of the assets of the ACB Business were to be transferred by ACB Co Vendor to ACB Co Purchaser, so as to enable Achilla to carry on the ACB Business.[85] As was noted in the introduction, an important feature of the Second Sale Agreement was the reciprocal supply obligations pertaining to the supply of raw materials on the one hand, and the procuration of OME work on the other, that were to apply for a period of five years after Completion. As part of the contractual arrangements, ACB Co Purchaser (as 'Chargor') also granted a 'fixed and floating charge' to ACB Co Vendor and APA (jointly and severally as 'Chargee') to effectively secure the payment of the purchase price of $1 million by instalments over the five year period.
The Holihan parties contend that the Second Sale Agreement (as written) does not reflect the bargain the parties reached
112 In the Achilla Counterclaim, the Holihan parties contend that the Second Sale Agreement, as written, with ACB Co Vendor as the counterparty, does not accurately reflect the bargain that the parties reached. However, they do not contend for rectification of the agreement. Rather, they say, the facts demonstrate that the real or commercial agreement was one reached with APA, rather than ACB Co Vendor, such that the Court should find there was an implied supply agreement containing terms identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, or alternatively, that APA is estopped from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to those alleged in the implied supply agreement.
113 In support of their implied supply agreement, the Holihan parties say that both the 'sale obligation' contained in clause 12.1 and the 'purchase obligation' contained in clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement were imposed on the 'Vendor', which was ACB Co Vendor, but they contend that that can only be due to misapprehension because 'the facts demonstrate that the parties always intended APA to be the counterparty to the supply obligations.'[86] They submit that for ACB Co Vendor to carry either the 'sale obligation' or the 'purchase obligation' after the sale of the ACB Business would demonstrably have made 'no commercial sense'[87] and would render them 'hollow' obligations.[88] That is because under the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Vendor sold all of its assets, being plant and equipment,[89] interests in contracts, customers, books and records, business name and goodwill, to ACB Co Purchaser and terminated all of its employees. Having done so, the Holihan parties contend ACB Co Vendor 'was left with no business that would have any OME requirements, and no capacity to supply raw materials to Achilla.'[90]
114 Further, the Holihan parties say that throughout the negotiations that culminated in the Second Sale Agreement, 'the role of APA/AFP/AFPA as the party bound by the purchase obligation and the sale obligation was taken for granted by those doing the negotiation.'[91] They say that their case is 'a very simple one', namely:
APA is a company that entered into a contract that bound it. The terms of that contract read down the scope of its operation by reference to a particular type of work, that being fibre packaging work, and by reference to, among other things, a geographical area by use of the exception. We don't need to draw fine distinctions between various business names that were owned by APA and used in the conduct of its business, and we don't structure our case by reference to those at all.[92]
Accordingly, Achilla has not made a claim for any work done for any business other than an AFP business, and no claim is made for any work done for any of the non-Sydney arms of the business.[93]
115 The Holihan parties submit that when regard is had to the evidence concerning the negotiations that led to the entry into the Second Sale Agreement, it is clear that the agreement as written 'did not embody the supply agreement that all of the parties understood that they had entered, or the arrangements that they acted upon.'[94] Further, they maintain that the parties' conduct after execution of the Second Sale Agreement effectively confirms this position. Accordingly, they contend that in those circumstances 'the law (via an implied contract, or an estoppel to like effect) recognises a contract between Achilla and APA in the same terms as those in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.'[95]
116 In their counterclaim, the Holihan parties plead that the terms of the 'implied supply agreement' they contend for were 'identical to' clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, save that under the implied supply agreement, APA had the rights and obligations that ACB Co Vendor had under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.[96] By the time closing submissions were made, however, the content of the alleged implied supply agreement had been enhanced. During closing submissions, in answer to a question from the Court, Counsel for the Holihan parties clarified the scope of the alleged implied supply agreement, as follows:
MS MURPHY: Your Honour, the implied agreement doesn't just pick up 12.1 and 12.2. So it would pick up, for example, the obligation to - clause 5.5, provide financial assistance for the first six months where Amcor was to pay weekly in arrears rather than the monthly reconciliation. It would pick up also clause 9.3, the PICK system, the obligation to leave intact the existing computer system. It would pick up...the restraint in clause 12.5 for example, 12.3, 12.4 obviously, and in relation to the lease, Your Honour, the lease is a separate agreement that stands, express agreement that can happily stand alongside the implied agreement.
So what we say is that the implied agreement picks up everything in the written agreement that is necessary for the operation of the supply agreement, the performance of the obligations.[97]
117 Further, in support of their implied supply agreement, the Holihan parties submit that the best indication of the fact that the construction for which they contend works is that it is precisely the construction that the parties explicitly agreed to on 21 March 2005 when they entered into the Deed of Accession, which Vickery J found 'in effect substituted APA for ACB [ACB Co Vendor] in relation to "all capacities and for all purposes under or pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement"'.[98] Accordingly, the Holihan parties say that from 21 March 2005 until its expiry, this contract worked exactly as they contend it was intended to work from Day 1, so there can be no objection to its practical operation in that context. (It is implicit in their argument that once the Deed of Accession was entered into, the implied supply agreement no longer operated.[99])
The Amcor parties contend that the Second Sale Agreement represents 'the entire agreement' between the parties
118 The Amcor parties' response is to deny that there was any implied agreement of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties or any estoppel by convention.
119 In their closing submissions, the Amcor parties adverted to the obvious shortcomings of the alleged implied supply agreement, pointing out that, 'for the implied Supply Agreement to function, more terms of the Second Sale Agreement would have to be picked up and included in that collateral contract'.[100] They observed that clause 12 cannot effectively function without, for example, bringing with it Annexure 5 (which deals with the D & D basis of charging for the purposes of clauses 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3) and the definitions clause in the Second Sale Agreement. They submitted that none of that is pleaded, and without it, the pleaded contract is inefficacious.[101]
120 Further, in reliance upon clause 15.11, the Amcor parties contend that the Second Sale Agreement represents 'the entire agreement between the parties', and say that while APA was 'clearly contemplated by' the Second Sale Agreement, it was not bound by it until the Deed of Accession was entered into in March 2005.[102]
121 The Amcor parties submit that, in any event, the evidence shows that there was no pre-contractual common intention that APA should be bound to obtain supplies from Achilla. They maintain that 'APA' was not, and never was, the same as the trading division 'AFP'. Furthermore, they submit APA was not the supplier of the ACB Business prior to the sale, nor was it the customer, so the premise that APA was the party to the supply arrangements does not fit with the commercial reality of what happened. Importantly, the Amcor parties say, Achilla does not claim that the Second Sale Agreement was 'mistaken' in its imposition of the clause 12.2 obligation upon ACB Co Vendor rather than APA. Had the Holihan parties wished to contend for this, they would have sought rectification, but they disavowed this course earlier on, preferring to opt for an implied agreement whereby they could contend that APA agreed to obtain 'all OME supplies' from Achilla or to rely upon an estoppel to similar effect. The Amcor parties submit that in this way, the Holihan parties seek to extend the 'business as usual' concept that the parties were operating under far beyond whatever happened in practice, and thereby to 'bind a large slice of APA (and thus its subsidiaries, divisions and their businesses such as Displays but not Metals, Corrugated, Plastics, Cartons and Sacks, Paper and Glass) to an obligation to obtain "all its OME Supplies" from Achilla.'[103]
122 Further, the Amcor parties contend that pre-contractual negotiations cannot support an estoppel by convention that is inconsistent with the terms of a written contract.[104]
The dispute between the parties involves the construction of the Second Supply Agreement and its terms
123 Against that background, it will be seen that there is a real dispute between the parties as to what was agreed between them, and by whom, concerning the sale of the ACB Business. The Amcor parties contend that their agreement is as recorded in the Second Sale Agreement (as written) and the Deed of Accession. Whereas the Holihan parties contend that at least until the Deed of Accession was entered into, there was also an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla running 'sidecar' with the Second Sale Agreement and containing terms identical to clause 12 (and read together with 'everything in the written agreement that is necessary for the operation of the supply agreement'[105]); alternatively, that their relationship was conducted at all material times on the basis of a mutual assumption that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the entity bound by the sale obligation and the purchase obligation in clause 12.
124 The logical starting point is the Second Sale Agreement itself.
125 The Second Sale Agreement was styled as an 'Asset Sale Deed' and made between ACB Co Vendor (as 'Vendor'), ACB Co Purchaser (as 'Purchaser'), Achilla (as the trading entity) and Mr Holihan (as the provider of limited guarantees of due performance by the Purchaser) and executed on 2 June 2003.[106] The recitals stated:
126 In clause 1.1 the terms 'Business' and 'Assets' were defined to mean, unless the context otherwise requires, as follows:
'Business' means the business carried on by the Vendor of the sale and supply of corrugated packaging as at the date of this Deed and for the avoidance of doubt, does not include any part or parts of the business of Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited [i.e., APA] or Amcor Ltd;
'Assets' means the property and assets owned by the Vendor in connection with the Business as at Completion including:
(a) the Stock;
(b) the Plant and Equipment;
(c) all of the interest of the Vendor under or arising out of the Contracts;
(d) the Customers;
(e) the Books and Records;
(f) the Business Name; and
(g) the Goodwill.
127 The 'Contracts' referred to in paragraph (c), and the 'Customers' referred to in paragraph (d) of the definition of Assets were defined in clause 1.1 to mean, respectively:
'Contracts' means any contracts and agreements (whether written, oral or arising through a course of trading, or a combination of any of these) which relate to the Business and to which the Vendor is a party or by which the Vendor may be bound as at Completion, including for the avoidance of doubt contracts and agreements for supply to Customers;
...
'Customers' means the customers of the Business or other persons to which the Business supplies or supplied products or services at the Completion Date or during the period of 12 months before that date, and for the avoidance of doubt includes:
(a) customers of the Vendor appearing on its debtors ledger; and
(b) those customers with which the Vendor's sales team has dealt at any time during the 12 month period up to the Completion Date.[107]
128 Clause 9 dealt with 'Contracts'. Clause 9.1 provided for the assignment of the Vendor's interest in, or the novation of, the Contracts in favour of Achilla or ACB Co Purchaser or both, on and from completion. These assignments and novations were expressed in clause 9.1(b) to be 'subject to and conditional upon the obtaining of any third party consents or approvals which may be necessary or desirable'. Provision was also made in clause 9.1(d) to ensure that following completion, ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla (or both) could obtain supplies of requisite materials such as starch, inks, waste, energy and relevant services 'at prices and on other terms which are no worse than those upon which the Vendor obtains the same'.
129 Clause 9.2 dealt with 'Practical arrangements' concerning assigned or novated contracts. Where a contract had been assigned or novated, or purported to be assigned or novated, ACB Co Vendor was required, 'to the extent practicable and appropriate to the nature of the relevant Contract', until the assignment or novation takes place to:
(a) sub-contract or grant to the Purchaser or Achilla a sub-lease or sub-licence or other right to use or exercise the subject matter of the Contract as if the Purchaser or Achilla had the same right, title and interest under the Contract as the Vendor, and the Purchaser or Achilla will otherwise in all respects carry out and perform obligations under such Contracts as sub-contractor for the Vendor; or
(b) hold the benefit of the Contract for the Purchaser or Achilla, provided that the Purchaser performs the obligations of the Vendor under the Contract on its behalf.[108]
130 Under clause 9.3, Achilla or ACB Co Purchaser was also given the ability to continue to use the existing computer ordering system that was used by the ACB Business. Clause 9.3 provided that:
The Vendor will at no cost to the Purchaser or Achilla and subject always to the terms of any licence in force for use of the same:
(a) leave intact the existing computer system by which orders are placed direct into the manufacturing system, use of which (and any related software) is pursuant to a licence from the Vendor, and no ownership or title therein is conferred on the Purchaser or Achilla, but upon replacement by the Vendor of the existing system with another system (as it is acknowledged is currently contemplated), the parties will meet to discuss and agree upon an effective and efficient process for achieving the same or substantially the same results; and
(b) make available to the Purchaser or Achilla an effective order processing and tracking system similar to that available to other customers of the Vendor by which the Purchaser may place and track orders in the Vendor's manufacturing system.[109]
131 Relevantly, the evidence was that there were two computer systems in use at the time of the sale, namely the Production Control System or 'PCS' and the 'PICK' system. The 'PICK' system was a costing and sales order processing system used by the ACB Business.[110] The component costs for each item of OME supply were effectively fixed at (or ascertainable by using) rates that were contained within the 'PICK' system.[111] Lead times for work to be undertaken were dictated by the amount of work that particular machines or work types were required to do at the time when the work was ordered. Mr Holihan said that 'PCS' (or Production Control System) was the machine loading and feedback system which received information from the 'PICK' system and managed the flow of work through the machines.
132 Clause 3.1 provided that the 'purchase price' for the 'purchase of the Business' (other than the Stock, Accrual Amount and pre-payment Amounts) is $1,000,000. The 'purchase price' was payable by instalments progressively over the period of the contract, with the first instalment (of $100,000) being payable within 12 months of completion and the fifth and final instalment (of $300,000) being payable within 60 months of Completion. Under clause 3.2, the purchase price for the stock was to be calculated pursuant to a stocktake and 'be payable 12 months from Completion'.
133 The 'trading arrangements' referred to in recital D were relevantly those set out in clause 12. Clause 12.1 dealt with the 'supply by the Vendor of raw materials' (corrugated board and cartons) and clause 12.2 dealt with the supply by the Purchaser of (finished) products. Each supply arrangement was drafted in a similar fashion, as is demonstrated in the side-by-side comparison below, and imposed correlative obligations on the Vendor on the one hand, and Achilla and/or the Purchaser on the other, that were to remain in force for a period of five years:
The Vendor will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply corrugated board and corrugated cartons ('Products') to the Purchaser and Achilla at prices based on D & D costs to the Vendor.
Achilla will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply Products to the Vendor at prices based on D & D costs to Achilla.
Achilla (and if appropriate the Purchaser) will for that period obtain all supplies of Products from the Vendor, save for those products that Achilla manufactures for itself (or the Purchaser), and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to the Vendor's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. After this period Achilla may (but only if the parties agree in writing) purchase Products from the Vendor on terms expected to be D & D + 20%.
The Vendor will for that period obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
For the periods referred to below prices to Achilla will be as follows:
For the periods referred to below prices to the Vendor will be as follows:
In all other respects supplies by the Vendor and acquisitions by Achilla will so far as not inconsistent with this clause 12 be made on Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited's standard terms and conditions applying for substantially similar supplies from time to time.
Achilla may request that the supply and other obligations in this clause 12 be extended by a further period of 60 months, such additional term to commence 60 months from Completion, but it is acknowledged that this will only be effected if all the parties agree in writing. The request will be exercisable by notice in writing to the Vendor given at any time within 30-60 months after Completion. A pricing basis of D & D +20% is expected to apply for the renewal term of 60 months.
134 Under clause 12.1, the Vendor was required to supply 'Products', being 'corrugated board and corrugated cartons', to the Purchaser and Achilla at prices based on D & D costs to the Vendor.[112] The acronym 'D & D' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean 'the applicable costing base of products for the purposes of calculating costs in relation to clause 12 as shown in Annexure 5'. Relevantly, the D & D costs were 'direct and distribution costs' that were effectively fixed or ascertainable under the contractual mechanism agreed between the parties (and further explained in Annexure 5 thereto) and were to be ratcheted up in each contract year by the agreed margin specified in clause 12. By adopting the D & D pricing mechanism, when an order was placed with the ACB Business using Amcor's 'PICK system', the PICK system could generate a costing or quote for the proposed work.
135 Under clause 12.1, Achilla (and if appropriate ACB Co Purchaser) was obliged to obtain all of its supplies of Products from the Vendor, save in the exceptional circumstances mentioned. Strictly speaking, this required Achilla to obtain from the Vendor 'all' of the raw materials to be used in any order placed by a customer irrespective of whether the work to be performed was 'OME' work (for an Amcor related customer) or third party work (for a non-Amcor related customer). In practical terms, however, the undertaking in clause 12.1 applied only to the supply of corrugated board and corrugated cartons for the non-Amcor work to be performed by the ACB Business, which constituted about 20 percent of its work. The evidence was that where the ACB Business was required to perform a job for an Amcor entity (or the customer of an Amcor entity), which constituted about 80 percent of the work performed by the ACB Business, the raw materials were supplied by the Amcor entity to Achilla and they remained its property during the whole process. That is, there was no initial charge to Achilla for the raw materials, and Achilla supplied the finished product to the Amcor entities at prices based on D & D costs to it. Further, in that scenario, the Amcor entity would invariably arrange (and bear the cost of) the freight associated with delivery of the finished product to the customer.
136 By means of the arrangement set out in clause 12.1, Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser were effectively assured that a supply of raw materials would be available to them by ACB Co Vendor at set prices throughout the term of the agreement, and ACB Co Vendor bound them to continuing to source their raw materials from it, save in the exceptional circumstances mentioned.
137 Similarly, under clause 12.2, Achilla was required to supply 'Products' to ACB Co Vendor at prices based on D & D costs to it. ACB Co Vendor, in turn, was obliged to 'obtain all its OME supplies' of 'Products' from Achilla, save in the exceptional circumstances mentioned. The prices at which Achilla was to make the OME supplies of 'Products' available to ACB Co Vendor were based on 'D & D costs' plus a margin (initially 12% and ratcheted up by an additional 2% in each annual period of the 5 year term to a maximum of 20%). Once again, the contractual pricing mechanism of 'D & D' plus a margin operated so that, by using the PICK system, the parties could ascertain or predict the price at which the relevant supply of Products would take place in each 12 month period during the term.
138 Under clause 2.2, the Vendor and Purchaser agreed, 'solely for Tax[113] purposes' that any supply made under the Second Sale Agreement 'is of a going concern as defined within A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999.'
139 Under clause 4.2, each of the Vendor and Mr Holihan 'as an employee of the Vendor' undertook that until Completion[114] they would 'conduct the Business in the ordinary course and in substantially the same manner as it was conducted prior to the date' of the Second Sale Agreement.
140 The only Amcor company that was named as a party to the Second Sale Agreement was ACB Co Vendor, which carried on the 'Business' and owned the relevant 'Assets'. APA, the parent of ACB Co Vendor, was mentioned in the Second Sale Agreement but was not named as a party to it. For example:
141 Further, clause 2.4 expressly provided that obligations of the Vendor, or property to be transferred by the Vendor, may be carried out or effected 'by or through a Related Body Corporate, including for the avoidance of doubt Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited and Amcor Ltd.'[115]
142 As noted earlier, it was not until the Deed of Accession was entered into in March 2005 that APA formally became a party to the Second Sale Agreement.
Issue 1A: Was the date of 'Completion' of the Second Sale Agreement 30 July 2003 (as the Amcor parties contend) or 31 July 2003 (as the Holihan parties contend)?
143 Issue 1A simply reflects a contest between the parties as to when 'Completion' took place. The Amcor parties contend that it was on 30 July 2003 whereas the Holihan parties submit the evidence demonstrates that it took place on the following day.
144 Clause 9.4 of the Second Sale Agreement provided that ACB Co Purchaser was to assume:
(a) all liabilities of the Vendor in relation to the Business which arise in relation to the conduct of the Business arising following Completion; and
(b) all liabilities which arise in relation to the conduct of the Business prior to Completion, to the extent that that liability has been included in the calculation of the Accrual Amount.[116]
145 Similarly, under clause 12.2, Achilla's obligation to supply Products to the Vendor operated 'from Completion' for a period of five years.
146 The expression 'Completion' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean:
completion of the sale and purchase of the Assets under this Deed.
147 Under clause 5.1, 'Completion' was to take place at the Wetherill Park factory premises on the 'Completion Date', which was defined in clause 1.1 to mean:
close of business on 30 July 2003 or such other time and date as the parties agree in writing.
148 The Holihan parties submit that while there is no evidence of an explicit agreement as to the Completion Date, nevertheless the evidence demonstrates that the parties had agreed to change the date to 31 July 2003.[117]
150 Documentation passing between the parties was consistent with the evidence given by Mr Holihan, as was the Amcor parties' internal correspondence.
151 On the morning of Thursday 31 July 2003, Mr Holihan sent Mr Darren Nellies, a business services manager for Amcor,[120] an email confirming the contents of an earlier telephone conversation between them. He stated that they were 'loading stuff today for delivery tomorrow [Friday]', and asked that Mr Nellies arrange for 'any trucks with board to come in after noon'.[121] Mr Holihan said that he informed Mr Nellies that they would lose only one day of production, being Friday 1 August 2003, and production would re-commence the following Monday (4 August 2003). Any deliveries would be received by Achilla that afternoon, and with extra people and overtime used on Monday, they would convert the material with minimum disruption. Mr Holihan also explained that on Friday 1 August 2003, which he said was the first day of the supply contract, each of the ex-ACB Co Vendor employees that worked in the Wetherill Park factory underwent an interview with Forstaff, the labour hire firm Achilla had commissioned to find suitable factory staff. He said that they had sufficient numbers available on that day for the volume of work Achilla had received.[122]
152 On 31 July 2003, Mr Holihan also received an email from Amcor representatives confirming that Amcor-owned stock and equipment at the Wetherill Park factory would continue to be covered by its insurance until such time as alternative insurance arrangements have been received.[123] Mr Holihan forwarded this email to Mr Ian Lewis at Amcor's head office. At that point in time, Mr Lewis was the secretary of ACB Co Vendor. The Holihan parties submit this email confirmation is consistent with the transfer of ownership of the ACB Business on that date.
153 Also on 31 July 2003, Mr Holihan executed a letter agreement with AFP to issue 'recipient created tax invoices' that Mr Anthony (Tony) Joyce (then Commercial Manager, Operations, AFP) had sent him. In his letter, Mr Joyce referred to Achilla receiving fees for toll converting from AFP 'from 1 August 2003'.[124]
154 Similarly, the Holihan parties submit that AFP's internal correspondence indicates an acceptance that Completion occurred on 31 July 2003. In an email from Mr Lewis to Mr Joyce, Mr Brown (then Managing Director of Amcor Australasia) and others dated 4 August 2003, Mr Lewis stated that 'the business operating as Australian Corrugated Box has been sold effective 31 July 2003.'[125]
155 The submission made by the Amcor parties simply focusses on the provisions of the Second Sale Agreement (referred to above). They contend that the Second Sale Agreement says what Completion is, and as there is no evidence that it was varied in writing, Completion remained as 30 July 2003. Further, they noted that when the definition of Completion Date refers to 'close of business on 30 July 2003' (emphasis added), it may be that it gave the false impression that completion occurred on 31 July 2003.
156 In my view, the internal correspondence sent by Mr Lewis dated 4 August 2003 informing interested Amcor staff and entities that 'the business operating as Australian Corrugated Box has been sold effective 31 July 2003'[126] confirms that Completion did not occur prior to that date. He was clearly operating on the basis that the sale was 'effective 31 July 2003'. It will be recalled that Mr Lewis was the secretary of ACB Co vendor and he witnessed its execution of the Second Sale Agreement. He was also aware of the insurance arrangements concerning the Amcor-owned stock and equipment at the Wetherill Park factory because Mr Holihan had forwarded the insurance advice to him. In my view, the internal correspondence records, or provides written confirmation of, the effective position between the parties. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Completion took place on 31 July 2003.
Issue 1B: Did Achilla commence operations of the ACB Business on 4 August 2003 (as the Amcor Parties contend) or 1 August 2003 (as the Holihan Parties contend)?
157 There now appears to be no real dispute between the parties on this issue. The Amcor parties accept that because there is unchallenged evidence that Achilla had commenced operations on 1 August 2003, in so far as material was being loaded, deliveries were being received, and potential staff were being interviewed on that day, the Court can make a finding to the effect.[127] Accordingly, I so find.
KEY ISSUE: Was there an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla containing terms identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, or is APA estopped from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to those alleged in the implied supply agreement?
Issue 1: Was there an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla containing terms identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement?
The 'implied' supply agreement alleged by the Holihan parties
158 As noted above, the Holihan parties allege that at all relevant times prior to the entry into the Deed of Accession there was an 'implied' supply agreement between APA, the parent of ACB Co Vendor, and Achilla containing terms identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. In essence, they contend that the reference to 'the Vendor' in clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement was, and was treated by all parties as, a reference to APA, rather than to ACB Co Vendor itself. They say the facts demonstrate that the parties always intended APA to be the counterparty to the clause 12 supply obligations because after Completion of the sale of the ACB Business, there was simply no prospect that ACB Co Vendor would have any need for the supply of OME products, it having sold all of its plant and equipment, interests in contracts, customers, books and records, business name and goodwill to ACB Co Purchaser, and terminated all of its employees. Further, it was also said that because ACB Co Vendor was not itself a supplier of raw materials before the sale, it was unlikely that after completion of the sale, ACB Co Vendor would have any ability or capacity to supply raw materials to Achilla.
159 The Holihan parties seek to address the disconformity between what they contend was the practical and commercial reality of the arrangements proposed between the parties on the one hand, and the terms of the Second Sale Agreement on the other. To this end, they plead the existence of an implied contract between APA (the parent of ACB Co Vendor) and Achilla (but not ACB Co Purchaser) in essentially the same terms as those set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
160 The plea concerning the implied supply agreement was not present in the original counterclaim when it was filed by Achilla but it was added at a later point.[128] In its current form in the Fourth Amended Counterclaim, the 'implied' supply agreement is pleaded as follows:
Contemporaneous with the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, APA and Achilla entered an exclusive supply agreement (the "Supply Agreement"), the terms of which were identical to cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, save that under the Supply Agreement, APA had the rights and obligations that [ACB Co Vendor] had under cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. [129]
161 Particulars of the implied supply agreement were given as follows:
The Supply Agreement was partly in writing and partly to be implied.
In so far as it was in writing, it was constituted by the Second Sale Agreement. In so far as it was implied, it was implied from the following facts:
(a) the Second Sale Agreement provided for [ACB Co Vendor] to sell all of the property and assets that it owned in connection with the business of selling and supplying corrugated packaging, including its interest in contracts with its customers;
(b) prior to completion of the Second Sale Agreement, APA was the largest customer of [ACB Co Vendor] by turnover;
(c) the effect of the Second Sale Agreement was to be that [ACB Co Vendor] would no longer be a purchaser or supplier of corrugated products;
(d) for those reasons, if [ACB Co Vendor] (and not APA) was to be the counterparty to Achilla under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, that clause would serve no commercial purpose;
(e) during the negotiations that culminated in the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla (through Mr Holihan) and APA (through its representatives including Trevor Barnes, John MacPhail, Tony Joyce, Ryan Patrick (sic[130]), Ken Parker, Jim Hodgson, Paul Brown, Peter Dwyer and Greg Crouch) expressed a common intention that the effect of the agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12.
The intention of the parties is to be inferred from a conversation between Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail on or about 20 September 2002 in which:
- Mr MacPhail said words to the effect that the vendor and purchaser companies needed to be corrected in the draft agreement so that the agreement was between [ACB Co Vendor], and Mr Holihan and his company;
- Mr Holihan said words to the effect that the supply agreement needed to involve AFP;
- Mr MacPhail said words to the effect that that was unnecessary, that the involvement of AFP was taken care of under clause 2.4; and that the agreement would work exactly the same way as it had with ACB Packaging[131] -
...[132]
(f) in the period following execution of the Second Sale Agreement (and save to the extent that APA breached the Supply Agreement as described below), APA and Achilla conducted themselves as if they were bound by clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
The conduct was as follows:
(i) APA gave orders to Achilla, and Achilla supplied Products to APA, as if those orders and supplies were subject to clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement. Particulars of those supplies are set out in document 1L of Achilla's discovery on the counterclaim; and
(ii) as demonstrated by the following documents.[133]
...
162 As pleaded, it is clear that the implied supply agreement alleged by the Holihan parties is not simply a term that is to be implied into the Second Sale Agreement. Rather, it involves the Court finding a fresh agreement that is said to have been entered into contemporaneously with the written agreement, but between different parties, and operating alongside the written agreement and concerning only the obligations and matters set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. Further, the Holihan parties say that just as the rights and obligations in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement must be read in the context of the remainder of that agreement, so the rights and obligations under the implied contract would be subject to the same ancillary machinery, mutatis mutandis.
163 It should also be noted that by contending that APA is the counterparty under the implied supply agreement, the Holihan parties seek to capture, and bring within the Vendor's obligation in clause 12.2, all of APA's OME requirements. That is, they effectively maintain that the Vendor's obligation in clause 12.2 is to be construed so as to mean that any OME work required by any of the AFP businesses that fall within APA's Corrugating division in New South Wales, including Amcor Displays, was to be given to Achilla.
164 In opening the case for the Holihan parties, Counsel said the implied contract 'sits happily next to the equivalent part of the written agreement, which can sit silently unused while the remainder of the written agreement is complied with.'[134] Further, Counsel for the Holihan parties explained:
the parties didn't intend to have a written agreement and an implied oral agreement sitting next to it. The parties intended to have one suite of agreements which would operate in a particular fashion. The fact is they didn't write that down. What they did write down gave rise at law to the effect that the part they didn't write down took effect as an implied agreement. And the reason that there's no problem about that is because the implied agreement can happily sit consistently with what they wrote down and did.[135]
165 The Holihan parties' case as summarised in their closing oral submissions has three aspects to it. First, it was said the structure of the Second Sale Agreement demonstrates that APA was intended to be the counterparty. Secondly, the facts demanded that APA be the counterparty in the sense that it had to be the counterparty in order for the agreement to work. Thirdly, the parties at all times conducted themselves as if APA was the counterparty.[136]
166 The impact of this implied supply agreement issue is important because, as the Holihan parties' observe, APA is the only (relevant) defendant to counterclaim, so that if the implied supply agreement is accepted, Achilla's claim will extend from the date of Completion to the date five years after that date. If the implied supply agreement is rejected, however, then Achilla's claim will be restricted to supplies made after the commencement of the Deed of Accession on 21 March 2005.[137]
The Amcor parties deny that there was any implied supply agreement
167 In their defence, the Amcor parties deny that there was any implied contract or supply agreement of the kind the Holihan parties allege.[138] They plead that '[t]he Second Sale Agreement represented the entire agreement of the parties about the subject matter of that deed'[139] and that 'it superseded any representations, negotiations, arrangements, understandings or agreements and all other communications',[140] and that '[i]t follows that the Second Sale Agreement superseded all arrangements and understandings including the common intention to which Achilla refers ... (the existence of which is denied).'[141]
168 Further, they contend that, in the premises, the Second Sale Agreement does not provide a written foundation for the alleged implied supply agreement. Rather, they say that the implied supply agreement is an artificial concept designed by the Holihan parties to avoid or circumvent the existence and plain effect of the Second Sale Agreement (including the 'entire agreement' clause set out in clause 15.11) and the operation of the Deed of Accession that was entered into in March 2005. They also rely upon clause 2.4 of the Second Sale Agreement, contending that it enabled any obligation imposed on ACB Co Vendor under the agreement to be carried out by ACB Co Vendor through a related body corporate, including APA and Amcor Limited.
169 The Amcor parties plead that pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement:
(a) in the period from close of business on 30 July 2003 to 21 March 2005:
(i) ACB Co Vendor whether in its own capacity or through a related entity such as APA pursuant to clause 2.4 supplied corrugated board and corrugated cartons (defined as "Products" in the Second Sale Agreement) to Achilla; and
(ii) ACB Co Vendor whether in its own capacity or through a related entity such as APA pursuant to clause 2.4 sought OME (Outside Manufacturing Enterprise) supply from Achilla.[142]
(b) In the period from 21 March 2005 to 30 July 2008, as a result of the matters pleaded below in respect of the Deed of Accession, APA in its own right fulfilled the supply obligations resting on ACB Co Vendor under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.[143]
170 In further answer to the implied supply agreement advanced by the Holihan parties, the Amcor parties also plead that the 'Amcor Displays Business', being the graphics and displays business operated by the business named 'Amcor Displays', was 'distinct from' both the business operated by ACB Co Vendor prior to the execution of the Second Sale Agreement and the businesses operated by APA.[144] In that regard, the Amcor parties plead that, at all material times:
(a) The Amcor Displays Business did not form part of the Amcor Fibre Packaging business carried on at APA's Smithfield and Revesby box plants ("AFP Business");
(b) The OME supplies of Products to Service Containers[145] did not form a supply of such Products to APA;
(c) The parties did not intend that, following the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, Service Containers would become obliged to purchase or procure all of its OME supplies of Products from Achilla.[146]
Further, they contend that '[u]nder the Second Sale Agreement, as a matter of interpretation, the obligations in clause 12 did not extend to the OME supply of Products to Service Containers'[147] and a similar position applies in the case of the implied supply agreement (the existence of which is denied).[148] Accordingly, they plead that there was 'no mutual understanding or arrangement that Service Containers would be bound to obtain all of its OME supplies of Products from Achilla.'[149]
171 In particular, the Amcor parties take issue with two fundamental aspects of the factual basis the Holihan parties rely upon as giving rise to the implied supply agreement. They point to the fact that first, the Holihan parties allege that at the time of sale the largest customer of the ACB Business was AFP, which was a trading division of APA. Secondly, they say the Holihan parties then proceed to effectively equate AFP with APA and maintain that (1) APA sent short run specialty work (or OME) to the ACB Business; and (2) APA supplied the ACB Business with raw materials (i.e., corrugated cardboard), both for use in work for its own customers and as the raw product for OME work required by APA.[150]
172 The case presented by the Amcor parties at trial, however, differed somewhat from the case as pleaded. The Amcor parties acknowledge that 'there are difficulties with the named parties within the agreement' and they say this is because 'Amcor has at all times operated a business model based on operating divisions.'[151] The Amcor parties dispute, however, both that APA was the supplier of corrugated cardboard to the ACB Business and that it was relevantly the customer of the ACB Business. They say that APA ran national businesses across different industries: Metals, Corrugated, Plastics, Cartons and Sacks, Paper and Glass,[152] as Vickery J noted in the principal judgment. APA operated sites within those different divisions nationally and also in New Zealand. The Amcor parties contend that the customer of the ACB Business was not APA, but rather that it was the businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales, trading as AFP, that placed orders with the ACB Business and supplied the raw materials.[153] Further, they say that APA was not and never was the same as 'AFP', AFP being simply a reference to the division of Amcor that operated the corrugated board aspect of the Amcor business, nor was it the equivalent of the AFP New South Wales, Smithfield and Revesby sites.[154]
173 The gist of the Amcor parties' response to the implied supply agreement alleged by the Holihan parties was explained by Senior Counsel in opening their case, as follows:
we say the objective intention was that the [ACB Co Purchaser] would step into the shoes of the [ACB Co Vendor], the shoes that [ACB Co Vendor] was wearing prior to the sale. And our case will be that on [that] construction of the contract that Achilla would continue to get the kind of work that it was doing before ...[155]
174 The Amcor parties expressly accept that clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement required Amcor to continue to obtain OME supplies from Achilla, where the previous ACB Business had already been producing those jobs for Amcor's customers, unless Achilla could not do so consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.[156]
Amcor's 'business as usual' case as set out in their aide-mémoire documents
175 During the opening of the Amcor parties' case, Senior Counsel provided two diagrams to the Court, the first entitled 'Diagram of how the AFP NSW Smithfield and Revesby sites gave work to the ACB Business and other OME suppliers before the sale' and the second entitled 'Diagram of how the AFP NSW Smithfield and Revesby sites gave OME jobs to Achilla and other OME suppliers after the sale.' These diagrams represented the gist of what their 'business as usual' case entailed as a practical matter both before and after the sale.
176 In their closing written submissions, the Amcor parties refined the argument further and sought to explain the role of ACB Co Vendor in the context of their 'business as usual' case. They contended that while under clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, the obligation to obtain OME supplies from Achilla is imposed on the 'Vendor', and ACB Co Vendor is the named vendor, nevertheless '[t]he evidence shows that the parties did not have regard to the identity of the "Vendor" but continued to operate on the basis of business as usual, as it was run on the day before the sale.'[157] In other words, the Amcor parties maintain that, notwithstanding the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, the ACB Business would (and did), as a practical matter, continue to do 'business as usual', in the sense that under the new ownership arrangements, the ACB Business would (and did) continue to perform the work that historically had been undertaken by the ACB Business, and essentially on the same basis as before, including that its supplies of raw material would continue to be sourced from the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales.
177 In the course of presenting their oral closing submissions, the Amcor parties provided a further table format document to the Court as an aide-mémoire to assist the Court and the parties to better understand the Amcor parties' case concerning the operation of the Second Sale Agreement with ACB Co Vendor as the Vendor. The aide-mémoire set out the essential propositions of the respective parties' cases under a timeline, commencing with the 'Period pre-Completion of the Second Sale Agreement', then moving through the 'Period between Completion and the Deed of Accession', and finally the 'Period following the Deed of Accession'. Relevantly the document summarised the Amcor parties' case by reference to those various periods in time as follows.
(1) Period pre-Completion of the Second Sale Agreement
178 The Amcor parties submit that in the pre-Completion period:
• Some of the short run work was done by the ACB Business within Amcor;
• ACB[158] operated out of Wetherill Park and serviced the Amcor corrugated box manufacturing sites at Smithfield and Revesby (AFP NSW);
• Other short run work from Smithfield and Revesby was outsourced externally to several OME suppliers, including Thompson, J S Cutting, Northwest Packaging, Sainsbury, SPS Packaging and Ubeeco.
(2) Period between Completion and the Deed of Accession
179 The Amcor parties contend that in this period the Amcor entity that was the party to the supply agreement was ACB Co Vendor. The Amcor parties' position is that:
• Pursuant to clause 12.2, ACB Co Vendor would obtain all its OME supplies from Achilla other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
• Clause 2.4 allowed ACB Co Vendor to have any of its obligations carried out by other parts of Amcor.[159]
• The words 'all its OME supplies' refer to the business that the ACB Business was conducting prior to the sale, i.e., 'business as usual'.
• After Completion and before the Deed of Accession was entered into, the Smithfield and Revesby box plants (AFP NSW) continued to give the Holihan parties the sort of work ACB[160] had been doing prior to the sale.
• 'AFP NSW'[161] did not include, and was separate from, Amcor Displays.
180 The Amcor parties contend that following the entry into the Deed of Accession, the Amcor entity that was the party to the supply agreement was APA 'insofar as it was to perform the rights and obligations of ACB Co Vendor.' The Amcor parties' position is that:
• The evidence is that the Deed of Accession was entered into as a result of a 'tidying up' within head office which administered the corporate entities for statutory and accounting purposes.[162] The operating side of Amcor was not involved and had no knowledge.
• The Deed of Accession did not expand the obligations under the Second Sale Agreement. Rather, APA simply 'stepped into the shoes of' ACB Co Vendor.[163] Amcor Displays was not part of the agreement in 2003, and it was not inadvertently included from 21 March 2005 as a result of the Deed of Accession.
• Further, the Amcor parties contend that the Deed of Accession 'also points firmly against the adoption of a common assumption' of the kind pleaded by the Holihan parties in their estoppel by convention case 'that APA was bound by clause 12'.[164]
181 As will be apparent from the foregoing, in the period between Completion and entry into the Deed of Accession, the Amcor parties effectively acknowledge the difficulty in making the Second Sale Agreement work as a practical matter in circumstances where ACB Co Vendor is the Amcor entity that is bound by the supply obligations in clauses 12.1 and 12.2. In the course of oral closing submissions, Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties explained the operation of clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement in the period after Completion, submitting that ACB Co Vendor is promising in clause 12.1 that it will supply corrugated board and corrugated cartons, and in clause 12.2 that it will procure OME supplies from Achilla, and in each case, 'is delegating the performance of that promise to AFP'.[165] Senior Counsel elaborated further, by submitting that 'there's been a delegation of that performance',[166] and she referred the Court to a line of English cases, notably Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Limited,[167] British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co[168] and Davies v Collins[169] as cases establishing the concept of vicarious or delegated performance.
182 In Nokes, the question before the House of Lords was whether, upon the court making an order for the amalgamation of two companies under section 154 of the Companies Act 1929, a contract of personal service existing at the date of amalgamation between a workman and the transferor company is automatically transformed into a contract of personal service between the employee and the transferee company irrespective of the consent of the employee. The House of Lords (Lord Romer dissenting) held that it does not.
183 In support of their delegation of performance argument, the Amcor parties rely upon a passage in the judgment of Viscount Simon LC, where his Lordship discusses the assignability of contracts, as follows:
The rules of law restricting the assignability of contracts are, however, by no means limited to contracts of personal service. In the case of contracts for the sale of goods, for example, (unless the contract expressly or by implication covers the purchaser and his assigns), the seller is entitled to rely on the credit of the purchaser and to refuse to recognise any substitute. Similarly, the purchaser is entitled to rely upon the seller and to hold him responsible for due performance. I may add that a possible confusion may arise from the use of the word "assignability" in discussing some of the cases usually cited on this subject. Thus, in British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea the real point of the decision was that the contract which the Parkgate company had made with Lea for the repair of certain wagons did not call for the repairs being necessarily effected by the Parkgate company itself, but could be adequately performed by the Parkgate Company arranging with the British Waggon company that the latter should execute the repairs. Such a result does not depend on the assignment of contract at all. It depends on the view that the contract of repair was duly discharged by the Parkgate company by getting in the repairs satisfactorily effected by a third party. In other words, the contract bound the Parkgate company to produce a result, not necessarily by its own efforts, but, if preferred, by vicarious performance through a sub-contractor or otherwise.[170]
184 Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties submitted that the concept in British Waggon that Viscount Simon LC had referred to was that of 'getting the job done, not necessarily by its own efforts, but it's arranging or facilitating to get it done',[171] and that '[i]t doesn't require an assignment or proof in writing. Inference can be it's going to be done.'[172] She acknowledged, however, that the position was different where a contract expressly or impliedly required personal performance.
185 Senior Counsel then proceeded to explain how the Amcor parties contended this concept of delegation of performance operated in the present case without invoking the operation of clause 2.4. [173] In effect, Dr McNicol QC submitted that in contradistinction to clause 2.4, the common law authorities she had referred to make clear that the ability to delegate performance is not confined to delegation to a related body corporate. She then summarised the Amcor parties' position, contending that it was neither relevant, nor necessary, to ask the question of the proper construction of the contract, but rather to look at the fact that the obligation was fulfilled through the life of the contract. It was said that 'the way that the Amcor business was structured, it ran on operational levels,'[174] and there was no evidence that clause 2.4 was invoked.[175] Dr McNicol QC submitted that relevantly, clause 12.2 operated by guaranteeing that ACB Co Vendor would obtain all its OME supplies from Achilla for the relevant period and the expression 'all its OME supplies' meant 'the OME supplies of the pre-existing ACB business.'[176] She explained:
It's business as usual, that's the concept that we've invoked, and we say that whatever evidence there is of the conduct and operation of the ACB business prior to the execution is precisely the same business that is to be carried on after the execution.[177]
186 The Holihan parties contend that where the facts indicate the existence of a particular agreement or contractual relationship, the law will imply a contract where to do so is necessary to give effect to the reality of the parties' intentions. In this regard, they rely upon (what are said to be) the words of Bingham LJ in The Aramis,[178] to the effect that the common law will imply a contract where that is:
... necessary ... in order to give business reality to a transaction and to create enforceable obligations between parties who are dealing with one another in circumstances in which one would expect that business reality and those enforceable obligations to exist.[179]
The Holihan parties acknowledge, however, that consistency of the parties' conduct with the terms of the contract alleged is not enough: rather, there must be a positive indication of the existence of the particular agreement in question.[180]
187 The Holihan parties submit that there is nothing novel in the co-existence of a written contract between parties A and B, and an implied contract between parties B and C, concerning overlapping subject matter. They argue that such contracts are frequently recognised by courts in what are known as 'triangular contracting' cases, in the context of employment law: where a labour hire company enters into a written contract with a worker requiring the worker to provide services to a customer, and a contract with the customer agreeing to provide the services of workers to that customer, but the courts nevertheless find there is an implied contract between the worker and the customer. They rely upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Homecare Direct Shopping Pty Ltd v Gray[181], which was a triangular labour hire case, where Forrest AJA (with whom Neave and Kellam JJA agreed) accepted that when the totality of the triangular arrangements made between the parties are examined, the court may find that the entry into a written contract does not preclude the implication of a contract in a context where work is performed by one person for another. Forrest AJA referred to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd v Dacas[182] where Mummery LJ said:
Depending on the evidence in the case, a contract of service may be implied - that is, deduced - as a necessary inference from the conduct of the parties and from the circumstances surrounding the parties and the work done. As already indicated, the overall situation under consideration is shaped by the triangular format used for the organisation of the work: the applicant, the employment agency and the end-user are all involved. Each participant in the triangular situation may have an express contract with either one of, or with each of, the other two parties.
The critical point is that, although the construction of the contractual documents is important, it is not necessarily determinative of the contract of service questions, as contractual documents do not always cover all the contractual territory or exhaust all the contractual possibilities. In determining the true nature of the relationship (if any) between each of the respective parties, it is necessary to consider the total situation occupied by the parties.[183]
188 Forrest AJA said that this approach was consistent with what was said in Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc[184] where the High Court recognised that the search for whether a contract exists may not be confined to the examination of the terms of a particular contractual document. His Honour said that in ascertaining whether an implied contract exists, the court must consider 'all the factual issues, including the written agreements'[185] and that 'it is the whole of the circumstances viewed objectively that will determine whether a contract exists or not.'[186] Forrest AJA found that, in the circumstances of the Homecare case, it was open for the trial judge to find that there was an implied contract between the retailer and the worker.[187]
189 The Holihan parties also rely upon the decision of the Full Federal Court in Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd[188] and the earlier case of Damevski v Guidice[189] to which North and Bromberg JJ referred with approval in their joint judgment in Quest.[190] Since the present matter was argued, however, the High Court has allowed an appeal from the decision of the Full Federal Court in Quest, concerning the proper construction of s 357(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth): see Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 109 989 531).[191]
190 In Quest, the respective decisions turn on the nature of the employment relationship of the two women, who were employed as housekeepers, and the sham nature of their independent contractor status. The High Court noted that the two women 'continued to perform precisely the same work for Quest in precisely the same manner as they had always done' and 'in law, they never became independent contractors.'[192] The High Court held that s 357(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) is not confined in the manner suggested by the Full Federal Court, namely to misrepresentations by an employer to an employee. Rather, the High Court said the purpose of the provision, when read in the context of the legislative scheme, 'is to protect an individual who is in truth an employee from being misled by his or her employer about his or her employment status, and 'it is the status of an employee which attracts the existence of workplace rights.'[193]
191 In my view, the respective decisions in Quest turn on the particular facts of the employment situation and the statutory framework and do not assist in resolving the quite different issues that arise in the present case.
192 The Holihan parties' case for implication of a fresh and separate agreement between APA and Achilla is advanced primarily on the basis that it is necessary to do so in order to give effect to the 'obvious business reality'[194] of the situation that existed between the parties. They contend that absent the implied agreement, the business reality of the parties' relationship would be frustrated.
193 The Holihan parties' case is effectively that the documentation of the agreement reached between the parties miscarried - while ordinarily that would give rise to a claim for rectification, the Holihan parties seek to sidestep the difficulties inherent in making out such a case by pleading the existence of a fresh implied contract, made between a subset of the parties that were involved in the negotiations.
194 The Amcor parties reject the notion that there was any implied agreement of the kind contended for. First, they say the implied agreement is nothing short of a claim for recognition of a 'collateral contract', and courts are notoriously slow to find the existence of a collateral contract, particularly where the contract is one sought to be implied from conduct. As Finkelstein J observed in Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd,[195] 'the case for an implied contract will be rare' and 'it is only in a very clear case that a promise will be implied from facts which do not involve written or oral communications from which a promise appears.'[196]
195 Further, the Amcor parties say[197] that for a contract to be implied:
the conduct relied upon must 'necessarily'[198] lead to the inference that an agreement has been made. 'Not only must the conduct point to the existence of a contract but it must point to the existence of the contract in the terms alleged in the proceedings.'[199] And '[i]t is not enough that the conduct is consistent with what are alleged to be the terms of a binding agreement. The evidence must positively indicate that both parties considered themselves bound by that agreement.'[200]
196 The Amcor parties also identified what they contend is 'a fundamental threshold difficulty' with the Holihan parties' case, namely the fact that the evidence led at trial did not demonstrate any intention on the part of the parties to bring into existence a separate and independent contract, nor did it support the co-existence of an implied supply agreement running in parallel with the written agreement.
197 The Holihan parties responded by clarifying that their implied contract case does not rest on the existence of any subjective intention, and they submitted that demonstrating an intention to be bound to a separate unwritten contract is not essential to a finding that an unwritten contract existed parallel to a written one. Rather, the Holihan parties contend that the task of the Court in construing the effect of the parties' arrangements is, as the High Court stated in Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc,[201] namely, to undertake an 'objective assessment of the state of affairs between the parties' to determine whether their agreement has the character of a contract.[202] And the Holihan parties submit that an objective analysis of the relevant circumstances demonstrates that the parties intended APA to be bound by clause 12.
198 The Amcor parties submitted that the evidence that Mr Holihan gave, to the effect that clause 2.4 of the Second Sale Agreement permits APA to come within the agreement on the supply side, was 'fatal to this implied contract theory'.[203] Mr Holihan's evidence was to the effect that APA was 'covered off' because Mr MacPhail had said to him words to the effect of '[d]on't you worry about APA, they're looked after, they'll fall under the rubric of clause 2.4'.[204] The Amcor parties submitted that this evidence 'directly contradicts the need for having an implied supply agreement.'[205] Further, they contended, when the Deed of Accession was entered into, 'there was no evidence that anyone thought they were putting an implied agreement into an express form.'[206]
199 The Amcor parties also noted that the Holihan parties' 'implied agreement' case does not grapple with the inconsistency that arises between clause 12 of the written agreement and clause 12 of the alleged implied agreement in circumstances where the latter operates only as between APA and Achilla, and ACB Co Purchaser is not mentioned. Further, they say that the Holihan parties do not explain how the implied agreement can arise, and exist, in the face of the entire agreement clause contained in clause 15.11 of the Second Sale Agreement.
Circumstances where courts have recognised or found an 'implied contract' - applicable legal principles
200 The courts in the United Kingdom, and in Australia, have long recognised that the business dealings between commercial people do not always fit readily within the offer and acceptance framework and that there are cases where it is objectively clear that less formal dealings between the parties will nevertheless suffice to manifest them as having reached an agreement. In 1877, in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co,[207] the House of Lords recognised an acceptance by conduct, finding that a contract came into existence either when the defendant company ordered its first load of coal from Brogden or when Brogden supplied it, in each case on the terms of a draft form of agreement, the execution of which had never been completed. Lord Cairns LC described the correspondence between the parties as being imbued with -
[T]he expression of a feeling on the one side and on the other that those who were ordering the coals were ordering them, and those who were supplying the coals were supplying them, under some course of dealing which created on the one side a right to give the order, and on the other side an obligation to comply with the order.[208]
201 Brogden has been applied many times in Australian courts. In Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd,[209] Ormiston J referred to Brodgen and cases of a similar kind, including his own analysis in Gjergja v Cooper[210] and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales in Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd[211] and in Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners Pty Ltd.[212] Ormiston J said that he was 'prepared to accept' that -
agreement and thus a contract can be extracted from circumstances where no acceptance of an offer can be established or inferred and where the most that can be said is that a manifestation of mutual assent must be implied from the circumstances.[213]
202 The decided cases make clear, however, that where an acceptance by conduct is alleged, the focus will be on the particular facts of the case and that what actually happened will be all-important.[214] The courts continue to approach the task of implying a contract with a good deal of caution, and require that the conduct relied upon must 'necessarily' provide evidence of acceptance,[215] and it may not be sufficient if the conduct is only consistent with acceptance.[216]
203 A few months after Vroon was decided, an appeal was heard in Toyota Motor Corporation Aust Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd,[217] a case which had raised the issue of whether the parties intended to create legal relations. The trial judge held that a binding agreement was made in December 1990, the terms of which were recorded in a letter dated 19 December 1990 and a one page enclosure dated 20 December 1990 (together referred to as 'Exhibit G'). On appeal, the Full Court held that Exhibit G did not evidence a binding contract. In his reasons, Tadgell J referred to Ormiston J's analysis in Vroon but expressed doubt about whether, in the absence of an offer and acceptance, an 'implied contract' can be discerned from the parties' dealings and communications with one another over a period of time. His Honour said:
Despite several references in the judgment in the Vroon Case to an "implied contract", perhaps encouraged by some text writers (e.g. Greig and Davis, at pp. 249-52) and some judges (e.g., Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Paul Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal (The Hannah Blumenthal) [1983] 1 AC 854, at p 914) I do not find the concept easy to comprehend, respectfully sharing as I do with Oliver LJ: "... some difficulty in the concept of the implication of a term, not for the purpose of finding what the parties have agreed on a matter on which their written or proven oral exchanges are silent, but for the purpose of ascertaining whether they have entered into an agreement at all": Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Company of Canada (CI) Ltd [1985] 1 Ch 103, at p 141. If there is that difficulty in implying a term, how much greater the difficulty to imply a contract when the question is whether parties have entered into an agreement at all. If a contract is to be discerned in the absence of offer and acceptance I venture the suggestion that, leaving aside questions of estoppel, it is to be discovered by inferring from the relevant facts the conclusion that the parties have agreed to incur reciprocal promissory obligations: cf. Pearl Mill Co Ltd v Ivy Tannery Co Ltd [1919] 1 KB 78, at p 82, per Rowlatt J; applied in André & Cie SA v Marine Transocean Ltd (The Splendid Sun) [1981] 1 QB 694, a decision questioned by the Court of Appeal in Allied Marine Transport Ltd v Vale Do Rio Doce Navegacao SA (The Leonidas D) [1985] 1 WLR 925, at pp 937-40, although apparently approved by at least some of the Lords in The Hannah Blumenthal and embraced by Kerr LJ in The Antclizo, at pp 148-9. As Williston suggests, the necessity or opportunity to infer in the absence of offer and acceptance is likely to be rare, and in my opinion neither necessity nor opportunity exists here.[218]
204 Tadgell J's observations, and the cautionary note expressed by his Honour, serve to emphasise the difficulty the Holihan parties face in advancing a case for the implication of a supply contract between APA and Achilla based on the provisions of clause 12, in circumstances where ACB Co Vendor has entered into a written contract with ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla containing the whole suite of provisions, including those in clause 12.
The evidence falls short of demonstrating a proper basis for implying an agreement between APA and Achilla
205 In my view, when the whole of the circumstances are viewed objectively, the evidence falls short of demonstrating a proper basis for implying an agreement between APA and Achilla of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties, effectively requiring that (prior to entry into the Deed of Accession in March 2005) 'all' of the OME work that APA required be performed by Achilla.
206 First, the case opened by the Holihan parties was posited on 'the parties' (without specifying whom) not intending 'to have a written agreement and an implied oral agreement sitting next to it.'[219] Rather, it was said 'the parties' 'intended to have one suite of agreements which would operate in a particular fashion.'[220] The loose reference to 'the parties' rather than to the particular entities involved suggests that each of them was involved in the 'one suite of arrangements' and that each intended to be bound by them. As a matter of law, however, for the Holihan parties to make out their case for an implied supply contract, they were required to lead evidence that would show first, an intention on the part of each of 'the parties', and in particular, relevantly APA and Achilla, to be legally bound by an agreement or arrangement of the kind contended for; and secondly, that the conduct relied upon by them necessarily leads to the inference that an agreement was made between APA and Achilla and in the terms alleged.
207 In my view, for the reasons set out below, the evidence led on behalf of the Holihan parties fell short of establishing each of those matters.
208 The List of Issues poses five 'sub-issues', formulated by the parties, that (it is stated) 'might impact on the determination of' the central issue of whether there was an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla in the same terms as clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. Those sub-issues are framed as follows:
(a) If ACB [Co Vendor] (and not APA) was to be the counterparty to Achilla under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, would the clause have any commercial purpose?
(b) During the negotiations before entry into the Second Sale Agreement, did Achilla and APA express a common intention that the effect of that agreement would be that Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which was at that time provided to ACB Co Vendor by APA?
(c) Following execution of the Second Sale Agreement, did APA and Achilla conduct themselves as if they were bound by the terms of clause 12 of that agreement?
(d) Did ACB Co Vendor, in its own capacity, ever supply Products to Achilla or purchase Products from Achilla in the period from Completion to 21 March 2005?
(e) Do the Second Sale Agreement and the Deed of Accession preclude a finding that there was an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla?
209 Having now heard all of the evidence called and the submissions made by the parties, my view is that the 'sub issues' posed operate to distract or divert the Court away from the determination of the central issue in an orthodox and principled way. So much may be demonstrated by issue 1(a), which effectively seeks to discern from an allegedly 'uncommercial' outcome that is said to arise from a contract entered into between the parties that there is another contract to be implied between different parties that would render a more commercial outcome.
210 In those circumstances, I propose to briefly discuss each of the documents relied upon and the evidence advanced by the Holihan parties in support of the alleged common intention(s), as part of the overall chronological context of relevant events and circumstances that they rely upon for their implied supply agreement.
Chronological context of relevant events - body of (pre-contractual) evidence relied upon by the Holihan parties in support of the alleged common intention
211 The first document identified is the January 2002 Business proposal that Mr Holihan says he put to 'AFP representatives' (without specifying whom)[221] seeking '[t]o be the preferred supplier of OME to Amcor Fibre Packaging (AFP-NSW)'.[222] Relevantly, the proposal identified four supply opportunities sought to be undertaken by Mr Holihan as follows:
212 Mr Holihan followed up in August 2002 with a 'Management Buyout' proposal for 'the Australian Corrugated Box Co' (i.e., ACB Co Vendor). In his proposal, he stated that 'the business will supply corrugated products to AFP where these products are deemed to be either too big, too small or that may result in bottlenecks in a high-speed low-cost producing plant', and noted that 'the existing ACB business has been set up on this basis.'[224] Mr Holihan pointed out that some of the inefficiencies in the present business, such as the hidden cost associated with 'a fragmented approach' to the supply of OME products could be 'removed via a close relationship with a partnered supplier who understands the workings of AFP.'[225] In his proposal, he summarised the benefits he perceived would accrue to Amcor:
The Benefits to Amcor
With a neutral impact on AFP's profit, the added benefits will flow from
The business will make its money by trying to reduce its cost basis via flexible work place agreements and a working environment which is not possible being part of a large company such as Amcor.[226]
213 Mr Holihan said that he prepared the Management Buyout Proposal with himself as a potential purchaser in mind and presented it to Mr Alvarez, Mr Barnes, Mr Cichonski and Mr Beynon, all of whom were part of the AFP New South Wales management team, at some time between 5 and 15 August 2002, but he cannot remember exactly when.[227] Mr Holihan was unable to remember the detail of what was discussed at the presentation but said he does remember presenting his proposal document by reading it out to the attendees using an overhead projector, and discussing the effect of consolidation of supply. He said that during the presentation he referred to the situation where the OME supplier was on the PICK system as being something that would be beneficial to AFP and that 'none of Barnes, Alvarez, Cichonski nor Beynon said that they disagreed'.[228]
214 Mr Holihan was cross-examined about this notion of consolidation of supply. Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties asked him whether in August 2002, when he presented the Management Buyout Proposal, any Amcor staff said they saw a benefit to Amcor in having one consolidated supplier. He responded by saying that 'I don't recall now that they said that. But in presenting it, nobody said that they didn't think it was a good approach.'[229] He was then asked whether after August 2002 any Amcor staff said to him that they saw a benefit to Amcor in having one consolidated supplier. He responded '[p]ossibly Barnes' but added that 'I can't be sure, so I'll just have to answer that I don't recall.'[230] Mr Holihan was then asked a further question of whether at any time before entering into the Second Sale Agreement, any Amcor staff said to him that they saw a benefit to Amcor, and he responded 'No'. Senior Counsel then concluded the cross-examination of Mr Holihan by putting to him 'that Amcor simply did not see it as a benefit.' He responded, as follows:
... well I believe that they did, even though it wasn't - I don't recall them discussing it, it [sic.] believe it was a benefit to them because of the fact that having a fragmented approach people - there's a lot of resources tied up in dealing with multiple suppliers and it just makes much more sense to have one entity supplying the lot and not having to raise multiple purchase orders, pickups for products, dropping products off. Um, it was very time consuming and resource - very resourceful in dealing with multiple suppliers.[231]
215 Of the AFP New South Wales management team who attended at Mr Holihan's presentation, Mr Cichonski was the only one that was called by the Holihan parties to give evidence at the hearing of the Achilla counterclaim. Mr Cichonski said that he could not recall any such presentation by Mr Holihan and could not recall Mr Holihan having presented a management buyout proposal.[232] In re-examination, when Mr Cichonski was asked about the suggested benefits of consolidating OME supply, as mentioned in Mr Holihan's August 2002 note, Mr Cichonski agreed that they 'make a lot of sense.'[233] The Amcor parties submit that as Mr Cichonski was not involved in the negotiation of the Second Sale Agreement, and was unable to recall any such management buyout proposal presentation having been made by Mr Holihan, his observations in June 2015 about events that took place in August 2002 could be accorded only 'little' weight. I share that view.
216 It would appear that from early in the discussions, Mr Holihan was keen to highlight the benefits of consolidation of supply, contending that it would be of benefit to Amcor to have one consolidated OME supplier. What is not clear, however, is that the Amcor parties ever shared this view. Mr Holihan gave evidence that nobody at Amcor said to him, and/or that he could not recall them saying to him, that they agreed that it would be a benefit to Amcor to have one consolidated OME supplier.[234] Indeed prior to the sale, when the ACB Business was operated 'in-house', the position was that Amcor had chosen to source the supply of certain OME work from other external suppliers, and in many cases had done so over a long period of time. Mr Darren Nellies,[235] who gave evidence on behalf of Amcor, did not accept that there was necessarily a benefit to Amcor if OME work was consolidated in a single supplier.[236] But he did accept that there were benefits to Amcor in having more supply on the PICK system, given that it was a quicker way of arranging orders.[237] Mr Joyce,[238] who gave evidence on behalf of the Holihan parties, was also asked whether he recalled any discussions to the effect that a benefit of the sale was that Amcor could obtain all of its OME supplies from the one supplier, but he said he did not specifically recall that point being made to him.[239] Mr Joyce also observed that he 'saw no commercial reason' why any other outside manufacturing work that was previously going directly external 'needed to be channelled through the new Australian Corrugated Box Company'.[240]
217 Mr Holihan said that at the end of the meeting at which his Management Buy Out Proposal was being discussed, Mr Barnes told him that if he was interested in buying the ACB Business, he would need to work up an agreement with Mr MacPhail at Baker & McKenzie.[241]
218 At a practical level, the Second Sale Agreement was negotiated between Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes for the most part. At the trial of the principal proceeding, both Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan gave evidence. At the trial of the Achilla counterclaim, however, Mr Barnes did not give evidence.
219 Each of Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail, the solicitor at Baker & McKenzie in Sydney who was engaged by the Amcor parties in relation to the drafting of the Second Sale Agreement, gave evidence at the trial of the Achilla counterclaim and was cross-examined extensively. The Court directed that in the case of each of Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail, where their evidence was to cover the same territory and was contentious, it must be given viva voce rather than by each of them simply relying on their witness statements.
Initial discussions between Holihan and Barnes
220 The evidence was that the 'negotiations' commenced on 26 August 2002, when Mr Barnes emailed a draft 'asset sale agreement' to Mr Holihan.[242] It is unclear who actually prepared that draft, but shortly after Mr Holihan received it, he followed up by making an appointment to meet with Mr Barnes on or about 27 August 2002 at the AFP office at Smithfield.
221 The first draft had been prepared by using the First Sale Agreement (prepared by Baker & McKenzie for the sale of the Service Packaging Business to Mr Hottes) as a template for the transaction. The first draft bore the name of Baker & McKenzie on the front page but it was not prepared by that firm.[243] The document was styled as an 'asset sale agreement' between 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd' as the vendor and 'Australian Corrugated Box Pty Ltd' as purchaser, and 'Craig Holihan' as guarantor of the due performance by the purchaser. At that point in time, however, there was no corporate entity in existence known as 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd' and the ABN[244] recorded on the recital page as '48 005 319 666'[245] was in fact the ABN for Service Containers Pty Ltd, which was the named vendor under the First Sale Agreement with Mr Hottes.
222 Mr Holihan said that during his initial meeting with Mr Barnes on 26 August 2002, he made notes on the draft 'asset sale agreement'.[246] The substance of the discussion that took place between them was to the effect that Mr Holihan should use the draft as a template to work on in conjunction with Mr MacPhail and 'knock it into shape' and when they were happy with it the agreement would be put up for review. Mr Holihan said that Mr Barnes also mentioned to him that there needed to be a clause in the agreement for the supply of OME to AFP so that it could get its OME work from the new business. Mr Barnes apparently made a note to this effect on Mr Holihan's copy of the draft agreement, under clause 13.1. Mr Holihan then referred him to clause 13.4 of the working draft (which was an early iteration of what became clause 12.2), which he said covers this.[247] Mr Holihan said that this was also in line with what was discussed earlier in August 2002 when he first presented the Management Buyout Proposal to Mr Barnes and others.
223 Mr Holihan reviewed the draft agreement that Mr Barnes had given him. He summarised the observations he had made at the time, stating:
It had a number of mistakes in it that I picked up. It had wrong entities, wrong ABN numbers. It has references to other people. So the first thing I picked up was that it needed to be between Amcor Fibre Packaging and my new company. The rest of it I walked through and...amended where I could...changed references to the vendor and the purchaser, and finally sent a draft to MacPhail to consider that we then sat down and went through on 20 September 2002.[248]
Mr MacPhail's role in drafting the Second Sale Agreement
224 Between 1999 and 2003, Mr MacPhail was a Senior Associate in the Sydney office of Baker & McKenzie, and he acted for a variety of companies or entities within the Amcor group in drafting a number of commercial agreements, usually on instructions from Mr Barnes. In around 2001 to 2002, Mr MacPhail had acted for Amcor on the sale of the 'Service Packaging Business' to Mr Hottes. That sale was effected by the First Sale Agreement, dated 1 February 2002. In that matter, he received instructions from Mr Barnes and Mr Hottes.[249]
225 In around 2002 to 2003, Baker & McKenzie, and thereby Mr MacPhail, were again engaged to act for Amcor on the sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan. Mr MacPhail said that in that matter, he 'was acting essentially for the vendor for the sale of the assets.'[250] He received his instructions from Mr Barnes, but some of the instructions were communicated to him by Mr Holihan. He said that while his day to day instructions were from Mr Holihan, Mr Barnes was his instructor and he had complete control and power to override Mr Holihan.
226 Mr MacPhail said that initially he had spoken with Mr Barnes by phone. Mr Barnes told him that the deal that was about to be done for the ACB Business was essentially the same as Mr Hottes' management buyout for the specialty trading unit of the Amcor group that he had done in February 2002. Mr Barnes said to Mr MacPhail words to the effect that the current deal 'was going to be very much in the same flavour' and that 'the deal was to get some assets off the books of Amcor which was consistent with a financial policy or an accounting policy' and that Mr MacPhail's job was to do the legal documentation for the deal, being the sale of the assets to Mr Holihan.[251]
Preliminary discussions between Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail
227 Mr Holihan followed up with Mr MacPhail, telephoning him on or about 11 September 2002 to discuss about the terms of sale for the ACB Business. He said he told Mr MacPhail that he would be buying the subject assets. Mr Holihan also told him a little about the benefits of the sale for both parties and said he would send through his comments on the draft asset sale agreement and any suggested changes once he had had a chance to review it in more detail.
228 On 12 September 2002, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr MacPhail enclosing a version of the draft asset sale agreement with his comments and amendments.[252] Clause 13 of this draft contained a supply agreement between the vendor, named as 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd', and the purchaser. Mr Holihan said that this was consistent with his intention that he, or a company of his, would effectively 'step into the shoes' of ACB Co Vendor in terms of the existing relationship between ACB Co Vendor and AFP insofar as OME work was concerned.[253] Also, in this version, the term of the respective supply obligations was expressed to be 'for a period of 7 years from Completion' rather than five years as stated in the first draft.
229 A further draft of the agreement was generated on or around 16 September 2002.[254] Mr Holihan said that he worked through the document by himself in his office at Wetherill Park and made some amendments to it. One of the changes he made was to include a reference to APA as the vendor, and consequentially, as the party to the supply obligations in clause 12. He says that by this time, he had learned that there was no legal entity known as 'Amcor Fibre Packaging' and that APA was the corporate vehicle through which AFP conducted its operations. Further, he said, as the purchaser was to be a new 'Australian Corrugated Box' company owned by him, he also crossed out the ACN[255] under the name of the purchaser on the front page of the agreement.
230 On 20 September 2002, Mr Holihan emailed to Mr MacPhail the latest version of the agreement he had been working on.[256] The email cover sheet indicates that they were going to meet at around 4.00 pm that day to discuss the matter. The front cover sheet of this version of the draft showed the parties as being 'Amcor Packaging Australia Pty Ltd ABN 55 004 275 165'[257] and 'Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd ABN 93 002 693 843' and Craig Holihan. Mr Holihan says that this reflected his intention, namely, that APA would be the counterparty to the supply agreement under clause 12. Under cross-examination, he said that in September 2002, he thought that APA and AFP were the same entity[258] but he later clarified that answer by saying 'AFP was a trading entity of APA, so AFP on its own couldn't have signed the agreement.'[259] In this version of the draft, however, the listing of the parties (just above the Recitals) continued to show the vendor as being 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd ABN 48 005 319 666'[260] rather than APA (as was shown on the cover sheet).
The meeting at Baker & McKenzie's office on 20 September 2002
231 The meeting between Mr MacPhail and Mr Holihan on 20 September 2002 took place at Baker & McKenzie's office in Sydney. This was the first time that Mr MacPhail and Mr Holihan had met. Mr Holihan described the meeting as being 'the start of a process and for me [Holihan] to inform him [MacPhail] of what Amcor's wishes were.'[261] Mr Holihan said that at the meeting with Mr MacPhail he was wearing two hats - one as the purchaser, and the other as general manager of the ACB Co Vendor.[262]
232 Mr MacPhail said that his recollection of the meeting was a bit distant now, it having taken place some 13 years ago. He said that during the meeting he was doing at least three things: listening to Mr Holihan, speaking himself and making notes on a note pad contemporaneously.[263] He said he had used those notes to refresh his memory for the purposes of giving evidence.
233 At the beginning of the meeting, Mr MacPhail asked Mr Holihan if he had a solicitor dealing with the matter who would be providing separate legal advice to him. Mr Holihan mentioned that Mr David Roe was his solicitor. Mr MacPhail said he believes that at their initial meeting, Mr Holihan had flagged that he would be obtaining advice from his solicitor, but Mr MacPhail did not deal with Mr Roe until much later in the piece.[264]
234 Mr MacPhail said that, in essence, Mr Holihan confirmed what Mr Barnes had told him about the deal in their earlier phone calls. Mr Holihan explained to him what 'OME' or outside manufactured enterprise product was. The ACB business involved taking raw product, usually corrugated board, and manufacturing it into finished product, such as cartons, pallets, or display stands etc. In the majority of cases the finished product was for customers of Amcor, and in others, it was for non-Amcor customers. At one stage during the meeting, Mr Holihan assisted Mr MacPhail by making a note on MacPhail's note pad to explain the operation of the manufacturing and selling arms of the Amcor business and the relative numbers of customers involved in each activity, as follows:
235 Mr MacPhail said that he understood that the agreement for the sale of the Service Containers Business that took place in February 2002 was being used as a template for the documentation of this deal - in the sense that ACB Packaging was effectively being substituted for Service Containers in all the documents - and so 'it was just a kind of cut and paste job on the documentation.'[266] But he confirmed that the version of the draft that was available for discussion at the meeting with Mr Holihan was not one that was drafted by him and that he had only received it that afternoon by fax or email from Mr Holihan.[267] Mr MacPhail said that at the meeting:
I was really taking instructions and saying, well what is the deal that you and Trevor have worked out. And I saw my role very much as I suppose an amanuensis, or kind of just doing the legals on the particular...deal which had been struck,...as I was instructed between Trevor Barnes and Mr Holihan.[268]
236 During the meeting, matters such as employees, and how to deal with them, and the vendor financing of the purchaser were raised. Mr Holihan explained that Amcor would be a secured creditor and he would be repaying the loan out of cash flow. He said he would not be giving any warranties, guarantees or indemnities to the vendor, but would accept liability for third party claims. The file note also records that Mr Holihan was to 'retain "control" of the [Purchaser] co' but 'only whilst $ o/standing' and that Amcor was to have '1st rt to buy business & last refusal'.[269] Mr MacPhail said he thought the first part of the note was a reference to the fact that Mr Holihan would not be permitted to part with control of his company or sell the shares in it to another party whilst any of the vendor finance was still outstanding.[270] He thought the second part was that Amcor was to have a first and last right to buy the business if Mr Holihan was trying to sell it, but he could not recall whether this was limited to the period of the vendor financing.[271] The final line of the note stated 'share sale - what if Amcor sells the Amcor Fibre Packaging'. Mr MacPhail said there may have been some brief discussion about whether this deal would be easier and neater if done as a share sale, but he did not think they spent long on it and it was, or would have been, rejected anyway.[272] Mr Holihan disputes this account given by Mr MacPhail. In examination-in-chief he said this entry was in fact a reference to his concern, which he expressed to Mr MacPhail at the meeting, that there was chatter in the marketplace to the effect that Amcor Fibre Packaging might possibly be going to sell its business to a competitor, being Carter Holt Harvey, and how would that affect the supply arrangements entered into.[273] He said Mr MacPhail did not know the answer to that question, but he made a note about that part of the conversation.
237 Mr Holihan said that at the meeting he raised with Mr MacPhail the question of the identity of the vendor, pointing out that the agreement needed to involve AFP on the supply side, otherwise he could not see how the supply side could work. In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Holihan explained that, without Amcor Fibre Packaging as a party to the agreement for the supply side, it made no sense because the named vendor would be effectively closing its doors once the assets of the business were sold.[274] He said Mr MacPhail's response was to the effect that:
... he took me to clause 2.4 and pointed it to me and read it to me and said that the - the work can be done through a related entity, and it can be done via AFP, or APA, and that 2.4 allowed for that, and he also referred to the fact that the existing contract that was in place with Ian Hottes - the ACB - the prior sale - had also a clause that allowed for that and that was working perfectly fine.[275]
2.4 Vendor obligations
Where any obligations are expressed to be carried out or property transferred by the Vendor, the Vendor may where appropriate procure such carrying out or effect such transfer by or through a Related Body Corporate, including for the avoidance of doubt Amcor Fibre Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited and Amcor Ltd.
239 Mr MacPhail disputes that any such conversation took place about the identity of the vendor. He said he does not remember Mr Holihan saying that the agreement needed to involve APA on the supply side, nor does he remember any mention of clause 2.4.[276]
240 Mr MacPhail said that during the meeting, he did say to Mr Holihan that the important thing about the vendor in the sale agreement was that it actually had to own the assets being sold so as to be able to transfer legal title to the purchaser. However, he said, at that stage, they were not worrying too much about which particular legal entity it was.[277]
241 Mr MacPhail said he thinks that early in the meeting, he asked Mr Holihan about whether Amcor Fibre Packaging was going to continue to do business after the sale. Mr Holihan responded along the lines that:
It's going to be the same - it's going to be business as usual, it's going to be the same...exact trading relationship as currently pertains between the entities or within the Amcor group.[278]
242 When Mr MacPhail asked Mr Holihan what was going to happen, Mr Holihan added that:
they're going to buy from me because where else are they going to get it from. ...also I know the prices, I know the product, I know the way these things work, so yeah, there will be buy and - and take obligations in the deal...as they were. But it doesn't matter too much, because basically for the short to medium term, at least, they're always going to be taken from me because I can give them the best price, the best product and you know, get it on time and on...on the right terms.[279]
243 Mr MacPhail said that he would not have, and did not, refer to clause 2.4 at the meeting. He said that he was not familiar with the agreement that had been drafted for the sale of the ACB Business and had not reviewed it in detail in advance of the meeting. Further, he said he did not read clause 2.4 because it was not in 'the operative parts of the agreement, on which [he] was concentrating when [he] was talking to [Mr Holihan]and getting instructions as to what the deal was.'[280]
244 Under cross-examination, Mr MacPhail continued to maintain that he did not recall there having been any discussion at the meeting about clause 2.4. It was put to him that the discussion might have taken place in the context of a discussion about the identity of the vendor and the assets it owned, but he responded saying:
---I don't think we had that conversation and because my notes don't contain any reference explicitly or impliedly to clause 2.4, I don't think we had that conversation.
MR MAIDEN: It's fair to say that your recollection of this meeting is driven principally by reference to what's in your notes, isn't it?---Yes, yes.
It's also fair to say that because you were communicating to Mr Holihan, taking instructions from him and at the same time, trying to make notes of the most significant aspects of your conversation, that your three page note wouldn't reflect everything that was said in that meeting?---No, that's correct, but I think it's true to say that if it was stuff that I needed to do later... offline, then I would have taken a note of the particular clauses, just as I did with a couple of other clauses there.
Yes. So it's possible that you did discuss clause 2.4 in the context of saying to Mr Holihan, it's really an asset sale agreement. We've got to make sure that the vendor is the company that owns the assets and I've got this clause that allows you to take any of the assets that may not legally be owned by the vendor. That's fair, isn't it?---I just don't recall making any reference to clause 2.4. I more recall that it was just a general principle which was discussed, which was if you're going to purport to sell stuff, you've got to have legal title to it. And we've got to just make sure that comes good when we do the deal.
Yes. So it's not the case that you remember not discussing clause 2.4, you just don't remember discussing it?---I just don't think we discussed clause 2.4.
. . .
MR MAIDEN: Mr MacPhail, it would be logical to say that if you had been discussing the need for the vendor to be the company that owned the assets and if clause 2.4 had been discussed in the context of that discussion, that Mr Holihan might have misunderstood the reference to 2.4 and taken it to be something beyond what you'd said. You'd accept that?---Well, I just don't recall that we would have discussed 2.4.[281]
245 Mr MacPhail said that he understood Mr Holihan's reference to 'business as usual' to be an apt description for the deal that was being done. He said that, in essence, it meant -
that the legal ownership and management of the business unit would change and would be bought out by Mr Holihan and his company. But that the actual flow of product and the prices paid for it would remain exactly the same. And so that customers of the business unit...would probably not even know that there had been a change of ownership...except for perhaps the changes of invoicing. And so that they would continue to go direct to that business unit and place orders or sell product for transformation and finishing to that unit.
...
... Amcor customers as they then were, would be switched across, in effect and be getting their finished product. Probably still from Amcor, but the actual transformative process would be done again in the same premises and by the same equipment, but just under the auspices and control of Mr Holihan and his company. [282]
246 Mr MacPhail was also asked, in examination-in-chief, whether he was given any instructions about Amcor Displays, or whether it was mentioned in discussions. He said 'No, no that was never mentioned. Not in this meeting anyway.'[283]
247 Following the meeting, Mr MacPhail wrote to Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan in relation to the sale of the ACB Business. In his letter dated 25 September 2002, Mr MacPhail stated:
As mentioned to Craig [Holihan], and so as to avoid any misunderstandings and make matters clear, I have assumed that Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Limited (Amcor) is my client (from which I will take instructions and for which I will seek the best possible outcome).
However, assuming Trevor [Barnes] instructs me to do so, I am happy to take instructions from Craig for the purposes of assisting with documenting and facilitating what appears to be a relatively uncontroversial transaction. If any contentious, sensitive or confidential issues arise, I may need to seek specific instructions direct from Trevor. Craig is obtaining or will obtain separate legal advice and assistance on particular issues.
I attach a redrafted version of the proposed Asset Sale Agreement, marked up in redline. The following are particular comments which you should both note.
General Comments
...
(iii) during the 10 year period[284] that a portion of the purchase price is outstanding from the Purchaser to Amcor, there will be a charge in favour of Amcor over the assets of the business. This fixed and floating charge will be released by Amcor once the final instalment of the purchase price is paid. The charge is attached as a separate document. It contains no unusual or out of the ordinary provisions. It has been pruned down from a lengthy standard-form document customarily used in banking and financing transactions.
Specific comments
...
I look forward to receiving your comments and further instructions once you have reviewed the attached.[285]
248 The 'assumption' noted at the outset of Mr MacPhail's letter suggests that, at that point, he was unaware that 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Limited' was not a corporate entity. Mr MacPhail said that he became aware of that fact a little later. During cross-examination, Mr MacPhail readily acknowledged that when he first met with Mr Holihan he did not have a complete understanding of the various Amcor companies and the relationships between them,[286] nor was he aware of all of the various 'divisions'.[287] He said that what he had understood was that 'Amcor Fibre Packaging whether or not it be Pty Ltd, would have been the ultimate parent or holding company, or one of the intermediate holdings companies of the vendor.'[288] He agreed also that he understood there to be two companies involved, one of which was the vendor that was selling the assets and the other, which was the Amcor Fibre Packaging entity, that sat somewhere above the vendor in the corporate structure.[289]
249 Between 25 September and 28 November 2002, emails were exchanged back and forth between Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail discussing the agreement and the related security. A further draft of the agreement was sent on behalf of Mr MacPhail on 21 October 2002 to Messrs Holihan and Barnes. The covering email stated:
Craig - I enclose the redlined version of the amended draft. I think you will need to check carefully in clauses 12.1 and 12.2 the use of the term 'corrugated board and cartons'. In view of the importance of that term in the context of the agreement, should this perhaps be a defined term?
As soon as you confirm that the agreement is in final form, I will send a clean version for execution.[290]
250 This version of the draft showed the parties as being 'Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd ABN 93 002 693 843' as vendor, 'NewCo' as the purchaser and Mr Holihan as guarantor of the due performance by the purchaser. Mr Holihan says that he did not think about this change in the identity of the vendor 'because of the discussion that [he] had with Mr MacPhail about how clause 2.4 would operate on 20 September 2002'.[291] This version of the draft agreement also contained clause 14.16, dealing with change of control of the purchaser.
251 On 25 November 2002, Mr MacPhail emailed a further version of the draft agreement to Messrs Barnes and Holihan, marked-up to show changes.[292] In his covering email, headed 'Asset Sale Agreement', Mr MacPhail explained that he had deleted several redundant definitions and changed the order of the 'back end' to make it more logical. He then discussed the scheme of the guarantee and charge, noting that Amcor has three separate options to purchase back the business. He recorded that Mr Holihan has expressed concern and asked him to specifically point out to Amcor that, with the delays involved in any purchase back arrangement, he may lose a potentially lucrative offer from a third party, but he said that he saw 'no easy way to accommodate this'.[293] Mr MacPhail also noted that he has discussed the assignment clause, clause 14.9, with Mr Holihan.
252 Meanwhile, on 15 November 2002, Mr MacPhail had sent two memos to Mr Barnes dated 14 and 15 November 2002 dealing with the 'Fixed and Floating Charge from ACB' and the 'Proposed Sale of ACB to Craig Holihan' respectively, and requesting that Mr Barnes discuss the latter with him.[294] Mr Barnes forwarded Mr MacPhail's email to Mr Holihan on 18 November 2002, commenting that 'the first document makes sense' and requesting that Mr Holihan give him a call. In the memo to Mr Barnes dated 14 November 2002, dealing with the charge, Mr MacPhail describes the charge to be given in favour of Amcor as follows:
The charge is in favour of Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Limited ("ACB") [i.e., the vendor] and Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Limited ("Amcor") [i.e., the company that Mr MacPhail referred to as being further up or elsewhere in the corporate chain[295]], jointly and severally. It is not clear whether ACB will be an on-going entity after the sale of its assets to Craig Holihan's "Newco" has taken place, but this is not relevant for present purposes.[296]
253 When cross-examined about this memo, Mr MacPhail said that he was not quite sure what he meant. But he accepted that he could have been saying that the vendor, ACB Co Vendor, might not be an on-going entity in the sense that it might not continue in existence after the sale.[297] It was put to him that if the vendor were not to continue in existence, then the reference to the vendor as the party that had the five year purchasing obligation in clause 12.2 of the draft agreement might have been erroneous. He acknowledged that the obligation in clause 12.2 was inconsistent with this statement in the memo but added that 'I clearly don't have ... clause 12.1, 12.2 in my mind, when I'm writing that.'[298] He also accepted that the reason that the 'Amcor Fibre Packaging' entity was to be a party to the charge was so that there would still be an Amcor party in existence that was capable of enforcing the charge.[299]
254 On 21 November 2002, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr MacPhail setting out points to consider and points requiring discussion.[300] One of the points noted concerned clause 14.16, which (then) dealt with change in control of the purchaser. Mr Holihan's comment was that this clause only applies whilst there is a charge over the assets held by the vendor and if the vendor refuses the change of control, the vendor must buy back the business as outlined in clause 12.5.
255 Mr MacPhail and Mr Holihan had a further discussion on 26 November 2002. Mr Holihan says that he said to Mr MacPhail words to the effect that he would incorporate a company to perform the supply obligations under clause 12 and have ACB Co Purchaser hold the assets to be used in the business. He asked Mr MacPhail to amend the draft agreement to provide for this. Mr MacPhail made a file note of this conversation,[301] indicating that the phone call took place at 5.30 pm that day. Mr MacPhail sent an email to Messrs Holihan and Barnes at 6.55 pm that day, enclosing a further draft, but it did not deal with the issue of having a trading company performing the purchaser's obligation under clause 12 etc. The covering email noted that '[t]here are still some gaps to fill in - identity of NewCo, completion of annexures etc.'.[302]
256 In this draft, the provisions of the clause dealing with change in control of the purchaser changed from the earlier draft, as shown below in the side by side comparison below:
Earlier draft
14.16 Change of control of Purchaser
The Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor in its sole and absolute discretion. If notwithstanding there is a change in control of the Purchaser, then the Vendor may at its option -
(a) terminate this Agreement on 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser; or
(b) provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days, and if at the end of that period of control the Purchaser has not returned to the status quo ante, the Vendor may thereafter terminate this Agreement on written notice to the Purchaser.
In this clause 14.16 "control" has the meaning set out in the Corporations Act.
Later draft
16.14 Change of control of Purchaser
(i) The provisions of this clause 16.4 apply only for so long as the Charge remains in force or is not discharged.
(ii) The Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor in its sole and absolute discretion. If notwithstanding there is a change in control of the Purchaser, then the Vendor may at its sole option provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days, but if at the end of that period the Purchaser has not returned to the status quo ante, the Vendor may thereafter -
(a) terminate this Agreement on 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser; or
(b) acquire the Purchaser's Business, for the consideration and as referred to in clause 16.3 (with any necessary changes).
In this clause 16.14 "control" has the meaning set out in the Corporations Act.
257 In the next iteration of the draft agreement, the definitions of 'control' were moved into the supply agreement provisions in clause 12.[303]
258 In around December 2002, Mr Barnes told Mr Holihan that Mr Ken Parker, Amcor's Group General Manager Commercial, was going to review the sale agreement and that he could expect a call from him.[304]
259 In January 2003, Mr Parker requested Mr Joyce to review an early draft of the Second Sale Agreement. Relevantly, at that time Mr Joyce was AFP's Commercial Manager Operations, and based in Melbourne. In that role, Mr Joyce supported all of AFP's operations for all financial reporting, governance and control requirements. He was later appointed General Manager Commercial, AFP.[305] In that role, the Amcor Displays business was part of his responsibility.[306] Mr Joyce left Amcor in May 2005 and joined another industrial company as the general manager, finance.
260 Mr Joyce was called by the Holihan parties to give evidence. Mr Joyce, whose corporate reporting line was to Mr Parker, said that Mr Parker had asked him to review the draft agreement and 'provide comments and observations as to things that [he] thought needed some investigation or amendment or correction.'[307] He did so and prepared a typewritten document of 8 pages for Mr Parker headed 'Notes on Proposed ACB Contract' dated 7 January 2003.[308]
261 Mr Joyce did not have any direct role in the negotiation of the 'asset sale' part of the Second Sale Agreement with Mr Holihan. But he said he and Mr Parker did work collaboratively to refine the definition of what was explicitly included and excluded in the formula for determining the charge rates, that is, the 'D & D' rates, that would apply under the supply agreement, so as to reach an acceptable position that Amcor was comfortable with. In that regard, he was also working and in regular conversation with Mr Holihan. They also collaborated to identify the list of assets that were to be included and excluded from the sale.
262 In the note he prepared for Mr Parker, Mr Joyce commented on, or raised queries about, various clauses of the proposed contract, and also in relation to the 'Fixed and Floating Charge' to be provided over the assets of Mr Holihan's company. Throughout the note, Mr Joyce continually refers to 'the vendor' as being 'AFPA' or 'we'. For example, in commenting on clauses 12.1 and 12.2 of the draft agreement, Mr Joyce states:
263 Whilst under cross-examination by the Amcor Parties, Mr Joyce was asked whether he recalled any discussions about what work was to be routed to Mr Holihan. Mr Joyce said it was not his expectation that Mr Holihan's business was going to be the only supplier to Amcor following the sale of the ACB Business.[310] He said that in the discussions to which he was privy during the negotiations to sell the ACB Business he did not have any specific recollection of anyone saying that work that was currently being sent to other suppliers should be re-routed to Mr Holihan. Rather, he said, 'the guiding principle [he] operated by at the time was that the work that was, and had historically been routed through Australian Corrugated Box would continue to be routed through that operation.'[311] The reason for this was, he explained:
Because the site had contained certain specialist corrugating conversion machinery and therefore that work logically had to continue to be routed through that facility. In terms of any other outside manufacturing work that was previously going directly external, I saw no commercial reason why it needed to be channelled through the new Australian Corrugated Box Company.[312]
264 In re-examination, Mr Joyce was also asked about the vendor obligation in proposed clause 12.1. He confirmed that the base material used by the ACB Business was corrugated sheet sourced from either the Smithfield or Revesby sites, and he said the negotiations for the sale proceeded on the basis that that supply agreement should continue.[313]
265 In respect of clause 12.2, Mr Joyce said that 'there were elements of how the clause was structured that struck [him] as being commercially unusual.'[314] One example he referred to was the fact that the agreement was structured such that under the formula provided for calculating the charge back mechanisms, if the new company's owners were successful in achieving efficiencies in the business over time, the result would be that 'Amcor never received any share of those production or performance improvement efficiencies via a reduction in their charge out rate.'[315] In relation to the definition of OME work, he said there were no specific exclusions as to what types of OME should be carved out of the agreement, and at the time he could think of at least one that historically had not been performed by ACB, being silk screening, and he proposed to have a further conversation about whether there were any others that should be specifically carved out.[316] Later in his evidence, Mr Joyce said 'carton erecting' was another area that he recalled was not included.[317] Mr Joyce explained[318] that one of the normal arrangements was that in a fruit or vegetable growing region where Amcor's customers would be operating, Amcor would provide carton erecting services. Amcor would produce completed 'blanks' that were then flat packed and sent to the regional area. Amcor had specialist machinery located in regional areas that would take those flat packed blanks and assemble them into a box that the produce could be inserted into and then sealed for on-shipping to customers. Amcor owned the machinery required and typically it would be operated out of leased premises in the regional area. When he referred to 'Amcor' Mr Joyce said this was a reference to APA.[319]
266 Mr Joyce described the process used in agreeing the charge (or recovery) rates, that is the 'D & D' rates, as one where the volumetric data used was the historical actual throughput from the Wetherill Park plant operated by ACB, and by reference to the individual machines located there, and that was used as a reference point for agreeing the recovery rates that would be used for the purposes of the agreement.[320]
Mr Holihan reviews and comments on Mr Joyce's note
267 In early January 2003, when Mr Holihan was present in Mr Barnes's office, Mr Barnes gave him a copy of the 'Notes on ACB Contract' which he said had been prepared by Mr Joyce. Mr Holihan knew Mr Joyce to be the AFP Commercial Manager Operations based in Melbourne. Mr Barnes asked Mr Holihan if he would like to look at Mr Joyce's comments. Mr Holihan then proceeded to read the document in Mr Barnes's office and made a number of handwritten comments on it.[321] At the end of this process, Mr Holihan said to Mr Barnes that he did not see anything in the note that was controversial and which couldn't be sorted out, and that he would prepare a formal reply which Mr Barnes could pass on to Mr Parker and Mr Joyce.
268 One of the handwritten comments that Mr Holihan made on Mr Joyce's note concerned the issue of silk screening or screen printing raised by Mr Joyce in his comments on clause 12.2 of the draft agreement. Mr Holihan said that he was aware, that ACE Print had a contract with AFP to do OME work, including screen printing work, for Amcor Displays. The comment he made in relation to screen printing was 'with exception where any other contract to supply exists at the time of completion'. That is, Mr Holihan says he accepted that, if he entered into a supply agreement of the kind contained within the Second Sale Agreement, the agreement would not extend to any OME work that was the subject of the agreement with ACE Print (while that agreement remained on foot).[322] Under cross-examination, he acknowledged that he was aware that the contract with ACE Print did not relate only to Amcor Displays' work, and he said he believed 'that AFP would have had all of its screen print work made by Ace and then Ace did other things as well.'[323]
269 Mr Holihan prepared a formal response to Mr Joyce's comments, dated 10 January 2003,[324] which he discussed it with Mr Barnes on 13 January 2003 when he met with him.[325] Mr Holihan said he doesn't remember exactly what was said but Mr Barnes made handwritten notations on his copy of Mr Holihan's response. Mr Holihan's formal response commented on clause 12.2, which required all OME to be purchased from him for five years at D & D costs plus a margin, noting that the benefits to consolidate Amcor's supply of OME have been discussed and he added that he 'would not expect Amcor to have any OME made by the new business that was under contract or where it could manufacture it more competitively itself.'[326]
270 Between 21 January and 1 April 2003, many more emails, memoranda and drafts passed between Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail and others. In late January 2003, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Barnes concerning 'D & D charge back' and enclosed an email exchange that he had had with Mr Greg Crouch of Amcor some 12 months earlier, clarifying with Mr Crouch the operation and components of the (then) current D & D mechanism used by and between AFP and Wetherill Park for charging.[327] Mr Barnes provided Mr Holihan with a copy of some preliminary legal advice dated 7 February 2003, given by Mr Patrick Ryan of Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks, Amcor's external solicitors, at the request of Mr Parker concerning the potential for trade practices problems to arise in relation to the sale of the ACB Business and the proposed toll manufacturing arrangement with ACB.[328] Relevantly, the Holihan parties rely upon the external solicitors' description of the proposal under consideration as supporting their implied agreement. In their letter, the 'Proposal Considered' was described as follows:
At the conclusion of the letter, Mr Ryan expressed a 'Cautionary Note' to the effect that '[w]hen the proposal is finalised, it would be prudent for you to send it to me for a legal sign-off.'[330]
271 On 19 February 2003, Mr Barnes provided Mr Holihan with a further iteration of the draft sale agreement and a draft of the proposed agreement for lease of the Wetherill Park premises.[331] On 21 February 2003, Mr Barnes sent an email to Mr Parker and Mr Hodgson enclosing the agreement, together with his comments on it, the lease proposal and the list of assets included in the sale.[332] Mr Barnes said that when they were all in agreement he would pass the documents on to the lawyer for updating. The lease proposal was for the Wetherill Park premises, where the corrugator was located, and was documented in the form of a memorandum to be signed by Mr Holihan. It provided that Mr Holihan would lease the Wetherill Park premises and 'operate the corrugator for the purpose of supplying AFP.'[333]
272 In the draft 'Sale Agreement', a comment was inserted under clause 5.4 (dealing with 'Premises') to the effect that if, at the end of the lease, the tenant wishes to re-site the business, 'AFPA will be solely responsible for the costs associated with the removal and disposal of the corrugator and ancillary plant and equipment'.[334] Against clause 5.5 (dealing with 'Line of Credit') the following comment was inserted, suggesting that 'AFPA' would make payments to Mr Holihan:
Based on CH remaining in WP building, suggest that the line of credit be replaced by AFPA paying CH weekly for OME (50 to 60% of this is wages) for the first six months. Thereafter standard trading terms. Refer 12.3. This should not affect AFPA current cash flow at all.[335]
273 A comment was also inserted after clause 9.1(d) (dealing with 'Assignment and novation') noting that the clause had been 'inserted to ensure that CH obtains the same prices for starch, inks, waste, energy etc as Amcor' and thereby ensure that OME costs are contained.[336] The 'author' suggests that the terms should be changed to reflect one of three options:
274 In clause 15.9, dealing with assignment, a comment was inserted at the end of paragraph (d) stating that 'AFP will have the ability to veto assignment to Visy board.'[338]
275 On 20 March 2003, Mr Holihan received a list of OMEs that he had requested from Ms Megan Young, one of the assistants to the accountants at AFP Smithfield.[339] Mr Holihan said that he was using this list in the lead up to the commencement of the supply agreement to establish which of those suppliers were supplying corrugated products, and of those, which were the bigger ones that he could attack first.[340]
276 On 24 March 2003, Mr MacPhail sent Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes a further draft of the sale agreement.[341] This version included, for the first time, clause 12.4, which permitted a related company of the purchaser to perform the supply obligations under the agreement. Mr Holihan said this clause was included at his request. This draft of the sale agreement also included 'Annexure 5', outlining the 'D & D basis' pertaining to sales from Vendor to Purchaser and for sales from Purchaser to Vendor. The draft Annexure 5 noted, in the context of sales from Purchaser to Vendor, that 'paper and freight remain the responsibility of AFPA' and for 'corrugator related activities' similarly 'Paper, Maintenance, Rent and freight remain the responsibility of AFPA.'[342] Reference was also made to 'sales of fanfold, single face and solid fibreboard from ACB to Amcor.' The draft also stated that 'D & D changes will be agreed to between CH and the Vendor's Operations financial manager (Tony Joyce)'.[343]
277 On 1 April 2003, Mr Barnes sent an email to Mr Parker, Mr Hodgson and Mr Peter Dwyer,[344] copied to Mr Holihan, enclosing a suite of 'final documents'.[345] Annexure 5 of the sale agreement was in substantially the same form as before and continued to make reference to 'AFPA' and 'Amcor' in addition to the 'Vendor'.[346] Mr Holihan says that for several weeks following, there was little or no work done on the sale agreement that involved him.[347]
278 On 23 April 2003, each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla were registered as companies, Mr Holihan's intention apparently being that ACB Co Purchaser would own the subject assets and Achilla would be the trading company for the ACB Business.
Final stages of negotiating the Sale Agreement
279 During May 2003, a lot of activity took place regarding the draft sale agreement and much of the correspondence passing between the respective parties concerned the D & D costing mechanism. On 15 May 2003, Mr Parker sent an email to Mr Holihan enclosing a spreadsheet dealing with the D & D in respect of supplies proposed to be made under clause 12.[348] This spreadsheet commenced with 'an excerpt from Annexure 5' and reproduced the text of Annexure 5 as contained in the final draft mentioned above. This spreadsheet gave rise to a host of subsequent emails passing between Messrs Crouch, Parker, Barnes and/or Holihan dealing with the same issue.
280 In the final stages of those discussions, Mr Holihan came up with the idea of presenting the definitions of the D & D charges in a matrix form, with an 'x' representing instances where a charge would be applicable so as to capture the costs.[349] Mr Crouch prepared and circulated the first version of the matrix to Mr Holihan on 23 May 2003.[350] Mr Holihan responded a few days later with a revised version.[351] Various iterations of the matrix were prepared following comments and revisions suggested by those involved in the discussions. Throughout this exchange of views, the matrix continued to refer to charges 'from AFP to ACB' and 'from ACB to AFP' and 'Corrugated work for AFP by ACB'.[352]
281 In essence, the matrix set out to record the (then) current basis for charging - using the headings set out below, and taking 'Direct Materials' and 'Board' as an example:[353]
282 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Holihan explained the way these 'Direct Materials' costs were to be captured and charged for:
So paper, Amcor would take, Amcor being Amcor Fibre Packaging, would take paper, run on their corrugator using the next line being starch to make corrugated board. So the first two crosses relate to the manufacture of corrugated board from AFP to ACB.
Now, the reason there are no crosses in the next two columns is because we didn't supply corrugated board to AFP. The supply of board was one way. We manufactured products that were given to us by AFP, and it was only then the value add, if you like. The value add to that board that we got reimbursed for.
...
MR MAIDEN: The second entry is heading, "Board"?---Yes.
There's no cross underneath the AFP to ACB column?---No.
But there is a cross underneath the ACB to AFB column?---Yes.
Can you explain why that is?---I can. So - so the first lines I told you before was paper and starch, that's starting from the raw material. The board side was - let me go back again. Those first two with the manufacturing, Amcor's manufacturing for paper and starch to make board. They would supply us sometimes stock board, which was used for making very short quantities. They weren't efficient - they couldn't be run off their corrugators efficiently. Somebody may require 50, 100 boxes, or it could be a very small box and it wasn't possible to run that paper on the corrugator to run that product, so we were given stock board, which would be charged from Amcor, and then in the manufacturing of those very small products, using that stock board, we had to get reimbursed, if you like. We would charge Amcor for the use of that stock board. ...
... But in the norm, if you like, in the 99 per cent, we were given material from Amcor at no charge to convert product for their customers, which then went back to AFP.[354]
283 Mr Holihan said that in those discussions he had with AFP representatives about the D & D calculations, 'AFP' was referred to as the business that would be buying OME supplies from his company after the sale was completed.
284 On 27 May 2003, Mr MacPhail circulated a revised version of the draft agreement, redlined to show changes from the draft circulated in early April 2003.[355] In his covering email, Mr MacPhail mentioned that he had received some further small changes from Mr Parker which would be factored into the next draft. Mr Holihan's solicitor, Mr Roe, was included in the list of recipients for this email. Mr MacPhail noted that Mr Roe had sought copies of various documents from him. In his covering email, Mr MacPhail added a comment to the effect that now that he knows Mr Roe is acting for Mr Holihan, he should ask Mr Roe to confirm that it is acceptable for him to correspond with Mr Holihan direct.[356] As was noted earlier, Mr Roe's name had been mentioned at Mr MacPhail's first meeting with Mr Holihan, and Mr MacPhail had written it down at the beginning of his file note.[357]
285 On 28 May 2003, Mr Parker sent an email to Mr MacPhail, copied to Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, enclosing both his and Mr Holihan's final comments and requesting that the document be finalised that day so that the transaction could be completed.[358] Attached to Mr Parker's email was a copy of Mr Holihan's summary of changes to be made to the Second Sale Agreement, a spreadsheet entitled 'D & D inclusions' (which it was proposed would be inserted as Annexure 5 to the Second Sale Agreement) and a list of the assets to be purchased pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement (which it was proposed be inserted as Annexure 3). Mr Parker told Mr MacPhail that the listing of D & D inclusions was to be inserted in Annexure 5 'with words of his choosing' but indicating that '[d]etails of costs included in the calculation of D & D are as set out and marked below'.[359]
286 In the process of finalising the Second Sale Agreement, Mr MacPhail adjusted the description used in the column headings in Annexure 5. Relevantly, the words 'From AFP to ACB' became 'From the Vendor to Achilla' 'From ACB to AFP' became 'From Achilla to the Vendor', and 'Corrugated work for AFP by ACB' became 'Corrugated work for the Vendor by Achilla'.[360]
287 Between 28 and 30 May 2003, a number of emails passed between Mr Holihan and others about the draft of the Second Sale Agreement. At around this time, Mr Holihan started working with Carden Calder & Associates, Corporate Affairs, Communication and Reputation Management consultants ('CCA'), in relation to a 'communication plan' for the announcement of the sale of the ACB Business. He did so at the request of Mr Jon Dyster, who was the AFP NSW Human Resources Manager. AFP had apparently engaged and was instructing CCA.
288 During cross-examination, Mr MacPhail was taken to the wording of clause 12.2 in the form in which the agreement was executed, and to the second sentence in particular, which records the obligation on the part of the vendor, as follows:
The Vendor will for that period obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.[361]
289 Mr MacPhail was asked whether it would have been a simple thing to exclude particular types of OME work from the clause had he understood the clause not to extend to all OME supplies and products. He acknowledged that whilst perhaps not simple, it would have been 'do-able', in the sense of 'wordsmithing' to exclude particular types of OME work from that clause.[362] A series of further examples were then put to him by Counsel, and the following exchange took place:
MR MAIDEN: For example if the obligation was intended only to cover all OME supplies and products of the type done at the time of the agreement, words to that effect could have been included in clause 12.2?---Yes, I don't think I'd be quite happy with that wording, I'd want to expand the concept.
Of course?---But I'd understand the concept and possibly be able to wordsmith it, yes.
Similarly, if you'd been aware that the clause was intended to exclude work done by competitors of the ACB business, it would have been an easy enough exercise to draft it so as to exclude those jobs wouldn't it?---Yes, if I'd been instructed I certainly would have.
Or for example if work for the Amcor Display's division was to be excluded from the agreement, it could have been drafted so as to exclude that, couldn't it?---Yes, yes, if I'd been instructed.[363]
290 In re-examination, Mr MacPhail said that clause 12.2 was one of the more 'hotly negotiated' clauses where the language was tweaked and changed and it went through several iterations before the final version was arrived at.[364] He added that the words 'other than due to Achilla's inability ...' were inserted in clauses 12.1 and 12.2 in the first half of 2003, following a conversation with Mr Parker where Mr Parker had expressed a concern about the possibility of Amcor being tied to unfavourable pricing terms and being obliged to purchase product from Achilla. Mr MacPhail said that he 'certainly didn't understand D & D properly' and so that was why he put in those words including that term 'price'.[365]
Formal entry into the Second Sale Agreement, the Sub-Lease and the giving of the Charge
291 The Second Sale Agreement was executed on 2 June 2003.[366] The common seal of ACB Co Vendor was affixed in the presence of Mr Ian Lewis (as secretary) and Mr Colin Clayton (as director). Mr Holihan executed it on behalf of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla, as well as in his own capacity (as guarantor).
292 Also on or around 2 June 2003, ACB Co Purchaser, as Chargor, granted a fixed and floating charge to ACB Co Vendor and APA 'trading as Amcor Fibre Packaging' jointly and severally over the Secured Property (as defined) ('the Charge').[367] The Charge was executed by Mr Holihan as the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, and by ACB Co Vendor and by APA in each case by affixing the common seal in the presence of Mr Lewis (as secretary) and Mr Clayton (as director).
293 A Sub-Lease of the Wetherill Park premises was also executed between APA as sub-lessor and Achilla as sub-lessee.[368] The Sub-Lease was for a term of '5 years less 1 day', commencing on 1 August 2003 and terminating on 30 July 2008. In similar fashion to the other documents, the Sub-Lease was executed by Mr Holihan as the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, and by ACB Co Vendor and APA in each case by affixing the common seal in the presence of Mr Lewis (as secretary) and Mr Clayton (as director).
294 As noted earlier, despite the Completion Date being stated in the Second Sale Agreement as 30 July 2003, Completion took place on the following day, 31 July 2003. On 1 August 2003, ACB Purchaser took control of all of the equipment of the ACB Business.
The evidence adduced does not provide a proper basis for the Court to imply a supply agreement
295 In my view, there is no proper basis for the Court to imply a supply agreement of the kind alleged by the Holihan parties. First, and fundamentally, there is no evidence of an objective intention on the part of APA to be legally bound by the supply arrangements set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. The presence, or absence, of an intention to be legally bound by an agreement or arrangement, which may be express or implied, will depend on the facts of the particular case.[369] But having now canvassed the relevant evidence, I am not satisfied that the Holihan parties have demonstrated that APA, as opposed to ACB Co Vendor, manifested an intention to enter into a legally binding arrangement with Achilla in relation to the sale of the ACB Business.
296 The objective evidence is that APA did enter into a Sub-Lease of the Wetherill Park premises and a Charge in connection with the sale of the ACB Business. In that sense, APA clearly facilitated the sale by its subsidiary, ACB Co Vendor, of the ACB Business and manifested an intention to be legally bound by those arrangements, but it did not bind itself to any legally enforceable supply obligation of the kind set out in clauses 12.1 and 12.2.
297 The particulars given by the Holihan parties[370] rely on conduct by Mr MacPhail, but Mr MacPhail did not have any ability to bind APA, or indeed any other entity. His role was to document the agreement reached between the parties. To that end, he took his instructions primarily from Mr Barnes, but even Mr Barnes did not have the ability to commit APA to any legally enforceable arrangement. Where APA did intend to enter into legally binding arrangements concerning the ACB Business, it did so through Messrs Clayton (as director) and Lewis (as secretary) as officers of the company, not through Mr MacPhail or Mr Barnes who were not, and who lacked any relevant authority to act on behalf of APA. Indeed, so much is confirmed by the fact that in March 2005, when the Deed of Accession was entered into, it was Mr Clayton (as director) and Mr Lewis (as secretary) that executed the deed as officers of the company.
298 The Holihan parties also rely upon a number of documents passing between representatives of the Holihan parties and representatives of the Amcor parties as demonstrating that by the time the Second Sale Agreement was signed on 3 June 2003, at least Mr Parker, Mr Crouch, Mr MacPhail and Mr Ryan (of Allens Arthur Robinson) were acting on the assumption that following the sale, the ACB Business would be supplying, and purchasing from, APA. Further, they contend that the evidence given by Mr Joyce at the trial was consistent with that course.
299 In my view, when the objective evidence about the course of dealing that took place between the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties is examined, the clear impression conveyed is that each side intended that the OME work which had been routed through the ACB Business prior to the sale would continue to be routed through the ACB Business after the sale. Indeed, as the summary set out above records, it was Mr Holihan who said to Mr MacPhail, in response to his question about whether AFP was going to continue to do business after the sale, that '[i]t's going to be the same - it's going to be business as usual, it's going to be the same ... exact trading relationship as currently pertains between the entities or within the Amcor group.'[371] And Mr MacPhail said that he understood Mr Holihan's reference to 'business as usual' to be an apt description for the deal that was being done, in the sense that he understood that 'the legal ownership and management of the business unit would change ... [b]ut that the actual flow of product and the prices paid for it would remain exactly the same.'[372]
300 Pursuant to the direction given by Mr Hodgson to Mr Parker, representatives of AFP, such as Mr Joyce, were also involved in commenting on the proposed arrangements. This is not surprising given that the ACB Business had traditionally performed OME work for the AFP operations conducted at Smithfield and Revesby in New South Wales, which APA owned. But Mr Joyce said that 'the guiding principle [he] operated by at the time was that the work that was, and had historically been routed through Australian Corrugated Box would continue to be routed through that operation'.[373] Mr Joyce said that it was not his expectation that Mr Holihan's business was going to be the only supplier to Amcor following the sale of the ACB Business.[374] On the contrary, he 'saw no commercial reason' why any other outside manufacturing work that was previously going directly external 'needed to be channelled through the new Australian Corrugated Box Company'.[375] Mr Joyce also confirmed that the base material used by the ACB Business was corrugated sheet sourced from either the Smithfield or Revesby sites, and said the negotiations for the sale proceeded on the basis that that supply agreement should continue.[376]
301 Mr Holihan said that he took comfort from an assurance which he says was given by Mr MacPhail at their initial meeting, to the effect that clause 2.4 was a means by which he could be assured of the ongoing benefit of APA's OME business and for that reason he took no steps to ensure that APA became a party to the agreement or was named in clause 12.2. Mr MacPhail did not recall any discussion of clause 2.4 at the meeting. He did not make any record of any such discussion in his file note, which he accepted was not comprehensive,[377] but he explained why he thought it unlikely that any discussion of the kind contended for by Mr Holihan took place. In this regard, I prefer the evidence of Mr MacPhail to that of Mr Holihan. In circumstances where Mr MacPhail had not prepared the draft under discussion, it would be surprising for him to have referred Mr Holihan to clause 2.4 and opined as to its effect, particularly when he had not reviewed the document in detail in advance of the meeting and had not read clause 2.4 because it was not in the operative parts of the agreement on which he was concentrating. In my view, it is unlikely that at their first meeting Mr MacPhail would have given any such assurance on a matter of importance to Mr Holihan in his capacity as the counterparty to the transaction. And if such an assurance was given, it is likely that Mr MacPhail would have recorded it in his note. Mr Holihan says he regarded the assurance as an important matter but, it seems, he did not himself make a note or record of the assurance having been given, or convey the fact of the assurance having been given to Mr Roe, or reiterate it at some point later in the negotiations.
302 It follows that I am also not satisfied that the 'common intention' alleged by the Holihan parties in their particulars, that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12, is made out.
303 The Holihan parties also contend that the documents and other evidence referred to demonstrates that by the time the Second Sale Agreement was signed on 3 June 2003, at least Mr Parker, Mr Crouch, Mr MacPhail and Amcor's external solicitor, Mr Ryan, acted on the assumption that following the sale, the ACB Business would be supplying, and purchasing from, APA. In my view, the evidence does not demonstrate that. First, I do not regard the solicitor's correspondence as advancing the alleged implied supply agreement in any meaningful way. Secondly, to the extent that representatives of AFP, such as Mr Joyce and Mr Parker, were involved in the negotiations for the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, the objective intention demonstrated was that following the sale, it would be 'business as usual'. That is, following the sale, the ACB Business would continue to perform the work that was, and historically had been, routed through the ACB Business, including the work that it performed for the AFP operations conducted at the corrugated box manufacturing sites at Smithfield and Revesby in New South Wales. And other short run work from the Smithfield and Revesby plants would continue to be outsourced externally to other OME suppliers, including Thompson, JS Cutting, Northwest Packaging, Sainsbury, SPS Packaging, All Pack, Le Breton and Ubeeco.
304 In my view, the fact that all persons involved in the negotiations envisaged that following the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties it would be 'business as usual', and that the ACB Business would continue to perform work for the AFP operations conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales, does not entail the consequence that APA would be the party bound by clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, and thus be required to ensure that all of AFP's OME work was performed by Achilla. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis, or necessity, for the Court to imply an agreement between Achilla and APA of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties, containing terms identical to those set out in clause 12 (save that APA would have the rights and obligations that ACB Co Vendor has under clause 12). Indeed, to do so would be contrary to the notion of 'business as usual' that was evident throughout the negotiations.
305 Further, to the extent that prior to the sale of the ACB Business there were trading arrangements in place with 'Customers', the Second Sale Agreement contained a mechanism to facilitate the continuation of the 'business as usual' objective following the sale. It will be recalled that clause 9 of the Second Sale Agreement expressly provided for the 'assignment and novation' of 'Contracts' to which ACB Co Vendor was a party, which term embraced 'any contracts and agreements (whether written, oral or arising through a course of trading, or a combination of any of these) which relate to the Business' and 'including for the avoidance of doubt contracts and agreements for supply to Customers'. Accordingly, where there was a trading relationship in force prior to the sale, ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla could request that an assignment or novation take place, and pending same being obtained, could invoke the 'Practical arrangements' set out in clause 9.2, including requiring ACB Co Vendor to 'hold the benefit of the Contract for the Purchaser or Achilla, provided that the Purchaser performs the obligations of the Vendor under the Contract on its behalf.'
306 Notwithstanding the view I have formed about the sub-issues raised under issue 1, it is useful to record the arguments advanced by the parties lest the matter go further.
Issue 1(a): If ACB Co Vendor (and not APA), was to be the counterparty to Achilla under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, would the clause have any commercial purpose?
307 The Holihan parties submit that, viewed from a commercial perspective, the most significant benefit they would obtain from entering into the Second Sale Agreement was the clause 12 supply arrangement and the ongoing work that was to come from that source. Mr Holihan gave evidence to the effect that in executing the Second Sale Agreement, and throughout the negotiations, he understood that Achilla was obtaining the benefit of the OME business that, prior to the execution of the agreement, AFP had provided to ACB Co Vendor, and that had he known APA was not bound by the clause 12 obligations, he would have negotiated so as to achieve that outcome.[378]
308 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Holihan explained the importance of the clause 12 arrangements from a commercial perspective:
[MR MAIDEN:] Let's talk about the supply agreement part of that document?---Yes.
Was that important to you?---Yes, absolutely. I wouldn't have bought the business without a supply agreement two-fold. Ah, I needed to get product for my own customers, and it was important to understand what those conditions were, what those pricing levels were. On the other side the OME work was probably the existence why the ACB Business was there. Um, with 80 per cent of the volume going through the plant being that for Amcor public [sic.] packaging. If it had have been another arrangement I could have possibly picked up, not stayed at the site, not acquired those assets and had a different model. But as the Amor Fibre Packaging, the OME work was a significant part of the business, I saw it as an opportunity to - the business wasn't making money at the time, but I felt that under private ownership and with a lot of hard work and effort I could reduce those costs, boost the external sales to our customers and turn the business around which is what happened.
If those were your objectives why was what became clause 12 so important to you?---I think it was important to both sides, um, and I say that because I had discussions with Amcor representatives and people like Tony Joyce, Ken Parker, initially Barnes, and they were saying to me that it was important that they had an avenue, a place where this work could be made. So it was important to me to have that work, but with what I was being told it was important for them for that work to be made. And so the existing arrangements we had in place, um, it made sense as far as I could see for both parties to know that there was a secure place for their work to be made.
And what about from your perspective?---Well from my perspective it made - I was paying $1m for the business which included the assets. It was a business that wasn't making money, um, and so it was important for me to take on the OME work and to grow my own external sales on top of the work that I was doing work for Amcor. So that OME work was a significant part of why I bought that business.[379]
309 Against that background, the Holihan parties contend that in circumstances where it was APA, and not ACB Co Vendor, that required the OME work that was done by the ACB Business before the sale, clause 12.2 would have no real commercial utility if APA was not the party that was bound.[380]
310 Further, they say the Second Sale Agreement makes clear that the evident commercial purpose of clause 12.2 'would be defeated if ACB Co Vendor was to be the counterparty to Achilla.'[381] First, they point to the fact that the definition of 'Business' in clause 1.1 (set out above) expressly acknowledges the distinction between ACB Co Vendor and APA by confirming that the 'Business' does not include 'any part or parts of the businesses of Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd or Amcor Ltd.' Secondly, they say the Second Sale Agreement was intended to sell a 'going concern': clause 2.2. To that end, they submit that under the Second Sale Agreement, by its operative terms:
ACB Co Vendor sold all of its assets (other than its premises, its corrugator and a few minor pieces of machinery) to ACB Co Purchaser. The premises were to be leased to APA and sub-leased to Achilla, and the corrugator was to be left with Achilla to be used in the conduct of its business. ACB Co Vendor was to terminate the employment of all of its staff, and pay out all of their entitlements, allowing ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla to offer them employment from the Completion Date. And it assigned to ACB Co Purchaser the benefit of all of its contracts. A non-compete clause was intended to prevent ACB Co Vendor from competing with ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla for any work or employees for three years after Completion.[382]
311 In effect, they submit that once completion of the sale took place, ACB Co Vendor was left as an 'empty shell', with 'no customer base to serve, no contracts to fulfil, no employees to do any work and no significant assets, and it had agreed not to compete with the Holihan companies for work.'[383] In terms of the clause 12 supply obligations, the practical reality is that there was no prospect of ACB Co Vendor, as an empty shell, having any requirements for OME work to be performed, and no obvious ability on its part to supply raw materials to ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla.
312 The Holihan parties point to other textual suggestions in the Second Sale Agreement which they submit indicate that APA was intended to be a party to the agreement, such as the sub-leasing arrangement under clause 5.4 that was to be entered into by 'the parties', and to clause 10.5 (Statutory actions) which refers to 'Vendors' in the plural.
313 The response of the Amcor parties is to point to the unprincipled nature of the Holihan parties' argument, in effectively seeking to discern from an allegedly 'uncommercial' outcome said to arise from a contract entered into between the parties that there is another contract to be implied between different parties that would render a more commercial outcome. They submit that the Court should not answer this question.
314 In my view, Issue 1(a) should not be answered. In circumstances where it is posed as the first issue to be considered, it puts the cart before the horse (so to speak) and operates to distort what would otherwise be the proper and principled, or orthodox, approach to the construction of the contract that was entered into between the parties. Accordingly, I do not propose to answer Issue 1(a).
Issue 1(b): In negotiations, did the parties express a common intention that Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which was at that time provided to ACB Co Vendor by APA? (Alternatively, a common intention that the effect of that agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12?)
315 In the Joint Statement of Issues, Issue 1(b) is framed in terms of whether, during the negotiations that preceded the entry into the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla and APA expressed a 'common intention that the effect of that agreement would be that Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which was at that time provided to ACB Co Vendor by APA?' That formulation of the alleged 'common intention' appears to relate to an earlier iteration of the particulars subjoined to paragraph 3AA of Achilla's counterclaim, that no longer appears in the current version.[384] In Achilla's Fourth Amended Counterclaim dated 16 February 2015, the alleged 'common intention' is framed in terms of Achilla and APA having 'expressed a common intention that the effect of that agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12.'[385] The common intention is said to be 'inferred from a conversation between Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail on or about 20 September 2002' and a body of documentation set out in the particulars.
316 In their closing written submissions, in addressing Issue 1(b), the Holihan parties contend that in the negotiations that culminated in the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, both Achilla and APA expressed a common intention that Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which was at that time provided to ACB Co Vendor by APA. In support of this contention, they rely, in particular, on essentially the same body of documentation that was set out in the particulars and tendered by them as demonstrating that the parties intended that it was APA, not ACB Co Vendor, whose business Achilla would obtain.[386]
317 In their closing submissions, the Amcor parties submit that Issue 1(b) need not be answered. They say even if (contrary to their submission) such a common intention were found to have existed, 'that common intention cannot lead to the conclusion that there is an implied collateral contract unless there was some evidence that there was to be an agreement additional to the Second Sale Agreement', and there is no evidence to that effect.[387] I agree with that submission, and do not propose to answer issue 1(b).
Issue 1(c): Following execution of the Second Sale Agreement, did APA and Achilla conduct themselves as if they were bound by clause 12 of that agreement?
318 The Holihan parties also rely on a body of correspondence and conduct post-execution of the Second Sale Agreement to demonstrate what they contend is 'the parties' mutual understanding' (but without specifying which relevant parties) and to support both the existence of the alleged implied supply agreement (and/or the alleged estoppel by convention) that they maintain precludes the Amcor parties from denying the implied agreement.
Other documentation and conduct (post-execution of the Second Sale Agreement) relied upon by the Holihan parties as evidencing a common intention on the part of Achilla and APA that Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which at the time of sale was provided to ACB Co Vendor by APA
319 The document that the Holihan parties contend most clearly demonstrates that both parties intended that APA was the party bound by clause 12.2 is the agreement to issue 'recipient created tax invoices' (the 'RCTI agreement') made between Achilla and APA in late July 2003 for goods and services tax ('GST') purposes. The background to the RCTI agreement was that the Australian Tax Office had issued a GST Ruling No GSTR 2000/10 concerning the classes of tax invoices that a recipient of a taxable supply may issue (referred to in the ruling as 'recipient created tax invoices' or 'RCTIs). The ruling sets out the requirements that a recipient must follow when issuing an RCTI and the information that an RCTI must contain. Under the ruling, the recipient and the supplier were required to have a written agreement between them specifying the supplies to which it relates.[388]
320 By letter dated 29 July 2003 Mr Joyce, wrote to Achilla with a view to entering into an agreement to issue RCTIs. The letter, which was written on the letterhead of 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia' (stated at the footer of the letter to be 'a Division of Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd ABN 55 004 275 165'), commenced as follows:
As you know, from 1 August 2003 the fees for toll converting Amcor Fibre Packaging pays to you under the asset sale deed will be subject to GST.
The GST legislation imposes certain formalities in relation to the issuing of tax invoices. The purpose of this letter is to reach an agreement on how tax invoices for the Fee will be issued. The general rules in the GST legislation will require Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd [Achilla] to provide Amcor with tax invoices for the Fee. However, as Amcor is able to calculate the amount of the Fee, it will be more convenient and practical for both Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd and Amcor if Amcor issues the tax invoices on behalf of Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd. Fortunately, the GST legislation will allow Amcor to issue tax invoices for the Fee on behalf of Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd, provided certain conditions have been met and we have agreed certain things in writing.
...
If Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd does not sign and return the copy of this letter, Amcor will not be able to issue tax invoices on behalf of Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd and Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd will be required to issue those tax invoices to Amcor instead.
Agreement to Issue Recipient Created Tax Invoices
Amcor accepts the terms and conditions set out below and, by signing the copy of this letter, Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd also agrees to those terms and conditions.
(a) Amcor can issue GST tax invoices on behalf of Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd in respect of supplies made by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd to Amcor under the asset sale agreement.
(b) Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd will not issue GST tax invoices in respect of supplies made by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd to Amcor under the Asset Sale Deed. ...[389]
321 Mr Joyce inserted a notation at the end of the letter so that Achilla could acknowledge formally that it 'accepts the terms and conditions set out in this letter', but he instructed Achilla that it should not sign the letter until it is registered for GST. Some discussion and email correspondence took place between Mr Holihan and Ms Kerrin Niklas, one of AFP's administrative staff, as to the operation of the proposed agreement. In an email to Mr Holihan, Ms Niklas clarified that the RCTI agreement 'does not preclude ACB from raising invoices for other purposes' and she added that '[o]nce we move on to SAP[390] this agreement will obviously be redundant and tax invoices will be provided by ACB [Achilla] for work done for AFP.'[391] On 31 July 2003, Mr Holihan signed the RCTI agreement letter for and on behalf of Achilla.[392]
322 Mr Joyce explained the background to the parties entering into the RCTI agreement as follows:
MR MAIDEN: Do you recall why that [i.e., entry into the RCTI agreement] was done?---Yes I do.
Why?---As I mentioned earlier, because the - in the transition phase, the new company, the new Australian Corrugated Box Company [Achilla] was still embedded in Amcor's IT systems. We could no longer apply the standard integrated accounting and transaction reporting processes. Coupled with that, because there was a supply going to and from two external legal entities, we needed to put in place, to satisfy the GST legislation, an arrangement where Amcor Packaging and Australian Corrugated Box [Achilla] agreed that Amcor Packaging could issue a recipient created tax invoice. We did that in order to help make the settlement processes between the two companies more efficient.[393]
323 The oral evidence given by Mr Joyce confirmed that the RCTI agreement concerned supplies to be made by Achilla under the Second Sale Agreement.
324 At about the same time, Mr Joyce was also involved in establishing the 'weekly in arrears' payment arrangements that were to apply under clause 5.5 of the Second Sale Agreement for all trading activity for the first six months following the change of ownership. Mr Joyce and others met with Mr Holihan in late July 2003 and agreed the arrangements that were to apply with regards to Amcor, that is APA, 'settling accounts with ACB'. He then confirmed them a few days later by email to Mr Nellies and Ms Young, two operational people who worked for APA and were based in New South Wales, and copied it to Mr Holihan, Ms Niklas and others. In his email, Mr Joyce stated:
... For the period from August 1st 2003 to 31st January 2004 we [i.e., APA] will cut off transactions at close of business on each Friday. On the following Monday we need to run the various reports to determine the payment to be made to ACB - we will RCTI them for this work. (This is as per the agreed procedure that Kerrin [Niklas] and I have been discussing with ACB - Kerrin will walk you through the specifics of this once we have sign off from ACB).
Plus ACB may/will provide Amcor with an invoice for work that falls outside the scope of the above mentioned work - e.g.: rework done via hand etc.
You will then need to seek approval for payment of the RCTI and ACB invoices from Darren [Nellies] or his nominated deputy by Tuesday. We then need to ensure that payment via ABS is done via EFT to ACB's nominated bank account by Wednesday. (Craig or Nick will provide the account details by early next week).
Can you take this on board and give this the due priority each week to ensure that ACB's cash flow is maintained during the 6 month period please? [394]
325 In my view, the Holihan parties' reliance upon the RCTI agreement is misplaced. The RCTI agreement reflects the fact that under the ruling, the recipient customer and the supplier were required to have a written agreement between them specifying the supplies to which it relates.[395] In circumstances where, following the sale, the ACB Business under the new ownership would continue to perform work for existing customers of the business, such as the AFP operations conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales, it was necessary to ensure that proper tax invoicing arrangements were in place. As Mr Joyce explained, with the ACB Business under new ownership external to the Amcor group, each taxable supply made would be a supply between two external legal entities, and so the Amcor group could no longer apply the standard integrated accounting and transaction reporting processes. Once operating under that new regime, and with a view to making the settlement processes between the two external legal entities more efficient, they implemented the RCTI process so that APA as the recipient of a taxable supply, in its capacity as the owner of the business conducted by the AFP operations at the Smithfield and Revesby sites, could issue a tax invoice for the OME work performed by Achilla. Contrary to the Holihan parties' submission, the entry into the RCTI agreement by APA and Achilla does not demonstrate that both parties intended that APA was the party bound by clause 12.2 of the Second Supply Agreement.
Documentation that is said to demonstrate 'the parties' mutual understanding'
326 The Holihan parties also rely upon a body of further correspondence and internal documentation that came into existence following the execution of the Second Sale Agreement that is said to demonstrate 'the parties' mutual understanding' or 'mutual acceptance' that APA was the counterparty bound by clause 12.
327 Following a meeting on 27 June 2003, Mr Holihan sent an email to Messrs Joyce, Parker, Crouch and Barnes on 30 June 2003 regarding Amcor's proposal to cut-off Wetherill Park's access to the PICK system from 31 July 2003. Mr Holihan referred to the inconvenience and disruption this would cause to the logistical relationship between AFP and ACB on an ongoing basis and requested that the matter might be given further consideration. In particular, he mentioned the fact that 'manual, hand written delivery dockets would be required at AFP for all deliveries to ACB customers', 'orders into ACB from AFP would be via PCS' and 'ACB's work would not appear in PCS and AFP work would not appear in ACB's system.'[396]
328 On 10 July 2003, Mr Holihan emailed Mr Barnes and said he would like to 'work through a service level agreement' for the AFP and ACB businesses. On 12 July 2003, Mr Barnes responded by informing Mr Holihan that he was appointing Roger Bayley for these discussions and that he had already raised the matter with him.[397]
329 At a 'transition meeting' held on 25 July 2003 between representatives of Achilla (Mr Holihan and Mr Papadimatos) and AFP (Mr Joyce and Ms Niklas) regarding the Second Sale Agreement, Mr Joyce made notes on a whiteboard that were printed out at the end of the meeting. The notes recorded a reference to carton erecting work done for APA, expressed in terms of '[e]xisting carton erecting @ Bathurst, Batlow & Araluen - out of scope for ACBC'.[398] In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Joyce explained what this reference means. He said:
--- One of the normal arrangements would be that Amcor would provide carton erecting services in regional areas where Amcor's customers would be operating. Typically it could be in a fruit growing or a vegetable growing region or a wine bottling facilities. And so Amcor would produce completed blanks flat packed, and they would be sent to those specific regions, and Amcor had specialist machinery that would take those flat packed blanks and assemble them into a box that the product or material could be inserted into and then sealed for then on-shipping to their customers.
...
MR MAIDEN: And who owned those erecting operations?---Amcor owned the machinery. They would typically be operated out of leased premises.
When you say Amcor, are you referring to any particular part of Amcor?---Amcor Packaging Australia Pty Ltd.
And can you explain the last five words on that line?---"Out of scope for ACBC." Amcor - we believe we were retaining the activities of carton erecting and that that was not included in the asset sale agreement.[399]
330 On 15 August 2003, Mr Crouch sent an email to Mr Holihan (copied to Mr Joyce) attaching a 'comparison of Net D & D before and after the changes to cost for the new budget year' together with a spreadsheet headed 'Amcor Fibre Packaging - NSW'. Mr Holihan gave evidence that the spreadsheet lists ACB Customers (column C), sales to those customers (column H), and the margin above D & D that was charged to those customers for the period from July 2002 to June 2003 (column AA).[400] Mr Holihan said the average level above D & D is 79%.[401]
331 On 24 September 2003, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Sangster, copied to Mr Caldow and Mr Bayley, headed 'partition slotter'. Mr Holihan informed Mr Sangster that he had 'been asked by AFP estimating to look at setting up an area to do corrugated partitions' and was following up on 'a machine that's been pulled out of Spearwood that would be perfect and is not required anywhere.' He said that Mr Caldow told him that he would need to get approval from Mr Sangster before the machine could be released to anyone. Mr Holihan stated that 'the machine will be used to supply partitions to AFP and can be set up as a machine within Pick [sic.] and product supplied back at cost based on the supply agreement.'[402]
332 On 15 October 2003, a confidential memorandum from Mr Sutton (Managing Director, Amcor Australasia) and Mr Hodgson (Group General Manager, AFPA) entitled 'Update on AFPA Improvement Plans' was circulated to the board of Amcor Limited. Under the heading 'Forecast', the board paper gave an update on developments at Wetherill Park, as follows:
Our Wetherill Park site in New South Wales was focussed on short run orders and fitment work and we were considering relocation and/or selling the business. The sale was completed in July 2003, reducing total employees by 45. We have entered a long-term supply arrangement with the purchaser as predicted.[403]
333 On 23 October 2003, Mr Manser sent an email to Mr Holihan and others containing the agenda for the forthcoming Specialty Group IT solution meeting to discuss the IT requirements involved in moving off the PICK system to SAP. The agenda included discussion of the 'Vision from a management perspective' regarding the 'transactional relationship AFPA to Specialty Group' and 'feedback requirements AFPA to Specialty' businesses, which, so the Holihan parties contend, includes by inference, the ACB Business.[404]
Discussions regarding fixed costs (October 2004)
334 A year or so later, on 11 October 2004, an email exchange took place between Mr Crouch and Mr Holihan concerning a proposed change in invoicing method and the basis of the charges between AFP and ACB. Mr Crouch informed Mr Holihan that as from October 2004 (and adjusting July-September) he wanted to cease paying Mr Holihan 'for your work you do for your own product.'[405] He explained that:
The reason for doing this is we may charge you D & D (which is Lab & Var by machine) [i.e., labour and variable costs] and yet pay you Lab Var and Fixed [i.e., labour, variable and fixed costs]. Therefore costing AFP the fixed component for every sqm that is your own product.'[406]
335 Mr Crouch said that he was completing the analysis on the July-September period and would forward it to Mr Holihan so that they could sit down and discuss it. In essence, he said 'AFP is being detrimented' because under the current arrangement ACB was effectively being over paid 'by the fixed cost per machine for [its] own work.'[407] Mr Holihan responded in terms that he would await the analysis and be happy to discuss the matter but said he 'believes the problem goes back to AFP not adjusting the costing system to reflect the charged rates from ACB' and his 'understanding is, if the system reflected the correct charge, then the back and forward charging would net itself out.'[408] On 18 October 2004, Mr Holihan received a further email from Mr Crouch addressing this matter.[409]
336 The evidence that Mr Holihan gave at trial was to the effect that when this matter was raised, he was unwilling to change the charging mechanism to Achilla's detriment, but was amenable to discussing a broader set of changes to the arrangements that would include benefits to Achilla, and he sent an email to this effect to Mr Crouch on 19 October 2004.[410]
337 On 14 February 2005, Mr Crouch sent an email to Mr Beynon[411] providing 'some thoughts/issues on ACB Wetherill Park', which was a reference to Achilla. He mentioned the charging issue that he had raised with Mr Holihan, and described the current charging regime in terms of 'the charges from ACB to AFP ...' and for all work that AFP does for ACB 'AFP charges ACB ...'.[412] He pointed out to Mr Beynon that '[e]very month AFP has to wear the cost of 37k for Depreciation and 31k for rent' and 'the fixed costs of the corrugator are not being recovered' and foreshadowed that under the current arrangements they 'will be ultimately allowing an outside company the ability to produce board and compete against us'. He noted also that they 'use ACB for either Jumbo work, or closure/handwork' and said their 'costs are high due to the volume they have vs the costs they need to recover' and so 'the costs for our OME work are high'.[413]
338 The documentation referred to above is just a small part of the extensive body of communications that took place between representatives of the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties following execution of the Second Sale Agreement. Given the views I have expressed earlier in these reasons about the 'business as usual' objective of the arrangement entered into, and recorded in the Second Sale Agreement, I am not satisfied that these communications demonstrate any 'mutual understanding' or 'mutual acceptance' by the parties that APA was the counterparty bound by clause 12.
Steps taken towards de-registration of ACB Co Vendor
339 The Holihan parties also rely upon the 'winding down' of ACB Co Vendor immediately after the sale of the ACB Business took place, contending that it is '[a]nother stark indication of the Amcor Parties understanding that it was APA and not ACB Co Vendor that was bound to the Supply Agreement.'[414]
340 They refer to an email sent by Mr Lewis, the company secretary and director of APA, on 4 August 2003, immediately following the completion of the sale, with the subject 'Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd - Change of name'.[415] The email was sent to Mr Brown (then a director of ACB Co Vendor and APA, and the managing director of Amcor Australasia), Messrs Colin Clayton and John Crawford (then directors of ACB Co Vendor and APA), Mr Joyce, Mr Holihan and others.
Dear all
as you may be aware the business operating as Australian Corrugated Box has been sold effective 31 July 2003.
The assets of the business, not the shares, were sold to Achilla P/L. The business will continue to operate by the new owner from the existing site at 159 Newton Rd Wetherill Park NSW.
As a consequence of the sale the Amcor owned company will change its name as follows:
FROM: Australian Corrugated Box Co P/L (ACN 002 693 843)
TO: ACN002693843 Box P/L (ACN 002 693 843)
In addition the Achilla owned company will change its name as follows:
FROM: Achilla P/L (ACN 104 489 670)
TO: Australian Corrugated Box Co P/L (ACN 104 489 670)
The Amcor company ACN002693843 Box P/L still does have assets however it is planned to wind its few remaining activities down so that it basically becomes a non trading entity in due course.
Appropriate documentation has been lodged with ASIC and we are awaiting confirmation.[416]
342 Mr Lewis did not give evidence in the counterclaim proceeding. However, the Holihan parties rely upon evidence that he gave in the principal proceeding before Vickery J concerning the events that followed his email and culminating in the execution of the Deed of Accession in March 2005. They contend that it 'unequivocally demonstrates Amcor's understanding that ACB Co Vendor had become a defunct company.' Mr Lewis's testimony before his Honour was as follows:
Deed of Accession
[62] As part of my role at Amcor, I was at the relevant time and am still today responsible for preparing the necessary documentation in order to liquidate and deregister Amcor subsidiaries which are non-operating companies which hold no assets and are no longer trading.
[63] Before 1998, Amcor had hundreds of non-operating companies which were not trading and had no assets. In 1999/2000 there were still many companies in this position although there had been some efforts to deregister non-operating companies. It was decided by Amcor Tax Group (AGT) at about that time, that as those companies were no longer trading, it was not necessary for Amcor to keep those companies registered and a process was put in place to "clean up" those companies by liquidating and deregistering them.
[64] On 18 October 2004 I received an email from Vic Timos stating: "...you may recall me mentioning that AGT were looking at liquidating some of the Australasian companies. We have started some preliminary work on this and we are at a point where we need your assistance" (CB 6577, Vol 40). That email referred to ACB.
[65] Further to that email, in about December 2004, I identified ACB and another company not related to this proceeding, "AP Chase Pty Ltd", as unwanted companies which needed to be liquidated. I note that as part of the sale of the ACB Business to Craig Holihan, Achilla and ACB Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd Amcor consented to Achilla changing its name to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd and ACB became known as ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd). However, when I refer to liquidating ACB I mean the shell that was left behind after the sale of most of the business' assets to Craig Holihan and his companies. This shell is also referred to as ACN Box.
[66] In keeping with Amcor's practice of cleaning up such shell companies, on 15 December 2004 I sent emails to Vic Timos and to Jim Mitsonis about the liquidations of a few companies, and in particular, asked whether there were any ongoing contracts of any nature with ACB and AP Chase Pty Ltd (CB 7017, 7066, 7067-7068, Vol 42).
[67] On 21 December 2004, I received an email from Tony Joyce advising that there was a clause in the contract (Second Sale Agreement) which stated in summary that where obligations were expressed to be carried out or property to be transferred by the vendor, the vendor could effect the transfer by or through a related body corporate, including APA or Amcor and Tony Joyce's reading of that was that ACB could be liquidated without any issue (CB 7066, 7067-7068, Vol 42).
[68] On 12 January 2005, I sent an email to Christina Cavallo, a secondee from Allens Arthur Robinson who was working at Amcor at that time, and asked her to prepare an appropriate document to proceed with a formal assignment by way of the Deed of Assignment (Amcor Discovery L691 and L692).
[69] On 14 January 2005 I received an email from Angelo Tenace, Taxation Manager Transfer Pricing, confirming the rationale behind the liquidation of ACN Box and other non-operating entities. He stated in the email that: "As you know AGT have identified potential saving (ie compliance costs and personnel/ admin time) from eliminating surplus legal entities in the worldwide Amcor Group, including Amcor Australasia, and as a result have proposed to liquidate the following companies...." The email went on to list eight companies including ACN Box (CB 7085, Vol 43).
[70] On 27 January 2005, I sent an email to Christina Cavallo attaching a copy of a deed of assignment previously used for property assignments which I suggested could be used for the ACN Box sale of business assignment (CB 7113, 7114-7122, Vol 43).
[71] On 29 January 2005, I received from Christina Cavallo a draft Deed of Accession (CB 7123-7125, Vol 43).
[72] On 16 February 2005, I sent an email to Craig Holihan stating that as ACB was no longer trading since the business was sold to his group and Amcor's continuing practice was to remove company structures which were no longer required, they wished to place ACB into voluntary liquidation and deregister it. I explained that in order to achieve that they ACB needed to assign any existing contractual obligations to APA. My email also stated that the Second Sale Agreement would need to be assigned and attached a copy of a document entitled "Deed of Accession" (Deed of Accession) (CB 7160, 7161-7168, Vol 43).
...
[74] Transferring assets of companies that were no longer operational through use of a deed of accession was a routine Amcor procedure put in place for internal efficiencies. It is not something I analysed or deliberated over - the focus was simply on eliminating unnecessary on-going reporting obligations for companies that were no longer serving any real purpose from Amcor's perspective.
[75] On 3 March 2005, I received an email from Craig Holihan forwarding on a copy of an email from David Roe to Craig Holihan in relation to the Deed of Accession which attached a marked up copy of the Deed of Accession with proposed changes (CB 7173, 7174-7182, Vol 43).
[76] On 21 March 2005, I executed the Deed of Accession on behalf of ACB and APA (CB 7198-7205, Vol 43).[417]
343 The Amcor parties rely upon the Deed of Accession as effectively putting paid to the notion that there could have been any mutual assumption that APA was the party bound by the clause 12 supply agreement. In effect, they submit that if APA was the party that was bound from the outset, there was no need for the parties to enter into the Deed of Accession. The Holihan parties dispute this and contend that the Deed of Accession simply reflected and formalised what had always been the case.
344 It will be recalled that in the principal proceeding, Vickery J discussed the Deed of Accession, finding that it was entered into on or about 21 March 2005, and made between ACB Co Vendor, APA, Mr Holihan, ACB Co Purchaser and Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly, Achilla). Relevantly, his Honour said:
Deed of Accession - Second Sale Agreement
[1752] On or about 21 March 2005, ACB, APA, Holihan, the ACB Purchaser and Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly, Achilla) entered into a transaction known as the "Deed of Accession" (the "Deed of Accession"). The Deed of Accession in effect substituted APA for ACB [ACB Co Vendor] in relation to "all capacities and for all purposes under or pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement". ...
[1753] The Accession Date is 21 March 2005.
345 The Holihan parties contend that the Deed of Accession had the effect, on and from 21 March 2005, of transferring to APA the rights and obligations that (according to the Second Sale Agreement) then bound ACB Co Vendor.[418] They allege that the transfer or assignment to APA was, from the Amcor Parties' perspective, 'a crucial requirement prior to the winding up of ACB Co Vendor, even if ACB Co Vendor was not a party to the Supply Agreement, because ACB Co Vendor was entitled to receive the $1,000,000 purchase price, $900,000 of which then remained unpaid.'[419] Counsel for the Holihan parties said their case is that once the Deed of Accession was entered into, 'the implied contract necessarily ceases to have effect because the circumstances of the parties no longer require it to exist' and the Second Sale Agreement 'subsumes the implied contract' between Achilla and APA. [420]
346 The Amcor parties do not dispute that the identity of the Vendor changed with effect from 21 March 2005 by operation of the Deed of Accession. They submit that this occurred 'as a result of a "tidying up" within head office which administered the corporate entities for statutory and accounting purposes and that the operating business within Amcor was not involved and had no knowledge of it.'[421] But the Amcor parties contend that the parties' entry into the Deed of Accession 'is flatly inconsistent with the existence of the alleged implied Supply Agreement'.[422] They plead in their defence that entry into the Deed of Accession effectively confirms that up to that point, the intention of the parties to the Second Sale Agreement was that the supply obligations under clause 12 would rest on ACB Co Vendor rather than APA.[423]
347 In response, the Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties' reliance on the Deed of Accession is misconceived and wrong for at least four reasons:[424]
(a) having been initiated in or about January 2005,[425] the Deed of Accession can shed no light on the understanding of the parties at the time that the Second Sale Agreement was negotiated and executed, or in the period between that time and January 2005;
(b) as is made clear from Mr Lewis's testimony to Vickery J, the deed arose not because the parties wanted to move ACB Co Vendor's obligations to APA for operational reasons, but because Amcor had decided to clean its corporate register of "surplus legal entities" such as the "shell" that ACB Co Vendor had become;
(c) the importance of the Deed of Accession was in preserving an actionable right to recover the $900,000 outstanding purchase price as it fell due (a right that was not within the Supply Agreement, but was part of the sale machinery and which the parties agree was correctly expressed to be a right of ACB Co Vendor); and
(d) Mr Holihan's understanding of the relationship between the Second Sale Agreement, the Supply Agreement, and the Deed of Accession is best explained in his own words, given in answer to questions in cross-examination:
DR McNICOL: Mr Holihan, are you aware that in this case there is alleged on your behalf a reliance on a written deed which has got a supply agreement in it called the asset sale deed, but there's also a reliance on an implied supply agreement?---Yes.
This implied supply agreement has always been your position has it? You've always understood there to be an implied supply agreement as well as a written supply agreement? --- I wouldn't have used those words. I've come to understand what those words mean now in a legal sense. But I did not enter the contract thinking that it was an implied contract.
DR McNICOL: When you went into the written contract you did not think there was another contract which was implied? --- My understanding was that the supply agreement was covered by 2.4 of the asset sale deed and that supply agreement was dealt with - was between the parties of AFP under the company of APA and Achilla.
You didn't give instructions to your lawyers that there was another agreement other than the written agreement? --- I know - I now understand what an implied contract means and so at this point in time in doing this evidence - in evidence in my witness statement, yes they were my instructions.
When did you actually first understand that there was this other agreement? When did it first happen? --- At all times I knew that the supply was between different parties that weren't part of the written agreement. I understood that. I understood also that it was taken care of under the agreement, clause 2.4. And it became more apparent when the deed of accession came through from Ian Lewis.
It's always been important to you that there was this implied agreement?---Because the agreement operated independently of the written agreement I didn't need to turn my mind to it again because it was working well. Everybody understood how it worked. I didn't put my mind to the fact that there was not a mistake in the contract. It only became apparent after my first meeting with MacPhail, after my first meetings with MacPhail when the deed of accession came through and that then to me put in place what I'd been trying to explain to John MacPhail in our first meeting.[426]
348 The Deed of Accession appears to have had its origin in email correspondence from Mr Lewis, in his role as company secretary of APA, to Mr Jim Mitsonis, an accountant with AFP, headed 'Liquidations' in mid-December 2004. In his email, Mr Lewis said that '[i]n preparing for the liquidations of unwanted companies', he would like Mr Mitsonis to make inquiries and advise if he is aware of 'any ongoing contracts, of any nature, with: [relevantly] ACN002693843 Box P/L (formerly Australian Corrugated Box P/L).'[427] Mr Mitsonis followed up by email to Messrs Lewis, Joyce and Crouch a few days later enquiring whether there is a contract between 'ACBC and ACN# (Wetherill Park)?'[428] Mr Joyce responded by email the next day, 21 December 2004, as follows:
Yes and no. The Asset sale agreement was between ACN# and ACBC. However there is a clause in the contract that says:
"Where any obligations are expressed to be carried out or property to be transferred by the vendor (that's us), the vendor may where appropriate procure such carrying out or effect such transfer by or through a related body corporate, including for the avoidance of doubt Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd and Amcor Ltd."
My reading of this says that we can liquidate ACN# without any issue.[429]
349 When Mr Joyce gave evidence, he said the intention to liquidate the company in due course did not surprise him because 'it was just normal commercial practice to try and keep the legal entity structures as clean and uncluttered as possible.'[430]
350 It appears that it was not until February 2005 that Mr Lewis progressed the matter further. Mr Holihan gave evidence that on 16 February 2005, he received an email from Mr Lewis regarding ACB Co Vendor which attached a draft 'Deed of Accession'.[431] In his email, Mr Lewis commenced by referring to the 'old company for ACBC' which he said Mr Holihan was aware 'is no longer trading since the business was sold to [his] group' and said:
Amcor's continuing practice is to remove company structures no longer required. As such we wish to place the old company into voluntary liquidation and deregister it. To achieve this we must assign any existing contractual obligations to the main Amcor company, namely Amor [sic] Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd.
To this end, the Asset Sale Deed between our two groups will need to be assigned. Clauses 2.4 and 11.10[432] in the Deed already allow for this however the attached Deed formalises the process.
I will forward hard copies for execution in the next few days. Let me know if you have any concerns.[433]
The proposed Deed of Accession showed the parties as being ACB Co Vendor, ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla, Mr Holihan and APA (as transferee).
351 Mr Holihan referred the proposed deed to his solicitor, Mr Roe, for review. Mr Roe provided his comments by email on 3 March 2005, which Mr Holihan forwarded to Mr Lewis for his consideration the same day.[434] In his email to Mr Holihan, Mr Roe stated:
There are two aspects of the agreement which I question.
Firstly its affect [sic] seems to be that Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd will become responsible for the former Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd obligations only as and from the date of the accession deed. It should be made clear that they accept any existing liabilities of that company. Particularly I suggest that amendments should be made to clause 2.3 and clause 3. I attached marked up changes which I think are appropriate.
Secondly, as you quite rightly point out, clause 6 which requires you to bear your own costs is unreasonable. The costs will not be high, but nonetheless Amcor should pay for them.
I enclose amended (and marked up) deed.[435]
352 As the letter or initiating email sent by Mr Holihan to Mr Roe is not in evidence, it is not known what matters Mr Holihan raised with Mr Roe when he sent the proposed Deed of Accession to him. But the response from Mr Roe does indicate that one matter Mr Holihan had raised for consideration by him was the issue of the costs involved. The reply from Mr Roe does not make any observation, or mention any comment having been made by Mr Holihan to the effect that the proposed Deed of Accession would formalise the practical effect of the existing arrangement, or would put in writing what was operating in practice between the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties concerning the ACB Business. In his oral evidence at the trial, Mr Holihan described the effect of the Deed of Accession as putting into writing what was operating in practice between the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties concerning the ACB Business and said that it was important to him that the true position was now being documented. He said:
---Um it was putting into place what was already existing. It was rectifying the conversations that I'd had with John MacPhail in the drafting of the asset sale deed and was really putting into place what I knew was existing practice. It was correcting a mistake.[436]
354 On 24 March 2005, Mr Lewis reported to Mr Timos, the Taxation Manager-Australasia/Asia, by email, copied to Mr Joyce, that the Deed of Accession had been finalised and '[t]ransfer ACN Box rights and obligations to APA. Nothing else I am aware of prohibiting liquidation'.[439] Mr Timos responded, saying that the 'only issue holding up any liquidation is potential stamp duty impost on transferring assets from ACB to APA' and that 'PWC are currently looking at this' and once he has a definitive position he 'will advise'.[440]
355 The Deed of Accession was also executed by the Amcor parties, being 'ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd' (that is, ACB Co Vendor) as 'Vendor' and APA as 'Transferee,' in each case by affixing the common seal in the presence of Mr Lewis and Mr Clayton. Under cross-examination, Mr Roberts was asked about his role in relation to the Deed of Accession. He said he was not consulted about it, and was not involved in it, and that Mr Lewis and Mr Clayton would have had authority to execute the Deed without reference to him.[441]
356 Despite the Amcor parties' intention to liquidate ACB Co Vendor, the position is that it has not been liquidated and it remains a company within the Amcor group and is a party to this proceeding.
357 The recitals record the relevant background to the parties' entry into the Deed of Accession. Recital A refers to the 'Asset Sale Deed' and then recital B states:
Due to a corporate restructuring of the Amcor group and the Vendor, the parties to the Deed have agreed that the rights, covenants, undertakings and obligations set out in the Asset Sale Deed will be novated on the terms of this Deed with the result that:
(a) the Transferee [APA] will become a party to the Asset Sale Deed in place of the Vendor [ACB Co Vendor]; and
(b) the Vendor will be released from its obligations under the Asset Sale Deed.[442]
358 Clause 2 dealt with 'Novation' and provided as follows:
2.1 The Transferee as a party to the Asset Sale Deed
With effect on and from the Accession Date:
(a) the Transferee shall be substituted for the Vendor in all capacities and for all purposes under or pursuant to the Asset Sale Deed: and
(b) the Asset Sale Deed shall take effect as a deed on the same terms as previously except that references to the Vendor shall be read and construed as if they were references to the Transferee.
2.2 Assumption of benefits and obligations
With effect on and from the Accession Date, the Transferee shall observe, perform, be bound by and comply with the provisions of the Asset Sale Deed binding on the Vendor and shall enjoy all the rights and benefits of the Vendor under or pursuant to the Asset Sale Deed.
2.3 Consent
The Purchaser, ACB and CH hereby irrevocably and unconditionally consent to the Transferee becoming a party to the Asset Sale Deed on and from the Accession Date and assuming the obligations of the Vendor in accordance with Clause 2 of this Deed and acknowledges and agrees that the Transferee shall be entitled to exercise all of the rights, privileges and benefits of the Vendor and agrees to be bound by the terms of the Asset Sale Deed as if the Transferee were named therein as a party instead of the Vendor.
2.4 Release of the Vendor
With effect on and from the Accession Date, the Purchaser, ACB and CH release and forever discharge the Vendor from all its obligations and liabilities under the Asset Sale Deed and all actions, claims or proceedings, demands and liabilities that it may have against the Vendor under or in respect of the Asset Sale Deed which arise on or after the Accession Date in relation to an act, omission, event, matter or thing occurring on or after the Accession Date.
2.5 To avoid any doubt, the parties agree that by this deed, the purchaser assumes the obligations and obtains the rights, privileges and benefits of the vendor under the asset sale deed whether those exist at the Accession Date or come into existence after the Accession Date.
359 'Novation' is, as Windeyer J explained in Olsson v Dyson[443] a transaction by which all parties to a contract agree that a new contract is substituted for one that has already been made, such that a substituted obligation is created in place of that which has been extinguished. Whether or not a novation has been effected ultimately depends on intention,[444] but the novation may be express or implied from the circumstances. In Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou,[445] the New South Wales Court of Appeal referred to the view expressed by Barwick CJ in Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Pty Ltd[446] to the effect that in searching for contractual intention, 'no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted, particularly in the case of commercial arrangements', and said that such an approach 'equally applies, in our view, when searching for an intention that there be a novation.'[447]
360 To similar effect, in ALH Group Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW),[448] the plurality of the High Court described 'novation' in the following terms:
A novation, in its simplest sense, refers to a circumstance where a new contract takes the place of the old: Olsson v Dyson [1969] HCA 3; (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 389. It is not correct to describe novation as involving the succession of a third party to the rights of the purchaser under the original contract. Under the common law such a description comes closer to the effect of a transfer of rights by way of assignment. Nor is it correct to describe a third party undertaking the obligations of the purchaser under the original contract as a novation. The effect of a novation is upon the obligations of both parties to the original, executory, contract. The inquiry in determining whether there has been a novation is whether it has been agreed that a new contract is to be substituted for the old and the obligations of the parties under the old agreement are to be discharged.[449]
It has been observed that, in cases involving the substitution of one debtor for another, some legal systems permit a succession to an obligation which remains, which is to say the obligation of the original debtor. But this is not the approach taken by English law, which has developed by reference to Roman law principles and looks to the creation of a new agreement.[450]
362 Accordingly, it is clear that the legal effect of the Deed of Accession was not to assign or transfer any rights and liabilities of ACB Co Vendor but rather was to extinguish the original contract and create a new agreement in its place.[451]
363 From a contract construction point of view, it is of significance that the novation effected by the Deed of Accession operates as a matter of law to extinguish the original contract and replace it with a fresh contract, whereby 'the [Second Sale Agreement] shall take effect as a deed on the same terms as previously except that references to the Vendor shall be read and construed as if they were references to the Transferee',[452] namely APA. Accordingly, the fresh contract falls to be construed according to its terms, with effect on and from 21 March 2005, and in the light of the objective circumstances existing at that time.
364 The Deed of Accession expressly records, in clause 2.3, the irrevocable and unconditional consent of each of the Holihan parties to APA, as Transferee, 'becoming a party to the Asset Sale Deed on and from the Accession Date' and to APA 'assuming the obligations of the Vendor in accordance with clause 2' of the Deed. Further, under clause 2.2, APA agreed to 'observe, perform be bound by and comply with the provisions of the Asset Sale Deed binding on the Vendor' with effect on and from the Accession Date. In my view, these provisions make clear that hitherto APA was not bound by the provisions of the Second Sale Agreement. And if, as the Holihan parties contend, the Deed of Accession was simply putting an existing implied contractual regime into express form, it is likely that the Deed of Accession would make mention of that arrangement, at least in the recitals to the agreement. The fact that it does not is telling. Moreover, if the Deed of Accession was recognising and formalising the existence of the alleged implied supply agreement, the operative clauses would not be drafted in terms of APA 'becoming a party' and 'assuming the obligations of the Vendor'. In my view, the parties' entry into the Deed of Accession is demonstrably at odds with the existence of the implied supply agreement contended for by the Holihan parties.
Issue 1(d): Did ACB Co Vendor, in its own capacity, ever supply Products (raw materials) to Achilla or purchase Products (OME supplies) from Achilla in the period from Completion to 21 March 2005?
365 The Holihan parties point to the absence of any evidence before the Court that ACB Co Vendor ever supplied Products, that is raw materials, to Achilla or purchased Products, that is OME supplies, from it. Rather, they say,[453] that as is demonstrated by the list of 'AFP jobs routed to ACB' that Mr Crouch produced late in August 2005, the jobs were purchased by APA,[454] and Mr Cichonski gave unchallenged evidence to the same effect: namely, that after the sale, AFP's estimating department continued to route work (albeit now to Achilla) in the same way that it had to ACB Co Vendor previously.[455]
366 Further, the Holihan parties contend that the pleaded allegation advanced by the Amcor parties to the effect that ACB Co Vendor supplied 'through' APA[456] is 'without foundation'.[457] They submit that for ACB Co Vendor to have purchased 'through' APA would have been contrary to the recipient created tax invoice regime and inconsistent with all of the parties' communications.
367 The Amcor parties' response is that there is no evidence to suggest that any such supply by ACB Co Vendor took place.
368 In the period between Completion and entry into the Deed of Accession, the evidence shows that orders were placed with the ACB Business using Amcor's PCS and PICK system, raw materials were supplied to Achilla, and Achilla performed OME work for the Amcor parties.
369 Achilla performed OME work for AFP during the term of the supply agreement. Mr Holihan gave evidence that the profit & loss statements for Achilla show that in the respective financial years during the term of the supply agreement, AFP purchased OME supplies totalling the amounts shown below:
(a) $4,467,723.53 for the financial year ending June 2004 (11 months only, from 1 August 2003);
(b) $5,213,986.73 for the financial year ending June 2005;
(c) $3,360,322.31 for the financial year ending June 2006;
(d) $1,925,474.82 for the financial year ending June 2007;
(e) $1,261,482.74 for the financial year ending June 2008; and
(f) $74,757.05 for the financial year ending June 2009 (month of July 2008 only).[458]
370 Mr Holihan said that in the first year the agreement seemed to be working, but he first noticed a drop in sales to AFP throughout the first half of 2005.
Issue 1(e): Do the Second Sale Agreement and the Deed of Accession preclude a finding that there was an Implied Supply Agreement between APA and Achilla?
371 This issue captures the defence pleaded by the Amcor parties that:
(a) the Deed of Accession and the entire agreement clause (contained in clause 15.11 of the Second Sale Agreement) are evidence of the parties' intentions that the clause 12(b) Purchase Obligation (i.e. obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla ...) rested on ACB Co Vendor;[459] and
(b) the entire agreement clause precludes the existence of the alleged implied agreement.[460]
372 As will be apparent from the foregoing, the Holihan parties dispute that any such obligation rested on ACB Co Vendor. Rather, they say the clear intentions of the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties, as spelled out in their conduct and correspondence, was that APA was to be the party bound.
373 As to the clause 15.11 argument, they say that the clause, by its terms, only operates as between the parties to the written agreement, and as APA was not a party to that instrument, the clause cannot preclude the existence of an implied agreement between ACB Co Purchaser and APA.
374 Here again, with the separation and bifurcation of the central issues in the case into a set of discrete issues to be answered seriatim, there is a real risk of departure from the orthodox and principled approach that the Court should follow when interpreting a contract or ascertaining whether or not there is an implied contract. Accordingly, I do not propose to answer this question as a separate issue.
Issue 2: Is APA estopped from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to the alleged implied supply agreement?
The estoppel by convention alleged by the Holihan parties
375 As noted earlier, the Holihan parties also advance an estoppel by convention argument in the alternative to their alleged implied contract. They rely on the parties' correspondence and conduct prior to execution of the agreement, and their correspondence and conduct after execution of the agreement, as discussed above, to support the existence of both the implied supply agreement and the estoppel by convention that they contend precludes the Amcor parties from denying the implied supply agreement.[461]
376 In paragraph 3AB of Achilla's counterclaim, the Holihan parties plead the alleged estoppel by convention in the following terms:
Estoppel by Convention
3AB Alternatively to paragraph 3AA above:
(a) during the negotiations that culminated in the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, and at all material times following the execution of that agreement:
(i) Achilla adopted the assumption that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12; and
(ii) APA adopted the same assumption;
(b) at all material times, Achilla and APA conducted their relationship on the basis of that mutual assumption;
PARTICULARS TO SUBPARAGRAPHS (a) AND (b)
Achilla repeats paragraphs (e) and (f) of the particulars to paragraph 3AA above.
(c) each of Achilla and APA knew that the other was conducting the relationship on that basis;
PARTICULARS
Achilla repeats paragraphs (e) and (f) of the particulars to paragraph 3AA above.
Further, APA was aware of:
(A) the fact that it was providing work to Achilla and being charged in the manner set out in clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement; and
(B) the fact that Achilla charged higher margins to its other customers than it did to APA for most equivalent work -
because the 'PICK' computer system, which was operated by APA, contained Achilla's customer, job routing and pricing information;
(d) if APA is now permitted to depart from that assumption, it will cause Achilla detriment.
PARTICULARS
(i) Prior to the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, had Achilla not believed that APA was bound by the obligations created by cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla would not have executed that agreement, but would have sought and obtained an amendment to the effect that APA had the obligations that ACB [i.e., ACB Co Vendor] had under cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement as written.
(ii) Following execution of the Second Sale Agreement, had Achilla believed that ACB and not APA had the rights and obligations of ACB under cl. 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement as written, Achilla would not have allowed APA the benefit of the prices required by that clause, and so would have made greater profits on the sale of products to APA. Achilla charged higher margins to its other customers than it did to APA for most equivalent work.
(e) APA is therefore estopped from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to those of the Supply Agreement [i.e., the implied supply agreement].[462]
377 The Holihan parties submit that at all material times, the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties 'acted as though APA was the party bound by the Purchase Obligation'[463] in clause 12.2 and that 'it was on the strength of that mutual assumption that Achilla entered into the Second Sale Agreement and continued to allow APA to purchase OME supplies of Products from it' at the prices prescribed by clause 12.2.[464] In those circumstances, they contend that the Amcor Parties are now estopped from denying the existence of the implied supply agreement.
378 In essence, they say '[t]he parties' correspondence and conduct, both before and after execution of the Second Sale Agreement, demonstrates that both APA and Achilla assumed that they were the parties bound by clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, that each understood the other to be operating on the basis of that assumption, and that both conducted their relationship on the basis of that assumption.'[465] Accordingly, they contend a conventional estoppel operates as between APA and Achilla, and that APA is estopped from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to those alleged in the implied supply agreement.
379 There is no dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal principles. In Strategic Property Reservoir Pty Ltd v Condec Pty Ltd,[466] Almond J described estoppel by convention in the following terms:
[178] Estoppel by convention is founded on the conduct of relations between the parties on the basis of an agreed or assumed state of affairs (whether as to a matter of fact or a matter of legal effect), which both will be estopped from denying. The assumed state of affairs takes as a given the terms of the contract between the parties, but from which the parties have departed in the course of furthering their relationship under the contract.[467]
380 His Honour also endorsed the statement of principle enunciated by Lord Steyn in the India v India Steamship Co Ltd (The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace) (No 2),[468] that:
an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared ... or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption.[469]
381 Generally, in order for a plaintiff to establish a conventional estoppel, it must be demonstrated that:
(a) the plaintiff has adopted an assumption as to the terms of its legal relationship with the defendant;
(b) the defendant has adopted the same assumption;
(c) both parties have conducted their relationship on the basis of that mutual assumption;
(d) each party knows or intends that the other will act on that basis; and
(e) departure from the assumption will cause detriment to the plaintiff.[470]
382 The Holihan parties submit that the relevant assumption adopted can be as to the existence of a binding contract between the parties. [471]
383 If the elements of a conventional estoppel are satisfied, the Holihan parties say that it would have the same practical effect as the implied contract they contend for, in that it would treat APA as the party bound by clause 12.2, but it would do that without having to tackle some of the complexities raised by the implied contract. Counsel for the Holihan parties also noted that it would avoid the question of how the implied provisions sit alongside the express provisions of the Second Sale Agreement.[472] He explained that under the conventional estoppel argument, the parties are estopped from denying that clause 12 operates as if APA rather than ACB Co Vendor were the vendor named in that clause, rather than by imposing a second set of obligations that sits alongside the written contract.
384 As the doctrine of conventional estoppel precludes either party to a contract from denying an assumption which has formed the conventional basis of the relationship between them, it is necessary to determine whether the parties have in fact adopted such an assumption as the conventional basis of their relationship.
385 In my view, the Holihan parties' conventional estoppel argument suffers from the same essential vice as their implied contract argument. It proceeds on the footing that APA was involved in negotiations with Achilla that culminated in the Second Sale Agreement and that, in so doing, APA adopted the same assumption as that adopted by Achilla, namely that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12, and that each of them knew that the other was conducting their relationship on that basis. In other words, the pleaded claim treats APA as if it were a party to the Second Sale Agreement, and then asserts or intuits that APA was at all relevant times conducting its relationship with Achilla on the basis of the agreement set out in clause 12.
386 There is a distinct lack of clarity in the Holihan parties' case as to who on behalf of APA is said to have had the requisite authority to participate in the negotiations for the Second Sale Agreement and how it was that APA insinuated itself into that agreement and became a party such that, from Commencement, it was bound by the clause 12 obligations. Rather, the position is, as I have found in the context of the implied agreement argument discussed above, that prior to its entry into the Deed of Accession, APA was not a party to the Second Sale Agreement. The evidence is that before the sale, APA, in its capacity as owner of the AFP business operations conducted at the corrugated box manufacturing sites at Smithfield and Revesby in New South Wales, was a significant customer of the ACB Business conducted by APA's subsidiary, ACB Co Vendor. After the sale, the ACB Business was conducted on a 'business as usual' basis save that in March 2005, the Deed of Accession was entered into, whereupon APA became a party to the Second Sale Agreement in place of ACB Co Vendor.
387 As the Amcor parties point out, the Deed of Accession 'points firmly against there having been an adoption of the common assumption that APA was bound by clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement from completion'[473] and '[i]t would be unnecessary to bind APA by the Deed of Accession if it had been assumed that APA was already so bound.'[474]
388 Further, to the extent that the estoppel by convention pleaded by the Holihan parties relies upon what is said to have transpired in pre-contractual negotiations, the Amcor parties also point to the threshold difficulty that they contend is well-established in Victoria, namely that pre-contractual negotiations cannot form the basis for an estoppel by convention that is inconsistent with the terms of the written contract. In Retirement Services Australia (RSA) Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd,[475] the Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Harper JA and Robson AJA) endorsed[476] the following statement by McLelland J in Johnson Matthey v AC Rochester Overseas Corporation:
In substance an estoppel by convention is in the nature of an agreement. There is no less reason in principle that such an agreement be treated as superseded by the subsequent written contract than that any other agreement arrived at during pre-contract negotiations be so treated. Furthermore it would be subversive of the policy on which the parole evidence rule is founded, and would unduly shake the security of written contracts, if proof were permitted of such alleged estoppels.[477]
389 The Holihan parties submit that the passage in Retirement Services relied upon is obiter dicta in so far as it concerned estoppel by convention, and point to conflicting authorities on the point but say it is unnecessary for the Court to resolve them.[478] First, they contend that the bases upon which pre-contractual conduct is excluded from consideration do not require that non-parties be precluded from claiming estoppels in the face of such contracts. The Amcor parties also acknowledge that in the context of an alleged estoppel that relies on conduct between parties that pre-dated a binding contract between them, the rationale or bases on which pre-contractual conduct is excluded from consideration, such as preserving the integrity of the written contract, do not apply with the same force where non-parties are involved.
390 Secondly, the Holihan parties say it is well accepted that contracting parties can be bound by an estoppel by convention arising from post-contractual conduct, and that where the relevant conduct began prior to execution of the contract, there should be no reason precluding a court from considering the pre-contract conduct together with the post-contract conduct.
391 In the present case, for the Court to accept that the estoppel by convention advanced by the Holihan parties is made out would also involve the Court finding, at least implicitly if not expressly, that the parties intended to depart from the written contract that was entered into by the parties at the conclusion of those negotiations. Not only would that be subversive of the policy on which the parole evidence rule is founded, it would also call into question the efficacy of the later dealings between the parties in relation to the Deed of Accession which proceeded upon the basis of, and effectively re-affirmed, that their prior dealings were as set out in the written contract.
392 The Amcor parties acknowledge that 'how Mr Holihan and Amcor understood the Second Sale Agreement to operate' is properly able to be the subject of an estoppel by convention. But they contend that the evidence led by the Holihan parties has not been directed to what Mr Holihan and Amcor thought the Second Sale Agreement to mean as such, and say that the Holihan parties have provided no evidence from Mr Barnes, who was Amcor's principal negotiator, to establish what was Amcor's understanding. Rather, they submit, the evidence adduced by the Holihan parties has ranged more broadly, seeking to establish that some Amcor entity other than ACB Co Vendor had promised to obtain OME supplies from Achilla. Accordingly, they contend that there is no evidence before the Court supporting the mutual assumption pleaded by the Holihan parties.
393 The Amcor parties submit that the Holihan parties' failure to call Mr Barnes to give evidence is telling. At the time the negotiations for the sale were underway, Amcor was unaware that Mr Barnes had any business association with Mr Holihan and was to become a co-owner of the ACB Business with him following completion of the sale. It was only several years after the sale had taken place that Amcor became aware that Mr Barnes was actually a co-owner of the ACB Business with Mr Holihan, and had been from the outset. The Amcor parties contend that if a common intention of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties was expressed, then Mr Holihan should have called Mr Barnes and put that evidence before the Court. However, given the failure to call him, they submit 'the Court should draw the conclusion that no such common intention was ever expressed.'[479]
394 The Holihan parties do not accept that Mr Barnes was the principal negotiator for the Amcor parties in respect of the transaction. They accept that Mr Barnes had 'some involvement' but say that Mr Holihan did not 'negotiate the agreement' with him[480] because the evidence shows that Mr Parker, Mr Crouch, Mr Joyce[481] and Mr MacPhail were also directly involved.[482] Secondly, they say, the common intention relied upon is reflected in the body of documents set out in the particulars given of the implied agreement and the estoppel, and insofar as oral testimony about them was required, each of Mr Joyce, Mr MacPhail and Mr Holihan were called. They submit that Mr Barnes was not required, because Mr MacPhail took instructions from him and gave evidence about what Mr Barnes did. Indeed, they say the only useful evidence Mr Barnes could have given was that he instructed Mr Holihan to work with Mr MacPhail, and that was not in dispute. Further, the Holihan parties submit that Mr Parker, Mr Alvarez[483] and Mr Crouch were also involved in the email correspondence that evidences the common intention, and they could have been called by the Amcor parties had they wanted to rebut the common intention.
395 The evidence summarised earlier in these reasons shows that Mr Barnes was 'in the driving seat' from the outset. Mr MacPhail's evidence made clear that he was taking his instructions from Mr Barnes albeit subject to any views expressed by Mr Parker. Mr Holihan gave evidence about what he says transpired in his discussions with Mr Barnes but that evidence was not corroborated. I am not satisfied that there was any common intention of the kind contended for.
396 Finally, the Amcor parties challenge the alleged estoppel by convention at the level of detriment. As I have found that there was no common assumption between Achilla and APA of the kind alleged, namely that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12, it is not necessary to deal with this aspect, save perhaps to summarise the arguments advanced.
397 The Holihan parties pleaded the relevant detriment as being that if APA is now permitted to depart from the (common) assumption, it will cause Achilla 'detriment' as follows:
(i) Prior to the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, had Achilla not believed that APA was bound by the obligations created by cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla would not have executed that agreement, but would have sought and obtained an amendment to the effect that APA had the obligations that ACB [ACB Co Vendor] had under cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement as written.
(ii) Following execution of the Second Sale Agreement, had Achilla believed that ACB and not APA had the rights and obligations of ACB under cl. 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement as written, Achilla would not have allowed APA the benefit of the prices required by that clause, and so would have made greater profits on the sale of products to APA. Achilla charged higher margins to its other customers than it did to APA for most equivalent work.[484]
398 The Amcor parties contend that the first detriment pleaded 'cannot logically be a sufficient detriment to justify the finding of an estoppel by convention' because in form and in substance, it is effectively a claim that Achilla has lost the opportunity to formalise the alleged common assumption in a contract. They argue that that cannot be a sufficient detriment to attract the Court's assistance at common law because in every case, a detriment in that form could be alleged and the party alleging it 'could thereby bootstrap themselves into an estoppel.'[485]
399 As to the second detriment, the Amcor parties acknowledge that Mr Holihan gave evidence to the effect that 'Achilla (like the ACB Business before it) charged the [non-AFP] Customers significantly higher margins than it charged to AFP'[486] and that the margins he was charging to other customers were about 79 per cent above D & D[487] but they say it is 'insufficient to demonstrate detriment'. They contend:
A lost opportunity to charge a 79% margin assumes that Mr Holihan would have obtained the work from Amcor at that greater price. That premise, and the lost opportunity founded upon it, has not been demonstrated by any evidence. Indeed, the evidence shows that Holihan was already too dear for some work which is why it went to other OME suppliers.[488]
400 The Holihan parties responded by submitting that the alleged detriment was not so much a loss of opportunity as 'a loss of a right that the parties accepted would be granted.'[489] That is, they contend that the evidence relied upon, most tellingly the RCTI agreement and the Deed of Accession, creates an 'inescapable inference that the parties would have agreed to include APA as a party to the Second Sale Agreement and bind it to clause 12.2 had they properly turned their minds to the question.'[490] In oral submissions, Counsel for the Holihan parties summarised the position, stating:
The detriment allegation that's actually raised [...] is not related to the loss of an opportunity to negotiate a different contract. It's related to the loss of the certainty that the parties would have amended the written instrument so as to give effect to the actual that it's clear they'd entered into and, further, that the Holihan parties would not have acted as if they were so bound in allowing the pricing advantages to the Amcor parties that were allowed pursuant to the supply obligations had the mutual assumptions not been adopted.[491]
401 As will be apparent from the views expressed above, I am not satisfied that the parties would have agreed to include APA as a party to the Second Sale Agreement and bind it to clause 12.2 had they properly turned their minds to the question. Accordingly, the first alleged detriment is not made out. As for the second alleged detriment, the view I have formed is that the work performed by the ACB Business for the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites operated by APA was to be, and was undertaken, on the basis of 'business as usual' and the costing that applied reflected that which had prevailed in the past. Accordingly, when taken in the context of the case as a whole, I do not accept the evidence given by Mr Holihan to the effect that Achilla would have charged higher prices to APA had he not believed it to have the benefit of clause 12. In my view, the prices charged by Achilla for work performed for the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites operated by APA reflected the 'business as usual' arrangement that continued following the change of ownership of the ACB Business. Relevantly, there were differences between the arrangements that applied to the work performed for that customer, as opposed to other customers of the ACB Business generally, that were consistent with 'business as usual' rather than the contractual arrangements in place under clause 12. For example, the raw materials required for such jobs was not supplied to Achilla at prices based on D & D costs, as required under clause 12.1. Rather, Mr Holihan's evidence was that where work was required to be performed for the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites, they supplied the corrugated board and cartons directly to Achilla, and they also arranged and paid for the freight associated with delivery of the raw materials to, and collection of finished product from Achilla's premises at Wetherill Park. In that sense, the D & D pricing mechanism set out in Annexure 5 to the Second Sale Agreement did not accord precisely with that which applied in the context of these 'business as usual' arrangements.
KEY ISSUE: What is the scope of clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, and the equivalent clause of any implied supply agreement?
402 In their recent decisions in Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd[492] and in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited,[493] the High Court reaffirmed that an 'objective approach' is to be adopted in determining the rights and liabilities of parties to a contract and that the approach to construction enunciated in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales[494] by Mason J, with whom Stephen and Wilson JJ agreed, is to be followed. In Codelfa, Mason J stated the 'true rule' of construction as being:
[T]hat evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties...[495]
403 In Mount Bruce Mining, French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained the approach to be adopted as follows:[496]
[46] The rights and liabilities of parties under a provision of a contract are determined objectively[497], by reference to its text, context (the entire text of the contract as well as any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in the text of the contract) and purpose[498].
[47] In determining the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract, it is necessary to ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean[499]. That enquiry will require consideration of the language used by the parties in the contract, the circumstances addressed by the contract and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract[500].
[48] Ordinarily, this process of construction is possible by reference to the contract alone. Indeed, if an expression in a contract is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances (events, circumstances and things external to the contract) cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning[501].
[49] However, sometimes, recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contract is necessary. It may be necessary in identifying the commercial purpose or objects of the contract where that task is facilitated by an understanding "of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating"[502]. It may be necessary in determining the proper construction where there is a constructional choice. The question whether events, circumstances and things external to the contract may be resorted to, in order to identify the existence of a constructional choice, does not arise in these appeals.
[50] Each of the events, circumstances and things external to the contract to which recourse may be had is objective. What may be referred to are events, circumstances and things external to the contract which are known to the parties or which assist in identifying the purpose or object of the transaction, which may include its history, background and context and the market in which the parties were operating. What is inadmissible is evidence of the parties' statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations.[503]
[51] Other principles are relevant in the construction of commercial contracts. Unless a contrary intention is indicated in the contract, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract an interpretation on the assumption "that the parties ... intended to produce a commercial result".[504] Put another way, a commercial contract should be construed so as to avoid it "making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience".[505]
404 In adopting an 'objective approach', the Court, when construing the terms of a commercial contract, will look to what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the contract to mean. In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd,[506] the High Court said '[w]hat matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe'[507] and that normally requires 'consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.'[508] A few years later, in Electricity Generation, a differently constituted High Court also reiterated and endorsed the view expressed by Mason J in Codelfa that the ascertainment or understanding of the commercial purpose or objects of the contract 'is facilitated by an understanding "of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating"'.[509] In their joint judgment, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ explained that a commercial contract should be construed by considering 'the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract'[510] so as to avoid arriving at a result that could not have been intended. Further, their Honours endorsed the observations of Arden LJ in Re Golden Key Ltd (in rec)[511] to the effect that a court is entitled to approach the task of interpreting a commercial contract 'on the assumption "that the parties ... intended to produce a commercial result"' and stated that a court is to construe a commercial contract 'so as to avoid it "making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience."'[512]
405 In seeking to give a commercial contract an interpretation that would promote and give effect to the notion that the parties intended to produce a commercial result, however, a court must also ensure that by having regard to the context and surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, it does not impermissibly depart from the meaning of the words used by the parties merely because it regards the result as inconvenient or unjust.[513]
Clause 12.2 - the rival constructions advanced by the parties
406 Clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement and/or the implied supply agreement relevantly provides as follows:
... The Vendor [i.e. Amcor party] will for [the period of 5 years from Completion] obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
407 The Holihan parties submit that the meaning of clause 12.2 is clear and unambiguous, and thus that the question of breach falls to be determined by reference to its terms. They contend that clause 12.2 required the relevant Amcor party to obtain all of its OME supplies of Products from Achilla. In the course of their oral closing submissions, however, the Holihan parties came to accept that there is relevantly 'ambiguity'[514] in the Second Sale Agreement, demonstrated for example when one seeks to ascertain the meaning of the word 'Product' as used in clauses 12.1 and 12.2 respectively.[515] In these circumstances, the Holihan parties readily acknowledged that in interpreting the clause, it was open to the Court to look beyond the express words of clause 12.2 and to consider surrounding circumstances in order to arrive at its meaning. Further, they said that the effect of their concession was that there would now be no real difference between the approach to be taken by the Court in the construction of the implied supply agreement and the construction of the written agreement, and confirmed it was open to the Court to consider the same extraneous circumstances when construing the written agreement as it would when construing the implied agreement.[516]
408 The Amcor parties contend that the purchase obligation in clause 12.2, on its proper construction, required Amcor to continue to obtain OME supplies from Achilla in cases where the previous ACB Business had already been producing those jobs for Amcor's customers, unless Achilla was unable to do so consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. They point to the definitions of the 'Business', the 'Contracts' and the 'Customers' in clause 1.1 as lending support to such a construction.[517] So too, they submit, does the fact that Amcor, having sold or leased the machinery used in the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, no longer had the machinery available to do the OME work itself for its customers, and, as Mr Holihan well knew, the Amcor parties needed to have 'a secure place for their work to be made'[518].
409 Further, the Amcor parties contend that clause 12.2 did not require Amcor to re-route all existing work away from other OME suppliers and direct it to Achilla instead. Indeed, they said the Holihan parties, through Mr Holihan, 'understood and assumed that Achilla was obtaining the benefit of the OME business that, prior to execution of the Sale Agreement, AFP provided to ACB Vendor',[519] and knew that the ACB Business under Amcor ownership was using a variety of other OME suppliers. Accordingly, the Amcor parties submit that the purchase obligation in clause 12.2 did not require them to purchase all OME supplies from Achilla, but rather, required Amcor to obtain OME supplies from Achilla where those jobs had previously been made by the ACB Business. In other words, they submit that when viewed in the context of the Second Sale Agreement and the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that 'all' OME supplies does not mean 'all'.
410 In the circumstances, both the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties acknowledged that the proper construction of clause 12 is to be arrived at by considering not only the words used but also the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time and the purpose and object of the transaction.
The surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction
411 When one has regard to the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that the Second Sale Agreement sought to do two things: first, to sell the assets of the ACB Business (and sub-lease the Wetherill Park premises) to the Holihan parties[520] so that they could carry on the ACB Business, and secondly, to enter into trading arrangements[521] whereby the Amcor parties would supply (or continue to supply) raw materials to the ACB Business (under new ownership) and the ACB Business (under new ownership) would perform (or continue to perform) OME work for Amcor entities and others of the kind performed by the ACB Business (under Amcor ownership). It is also relevant to note that the ACB Business was being sold by the Amcor parties to Mr Holihan, who was at that time employed by Amcor and was the manager of the ACB Business.
412 ACB Co Vendor was the owner of the assets. It conducted the ACB Business from the Wetherill Park premises, and had its own workforce. Being part of the Amcor group of companies, ACB Co Vendor also had access to infrastructure and systems available for use by entities within the Amcor group. ACB Co Vendor performed OME work for entities within the Amcor group and for third parties. But the bulk of its OME work was sourced from the corrugated box plants at Smithfield and Revesby in New South Wales that were operated by AFP(NSW), a division of APA. APA was also relevantly the parent of ACB Co Vendor, and the head lessee of the Wetherill Park premises.
413 Generally speaking, the corrugated box plants operated by AFP(NSW) at Smithfield and Revesby ('AFP Smithfield' and 'AFP Revesby') supplied the corrugated board and cartons to ACB Co Vendor that was used by the ACB Business to perform the OME work required to fill orders that customers such as Arnotts and Kelloggs had placed with AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby, as well as orders placed by third parties directly. In this way, APA's corrugated box plants had a ready avenue (or dedicated customer) for the supply of the raw materials they produced.
414 Viewed from an Amcor 'whole of business' perspective, there were obvious efficiencies and economies in AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby supplying raw materials to the ACB Business on the one hand, and in the ACB Business performing the OME work on the other, and thereby keeping the OME work 'in-house'. However, AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby did use other alternative suppliers to perform OME work on a regular basis. Sometimes alternative suppliers would be used to perform certain OME work because they had a particular specialty, or special equipment that was required for a particular job, or because the alternative supplier could perform 'fiddly' work well or manual labour tasks more cheaply than the ACB Business could. On occasions, OME work ordinarily performed by the ACB Business would be diverted to an alternative supplier (and vice versa) simply because the work was urgent or could not be performed on ACB Co Vendor's equipment within the requisite timeframe because other work was scheduled for those machines at that time.
415 The ACB Business, the corrugated box plants at AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby and other entities within the Amcor group all had access to the PCS and PICK system.[522] PCS was a part of a package called 'KiwiPlan', that had a corrugator scheduling component called 'CSC' and a plant scheduling component called 'PCS'. Generally speaking, 'PCS' was a scheduling system that was used to determine where the particular OME job was to be sent out to be manufactured, and it would determine the order of manufacture of products through the plant, machine by machine. KiwiPlan and the PICK system had an interface, and they communicated with one another, so that once an order was placed in the PICK system it could then by uploaded into both CSC and PCS. PCS could be used to change the routing of a particular job but the preferable course was to make routing changes using the PICK system.
416 The PICK system had access to information about all of the Amcor machines available for use, including those used in the ACB Business.[523] Mr Holihan agreed that while Achilla was on the same system as the Amcor parties, Achilla was visible to the Amcor parties through the use of PICK and PCS. He said that PCS would show the machine line ups for a job, and once each of the machine rates was entered into PICK by Amcor, 'they then had a mechanism to know what it would cost to have a product produced by [Achilla] on any of these machines so they could quote their customers without having to contact us, ring us.'[524]
417 Information about the machines of the alternative suppliers was not contained within PICK but the estimators generally knew what machinery was available at each of the alternative OME suppliers and what work the respective suppliers could do or not do and at what price. Prior to the sale, the estimators would route new work to the ACB Business or to the alternative suppliers according to their respective availability and ability to perform the OME work.
418 The PICK system contained all of the specifications for the particular job, including the costings, pricing, accounting information, order histories, delivery information and invoicing information. The evidence was unclear as to whether, in cases where an alternative OME supplier was involved, the PICK system also disclosed the identity of the relevant OME supplier.[525] It appears that it was possible to 'drill down' into a particular order to determine which OME supplier had performed the work for that order, but it was not possible to run a report from PICK to determine where OME work had been sent.[526]
419 When a fresh order was placed by a customer with an Amcor sales representative, the sales representative would notify the estimator at the ACB Business of the new job and its internal dimensions, paper requirements (printed or plain), the quantity required, delivery details etc. The estimator would enter those details into the PICK system, and it would generate a best price for that job. The estimator would then supply a quotation to the customer and if the customer was happy, the work would be ordered by reference to the quotation. The estimator would create a 'master' on the PICK system using the quotation number which contained the requisite information. Where, however, the job was a 'repeat' job, that had been performed for the customer at an earlier point in time, the customer would simply supply the master number (i.e., no estimator was required to be involved because the costing etc was contained in the master) which enabled the ACB Business to access the relevant details through PICK.
420 Where tooling was required for a particular OME job, Amcor would usually supply the tooling to the OME supplier itself, so as to eliminate the prospect of any mark-up or margin on the manufacturing cost being charged to it.[527]
421 At a practical level, once an order was placed and a master created was for a job in PICK, subsequent orders for the same work from the same customer would be routed to the same OME supplier, particularly if special tooling was involved, and the finished work would be charged at the same price as before. But it was possible to change the job specification in PICK and re-route the work to another OME supplier if necessary or desirable to do so.
422 At the time of sale, the ACB Business was regarded by Amcor as an underperforming business in the sense that it was not meeting Amcor's 'return on funds employed' (ROFE) benchmark. When ACB Co Vendor sold the assets and undertaking of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, it was the sale of a going concern, and it was envisaged on both sides that after the sale, the ACB Business would continue to do the OME work that historically had been routed through the ACB Business prior to the sale, using the same equipment and at the same premises. Further, raw materials required by the ACB Business (under new ownership) would (continue to) be supplied by ACB Co Vendor sourced from the corrugated box plants at AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby at D & D prices agreed between them, and the ACB Business would (continue to) perform OME work for customers of the corrugated box plants at AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby at D & D prices agreed between them, and the PICK and PCS systems would (continue to) be used for ordering, quoting and scheduling the work to be undertaken by the ACB Business (under new ownership). In that sense, the ACB Business (under new ownership) would operate in much the same way as it had in the past, and work for customers would be ordered and received in much the same way as before, and at the same or similar pricing. To facilitate that course, the Wetherill Park premises from which the ACB Business operated were to be sub-leased to the Holihan parties by APA and the ACB Business (under new ownership) would continue to have access to the corrugator located there. And the Holihan parties were permitted to offer employment to any of the 'Employees' (defined to mean the employees of the Vendor engaged in the Business as listed in Annexure 7) with effect from the Completion Date.
423 Under clause 2.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Vendor sold, and the Holihan parties agreed to purchase the assets of the ACB Business. The assets included:
(a) the 'Stock' (defined to mean 'all raw materials, supplies, packaging and containers, work-in-progress, finished products, parts and components and other inventory of the Business including items of stock in transit or on consignment to customers');
(b) the 'Plant and Equipment' (defined to mean 'all fixed and loose plant, equipment, machinery, furniture, fixtures and fittings, computer hardware, vehicles, and all other tangible assets listed and set out in Annexure 3');
(c) 'all of the interest of [ACB Co] Vendor under or arising out of the Contracts' (where 'Contracts' were defined to mean 'any contracts and agreements (whether written, oral or arising through a course of trading, or a combination of any of these) which relate to the Business and to which the Vendor is a party or by which the Vendor may be bound as at Completion, including for the avoidance of doubt contracts and agreements for supply to Customers');
(d) the 'Customers' (defined to mean 'the customers of the Business or other persons to which the Business supplies or supplied products or services at the Completion Date or during the period of 12 months before that date, and for the avoidance of doubt includes:
(a) customers of the Vendor appearing on its debtors ledger; and
(b) those customers with which the Vendor's sales team has dealt at any time during the 12 month period up to the Completion Date');
(e) the 'Books and Records' (defined to mean 'originals or copies (as appropriate) in machine readable or printed form of all registers, books, reports, correspondence, files, records, accounts, documents and other material, in the possession or control of the Vendor, about or used in connection with the Business and the Assets')
(f) the Business Name (defined to mean 'the business name Australian Corrugated Box Co'); and
(g) the 'Goodwill' (defined to mean 'the goodwill of the Business').
424 The 'Business' was defined to mean 'the business carried on by the Vendor of the sale and supply of corrugated packaging as at the date of this Deed and for the avoidance of doubt, does not include any part or parts of the business of Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited [i.e., APA] or Amcor Ltd'.
425 The purchase price for the 'Stock' (which was to be calculated pursuant to a stocktake) was payable 12 months from Completion and the purchase price for the Business (other than the Stock and the Accrual Amounts and Prepayment Amounts) of $1,000,000 was payable by five yearly instalments, the first commencing 12 months after Completion and ending 60 months after Completion.
426 Upon entry into the Second Sale Agreement, clause 4.2 required both ACB Co Vendor and, so far as practical and feasible, Mr Holihan as an employee of the Vendor, to 'conduct the Business in the ordinary course and in substantially the same manner as it was conducted' prior to entry into the agreement. The Holihan parties were also required to enter into a fixed and floating charge in favour of ACB Co Vendor and APA as Chargee, effectively to secure the payment of the instalments of the purchase price.
427 Under clause 9.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, provision was made for ACB Co Vendor to assign the Vendor's interest in, or obtain novation of, the Contracts to or in favour of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla (or both), and to ensure that for a period of up to 12 months following Completion, the ACB Business (under new ownership) could so far as practicable obtain supplies of starch, inks, energy etc on terms which were no worse than those upon which ACB Co Vendor obtained them, Clause 9.2 made provision for certain 'practical arrangements' (by way of sub-lease or sub-licence or ACB Co Vendor holding the benefit of any such Contract for the Holihan parties) to apply in the interim until any novation or assignment under clause 9.1 took place. Importantly, clause 9.3 made provision for the ACB Business (under new ownership) to continue to use the 'Computer ordering system', as follows:
9.3 Computer ordering system
The Vendor will at no cost to the Purchaser or Achilla and subject always to the terms of any licence in force for use of the same:
(a) leave intact the existing computer system by which orders are placed direct into the manufacturing system, use of which (and any related software) is pursuant to a licence from the Vendor, and no ownership or title therein is conferred on the Purchaser or Achilla, but upon replacement by the Vendor of the existing system with another system (as it is acknowledged is currently contemplated), the parties will meet to discuss and agree upon an effective and efficient process for achieving the same or essentially the same results; and
(b) make available to the Purchaser or Achilla an effective order processing and tracking system similar to that available to other customers of the Vendor by which the Purchaser may place and track orders in the Vendor's manufacturing system.
428 The ability of the ACB Business (under new ownership) to continue to use the PCS and the PICK system facilitated the conduct of the 'business as usual' following the sale, in the sense that those systems effectively recorded the OME work that historically was performed by the ACB Business whilst under Amcor ownership. The Second Sale Agreement did not guarantee or specify a 'minimum' amount of OME work that the ACB Business (under new ownership) would receive under clause 12.2 or a 'minimum' amount of raw materials that the ACB Business would purchase from ACB Co Vendor under clause 12.1. But given the way the PCS and the PICK system operated to generate quotations and route OME work to the ACB Business and the alternative suppliers, the work formerly performed by ACB Co Vendor would in the ordinary course continue to be performed by the ACB Business (under new ownership). That is because the OME work that was performed historically by the ACB Business whilst ACB Co Vendor was running it was identified on the PCS and the PICK system by the numerical denotation in the 'master' for the job. When further quantities of the particular OME job were required and ordered for that customer, the job would continue to be routed to the ACB Business because it was denoted in the master coding as the OME supplier for that job. In the case of new work, the estimator could use the PCS and the PICK system to ascertain the price at which the ACB Business could perform the OME work and prepare a quotation for the customer, which if accepted, would see the job routed to the ACB Business. Similarly, if a fresh supply of an existing OME job was required on an urgent basis, but the alternative supplier who usually performed that work was unable to complete it within the requisite time frame, the estimator could use the PICK system to ascertain whether the ACB Business could perform the work, and at what price, and if acceptable to the customer, the work would be routed to the ACB Business.
429 The D & D costing mechanism used in the Second Sale Agreement was developed by the parties in consultation with each other in the manner outlined in the factual chronology earlier in these reasons. The acronym 'D & D' (a reference to the 'direct and distribution costs') was defined in clause 1.1 to mean 'the applicable costing base of products for the purposes of calculating costs in relation to clause 12 as shown in Annexure 5'. While Annexure 5 specified the discrete cost elements that were to be included in arriving at the 'D & D rates' formula, it expressly left open some scope for adjustment to the D & D insofar as it stated that 'D & D changes will be agreed between CH and the Vendor's commercial manager.'[528] Further, clause 12.3(ii) provided that:
[ACB Co Vendor] and Achilla will in writing or in meetings, or as otherwise deemed appropriate, verify and confirm the basis of D & D, to ensure that this is a true and accurate reflection of costs, such process to be carried out at or shortly before Completion, and upon each anniversary of Completion, or as otherwise agreed between the Purchaser and the Vendor.
430 The objective of the D & D costs mechanism was to allow the Vendor, or Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) to recover their respective 'direct and distribution costs' involved in the supply of raw materials on the one hand, and the supply of finished products on the other, on the basis of an effectively agreed pricing.
431 Generally speaking, it was through the D & D pricing mechanism that ACB Co Purchaser/Achilla would recover its fixed costs of operating the ACB Business. However, as the Second Sale Agreement did not specify any minimum quantity of OME work (or raw materials) that was required to be ordered and supplied under either clause 12.2 (or clause 12.1), the practical reality was that Achilla was required to be ready to provide all of the anticipated work that the Amcor parties might want across the year, and that necessarily involved it carrying the fixed costs of having the requisite capacity available to do so, irrespective of whether or not it received the benefit of that work.
432 The pricing that was to apply in the first year of operation of the ACB Business (under new ownership) was to be arrived at by reference to the pricing that applied to the historical actual throughput from the Wetherill Park plant as operated by ACB Co Vendor preceding the sale, and ratcheted up in each contract year by the agreed margin(s) specified in clause 12. In that way, with the D & D pricing mechanism in place under the Second Sale Agreement, an estimator who was quoting on a job or order to be placed with the ACB Business, could enter the job details into the PICK system and the PICK system would generate a costing or quote for the item of proposed work.
433 Against that background, it will be seen that clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement established the reciprocal supply and purchase obligations that applied to ACB Co Vendor, as Vendor, and to ACB Co Purchaser (and Achilla), as Purchaser, of the ACB Business. Under clause 12.1, ACB Co Vendor agreed it would supply corrugated board and corrugated cartons to ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla at prices based on D & D costs to ACB Co Vendor. And Achilla (and if appropriate ACB Co Purchaser) undertook to 'obtain all supplies of' such Products from ACB Co Vendor at the D & D prices specified, save for those that Achilla manufactures for itself (or ACB Co Purchaser), and agreed it would not purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to ACB Co Vendor's 'inability to supply consistently...' etc. Accordingly, for a period of five years, ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla were required to obtain their raw materials from ACB Co Vendor and not from any other source. Further, such supplies by ACB Co Vendor and acquisitions by Achilla were to be made on APA's 'standard terms and conditions applying for substantially similar supplies from time to time.'
434 Similarly, under clause 12.2, Achilla undertook to supply 'Products' (in context, that must be construed to mean finished products and not corrugated board and cartons) to ACB Co Vendor at prices based on D & D costs to Achilla. ACB Co Vendor agreed that during the five year period it would 'obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla' and would not 'purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently...' etc.
435 Clause 2.4 of the Second Sale Agreement provided that where any obligations are expressed to be carried out or property to be transferred by ACB Co Vendor, 'the Vendor may where appropriate procure such carrying out or effect such transfer by or through a Related Body Corporate,' including APA or Amcor. Clause 12.4 conferred a similar power on ACB Co Purchaser to 'nominate another company in lieu of Achilla to carry out and fulfil all (but not some only) of its obligations and responsibilities and obtain the benefit of all (but not some only) of the rights and privileges' pursuant to clause 12 on the proviso that such company at all times be a Related Body Corporate of ACB Co Purchaser and under the control of Mr Holihan.
The proper construction of ACB Co Vendor's obligation under clause 12.2
436 In my view, when the provisions of clause 12 are viewed in the context of the whole agreement and the surrounding circumstances, the obligation imposed on ACB Co Vendor under clause 12.2 to obtain 'all its OME supplies' from Achilla is to be construed as an obligation on the part of ACB Co Vendor to continue to provide to Achilla after the sale all of the same sort of work that the ACB Business had been doing prior to the sale, save in circumstances where the exception was enlivened. That is, notwithstanding the sale, the ACB Business (under new ownership) would effectively continue on the same basis as before (i.e., when conducted by ACB Co Vendor). Thus, in the ordinary course, customers' work that was entered in the PICK system with a master denoting the ACB Business would be routed to Achilla notwithstanding the change in ownership. Similarly, in the case of new jobs that involved work of the kind that was performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale, in the ordinary course a quote would be generated using the PICK system, and work would be routed to Achilla unless the exception was enlivened. In this way, Achilla would continue to perform the work that historically had been undertaken by the ACB Business, and essentially on the same basis as before, including that its supplies of raw material would continue to be sourced from the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales.
The proper construction of APA's obligations as 'Vendor' under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement
437 Turning then to the fresh Second Sale Agreement that came into effect on and from 21 March 2005, with APA as the named 'Vendor', it will be seen that clause 12.2 relevantly provides as follows:
Achilla will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply Products to the Vendor [now APA] at prices based on D&D costs to Achilla. The Vendor [now APA] will for that period obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. ...
438 The plain meaning of clause 12.2 is relevantly that APA will obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla, save where the exception operates.
439 The Amcor parties acknowledge that 'the parties were content to substitute APA for ACB Co Vendor when entering into the Deed of Accession (even if those in the AFP business were unaware of it)' but observe that that 'says nothing about whether or not the term "APA" itself requires construction.'[529] That is, they say that even though the parties named the legal entity 'APA', they nevertheless recognised that the substitution of APA for ACB Co Vendor was not intended to render all of the businesses operated by APA across Australia and New Zealand subject to the clause 12 obligations. Indeed, the Holihan parties admit (albeit for the purposes of their estoppel by convention claim) that the obligation 'would not extend to all of the businesses operated by APA across Australia and New Zealand.'[530]
440 As noted earlier, in closing submissions, the Amcor parties submitted that entry into the Deed of Accession did not expand the obligations under the Second Sale Agreement but rather, that APA simply 'stepped into the shoes of' ACB Co Vendor. Further, they say, APA's business unit known as Amcor Displays was not part of the Second Sale Agreement as made in 2003, and it was not inadvertently included from 21 March 2005 as a result of the Deed of Accession.
441 The Holihan parties accept that the effect of the Deed of Accession was that APA stepped into ACB Co Vendor's shoes 'for all purposes',[531] but they do not accept that the Amcor Displays' work was not encompassed within clause 12.2.
Is Amcor Displays' work captured within the clause 12.2 obligation?
442 As was the case with AFP, Amcor Displays was simply a business name (rather than a corporate entity), that was owned and used by APA. The Amcor Displays business occupied a prominent and important position in the conduct of the trial, primarily because the work performed for this business during the five year period forms a significant part (about half, by value) of the quantum of the Holihan parties' claim that is contested by the Amcor parties.
443 As noted earlier, the Holihan parties contend that clause 12.2 unambiguously required APA 'to obtain all of its OME supplies of Products from Achilla for a period of five years. Accordingly, the Holihan parties submit that there was no 'carve-out' from the clause 12.2 purchase obligation for the Amcor Displays' work, such that any OME work done by the alternative suppliers for Amcor Displays was prima facie in breach of clause 12.2, such that they are entitled to claim loss and damage in respect of that work. Alternatively, the Holihan parties submit that if the Court were to find that there is ambiguity, such that regard may be had to the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that clause 12.2 extended to Amcor Displays' work, except work that was subject to a third party agreement with ACE Print.
444 In that regard, the evidence was that prior to the Second Sale Agreement being entered into, AFP had entered into a supply agreement with ACE Print in relation to Amcor Displays' work.[532] As noted earlier, Mr Holihan knew, at the time the Second Sale Agreement was entered into, that there was an agreement in place with ACE Print for it to do work for Amcor Displays[533] because Mr Alvarez had sent an email to him on 22 January 2002, enclosing a copy of the ACE Print contract 'as approved'.[534] That agreement apparently began sometime in 2001 and came to an end in February 2004 following the purchase of ACE Print by Visy.
445 The relevant agreement refers to ACE Print doing work 'in response to orders from AMCOR Pty Ltd (ABN 55 004 275 165) ("Amcor") on behalf of Amcor's customers.'[535] The Holihan parties rely upon this statement as demonstrating that Amcor has only one class of customer, and that there is not a separate class of 'Displays' customers. They say that this is also apparent from the sales and customer listing for the financial year ending 30 June 2003[536] discovered by Amcor.[537] Mr Nellies did not recognise this document, but under cross-examination he agreed that customers of Amcor Displays were customers of Amcor.[538]
446 It is common ground that at the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement and at Completion, Amcor Displays was contractually obliged to use ACE Print as its supplier of OME work. But the Holihan parties do not accept that during the period when the ACE Print agreement was in place that ACE Print was doing all of the Amcor Displays' work. Rather, they say, while that agreement was on foot, some of the Amcor Displays work (including corrugated point of sale displays and litho lamination) was being done by ACB Co Vendor, either at the request of Amcor Displays directly or at the request of Amcor for Amcor Displays.[539] In this regard, they rely upon evidence given by Mr Holihan, Mr Silva and Mr Cichonski and the June 2003 profit & loss statement for the Wetherill Park operations of the ACB Business.[540]
447 Against this background, the Holihan parties claim that the work requirements of the Amcor Displays business fell within, or were encompassed by, the obligation under clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement (or the implied supply agreement). In effect, they submit that once the ACE Print contract came to an end, the Amcor Displays' OME work was captured by the clause 12.2 requirement that APA 'obtain all its OME supplies' from Achilla, because Amcor Displays was relevantly a business operated by, or under, APA. In their closing oral submissions, Counsel for the Holihan parties submitted that when regard is had to the Amcor parties' defence and the way the case was opened 'it is still not clear on what basis precisely' the Amcor parties challenge or resist the claim for the Amcor Displays jobs or in respect of which of the jobs their Amcor Displays' defence is said to apply.[541]
448 The Amcor parties' pleading of their defence to the Holihan parties' case as it concerns Amcor Displays is summarised earlier in these reasons. The pleaded defence related to Service Containers but that position was not actively pursued and their defence was refined, initially during the Amcor parties' opening, and further throughout the running of the trial.[542] In essence, the Amcor parties now contend that Amcor Displays was a distinct and discrete business within Amcor, that was run separately from the businesses conducted by AFP at its Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales, at a different location and with different management.[543] Accordingly, they contend that the clause 12.2 obligation did not extend to the Amcor Displays business.
449 The Amcor parties effectively contend that the OME work requirements of Amcor Displays were not encompassed within the clause 12.2 obligation because Amcor Displays was at all relevant times a discrete and distinct business that was conducted separately from 'the AFP business' at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales. Further, they say, as a matter of interpretation, the clause 12.2 obligation did not extend to the Amcor Displays business.
Prior to the sale, Amcor Displays was located at Revesby
450 Amcor Displays was a graphics and displays business, that sold and supplied cardboard-based point of sale products such as display stands and storage bins of the kind seen in chemist stores and supermarket aisles. The Amcor Displays business was initially located at Milperra Road, Revesby, but it was relocated to Wetherill Park in mid-2004 and then to Enfield after that.
451 In the principal judgment, Vickery J found that prior to entry into the First Sale Agreement on 1 February 2002, the Amcor Displays business was a component part of the Service Containers Business but, being profitable, it was retained by Amcor and did not form part of the sale of the Service Packaging Business that was sold to Mr Hottes. Prior to the sale of the Service Packaging Business, Mr Hottes was engaged as an independent contractor by Amcor to operate both the Service Packaging Business and the 'Displays Business'. After the sale, Amcor extended Mr Hottes' consultancy. Following the death of Mr Hottes in August 2004, however, a separate arrangement was entered into with the Holihan parties for Mr George Daaboul, an employee of the ACB Business, to go across to Amcor Displays and run that business as a manager.
452 Mr Holihan gave evidence as to how that arrangement for the ACB Business (under new ownership) to provide a manager for Amcor Displays was reached. He said that in November 2003, Mr Alan Caldow, who was the National Specialty Manager for AFP, telephoned him and asked whether he would be happy to enter into some sort of arrangement for Amcor Displays to relocate to Wetherill Park and for Mr Daaboul to be seconded to AFP to manage the Amcor Displays business.[544] Mr Holihan said he knew that Mr Caldow knew Mr Daaboul because previously they had all worked together at Visy Board. He said Mr Caldow told him that the work that AFP was doing for Amcor Displays in-house at its Revesby and Smithfield factories would now be routed to Achilla, and he could send Mr Holihan a fax of some notes that he had made about his current thinking.[545] On 17 November 2003, Mr Holihan received a fax from Mr Caldow regarding Amcor Displays, setting out the details of the proposal that he and Mr Caldow had discussed.[546]
453 In his 'draft' proposal, Mr Caldow outlined the proposal as follows:
454 Mr Holihan said he saw this invitation as a tremendous opportunity for Achilla because it would give Achilla some real insight into the OME work that Amcor Displays had.[548] Mr Holihan said that having sat in on the monthly AFP management meetings, and being familiar with the work required in producing corrugated cardboard displays of the kind sought by Amcor Displays, and having visited the Amcor Displays site, he knew Achilla was able to perform all of the operations involved in the manufacture of displays except for screen printing.[549]
Relocation of the Amcor Displays team to Wetherill Park (mid-2004)
455 In or around early 2004, Mr Caldow left Amcor. Mr Holihan said that Mr Manser called him to let him know that he was now the acting Specialty Manager for AFP, and was aware of the discussions that had taken place with Mr Caldow regarding Amcor Displays, and he supported and wanted to move forward with the proposal to move Amcor Displays to Wetherill Park with Mr Daaboul as manager.[550] During that conversation, Mr Manser also informed Mr Holihan that ACE Print had been bought by Visy Board, the contract with ACE Print had been terminated, and he was keen to move the existing ACE Print work across to Achilla as soon as possible.[551] Some time after that conversation, Mr Holihan met with Mr Manser at Achilla's premises at Wetherill Park to discuss Amcor Displays and the physical space it would require for its sales team and customer service support.[552]
Achilla enters into a management agreement with APA regarding Amcor Displays
456 In or around mid-2004, Achilla entered into an agreement with APA whereby Achilla agreed to undertake the management of 'a Division of Amcor Displays Australasia in New South Wales' on a 'fee for service' basis to be paid by APA.[553] The management agreement was executed by Mr Bayley on behalf of APA[554] and by Mr Holihan on behalf of Achilla. Under the management agreement, Achilla's employee, Mr Daaboul, was designated as 'the person responsible for carrying out the management duties' and he was required to devote an average of 20 hours per week to that role. The agreement was to commence to operate from 1 July 2004 and cease on 30 June 2005 unless extended by agreement.[555] In or around mid-2004, Achilla confirmed Mr Daaboul's terms of employment by letter, drafted mainly by Mr Manser, with input from Mr Holihan.[556]
457 Amcor Displays moved in to Wetherill Park in about July 2004 and Mr Daaboul took up the role of running the business.[557] However, the position was soon reached whereby Mr Daaboul was spending more time working on the Amcor Displays business than first anticipated, and on or around 26 August 2004, ACB Co Purchaser and APA agreed to vary the management agreement in relation to Amcor Displays with effect from 1 September 2004. [558]
458 Mr Holihan said that the work that Achilla did for Amcor Displays increased markedly from around the time Amcor Displays relocated into the Wetherill Park site and it remained steady until late 2004. However, notwithstanding that the contract with ACE Print had been terminated, Achilla did not immediately get the work that ACE Print had been doing.[559] ACE Print had apparently been asked to return the films and other tooling it held, but it was not until around September 2004 that the remaining material was returned to Amcor Displays at Wetherill Park.[560]
Decline in OME work - Amcor Displays relocates
459 During the first quarter of 2005, Mr Holihan first noticed a decline in the volume of OME work being received by Achilla from AFP. At about this time, Mr Manser told Mr Holihan that Amcor Displays would not be signing the deed to lease space from Achilla and that it would be moving out, which it later did. Mr Manser had also informed him that he was going to relocate the purchasing functions of Amcor Displays NSW to Victoria and have them run from a Service Containers business. [561] The management agreement with Mr Daaboul was not extended and came to an end by effluxion of time on 30 June 2005.
460 Mr Joyce gave evidence that in a corporate sense, responsibility for the Amcor Displays business was part of his role as Commercial Manager Operations for AFP, based in Melbourne.[562] Mr Joyce described the Amcor Displays business as being essentially a 'point of sale' business that lacked any manufacturing capability. He said:
Amcor Displays was a small sales organisation. It had no manufacturing capability sitting behind it. It was - all its material that it sold was supplied out of the main manufacturing operations that Amcor owned in and around Sydney, and that also included some outsourcing of specialist activities. The displays business produced cardboard based point of sale shelving, advertising that could go for example into stores or into any other sort of retail environment.[563]
461 Mr Joyce explained that the base material for the Amcor Displays work was sourced 'from one of the two large manufacturing plants at Smithfield and Revesby'[564] and he believed that it was the sales staff for the Amcor Displays business who managed the process of determining where the work required was to be directed, by reference to the product specification. Under cross-examination, he explained the basis for his belief:
And why do you believe that to be the case?---Um, because they had the intimate and unique understanding as to what the customer requirements were and, therefore - and also, um, needed to manage the commercial relationship with the customer and, therefore, could not afford to be disappointed if that manufacturing step, or one or many of the manufacturing steps, did not take place in the appropriate timeline.[565]
462 Mr Anthony Cichonski, who was the New South Wales Regional Operations Manager of Amcor from June 2000 to January 2005, gave evidence that before the sale in July 2003,[566] Amcor Displays was a separate business to that conducted at Smithfield and Revesby, and that Amcor Displays had its own sales team and estimating department and a different product.[567] Mr Cichonski said that during his time with ACB Co Vendor, in the period prior to the sale to the Holihan parties, the ACB Business did work that included making boxes and displays and other corrugated product[568] and Amcor Displays used the Smithfield and Revesby facilities for production of components of its work (but they did not perform the OME work itself).[569] Orders for Amcor Displays were placed on the PICK system, the system would 'divvy up' how the work was to be done and, as part of that, the Smithfield or Revesby plants would manufacture the corrugated cardboard component of a Displays job.[570] He said that those plants may also have die-cut the work depending on volume.[571]
463 Mr Cichonski said that in January 2005, when he commenced employment with ACB Co Purchaser/Achilla as its Operations Manager, the ACB Business could do a similar range of work, including the 'assembly, bundling, folding, gluing, stitching, slitting, slotting, strapping, palletising, wrapping and packing of corrugated boxes and other corrugated products such as displays' and 'laminating of corrugated products, including litho lamination.'[572]
464 Mr Joyce was less certain about whether, before the sale, the ACB Business had performed work for Amcor Displays. In giving his evidence, he agreed initially that when he was the Commercial Manager Operations at AFP, one of the businesses that the ACB Business serviced in and around Sydney was Amcor Displays.[573] However, when asked if he could remember whether or not Amcor Displays had work done by the ACB Business prior to the sale he clarified the position and said '[i]t was possible that work could go through the Wetherill Park site of Australian Corrugated Box, in order to produce product for Displays New South Wales'.[574] He did not recall whether he anticipated that position might continue after the sale.
465 Under cross-examination, Mr Joyce explained what he meant when he said it was 'possible':
Now, you said earlier that it was possible that the ACB business did work for Amcor Displays. Why did you say that it's possible?---Ah, because depending on the nature of the product as it was specified, um, it could have required some of the converting machinery that resided within the Australian Corrugated Box plant at Wetherill Park.
And at the time - this is again presale - ACB business was an internal company - isn't it?---That is correct.
So Amcor's policy at the time would be to do whatever work could be done internally, is that right?---Absolutely.
That way the profits would be kept in-house?---It would retain the margin internally.
So it's for that reason it may well be possible that ACB business did work for Amcor Displays where they had the machines?---Correct. That is correct.[575]
466 Mr Garcia, who was called as a witness by the Amcor Parties, gave evidence about the separate estimating workforce in place at Amcor Displays. Mr Garcia, who is currently employed by Orora Australasia as a Regional Estimator, has worked for about 35 years in the estimating departments of several of the companies operating in the corrugated fibre packaging industry. Mr Garcia described the role of an estimator as having two aspects - he said the main role is to give a price to the customer and the other is 'to route the job', that is, to determine how you are going to manufacture it in the factory.[576] He explained that the estimator is involved where the particular work is requested by the customer for the first time. Once the estimator has created a 'master' number for the job, the customer uses that master number when re-ordering the job. He said that when it came to OME jobs, he knew all of the OME vendors' limitations, in the sense of what machinery they had and what work they can or cannot do, and what prices they charged.[577]
467 Mr Garcia said he knew of Amcor Displays, describing it as 'another division'.[578] He said that he did not do estimating work for Amcor Displays and he did not have interaction with their staff. He said he thought that Mr Walter Dailey and Mr Bret Roddy did the estimating work and the routing work for Amcor Displays.[579]
468 Mr Nellies, who was called by the Amcor parties, also gave some general evidence about the estimators at Amcor Displays. He said that the estimators in Amcor Displays did not report to him, nor did they report to Mr Azzopardi (who reported to him).[580] Mr Nellies said that he knew that Mr Dailey was an estimator and customer service person at Amcor Displays, he having originally started at Amcor and then later moved across to Amcor Displays.[581] Mr Nellies said that Mr Dailey, in his role at Amcor Displays, 'would have reported into the Amcor Displays hierarchy,' but he was not privy to knowing what that was, whereas the estimators who were working for Amcor reported to Mr Vince Azzopardi, who in turn reported to Mr Nellies.[582]
469 Mr Nellies, in giving his evidence, also described Amcor Displays, saying 'technically, Amcor Displays was a customer' so that they should have been placing orders with Amcor in the same way that a customer would place orders.[583] He explained this further, saying:
- - - Because they were a different division. So we had Amcor Cartons, we had other divisions of Amcor that would place orders within ourselves, so we would - they would place a purchase order to do that.[584]
470 He was then taken to Exhibit H423, which is a listing of Amcor's Sales & Customers for 2003. The listing was separated into customers of AFP, which commenced with Amcor Cartons and ended with Amcor Aerosols, and customers of ACB, which commenced with ARK Relocations Pty Ltd and ended with Pack & Send South Brisbane, and it showed the volume of product purchased (in sqm) and the 'Sales $' by amount for each customer. Mr Nellies said that Amcor Aerosols was a division of Amcor that was a client of AFP New South Wales.[585] He then explained what he meant by the expression 'a client of AFP' saying that they purchased cartons from AFP as a division of Amcor, and they would 'place a purchase order for us to manufacture goods on their behalf.'[586]
471 Mr Nellies confirmed that Amcor Displays was not shown in the listing of customers of ACB.[587] In the listing of customers of AFP, however, there was a line item recording an 'Amcor Displays-cash sale'. Mr Nellies explained that this could be anything but said it likely referred to invoicing 'for a product that would have been sold to a client that didn't have an account with Amcor Displays'.[588] He added that Amcor Displays 'as a division of Amcor it was part of the Amcor sales. So there was a Revesby and a Smithfield ... - and a Displays.'[589]
472 The Holihan parties say that Mr Nellies, who was responsible for estimating, gave evidence that the New South Wales estimating department received the email instruction from Mr Azzopardi to direct all OME to Achilla and that the Amcor Displays' estimators were included as recipients of that email.
473 Mr Paul Silva, who prior to the sale was the 'Logistics Manager' with the ACB Business and responsible for distribution and planning at Wetherill Park, was re-employed by Mr Holihan's company after the sale and continued in essentially the same role. Mr Silva said that after the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties the work that the ACB Business received from AFP was the same, 'at least for a while.'[590] He said that the ACB Business 'continued to do litho lamination work, including for another AFP Business, Amcor Displays', and he confirmed that the ACB Business made displays for Amcor Displays both before Mr Holihan bought the business and 'for a short period of time' after that.[591] He said that 'Amcor Displays was on the PICK system until early 2005.'[592]
474 In respect of Amcor Displays, the evidence was that the 'AFP NSW Displays' or 'Amcor Displays' work is clearly identified on invoices and the like by the prefix 'SX'. Mr Phillips, who worked on the transition from the PICK system to SAP and was very familiar with the codes used by the various businesses to place orders in the system gave evidence that any invoice listed or identified or discovered where the jobs commence with the SX prefix must be accepted to be an Amcor Displays job.[593]
475 The Holihan parties contend that documentary evidence, primarily the June 2003 profit & loss statement, confirms that notwithstanding the contract with ACE Print, the ACB Business nevertheless performed work for Amcor Displays prior to the sale. The profit & loss statement records the revenue that ACB Co Vendor earned from Amcor entities in the notes to the line entry headed 'RESALE PURCHASES / COST OF CORR / RECOVERY'. Mr Holihan said that this item was treated as a 'negative expense' because it was the 'recovery' by the ACB Business of costs incurred in producing that work, and so that two Amcor business units did not record the same sale in each of their accounts.[594] He explained that as at June 2003, those OME sales to Amcor entities totalled $3.683 million, and were comprised of the recovery of the cost of work done for AFP and Amcor Displays by machine hour ($2.622m), the recovery of the cost of manufacturing single face fanfold cardboard for AFP ($785,000) and the recovery of costs associated with carton erecting (fruit and vegetable boxes, known as 'P84s') ($376,000).
476 There was also unchallenged evidence that the machine rates agreed between the parties for the purpose of the D & D calculation included some Amcor Displays' volume. The data tables accompanying the June 2003 profit & loss statement, headed 'Amcor Fibre Packaging - Recovery of Wetherill Park Labour, Variable and Fixed Costs Based on Machine Hours, MTD June 03', give the detail for the components of the $2.622m that is referable to the recovery of the cost of work done for AFP and Amcor Displays by machine hour, and confirm that the sum of $172,097.83 represents 'Management Unit C' being 'Amcor Displays' and the remaining sum of $2,450,225 represents 'Management Unit A' being 'NSW Box'.[595]
477 The Amcor parties acknowledge 'that it cannot be ruled out' that the ACB Business did some work for Amcor Displays prior to the sale, essentially for reasons agreed to by Mr Joyce.[596] Under cross-examination, he acknowledged that as the ACB Business was Amcor-owned before its sale to Mr Holihan, if its machines could do the work, then Amcor Displays may well have run work through those machines to keep profits internal to the Amcor group.[597] But the Amcor parties say that it is a matter for the Holihan parties to establish that Amcor Displays' work was captured by the clause 12.2 obligation. They also dispute the suggestion that Amcor Displays was part and parcel of AFP and thereby bound by clause 12.2.
478 Against that background, the Holihan parties submit that it is open to the Court to infer that there must have been Amcor Displays' work that fell outside the contract with ACE Print which the ACB Business received and did. Thus, they say it follows that even on the Amcor parties' 'business as usual' construction, whenever there was Amcor Displays' work that fell outside the ACE Print contract, the ACB Business or Achilla should have received that work.
479 On the evidence presented, it seems clear that while the ACB Business was doing some 'work' for Amcor Displays prior to the sale, it was not doing all or even a significant proportion of the Amcor Displays' OME work. The data tables accompanying the June 2003 profit & loss statement suggest that a small component of the Amcor Displays' work was being performed by the ACB Business notwithstanding the arrangement in place with ACE Print, and that it was being recorded separately from the other work performed for the businesses conducted by AFP at its Smithfield and Revesby sites. Accordingly, I am satisfied that on a 'business as usual' construction of the clause 12.2 obligation, Achilla would likely have received some small amount of Amcor Displays' work, unless the exception was enlivened.
480 The Second Sale Agreement does not specifically mention or deal with the Amcor Displays' work. Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail, who drafted the Second Sale Agreement, did not discuss any specific limitations on the work to be provided under clause 12.2.[598] Mr MacPhail conceded in cross-examination that it would have been a relatively easy process for him to draft further carve-outs to clause 12.2 had he been instructed to do so.[599] In this regard, the Holihan parties relied upon a notation made by Mr Joyce who reviewed a draft of the Second Sale Agreement in January 2003 for Mr Parker, the General Manager, Commercial. In his notes Mr Joyce observed in relation to the proposed clause 12.2:
481 As noted in the chronology above, Mr Joyce gave evidence about this notation. He said:
the definition around OME ... didn't have any specific exclusions as to what types of OME should be carved out of the agreement, and at the time I could think of one being silk screening and proposed to have a further conversation about where [sic.] there any others that should have been specifically carved out.'[601]
482 The Holihan parties submit there is no evidence of any further such conversations, and Mr Parker was not called to give evidence.
483 Later in the piece, however, in the period immediately before Completion, Mr Joyce made a further notation on a whiteboard at a transition meeting with AFP representatives held on 25 July 2003, which Mr Holihan attended. The notation suggested that certain work, namely 'Carton erecting, Bathurst, Batlow, Araluen' was 'out of scope for ACBC'.[602] Under cross-examination, Mr Joyce said, by reference to his whiteboard notes_,_ that it was intended to exclude the carton erecting work (the 'P84s') from the scope of work to which the Holihan parties were entitled under the supply agreement.[603] The Holihan parties observe that he did not, however, say that there was any negotiation about other exclusions from the definition of OME work and he was not re-examined about it.[604]
484 The Holihan parties contend that the Amcor Displays' work was encompassed within the clause 12.2 obligation but they acknowledge that for so long as APA was contractually obliged to send certain work to ACE Print, it would not be commercially reasonable and acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability to send the work to Achilla, because to do so would have involved APA in a breach of that contractual arrangement.[605]
485 The Holihan parties also led evidence from Mr Holihan[606] to the effect that when the Second Sale Agreement was being negotiated, he made a handwritten notation pertaining to the clause 12 purchase obligation alongside Mr Joyce's comments on the agreement (prepared by him for Mr Parker), specifically addressing the existence of the ACE Print contract stating: 'With exception, where any other contract to supply exists at the time of completion.'[607] His handwritten notes were engrossed in typewritten form and sent to Mr Barnes by email.[608] In the typed form, Mr Holihan's comment was 'I would not expect Amcor to have any OME made by the new business that was under contract or where it could manufacture it more competitively itself.' It is not clear whether Mr Holihan's comment was passed up the line to Mr Parker or otherwise communicated to Amcor or its legal representatives during the negotiations - e.g., to Mr MacPhail etc. If, as Mr Holihan suggests, he was only prepared to allow work to be performed by ACE Print for so long as the contract was in place, and envisaged that it might later come across to the ACB Business when that contract came to an end, it is a little surprising that this was not more of a focal point in discussions and the subject of drafting discussions with Mr MacPhail and Mr Barnes. The Holihan parties say that that was not necessary because the phrase 'all its OME supplies' encompassed the Amcor Displays' work save where the exception was engaged.
486 In closing submissions, the Holihan parties advanced an argument based on comments made by Mason J in Codelfa[609] to the effect that where there is evidence that the parties have refused to include a particular provision in the instrument - here said to be a carve out from the absolute obligation to procure all OME supplies of products from Achilla - then evidence of that refusal is admissible to negative an inference that might otherwise be sought to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances. The Holihan parties contend that having turned their minds to the prospect of narrowing the definition of OME so as to exclude some aspects of OME and having not so narrowed it, the parties' objective intention can be discerned as not intending that there be any narrowing of that definition.
487 I do not accept that the evidence in the present case would permit the Court to make such a finding, particularly in a context where the agreement being negotiated was between ACB Co Vendor and ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla, and did not involve APA as a party.
Period before the Deed of Accession was entered into
488 In my view, it is clear that at the time the Second Sale Agreement was entered into, the requirements of Amcor Displays were not encompassed by the clause 12.2 obligations.
489 As a matter of construction, the Amcor Displays' work is not captured by the express language of clause 12.2. Amcor Displays was not part of ACB Co Vendor, and so the Amcor Displays' work did not form part of 'its' OME supplies. In my view, when one looks to the surrounding circumstances in order to arrive at the proper construction of clause 12.2, the objective evidence confirms that the entirety of the OME requirements of Amcor Displays was not encompassed by the clause 12.2 obligations. Relevantly, at the time the Second Sale Agreement was entered into, there was a separate arrangement in place with ACE Print to perform work for Amcor Displays, of which Mr Holihan was aware. Amcor Displays was operated and conducted separately from the ACB Business (operated and conducted by ACB Co Vendor) and also separately from the AFP corrugated box plants at Revesby and Smithfield. In the period immediately prior to the sale of the ACB Business, Amcor Displays was not being managed by a staff member of AFP, but by Mr Hottes who was doing so on contract. Amcor Displays had its own estimating staff who would quote and arrange the routing of work. Amcor Displays also had access to the PICK system but, as Mr Nellies observed, 'technically, Amcor Displays was a customer' so that they should have been placing orders with Amcor in the same way that a customer would place orders.[610]
490 While the evidence shows that the small amount of work that was performed by the ACB Business for Amcor Displays prior to the sale was, however, taken into account in estimating the volume of work that would likely be performed by the ACB Business in the first contract year, and thereby in arriving at the D & D rates that would apply, that scintilla of evidence does not entail the consequence that all of the Amcor Displays' work was captured and brought within the scope of the clause 12.2 obligation. Mr Joyce's evidence gave some indication of the type of Amcor Displays' work that would be sourced from the ACB Business while under Amcor ownership, and on a 'business as usual' scenario, it is likely that work would continue.
Period following execution of the Deed of Accession
491 Following the entry into the Deed of Accession, from 21 March 2005, APA became the party that was bound by the Second Sale Agreement. The Holihan parties contend that on a plain reading of clause 12.2 following entry into the Deed of Accession, APA (as the named Vendor) was required to obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla save where the exception ('...other than due to Achilla's inability ...') was enlivened. The Amcor parties accept that the effect of the Deed of Accession is that from the accession date onwards, APA is the named party in the Second Sale Agreement.[611] However, the Amcor parties do not accept that the novation gave rise to any enlarged operation of the Second Sale Agreement and they dispute that on and from 21 March 2005, the effect of the Deed of Accession (and in particular, clause 2.1) was to bring the Amcor Displays' work within the clause 12.2 obligations. The Amcor parties submit that it is a question of construction as to what is meant by the expression 'obtain all its [APA's] OME supplies of Products from Achilla' in clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, and that one must look at the course of conduct that took place beforehand in determining whether or not Amcor Displays was also effectively bound by the clause 12.2 obligations.
492 I am satisfied that there is relevantly ambiguity as to the meaning of clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement following entry into the Deed of Accession. In the first place, the legal effect of the novation was to give rise to a fresh contract between APA (as Vendor) and ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan. That contract falls to be interpreted by the Court, against a background where the Court has rejected the implied supply agreement and the conventional estoppel contended for by the Holihan parties, and they now rely upon the terms of the Second Sale Agreement as written, and as amended by the Deed of Accession, for the relief they seek in respect of the period on and from 21 March 2005. However, the Second Sale Agreement was entered into for a term of five years, and matters such as the 'D & D pricing' that was to apply to both the supply of raw materials and the supply of finished products for the whole five year term of the contract were negotiated at the outset of the original contract. In circumstances where some 20 months or so had elapsed before the Deed of Accession was executed, it is unclear whether the requirement for the Vendor to obtain 'all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla' was to be construed as a reference to APA's OME requirements or by reference to the OME requirements that pertained under the original contractual arrangements.
493 In summary, the Amcor parties contend that following the substitution by novation of APA for the 'Vendor' in all its capacities and for all purposes under the Second Sale Agreement, there was no enlargement in the scope of the contractual undertaking or obligation in clause 12.2, and it remained the case that the Amcor Displays' work was not encompassed within the supply obligation in clause 12.2, save to the extent that the notion of 'business as usual' might continue to capture the small amount of work that the ACB Business performed historically for Amcor Displays.[612]
494 In closing submissions, the Amcor parties contended that it remains the case that the Amcor Displays' work is not included because as a matter of construction, the meaning of APA and the words 'all its OME supplies', and in particular the possessive pronoun, refer to parts only of APA.[613] The Amcor parties accept that 'the only contractual hook for that proposition' lies in the Charge, which was made between ACB Co Purchaser, ACB Co Vendor and APA contemporaneously with the Second Sale Agreement. The Amcor parties contend that because APA is identified as a party to the Charge in terms of 'Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd (trading as Amcor Fibre Packaging)' it demonstrates the objective contemplation of the parties as being 'that there were business divisions beneath and operating within the umbrella of the corporate vehicle APA.'[614] Further, in support of that construction, they call in aid the background and surrounding circumstances that they rely upon to resist the Holihan parties' claim of an implied contract and estoppel by convention, in particular, the alleged differences between Amcor Displays and the rest of AFP in terms of its staffing, its budgeting and its financing.
495 Between the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement and the Deed of Accession being executed, the position concerning Amcor Displays had changed. Importantly, the contractual arrangement with ACE Print had been terminated, and the Amcor Displays' OME work was being routed by the estimators at Amcor Displays (and not the AFP estimators) and performed variously by one or other of the alternative suppliers and in some cases by Achilla. Further, the Holihan parties (via Achilla) had entered into a management agreement with APA whereby Achilla's employee, Mr Daaboul, was undertaking the management of 'the NSW Displays Division' of APA. However, Mr Manser had informed Mr Holihan that the arrangement would not be extended beyond 30 June 2005 because he was going to relocate the purchasing functions of Amcor Displays NSW to Victoria and have them run from a Service Containers business. Accordingly, at the point at which the Deed of Accession was entered into, the arrangements pertaining to the Amcor Displays' work were markedly different to those in place concerning the OME work then being performed by Achilla under the Second Sale Agreement.
496 The evidence given by the respective parties concerning the entry into the Deed of Accession, which is summarised earlier in these reasons (under Issue 1(c), 'Background to the Deed of Accession'), is of limited assistance. The evidence is that it was initiated by the Amcor parties, having been discussed internally at a management level before being communicated to Mr Holihan on 16 February 2005, when he received an email from Mr Lewis regarding ACB Co Vendor which attached a draft 'Deed of Accession'.[615] In the covering email, Mr Lewis referred to Amcor's continuing practice of 'remov[ing] company structures no longer required' and said that they wish to place ACB Co Vendor in voluntary liquidation and deregister it, and to facilitate that course it was necessary to 'assign any existing contractual obligations to the main Amcor company, namely Amor [sic] Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd liquidation.'[616] Mr Holihan referred the proposed deed to his solicitor, Mr Roe, for review and once his comments were to hand, Mr Holihan forwarded them to Mr Lewis for his consideration the same day.[617] The Deed of Accession was executed by the parties a few days later.
497 The Holihan parties submit that the Deed of Accession was correcting a mistake and really putting into place or formally recording what was the existing practice between the parties. In my view, the objective evidence does not support that position. It is not one that is recorded or otherwise evident in either the contemporaneous correspondence exchanged between the parties or the recitals to the Deed, and does not reflect what was the (then) existing practice between the parties. Furthermore, there was no discussion between the parties about enlarging the scope of the contractual undertaking so as to encompass all of Amcor Displays' OME requirements within the clause 12.2 obligation. Were that proposed to occur, it was necessary for the Amcor parties to discuss the matter with Achilla. That is because any change to the scope of the clause 12.2 obligations would have implications for Achilla, particularly in circumstances where it was required to supply finished products to the Vendor 'at prices based on D & D costs to Achilla'.
KEY ISSUE: Did APA breach the Second Sale Agreement or any implied supply agreement and if so how is any loss suffered by Achilla to be quantified?
The Holihan parties' claim for breach of the implied supply agreement and/or Second Sale Agreement
498 The Holihan Parties claim that in breach of the agreement (relevantly either the implied supply agreement and/or the Second Sale Agreement), APA did not purchase or procure the supply of all its OME work from Achilla, and purchased or procured supplies of products from parties other than Achilla, for reasons other than Achilla's 'inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability' within the meaning of clause 12.2[618]
499 The Holihan parties contend that between about 30 July 2003 and 31 July 2008, there were 1,913 instances where OME work was performed by persons or entities other than Achilla, in breach of the implied supply agreement and/or the Second Sale Agreement. Achilla has not made a claim for any work done for any business other than an AFP business, and no claim is made for any work done for any of the non-Sydney arms of the business. Particulars of the alleged breaches are contained in their liability particulars dated 3 May 2013, where they set out in relation to each of the 1,913 jobs the nature of the work done by the alternative OME supplier for the particular job, the equipment required to perform that work and the equipment that Achilla had available to it to do that work.[619] In essence, the Holihan parties contend that Achilla was ready, willing and able to perform that OME work but was denied the opportunity to do so, in breach of the agreement.
500 The response of the Amcor parties is four-fold. First, they deny that there was any relevant breach.[620] Secondly, they say that screen printing work and/or services are excluded from the scope of the clause 12.2 allegation.[621] Thirdly, they say that in all cases, the purchase or procurement of supplies of OME products from an alternative supplier was made in accordance with clause 12.2 (but where necessary, relying positively upon the contractual carve-out in clause 12.2).[622] In that regard, at the trial the Amcor parties also contended for the first time that 'repeat orders', being orders where the OME work required to be done was work of a kind for which that customer had placed orders on prior occasions, are 'a kind of job that Achilla was unable to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability'.[623] Fourthly, the Amcor parties plead that a conventional estoppel operates in relation to all supplies of products procured from alternative OME suppliers throughout the period from July 2003 to October 2005 (when the PICK system was decommissioned) in that the parties at all relevant times operated on the basis that APA was entitled to procure the supplies that it did from the alternate OME suppliers.[624] In particular, the Amcor parties rely upon Achilla having had the ability to access the PICK system in that period, Mr Holihan's role as General Manager of the ACB Business before its sale and, in relation to Amcor Displays, the role of Mr Daaboul within that business in the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, and Amcor Displays co-occupation of the Wetherill Park premises for that period.[625] The Amcor parties provided a 'job by job' response to the Achilla liability particulars, also in the form of an electronic document, setting out reasons why each of the 1,913 jobs did not, in their submission, amount to a breach of the relevant implied supply agreement and/or clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement.[626]
501 Achilla responded to the Amcor parties' 'job by job' response to the liability particulars. Achilla's response was prepared in a table format that synthesised each of the (essentially pro forma) allegations made by the Amcor parties in respect of each contested 'job', the number of jobs that utilised the relevant pro forma allegation, and the total value of those jobs.[627] However, many of the 1,913 jobs were the subject of more than one set of pro forma allegations. Further, Achilla's summary document did not deal with the new issues of 'repeat orders' or the conventional estoppel ground because these were only raised for the first time after the document was filed.
502 During the trial, the Court requested the parties to undertake a breakdown (by reference to invoice date as contained in the summary spreadsheets/invoices) of where the contested jobs fell in terms of dates referable to the various allegations made in the case. To assist the Court, the parties prepared a document, on an 'indicative basis' only, designed to give a general indication of the jobs that were alleged to be performed by alternative suppliers in breach of the agreement(s) and how they were spread over the relevant time period. The document, headed 'Schedule of job numbers claimed by reference to requested dates', gives a useful indication of the (approximate) relative volumes or number of jobs that form the 'Displays'[628] and 'Non-Displays' components of Achilla's claim at various intervals, such as before the Deed of Accession was entered into.
503 In general terms, and on an indicative basis only, the document shows that of the 1,913 occasions during the period when it is alleged jobs were given to OME suppliers other than Achilla to perform, approximately 757 of the 1,913 jobs alleged relate to the period prior to the entry into the Deed of Accession, and of those 757 jobs, 120 were for work required by Amcor Displays[629] and 637 were for work required by other Amcor entities. The balance, namely 1,156 jobs, relate to the period after entry into the Deed of Accession, and of those 1,156 jobs, 553 were for work required by Amcor Displays and 603 were for other Amcor entities.
504 During closing submissions, however, concessions were made by both parties in the sense that the Holihan parties conceded some of the claims made by the Amcor parties and the Amcor parties effectively abandoned, or did not actively pursue, some of the arguments they had earlier advanced or indicated that they would rely upon.
Approach to be taken in light of the proper construction of clause 12.2
505 As the Court has now determined that there is no implied supply agreement or estoppel by convention of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties, and that ACB Co Vendor's obligation under clause 12.2 on its proper construction meant 'business as usual' for the ACB Business notwithstanding the sale, and did not encompass all of the Amcor Displays' work, it is clear that many of the instances of breach alleged and relied upon by the Holihan parties will simply not be made out. Nevertheless, lest the matter go further, it is convenient to outline the essence of the claims made and the arguments advanced, as itemised in the List of Issues.
506 In the context of this case, the determination of which party bears the burden of proof is an especially important one because there is a paucity of direct evidence concerning each of the 1,913 instances of alleged breach.
507 The Holihan parties accept that they bear the burden of proving that OME work was sent to others when it should have been sent to Achilla (i.e. that Achilla could do the work done by others). They say that as no general issue has been raised about Achilla's manufacturing capacity, the issue falls to be determined by reference to the equipment and skills of Achilla at Completion and throughout the Relevant Period. Further, they say, once breach is shown, the burden of proof shifts to the Amcor parties to adduce any evidence directed to preventing the inference of breach being drawn in the case of each job.[630]
508 The Amcor parties, however, point to the carve-out contained in clause 12.2, and contend that a breach of clause 12.2 is not complete merely by observing that OME supplies were obtained from elsewhere.[631] Rather, the Amcor parties submit that the Holihan parties must show that it was a breach of the promise to 'obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla' and not to 'purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability' for Amcor to obtain OME supplies from others.[632]
509 Achilla, on the other hand, contends that the words of exception (or carve-out) in clause 12 are a true exception or proviso for which the Amcor parties bear the burden of proof. They contend that it sets in operation an exception to the primary promise by APA to obtain all OME supplies of products from Achilla.
510 In my view, essentially for the reasons advanced by the Holihan parties, the carve-out in clause 12.2, on its proper construction, operates as an exception to the primary supply obligation, by defining the circumstances in which the relevant Amcor party was entitled to place orders with alternate suppliers without breaching the primary obligation to obtain all of its OME supplies of Products from Achilla. Having said that, however, the carve-out will only have work to do in those instances where the relevant order was an OME supply that, on a 'business as usual' scenario, would, in the ordinary course, have been routed to the ACB Business.
Burden of proof concerning the carve-out in clause 12.2 - applicable legal principles
511 In McLennan v Insurance Australia Ltd,[633] the New South Wales Court of Appeal endorsed the approach that Jordan CJ had taken to the question of onus some 70 years earlier in two cases, Kodak (A/asia) Pty Ltd v Retail Traders Mutual Indemnity Insurance Association[634] in the context of a clause in an insurance policy, and in Gordon v Australian & New Zealand Theatres Ltd[635] in the context of a clause allowing for the termination of a contract of employment.
512 In Kodak, the appellant, the insured, had claimed under a Workers' Compensation policy seeking an indemnity for sums which it had become liable to pay and had paid by way of compensation to an employee. The policy provided that the insurer would 'indemnify the employer against all such [compensation] sums for which the employer shall be so liable' subject to certain specified conditions. The sixth condition specified was relevantly that the 'employer shall take all reasonable precautions to prevent injuries.' The trial judge held that the onus of proof was on the insurance company to establish that the employer had not complied with condition 6, and held that it had discharged this onus to his satisfaction. On appeal, it was contended that the trial judge's decision was wrong in law because there was no evidence that the employer had failed to comply with condition 6. The Full Court allowed the appeal, finding that the condition was a condition precedent and that it was a matter for the employer to prove compliance with.
513 Jordan CJ delivered the judgment of the Full Court. In dealing with the question of onus, his Honour commenced by observing that 'the question of where the onus lies must in every case depend primarily upon the nature of the condition and the provisions of the policy.'[636] His Honour then made reference to and relied upon the following passage from Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, as usefully summarising the relevant principles:
The test [as to which party bears the burden of pleading and proving a qualification or proviso in an insurance or transportation contract] no longer depends upon whether the limitation upon the promise is to be found in a separate clause or not, but, instead, on whether the exception is as wide as the promise and thus qualifies the whole promise, or whether it merely excludes from the operation of the promise particular classes of matters which but for the exception would fall within it, leaving some part of the promise unqualified and absolute. In the case of a qualified promise, that is, where the exception would defeat the whole promise, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case unless he alleges the promise and negatives the exception as of old, whereas, if the promise is simply subject to some exceptions, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to bring himself within the general terms of the promise, leaving it to the defendant to allege and prove that the plaintiff's claim in fact falls within an excluded exceptional class.[637] [Footnotes omitted]
514 When considering the terms of the policy in question in Kodak, Jordan CJ observed that some of the conditions were clearly conditions precedent to the insurer incurring a liability to pay, whereas others were essentially conditions subsequent. In the case of condition 6, being the condition in question, there was an issue as to whether the insured had to prove fulfilment of the condition before the insurer's liability would accrue. The Full Court found that it was a condition precedent and that it was for the employer to prove compliance with it. In the context of dealing with the question of onus, Jordan CJ explained the practical application of the principles that apply in the situation where a condition creates an exception to the insurer's obligation to indemnify, as follows:
Again, a plaintiff seeking to enforce an obligation qualified by a general exception which is applicable to all cases must negative the exception; but if the obligation is general and qualified only by particular exceptions, a person seeking to rely on an exception must prove himself within it: Munro Brice & Co v War Risks Association; Pye v Metropolitan Coal Co Ltd; Willeston on Contracts (1936) III, p 1939. Similarly a person who seeks to escape an accrued liability by a claim that it has been discharged by breach of a condition subsequent must prove the breach; and a person who contends that a contract has been rescinded in pursuance of a resolutive condition must produce evidence in support of his contention ...[638] [Footnotes omitted]
515 In their later decision in McLennan, the Court of Appeal noted these were the same principles that Jordan CJ had earlier applied in Gordon to the issue of onus arising in the context of the termination of a contract of employment.
516 In McLennan, the Court of Appeal was faced with the task of construing the provisions of a home and contents policy of insurance, in circumstances where the appellant's home and contents had been severely damaged by fire. The policy provided that if the home or contents suffered loss or damage caused by fire, the insurer would repair or replace the damaged contents or re-build the damaged part but would not cover loss or damage as a result of a fire started by the insured (or someone who lives in the insurer's home) with the intention of causing damage.
517 The insurer denied liability, contending that the insured had not proven that the fire was not deliberately started. The primary judge agreed, finding that the insured bore the burden of proving that the fire was not deliberately lit by her or someone who had entered her home without her consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the insured's appeal. The Court held, following Kodak and Munro Brice & Co v War Risks Association,[639] that the insurer had the onus of establishing that the fire was deliberately started because the qualification it sought to rely upon operated as an exception that excluded from the insurer's promise a particular class of case which would otherwise be within it (as opposed to qualifying the whole of the general promise). The Court said that the qualification set out in the clause described 'the limited circumstances in which the insurer's promise is not to apply', noting that '[t]hose limited circumstances are not all of the circumstances in which the promise applies and the qualifications do not apply in all of the circumstances.'[640]
Conclusion - the Amcor parties bear the burden of proof concerning the carve-out in clause 12.2
518 In the present case, under clause 12.2, the primary promise given by the relevant Amcor party was to (continue to) obtain all its OME supplies of products from Achilla. What the words of the carve-out do is to set in operation a specific exception to the primary promise that will apply to only a subset of those circumstances, namely where there is an inability on the part of Achilla 'to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.' At a practical level, what this means is that Achilla is required to bring itself prima facie within the terms of the promise, by demonstrating that the work in question was the sort of work that the ACB Business had been doing for customers of AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby prior to the sale, leaving it to the Amcor parties to prove that although prima facie within its terms, the alleged instance of breach falls within the words of exception in the carve-out.
The carve-out in clause 12.2 - what must be shown?
519 It is common ground between the parties that the carve-out was for the benefit of the Amcor parties, and that it was a matter for the Amcor parties to determine whether there was an inability on the part of Achilla to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable, etc.[641] The evidence was that the provision was drafted and inserted by Mr MacPhail after Mr Ken Parker expressed concern to him about the possibility of Amcor 'being tied to unfavourable pricing terms'[642] in terms of the product that Amcor was obliged to purchase from Achilla.
520 The Amcor parties contend that the cognate expression 'other than due to Achilla's inability to supply etc.' contains three different concepts. The first concept is 'consistent supply'. The second concept is 'commercial basis'. The third concept is whether it is 'reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability'. Further, it was said, as a matter of construction, the notion of 'commerciality' has a broad meaning and goes further than, and is not limited to, what is reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.[643] The Amcor parties cited the Amcor Displays' contract with ACE Print as being perhaps 'the clearest example' arising on the evidence that demonstrates the notion of commerciality in the context of clause 12.2 is not captured by considerations of price, quality and availability alone.
521 Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend,[644] as a matter of construction of clause 12.2, first, that the three elements, namely consistency, commerciality, and reasonable acceptability in terms of price, quality and availability, are separate and not cumulative. Secondly, they say, a 'commercial' basis is not confined to that which is informed by price, quality and availability, but rather it goes beyond those three things. Thirdly, whether the 'exception' is enlivened is a matter to be determined in the opinion of Amcor.
522 The Holihan parties accept that the exception exists for Amcor's benefit but say it does not allow APA to avoid the clause 12.2 purchase obligation on arbitrary or non-commercial bases. They say the question of whether or not supplies are commercial and reasonably acceptable is to be answered by reference to three specific criteria that are set out in a single compound expression, namely, price, quality and availability. They submit that the distinct elements of that compound expression do not work independently and there is no standalone 'commerciality' ground. Further, they contend that in order to trigger the exception, there must first be demonstrated a consistent inability on the part of Achilla to provide supplies that are commercial and reasonably acceptable.
523 In my view, the construction of the words of exception advanced by the Holihan parties is to be preferred. The words of exception appear in both clause 12.1 and clause 12.2. They are a compound expression that is to be interpreted as a whole. Read together, they serve to define the circumstances in which the vendor, or purchaser as the case may be is permitted to seek an alternate source of supply. That is, the parties agreed that in circumstances where the contracted supplier has demonstrated an inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability, the vendor, or purchaser as the case may be, is permitted to seek the supply of products from an alternative source.
524 During closing submissions, the Holihan parties contended that the Amcor parties were obliged to ensure that Achilla could not do the work before they could rely on the exception. I do not accept that the words of exception, on their proper construction, embodied any notion that Achilla was required to be given a first opportunity to supply, or a last right to match any competitor's pricing. Under clause 12.2, Achilla was entitled to receive from APA the sort of work that the ACB Business had been doing prior to the sale. APA was obliged to continue to procure that work from Achilla after the sale. But if Achilla demonstrated an inability to supply finished product consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability, APA was permitted to seek the supply of such product from an alternative source. In the case of 'repeat order' work that, prior to the sale, was being performed by an alternative supplier such as Le Breton, APA was not required, following the sale, to provide an opportunity for Achilla to effectively 'price match' Le Breton's pricing.
The Holihan parties contend they have discharged their onus re breach
525 The Holihan parties rely upon five points to discharge their onus. First, they say Achilla has demonstrated that it had the necessary machines to do the OME jobs. Secondly, they say Achilla had the necessary capacity to do the work. Thirdly, they say that in any event, Achilla could get others to do the work by 'outsourcing', and fourthly, Achilla had the 'know how'. The fifth point the Holihan parties rely upon is the fact that there were no unresolved complaints about Achilla's lack of capacity, there was an absence of any non-conformance reports identifying issues with quality or timeliness of delivery, and no attempt was made to have Achilla 'price match' or better prices that were offered by alternative suppliers.
526 The Holihan parties contend that that evidence is evidence of circumstances that raise a more probable inference in favour of the Holihan parties, namely that the alternative suppliers were not used because Achilla was unable to supply consistently and on a commercial and reasonably acceptable basis. In those circumstances, they submit that the evidence gives rise to 'a reasonable and definite inference, and the Court can be reasonably satisfied that the exception in clause 12.2 did not apply to the supplies'[645] such that the evidential burden shifts or falls on the Amcor parties to prove that the exception applied in the case of each supply.
527 The Holihan parties also point to, and call in aid, the fact that the Amcor parties, and not Achilla, were the ones that had the means from which to assess whether or not Achilla was unable to supply consistently and on a commercial and reasonably acceptable basis. That is, APA, not Achilla was privy to the requirements of its customers, in terms of price, quality and availability (in the sense of delivery dates), and, as the Amcor parties contend, whether the 'exception' is enlivened is a matter to be determined in the opinion of Amcor. The Holihan parties submit that the fact that these were matters which Amcor alone was to determine serves to confirm that the Amcor parties bear the onus of proof.
528 Generally speaking, there is a lack of evidence addressing the matters the subject of the exception and whether, and if so when, it was enlivened. The fact is that Amcor did obtain OME supplies of products from alternative suppliers during the relevant period, but they contend they were permitted to do so because under clause 12.2, the Holihan parties only contracted to receive the business that was being done by the ACB Business prior to the sale.
529 In closing submissions, the Amcor parties acknowledged that there were:
good commercial reasons why Amcor should have gone to Achilla for work. So the PICK system made it easier to obtain those supplies, as Ms Murphy points out in her closing submissions. And an increase in volume would result in a decrease in prices later on. Amcor had some familiarity with the machines, which the Achilla business had and there was evident familiarity, in terms of the personnel. So all of these would make Achilla an attractive commercial proposition,...[646]
However, the Amcor parties submit that in circumstances where Amcor was demonstrably carrying on business with a view to profit, if there were sound commercial reasons (of the kind acknowledged above) for Amcor to get work done by Achilla, yet it did not do so, then a countervailing inference arises, namely that it just simply wasn't commercial, for whatever reasons known to Amcor, for it to obtain those supplies from Achilla.[647] The Amcor parties contend that unless the Achilla parties can show some perversity on the part of Amcor, or a vendetta or something of that nature against Achilla and Mr Holihan, then the Holihan parties will have failed to displace what is otherwise a countervailing inference.
530 The Amcor parties contend that the Holihan parties' breach claim involves 1,913 separate instances that are said to be OME supplies made in breach of the agreement. In some cases, where specific evidence has been adduced, such as in the case of work performed for the customer named 'RTS Imaging', it may be possible for the Court to make findings, but the Amcor parties submit that in the case of many of the jobs, there is an absence of discrete evidence specific to the job from which the Court could reasonably infer that there has been a breach. The Amcor parties contend that, for the most part, an inference of breach could not be drawn because there is 'at the very least an equally probable inference ... [a]n equally available inference that it just simply wasn't commercial to give it to Achilla, because had it been commercial, Amcor would have done it.'[648] I do not agree. It is only an equally available inference that would justify the Court reaching that conclusion if there are facts from which it can be drawn. And an obvious difficulty with this submission, is that it was not the subject of evidence adduced by the Amcor parties.
531 The Holihan parties contended that the Amcor parties' approach, of merely asserting that the Court should draw an inference that there was some good commercial reason to withhold the work from Achilla, really just begs the question of whether that unexplored commercial reason satisfied the exception in clause 12.2.
532 A more fundamental difficulty with the issue of breach, however, is to identify, many years after the event, which (if any) of the 1,913 particular jobs would have been routed to the ACB Business in the ordinary course, on a 'business as usual' basis. The Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties have caused or contributed to this difficulty because they failed to keep the PICK system operational after it was replaced by SAP in November 2005 or thereabouts, with the result that the historical records of the ACB Business contained within the PICK system are no longer accessible. In these circumstances, the Holihan parties rely upon the 'Document Unavailability' provisions contained in Division 9 of Part III of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 and seek an order under section 89B to redress the unfairness that they contend would otherwise result. This aspect is addressed under Issue 4 below.
Particulars of the 1,913 alleged supply breaches
533 Achilla seeks compensation totalling $4,091,022.55 in respect of the 1,913 jobs that the Amcor Parties sent to suppliers other than Achilla. Achilla contends that in each case, the Amcor parties' conduct in sending such jobs to other suppliers constitutes a breach of the Second Sale Agreement and/or the implied supply agreement. Details of these alleged breaches are set out in Achilla's particulars, which are contained in an electronic file that is some 2,000 pages long (reproduced at section C of the electronic Court Book).
534 Mr Holihan prepared and produced the Achilla liability particulars using as a base the information that was set out in a document that was created by the Amcor parties for the purposes of these proceedings, the Court having ordered the Amcor parties to identify all of the OME supplies that it obtained from the eight non-Achilla suppliers during the term of the Second Sale Agreement or the implied supply agreement.
535 The Achilla liability particulars (as amended) were set out in a table format in columns under the following headings:
536 The detail set out in column F ('work done') of the Achilla liability particulars is Mr Holihan's description of the work that was involved in each relevant supply performed by a non-Achilla entity, as extrapolated from invoices he inspected, and columns G ('purchasing entity') and H ('invoiced entity') are taken from source documents, where available,[649] that sit behind the Amcor schedule. Achilla then created and supplied, in column I, its liability particulars for each of the 1,913 alleged instances of breach, explaining how it is that the work identified in column F falls within the scope of the Second Sale Agreement or the implied supply agreement.
537 The Amcor parties responded to the Achilla liability particulars, by adding an additional column, column J, setting out their response to each alleged instance of breach. Achilla then filed a separate document headed 'Reply to Liability Particulars of the Amcor Parties' dated 8 October 2014 ('Summary Particulars'),[650] responding to the matters set out in the Amcor parties' column J. In its Summary Particulars, Achilla has collated the Amcor parties' responses under thematic headings, and those headings have found their way into the parties' Agreed Issues List under Issue 3. In the Summary Particulars, Achilla has also ascribed a 'value' for the jobs listed under each of those thematic headings.
538 In summary, the 1,913 jobs in contention have been grouped under these thematic headings or issues and 'valued' by the Holihan parties for the purposes of their claim as follows:
Inability to supply consistently on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable
[Work prior to the commencement of the implied Supply Agreement]
[Inability to supply consistently on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable (Alternative 1)]
[Inability to supply consistently on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable (Alternative 2)]
[No basis to say commercially and reasonably acceptable where insufficient documentation]
[Achilla knew that the work was supplied by the alternate OME supplier]
Particular types of work said to be unable to be completed by Achilla
[Printing not work which Achilla could do. No contracting out]
[Screen printing excluded from the Supply Agreement]
[Litho laminating RTS work not able to be done until October 2004]
[Work involved various types of work which Achilla could not do. No contracting out]
[Work required slotting. Achilla did not purchase a partition slotter until October 2004]
[Work required Kellogg's pallets. Achilla could not do this until May 2004]
[Work required Kellogg's pallets. Achilla did this only between July 2004 and July 2006]
Work not same or similar as work done by ACB prior to execution
[Work was not part of or the same or similar as business prior to execution]
[Pleadings as to the application of s 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958]
Miscellaneous comments made by the Amcor Parties in the body of Achilla's particulars
[Pleadings as to the invoice being available and discovered]
[Pleadings as to the purchase order being available and discovered]
[Pleadings as to the product specification information being available and discovered]
[Pleadings as to the work not being described in the invoice]
539 Achilla also prepared quantum particulars in a separate spreadsheet document, but adopting some of the columns used in the liability particulars and the same line items in the same order, so that they could be cross-matched easily.[651]
Cost to ACB/APA to obtain supply, and revenue to Supplier
Costs Achilla would have incurred to provide the supply[652]
Evidence concerning the 1,913 instances of alleged breach
540 The 1,913 jobs that the Holihan parties contend are the instances of alleged breach for which they claim damages, were performed by eight alternative OME suppliers during the relevant five year period. The alternative suppliers are relevantly:
(a) All Pack;
(b) Northwest Packaging;
(c) Le Breton;
(d) JS Cutting;
(e) Thompson;
(f) SPS Packaging;
(g) Ubeeco; and
(h) Sainsbury.
541 The Holihan parties called evidence from each of the alternative suppliers, save for Sainsbury. Sainsbury was purchased by APA upon the recommendation of Mr Powell in 2008, and as part of that sale/purchase process, APA acquired its business records.
542 At the trial, the approach adopted by both sides was not to lead specific evidence on, or cross-examine about, each individual job. Had that course been adopted for each of the 1,913 alleged instances of breach, the trial would have occupied months instead of weeks. Instead, the body of documentation pertaining to the OME work performed by each of the respective alternative suppliers for the Amcor parties during the relevant period was tendered, and in each case, the representative of the alternative supplier was examined, and cross-examined, about examples of the work performed. The result is, however, that there is not a body of detailed evidence about each individual job.
543 The Holihan parties have presented their case as 1,913 instances of the alleged breach of clause 12.2. The Amcor parties, on the other hand, contend that in determining breach, each individual job is to be regarded as being a separate cause of action. I do not agree.
Work performed by the alternative suppliers during the relevant period
544 Mr Christopher Prasad, who has been a manager at All Pack since 1994, gave evidence about the type of work that All Pack performed for the Amcor parties between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2008, the equipment used and his knowledge of the type of work that ACB Co Purchaser did at that time.
545 During the relevant period, All Pack's business involved the packaging and assembling of cardboard products of various types, mainly large cartons and cardboard display stands. Its main customer was Amcor. Mr Prasad identified a body of invoices rendered by All Pack to Amcor and related purchase orders for work performed during the relevant period. The type of work performed was essentially manual labour, and generally involved the assembly of corrugated cardboard cartons (either printed or plain), gluing them (by hand with a hand-held glue gun or a sauce bottle filled with glue), and in some cases 're-palletising' them. 'Re-palletising' involved taking pieces of cardboard of different sizes, putting them on a separate pallet in bundles of about 20 and then strapping them with polyethylene straps (using a machine) and shrink wrapping them (by hand) ready for delivery.
546 Some of the work performed by All Pack was the preparation of 'display stands'. This work involved the assembly of bits and pieces of different shaped pieces of pre-cut cardboard. An example of the type of work performed by All Pack was in respect of the Arnott's waterfall units. Mr Prasad said that All Pack would assemble all the pieces and send them back, or glue them and put them in a separate box and send them back. Another example he gave was the display stands prepared for Mortein Outdoor Professional. For that work, All Pack was required to print boards that they would assemble and glue together ready to go to stores for use as displays. The finished work would usually be collected by Amcor, but occasionally it was required to be delivered by All Pack direct to the customer, and in that event, a freight cost would also be charged. Mr Prasad said that sometimes the work was required to be performed with a turnaround time of one day, and they 'were actually quite well known for on time delivery.'[653]
547 All Pack employed a workforce comprising four full-time employees and two casuals. Mr Prasad said that they were experienced at this sort of manual work and were able to do jobs as required. He added that the casuals 'were just as good' and that 'these are pretty easy, simple jobs.'[654]
548 Mr Prasad said that they would often do a number of similar jobs over time, and once they had quoted a price, the repeat jobs would keep coming and they would stay with that price.
549 Some of the work performed by All Pack was for Amcor Displays, which Mr Prasad described as 'just another division of Amcor where they did the display work.'[655] The people he dealt with at Amcor Displays were Joe Formosa, Walter Dailey and George Daaboul.
550 Mr Prasad said that during the period, they also performed gluing work for ACB Co Purchaser. He said they used to glue (by hand) very small boxes that would not run through their machines.
551 Mr Robert Pellizzari, a director of Pandapak Pty Limited, which trades as 'Northwest Packaging', gave evidence about the type of work Northwest Packaging performed for the Amcor parties between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2008, and the equipment used to perform that work. Mr Pellizzari has been the managing director of Northwest Packaging for 20 years, in addition to holding an external sales role with Northwest Packaging for approximately 30 years.[656] Prior to joining Northwest Packaging, Mr Pellizzari had worked for Amcor (variously with Hardy Containers, APM Containers and AFP) and as a sales executive with Visy Board.
552 Mr Pellizzari said that during the relevant period, Northwest Packaging was doing business with Amcor and it would probably have been one of Northwest Packaging's main clients. The work was done on, or using, corrugated cardboard. He said it was predominantly partitions work and single face pads, corrugated pads and possibly some short runs in cartons, some flexographic printing, stitching work, die-cutting and gluing. Mr Pellizzari said that in most cases, '99 per cent of the time we would buy the material from Amcor'[657] either in blank size, which Northwest would carry in stock for the smaller runs, or cut to size in length by width for the larger volume runs (which meant there were two less machines processes to go through).
553 Mr Pellizzari explained that 'single face pads' are made using a machine called a 'single facer'. Two reels of paper are loaded on to mill stands and fed through a heated roll so that a corrugation effect is created on one piece of paper and the other piece is laminated to it using a starch based adhesive whereby the corrugated peaks cause the adhesion. The end product is a single faced roll of about 75 metres in length (or as required) with a layer of paper on one side and a corrugated piece on the other.
554 In the case of 'corrugated pads', the process is similar but the end result has corrugated boards on both sides. The production of corrugated pads involves the use of more equipment, usually requiring the use of a slitter to cut the pad to the right width and a bandsaw to cut it to the right length, or vice versa depending on which way the customer requires the corrugations to run.
555 Mr Pellizzari explained that partitions are made in several different ways depending on how many cells each partition required, and some handwork is also involved. To make partitions, stock sheets of cardboard are put through a slitter and then cut to the required width using a bandsaw, before the partitions themselves are assembled by hand.[658] The short run boxes are also made using both the slitter and a vertical slotter, before they being hand or machine glued depending on volume. If printing was required, a flexographic printer was also used.[659] Die-cutting was done with a 'flat-bed' die-cutter, also known as a 'clamshell' die-cutter which was approximately 900mm in length by 700mm in width.[660] Finally, stitching to boxes was done manually, by use of a foot-pedal operated machine.[661] Mr Pellizzari added, however, that Northwest Packaging did later purchase a Bahmueller stitcher gluer which is an automatic machine that stitches at a faster rate.[662]
556 During the relevant period, Northwest Packaging was located in South Windsor, New South Wales. In the majority of cases where work was performed for Amcor, the completed work was delivered to the relevant Amcor address, either at Smithfield or Revesby, and the delivery or freight cost was included in the price quoted.[663] Occasionally, however, work was required to be dispatched elsewhere if some additional work was required to be undertaken. Some of the invoices for work performed by Northwest Packaging showed that delivery was required to be made to the addresses of other OME suppliers such as Le Breton Graphics in Hornsby, All Pack or Thompson in order for particular work to be done.
557 Mr Pellizzari was familiar with the expression 'OME work'. He said that outside manufacturing refers to '[a]ny work that the manufacturing company deems to be not viable for them to produce or they don't have the equipment to produce it, they would have it sent out to a company that most probably has the equipment to make it much more efficiently.'[664] He said that Northwest Packaging had been performing work for Amcor for many years; indeed, when he was working with Amcor in 1986, he used to deal with Northwest Packaging as they made partitions for Amcor.
558 During the relevant period, Amcor placed orders with Northwest Packaging on a regular basis. Where the order was for an existing product, where Northwest had quoted, orders would just come through, but if it was for a new job or a new quotation, then they would have to go through the quotation process first. Mr Pellizzari explained that in the period from 2003 to 2008, Northwest Packaging had a costing system:
we would go along and cost and it would go through the process depending on whatever the request was, and we'd allocate the machines that would be best suited for that particular style of product that they wanted made, and then they would shell [sic] a bottom on price. If we had distributors we would classify Amcor as a distributor. We would leave a margin there for them to be able to allow a mark-up there to sell on.[665]
559 Invoices were rendered by Northwest Packaging following completion of the work, usually one or two days after the work was done. Mr Pellizzari said they were a cost effective small operation, with a small footprint and comparatively low labour costs. They had particular expertise in partition making and were very cost effective at doing that work, and had built their business around that work. Also, in the case of single face pads, they had low overheads and used high quality machines to process the cardboard through in an efficient way. For example, to produce the single face pads, Northwest Packaging used a quality German machine called the Gopfert rather than the French built Mechani-Lek. Mr Pellizzari said he regarded the Mechani-Lek as the 'Hyundai' of the cardboard converting machines whereas the Gopfert was the 'Mercedes' model.[666] He said that while the Mechani-Lek could produce corrugated pads, it could not produce single face pads efficiently and would be likely to jam the machine and be too slow.
560 During cross-examination, Mr Pellizzari was also taken to an order for a job, Item No. 50751-170 on Invoice No. 00039430,[667] for the supply of 1,660 assembled partitions made using double white lined board (white rather than brown on the outside and on the inside).[668] Mr Pellizzari said these partitions were made using a large hybrid slotter and a bandsaw and the 1,660 partitions were then assembled by one lady who was experienced in doing that manual job. Mr Pellizzari doubted that a Mechani-Lek could have been used to cut partitions of the size required, namely 247 by 127 and 200 by 137. He said that he has not used a Mechani-Lek himself, but he understands that while a Mechani-Lek could do partitions work of certain sizes it wasn't practical for doing these particular partitions - he believed that they 'would just drop through the middle of the machine or create an issue and hamper the machine processing it.'[669] He said that he has not seen a Mechani-Lek being used to make single face pads.[670]
561 Northwest Packaging employed a staff of about 15 to 20 experienced operators. The staff performing the machine-based tasks were multi-skilled and able to move from one machine to another, as required. The staff performing the assembly work were also experienced. On occasions, casual staff would also be employed for hand work assembly type tasks but they did not work on the machines.
562 Mr Pellizzari verified invoices[671] issued by Northwest Packaging to Amcor, and the purchase orders[672] placed by Amcor on Northwest Packaging, in the relevant period. Much of the work that Northwest Packaging performed for Amcor was 'repeat order' work. In those cases, Northwest Packaging often pre-empted the order coming through in the sense that they carried finished stock on hand so that they could supply it quickly. That was part of the service they offered to their customers. Where dies were required, they were usually sourced from an external supplier such as Stan's Die Cutting Formes. Mr Pellizzari said that in some instances, the die or knife would be supplied, but in the majority of cases, they would seek permission to order a new knife (based on the drawing or information given to them) in conjunction with the material.[673]
563 Northwest Packaging did perform some work for Amcor Displays. Mr Pellizzari said that the business of Amcor Displays was basically the supply and manufacture of displays items for their clients, which was treated as 'a separate business'. He explained that:
Displays is an industry within an industry so it's treated with a different level of expertise you could say and you're dealing with a lot more marketing companies and so on. And Displays has a high end profit value attached to it, then [sic] you would say the normal brown box would because it's a value added product. It's everything that you would see in a supermarket carrying everyday items and they're in cardboard.[674]
564 Mr Pellizzari said that the invoices that he had been taken to by Counsel showed that Northwest Packaging had done some 'outers' for Amcor Displays during the relevant period. Work performed for Amcor Displays included jobs such as that the subject of Invoice No. 00042943 dated 13 March 2007 , described as the supply of 220 'CCS dump bin shipper FFSC' in '3C printed 1 colour'.[675] Mr Pellizzari explained that the job involved the production of 220 dump bin shippers with a 'full flap slotted container' made of material grade 3C and printed in one colour.[676] There was also a 'stereo cost' shown on the invoice. He said that this particular job involved them supplying an 'outer shipper' to Thompson, who screen printed displays, so that the display item could be packed into an outer for shipping.[677] Under cross-examination, Mr Pellizzari agreed that the finished job was to be shipped to Thompson, but billed to Amcor Displays. He also agreed that by placing the order for the outers directly with Northwest Packaging, rather than with Thompson and leaving it for them to arrange, 'there would have been a margin saving there.'[678] He said that 'if Thompsons had received a total order and placed it [...] outside there would have been an involvement in handling there, so they potentially would have put a mark-up over that carton.'[679]
565 Mr Pellizzari said that at the tail end of 2002 and into 2003, the volume of work that came to Northwest Packaging from Amcor dropped off dramatically and never returned to the historical level. After July 2003, with the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties, Mr Pellizzari said that Northwest Packaging had to change its model slightly because its business with Amcor was diminishing. Northwest Packaging started branching out into other products that they knew they could manufacture and get in, and also by going to smaller clients directly where they could, in order to generate income.
566 Mrs Kaye Frances Le Breton gave evidence concerning the OME work performed for Amcor by the two Le Breton entities, namely M Le Breton Graphics (Aust) Pty Ltd and M Le Breton Graphics Pty Ltd (together called 'Le Breton'). Mrs Le Breton's husband, Max Le Breton, operated the business but he was in hospital at the time of the trial and unable to give evidence, so the Holihan parties subpoenaed Mrs Le Breton to give evidence in his place. Mrs Le Breton has been a director and secretary of both companies for many years and also works in the business in an office role.[680]
567 Amcor was a large customer of Le Breton in the relevant period, and beforehand from about the 1990s. Mrs Le Breton verified invoices and purchase orders relating to work done by Le Breton for Amcor in the relevant period for customers such as RTS Imaging.[681]
568 Le Breton mainly did laminating (that is 'mounting' prints to cardboard') and die- cutting on corrugated cardboard for Amcor. Le Breton owned a mounting (laminating) machine and a die-cutter. Some of the work performed involved manual labour,[682] such as the stripping of cardboard waste after die-cutting, gluing by hand and packing.[683] Le Breton did not do any printing itself, but where printing was a component of the work required, Le Breton would organise for the printing to be done by a third party printer such as New Milligans. Sometimes, the litho printed sheets were supplied to Le Breton for incorporation into the work to be performed.
569 Much of the work done by Le Breton for Amcor was repeat order work that involved the use of standing knives. Le Breton would quote a price for the job when first activated and the job would remain at that standing price unless there was an increase in the paper. Le Breton itself also had standing arrangements with printers such as New Milligans for the price of the third party work to be performed. In the case of new work, if a knife was required, Le Breton would charge Amcor for the knife.
570 Mrs Le Breton said that once Le Breton had completed the work, Amcor would pick up the goods and deliver them to their customer. On occasions, however, Le Breton would be requested to deliver the goods, and where it did so, it would charge Amcor for the freight.
571 Mr Stanislaw Kierdal of J S Cutting Formes Pty Ltd ('J S Cutting') gave evidence about the work J S Cutting performed. J S Cutting was formerly conducted under the name 'Stan's Cutting Formes' and Mr Kierdal purchased a share of the business following the death of the former proprietor.[684] Mr Kierdal said that he had been running the J S Cutting business for about 12 years as its manager.[685] Initially, J S Cutting was based at Wetherill Park and then the business moved to Bankstown, New South Wales.[686]
572 In the period from July 2003 to July 2008, J S Cutting made and repaired corrugated knives, that is, knives for cutting corrugated paper, for various different businesses, one of which was Amcor. He said that at that time, there were about six employees working in the business, one of whom was a secretary who handled the invoicing and the other five were involved in making knives and die-cutting.[687]
573 Mr Kierdal had difficulty recalling what work was performed for Amcor during the relevant period. In giving evidence, he mentioned die-cutting, which he said involved cutting small quantities of cardboard boxes. Mr Kierdal said that in order to do the die-cutting, J S Cutting had machines 'which cut sheer [sic.] lines or flat bed.'[688] He said that if they used the die-cutter, the customer would supply the board, being paper cardboard, and J S Cutting would just do the die-cutting. He said that they may also have done small quantities of gluing by hand.
575 When giving evidence, Mr Kierdal was shown a bundle of invoices and delivery dockets passing between J S Cutting and Amcor.[693] He did not recall them specifically but agreed that it would be fair to say that the invoices were issued by J S Cutting on or about the dates they bear.[694] He could not say how long each particular item of work specified in the respective invoices would have taken to complete. In the case of some invoices to which he was referred, the work specified was the making or production of a knife to die-cut board[695] and in another the die-cutting of customised cartons and boxes.[696] He said that the customer would usually supply cardboard referable to the size of the box to be produced. Invoices would be sent to the customer after J S Cutting had completed the job.[697] Mr Kierdal said that when J S Cutting made knives for Amcor, they would deliver them back to Amcor.[698]
576 Mr Anthony Jeffriss Kent gave evidence in relation to work performed by Thompson Print & Display Pty Ltd ('Thompson'). Mr Kent had been working in the corrugated box industry since 1980. He commenced with Visy Board, and then purchased an interest in a business called Advanced Packaging, and later they bought Thompson. In the period from July 2003 to July 2008, Mr Kent was an owner of the Thompson business and was a working director.[699] He gave evidence that Amcor was one of Thompson's main customers in that period.[700] He verified invoices and purchase orders as between his then company and various Amcor entities.[701]
577 Mr Kent gave evidence that Thompson did screen printing[702] and 'finishing' work[703] for Amcor in the relevant period, as well as supplying stock bins from time to time.[704] By 'finishing' work he meant die-cutting (which was done with a large die-cutter machine), and hand gluing, packing and assembling.[705] All of the work Thompson performed was on, or using, corrugated cardboard.[706] In many cases, the work performed by Thompson for its own customers, such as Unilever, was for point of sale cardboard displays of the kind used in supermarket aisles and chemist shops. The kind of work involved in producing them was printing, laminating, die cutting, gluing, packing and delivery.[707]
579 Initially, the screen printing side of the business and the associated equipment was located at Tamworth and they also had a 'finishing' factory (which was the die-cutter) located at the premises at Tarlington Place, Smithfield (that Thompson shared with Mr Holihan), but later it was moved to Victoria Road, Wetherill Park.[712] Mr Kent said that Thompson 'got out of the [Tarlington Place] lease early' and Mr Holihan kept the lease going.[713]
580 Mr Kent identified a bundle of documents (see Alternative Supplier Bundle 5:2459 to 6:2750).[714] For the most part, the documents in that bundle comprise invoices from Thompson to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd' or 'Amcor Fibre Packaging', or to 'Amcor Displays Australasia', and credit memos and purchase orders from 'AFP NSW Displays', 'Amcor Displays Australasia' or 'Amcor Fibre Packaging' to Thompson for the period from October 2003 to 30 June 2008. Mr Kent said that invoices were issued by Thompson after the required work was performed, and invariably by the end of the month.[715] In some cases, the run of purchase orders and invoices (from March 2005) shows that the relevant purchase order was from 'AFP NSW Displays' but the invoice was rendered by Thompson to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd'.[716] In other cases, (from March 2007) where the purchase order was from 'AFP NSW Displays', the invoice was rendered by Thompson to 'Amcor Displays Australasia'.[717] Mr Kent gave evidence that Thompson would have sent the invoice to where they were directed to send the invoice. He said he did not work in the accounts department and 'never checked these things about where the invoices were sent'.[718]
581 The bundle also included Amcor Displays' documents referable to Thompson headed 'Sales by Customer Detail' from March 2005 through June 2008.[719] These documents summarised work performed by Thompson for Amcor Displays during that period by reference to tax invoices and dates etc and listing the type of work performed in each case.
582 In the period from March 2005 to June 2008, there are four kinds of 'item' listed: 'Invoice', 'Knife Cost', Film Cost' and 'Freight'. Mr Kent explained that a 'knife cost' is the cost of a knife that is bought for cutting the cardboard; 'film cost' is the cost of a negative that you have made to produce the print job - he said that with every screen printed job there will be film involved, because you require film to shoot the screen[720]; the 'invoice' is the actual amount for the job, and 'freight' is the charge for delivering the job if required to do so.
583 Mr Kent said that Thompson had their own truck that they used to deliver the goods. On occasions, however, Amcor would pick up the finished goods from Thompson's factory,[721] or, where there was some urgency attached to the job, Thompson would be requested to deliver direct to the customer.[722] Where the work was supplied on pallets, the pallets would be charged for, and a credit note would issue, once the pallets were returned.[723]
584 Mr Kent said that the majority of the work that Thompson performed was screen printing work. He explained that screen printing is different from flexographic printing and lithographic printing. The screen printing that Thompson was specialised in involved cardboard being fed through a printer, the screen would come down and water based inks were used in conjunction with the screen to produce an image on the cardboard. Mr Kent said that Thompson had a reputation for turning work around very quickly, and 'because we did the [screen] printing it was often easier to leave the job with us because you wouldn't have to transport the printing to someone else to do the die cutting.'[724]
585 When the work to be performed by Thompson required knives, Mr Kent said that Thompson had J S Cutting produce them.[725] Less often, the knives would be supplied by Amcor, and Thompson would use the existing die forms as supplied for the particular job.[726] In the case of film, Mr Kent said Thompson used a couple of suppliers, one of which was Independent Design.[727] On rare occasions, Thompson would also use other external suppliers such as Max Le Breton for lithographic printing work or laminating.[728] Mr Kent said that he had a close working relationship with Mr Le Breton and when he needed litho laminating done, he would go to Mr Le Breton, because he had a relationship with another printer and seemed to be able to get better prices than Thompson could get by going direct.[729] Mr Kent said he did not consider going to Mr Holihan for that work because he did not have a litho printer, and whilst Mr Holihan could have arranged to outsource it, Mr Kent said he had a longer standing relationship with Mr Le Breton and so would go to him for that work rather than to Mr Holihan.[730] The associated cost of film and the CTP (plate for printing) would be on-charged to the customer.[731] Mr Kent said that he would 'put a margin on' the price charged by Mr Le Breton, in the sense that 'it would go in at cost and then you would put a margin on it with all your other costs as you would normally price a job.'[732] The margin that would apply is something that he would decide and it 'would vary depending on the size of the job.'[733]
586 As mentioned earlier, at one stage, from about December 2003, Thompson and the Holihan entities shared premises at 21 Tarlington Place in Smithfield. Mr Kent could not recall the detail of the relationship between them at that point, but he said that the objective in opening up those premises was to 'save money on the lease' and as he did not need the entirety of the leased factory space, they 'agreed to share the costs of the factory.'[734] Under cross-examination, Mr Kent was shown a copy of an undated but signed Heads of Agreement made between Achilla and Thompson concerning a 'joint enterprise' whereby they would, inter alia:
1.3 Support and cooperate with each other for the supply of packaging materials by each of their businesses.
1.4 Where possible, use their respective supply agreements on behalf of each other to obtain savings in purchase costs.
1.5 Support each other by giving preference to each other in business dealings. [735]
587 Mr Kent identified his signature on page two but said that he did not recognise the Heads of Agreement document.[736] He was cross-examined further about the nature of their business relationship, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] ...Do you recall Mr Holihan ever saying to you, during these discussions, that you wouldn't be receiving any work from Amcor once you entered into these - this arrangement?---No, I don't - I don't recall him saying that, but if - yeah, if I wasn't going to be receiving work from Amcor, I wouldn't have been very pleased with the agreement, would I?
Why is that?---Because obviously Amcor was one of my big accounts.
Do you recall Mr Holihan ever saying to you that you wouldn't be getting any work from Amcor other than screen printing work?---No, I don't.
Do you recall Mr Holihan ever saying to you that the only Amcor work that you would be given is screen printing work for Amcor customers which Mr Holihan directed to your company?---No, I don't remember that.
Do you think you would recall those conversations if they occurred?---I'm pretty sure I would - I would recall - I wouldn't have been happy with that arrangement, so I probably would have remembered that conversation, yes.
Because as you said, Amcor was one of your main customers, is that right?---Correct, correct.[737]
588 Mr Kent said that at the Tarlington Place factory, Thompson did die-cutting and hand work including gluing and assembly work. Mr Kent was aware that Mr Holihan had a large die-cutter and a laminator at the premises but he said there was no interaction between the two businesses - 'he ran his business and I ran my business and I actually had no idea what he was doing and he had no idea what I was doing.'[738]
589 Under cross-examination, Mr Kent was taken to an invoice for screen printing work performed by Thompson dated 30 March 2005 and invoiced to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd', for delivery to 'Smithfield'.[739] The invoice described the work as:
Mr Kent said that this was a screen printing job. The company named 'Elizabeth Richards' is a client of Amcor. Being a 'print only' job, he said, Amcor would have sent corrugated cardboard sheets to Thompson and then Thompson would have printed them and then sent them back. Initially, he said that the only other business that could have done that work at the time was Visy Board but added that Amcor would not use their opposition to do their work. He then mentioned another entity named 'Frank Steel' as a business that could also have done the work as at 30 March 2005. He said he was unsure whether Sainsbury Packaging, who purchased a screen printer at some stage, could also possibly have performed that work. Mr Kent said that Mr Holihan's business could not have done this job, but he acknowledged that if Mr Holihan had been given the job, he could have asked Thompson to do the screen printing work.[740]
590 Another example that Mr Kent was taken to in cross-examination was the job described in a Thompson's invoice to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Pty Ltd' dated 21 September 2004, where the work produced was to be delivered to ACB (i.e., Achilla).[741] The invoice described the work as:
40055-293-Reckitts Benkiser Print Only - Base/Tray/Shelves
591 Mr Kent said that Reckitts Benkiser is Amcor's account customer. The job involved screen printing only and no die cutting, gluing or finishing work. He explained that there were three components - a base section, a tray section and shelf sections - so Thompson would have to print the three parts and then deliver the job to ACB in order for the finishing work to be done.[742] This job demonstrates the Amcor entities themselves arranging directly for an entity other than Achilla to do the printing work, thereby eliminating the prospect of a 'double margin' being charged, and then remitting the job to Achilla in order for the finishing work to be performed.
592 Mr Kent was then asked about what portion of the work Mr Holihan's company was able to do, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] At that time, could ACB, that's Mr Holihan's company, have done the printing work?---No.
They couldn't have. And why do you say that?---Because they didn't have any screen printers.
It didn't have screen printers?---They never owned any - they never owned any screen printers.
So do you agree, Mr Kent, that this invoice is an example of an occasion where Amcor place an order on your [sic.] for screen printing, which was then directed to be - - -?---Yep.
- - - delivered to ACB?---Yes, that's how I read it.
For this same job for whatever it is that was being made for Reckitts Benckiser, would it have been possible for Amcor to have placed the whole order on ACB and to have left it to ACB to procure the screen printing however it chose to do so?---They could have done that, yes. They could have given it to ACB and then ACB could have given it to me.
Based on your experience is there any difference or is there any difference between those two groups either placing the order for screen printing directly on you is the first option or the second option placing the full order on ACB and leaving ACB to acquire the sheets however it chose to do so?---If you go direct to Display you're only incurring one margin rather than two margins aren't you.
All right, so you're only incurring one?---One profit margin rather than two profit margins because I would have to quote - I would have to quote ACB a price with a margin and then obviously he would then have to quote Amcor a price with a margin, so there'd be two margins on there.
There's a difference in the margins depending on which option you go down. Are there any other differences that you can think of?---No, Craig [Holihan] could have done all the - all the die cutting and everything he had the facilities to do that, so he could have done that.[743]
593 The bundle of invoices also showed that on a number of occasions, Thompson produced the same product for Amcor, in effect, as a 'repeat order'. One such product was the 'BAM small extender'. Under cross-examination, Mr Kent was taken to a series of invoices and purchase orders for those type of jobs:
40055-308-2 "BAM Small Extender"
PK "TRAY" - S/S 1 COL + DCUT
A "3 X SHELVES" S/S 1 COL +DCUT
B "4 X PADS" - S/S 1 COL +DCUT + PACK
40055-309-2 "BAM Pedestal"
S/S 1 COL, D-CUT, GLUE + PACK IN 4'S
BAM Small Extender 40055-308
BAM Pedestal 40055-309
594 Mr Kent explained that in the consecutive jobs for the 'BAM small extender', Thompson was printing (silk screen with one colour) and die cutting the tray, the shelves and the pads and packing them. He said that the major cost involved in this job was the printing. He acknowledged that it might have been possible for Amcor to have asked Frank Steel to print the first job, and to have asked Thompson to print the second job but said that that might result in a colour variance between suppliers because the ink mix might be slightly different, and he added 'obviously price as well.'[748]
595 Achilla contends that, save for screen printing, the work performed by Thompson is all work that Achilla could have done at the relevant time.
596 Mr Remy Pribilovics, the managing director of SPS Packaging Services Pty Limited ('SPS Packaging'), gave evidence about the work performed by SPS Packaging for Amcor during the relevant period and verified the invoices[749] issued by SPS Packaging to Amcor during that period. All of the work done by SPS Packaging was performed on, or using, corrugated cardboard.[750]
597 Mr Pribilovics said that Amcor was one of its customers in the period from July 2003 to July 2008.[751] SPS Packaging made pads, partitions, fibre pallets and cartons, and did gluing and stitching for Amcor and may also have done some scored and slotted trays.[752] He said that SPS Packaging had also performed this same kind of work for Amcor in the period before July 2003.
598 Mr Pribilovics explained the process by which 'fibre pallets' were made. He said the fibre pallets were roughly the size of a wooden pallet but were made out of cardboard. The equipment required was a slitter, a bandsaw and a laminator, and manual labour was required to put it all together. SPS Packaging would order the size sheet needed for the top of the pallet to meet their specifications and they would manufacture the legs by laminating about 12 pieces of board together, and then glue the top to the legs and then add the bottom piece of board which they would also supply. SPS Packaging would purchase the board from Amcor and they would recoup that cost in the price charged for the final product.
599 Mr Pribilovics could not recall the exact number of employees who were working in the SPS Packaging business at the relevant time. They were unskilled labour but had been with the business for a while and were proficient in the use of the machines. He said that an unskilled person could be trained to use equipment such as a laminator in a couple of days. When SPS Packaging had a lot of work on. they would usually recruit casual staff through an agency.
600 In the case of corrugated partitions, to make them, one required the use of a slitter, a bandsaw, a partition slotter and labour for assembling the pieces of board together to create a partition. Similarly with corrugated pads, to make them, one required the use of a slitter, a bandsaw and a tying machine to bundle the pads in lots of 100. SPS Packaging also made corrugated pads out of scrap board, using offcuts from previous jobs.
601 Mr Pribilovics said that sometimes SPS Packaging would deliver the finished goods and on other occasions Amcor would collect them. There was no additional charge for freight.
602 At the trial, Mr Holihan had given evidence that he visited SPS Packaging's factory in 2004, but Mr Pribilovics +could not recall him doing so. He said he did not remember discussing with Mr Holihan the making of corrugated pallets for Kelloggs Australia, nor did he recall having shown Mr Holihan how to make them. Mr Pribilovics said 'I would find it strange for me to show my opposition how to make things that I make'.[753] This work was an 'important account' and he thought he would remember such a conversation if it had taken place. He said that SPS Packaging lost this work in 2008 - they only did about 6 jobs for Amcor in 2008 - and have not done any jobs since. He said he made enquiries of Amcor when they stopped receiving work and was told that they had gone elsewhere.
603 Mr Pribilovics verified the invoices[754] issued by SPS Packaging to Amcor in the relevant period.
604 Mr Joseph Borg is a director of United Box Company Pty Ltd ('Ubeeco'), as well as the chief executive officer and managing director of Ubeeco Group Pty Ltd.[755] That company took over the trading name 'Ubeeco Packaging Solutions' from Ubeeco in 2012. Mr Borg started with the business in 1970 and in the ensuing 45 years, he has worked at every level of it, from making and assembling boxes on the shop floor, to selling the boxes, performing accounting functions and management.[756]
605 Amcor was a customer of Ubeeco in the relevant period.[757] In response to a subpoena issued at the request of the Holihan parties, Ubeeco produced a spreadsheet capturing the invoices that were issued to Amcor and other information sought in the subpoena.[758] Mr Borg explained that they were unable to produce the original documents because they cull them every year.[759]
606 Among other things, Ubeeco assembled corrugated cardboard for Amcor,[760] made corrugated cardboard pallets[761] and did hand scoring (and shaping) to corrugated products.[762] Mr Borg said that Ubeeco 'would receive fibreboard components from Amcor and we either assembled them or we value-added those fibreboard components'.[763] By 'value-adding', he meant that Ubeeco 'would be attaching to timber pallets or we would attach foam inserts or insets to them depending on customer needs.'[764] The fibreboard was usually corrugated single flute but occasionally it would be double fluted.
607 Mr Borg said that the fibreboard assembly work was done by hand,[765] and in the case of the pallets, the work was done with a glue gun.[766] No other equipment was involved in the work that Ubeeco did for Amcor in relation to corrugated cardboard.[767] Mr Borg said that the assembly work was not particularly difficult and with 'a small amount of training', the team would be able to perform the assembly work.[768] In terms of costs, it was essentially labour and overheads. At the relevant time, Ubeeco had a workforce of about 100 employees, four or five of whom would have been involved in assembling fibreboard products.[769]
608 In examination-in-chief, Mr Borg was taken to a sample invoice, from Ubeeco to Amcor Fibre Packaging dated 22 July 2008, which involved the making of fibreboard pallets for Kellogg's, a customer of Amcor, and he was asked to describe the steps involved in making the pallets.[770] Mr Borg said:
... We would receive components from Amcor. We would then proceed to glue the bearers, which is the three runners that you would see on a normal pallet. But they are made out of cardboard fibreboard. And once they're glued then we put other panels to act as a top layer and a bottom layer. And that would be the pallet.[771]
609 As mentioned, another example of the work performed by Ubeeco was 'hand scoring.' By reference to an invoice from Ubeeco to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging' dated 30 June 2008, Mr Borg described the work involved in the process of 'hand scoring on Simplot bulk corn shipper'.[772] He said Ubeeco received corrugated cardboard from Amcor and we had to value add to that product by hand scoring, which involved shaping the corrugated cardboard component supplied by Amcor into a container.[773]
610 Mr Borg said that in some cases, Ubeeco was required to deliver the product to Amcor following assembly, but in other cases it was not. He said that all of their sales, apart from small value orders, are inclusive of shipping costs. He explained that where the value of the order was under a certain limit, which he did not presently recall, it would incur a freight charge. In the case of pallets (or 'returned pallets') which Amcor used to supply raw materials to Ubeeco, Mr Borg said that Amcor would charge Ubeeco for the pallet that the product was delivered on and once Ubeeco returned the pallets, the charge would be rebated by Amcor.
611 In the case of some jobs, Ubeeco would be asked not to 'oversupply'. That meant that Ubeeco would perform the order quantity in full, but deliver only as requested by the customer from time to time, and in the meantime, would hold the balance of the stock ordered.[774] He explained that this was part of the service that Ubeeco provided to its customers, adding that 'service is highly important in maintaining the customer.'[775]
612 As to pricing, Mr Borg said that the margins charged by Ubeeco varied from product line to product line and from customer to customer.[776] Generally, at the time of quotation for a job, Ubeeco would determine a set price for a particular product line and a particular customer.[777] Mr Borg said that in circumstances where Ubeeco was performing work on repeat orders of the same product, their prior experience with that type of job 'would have made us more efficient.'[778]
613 Mr Borg verified the invoices that were issued by Ubeeco to Amcor in the relevant period,[779] as well as the associated purchase orders. In cross-examination, Mr Borg was taken to a series of invoices rendered by Ubeeco for Kellogg's pallets produced for Amcor Fibre Packaging during the relevant period.
Mr Borg said he was unaware that Achilla was making Kellogg's pallets for Amcor at that time and charging $15.79 per unit.[781]
Mr Borg said he was unaware that, since May of 2006, Achilla was charging Amcor $17.70 per unit for making Kellogg's pallets.[783]
Mr Borg said he had 'no idea' why it was that Ubeeco's unit price for making Kellogg's pallets had increased from $15.50 to $18.10.[785]
Mr Borg said he did not know why it was that Ubeeco's unit price for making Kellogg's pallets had gone down from $18.10 to $17.70 and he did not recall having any discussion with Amcor about it.[787]
Mr Borg said he did not know why it was that Ubeeco's unit price for making Kellogg's pallets had gone up from $17.70 to $18.23.[789]
614 Amcor purchased the business operated by Stadour Pty Ltd and Sainsbury Nominees Pty Ltd (together, 'Sainsbury') in early 2008.[790] Mr Powell, who gave evidence on behalf of the Amcor parties, said that Amcor owned the Sainsbury business, from 2008.[791] Mr Powell had co-ordinated the due diligence exercise in relation to Sainsbury before it was purchased by AFP upon his recommendation[792]and his evidence was that the books and records of the Sainsbury business effectively passed to Amcor with the sale.[793]
615 Sainsbury is a competitor of Achilla. Evidence was given by Mr Holihan that Sainsbury did screen printing, flexo printing, die cutting, gluing, slotting, litho laminating, cutting and packing in the relevant period.[794] Save for litho lamination and cutting (as opposed to die cutting), Mr Powell confirmed this.
616 The Holihan parties endeavoured to obtain a complete suite of business records from Sainsbury without success. Efforts were made to contact a representative of Sainsbury through their last known addresses and phone numbers. Enquiries were also made of neighbours, and searches were conducted of the white pages directory and via 'Google', but to no avail.[795]
617 The Holihan parties contend that there is no reason to doubt that Achilla itself could have done the work that was sent to Sainsbury.[796]
Issue 3: Did APA breach an obligation to procure the supply of all of its OME supplies from Achilla, within the meaning of clause 12.2?
Issue 3(a)****: Did APA obtain OME supplies from alternate suppliers?
618 Issue 3(a) raises the question of whether, as alleged by Achilla, APA procured the supply of OME supplies from suppliers other than Achilla during the Relevant Period, namely:
(a) Completion to the date five years after Completion (if the implied supply agreement is proved); or alternatively
(b) 21 March 2005 (i.e., the date of the Deed of Accession) to the date five years after Completion?
619 As the Court has concluded that there was no implied supply agreement, it is only the alternative scenario, covering OME supplies procured during the period from entry into the Deed of Accession, that falls to be considered.
620 The evidence shows that on and from 21 March 2005, APA obtained supplies of products from ACB Co Purchaser and the alternative suppliers. The Amcor parties contend that APA was entitled to do so and that no breach of clause 12.2 is demonstrated.
(b) Were any of the following alleged supplies not OME supplies within the meaning of clause 12.2, and if so, which:
(i) Work that had been ordered from suppliers other than Achilla, but not completed, before:
(A) commencement of the Second Sale Agreement on the day following Completion (i.e. 31 July 2003 or 1 August 2003 - see Issue 1A[797]); or
(B) Achilla commenced operations of the ACB business (i.e. on 1 August 2003 or 4 August 2003 - see Issue 1B[798])?
622 Issue 3(b) focusses attention on the question of what were 'OME supplies of Products' for the purposes of clause 12.2?[799]
623 The Holihan parties submitted, at least initially, that the meaning of the expression 'OME supplies of Products' in clause 12.2 is clear[800] and allows for no ambiguity that requires consideration of the surrounding circumstances.
624 The expression 'OME supplies of Products' is not defined in the Second Sale Agreement. In clause 12.1 'Products' were defined as 'corrugated board and cartons' and under that clause, the Vendor was obliged to supply those 'corrugated board and cartons' to the Purchaser and Achilla. When clause 12.2 is read against that background, it is clear that the expression 'OME supplies of Products' in clause 12.2 must be addressing the supply of something other than simply 'corrugated board and cartons', because it would make no sense for the Vendor to be obliged to simply purchase the same 'Product' it has supplied to the Purchaser and Achilla. In my view, the expression is ambiguous, as the Holihan parties later came to accept, and reference to the surrounding circumstances is required to construe the contractual obligation.
625 The Holihan parties contend that the evidence given by Mr Holihan and other witnesses who worked for AFP at the relevant time, and by the alternative suppliers, demonstrates that 'OME' was 'any manufacturing work done outside AFP'.[801] The evidence given by Mr Holihan was to the effect that OME work was work sourced by AFP from a third party. He said that work was also called 'tolling', 'toll manufacturing', 'toll converting' or 'closure work'.[802] He also gave evidence of having received from Ms Young,[803] prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement, a listing of OME suppliers to AFP, which included each of the alternative suppliers.[804]
626 Mr Cichonski gave evidence that OME was short for 'outside manufacturing enterprise' and was work that AFP was not going to do itself, at one of its factories. He said that work was outsourced where the order was too small to run in the large plants or was specialised and AFP did not have the requisite machinery to do it, or where a lot of manual labour was involved.[805] Mr Joyce said that OME work was work that was routed to an external supplier 'because Amcor did not have the machinery capable of doing that particular conversion process.'[806]
627 The gist of the evidence given by the alternative suppliers was to similar effect. OME meant 'outside manufacturing' work, being work that was sent outside because it was unviable for the company to do that work itself, or because it lacked the necessary equipment or because it was short run, labour intensive or 'fiddly' work and would create a bottleneck in its high speed production operation.[807]
628 The work undertaken by the ACB Business prior to the sale was not strictly speaking within that concept of 'OME work' because it was not done outside AFP. Mr Holihan acknowledged this in his witness statement, where he stated:
This work that the ACB Business did for AFP (for simplicity, I refer to this work as 'OME work' even though it was done by an Amcor business) was ultimately for AFP Customers.[808]
629 For the most part, the Amcor parties accept that the 1,913 invoices record them as having procured or obtained OME supplies from third party suppliers other than Achilla. But they contend that acknowledgment does not entail any concession that there has been a breach of clause 12.2.
630 The Amcor parties contend that when the clause 12.2 obligation is construed against the background of the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that the parties intended that only the work that was being performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale would be performed by Achilla after completion of the sale because the Holihan parties 'only contracted to receive the business that was being done by the ACB Business prior to the sale.'[809] Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend that the obligation in clause 12.2 should be construed so as to mean that Achilla was only entitled to receive that 'OME work' which the ACB Business was doing for the AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby box plants prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement. Thus, they submit, it follows that Achilla was not entitled to any kind of work that was:
(a) not the same as, or of a similar nature to, work that ACB Co Vendor provided to Amcor before the execution of the Second Sale Agreement on 2 June 2003; and/or
(b) work that involved the repeat of work previously conducted by third parties.
631 Further, they say, the Court should find that it was not inconsistent with clause 12.2 for Amcor to continue routing 'repeat jobs' to the supplier who had performed the previous batches of that work.[810]
632 As will be apparent, the Amcor parties' submission accords generally with the construction of clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement arrived at by the Court.
Work performed by the ACB Business prior to (and after) the sale
633 Reference has already been made to the evidence Mr Holihan gave about the 'OME work' that the ACB Business performed prior to the sale. He also gave evidence about the type of work performed by Achilla after the sale, as follows:
Work types
[132] The type of Work that Achilla did for AFP and the ACB Customers was varied and included:
(a) Work in relation to corrugated cardboard that required components of work to be sourced from third party suppliers (i.e. OMEs to Achilla) and incorporated into the Finished Product. The components included things such as speciality paper or cardboard (e.g. IP board or A2 Gloss art paper), plastic handles, screen printing services and the printing of litho sheets. The sort of print work that Achilla obtained sometimes included additional costs such as film, CTP imaging, and litho with a cello finish. When parts or services were procured from an OME to Achilla, Achilla recovered those costs from AFP under the D&D mechanism in Annexure 5 to the Asset Sale Deed) as 'OME sundry' (i.e. these were the Other Costs).
(b) Litho lamination, including litho lamination jobs that involved the procuring of printed litho sheets. This work was done on the Grassi No 1 that was allocated machine number 450 and, from about February 2005, the Grassi No 3.
(c) Die cutting. Achilla had at least four die cutting machines at all relevant times (PICK codes 210, 240, 230 and 275).
(d) Scoring and slotting cardboard. Achilla (and ACB Vendor before it) had several machines available to it to make scores and slots. They were the ZLM Flexo folder gluer (PICK code 125), the Koppers rotary die cutter and slotter (PICK code 210), the Jumbo printer slotter (PICK code 305), a specialised partition slotter known as the Mecanelec (PICK code 325), the Partition Slotter (PICK code 421), a vertical slotter (PICK code 490) and a slitter (PICK code 500). Sometimes, Achilla used its die cutting machines to do slotting.
(e) Pad production, which involved cutting down pieces of corrugated sheets from larger pieces into smaller ones. Sometimes the corrugated cardboard was not 'double faced' (two flat sheets of paper with a corrugated sheet glued between them) but was 'single face' (a single flat sheet of paper with a corrugated sheet glued to one side of it) and the pads were cut from this material. The machines Achilla had available for the making of pads included the Mecanelec, the bandsaw (PICK code 495) and the slitter (PICK code 500).
(f) The production of corrugated partitions (created by assembling two or more 'slotted pads' together to form partitions in the spaces between them). Sometimes, Achilla (and ACB Vendor before it) assembled corrugated partitions from slotted pads itself (by hand). Other times, it provided customers with slotted pads for assembly by the customer.
(g) The production of corrugated pallets including for Power One and (from around mid 2004) Kellogg's.
(h) Bundling and strapping, which was done using Gerrard compression strappers (machines fm02000020 and fm90000137 listed in Annexure 3 to the Sale Agreement), an automatic tying machine (machine fm6000119), automatic strapping equipment (fm96000132), an automatic strapping machine (fm96000200) and a Hit tying machine (machine fm96000161).
(i) Box production of different sizes, which was done by use of the Mecanelec machine, the ZLM flexo folder gluer, the Koppers rotary die cutter and slotter and the Jumbo printer slotter that ACB Purchaser purchased from ACB Vendor.
(j) Handwork such as packing, tying, gluing, folding and assembly. Sometimes Achilla used hot melt glue units and stands, staple guns and strapping and bundling machines to do this work.
(k) Work for Amcor Displays, including work that required die cutting, litho lamination, flexo or screen-printing, packing, bundling and gluing. This work picked up from around the middle of 2004.
(l) From time to time Achilla did create 'single face' board in roll form for businesses owned by Service Containers in Victoria, but did not do work for Service Containers in NSW. The single face board ordered by Service Containers was not of a quality suitable for use in the production of displays. That was the only work that I can recall Achilla doing for Service Containers after the sale.
[133] In doing OME work for AFP (as well as the ACB Customers), Achilla (as ACB Vendor had done) purchased goods or services from third parties, such as timber pallets, glue, polystyrene foam, paper or cardboard (and if necessary plain IP board), litho sheets and screen-printing services. The cost of these goods and services was charged as a direct cost to AFP (just as ACB Vendor had done in relation to Other Costs) as 'OME sundry'. This is shown in for example, [CB7/2496[811]] which is a listing of all purchases by Achilla from Ultra Press, in the period 1 July 2004 to 7 December 2005.
634 Against that background, the Holihan parties contend that with the exception of screen printing (as opposed to the procuring of screen printing), the work done by the alternative suppliers in the relevant period could all have been done by Achilla.
635 Mr Holihan was cross-examined at some length over several days. In terms of the evidence he gave about work types performed, the cross-examination was directed for the most part to 'screen printing', 'partitions' and staffing issues. The evidence set out in his witness statement about Achilla's ability to perform much of the work the subject of the 1,913 invoices was not rigorously tested.
636 Evidence was also led by the Amcor parties from Mr Nellies about the kind of work that Amcor was obtaining from other OME suppliers prior to the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties.
[MR TRAN:] Did you know of the ACB business before it was sold to Mr Holihan in the middle of 2003?---Yes, I did.
What work was ACB business doing before it was sold to Mr Holihan?---ACB had a number of machines - the ACB business at Wetherill Park had a number of machines that were ex-Amcor machines that were transferred in there, so that the main plants of Revesby and Smithfield could concentrate on more everyday type work, and the more complex work was then sent to Wetherill Park.
Could you describe or list some of the sorts of work that the ACB business did before the sale to Mr Holihan?---There was work through a machine called a Jumbo, which was a large printer. They had a Koppers, which did five panel folders and slotted - slotted trays. They had a stitcher that stitched cartons and a hot melt gluer, and a taper. They had a corrugator that manufactured fanfold and single face rolls.
And when you say a printer, you mentioned that the Jumbo did printing, what kind of printing was that?---It was just - it was flexographic printing, but it was just on a very large scale, it was a very large box. So it was cartons that were too big to go through any machine that Revesby or Smithfield had in its possession.
Before the sale to Mr Holihan did the ACB business do any screen printing?---Um, no.
And did it do any litho laminating?---No, it did not.
Before the sale to Mr Holihan did Amcor use OME suppliers?---Yes.[812]
637 Mr Nellies was then shown the listing of OME suppliers to AFP (which included each of the alternative suppliers listed earlier in these reasons) that Mr Holihan said he had received from Ms Young prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement,[813] and the following exchange ensued:
MR TRAN: Do you see there, Mr Nellies, at the top of the page in small font it says "OME 0702-0203"?---Yes, I do.
Which of the suppliers listed there, over the next page, were OME suppliers at that time? So this is 02 to 03?---Do you want me to say each one as I can recall?
Yes, please?---Ace Print & Display.
Okay?---Le Breton Graphics.
Le Breton?---Northwest Packaging.
Northwest Packaging?---SPS Packaging.
SPS?---Stans Cutting Formes.
Stans?---Yep. Thompsons Screen Printing.
Okay?---Ubeeco Packaging Solutions.
Ubeeko?---I'm not sure if the ACB packaging is the ACB packaging at Wetherill Park or the ACB Packaging at Revesby, so I don't - I'm not sure. J.S. Cutting Formes.
All right?---So they're ones I recall that did, um, OME type work for Amcor.
You just mentioned that you weren't sure about ABC [sic.] Packaging, could you explain that in a bit more detail please?---... there were two ACB Packagings. One was at Wetherill Park that did the ... OME - just had some OME work for Amcor. And there was an ACB Packaging that was at Revesby that sold packaging materials to the packaging industry, like bubble wrap and brown paper and tape guns and things like that.
And who owned that ACB Packaging?---That was owned by Ian Hottes.
Of those suppliers that you just identified did any of those do things which the ACB business didn't do before the sale to Mr Holihan?---... Ace Print & Display did silk screening. Le Bretons did litho laminating. Thompsons also did silk screening. Ubeeco were making Kellogg's pallets. There were some other things that were - so what's his name - Stans Cutting Formes and J.S. Cutting Formes had specific work that they did for Amcor based on the type of tools that they had as well.
You say, "Specific work", what do you mean by specific work that they were doing?---A job if it's complex in its design will have a cutting tool associated with it. That cutting tool ... will be either specific to a particular job or specific to a family of jobs.
And so what do you mean that sometimes J.S. Cutting or Stans Cutting Formes did specific work for Amcor?---If they had intricate work that we couldn't put through one of our die cutters then they were - then they produced a tool that became part of that - that job and then we couldn't - it can only fit on the machines that they - they had.[814]
638 Mr Phillips also gave evidence to the effect that he did not understand the ACB Business to have had the capacity to perform any litho printing at any time.[815]
639 In his witness statement, Mr Phillips also identified some examples of jobs where he disagreed with Mr Holihan's assertion that Achilla could have done the work involved. He said:
[55] There are many instances in the Liability Particulars where Holihan states the invoice had insufficient detail but he sets out what he believes the work involved for that OME job and states that Achilla could do all such work. However, I have identified examples wherein Holihan has missed or not described all of the information in the invoices that in my view would be relevant to considering if Achilla could perform that work. For example I refer to:
(a) The work performed by J.S. Cutting Formes Pty Ltd in the invoice number 28644 dated 31 July 2003 [CB 2611]. Holihan states in the Liability Particulars that there was insufficient detail to know what work was required for this OME job. He states that he it would have involved die-cutting services and he says that Achilla could perform this work. I agree that the invoice description lacks detail. But it is probable that the work involved creating tooling or formes given that all die cutting services require a die or knife or mould, and the production of such was J.S. Cutting's business. As stated above Holihan stated Achilla could not create knives or tools of formes.
(b) The work performed by J.S. Cutting Formes Pty Ltd in the invoice number 28650 dated 18 August 2003 [CB 2612]. Holihan describes this work as die-cutting. I have read the invoice and it also refers to a knife. That suggests that the work also involved production of a knife.
(c) The work performed by J.S. Cutting Formes Pty Ltd in the invoice number 28773 dated 22 September 2003 [CB 2615]. Holihan described this work as die-cutting. I have read the invoice and even though the copy is difficult to read I can see that it refers to a knife. This suggests that the work also involved production of a knife.
(d) The work performed by SPS Packaging Service in the invoice number 7237 dated 27 August 2003 is in the amount of $5,517.79 [CB 2614]. I have reviewed this invoice. This invoice lists 7 different OME jobs for five different customers. In the Liability Particulars this invoice is listed twice at items 29 and 30. Holihan states at item 30 in so far as the work involves "Kellogg's Pallets" that Achilla could do such work. Holihan states at item 29 that for the balance of the other work, the invoice does not have enough information but he lists a long number of activities that he states would have been the work involved and that Achilla could do all such work. I have noted that Holihan does not state he knows the specifications, or any special needs of the customer for these jobs when he states Achilla could have done this work at this time. I know from the batch numbers that are set out for all of these OME jobs on this invoice that these are repeat jobs for products previously produced for those customers. For example I know that the reference to "5164 - 455 - 0052PK" means that as at August 2003 this was the fifty-second time that product had been produced for McWilliam Wines. I discuss repeat jobs further below.
...
[68] I also refer to the OME job completed as part of the Le Breton invoice marked L1089.290 dated 6 November 2007 [A 920]. That invoice was for an amount of $20,280 (ex GST). It appears as item 100A on Achilla's 2007 - 2008 Quantum Particulars. In that schedule Holihan has calculated as part of Achilla's claim for loss:
(a) estimated Litho print costs of $3,725;
(b) estimated D+D costs of $4,058.03; and
(c) thereby claiming a lost profit of $12,496.97.
[69] I do not agree with the calculations set out at paragraph 68 as an accurate estimate of the total costs involved, particularly as they result in a profit margin of more than 150% for the job. In my experience in this industry, I have not come across margins of this magnitude. Such margins would not in my experience be commercial. [816]
640 In my view, the starting point for consideration of the question of breach is that following the sale, Achilla was entitled to receive the 'business as usual' type of work that the ACB Business performed prior to the sale. That remained the position following entry into the Deed of Accession, in that the substitution of APA as Vendor in place of ACB Co Vendor did not enlarge the scope of the clause 12.2 obligation. The work that the ACB Business performed prior to the sale was delineated and identifiable by the master denotation in the PICK system, but as noted earlier, access to that data is no longer available in electronic form.
641 Mr Garcia gave evidence about the way the 'business as usual' approach to the routing of work to the ACB Business operated after the sale. In examination-in-chief, he was asked about the position within Amcor as it applied after the sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now after the sale to Mr Holihan, so now the ACB business is owned by Mr Holihan?---Yes.
Did you use - did you route work to OME suppliers then?---No.
You didn't use OME - you didn't use any other OME suppliers?---We - we use Thompson, because we - we know ACB cannot print silk screen. We still use Thompson.
Okay?---And we still use Le Breton.
And so what did you use - you said you used Thompsons for silk screening?---Silkscreen, yes.
What did you use Le Breton for?---For the same thing, to do the printer sheets on litho.
And did Le Breton only print litho sheets?---If they own?
Did Le Breton do anything else for Amcor, besides printing the sheets?---I don't remember, I don't remember.
Now were you ever told not to route work to Mr Holihan?---No.
Did you ever reroute any existing work away from the ACB business?---No.
Were you ever told to route all OME work to Mr Holihan?---Yes.
And did you - did you do that?---Yes - myself, yes.
And why did you route work to Mr Holihan?---I don't know, he was a good bloke. I don't know, I don't know, it's - I prefer he do the job than somebody else.
Now after the sale to Mr Holihan, so when Mr Holihan owned the ACB business, how would you route work to Mr Holihan's business?---The same ways as before, I think, we put in there - on the master, the job will be - we supplied board or we supplied this to this - to - to Newton Road, for ACB to finish the job.[817]
Issue 3(b)(i)****: Work that had been ordered from suppliers other than Achilla, but not completed, before commencement of the Second Sale Agreement, or before Achilla had commenced operations of the ACB business
642 Issue 3(b)(i) effectively concerns the 'lead time' between a purchase order being submitted to an alternative supplier and an invoice being dispatched for that work. In the context of the Second Sale Agreement, it raises the question of whether Achilla was entitled to work that was ordered, but not finished, before Completion,[818] alternatively before the commencement of its operations whether that be found to be 1 August or 4 August 2003.[819]
643 In the case of work that was ordered, but not finished, before Completion, this issue arises simply because the Holihan parties have claimed for work that was invoiced by the alternative suppliers on and from Completion.[820] In response, the Amcor parties contend that the Holihan parties are not entitled to any loss and damage in respect of work that was ordered from alternative suppliers before the commencement of the Agreement.[821] They contend that that work would have been ordered approximately three weeks prior to the invoice date and, as such, Achilla is not entitled to make any claim for that work. The Holihan parties accept that they were not entitled to claim for work performed by an alternative supplier that was finished and delivered (back to Amcor) before Completion. However, they dispute that the relevant work was ordered three weeks before the invoice date, and submit it is possible that work which was invoiced shortly after Completion was in fact ordered after Completion.
644 As to the period before commencement, the Holihan parties have identified this as an erroneous issue, because their Summary Particulars do not reveal any claim to the effect that work invoiced before the Start Date must have been ordered before the relevant Amcor party was bound by the supply obligation in clause 12.2 and, for that reason, they do not address Issue 3(b)(i)(B). Rather, the Holihan parties submit, that claims are made in items 3 and 4 of the Summary Particulars for work performed in the period immediately after the Start Date.
645 The Amcor parties have, however, identified 27 invoices that were issued in the period between 30 July 2003 and 21 August 2003 by J S Cutting, Le Breton, Northwest Packaging, Ubeeco and SPS Packaging, where they contend the work performed must have been ordered prior to Completion and, as such, they submit APA was not obliged to send the work to Achilla.[822]
646 Issue 3(b)(i)(A) focusses on work that had been ordered from suppliers other than Achilla, but not completed before commencement of the Second Sale Agreement on the day following Completion (i.e. 31 July 2003 or 1 August 2003 - as per Issue 1A). In their written submissions on liability, the Holihan parties conceded Issue 3(b)(i)(A) and accepted that the work the subject of the nine jobs invoiced on 30 and 31 July 2003 does not constitute a breach of clause 12.2. They stated:
[195] The Holihan Parties accept that the obligation to send OME work to Achilla bound APA only on and from Completion. In cross-examination, Mr Holihan reasonably conceded that work would have been ordered before being invoiced, and that work invoiced before Completion could not be a breach of clause 12.2 as the invoice comes after completion of the job (although note Mr Kent's evidence that sometimes Thompsons invoiced before completing work). Accordingly, the Holihan Parties concede that work invoiced on 30 July and 31 July 2003 does not amount to a breach of clause 12.2. There is an innocent explanation for the claim, and no negative view should be drawn about Mr Holihan for having made a claim for these nine jobs.[823]
647 The Amcor parties accept and acknowledge the concession made, but they take issue with 'the anodyne account given of how the concession was made.'[824] They submit that:
It is obvious, and should have been obvious, to the Holihan Parties since at least 7 June 2013, being the date of the Amcor Parties' response to the liability particulars, that there could be no reasonable basis on which these invoices could have been said to be breaches of any supply agreement that had not yet even commenced. The "innocent explanation" that these invoices had been included in the claim because they were included in the Amcor Parties' discovery belies the apparent rigour with which other aspects of the materials was scrutinised by Mr Holihan.[825]
648 As the issue has now been conceded by the Holihan parties, no further response is required.
Jobs invoiced in the period from 5 August to 21 August 2003
649 The Holihan Parties do not concede that jobs that were invoiced in the period from 5 August to 21 August 2003 do not amount to a breach of clause 12.2. They submit that the effect of the evidence given on behalf of Amcor, primarily that of Mr Phillips and Mr Nellies, when considered in light of that given by the relevant suppliers, 'does not support the Amcor Parties' position that all work in this period was ordered before Completion'.[826]
650 Mr Phillips gave evidence, based on his experience in the industry, which included him running his own speciality printing business, Renwick Pride Pty Ltd,[827] and operational roles with Amcor both in Indonesia and in Victoria at sites in Broadmeadows and Clayton and at its short run specialty plant operations at Box Hill. Mr Phillips' evidence was to the effect that the time between routing (i.e. placing an order with a supplier) and invoicing would be at least two weeks, but could be as long as four weeks for some complicated jobs.[828] The Holihan parties seek to downplay his evidence, contending that little weight should be accorded to it because Mr Phillips' experience had ended before Completion of the Second Sale Agreement and he has 'very limited short run specialty plant experience in Victoria' and 'was not working in the short run speciality business in New South Wales at the time in respect of which he gave evidence as to lead times.'[829]
651 The Holihan parties seek to place greater weight on the evidence given by the relevant alternative suppliers about their invoicing practices and the completion times for jobs, rather than that given by Mr Phillips. But, as the Amcor parties point out, those suppliers gave evidence about how many days it may have taken them to do the work and then invoice it, without factoring in the availability of machines to do the work. Further, they observed, the fact a job might take only one or two days to manufacture does not tell you when that manufacturing can commence. Mr Phillips accepted, however, that the pattern of invoicing recorded in the Holihan parties' quantum particulars for this period suggests that the work was invoiced by the alternative suppliers as it was completed, which he added 'would be normal practice.'[830]
652 Mr Holihan gave evidence that the time taken to do work for AFP depended on the nature of the work and the demands on the ACB Business at the time. The general position was that work would take no more than a few hours on any particular machine to complete and that some work was turned around in a day, while other work took a couple of days to produce. Urgent orders were prioritised and delivery dates were managed and agreed between Mr Silva and AFP representatives including Mr Nellies.[831]
653 Mr Silva's evidence was to similar effect. He gave evidence that the turnaround times for work differed from job to job, but would normally be between three and 10 days.[832] This accorded with Mr Nellies' evidence that a five day turnaround, from ordering to delivery, with three days to convert, was 'standard'. This was an average time; and certain items of work could have taken more, or less, time.[833] Mr Cichonski's evidence was the same. He said typical lead times for 'multi-pass' work was 10 days.[834]
654 Turning then to the evidence given by the relevant suppliers, J S Cutting, Le Breton, Northwest Packaging and SPS Packaging.
655 Of the J S Cutting invoices within these two categories of claim, two were issued on or around 18 August 2003. Mr Kierdal gave evidence-in-chief to the effect that he could not remember the usual period between work being sent to J S Cutting and it being completed.[835] He said that J S Cutting would send invoices to Amcor usually within a period of between about two to three days to a week after completing the work.[836] Under cross-examination, however, it became clear that Mr Kierdal had only purchased the business in about 2005 and as he had no involvement in J S Cutting in mid-2003, he could not give probative evidence about the turnaround time involved in such work.
656 In the circumstances, there is no probative evidence about when the particular work was ordered. Given the date on which the invoices were issued, and the general evidence given about the time taken to complete work of this kind, it seems likely that the work performed by J S Cutting was ordered after Completion.
657 Three Le Breton invoices are in contention, dated 18, 19 and 21 August 2003. Because Mrs Le Breton performed an essentially administrative role, she was unable to provide any meaningful evidence regarding this issue. She said that work took one, two, possibly three weeks, depending on what was involved and on matters outside Le Breton's control affecting turnaround times.[837]
658 In relation to the subject Le Breton invoices for August 2003, the Holihan parties contend that the Court should proceed on the basis of Mr Silva's evidence (which is the most generous to Amcor out of the evidence given by Mr Holihan, Mr Silva and Mr Nellies) that the work the subject of those invoices was ordered 10 days before they were issued (i.e. as early as 8 August 2003).
659 The evidence shows that the work performed by Le Breton was specialist work of a particular kind that often involved the co-ordination of aspects of the work with other printers or suppliers. Mrs Le Breton's evidence left open the prospect that the work may have taken between two and three weeks to complete. Given the fairly scant evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the work performed by Le Breton the subject of these invoices was ordered after Completion.
660 There are seven invoices from Northwest Packaging that are in issue, dated 5, 6, 13 and 19 August 2003.
661 Mr Pellizzari said that Northwest Packaging would normally invoice a customer upon completion of work, either on the same day that the work was finished or one day to two days later.[838] As the relevant invoices were 'blacked out' and the details obscured,[839] he said that it was not possible to tell what work it was that Northwest Packaging did in this period.[840] But he gave general evidence about the time taken to do work of the type done for Amcor in the relevant period. For example, he said it would take about three hours to make 9,000 single face pads[841] and three hours to make about 1,600 assembled partitions.[842] Evidence given by Mr Holihan under cross-examination regarding work done by Northwest Packaging in this period is consistent with the tenor of the evidence given by Mr Pellizzari in respect of turnaround times for both the work and the corresponding invoice. Mr Holihan said it was possible that work was turned around by Northwest Packaging within a day, depending on Amcor's requirements and the loading on Northwest Packaging's machines at the time.[843]
662 The Holihan parties contend that the work the subject of the relevant August 2003 Northwest Packaging invoices was probably completed in a very short time, and in all likelihood within a day. Even allowing a day or two for invoicing (but noting Mr Pellizzari's evidence that work may have been invoiced the day it was done), it appears that the earliest of the jobs was sent to Northwest Packaging on 3 August 2003. Accordingly, I am satisfied it is likely that the work performed by Northwest Packaging the subject of these invoices was ordered after Completion.
663 There are six SPS Packaging invoices in dispute, dated 15, 19 and 21 August 2003. Mr Pribilovics gave evidence about three of the SPS Packaging invoices in contention, for corrugated pads,[844] partitions,[845] and pallets.[846] His evidence was to the effect that the corrugated pads would have taken a couple of days to complete,[847] the partitions - two to three days,[848] and the pallets - five to six days.[849]
664 As to SPS Packaging, the work the subject of the 15 August 2003 invoice was for corrugated pads[850] (which would have taken SPS Packaging two days), the 19 August 2003 invoices were for partitions[851] (two to three days) and corrugated pallets[852] (five to six days) and the 21 August 2003 invoice was for corrugated pads and gluing.[853] The Holihan parties contend that the earliest the work would have been sent to SPS Packaging was, therefore, on 13 August 2003 (being two days before 15 August 2003 or six days before 19 August 2003).
665 In the circumstances, having regard to the nature of the various work required to be performed, I am satisfied it is likely that the work the subject of these invoices was ordered after Completion.
Issue 3(b)(ii)****: Purchases of OME for the business known as 'Amcor Displays'
666 The rival contentions concerning OME work that was performed for Amcor Displays have been considered earlier in these reasons. As will be apparent, I have concluded that the work done by the alternative suppliers for Amcor Displays was not encompassed within the clause 12.2 purchase obligation, save to the extent that the notion of 'business as usual' might continue to capture the small amount of work that the ACB Business had performed historically for Amcor Displays.[854]
667 Accordingly, save in respect of that small portion of work that the ACB Business performed historically for Amcor Displays, the Holihan parties are not entitled to recover any loss and damage in respect of the Amcor Displays' work.
Issue 3(b)(iii)****: Work that was already the subject of an ongoing OME contract with a supplier other than Achilla or ACB Co Vendor?
668 This issue is said by the parties to relate to screen printing work.
669 The Amcor parties contend that work involving screen printing was excluded from the clause 12.2 obligation primarily because clause 12.2, on its proper construction, entitles Achilla to receive only the OME work that the ACB Business was doing for Amcor prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement. It will be recalled that prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement there was a contract on foot with ACE Print, of which Mr Holihan was aware,[855] whereby ACE Print was required to do OME work, including screen printing work, for Amcor Displays. That agreement apparently began sometime in 2001 and ended in February 2004 following the purchase of ACE Print by Visy Board. It is common ground that at the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement and at Completion, Amcor Displays was contractually obliged to use ACE Print as its supplier of OME work.
670 The Amcor parties maintain that Achilla knew that AFP customers required screen printing and that screen printing work was being supplied by an alternative supplier. They claim that Achilla neither offered to do the work, nor did it purchase an appropriate screen-printer and make arrangements for the engagement of suitably qualified staff to do screen printing work.[856]
671 Save for the work the subject of the contract with ACE Print,[857] the Holihan parties deny that screen printing work was excluded from the clause 12.2 obligation. They also deny having had any knowledge that screen printing work was being sent to alternative suppliers, and contend that Achilla would have made appropriate arrangements to secure a screen printing machine, and had suitable arrangements in place to do screen printing work in any event.[858]
672 As the Holihan parties concede that Achilla was not entitled to perform the screen printing work done by ACE Print while that contract was on-foot, their claim concerns only screen printing work that was done by Thompson and Sainsbury.
673 Mr Nellies gave evidence that before the sale to the Holihan parties, the ACB business did not itself do any screen printing work.[859] However, Mr Garcia, who was subpoenaed by the Amcor parties, gave evidence that both before and after the sale to the Holihan parties he routed work that had a screen printing component to the ACB Business.[860] Under cross-examination, Mr Garcia described the arrangement as follows:
[MS MURPHY:] Now can I move to a different topic, when you were at Amcor before ACB was sold to Craig Holihan you sent finishing work to Craig's company, ACB, and some of that work involved parts of work that had been screen printed, silk screened?---We supplied the printer sheets.
Yes. And you got the screen printing done by Thompson - - -?---Thompson.
- - - or Ace. And after the business was sold to Craig the same thing happened?---Yes, yes.
So jobs were sent to ACB that had the cardboard screen printed beforehand?---Yeah.[861]
674 The gist of Mr Garcia's evidence is that prior to the sale, the ACB Business would not do the screen printing work itself but rather that Amcor would procure the screen printing to be done by Thompson and then send the printed sheets to the ACB Business in order for the finishing work to be completed.
675 The PICK system method for routing jobs that was in operation between the parties was dependent upon the machines involved in performing a job having been assigned a machine number in PICK, such that having the machines appear on the PICK system was integral to the routing of jobs. As a practical matter, when an estimator was preparing a quote for a screen printing job, the PCS and PICK system did not show Achilla as having the capacity to perform screen printing work itself using its own machines. Accordingly, as the Amcor parties point out, unless and until Achilla obtained a screen printing machine, and had it assigned a machine number in the PICK system, there was no way for the PCS and PICK system to route screen printing work to Achilla.[862]
676 Even though Achilla did not have a screen printer,[863] Mr Holihan nevertheless gave evidence about Achilla's ability to do OME work involving screen printing and the steps that he took towards enhancing Achilla's capability in that regard. In essence, he said that at all times during the operation of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla could arrange for screen printing work to be done by a third party supplier and for Achilla to then incorporate that printed work into a finished product.[864]
677 Mr Holihan also gave evidence about the arrangement he entered into with Mr Kent of Thompson, which resulted in them jointly leasing the factory premises at Tarlington Place, Smithfield. As noted earlier, Mr Holihan's evidence was to the effect that, from his perspective, he was interested in Thompson's ability to support Achilla in doing work for Amcor Displays as Thompson had a screen-printer and he entered into the Heads of Agreement with Thompson to facilitate that course.[865] But the evidence given by Mr Kent suggests that he was unaware that that was Mr Holihan's objective, and he did not share Mr Holihan's view. Mr Kent said Amcor was one of his big accounts and he would not have been pleased about any arrangement with the ACB Business that would result in Thompson losing work from Amcor. He did not remember Mr Holihan saying anything to the effect that future work for Amcor would be limited to screen printing work or that work would only be directed to his company via the ACB Business.[866] To the extent that it is necessary to indicate a preference for the evidence of one over the other, I prefer the evidence of Mr Kent. In my view, if Mr Holihan had made a statement to Mr Kent about the way that work, in particular for Amcor entities, was to be performed between them, or about the 'future work' that Thompson could have expected to receive, it is likely that Mr Kent would remember it.
678 Mr Holihan also gave evidence about the steps he took to obtain quotes for the provision of screen printing work from printers[867] and the arrangements with established suppliers that would enable Achilla to outsource its screen printing requirements.[868] He said that if volumes proved to be sufficient, then Achilla would have investigated options for leasing a screen printing machine or purchasing one.[869] In response, the Amcor Parties led evidence from Mr Phillips to the effect that the acquisition of 'such large machines' is costly and would take time.[870] But in cross-examination, Mr Phillips conceded that he had never purchased a screen printer, had no direct involvement with them and was unable to assist the Court as to what was happening in the market for new or second-hand screen printers in the Relevant Period.[871] Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that his evidence should be given little or no weight.
679 In my view, Mr Holihan has not demonstrated that Achilla was in a position to do screen printing work itself on a competitive basis. His evidence about the arrangement that he says was entered into with Thompson suggests that he was interested in a 'piggy backing' arrangement rather than in Achilla establishing a capacity to do screen printing on its own. In circumstances where the acquisition or establishment by Achilla of an in-house capability to perform screen printing work was likely to be a costly exercise, no matter whether the equipment was leased or purchased outright, common sense suggests that Achilla would not embark upon such a course unless it was assured of receiving screen printing jobs from the Amcor parties, and Amcor Displays in particular. At the inception of the Second Sale Agreement, that screen printing work was being performed by ACE Print under separate contractual arrangements. In that sense, it was not part of the 'business as usual' undertaking. And once ACE Print was sold to Visy Board, there was no obligation on the Amcor parties to route that work to Achilla or the ACB Business. In the case of other jobs performed by the ACB Business that involved a screen printing component, Mr Garcia's evidence was that Amcor would arrange the screen printing and provide the printed sheets itself so as to avoid the prospect of a margin on the screen printing component of the work being charged for twice.
680 It follows that I am not satisfied that after the sale APA was required to send screen printing work to Achilla because that work was not captured by, or encompassed within, the clause 12.2 purchase obligation.
Issue 3(b)(iv)****: Work that was not the same as, or of a similar nature to, work that ACB Co Vendor provided to APA before execution of the Second Sale Agreement on 2 June 2003?
681 This issue effectively captures the Amcor parties' contention that Achilla was entitled to perform only the OME work that was the same as, or of a similar nature to, the work that ACB Co Vendor did for APA before execution of the Second Sale Agreement.
683 The general claim, which is dealt with under this issue heading, is made in conjunction with claims relating to screen printing,[874] and the alleged prohibition on contracting out (e.g. the production of litho printed sheets).[875] Achilla's Summary Particulars indicate that this general claim relates to 676 jobs, with a total value of $1,678,837.58.
684 The Holihan parties contend there is no basis for reading any 'business as usual' limitation into the clear words of clause 12.2 so as to limit the scope of the work that Achilla/the ACB Business was entitled to perform. I do not agree, and I have set out my views concerning the proper construction of clause 12.2 above.
685 In the alternative, the Holihan parties contend that if, properly construed, clause 12.2 were so limited, they say the evidence shows that prior to the sale, the ACB Business did all types of work performed by the alternative suppliers during the relevant period, save for screen printing, and that the D & D costs applicable to the supply of OME Products as set out in Annexure 5, for example in respect of litho printed sheets, were allowed to be charged in relation to the particular supply. In effect, the Holihan parties maintain that the work the subject of this general claim was part of, or the same as, the business that prior to the execution of the Second Sale Agreement APA had provided to ACB Co Vendor. The Amcor parties dispute that the subject work is encompassed within the notion of 'business as usual'.
686 The dispute between the parties as to whether the work was, or was not, the same as, or of a similar nature to, the OME work that ACB Co Vendor did for APA before execution of the Second Sale Agreement is a factual matter that can only be determined by looking at the particular work orders or invoices in question and assessing the scope of the work required to be performed against the background of the evidence given and findings made about the OME work that was performed by the ACB Business on a 'business as usual' basis prior to the sale. In some cases, the particular jobs will be excluded from consideration because they do not fall within the post-21 March 2005 time-frame when APA became bound by the Second Sale Agreement. In other cases, particular jobs will be excluded because they involved the performance of OME work that would not have been routed to the ACB Business in the ordinary course because it did not have the requisite machinery and Achilla could only perform that work by outsourcing it. It follows that the task of identifying which of the jobs the subject of this general claim qualifies as an instance of breach is one that is to be performed once each of the breach sub-issues have been addressed.
687 During the course of the hearing, I raised with Counsel and solicitors for the parties that it was likely the Court would appoint an expert, under s 65M of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic),[876] to assist with any calculation or categorisation exercise required to be performed. In the absence of the parties reaching agreement as to the relevant invoices that reflect a supply of 'OME work' that on a 'business as usual' construction of clause 12.2 would have been routed to the ACB Business in the period between 21 March 2005 and the end of the five year term, that is the course I propose to adopt and direct be undertaken to the extent that it is necessary to do so.
Issue 3(b)(v)****: Acting as a re-seller of items that Achilla could not itself produce, and
Issue 3(b)(vi)****: The supply of paper or paper products including litho sheets, IP board A2, cello finished paper, 2500x2000 sheet 3C used for Kettle outers and printed sheets
688 Issues 3(b)(v) and 3(b)(vi) involve the consideration of similar evidence. Issue 3(b)(v) is whether or not particular work performed by the alternative suppliers (which the Amcor parties contend involved acting merely as a re-seller) was an OME supply of Products for the purposes of clause 12.2. Issue 3(b)(vi) describes the 'specific claim' mentioned above and involves the question of whether or not the supply of knives,[877] CTP imaging,[878] paper products[879] and the like was part of the work performed by the ACB Business prior to execution of the Second Sale Agreement.
689 The 're-seller' claim (item 15 in the Summary Particulars) is made in relation to 12 supplies in the relevant period, six by Sainsbury (where invoices were rendered to Amcor Displays)[880] and six by Le Breton (where invoices were rendered to Amcor Business Services).[881] A review of those invoices suggests that this 're-seller' claim is made by the Amcor parties in cases where an invoice on its face:
(a) identifies the supply of paper, in addition to other work such as laminating;
(b) suggests the invoice was for the supply of items such as the supply of 2500x2000 sheet 3C used for kettle outers, the supply of plain IP board A2, the supply of cello for prints, the supply of printed sheets and the supply of CTP imaging.
690 The Amcor parties submit that in making supplies of this nature, the alternative supplier was acting solely as a 're-seller', and not as an OME supplier, and, as such, the supply was not relevantly an 'OME supply of Products' within the meaning of clause 12.2. Therefore, they contend that the work was outside the scope of clause 12.2.[882]
691 In my view, in order to fall within the description of 'OME work' for the purposes of clause 12.2, the product supplied must involve some element of 'manufacturing' by the alternative supplier. That is, if the alternative supplier merely supplies an existing product, which does not involve any manufacturing enterprise on its part, that supply is a 're-sale' and does not qualify as an 'OME' supply. Where, however, the specialty work to be performed by an alternative supplier involved the use of speciality papers, cardboards, finishes on paper and tooling (dies or knives) which were often purchased from third party providers and incorporated into the speciality work performed by the alternative supplier to make the finished product, that supply falls within the description of 'OME work'.
692 In relation to Issue 3(b)(vi), Mr Holihan gave evidence that, before the sale, the ACB Business used third-party suppliers such as New Milligans, Imprimatur Press and Ultra Press for wide format litho printed sheets, printing with a cello-glazed finish and CTP imaging. He described CTP imaging as a set-up charge, akin to the tooling for a job,[883] that printers would pass through in supplying a printed sheet,[884] which in his experience would be passed-on to Amcor. He also said that the ACB Business sourced items such as solid fibre cardboard, including IP boards and papers[885] and paper[886] from third party suppliers which were incorporated into the finished product made for AFP customers or were often used in the OME work that the ACB Business did for AFP.[887]
693 The Holihan parties have also claimed for the cost of supplying tooling, including knives, where the supply is part and parcel of an OME supply. No claim is made for the manufacture of knives, as opposed to the supply of knives.[888] Mr Holihan gave evidence that before Completion, the ACB Business undertook work involving the supply of knives and that the supply of knives continued during the operation of the Second Sale Agreement.[889] Similarly, he said that items such as paper, paper products, litho print sheets, speciality boards and the like did form part of the business that, prior to the sale, APA gave to ACB.
694 In my view, the evidence given by Mr Holihan and the alternative suppliers supports the conclusion that where these items were supplied as an integral part of the performance of manufacturing work by that supplier, they fall within the description of OME work. But if they are merely the supply of an existing product, which does not involve any manufacturing enterprise on the part of the alternative supplier, that supply is a 're-sale' and does not qualify as an 'OME' supply.
695 This issue concerns the question of whether 'Die-cutter set up' charges fall within the clause 12.2 purchase obligation. Only one invoice, issued by Le Breton, is involved.[890] The invoice, which was issued to Amcor Displays, dated 24 January 2006 describes the relevant work as follows:
Arnotts Multipack Weekender
Die-Cutter Set Up
696 In their particulars, the Amcor parties claim that die-cutter set up is not an OME supply of Products within the meaning of clause 12.2.[891] The Holihan parties contend that the charge relates to an OME supply of Products and, as such, is within the scope of clause 12.2.
697 As noted earlier, the evidence of Mrs Le Breton was sketchy. In examination-in-chief she was asked about this invoice but was unable to assist the Court:
[MS MURPHY:] Now if you can go to p.A755, which should still be in that volume 2. You will see there there's a reference to "Die cutter set up", what's that?---I don't really know. Maybe it was a [sic.] extra charge for something. I don't know. An extra service or - I don't really know.[892]
Mrs Le Breton was not cross-examined about this invoice.
698 The fact that the relevant die-cutter set up work claimed for by Le Breton was invoiced to Amcor Displays and was referable to the 'Arnott's Multipack Weekender' and involved a quantity of 200 strongly suggests that the die-cutter set up claimed for was ancillary or related to specialty work performed by Le Breton. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the die-cutter set up work falls within the description of an OME supply of Products within the meaning of clause 12.2.
699 This issue concerns the question of whether a 'labour charge' falls within the description of an OME supply of Products within the meaning of the clause 12.2 purchase obligation.
700 Only one invoice, issued by SPS Packaging, is involved.[893] The invoice dated 8 September 2003, which was issued to Amcor Business Services for work delivered to 'Amcor - Revesby', describes the relevant 'Labour Charge' work as follows:
ATT DARREN NELLIES
LABOUR CHARGE AS DISCUSSED
BEING FOR LABOUR ORGANISED
TO COMPLETE WORK ON BEHALF
OF AMCOR
701 Mr Pribilovics gave evidence about the invoice issued by SPS Packaging, as follows:
[MS MURPHY:] Could you now turn to p.A2404?---2404, yep.
What is that document?---Again a tax invoice to Amcor business.
And what's it for?---Ah, labour charged to Darren Nellies. I cannot answer and tell you exactly what it was without seeing the work order.
And was it common to charge Amcor for labour at that time?---No. No.[894]
702 Mr Nellies was also asked about this labour charge. In examination-in-chief, he said:
[MR TRAN:] Sure, now if I could please ask Mr Nellies to please be given an invoice, but I've got some printed out I think. It will be A2404, A2404, I think I have some of those printed out Your Honour. For the transcript it's p.A2404 and it will be in folder 5 of the alternative suppliers bundle.
HER HONOUR: Thank you Mr Tran.
MR TRAN: Mr Nellies, do you see that in front of you and do you see that is an invoice from SPS Packaging?---Yes, I do.
If you look in the middle of the page do you see there it says, "Attention Darren Nellies. Labour charge as discussed"?---Yes, I do.
Can you explain what that means?---I'm sorry, I don't - I don't recall what that is.[895]
703 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan was also asked about this 'labour charge' as follows:
DR McNICOL: ... (To witness) Good morning, Mr Holihan. Can I please take you to an SPS invoice at A2404. And we have copies to hand to - I think we do. 2404. It's an SPS invoice. And, Mr Holihan, you can see that it's dated in the right-hand corner 08/09/03, can you?---Yes.
And it's an SPS Packaging Services invoice. And can you read the left-hand column what that is. The very first column that appears?---It says "Description".
Yes?---Underneath Description it says "Labour charge".
Right. So this is charges for providing labour to complete work on behalf of Amcor, is that right?---Yes.
So when we cast our minds back to clause 12.2 of the supply agreement you will recall that clause 12.2 refers to the supply of products. Is that right?---Yes.
And then it goes on to reference the OME supply of products. And products was defined - we can go back to clause 12.1 and 2 if you wish, but I think that you'll remember this. Products is defined in clause 12.1 as corrugated board and corrugated cartons - in 12.1?---Yes.
It is. Right. Thank you. And that's under the second sale agreement. So is the provision of labour the supply of a corrugated product?---It would depend upon what that labour is actually doing. If it's in the - the labour is being used to supply products then it would fall within the definition.
Well, looking at this particular invoice it just says a labour charge, doesn't it? What does it say in the middle column under "Attention to Darren Nellies"?---It says, "Labour charge as discussed being for labour organised to complete work on behalf of Amcor".
So you would say that this is a supply of product and this particular invoice would refer to a supply of product?---I'd be - - -
HER HONOUR: Sorry. I wonder if Mr Holihan might just leave the room for a minute. There's something I wish to raise with you, Dr McNicol.
...
DR McNICOL: Mr Holihan, under the clause 12.2, "Achilla for a period of five years from completion will supply products to the vendor (indistinct) based on D & D costs and the vendor will for that period obtain all its OME supplies of products from Achilla". I'm just reading out the first two lines of 12.2. Is a charge for labour a supply of products under 12.2 in your opinion? ---I don't think I can give a yes or no answer, I'm sorry. It depends.
What does it depend on?---It depends on what that labour is being used for. If it's in the supply of products, then I would say the labour charge would be covered under that definition. Can I add one more thing that this invoice was produced from a court order where Amcor had to provide those invoices that would have been covered by the supply agreement, so this invoice, I assumed, was under that court order and under that definition.
Right and this is an invoice for $3,620. And you've claimed this was a breach?---Yes.
It's in your quantum particulars?---Yes.
So a breach by Amcor, because Amcor obtained labour from SPS Packaging?---It doesn't say exactly what it's for. It would be good to have a purchase order to support this. It could have been for reworking of product, which is something that we would do. So if you had to rework a product, we would sometimes just charge labour. That wasn't something we didn't do, we did actually do that. If it was a damaged product or required re-palletising, so looking at the invoice as a standalone, it's hard to tell exactly what that's for.[896]
704 It will be recalled Mr Pribolovics' evidence was to the effect that SPS Packaging made pads, partitions, fibre pallets and cartons, and did gluing and stitching for Amcor, whom he said was a large customer in the relevant period. He said that SPS Packaging may also have done some scored and slotted trays. And all of the work that SPS Packaging performed for Amcor was on corrugated cardboard.[897]
705 Having regard to the evidence set out in the extracts above, in the absence of the relevant work order it is unclear precisely what work the labour charge related to. But SPS Packaging was clearly not a labour hire company, and when regard is had to Mr Pribilovics' evidence about the type of work it performed for Amcor during the relevant period, it seems likely that the labour charges related to work performed in relation to, or ancillary to the specialty work that SPS Packaging performed for Amcor. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the labour charge relates to an OME supply of products within the meaning of clause 12.2.
706 The Holihan parties no longer pursue their claim for this item of work.
Issue 3(b)(x)****: Work described as 'additional charge - charges from ACB'
707 The Holihan parties no longer pursue their claim for this item of work.
708 It would not be an efficient use of the Court's time for me to embark on the task of canvassing all affected invoices to identify instances of work that would be regarded as a 're-sale' as opposed to OME work, or instances where tooling or other components supplied were ancillary to a supply of OME work. As noted above, during the hearing, I indicated that it was likely the Court would appoint an expert, under s 65M of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic),[898] to assist with any calculation or categorisation exercise required to be performed. In the absence of the parties reaching agreement as to the relevant invoices that reflect a supply of 'OME work' that on a 'business as usual' construction of clause 12.2 would have been routed to the ACB Business in the period between 21 March 2005 and the end of the five year term, that is the course I propose to adopt and direct be undertaken to the extent that it is necessary to do so.
Issue 3(c)****: On the proper construction of clauses 12.2 and 12.4 of the implied supply agreement or Second Sale Agreement, was APA entitled to purchase OME supplies from suppliers other than Achilla on the basis that Achilla was not entitled to subcontract the production of goods or services to third parties (subcontractors), and if so, which supplies?
709 The issue of whether Achilla was entitled to contract out parts of the OME work to other OME providers or was permitted to claim additional job-specific costs of contracting out from APA under the D & D costing mechanism is one raised by the Amcor parties and noted in item 10 of the Summary Particulars.[899] They raise a similar argument in relation to printing generally (items 14[900] and 17(b)[901] of the Summary Particulars), screen printing (item 17(a)), and miscellaneous items such as printing plates (item 17(c)), CTP imaging (item 17(d)), partition assembly (item 17(e)) and the production of knives (item 17(f)).[902]
710 The Holihan parties contend that clauses 12.2 and 12.4, on their proper construction, do not prohibit the subcontracting out of any part of the work the subject of clause 12.2. In relation to the specific work-types identified by the Amcor parties,[903] the Holihan parties submit that the D & D costs applicable to the supply of OME Products set out in Annexure 5 expressly allows charges for these work-types to be recovered from Amcor. The Holihan parties otherwise refer to and repeat their position in relation to particular issues such as screen printing and partition assembly (see, respectively, Issue 3(b)(iii) discussed above and Issue 3(d)(v) discussed below).
711 The Amcor parties' argument in response starts from the position that it is common ground that Achilla could not itself produce litho sheets,[904] screen print,[905] produce printing plates or CTP imaging,[906] manufacture knives[907] or produce various kinds of paper and boards for inclusion in finished Products, including IP board A2, cello finished paper, litho sheets and 2500x2000 sheet 3C.[908] The Amcor parties accept that there was no contractual prohibition upon Achilla outsourcing work.[909] But they say it was open to the Amcor parties to obtain directly from other OME suppliers, work of a kind that Achilla could only supply if it were first to obtain it by out-sourcing it to another OME supplier. In summary, the reasons the Amcor parties advance in support of their argument are to the effect that:
(a) leaving it to Achilla to outsource components (or all) of the work which Amcor could have obtained itself directly from the same alternative supplier would result in Amcor paying for two margins (Achilla's and the alternative supplier's); and
(b) Amcor would lose a measure of control over the product if Achilla was left to source the necessary inputs.
712 In particular, the Amcor parties characterised as 'especially telling' the situation where Achilla would have been required to outsource the entirety of the work required, such as would apply in the case of screen printing.
713 The Holihan parties contend that the evidence given at trial demonstrates that there was no 'one-stop shop' OME provider in the relevant period and that it was common for each of the OME suppliers to rely upon the services of others (e.g. the services of a screen printer or litho printer). Indeed, the Holihan parties point out that in the Amcor parties' opening, they conceded that outsourcing components of work was an element of 'business as usual'.[910]
714 Further, they say that clause 12.4 does not prevent the contracting out of parts of the work. Clause 12.4 provides:
The Purchaser may nominate another company in lieu of Achilla to carry out and fulfil all (but not some only) of its obligations and responsibilities ... pursuant to this clause 12, such company at all times to be a Related Body Corporate of the Purchaser and under the control of CH. In such case the provisions of clause 11 of this Deed [CH warranty and indemnity] will apply in relation to the obligations of such other Related Body Corporate and it and CH will execute a confirmatory document by which each of them confirms that the provisions of this Deed including clauses 11 and 12 apply to the Related Body Corporate. The Vendor may in its sole and absolute discretion object to such proposed nomination ...(emphasis added)
715 In my view, clause 12.4 is not directed to the sub-contracting of part of the work involved in a particular job. Rather, it is directed to the (quite different) situation where Achilla is delegating the performance of all of its contractual obligations under clause 12, as opposed to all or some of the work required for a particular job. It does not operate to prevent Achilla from obtaining components to be used in the making of the finished products or utilising services provided by third parties in the making of those OME supplies.
716 Under the Second Sale Agreement, the purchase obligation set out in clause 12.2 did not bind the Amcor parties to the position where they were required to obtain finished product from Achilla in circumstances where, to fulfil that job, Achilla would have been required to outsource the entirety of the work required, such as would apply in the case of screen printing. In that situation, the Amcor parties maintained that they would be required to pay a double margin for work that they could have sourced directly from the entity that performed the actual screen printing work.[911] If the Amcor parties wished to provide screen printed sheets to Achilla in order for other specialty work (such as die cutting) to be performed by Achilla, clause 12.2 did not prevent them doing so. But in the case of a job which effectively required only screen printing work to be performed, Achilla could only undertake that job by outsourcing the entirety of the work (because Achilla did not itself perform screen printing). I do not regard such a job as an 'OME supply', and thus it would not fall within the description of an OME supply for the purposes of the purchase obligation in clause 12.2. Further, as the Amcor parties observed in closing submissions, if Achilla was outsourcing the particular work then the relevant pricing for the job would not be quoted or ascertained in the ordinary way by the estimator by using the PCS and PICK system, because outsourcing sat outside of the charging mechanism in the budget.[912]
717 In the evidence given at trial, there were instances where components of OME work performed by alternative suppliers were outsourced to other suppliers and shown to involve the payment of a double margin by the Amcor parties. For example, reference has been made to the evidence given by Mr Kent of Thompson concerning the use, on rare occasions, of other external suppliers such as Max Le Breton for lithographic printing work or laminating.[913] The position is that if Mr Kent was able to get better prices for the litho laminating components of a job by going through Le Bretons rather than by Thompson going direct to the same printer, it made commercial sense to do so. That is, the double margin that was charged was less than it would have been if Thompson had gone direct.
718 In the Thompson's example, the litho laminating work that was outsourced was part of an OME supply of products by Thompson, in the sense that Thompson was clearly performing manufacturing work itself in addition to the outsourced litho laminating work. In such cases, the litho laminating work performed was but a component of the job that involved an OME supply of products for the purposes of clause 12.2.
719 In my view, save in cases where virtually the entirety of the OME job involved work of a kind not performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale, the OME job was an OME supply of Products and, as such, was prima facie within clause 12.2. I am also satisfied that in performing jobs that were captured within clause 12.2, it was open to Achilla to outsource or subcontract one or more components of the work required to complete the OME supply of finished product, provided that it did not outsource or subcontract virtually the entirety of the work involved in the OME job.
Issue 3(d)****: Was any OME excluded from the exclusivity obligation?
720 Issue 3(d) raises the question of whether APA was entitled to purchase OME supplies from suppliers other than Achilla on the basis that Achilla was not able to provide the supplies consistently and on a basis that was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability, including for any of the following reasons:
(i) insufficient staff or insufficient skilled staff or AMWU[914] bans;
(ii) the work involved printing, including litho printing or screen printing;
(iii) the work involved the production of printing plates;
(vi) the work involved the manufacture or supply of knives;
(viii) the work involved the repeat of work previously conducted by third parties;
(ix) the work involved the manufacture of Kellogg's corrugated pallets; or
721 As will be observed, these categories overlap, in varying degrees, with others in the joint List of Issues.
Issue 3(d)(i)****: Carve out where there was an inability to supply due to insufficient staff, or insufficient skilled staff, or AMWU work bans
722 Dealing first with the 'transition period' issue, the Amcor parties claim that because Achilla did not commence trading until 1 August 2003, and had only two employees at that time, it was unable to supply OME consistently and on a basis which was commercially and reasonably acceptable.
723 Further, they say that it was not until 4 August 2003 that Achilla employed 15 contract workers, whereas before the sale, the ACB Business had some 45 employees. However, the Amcor parties do not actually plead, or state by way of particulars, that 15 employees was an insufficient number in order for Achilla to do OME work. Nor do the Amcor parties make any allegation to the effect that, throughout the duration of the Second Sale Agreement/implied supply agreement, Achilla was affected by staffing issues. Rather, the Amcor parties claim that there was a 'transition period' during which they would require 'short term supply', to which the Holihan parties agreed.[915] They also claim that APA was entitled to order work from alternative suppliers early on in the 'transition period' at the point when Achilla was unable to do work.[916]
724 Achilla disputes that there was any 'transition period' within which Achilla could not supply, and contends that there was no agreement to the effect that there would be a period within which the Amcor parties could go to other OME suppliers to fulfil 'short term supply'.
725 The evidence concerning Achilla's start-up of the ACB Business following Commencement of the Second Sale Agreement has been discussed above. Mr Holihan said that in the month before completion, he and Mr Papadimatos were working on the transition to the new business, but on and from Friday, 1 August 2003, Achilla employed more people, and had staff available to run the ACB Business[917] even though production did not commence until Monday, 4 August 2003. Mr Holihan said that the start-up went smoothly and Achilla did not receive any complaints from AFP about it. Mr Holihan had informed Mr Nellies the day before that there would be no one there on the Friday and that they were planning to have a staggered start on the Monday.[918] Mr Nellies did not recall there being any disruption caused by the short delay of one business day.[919]
726 The Holihan parties submit that the fact that Achilla used a casual workforce at this point in time is of no significance. As Mr Holihan explained:
...The OME jobs quoted and routed after 1 August 2003 could be competed because Achilla had available to it the labour force from Forstaff and Achilla's own pool of personnel. In paragraphs 134 to 137 of my First Statement, I described the process Achilla went through with Forstaff to recruit staff and the number and skills of staff available. Many of the tasks required non-skilled labour where there was an abundance of applicants. The remaining skilled roles were filled by ex-ACB Vendor employees. Achilla had available to it all of the ex-ACB Vendor employees along with a pool of non-skilled workers who had formed the majority of ACB Vendor's workforce. Through Forstaff and its own staff, Achilla had a flexible workforce, which could flex up or down as workloads increased or decreased. I could have flexed up from Completion if required. Every machine and work station was manned by trained personnel.[920]
727 Evidence given by the alternative suppliers confirmed that in many cases the tasks performed did not require skilled staff and that casual staff could be trained quite readily to perform manual work and, in some cases, to operate basic machinery.[921] For more difficult or complicated tasks, however, skilled labour was required.[922] Under cross-examination Mr Cichonski, who was called by the Holihan parties, explained the difference between 'unskilled work' and 'skilled work' as follows:
Skilled work is where you have somebody that has a technical understanding of the job that would for want of a - well a technician basically. They know exactly what they have to do to produce the job, how to mount the die, the printing plates, what have you to produce the job to the specification.
Now - - -?---An unskilled person is somebody that isn't expected to run the machine but they can pack a pallet, they can pack a box, they can put a bundle of boxes into a tiny machine.[923]
728 Mr Cichonski also gave evidence that while he was Operations Manager at Achilla between January 2005 and October 2007, Achilla never flexed up or flexed down its skilled labour.[924] Relying upon this evidence, the Amcor parties submit that the fact that 'it never happened is suggestive that it would not have happened'[925] and that 'in the circumstances, the Court should not find that Achilla could and would flex up skilled staff to meet new orders.'[926]
729 I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis on which the Court could find that because of workforce labour issues there was an inability on the part of Achilla to supply product from Commencement. First, the ACB Business was sold to the Holihan parties effectively as a going concern and on a 'business as usual' basis, and the Amcor parties led no evidence as to any agreement between Achilla and the Amcor parties to the effect that OME work could be sent elsewhere during any 'transition period'. Secondly, Mr Nellies was notified at the outset that there would be a loss of production of one day, and he did not recall there being any disruption caused by that short delay. Furthermore, during the early days of Achilla's operation of the ACB Business, there are no reports of late delivery, and no evidence of any complaints as to service or lead times was led by the Amcor parties.
730 Turning then to the 'AMWU work bans'. Mr Holihan gave evidence to the effect that he was told on 16 August 2003 that the AMWU had placed work bans on Achilla which stopped the delivery of all product and services to Achilla at Wetherill Park. He said that the particular bans were in relation to AFP employees located at Smithfield and Revesby, and not on employees of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla or those hired through Forstaff.[927] The work bans were lifted around mid-morning on Friday 22 August 2003.[928]
731 Mr Holihan gave evidence to the effect that whilst the work bans were in place:
732 The Holihan parties submit that importantly, the work bans were not bans placed on Achilla personnel; rather, they prevented the supply of raw corrugated product by APA to Achilla. They say that if the work bans prevented Achilla from undertaking OME work, it was because Achilla did not have the 'Product' that APA was required to provide it with. Accordingly, they contend that where Achilla's inability to perform work was caused by AFP's failure to comply with its obligations, the Amcor parties cannot rely on Achilla's non-performance to resist Achilla's claim.[932] Further, the Holihan parties submit that any defence based on the work bans must identify which jobs the Amcor parties assert were sent to other OME suppliers as a result of the work bans. They contend that as no such evidence was led by the Amcor parties, their case cannot be made out. But even if it could, the Holihan parties contend that the impact of the work bans on Achilla's ability to supply was transitory, and limited to the period between about 16 and 22 August 2003.[933]
733 The Amcor parties identify the real issue in dispute between the parties as being 'whether Amcor was not entitled to obtain OME supplies from others during this AMWU ban because, so the Holihan Parties say, Achilla's inability to supply was as a result of bans which were not imposed upon it, but upon Amcor.'[934] They contend that the point is a purely factual one to be determined in the context of the governing contractual language and submit that in circumstances where Amcor could not send work to Achilla, and where there is no question of bad faith or lack of cooperation, the words of clause 12.2 are clearly engaged.
734 Further, they say the Holihan parties are incorrect in their assertion that no evidence was led that jobs were sent to other suppliers due to the work bans. They refer to the Holihan parties' liability submissions where they state:
[435] Work and tooling were also moved back and forth by Amcor on a more ad hoc basis. Both Mr Holihan and Mr Joyce gave evidence about work having been moved from Achilla to alternative suppliers in August 2003 during the AMWU work bans, and Mr Holihan gave evidence about the collection of the tooling from Achilla at the time in order for other OME suppliers to do the work.
735 The evidence from Mr Holihan referenced in that paragraph was to the effect that:
On or around 20 August 2003 I received a call from Nellies, who told me he needed to arrange to pick up AFP's tooling that was used to produce OME work performed by Achilla. I later received an email to the same effect [CB5/1802]. The tooling was later collected, resulting in this OME work previously performed by the ACB Business being performed by other suppliers for a time.[935]
736 Mr Joyce's evidence was that when the union work ban event took place, 'Amcor Packaging was still required to meet its customers' expectations' and 'so it had to send certain work to external third parties to complete that work so that Amcor did not disappoint its customers and their needs.'[936]
737 Mr Holihan and Mr Nellies also gave evidence about the effect of the work bans on the routing of work. Mr Nellies gave evidence that some of the tooling was recalled and sent back to AFP at Smithfield because there were issues around the work not being able to be sent from the Smithfield and Revesby plants into the Wetherill Park plant during the time of the work bans. He said:
---So to make sure that the customers weren't disadvantaged during that time, we arranged for tooling to come back that could be run at either the Smithfield or Revesby plant or to another OME supplier, so that they could get the goods that they were desperately needing.[937]
738 In response to a question from the Court, Mr Nellies explained that when tooling such as a cutting knife is moved, it often has to be altered to fit the machinery at the new location, and once altered, it cannot then be moved back to operate at the original location. Using the tooling transfers set out in his email sent to Mr Holihan at the time of the work bans[938] as an example, Mr Nellies said:
---Okay, so sometimes they'll be a flat - a flat knife, so they'll be like - that could be any size up to 1200 by about 900 flat, okay. ..., with multiple knives and - and ..., cushioning against - on this - like a - it looks like a circuit board, okay, like that type of thing. So then they're getting impression of the - of the cardboard onto that. Some knives would cut through and some knives would crease, so that you could fold. So the knife would then [...], be physically that big. It will be then used on a machine that was - so can I use an example that's in here, it makes it easier for me to describe or no?
[HER HONOUR:] If you've got an example that works, just for the purposes of the demonstration?---Okay, okay, so there's one here for a - there's a top one for a Brownbuilt for a T70. Okay, so a T70 knife would be routed to a T70 machine, okay, which is a flat bed die cutting machine. ..., if - if we were to modify that T70 knife, we could move that knife back to another plant and in this case, Smithfield, to run on a similar machine called a Bobst, okay a Bobst die cutter. But we have to make modifications to that knife so cutting off what they call a leading edge. So where the knife falls - leads into the machine for the - for the board to come on. So that knife would then be modified by having that cut off. It could then not be remodified back to run on the T70 again. It is now routed to run on the Bobst only. Okay, so ... - so that would then be just physically picked up, it would be moved to the new plant, we would then modify the PICK specification in the - in the system to say, where this job was routed before to run on the T70 at Wetherill Park, we are now going to run it on the Bobst at Smithfield, route the job and book the job into the system that way.[939]
739 Mr Holihan was shown an email from Ms Adeline Scerri, Achilla's Customer Service officer, to him dated 27 August 2003.[940] In her email, Ms Scerri listed some 29 jobs that she said 'are still waiting to be sent to outside manufacturers in supposed [sic.] to ACB.' Mr Holihan said he forwarded the email to Mr Nellies shortly after he received it. He was asked why, and he responded and explained what took place, as follows:
[MR MAIDMENT:] Do you remember why you sent this email?---I do.
Why is that?---One of my employees, Adeline Skerri [sic.], identified to me that there was a bank of work, a number of jobs that was waiting to be sent to a competition [sic.] being Northwest Packaging and she sent this email to me because we were low on work and she effectively said this is the work that's waiting to go to Northwest Packaging, so I sent it through to Darren Nellies firstly to address it to him to so he had time to look at it and then secondly I spoke to him.
Do you remember when you spoke to him?---Same day.
Before or after the email?---After the email.
Do you remember what was said?---Sorry, the email says I left a voicemail. The email says, "I left a voicemail, please call me", which is what happened and then I called him or he called me, I can't remember. I can't remember whether he called me and we spoke.
Do you remember the content of the conversation?---Yes.
What was said?---I said that all this was apparently still to be sent to Northwest Packaging. He said to me that the board has been run off the corrugators at Amcor, orders have been placed on Northwest Packaging. I asked if he could cancel the orders and bring that work back. He said to me, "It's all a bit hard and all a bit too late". He also said he'd see what he could do but I didn't hear back.
Do you remember what happened about those jobs if anything after that conversation?---We may have got some of them back, I couldn't say that we got them all back.[941]
740 Mr Nellies was then taken to the email from Mr Holihan, which forwarded Ms Scerri's email and said 'as per me voice mail. Please call me', and the following exchange ensued:
[MR TRAN:] Well, if you look at the email now, can you - do you know what that email is about?---... my understanding is that this is a list of jobs that may have been ..., rerouted to another OME supplier ..., during the time when there were issues with deliveries into Wetherill Park ..., and they were - it was just a list of jobs that they had seen that were going elsewhere other than ACB.
And now you say these might have been jobs that were rerouted during that time. What would the rerouting process involve?---So the rerouting process, ..., would be a physical change in ..., PCS, which is the scheduling system to be able to ..., determine where the job has to be sent out to be manufactured for OME.[942]
741 The evidence shows that the AMWU work bans resulted in some 'inability' on the part of Achilla to supply OME work that had been ordered by Amcor and that it was necessary during the period of the work bans to re-route at least some of that work to alternative suppliers so as to avoid disappointing customers. It is unclear precisely which jobs were, in the final outcome, undertaken by alternative suppliers such as Northwest Packaging as a result of the work bans and which ones were performed by Achilla. But Achilla submits that there were 12 jobs that were sent to alternative suppliers for which it presses its claim.[943]
742 In my view, as Achilla was not able to supply on a 'consistent' basis certain items of work that were required by the Amcor parties during the period of the work bans, and (in some cases) for a short period thereafter because of the lead times involved for the respective jobs, the Amcor parties were entitled to re-route that work to alternative suppliers during the period whilst the bans were in place. It follows that Achilla's claim for the 12 jobs that were sent to alternative suppliers during the period of the work bans must fail.
Issue 3(d)(ii)****: The work involved printing, including litho printing or screen printing
743 The Holihan parties contend that this claim, to the effect that printing work could not be done by Achilla on reasonably commercial terms and thus the Amcor parties were entitled to rely upon the clause 12.2 carve out, is 'unpleaded' and the Amcor parties have not identified which of the 1,913 jobs the claim relates to.[944]
744 The claim is advanced by the Amcor parties on two bases. First, they say Amcor was not obliged to provide to Achilla any kind of work that was not the same as, or of a similar nature to, the kind of work that ACB Co Vendor provided to Amcor before the execution of the Second Sale Agreement on 2 June 2003. Secondly, they say that because Achilla did not own a screen printing machine[945] or a litho laminator,[946] the PICK system could not, as a practical matter, route screen printing work or litho laminating work to Achilla to do. That is, because there was no screen printing or litho laminating machinery entered in the PICK system, the work involved in the particular job could not be costed or routed using the PICK system.
745 The Holihan parties contend that in the case of screen printing and litho printing, 'Achilla was able to arrange for it to be done.'[947] Further, they say that before the sale, the ACB Business did do litho laminating.[948] Relevantly, Mr Garcia gave evidence that he routed work involving screen printing to the ACB Business both before and after sale,[949] and Mr Holihan gave evidence to a similar effect. Further, the Holihan Parties submit that in circumstances where the Amcor Parties have accepted that there was no contractual prohibition on Achilla outsourcing work,[950] even if Achilla could not itself litho laminate (which it denied), this work could have been outsourced.[951]
746 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan said that:
[317] In respect of screen-printing, Achilla was at all times able to outsource that component of the work whether to Thompsons with whom it had an alliance [...] or another supplier such as Allprint Graphics, just as ACB Vendor had done before entry into the Sale Agreement and Achilla had done for AFP after Completion. If Achilla had been offered the work that appears to have been done by Thompsons and Sainsbury, it would have (if it did not outsource the screen-printing component of the work), investigated options for leasing a screen-printing machine and either leased one or bought a machine itself (depending on volumes).
747 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Holihan said that he had never accessed the PICK system and so he was not familiar with it. Nevertheless, he went on to explain how the PICK system, in conjunction with the PCS system, was used by Amcor to quote on jobs for customers and, if accepted, to place an order and route it to the OME suppliers. He said:
---Then each of the machine rates was then entered into PICK by Amcor, AFP, Smithfield and they then had a mechanism to know what it would cost to have a product produced by us on any of these machines so they could quote their customers without having to contact us, ring us.
They could simply route a job, 'cause they understood our machines, they could allocate it to a machine and come back with a quote for their customer and if that customer accepted that quote and went ahead they could then within PICK place an order and the job would come - the board - the materials would come to us on a truck and on the machines themselves they had a terminal, a screen and they could see the job that had been - that had arrived, know which machine - the terminal itself would be on the machine, the machine themselves would see the work lined up and they knew in which order - because Amcor was setting the priorities for that work. That system itself is called - that system itself is called PCS.
[MR MAIDEN:] PCS, yes?---Stands for process control system. So once PICK - once an order had gone in PICK that information would flow through to PCS and the machines operators would know the line-up, the order of which Amcor's programmers were scheduling the work.
Now does that apply to only 80 per cent of the work that the ACB business was doing after the sale or does it apply to 100 per cent of the work that the ACB business was doing after the sale?---Almost 100 per cent.
Through the PICK system as I understand it they could view what was going through ACB's business in terms of when they wanted to route work they could see whether you had work - being using a particular machine on any particular day, is that the way it was working?---I don't know whether that was done through PICK. I'd never accessed PICK so I'm not familiar with it. I knew that PICK did costings and I knew this information went into PICK. I think it's probably more correct to say PCS.
PCS, right?---PCS would show the machine line ups and Amcor would have access to that.
The machine line up's, I just want to make sure I understand that. If there was work for example coming in on any particular week and on the usual week 80 per cent of the work would be for Amcor entities and 20 per cent might be for external customers. Would all of that work using the machines be shown in a way that Amcor could have visibility of how the machines were being used?---Yes, whilst we were on the same system PICK and PCS, we were one of the same.
You were visible?---Correct.
When did that stop being the case, being on the same system?---Late September 2005. Now not every machine had a screen, not every machine had a screen but it was simply a matter of walking across and having a look.[952]
748 As was noted earlier, Mr Kent of Thompson gave evidence that much of the screen printing requirements of the Amcor parties were undertaken by Thompson, both before and after the sale of the ACB Business to the Holihan parties,[953] and that the vast bulk of the Thompson invoices involved work ordered by (or invoiced to) Amcor Displays. Further, he said that if Achilla was left to obtain the screen printing by outsourcing it to another supplier, Amcor would incur a double margin - the margin imposed by the screen printer and the margin imposed by Achilla.[954] Mr Holihan accepted that Achilla would have put a margin on top of whatever (say) Thompson charged, but added that 'it included the additional other steps beyond screen printing that we would have done as well. It was a total package.'[955] Mr Garcia, who had worked for both Amcor and Achilla respectively over many years as an estimator observed, however, that in such a situation, Amcor would lose control of the job. Mr Garcia was asked a series of questions about how work was routed during his time with Amcor following the sale, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] So how did you route work to Mr Holihan where that work needed a machine that he didn't have?---He didn't have?
M'mm?---Which machines?
Say it's silk screen, did you ever route silk screening work to Mr Holihan?---No, no, we will supply the printer sheet to Mr - to ACB and he will finish the job. But he will receive the - the silk screen from us.
Did you ever route a job to Mr Holihan's business and then silk screening and then just leave it to Mr Holihan to arrange that?---No. I don't remember.
Is it possible that you would have done that?---I don't think so because Mr - ACB, we - they don't know what kind of printer we need to put on the job. You see our rep will go to the Thompson to put the printer he wanted on the - on the carton. I think is no point to tell - we tell ACB what we want and ACB go to Thompson. No, when we supply we supply the printer sheet to ACB to do - to finish the job.[956]
749 In the case of litho lamination work, there was evidence from both Mrs Le Breton and Mr Kent of Thompson that Max Le Breton had a standing relationship with a printer that involved a set price and enabled Le Breton to provide a set price to Amcor for a particular job. Mr Kent observed that Max Le Breton 'seemed to get better prices than what I could get going direct'.[957] This evidence serves to confirm the prima facie commerciality of the litho laminating work performed by or through Le Breton for Amcor. It seems unlikely that Achilla could have performed the work on a more attractive commercial basis and Achilla did not have the considerable experience that Le Breton had in doing this kind of work. In this regard, Mr Holihan acknowledged that Le Breton had been doing the work for an Amcor customer named 'RTS Imaging', which he described as 'a fairly large account',[958] 'for some time'.[959] And when Achilla sought to demonstrate to Amcor that it was capable of doing the RTS Imaging work, it encountered difficulties, as is discussed below in the context of Issue 3(d)(x).
750 In my view, where the screen printing and litho laminating jobs in question were ones that before the sale were performed by alternative suppliers such as Le Breton or Thompson, they will not be encompassed within the clause 12.2 purchase obligation. In the case of new jobs, however, where for example the screen printed sheets were supplied by AFP, and OME work was to be performed using them, they were prima facie within clause 12.2. In such cases, it was a matter for the Amcor parties to demonstrate that the words of exception were enlivened.
Issue 3(d)(iii)****: The work involved the production of printing plates
Issue 3(d)(iv)****: The work involved the supply of CTP imaging
751 The Amcor parties say that it is common ground that Achilla could not itself produce printing plates or CTP ('Computer To Plate') imaging.[960] The evidence given by Mr Phillips was that he was not aware that the ACB Business could perform any OME work requiring the production of plates using the CTP method.
752 No claim is pleaded by the Amcor parties to the effect that either the production of printing plates or CTP imaging could not be done by Achilla on reasonably commercial terms - i.e. that they were entitled to rely upon the clause 12.2 carve-out in relation to the production of printing plates and CTP imaging. Rather, the claim regarding printing plates as set out in the Summary Particulars is that Achilla was not permitted to sub-contract their production (item 17(c)). This issue has been dealt with above. In the case of CTP imaging, the claims as set out in the Summary Particulars are that Achilla was not permitted to sub-contract the supply of CTP imaging (item 17(d)), the supply of CTP imaging was not part of, or the same as, the business that prior to execution of the Second Sale Agreement Amcor provided to ACB (item 25), and the supply of CTP imaging was not an OME supply of Products (item 30). These issues have also been dealt with earlier.
753 The Holihan parties submit that, in any event, there is no evidence to support the Amcor parties' reliance on the contractual carve-out in the case of the production of both printing plates and CTP imaging, and their purported reliance on the carve-out is not made out. Further, they say that in circumstances where the Amcor Parties have accepted that there was no contractual prohibition on Achilla outsourcing work,[961] this work could have been outsourced by Achilla and there is no reason why claims for printing plates and CTP imaging should be denied.[962]
754 In my view, to the extent that the production of printing plates and CTP imaging was demonstrably an integral part of the body of OME work required to be performed for a particular job, Achilla could have outsourced that component of the work in order to perform the other finishing work required. As indicated earlier, however, in circumstances where Achilla could not itself produce printing plates or CTP imaging, any job that involved only the production of printing plates or CTP imaging would not be regarded as an OME supply.
Issue 3(d)(v)****: The work involved partition assembly
Issue 3(d)(vii)****: The work involved partition slotting
755 The claims made in Issue 3(d)(v) and Issue 3(d)(vii) cover the related topics of partitions, partition assembly and partition slotting. The quintessential example of partitions is said to be the cardboard inserts found in wine and beer cartons that are used to keep the bottles separated from one another.
756 In the case of Issue 3(d)(v) concerning partition assembly, the Amcor parties do not plead a claim to the effect that Achilla could not do partition assembly work on reasonably commercial terms - i.e. that they were entitled to rely upon the clause 12.2 carve-out in relation to partition assembly work. Rather, as set out in the Summary Particulars, the claim regarding partition assembly is that that Achilla was not permitted to sub-contract that work type (item 17(e)). This issue is dealt with above.
757 The Holihan parties contend that there is no evidence to support the Amcor Parties' reliance on the contractual carve-out in the case of partition assembly, and their purported reliance on the carve-out is not made out.[963]
758 Having regard to the Amcor parties' closing written submissions, however, it appears that the only real issue in dispute between the parties is Achilla's entitlement to claim for partitions work for a period connected with the 'partitions review' - that is, whether or not Achilla was entitled to the partitions work that was invoiced to Amcor during the period of that review. Reference was made to at least 16 jobs that were sent to Northwest Packaging between 21 June 2004 and 5 August 2004 (i.e., prior to the Deed of Accession), pertinent details of which are extracted below:[964]
Direct Labour & Oncosts, Direct Other, Energy
759 (As will be apparent, Northwest Packaging did a lot of partitions work for Amcor and so there is some overlap between partitions, as a standalone category, and Northwest Packaging but these claims address this discrete issue which was canvassed at some length during the trial.)
760 The Amcor parties effectively claim that, during the partitions review period, Achilla was not able to supply consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality or availability as it had limited capacity at the time.
761 Mr Holihan gave evidence that the work that the ACB Business did before and after Completion included hand work such as hand partition assembly.[965] The partition assembly work involved the manual assembly of corrugated partitions produced from slotted pads. Mr Holihan said that sometimes, Achilla (and ACB Co Vendor before it) assembled corrugated partitions from slotted pads itself (by hand) and at other times, it provided customers with slotted pads for assembly by the customer.[966]
762 Mr Holihan said that at all times during the operation of the supply agreement, Achilla could (and for most of that period did) do work which included the making of corrugated partitions. Achilla had a Mecanelec (machine 325), two slitters (machines 500 & 501), a band saw (machine 495) and a partition maker (machine 421) and after September 2003, it obtained an additional partition slotter which was also given the machine number 421.[967]
763 It is common ground that, from about June 2004, Mr Holihan conducted a review into partitions work. The background to that review was canvassed by Mr Holihan in his witness statement, as follows:
Review of Achilla's corrugated partitions (June 2004)
[193] On 9 June 2004, Nellies forwarded me an email from Nick Vernicos (Vernicos) concerning Achilla's service levels regarding corrugated partitions for an AFP Customer, Pieroth Wines. Vernicos was a member of AFP's sales team. To the best of my recollection, Vernicos' email was the only complaint that Achilla received from AFP regarding its partitions.
[194] Shortly after receiving this email, I reviewed the partition work that Achilla was then doing for AFP. I discovered several issues with the way in which partition work was being managed by AFP in relation to the PICK system. Among other things, I discovered that:
(a) AFP had entered orders into the system without giving Achilla the 'lead time' that had been agreed with Nellies in August 2003 [CB5/1783];
(b) all of the Raw Products for OME work had been sent by AFP's freight carriers to Wetherill Park rather than Tarlington Place where the partitions were being made for AFP, resulting in double handling; and
(c) jobs that were sent to Achilla were frequently 'short supplied' in the sense that not enough corrugated cardboard had been sent to Achilla in order for it to complete the work.
[195] I sent an email to Nellies, with a copy to Bacchetto (Vernicos' boss) and Azzopardi, following my preliminary review of the partitions work on 15 June 2004 [CB5/1913]. I formed the view at the time that it was best to complete a full review into partitions and resolve the issues before taking on more partition work because I thought that taking on more work without resolving the issues would just compound the existing problems. The review process took about one month. During this time I regularly spoke with Bacchetto who never raised this as an issue with me. If this had of [sic] been a major issue for AFP I would have expected Bacchetto and others to raise it with me. Nobody ever did.
[196] I worked with Nellies to seek to resolve the issues. My main concern was to work out why the PICK system was not properly calculating the amount of cardboard needed for partition jobs, which resulted in short supply of Products and late deliveries of Finished Products. [CB6/1964 and CB6/1962] are two emails that I sent to Nellies regarding the issue of the short supply of cardboard.
[197] I also reviewed all of the partition work that Achilla had done for AFP in the period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004, using information obtained from PICK. I ascertained that, in that period, Achilla had invoiced AFP for more than 277,000 corrugated partitions but that there had been short supplied cardboard totalling almost 46,000sqm. On 23 July 2004 I emailed Nellies with my conclusion and the figures that backed it up, which I'd had extracted from PICK [CB6/1982].
[198] The issue that I had discovered was finally resolved in September by an e-mail from Crouch to me and Papadimatos dated 27 September 2004 [CB6/2022].
[199] In the meantime, from mid-July 2004, following my review of the partitions' work, Achilla produced corrugated partitions for AFP without issue. [...] I was not aware that AFP's partition work was being sent elsewhere, other than for a short period during which the issues with the PICK system and partition work were resolved in consultation with Nellies and Crouch.
...
Responses to particular allegations made by APA
...
Acquiescence
[324] Nobody ever asked me whether AFP could send work the subject of the Supply Agreement to other suppliers, and I never said that that could happen. I accept that some partitions work was sent to other suppliers during the review of the partitions work described above, and I knew that some work was sent to other suppliers during the 3-day AMWU stoppage in 2003 (and I had agreed to provide tooling for that purpose), but in both circumstances I felt forced to accept that happening by reason of factors that were outside my control.
764 The email chain referred to in the extract above (that ended with the email Mr Holihan sent to Mr Nellies on 15 June 2004, following his preliminary review of the partitions work), took place in response to an email directive issued by Mr Azzopardi (NSW Estimating) to Amcor's 'NSW Estimating Department' concerning 'OME Work', dated 25 May 2004 and copied to Mr Bacchetto. In his email, Mr Azzopardi stated:
All OME work is now required to be sent through Wetherill Park. Inter company OME is to stay, but all other cardboard/laminating OME is to go via Wetherill Park.
Work that we usually allocate to Northwest is to the [sic] quoted 1st through Wetherill Park, if Wetherill Park come back and say that they can not do it then we are to go elsewhere.
Sales need to understand that there will be times where Wetherill Pk may not be able to do the job and we are then require [sic] us to go elsewhere, therefore additional time will be required for quoting turn around.[968]
765 Mr Vernicos responded by email to Mr Nellies dated 9 June 2004, copying in Mr Azzopardi and Mr Bacchetto, as follows:
Darren,
No problem BUT... are we going to see ACB WP lift its service levels.
Lets [sic] take partions [sic] for Pieroth Wines 71864-006 partitions as an example.
Of the last 22 orders- 17 have been late - are we allowing enough time.
I am currently chasing batch 061 which was due 7/6
Paul tells me this has gone outside WP[969] for hand assembly. This now means job travels to 3 sites.[970].
766 Mr Nellies forwarded the email response from Mr Vernicos to Mr Holihan a few minutes later and asked would he like to comment on it. Mr Holihan then set about conducting a review of the partition work that Achilla was then doing for AFP. Following his preliminary review of the partitions work, Mr Holihan responded to Mr Nellies by email sent on 15 June 2004, stating:
Darren, I'm not convinced we are geared up properly to take on any more partition work. I appreciate the support being given.
There are some changes required in the way we do things in this area which will take me a couple of months to sort out. We'll keep doing what we have and I will ensure we improve our level of service.
All litho work is not an issue as it is the reason Tarlington Place exists.
The Corrugated Pallet for Kellogg's is also no problem, with samples being made this week to be given to the rep for approval.
The solid fibre board is another which I believe we can do. I'll have some prices on that work to Vince & you by the end of the month. [971]
767 When giving oral evidence at the trial, Mr Holihan had difficulty recalling the precise duration of the review period. As noted above, in his witness statement he said that the issue with partitions that he discovered, apparently in early June 2004, and determined to review in mid-June 2004, was 'finally resolved in September' 2004.
768 In the course of cross-examination, Senior Counsel for Amcor drew to Mr Holihan's attention the fact that the 16 Northwest Packaging jobs Achilla had claimed for extended beyond the duration of the review and included jobs that were performed by Northwest Packaging while the review was on foot:
[DR McNICOL:] ...Irrespective of how it was that you calculated your costs, the costs that you would have incurred, you agree that you are claiming these as a breach, an asserted lost profit for a particular job that actually was a job that Northwest Packaging did during a period that you were reviewing your partition work?---Yes, but the review wasn't for that whole entire period.
Well, when did the review finish?---It's in my witness statement somewhere, but it lasted about two weeks, two to three weeks.[972]
769 Mr Holihan said that he could not recall the start and end dates of the review period but reiterated that he believed the partitions review 'lasted about two to three weeks.'[973] Senior Counsel then asked him to clarify the start date, which he said was '15 June 2004'.[974] He was then asked about the end date, and the following exchange ensued:
[DR McNICOL:] Now, what was the end date you said for the review?---I'd need to be calculating it out, but it was two to three weeks from 15 June.
Two to three weeks. So it could have been some time in August then - or July, sorry?---Four weeks would take it to 15 June. So three weeks would be seven days before that. So 7 July - sorry - would be three weeks.
And you haven't got any evidence to give to the court today about the actual finishing of the review?---No. It wasn't a big issue at the time. People like Bacchetto and Nellies - nobody really raised it as being a major concern. So it's only recently been brought up in this matter, but at the time it just was addressed and fixed, and everybody moved on.
So some of these earlier jobs in the quantum particulars obviously fall within a period of time where you've claimed a breach for jobs that you were not doing because you were reviewing your partitions job. Would you agree with that?---Yes, but you took me to paragraph 324 before - is what I say.[975]
770 Following the luncheon adjournment, Mr Holihan sought to re-visit and correct the evidence he had given about the length of the review period. He said he had re-read his statement, noting that in paragraph 195 he had said one month, and then sought to correct his oral evidence, as follows:
HER HONOUR: Well, if that's not correct you've got the opportunity to correct it?---There was no documents to put a date on it. I - this morning I was thinking of three weeks. In the statement I said a month. We're around there. We're not far.[976]
771 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan then confirmed that the finishing date for the review was 'about 15 July 2004'.[977]
772 On 15 July 2004, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Nellies, informing him that he had 'completed the exercise', a reference to the review, and was sending through as an attachment 'as a snap shot'.[978] He said 'All the OME partitions are correct and therefore not included' and added he would 'like to get together with [Mr Nellies] to work through a solution.'[979] The attachment listed five jobs and identified in each case the actual square metres required, the square metres calculated by PICK and the difference between the two.[980]
773 Mr Holihan was taken to another email that he had sent to Mr Nellies, dated 23 July 2004 concerning 'Partition.Sqm.xls'. He had attached to the email what he described as 'a file of Partitions with errors in the sqm', observing that 'it looks as if it's out by 46,000 sqm in the period 1st Aug 03 to 30th June 04.'[981] He asked Mr Nellies to let him know if he required any further information and said 'we would like to set up the masters around the new partition slotter', details of which he would advise next week, adding that this 'will be quicker and therefore a cheaper route.'[982] Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan was asked to clarify whether or not this email related to the partitions review, as follows:
[DR McNICOL:] So I'm just wanting you to clarify whether or not this is or is not related to the review?---Part of the review established that we were being short paid for the work that we had done. And part of that review was a claim that I made on Amcor. And that's the review, that attachment, that says that the PICK system had miscalculated the amount of square metres by 46,000 and there was a claim for subsequent payment made to Achilla for the work that we had done in that period 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004.
Now, is that part of the review or not, that email? Is that to do with the review or not?---It came out of the review, yes.[983]
774 The Holihan parties contend that the three issues that Mr Holihan identified in the partitions review[984] were 'issues within the processes of the Amcor parties, not within Achilla.'[985] That is, they say the first issue, that AFP had entered orders into the system without giving Achilla the 'lead time' that had been agreed with Mr Nellies in August 2003,[986] was a failure by Mr Nellies to comply with the agreed lead times. The second issue, of double handling as a result of the raw Products for the OME work being delivered by AFP's freight carriers to Achilla's Wetherill Park Premises rather than to the Tarlington Place Premises where the partitions were being made for AFP, was a failure by the Amcor parties to deliver the raw Product to the correct address. And the third issue, that jobs sent to Achilla were frequently 'short supplied' in that AFP would deliver insufficient corrugated cardboard to Achilla in order for it to complete the work, was an issue with the failure of the PICK system to identify the correct amount of board required for the partitions work such that the Amcor parties would short supply the raw Product for Achilla to do that work. In his witness statement,[987] Mr Holihan explained the steps he took to resolve these issues.
775 Mr Nellies gave some evidence-in-chief on the partitions issue, but it was pitched at a level of generality. When asked whether he had ever had any discussions with Mr Holihan about partition work, he said he recalled a couple of discussions:
[MR TRAN:] And what was said in those discussions?---... initially we had some issues with some supply and turnaround time and - and...delivering on time, service on - service on those particular things.
You said, "We had some issues", who - - -?---Amcor, as in we, okay, sorry.
And what was the effect of those issues?---...customer complaints...and a - and account manager agitation.
What were the discussions with Mr Holihan about then?---...to improve ...performance more than anything else, on those particular things. ...it wasn't - so a lot of that work would have previously been done by other suppliers.
Other suppliers. Which other suppliers?---...people like Northwest and SPS had done this partition work for us.
So do you remember whenabouts it was that you were having these discussions with Mr Holihan?---...I can't recall specific days, ...but yeah, it - it was - I know there were some discussions.
Was Mr Holihan doing partition work for Amcor during those discussions?---Yes.
And did those issues ever get resolved?---...I don't recall the closure, to say that they were fully resolved, ...we - we may have had an improvement, okay, but it's all going to be dependent on - I don't have the data in front of me to say whether it was successful or not.[988]
776 Mr Nellies also gave evidence about the partitions review and the three issues identified by Mr Holihan. In relation to the first issue, Mr Nellies agreed during cross-examination that there would be 'fluctuation' in lead times for partitions. The lead times were the agreed service level between the two businesses for partitions work ex Wetherill Park.[989] Mr Nellies explained that as the 'lead time ... was potentially fluctuating daily',[990] depending on the load on other machines,[991] the agreed procedure was for a lead time sheet to be circulated each day 'that detailed the next available delivery date for each machine across the entire three manufacturing plants in New South Wales'[992] and, for example, it 'would tell you the next available date that the Jumbo could manufacture a job.'[993] He said that the daily lead timesheet was issued out to the business, for 'the benefit of the Wetherill Park employees and also the Revesby and Smithfield employees'.[994] The Amcor parties contended that no set 'lead time' had been agreed with Nellies in August 2003.
777 Under cross-examination, Mr Nellies was taken to the email exchange that took place with Mr Holihan in July 2004 and then asked about the issues Mr Holihan had identified in the course of his partitions review. The following extract shows that Mr Nellies had difficulty in giving meaningful answers, and he frankly acknowledged that he had little recall of the detail of the issues.
[MR TRAN:] Mr Holihan gives evidence that he looked into the issues with the partitions work and in the course of doing that review, he worked with you. Does that jog your memory?---No, it does not.
I'll tell you that what he says is that as a result of that review, he worked out that there were three problems with the partitions work and I'd just like your comments on it, if I can. First, that AFP had entered orders into the system and didn't give Achilla the lead time that had been agreed?---Well, the - - -
Do you remember that?---Well, the evidence would have to match up. I - I wouldn't be able to comment, because it will be based on what orders were placed on a day on a - on a lead time that was potentially fluctuating daily. For me to know generally, no.
So you don't remember there being any issues with inadequate lead times being provided?---Not - not that I've been - not that I'm aware of, not that I remember.
Okay, do you remember that AFP had been sending the raw materials needed for the partitions work to the Wetherill Park premises, rather than the Tarlington Place premises?---...the job would have been sent to where the job was routed to go... - - -
Well, I'm not asking you to speculate, I'm asking - - -?---No, no, I know - no, I'm just telling you this is where - this is how it works, because the job has a routing within - and this would have been still in PICK, so PICK would have had a routing that said...I run the board off the corrugator and I send it to Wetherill Park. If Wetherill Park choose to have that machinery at another site, Amcor would have to reroute jobs just to indicate that these needed to go to a different location. And I don't recall that every [sic.] happening.
I see. So you don't recall work being sent to Wetherill Park in circumstances - I withdraw that. Cardboard being sent to Wetherill Park in circumstances where it ought to have been sent to Tarlington Place?---There's - there's no way that we would know that it had to go to Tarlington Place, if that's where machinery was there now, because Wetherill Park had determined that all partition work was going to get made at Tarlington Place.
You - - -?---Because we would have to - we would have to change materials, set up new - new locations to transfer other material and that's - that's a lot of work for Amcor to have to do. ...there would have been - there should have been discussion on that or expectation on that and that's - that's really the responsibility of Wetherill Park that if they choose to - let's even call it outsource that work, even though it's gone to a different location, then that's Wetherill Park's responsibility to ensure that that work gets there on time. Our agreement is to send work to Wetherill Park, ...our agreement, I don't believe, was ever to be sent to Wetherill Park's outsourcer, okay, if that's the term we want to use, in this situation. It would be very difficult for Amcor to be able to do that.[995]
778 The Holihan parties submit that the issues Mr Holihan identified were investigated and resolved promptly, and from mid July 2004, Achilla produced partitions for AFP without issue.[996] They contend that in circumstances where the Amcor parties did not equip Achilla with the ability to do the partitions work, they cannot rely on Achilla not having performed the supply of that work on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. Further, they say that even if that defence does apply to partitions work during the review period, it cannot apply to partitions work done after mid July 2004 when the issues were resolved.
779 The evidence shows that in late May 2004, the Amcor parties sought to send 'all OME Work' through Wetherill Park, other than 'intercompany OME'. That email directive issued by Mr Azzopardi prompted an immediate response from one of the NSW estimators to the effect that there were issues about the partitions work product supplied by Achilla, its service levels and the timeliness of its performance. After conducting a preliminary assessment, Mr Holihan's response was to undertake the partitions review as a means of investigating the issues that had been raised. Importantly, he informed Mr Nellies that while he appreciated the support given to Achilla, he was 'not convinced we are geared up properly to take on any more partition work' and added that '[t]here are some changes required in the way we do things in this area which will take me a couple of months to sort out' and meanwhile Achilla would keep doing what jobs they have and he would ensure that they improve their level of service.[997] That is, having made some preliminary assessment, Mr Holihan did not dismiss the issues that had been raised by Amcor. On the contrary, acting responsibly, he investigated the partitions issues.
780 The Amcor parties also responded in a reasonable and sensible fashion, in effect accepting and acting upon Mr Holihan's advice that Achilla could not take on any more partition work for the next couple of months and re-routing it through to Northwest Packaging. That the partitions review later identified issues which the Holihan parties contend were caused by the Amcor parties is not to the point. The reality is that Mr Holihan's advice to Mr Nellies demonstrates that, at that point in time, Achilla effectively acknowledged an inability on its part to supply partitions through that foreshadowed period 'consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.' Given the lead time for work being ordered and the fact that Mr Holihan notified Mr Nellies the review was likely to take a 'couple of months', it follows that Achilla's claim for partitions work in the review period of a 'couple of months' from 15 June 2004 must fail.
Issue 3(d)(vi)****: The work involved the manufacture or supply of knives
781 Several witnesses gave evidence about knives, and in particular 'standing knives', what function they performed, who made them and how much they cost. Evidence was also given by Mr Garcia that Amcor had its own 'knife making' business called 'Rotadie'.[998]
782 The Holihan parties do not make any claim in relation to the manufacture of knives. They do, however, claim for the supply of knives (i.e. dies).
783 The Amcor parties' response, as set out in the Summary Particulars, is to the effect that Achilla was not permitted to sub-contract the supply of knives (item 17(f)), that the supply of knives was not part of, or the same as, the business that prior to execution of the Second Sale Agreement APA provided to ACB Co Vendor (items 23 and 30), and that the supply of knives was not an OME supply of Products (item 33). As will be apparent, each of the essential issues raised has effectively been addressed in the context of discussing other grounds above.
784 The Amcor parties did not separately plead that they were entitled to rely upon the clause 12.2 carve-out in relation to the supply of knives, but in their written and oral submissions, the Amcor parties effectively sought to resist the Holihan parties' claim for the supply of knives on that basis also as part of their rolled up arguments about 'repeat work' and 'different work'.[999] The Holihan parties responded by denying that the exception was enlivened and objected to the argument being put on the basis that it departed from the Amcor parties' pleaded and particularised case. Further, the Holihan parties contended that there was no evidence to support the Amcor parties' reliance on the contractual carve-out in the case of knife supply, such that their purported reliance on the carve-out was not made out.[1000]
785 Mr Garcia gave evidence that Amcor supplied the tooling for OME jobs about 90 percent of the time, because there is 'no point to, to let another people make money when we can make money.'[1001] He explained this further saying:
---You see if you need to make knife you going [sic.] straight away to the knife manufacturing and they will charge me $400 and they will charge maybe another people $400 and these people will charge me $500. Where is the point to go to another person? I go straight away to the people who make the tooling.[1002]
786 Where a knife was made for one machine it could not usually just be transferred across to another machine and be expected to operate. Mr Garcia explained the position, saying:
[MR TRAN:] Why's that?---All the machine are different. The rotary machine they have different cylinders, they are a different size. You can't put one knife from one machine to another one. And the same happen with the flat bed. The flat bed some machine - some knife are different.
HER HONOUR: I'm sorry, Mr Garcia, I didn't hear what the term was you said, the same thing with a?---The cylinder or the machine are different.
Yes?---Some machine have a big cylinder another different, and the knife doesn't fit from one machine to another one.
That's right, and then you said the same thing with?---A flat bed.
A flat bed, thank you.
MR TRAN: And so did you know what kinds of machines other OME suppliers had?---Yeah.[1003]
787 Mr Garcia went on to say that where the OME work involved the use of a knife, he would usually only shift work between OME suppliers if he knew the knife would fit the equipment used at the new supplier's premises, otherwise he would not do it. The reason, he explained, was a commercial one:
[MR TRAN:] And why is that?---You had to buy another tooling to - to fit another machine. Who will pay for the tooling? How can I tell the boss I will spend $600 and I cannot punish the customer, I have to pay - the company had to pay for the knife I want to do the change. You see the customer only pay for the knife, for the tooling once.
So the customer would pay for the tooling at some point, and when did that - - -?---Yeah, a contribution.
And when would that be?---The first time, the first batch we charge a customer a contribution.
And if there weren't complaints would you change the OME supplier on an existing job?---Not really.
Not really. If I just give you a moment to think, can you remember any other reasons because you said that you might change if there was a complaint?---Yeah, I change it, yeah, yes, I change it.
Other than if there was a complaint, can you think of any other reason why you would change the OME supplier on an existing job?---Another reason? No, no, unless - if everything is happy with the, with the supplier we have now I will not touch it. I will not touch it.
And sorry if we've covered this before but it will be my last question, why wouldn't you touch it if there weren't any complaints?---Why you want to - to make trouble? Maye [sic.] you change it to somebody else and you'll start to have problems, and at the moment this supply maybe run 50 times and nobody complained, everybody's happy.[1004]
788 Mr Garcia accepted, however, that even with repeat work performed by the one supplier over time, the knife might occasionally need to be replaced if, for example, it became damaged.[1005] In the case of rotary knives, as opposed to flat knives, Mr Garcia said they might cost in the order of $6-$7,000. He said that the ACB Business had 'one machine to use as rotary, the Coppers [sic.]' and agreed that ACB was the only OME that had a rotary die-cutter.[1006]
789 Mr Cichonski gave evidence to similar effect about repeat work involving the use of knives being sent to the same OME supplier. Under cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
[MR TRAN:] If an OME had a knife or a die for a particular job?---Yes.
Would Amcor send a subsequent for that same job to that same OME supplier usually?---Yes.
And why is that?---Ease of doing business.
Could you expand on that in a little bit more detail?---Yeah, sure.
Thanks?---The dies are expensive. They are sharp blades and they have a fair bit of rubbering on them to help with the stripping process and that kind of thing to produce the shape that you want to produce. The more times you transport tooling around the place, the more risk there is of getting that damaged, which means then some rework, which is then going to affect your service levels and/or quality. ...so - and in some cases, a die may not necessarily fit someone else's piece of equipment.
And who would pay for these dies? Would the OME supplier charge Amcor for the making of the die?---To be honest, I'm not 100 per cent sure.
Sure?---Typically we would pay for it in there somewhere.
Okay?---So if we didn't supply it, they perhaps may have, but we would pay for it.
Sure?---You won't get a die for free.[1007]
790 Mr Phillips also gave evidence to the effect that tooling could be moved from one location to another, provided that it would fit the machinery at the new location or could be cut down to suit a smaller machine. But he said that it was '[n]ot often' that tooling would be moved, and '[n]ormally only as a result of a change of supplier,'[1008] by which he meant:
---If for instance a customer decided that the person who was supplying the work was not dividing it on a timely or a pricewise fashion it quite easily could be said that we don't want you to do the work anymore, we're transferring it a company, please transfer those tools to that company.[1009]
791 In my view, the Holihan parties' claim that they were entitled to receive work which involved the 'supply' of knives is to be addressed in a similar way to other OME work which was subcontracted or outsourced. As Achilla did not itself make knives, if knives were required for a particular OME job, then Achilla would either have to procure them from a third party supplier such as J S Cutting or else they would be supplied by APA when the work was ordered. The evidence given by Mr Garcia was to the effect that Amcor would usually arrange any knives directly so as to avoid incurring a double margin, and then provide the knife to the OME supplier along with the corrugated board or printed sheets. Any job that involved only the supply of knives, as opposed to a job where the supply of knives was an integral part of the larger body of work to be performed, would not be regarded as an OME supply.
Issue 3(d)(viii)****: The work involved the repeat of work previously conducted by third parties
792 This issue reflects a ground of defence that was added to the Amcor parties' defence in late May 2015, shortly before the commencement of the trial. In paragraph 29(c) of their defence, the Amcor parties plead that the 'purchase and/or procurement of supplies was made in accordance with clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession on and from 21 March 2005 to the end of the Period and/or the implied supply agreement (the existence of which is denied).' In the particulars subjoined to paragraph 29 they state:
...They further say that it was in accordance with the terms of clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement and/or the implied Supply Agreement (the existence of which is denied) for "repeat orders" to be given to the OME supplier who had previously performed that OME work.
"Repeat orders" means orders placed by customers for products (the production of which required OME work to be done) which those customers had placed before. Repeat orders are a kind of job that Achilla was unable to supply consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. In particular, repeat orders that were being placed with other OME suppliers could not be done by Achilla consistently, on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
The identification of repeat orders was known from the unique numbers allocated to every OME job ordered and placed in the PICK system. An example of such unique job numbers is "33326 - 101 - 40". The first number in the chain identified the customer (in this example the customer is RTS). The second number referenced the type of product being requested. The third number referenced the number of times that product had been produced or repeated for that customer. In the example above that product had been produced or repeated for RTS 40 times. This job numbering system and the existence of repeat orders was known to and understood by Achilla and its staff.
793 Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend that they did not breach clause 12.2 in respect of 'repeat orders' because 'repeat orders' could not be done by Achilla on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
794 At the trial, the issue of 'repeat orders' was opened by Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties, as follows:
The evidence will establish our case or establish that some things positively have to be established to the requisite standard and for example repeat orders is an area which we'll be coming to in this case. Now the evidence we say will establish that repeat orders is a term which is familiar in the industry, and it refers to an order of OME work for a product ordered by an end customer which has been done by a particular OME supplier before, in the past, because the end customer has placed an order for that product with the relevant Amcor entity in the past.
The evidence will show as a general proposition that we say Achilla could not necessarily provide OME supplies consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability where a different supplier was doing it previously. The previous supplier will have already been geared up, that is there are set up costs which have already been set up to do that work, and the relevant part of Amcor will already be set up to direct the work to them. The pre-existing procuring with that supplier. So shifting a repeat order to a new supplier we will say is not often done in the industry without good reason, because it will introduce unknowns and variables and uncertainties into what is a specific, precisely defined and established process, a pre-existing process.[1010]
795 With the filing of written closing submissions, it became clear that the Amcor parties' case was effectively that:
(a) on a proper construction of clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla was not entitled to any 'repeat work';[1011] and
(b) Achilla could not supply 'repeat work' consistently and on a basis that was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.[1012]
796 The Holihan parties contend that the Amcor parties' 'repeat orders' claim is vague and lacking in necessary detail. Further, they say that the Amcor parties 'fail to identify, by reference to the 1,913 jobs, which of the jobs they contend were "repeat jobs", and they fail to state, in respect of each and every "repeat job", why it was that the exception in clause 12.2 was engaged.'[1013] They submit that the words of exception or 'carve-out' embody a contractual requirement of 'consistent' default or sub-standard performance before reliance upon the exception can be justified. It follows, they say, that the clause does not permit of a blanket carve-out of the repeat work class, without Achilla first being given the opportunity to do each repeat order.
797 Jobs that were 'repeat jobs' can be identified from the job numbers on the invoices or purchase orders. The evidence before the Court was that in the PICK system, orders were given a code in the form:
The next three digits were the specific job or box to be made
The final two digits were the cycle, batch or repeat number
798 Each customer had its own code (first five digits), and each product which that customer ordered from Amcor had its own job code (next three digits). The term a 'master' was used to refer to the customer code and the job code, taken together. Mr Nellies explained that a 'master' is a detailed specification of a job. He said it 'would hold all the information concerning all the specifications, whether it be size or style, its routing and just the details of how it goes through the board size, board grade et cetera.'[1014] His evidence was to the effect that if OME work was to be re-routed to another OME supplier, say to Achilla in place of the previous supplier, then it would be necessary to change the master for that job.[1015]
799 On each occasion that the customer ordered the specified product from Amcor, the cycle, batch or repeat number would increase by one (i.e., final two digits). But, importantly, the number of times produced figure shows only the number of times the job had been ordered rather than the number of times the particular OME supplier had produced the earlier jobs. Indeed Mr Phillips, who gave evidence on behalf of Amcor, acknowledged that the batch or repeat number says nothing about the number of times that a particular OME supplier may have made the particular product.[1016] Generally, the evidence was that, in the ordinary course, the same product would have been produced by the one OME supplier over time but there were occasions when dies and other tooling were shifted and the job was produced by another OME supplier.
800 Mr Nellies gave evidence about the routing of a 'repeat order' and jobs generally, both before and after the sale to the Holihan parties, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now are the steps the same or different if the customer is ordering a box which he has already ordered from Amcor before?---[...] if the job has already been - is a repeat order, is what we used to call them, then the specification was already in PICK. It did not have to go through any different processes. So the customer would just place the order for that box again and we would produce the next batch of something. So there was a numeric process, so every customer would have a customer number, every - every different specification we made for them was called a box code and that's a three digit number and then every time that they ordered that particular box code it was then determined to be a batch and that was just a - a sequential numbering system. So batch 1, batch 2, batch 3, batch 4 based on how many times that they ordered then.
When would an estimator be involved? You said that they would be involved with the first order, what about the second batch order?---The only time it would be - estimator would be involved in a subsequent batch is if the quantity being ordered was different to an existing quantity grade that was in the system. So if the customer wanted us to set up initially that an order was for 1,000 boxes and the next time they wanted to order 500 or 5,000, then they could also request a different pricing based on that different quantity.
Why wouldn't an estimator be involved with subsequent batches of the same job?---Well once it was established then the routing had already been determined on how that job was going to be made so it didn't need to have an estimators expertise put in there to say - to put it into the system again.
Now was that ordering process and estimating process the same or different after the sale to Mr Holihan?---It was the same. It never changed.
How did Amcor route work to Mr Holihan's business after the sale of the business to Mr Holihan?---It was the same set up as it was before the sale as well. The Wetherill Park business was also on the PICK system. So from an estimating point of view our estimators would route work to the machines that were in the Wetherill Park business. Whether it be to Jumbo, to Coppers [sic.], the hot melt gluer, whatever that happened to be and then the system just took - had the costings accordingly.
Did Amcor or the estimators have to ring Mr Holihan for a quote?---No.
Why is that?---Because the costing system was done in the system. The whole - the whole premise of how the contract was set - was established was based on the costings that were in the PICK system. So my understanding was that he was given a percentage of whatever the costings were. What they call the D & D percentage plus a certain percentage on top of that. And that information was determined by what was in PICK. So we never had to go to the ACB business for any costings at all.
How would Amcor know whether Mr Holihan's business could do the job on time?---On a daily business we would - we issued out a lead timesheet. ... And that detailed the next available delivery date for each machine across the entire three manufacturing plants in New South Wales.[1017]
801 Mr Garcia also gave evidence about what was the usual position with 'repeat orders', to the effect that, in the ordinary course, work that was a repeat job would continue to be routed to the supplier who had performed the work on the last occasion, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] If I could ask you now what are the steps that would be involved if the customer wanted to order a job which Amcor had already made for that customer before?---They would supply with a master number. The customer will know the number for the job for future orders. Every time the customer ordered they need to supply us with a number.
Would an estimator be involved with those orders where Amcor has already made the box for the customer before?---No, no, no estimator, no estimators the job is finished, after they create the master is finished.
Would an estimator ever be involved in a subsequent order of a job that Amcor had done for that customer before?---No, after the job is created with the master number the estimator have nothing to do anymore.
If the existing job required an OME to complete, would the same OME be used for subsequent orders - - -?---Yeah, yes, yes.
Would you ever change the OME supplier for that repeat job?---No.
Why is that?---If you already have a vendor who do the job and you are happy with them you don't need to change it. Unless something happened, I don't know.
Unless something happened. Can you remember from your time in Amcor any examples of something happening such that you would change OME supplier?---No, I don't remember any.[1018]
802 It will be recalled that Mr Garcia was an estimator who worked with Amcor until December 2004, when he left to join Achilla. In April 2013 he resigned from Achilla and then resumed work with Orora (within the Amcor group) a few months later. His evidence was to the effect that from his many years of experience in the industry, he knew what machinery each of the OME suppliers had, and who could do the work and at what price. When he was asked how he would decide which supplier would be given the job, he responded as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now if a job needed an OME supplier to complete it how would you decide between OME suppliers?---In 2004 like now I know all the vendors limitations. I know what these people can do or not.
How do you know that?---Maybe the years I work in the industry. I know what machine ACB have, I know what machine Northwest have and I know what job they can do.
Did you ever go to - did you ever visit these other suppliers?---I visit a few of them, yes.
Can you think what factors would you take into account in choosing between OME suppliers?---The price.
Anything else?---This was early when we shopping around Yes?---Yes, one of them was the price.
You say one of them?---Yes.
Did you take into account anything else?---Not really, no.
How would you know what price the OME suppliers could do?---When I quote - I used to quote something OME I send it to three or four different supplies. Some of them come back on the same day, some of them come back - take two days but when I got all of them back is when I choose which one.[1019]
803 The Holihan parties submitted that Mr Garcia had said nothing about the commerciality (in terms of price, quality and availability, or otherwise) of Achilla with reference to the existing supplier for 'repeat work' and the fact that APA had a practice of using established suppliers for repeat work, and that Mr Garcia could not recall an example of a change in supplier, is irrelevant.[1020] I do not agree. Mr Garcia made clear that in his role as an estimator, when allocating a fresh job, price was a relevant consideration and he would shop around before determining which OME supplier he would choose to perform the OME work. And once allocated, that price would generally remain valid and effective for consecutive orders of the same job. Mr Prasad of All Pack gave evidence, under cross-examination, to the effect that once they set and quoted Amcor a price, they would stay with the quoted price for the repeat jobs.[1021] He said the customer would be aware of that price, and it would apply whenever they ordered that work 'unless there was a variation.'[1022]
804 The evidence given by Mr Phillips on behalf of Amcor was also consistent with the 'leave well enough alone' type of approach with respect to repeat work that was described by Mr Garcia. During cross-examination, it was put to Mr Phillips that since 2000 he had not been in a 'hands on' role with Amcor, dealing face to face with customers and making decisions about where to route work, so he could not assist the Court as to what Amcor's practice was in relation to repeat and rollover work in the period from 31 July 03 to 31 July 08. He agreed that he had not been making such decisions in that period but observed that his evidence was relevant 'in as much as it wouldn't have changed' and 'the reasons behind the using of the particular supplier for repeat work would still remain' because 'there's nothing that's changed in the business that would cause you to suggest any other.'[1023]
805 Ms Charlotte Gerke, an employee with Amcor for more than 20 years, who has been the NSW Customer Services Manager for Orora Fibre Packaging since 2006, also gave evidence on behalf of the Amcor parties about repeat orders or 'roll over' jobs for which a third party had been engaged to complete the OME work.[1024] In her affidavit, she described repeat jobs as 'particular packaging or display products that a customer ordered at regular intervals' that 'may require particular and special artwork and graphics, tooling such as dies or plates that require investment and specialist know-how to establish.'[1025] She added that once a third party supplier arrangement was established for particular OME work, 'such repeat work would usually continue to be routed to that supplier to ensure consistency in quality timing and price as demanded by our customers.'[1026] In her affidavit, Ms Gerke also explained that while it is critical to ensure that a quality product is delivered to customers on time, and to the correct specifications and at the right price, in the case of a repeat job, 'it is also crucial that this job is delivered to the same quality each time.'[1027] She then gave an example of an instance she recalled where a repeat job was given to a different OME supplier and the (unidentified) customer was dissatisfied:
I recall an example when a repeat job was given to a third party supplier different to the supplier that had normally completed the work for that type of job. The new supplier was unable to complete the job to the specifications and there was an incident with it being bundled or packed in the incorrect manner. This meant that my customer could not then process the packed product through its own machines/systems and the entire batch had to be discarded or redone. This caused a number of difficulties as the product was late, there were considerable wasted costs, and in particular I had a very unhappy customer.[1028]
806 Mr Pellizzari of Northwest Packaging also gave evidence, under cross-examination, about the benefits to Amcor, the customer and the OME supplier in repeat work being done by the same OME supplier, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now were there advantages to Northwest Packaging in Amcor placing the same order with Northwest Packaging on multiple occasions?---There were definite advantages, continuity of price, speed, speed through service, so and in - if we knew that this was a repeat order, sometimes we would pre-empt their order and that would be at our risk, but we would pre-empt the order and then carry some finished stock on there just in case. Because it was not unusual to have a phone call to say, "We've run out of stock. Can you get something for us urgently." So I wouldn't be - I would be fairly safe to say that we would carry a little bit of stock on the floor, maybe not the whole amount, but we would have some there to at least assist their client, and then we'd potentially finish the order.
So my question there, Mr Pellizzari, was directed to whether there were any advantages for Northwest Packaging. I think your answer may be viewed to advantages for other people. Could we focus first anyway, were there advantages to Northwest Packaging by having repeat orders placed with it?---Sales, basically the advantage for us was that we would collect sales, so we were - it was service, so that's we've always hinged our business on.
Did you consider there to be advantages to Amcor in sending repeat orders to you?---Yes.
And what did you consider those to be?---Continuity of supply and service, easy to do business with.
And based in particular on your experience, your sales experience dealing with external customers, did you consider there to be benefits to the end customer in repeat orders being placed with Northwest Packaging?---Yes.
And what were those advantages?---The ability to have the service that they needed in the event that they required the stock urgently, and also the competitive nature of the product.[1029]
807 Under cross-examination, Mr Joyce was asked about the process of re-routing OME work to another supplier. He prefaced his evidence on this topic by stating that he had 'just a very broad understanding' of how the PICK system operated, acquired as a result of his 'interactions and conversations with the expert practitioners that existed within the business'.[1030] Relevantly, his evidence was as follows:
[MR TRAN:] So prior to the sale to Mr Holihan, so this is pre 2003, I'd just like to ask you some questions to understand how PICK would work between Amcor and ACB business. So do you understand this is before the sale to Mr Holihan?---I do.
If an order was placed with Amcor, and Amcor wanted to route it to the ACB business, would they be able to do that using the PICK system?---Yes.
And how would the PICK system work in that situation?---Okay, there are two scenarios that you would have to consider. If - and the easiest one is if there was a repeat order from a customer, then that job or the specifications behind that job would have already been established within the PICK system. So the customer service officer would be able to access the relevant unique code for that customer job and that would automatically assign the manufacturing routing, which could include all manner of converting machines, including those that sat within the Wetherill Park site.
Would someone in Amcor and now I'm just using Amcor to separate it from the ACB business, but this is still presale, so I understand ACB is still part of Amcor?---M'mm.
Would someone at Amcor trying to route it to the ACB machine, need to call someone at the ACB plant to see if they had capacity to do that job?---That - that could be a very real scenario, yes.
It could be. Well, with - through PICK, do you know whether PICK showed you first how much the job would cost if that job was routed to the ACB machine?---Yes it would.
And would it show how long that machine would take to do it?---Yes, it would.
And would it show you how quickly it could do it. For example, if the customer said, I need that within two days?---Ah, it could give you a theoretical delivery date.
What do you mean by theoretical delivery date?---It's always subject to whether there is a heavier loading of other customer or other customer's jobs going through a discrete converting process. So a bottleneck in the manufacturing process.
Well, would PICK at least give you a default position and then you have to ring to check it up, is that how it works?---Yes it would.
Okay. And so after the sale to Mr Holihan, do you know whether the ACB business after the sale was still on PICK?---For a transition period, it was.
And how long was that transition period?---It was approximately 12 months.
[...] When is it that you left Amcor?---In May 2005.
In May 2005. And do you recall whether Mr Holihan was still on PICK at the time that you left?---He was still on PICK at the time.[1031]
808 I am satisfied that both before and after the sale, the usual practice was for repeat orders of OME work that had been performed by a particular supplier in the past to be routed to that same supplier. But there were times when OME work was moved from one OME supplier across to a different OME supplier. One example of this occurring after the sale, was with the Kellogg's pallets (discussed below) that over time were made by a number of different OME suppliers - each of SPS Packaging, Ubeeco and Achilla were making Kellogg's pallets for Amcor entities at some point in time throughout the relevant period. Another example is the partition work discussed above. Although Mr Azzopardi issued a directive concerning 'OME Work' to Amcor's 'NSW Estimating Department' by email dated 25 May 2004, to the effect that henceforth, all OME work was required to be sent through Wetherill Park etc. it did not, as a practical matter, translate into a broader re-assignment of work because of the concerns raised in response by Amcor estimators and sales consultants about Achilla's work. There was also OME work that Mr Holihan asked Mr Nellies to send to Achilla, such as the RTS Imaging work, which would have involved a change to the master details had the customer wished to go ahead with Achilla, but instead the customer responded by taking their work offshore.
809 The Holihan parties submit that it was a relatively simple step to change a 'master' for a job and re-route the work from one OME supplier to another. If particular tooling was involved, enquiries might need to be made to check in advance whether the tooling could be transferred across from one machine of a particular type to another machine of the same type (e.g. from the Platen die-cutter that Le Breton had to the Platen die-cutter of the Achilla business) or whether new tooling would be required, and if so, at what cost.
810 Initially, in their particulars (at paragraph 29(c)), the Amcor parties particularised 'repeat orders' as an example of a class of case where they contend Achilla was unable to supply consistently and on a reasonably acceptable basis. But in their closing submissions, the Amcor parties characterise repeat orders as falling outside clause 12.2 on a proper construction of the clause. The Holihan parties do not agree with this characterisation but in my view, it is the correct one. The issue of repeat orders is consonant with the notion of 'business as usual' in the sense that on a business as usual construction, the ACB Business would, following the sale, be entitled to receive the sort of work that the ACB Business had been doing prior to the sale. Similarly, where prior to the sale, particular OME work was being performed by an alternative supplier, repeat orders of that work ordered after the sale would, in the ordinary course, continue to be made by that supplier. On its proper construction, clause 12.2 does not encompass within the Vendor's obligation any requirement that Achilla be given work that was a 'repeat order' of OME work that prior to the sale was being sent to one or other of the alternative suppliers.
Issue 3(d)(ix)****: The work involved the manufacture of Kellogg's corrugated pallets
811 Kellogg's ordered corrugated cardboard pallets from Amcor on a frequent and ongoing basis. The evidence given by Mr Nellies was to the effect that Kellogg's had asked them to develop a cardboard pallet that they could use to safely transport cereal products both within their business and also to markets overseas. The pallets were made of cardboard because, given the nature of the food industry, Kellogg's required that their plant did not use wooden pallets 'in case bits of wood got into cereal boxes'.[1032] Mr Nellies said that because these cardboard pallets were an ongoing requirement, Kellogg's would only place the actual order when they required the product to be delivered, but in order to be able to supply stock the next day, Amcor 'had to keep a sufficient quantity [of] work in progress all the time of the various components and also finished goods available for them to draw down from as they required them.'[1033]
812 Mr Nellies explained that the process for making the corrugated cardboard pallets had a relatively long lead time and was time-consuming and that the work in progress and finished goods occupied a lot of space, as follows:
What was their typical lead time for these Kellogg's pallets?---The whole cycle probably takes a good three, four, five weeks to get through components. But you have - you have to order - you have to get components in at a certain volume to make it cost effective for yourself to be able to do that. So there'd be a number of different things and if Kellogg's weren't taking them up at a particular time of the year then you'd be stuck with a bit of work in progress and finished goods on the floor.[1034]
813 Mr Nellies said that they 'went through a couple of suppliers with Kellogg's pallets'; initially Ubeeco supplied Kellogg's pallets and later on SPS Packaging took over, and in the end ACB (Achilla) did that work.[1035] When asked if he recalled why there was a change between those three OME suppliers, he said:
---...there was a development of the pallet initially with Ubeeco, with Terry Healy. ...Terry Healy was the account manager at Amcor who went to work for Ubeeco and he developed the concept there with them. The manufacture of that then shifted to SPS Packaging as part of just a change in the way that we purchased that product. SPS Packaging kept a fair - ...bit of work in progress underway, because it's not just the case of being able to have these made up in a day. It takes considerable time to dry and to ...prepare each of the components ready for assembling into a finished product. And then after discussion with Craig we moved the work over to Wetherill Park.
[MR TRAN:] When Amcor moved between suppliers was that an instantaneous move or would there be overlap between - - -?---There would always be a transition because there would be components...that would still be work in progress okay that needed to be finalised, so Amcor would give that commitment to the supplier to use up whatever stock they'd got underway before moving off...to the next agreed supplier of that product.[1036]
814 Annexure C to Mr Holihan's witness statement includes a summary of the Kellogg's corrugated pallets which SPS Packaging, then Achilla and later Ubeeco made for Amcor during the term of the Second Sale Agreement,. Mr Holihan prepared the summary from the discovered and subpoenaed documents[1037] and he set out the relevant supply details as follows:
(a) Part 1 of Annexure C - sets out details of all supplies of Kellogg's pallets made by Achilla for AFP, starting with the first job which Achilla had after it transferred to Kiwi Plan (the order history for work made by Achilla for AFP whilst on PICK was not made available to Achilla when AFP separated Achilla from PICK), commencing with an invoice dated 16 November 2005 and ending with an invoice dated 30 June 2006;
(b) Part 2 of Annexure C - sets out details of the prices charged by SPS Packaging for the Kellogg's pallets supplied to AFP, commencing with an invoice dated 19 August 2003 and ending with an invoice dated 9 December 2004; and
(c) Part 3 of Annexure C - sets out details of the prices charged by Ubeeco for Kellogg's pallets supplied to AFP, commencing with an invoice dated 10 March 2006 and ending with an invoice dated 22 July 2008.
815 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan said that in around April 2004, Mr Azzopardi telephoned him and asked whether he thought he could supply the Kellogg's pallets that were currently being made by SPS Packaging. He said that at that time, Achilla had been making pallets for Power One using pallet feet, or bearers, purchased from SPS Packaging, and had not made pallet feet itself. Nevertheless, he responded to the effect that he did not see why Achilla could not.[1038] Mr Holihan said that shortly after that enquiry he visited SPS Packaging's factory, with a view to seeing how the pallet feet were produced, as follows:
[178] Not long after my conversation with Azzopardi, I visited SPS Packaging's factory and met with Remy and Richard (I can't now recall their last names), two of the owners of SPS Packaging who were customers of Achilla's and acquaintances of mine. I asked them if they knew that Achilla had the contract to produce all of AFP's OME work. I told them that the Kellogg's pallets formed part of that contract and asked if I could see how the feet were produced. They showed me around the factory and how they were making the Kellogg's pallets. I saw the equipment that was being used to make them (a slitter and bandsaw) and that there was a bit of manual work involved (hand assembly and gluing). There was nothing in that work that was not work that Achilla was already doing. I then set about making the necessary arrangements to establish Achilla as a manufacturer of Kellogg's pallets: the emails I sent [CB5/1913 and CB6/1949] were part of that process. Achilla produced Kellogg's pallets orders thereafter.
816 As noted earlier, Mr Pribilovics of SPS Packaging did not remember Mr Holihan coming to the factory and discussing the Kellogg's corrugated pallet product with him, or showing Mr Holihan how to make them. Under cross-examination, Mr Pribilovics said that he would have remembered it if it did take place because 'I would find it strange for me to show my opposition how to make things that I make.'[1039] He said that SPS Packaging did lose the work from Amcor - he said the invoices show that 'it was towards 2008 and there's only about six jobs that we did for them in 2008 and we have not done one job since.'[1040] When Mr Pribilovics enquired with Amcor as to why SPS Packaging had lost the work, he was told that 'they'd gone elsewhere.'[1041]
817 Aside from the issue of how Achilla gained the know-how necessary for making the Kellogg's pallets, Mr Holihan's evidence acknowledges that Achilla did not have the ability to make the Kellogg's pallets in their entirety from within its own resources until sometime after April 2004. (I note also that Mr Holihan's response to the enquiry from Mr Azzopardi was to the effect that he did not see why Achilla could not produce the Kellogg's pallets and he indicated he was receptive to doing this new work. He did not say to Mr Azzopardi that the Kellogg's pallets formed part of the contract and Achilla should be making the Kellogg's pallets already. But he says that he did convey that notion to Mr Pribilovics in his conversation with him. On this issue, I prefer the evidence given by Mr Pribilovics to that given by Mr Holihan.)
818 Reference has been made already to the email exchange between Mr Holihan and Mr Nellies on 15 June 2004 concerning Achilla not being 'geared up properly to take on any more partition work.' But in that same email, Mr Holihan informed Mr Nellies that there was no problem with the corrugated pallet for Kellogg's, 'with samples being made this week to be given to the rep for approval.'[1042] Further, email exchanges in late June 2004 record that a sample was made by Achilla, following which Mr Holihan requested that the master for the Kellogg's pallets job No. 41948-008 be changed 'to reflect it coming out of ACB copying 48846-095 routing.'[1043] The master was eventually changed from SPS Packaging to Achilla on or about 5 July 2004, 'to make 41948-008 exactky [sic.] like 48846-095' as noted in an email from Gabriel Telesca to Mr Holihan.[1044]
819 The Holihan parties contend that from the time of the sale, the ACB Business had the capability to make the Kellogg's corrugated pallets. Mr Holihan's evidence was to the effect that they had the necessary equipment and manual labour available, they were making similar pallets for Power One, and there was nothing in that work that was not work that Achilla was already doing. In giving evidence-in-chief about Exhibit H91, the D & D costing for the first year budget, however, Mr Holihan made reference to the 'Note' at the bottom of the page referring to matters including 'Kelloggs' and said:
I think that relates to - we were at that stage - AFP's customer Kellogg's was receiving their product without a pallet. A pallet being a wooden - wooden pallet and they didn't want to have wooden pallets in their process 'cause they were food manufacturers. Their boxes had to be strapped in such a way that there was no pallet.
So we were looking to take that out of - it was causing a bottleneck in the Amcor AFP business and we were going to look at doing that as a separate item for them so that it took the bottleneck away and this was just a consideration that if that was to occur, 'cause it was a significant volume, that would be done outside of this. [1045]
820 The evidence given by Mr Holihan does not suggest that Achilla was ready to make the Kellogg's pallets from Commencement. On the contrary, it was something that he was 'going to look at doing'. Indeed, his evidence about visiting SPS Packaging's factory in response to the enquiry from Mr Azzopardi in around April 2004 suggests that Mr Holihan believed he needed to understand how it was that SPS Packaging made the corrugated pallets before being confident that Achilla could take on that work. Once the sample was made and approved, however, Mr Holihan requested that the master be changed.
821 Notwithstanding the change in the master, some orders for Kellogg's pallets were fulfilled by SPS Packaging on or after 5 July 2004. Mr Nellies evidence about the 'forecast' ordering practice for the Kellogg's pallets and the need for the suppliers to hold stocks on hand to meet orders, given the lead time involved in making the pallets explains why there was a run off of orders with SPS Packaging before the work was performed by Achilla. The evidence also suggests that some lead time would also have been required for Achilla to build up and establish its stock of Kellogg's pallets so as to have them ready and available for delivery at short notice. The position was that under PICK, once the master was changed, the new work would be ordered from Achilla. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the invoices rendered by SPS Packaging during the balance of 2004 represent work that Achilla was entitled to receive.
822 Annexure C (prepared by Mr Holihan using the discovered documents and subpoenaed documents made available to him) shows that the prices for the Kellogg's pallets fluctuated up and down over time and between the three OME suppliers, as follows:
823 Annexure C shows that the Kellogg's pallet work was being performed by Ubeeco from March 2006 forward and through to the end of the Second Sale Agreement, initially at a slightly lower price than that charged by Achilla but thereafter, at the same or a higher price than Achilla had charged. The Holihan parties submit that they were not aware that the Kellogg's pallet work had been moved away from Achilla and were being made by an alternative supplier. By this point in time, the ACB Business did not have access to the PICK system, so it could not easily see what work was being performed, or not being performed by them and others. It is a little surprising that Mr Holihan was not aware of what work was/was no longer being performed by the ACB Business at any point in time, at least at a general level, and particularly in the case of the Kellogg's pallets given the 'forecast' nature of the ordering practice for them and the need for the OME supplier to hold stocks on hand to meet orders because of the lead time involved in making them. But, as the Holihan parties submit, '[t]here is no evidence of Achilla in fact knowing the work went to an alternative supplier, and the point was not put to Mr Holihan in cross-examination.'[1047]
824 The Amcor parties contend that the failure on the part of Achilla to make any enquiry or complaint concerning the Kellogg's pallet OME work is tantamount to an acquiescence by the Holihan parties to that work going elsewhere. Further, they say that because Ubeeco was demonstrably cheaper than Achilla, APA was entitled to send the Kellogg's pallet work to Ubeeco rather than Achilla. There was no evidence about why it was that Achilla's price increased from $15.79 to $17.70 in May 2006, but Annexure C shows that at that time, Ubeeco was making the Kellogg's pallets at a price of $15.50, although it later increased to more than $18.00.
825 While the Kellogg's pallet OME work was not part of the 'business as usual' work undertaken by the ACB Business prior to the sale, following the sale it was offered to the ACB Business and Mr Holihan welcomed the opportunity to perform that work. The ACB Business made the Kellogg's pallets for a period of time between July 2004 and June 2006. Relevantly, the ACB business was making them both prior to, and after, the Deed of Accession being entered into.
826 There is no evidence of any complaint by APA about inconsistency of supply or pricing, quality, availability or the like concerning the Kellogg's pallet work performed by Achilla and the Amcor parties have not led evidence to explain the reason for the work being moved across to Ubeeco. In my view, once the Kellogg's pallet work came across to Achilla, at the invitation of the Amcor parties, they were effectively to be regarded as part of the business as usual, and repeat orders of that work would, in the ordinary course, be routed to Achilla.
827 Mr Joyce gave evidence, under cross-examination, that while he was with Amcor (relevantly, he left in May 2005), he was unaware of any instruction having been given to route work away from Achilla.
[MR TRAN:] ... And just while we're on the time you left Amcor, while you were at Amcor, do you recall any directive from Amcor management to say that work shouldn't be routed to Mr Holihan?---I had no recollection of that directive ever being issued.
Would you expect to remember it, if such a directive had been issued?---Um, given the events that were transpiring at the time, I expect I would have.
And if such a directive were made, would you expect to have been told about it, given your role at Amcor?---Absolutely. [1048]
828 There is no evidence of any such direction having been given by management at a later point, but it nevertheless seems clear that the Kellogg's pallet work was moved away from the ACB Business from mid-2006, and was performed by Ubeeco from March 2006 (allowing a lead time to establish a stock available for supply) until the Second Sale Agreement came to an end. No evidence or explanation was advanced by the Amcor parties that would enliven the words of exception in clause 12.2. In those circumstances, in my view, Achilla was entitled to receive the Kellogg's pallet work that was performed by Ubeeco commencing with the supplies made on 10 March 2006 to the end of the term of the Second Sale Agreement.
Issue 3(d)(x)****: The work was RTS Imaging work
829 The 1,913 instances of breach relied upon by the Holihan parties include significant 'repeat' litho lamination work that was performed for AFP customers such as RTS Imaging and Legend Australia.
830 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan described the background to the RTS Imaging work and the request he made of Mr Nellies early in 2004 that Achilla be given the opportunity to undertake the RTS Imaging work. Mr Holihan said that as a result of him asking Mr Silva to review the PICK system to check that OME work was not going to other suppliers, he 'was aware that J S Cutting was doing die cutting work for AFP and that Le Breton was doing litho laminating work including for a major AFP Customer, RTS Imaging Pty Ltd (RTS Imaging).'[1049] RTS Imaging sold recycled printer toners of the kind used in laser printers and copiers.
831 Mr Holihan said that he was not happy that work was going to other OME suppliers because he had incurred expenses 'in the expectation that Achilla would receive all of that work' and he wanted to speak with Mr Nellies because he thought it was his area of responsibility to ensure that work was being routed to Achilla under the Supply Agreement.[1050] On 24 February 2004, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Nellies, asking to set up a meeting with him regarding litho lamination and die- cutting work.[1051] He gave evidence that he wanted to show Mr Nellies the Tarlington Place site 'and discuss with him the litho laminating work that I didn't think we were getting all of' and also some of the work that he thought 'might have been going to Stan's Dye Cutting still.'[1052] In response, a meeting was arranged by telephone, to take place between Mr Nellies and Mr Holihan at the Tarlington Place premises later that day.
832 Mr Holihan says he cannot remember all of the detail of the meeting but he does recall that Mr Nellies arrived on-site after he had completed a stocktake at a paper roll store, and he did not have much time available because he was going to be picked up. Mr Holihan then described the tour of the premises, during which he asked Mr Nellies to re-route the die-cutting work that J S Cutting (Stan's) was doing to Achilla at Tarlington Place:
We walked from the reception foyer area through, put on some yellow vests, walked into the factory. We didn't go far, he said he didn't have a lot of time. I showed him the equipment, he could see the factory running. ... he saw the just - the Thompsons Displays machines running ... I said to him now how do we go about getting the rest of this work. In particular we started with the Stan's cutting form - Stan's Dye Cutting. ...[1053]
833 Mr Holihan says that Mr Nellies' response, and the conversation that ensued, was along the following lines:
... [Nellies] said, look, you're getting that work. There's only bits and pieces, rats and mice I think he said, and I said, "Well I want all of it". He said, "You're sure you want all that", and I said, "Yes". He said, "Well that's a lot of work for me. He said I don't have the resources, and I said, "Well you need to put the resources into it", he said, "Leave it with me". I then took him to the litho laminating machine and I said, "I don't think we're getting all the litho laminating work. What do we need to do about that?" I said, "I know of an account, I have not seen any orders from AFP from one or their accounts called RTS imaging. He said to me that although there's a contract in place, he sort of got a bit defensive. He said, "I need you to show to me that it's not going to cost us anymore". I said, "That's fair enough. I'll do that exercise for you", which I did. I had one of my staff, and then I presented that back to him by email.
[MR MAIDEN:] Why did you do that?---I wanted to - well firstly he asked for it. Secondly, it was important to convince him that ... there was a benefit for the [sic.] to bring this work across. I wasn't just going to enforce the contract because I didn't think that was the way to go. I thought if I could engage him and for him to understand that there's no reason for this work not to be coming to me. Then that was a better way to go then trying to shove the contract down his throat.
...
[MR MAIDEN:] And that meeting and the previous one that you've told us about, did Mr Nellies say anything about Achilla's entitlement to do the work?---He never said that I wasn't entitled to do the work. The reverse is probably true where I was insisting that I should get this work. He didn't ever say anything of the contrary.[1054]
834 When Mr Nellies gave evidence, he said he did not have a detailed recollection of what took place at the meeting. He could remember attending at the Tarlington Place premises on one occasion, but does not remember what he saw there. He said the only memory he has is 'of me walking into Tarlington Place' and that it 'was a dark warehouse', and he did not recall 'seeing any machines' or the Tarlington Place factory operating.[1055] Mr Nellies was also asked whether he could recall any discussion with Mr Holihan, in about February or March 2004, about RTS Imaging and Mr Holihan saying that he wanted to do the work for the RTS Imaging account.[1056] Mr Nellies said that he did not believe any of the RTS Imaging work went across to Wetherill Park for litho laminating but he did understand that some of the RTS Imaging work went offshore at some stage[1057].
835 Mr Nellies was also asked whether he remembered speaking with Mr Holihan, in about February or March 2004, about die-cutting work that 'Stan's' (J S Cutting) was doing for Amcor. He answered '[s]pecifically I do not recall having any conversation with Mr Holihan ... on Stans.'[1058]
836 Following Mr Nellies' visit to the Tarlington Place premises, Mr Holihan wished to show Mr Nellies that it would not cost AFP any more to have the work done by Achilla than by other OME suppliers. Shortly after the meeting, Mr Holihan made an email enquiry of Mr Emad Nakhla, who was based in Queensland and doing special work for Mr Holihan/Achilla on a casual basis. Mr Holihan told Mr Nakhla that they 'need to do an exercise around a large litho AFP account', which was RTS Imaging. Mr Holihan set out the product codes for some of the litho laminating jobs that he obtained from a listing that had been prepared by Mr Dick Rae (who apparently worked for Amcor Displays) in 2001 and he suggested that Mr Nakhla should add in any others he found. Mr Holihan then instructed Mr Nakhla stating:
What I'd like is for each size, run the jobs down, routing them through Tarlington. Don't change the masters. You'll have the sheet sizes and the number up so you can get litho prices. Use the same criteria for costing as you have been doing so far regardless of what the master says.[1059]
837 In the email to Mr Nakhla, Mr Holihan also notes that '[w]e do/did one or two jobs for this account through our machines'.[1060] Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan said this was a reference to big large brown boxes which they used to do for RTS Imaging, and that the ACB Business, both before and after the sale, produced on behalf of AFP large bins where the spent printer toner cartridges could be deposited for recycling.[1061]
838 Mr Nakhla produced the new costings for some of the RTS Imaging jobs and sent them to Mr Holihan by email on 9 March 2004.[1062] The costing was performed using brown corrugated board, but typically the ACB Business was using a white corrugated board that had a better finish, so Mr Holihan told Mr Nakhla to upgrade the job to the better quality white corrugated board.[1063] In his email responding to Mr Nakhla on 12 March 2004, Mr Holihan stated:
Hi, the prices look very good. They'll need to be on a white - every time we've tried it on a brown we get a lot of washboarding - it may come doen [sic.] to experience.
Would you change the 4 enquires [sic.] to the nearest white liner. 843 & 163 on the stronger one.[1064]
839 By way of follow-up to the meeting with Mr Nellies, Mr Holihan sent an email to him on 15 March 2004 regarding litho lamination work for RTS Imaging. In his email, Mr Holihan said that Mr Nakhla had gone through the system and prepared a comparison between Achilla's estimated cost of doing litho lamination work as against Le Breton's.[1065] In his statement, Mr Holihan explained the approach they had adopted for making the comparison, as follows:
[175] ...In the attachment to the email, I set out a comparison between Achilla's estimated cost of doing litho lamination work as against Le Breton's [CB5/1875]. That comparison had been prepared by Emad Nadla [sic.], an Achilla employee, on my instruction. He extracted from PICK the prices that Le Breton had charged AFP for the various types of RTS work and then used PICK (and prices for litho printed sheets from Achilla's external litho printers) to calculate what Achilla would charge AFP for the same work (which included procuring and supplying litho print sheets). I took the figures that Emad had produced and prepared the spreadsheet that I then attached to [CB5/1875]. The master number referred to was a product identifier that uniquely identified the types of job in question in the PICK system, which we had used to determine what work was required for the RTS jobs. The seven character codes in bold next to the master numbers were PICK inquiry numbers generated in PICK when Emad routed the work to calculate Achilla's pricing for those jobs. I sent them to Nellies so that he could check the pricing himself.
840 Mr Holihan said he knew the RTS Imaging jobs had to be of a good quality.[1066] He acknowledged that they would not get the RTS Imaging work on the basis of cost alone, but would have to make sure that Achilla could also meet the time and quality requirements for the work and satisfy the client.
841 Mr Nellies responded by email, to the effect that he was in the middle of budgets and would review the material and get back to Mr Holihan.[1067] Mr Holihan followed up on 6 April 2004, enquiring as to progress[1068] and then on 3 June 2004, Mr Holihan received an email from Mr Azzopardi, who was then the Estimating Manager at AFP and reporting to Mr Nellies,[1069] regarding the re-routing of litho lamination work for RTS Imaging to Achilla. That email was copied to Mr Robert Guy, the AFP Account Manager for RTS Imaging, and to Mr Vic Bacchetto, a Sales Manager for AFP.
842 In his email, Mr Azzopardi referred to the 'change in routing to ALL litho laminated work now to go through Wetherill Park', and observed that Mr Guy had 'shown some concern to quality/timing of product for Customer "RTS".'[1070] Mr Azzopardi's email also noted that there were 40 RTS jobs to be re-routed, with new box codes created, and he stated that he would not do anything in relation to routing until advised to do so by Mr Guy.[1071]
843 After receiving this email, Mr Holihan responded promptly, stating that everyone at Achilla 'is aware of the importance of this account and will handle it with the utmost care.'[1072] Mr Holihan said he also rang Mr Bacchetto, who was Mr Guy's boss, to remind him of the contract. Mr Holihan said Mr Bacchetto told him 'don't worry, I'll fix it.'[1073] A little later that day, Mr Bacchetto responded to Mr Azzopardi's email, addressing Mr Guy's concerns. Mr Bacchetto stated:
I have spoken to Craig Holihan, he will transfer the work by group/family size.
Craig has reassured me the work will be transferred at a rate which will meet RTS requirements in OTD [on time delivery] and quality.
Rob could you work with Craig and he's [sic.] team to facilitate the transfer. > >
I will contact RTS and let them know of the change and logistics will inform MLE [Max Le Breton].[1074]
844 The next day, Mr Guy circulated an email to all concerned indicating that his concern around 'quality issues' was in regards to 'scuffing' that he wished to have addressed before there was any change to the status quo of the arrangements for the RTS Imaging account. Mr Guy said he wished to set up a meeting with Mr Holihan and Mr Bachetto (to whom he reported) before any changes were made to the master codes in PICK.[1075]
845 In cross-examination, Mr Holihan was taken through this email exchange. He said he did not understand Mr Guy's references to 'quality issues' because Achilla was not doing RTS Imaging work at that stage:
--- ... We hadn't started doing RTS work at that stage. We didn't have the film. We didn't have the samples. The meetings that I was - organised with Robert Guy was to get those samples. Scuffing, who knows. At that stage RTS Imaging was being supplied by Le Breton Graphics. We hadn't started supply. So all of this transition, all of these meetings were relating to getting that work as part of the contract, and we couldn't do anything until we had the artwork, the samples.
[DR McNICOL:] Right?---So I didn't discuss with Robert Guy who the scuffing was for or who it was with, but it wasn't something we were doing.[1076]
846 As will be apparent, Mr Holihan maintained that, to this point, Achilla had not done litho laminating work for RTS Imaging - all of their work was being done by Le Breton, and until Achilla was provided with the artwork and samples etc it could not do the work for RTS Imaging. Thus, he said, the 'scuffing' issue Mr Guy referred to could not relate to work completed by Achilla. Indeed, Mr Holihan said that if RTS Imaging did have a 'scuffing' issue with its current supplier, then that was all the more reason why the work should be moved across to Achilla.
847 Mr Holihan said that he was scheduled to meet with Mr Guy to discuss RTS Imaging with him, and that when they did meet at Tarlington Place, he addressed Mr Guy's concerns.[1077] Mr Guy disputed that his concerns were addressed but he accepted that the email he had sent to Mr Holihan was to do with the litho laminating work for RTS Imaging.[1078] Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that the evidence shows that to the extent there were quality issues around the litho laminating work performed for RTS Imaging, and in particular concerning 'scuffing', those concerns could only relate to work performed by Le Breton and not Achilla. This proposition was put to Mr Guy during cross-examination but he did not accept it. While he agreed that Le Breton was doing the litho lamination work for RTS Imaging at that time,[1079] and that he would have made the complaint about scuffing regardless of who had done the work,[1080] Mr Guy's evidence was to the effect that Achilla did a 'run of products' (he could not remember if the run of products was a test run or an actual order) which resulted in 'a number of quality issues' and there was scuffing on the finished cartons. According to Mr Guy, this led to the emails on 3 June and 4 June 2004.[1081]
848 Under cross-examination, Mr Guy gave evidence about an 'NCR' or 'non conformance report' that would be 'raised on any quality complaint'. But he agreed that no NCR was raised for this complaint:
MR MAIDEN: ...I see. So it's a report that's raised whenever work is produced for a customer which isn't up to scratch?---If the customer has a complaint about any sort of job, it's raised with the job details. That then flows through to whatever plant the job was run, for that team to look at. If it's an OME, then it goes through to that company for them to obviously provide their feedback and look at samples and then they give their investigation to each complaint.[1082]
...
MR MAIDEN: If an NCR issued in respect of work that had been done by an OME supplier, that would have been raised with the OME supplier, wouldn't it?---That's my understanding of the system.
When NCRs were raised was a written document produced?---Given that this is pre-2005 with the SAP system, as to what the processes were at that time I can't remember.
The NCRs were raised in a quality system weren't they, not in PICK?---Reps didn't have access as - the same as we don't today. Whether it's raised through the customer service and then through the system they have access to.[1083]
...
MR MAIDEN: Mr Guy, did you see the NCRs from time to time?---Yes.
Do you remember what form they took before the SAP system was introduced?---No.
Do you remember if they were hard copy or electronic?---No.
Do you remember what form they took after the SAP system was introduced?---Electronic.
And are they stored on the SAP system?---Yes.
So you can query the SAP system to go back and find non conformance reports if you need to?---There was no non conformance report raised for this complaint.
All right. If you want to find a non conformance report for another complaint that's happened in the past can you now go to SAP and find it?---If it's after November 2005 my understanding is that they should be.
Right. Before the SAP system did they take a form similar to the on time delivery reports, do you remember that?---No.
You don't remember, or they didn't?---I don't remember how it was formatted.
I see. How do you know that no NCR was raised in respect of the scuffing problem we've been talking about?---I didn't raise one.
I see?---There was no credit or, ah, requested by the customer other than raising the complaint.
If the complaint was about ACB wouldn't you have expected Mr Bacchetto to have been concerned about that when he directed you to assist in the transfer of all of the RTS work to ACB?---I can't answer for Mr Bacchetto.[1084]
849 In re-examination, the NCR process was again raised with Mr Guy:
MR TRAN: ...Did you always raise a formal NCR if there was a complaint?---It's not a straight answer to that, I apologise. It's based on what the level of complaint from the customer is. If there is going to be a reversal of an invoice then an NCR would be raised because there has to be a record of that. But if it's a general complaint it can either be put in ... writing so it is recorded or there could be a meeting between sales and production at that time as an informal complaint and then maybe just an email back to the customer or as - as a response to their particular complaint at the time. So there are some variables as to how that can happen.
You've been asked a lot of questions about the complaint by RTS Imaging, what do you remember about that complaint? Is there anything more that you'd wish to say about it?---Other than being called in and the reference to when you walked through the RTS finishing side of the plant you can see all of the finished pallets with the cartons just standing out, and as you get to a particular pallet that's where they raised it, it just stood out that the scuffing on that job was so pronounced that that's where they raised as to, ah, that complaint about that batch.[1085]
850 Returning to the meeting between Mr Holihan and Mr Guy, Mr Holihan said that he met with Mr Guy at Tarlington Place on 8 June 2004. He said that they walked through the factory and he showed Mr Guy the machines in operation. He said that Mr Guy 'said words to the effect that he was very comfortable now. He thought it was a good operation.'[1086] Mr Holihan gave evidence of his recollection of the meeting, as follows:
...[Mr Guy] was concerned about what impact that would have on Max Le Breton's business. He said he was a nice guy and he was concerned with what sort of an impact that would have when it was a fairly large account for a small laminating company like Max Le Breton's to be doing.
[MR MAIDEN:] Do you remember what you had said to Guy?---I said to him that it was part of the contract. I'd already had the meeting with Darren Nellies. I said to him that Darren had asked me about the costing, and I'd already provided the costings to Nellies. I said to Robert Guy that the costing's already shown that we were cheaper, so there was absolutely no reason why this work shouldn't be coming across. At the end of the meeting I took it that Robert Guy had accepted that. Everything he indicated to me was that he was comfortable. He promised to send me the boxes - the samples. From that we were going to start to make the - the RTS work.[1087]
851 Mr Guy described their meeting as a 'feel good' visit where Mr Holihan was showing him around the Tarlington Place premises and trying to build up his confidence in them and their capacity, in terms of what equipment they had.[1088] He could not recall the particulars of the machinery they had, noting that the visit took place some 11 years ago. Mr Guy did not profess to have more than a broad recollection of what took place. He did not remember precisely when the meeting took place but did recall that Mr Holihan had mentioned that Thompson were also utilising the Tarlington Place premises.[1089] He recalled meeting someone there who used to work with his father and said 'some light conversation went along those lines.'[1090] Save in respect of minor matters, he did not agree with Mr Holihan's account of what took place at the visit and, in particular, he did not agree that he had said he was uncomfortable with moving the RTS Imaging work because it was going to impact on Max Le Breton's business.[1091] Mr Guy could not remember discussing with Mr Holihan the notion of sending samples of the RTS Imaging work to Achilla, and said that this was not something that he normally did. But under cross-examination, he agreed that it was possible he said he would provide samples of the RTS Imaging work to Mr Holihan. [1092]
852 Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Bacchetto on 28 June 2004, chasing up the RTS Imaging work and referring to the fact that 'Robert [Guy] was going to provide samples.'[1093] That email was not copied to Mr Guy and Mr Holihan asked that Mr Bacchetto not forward it to him but said rather that he should call Mr Holihan if he wished to discuss the matter.[1094]
853 In the meantime, Mr Silva continued to inform Mr Holihan about new orders for RTS Imaging that were still being shown on the PICK system as sent to Le Breton.[1095] In response to one such email sent on 22 June 2004, Mr Holihan responded to Mr Silva saying: 'Thanks Paul. RTS will come across gradually. Everything else I'm going to put a stop to if and when they occur, Craig.'[1096] Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan explained that he was in discussions with Messrs Guy and Bacchetto to bring this account across, but he said he was going to 'put [his] foot down so other work as it was caught would be stopped by [him] ringing Nellies.'[1097] He added that the real difficulty for him was that once the order was placed in PICK, 'the horse has bolted' because the job had effectively been routed elsewhere.[1098]
854 In mid-July 2004, when Mr Silva's searches on PICK showed that new jobs for RTS Imaging were continuing to be allocated to Le Breton,[1099] Mr Holihan emailed Mr Guy, stating:
Robert, there doesn't appear to have been any progress in moving the RST [sic.] litho work into ACB. I was of the understanding was [sic.] you were going to arrange some samples and choose a number of jobs the same size as a start. We have a die and can begin once this has occurred.
Would you email me back a timetable for the change over.
I'd like to work towards all orders form [sic.] the 1st Sept will move across.[1100]
855 A week later there had been no response, so Mr Holihan forwarded the email chain to Mr Bacchetto on 21 July 2004 and said:
Vic,
We still haven't seen any samples of the existing work. I've not had a reply to my email below. George keeps chasing Robert, and Robert keeps promising. Samples were the first step and since my meeting with Robert in early June nothing has progressed.
I've been told Roberts now going away for two weeks.
I believe someone other than Robert should be moving this forward. Any suggestions?[1101]
856 Mr Holihan said that not long after sending the email, Mr Bacchetto called him and said words to the effect that it may be best to remove Mr Guy from the process. Mr Bacchetto told him that, against his instructions, Mr Guy had advised Colin Lewis, a director of RTS Imaging, of the proposed change, and that now Mr Bacchetto needed to arrange a meeting with Mr Holihan before Mr Bacchetto could authorise the change.[1102]
857 On 29 July 2004, Mr Bacchetto notified Mr Holihan that he had organised a meeting for them with Mr Lewis on 12 August 2004. Mr Holihan responded to the meeting notification, adding that he could explain to Mr Lewis that 'all jobs can be done in Sydney through the same printer' but they would need to retrieve the film for the litho laminating work from the Victorian third party litho printer that Le Breton was using, and suggested that this only be done 'after a few months of bedding down the work.'[1103]
858 Mr Holihan was cross-examined about Achilla's ability to do the work from the outset and in a timely way. His response was that Achilla could have produced the first job within days, but to get the entire account, depending on the frequency at which they ordered, would take some time.[1104] Based on the frequency with which RTS Imaging was placing orders, as disclosed by PICK, Mr Holihan said that from the beginning of the supply contract on 1 August 2003, 'it would have been no problem at all to have produced this work when it was required.'[1105]
859 On 12 August 2004, Mr Holihan met with Mr Bacchetto and Mr Lewis at RTS Imaging's offices located in Sydney. Mr Lewis took Mr Holihan on a tour of the factory and they discussed RTS Imaging's needs in terms of toner boxes. Mr Holihan gave evidence that Mr Lewis said words to the effect that he was happy that the litho cartons were to be made by Achilla because he felt that Amcor would be in better control of the process by bringing it back 'in house'. Achilla had been producing and suppling non-litho laminated boxes to RTS Imaging, via AFP, and Mr Lewis said that he'd been happy with the quality and service on these boxes. Mr Lewis said that he wanted Achilla to produce a trial run of a box that was 'fast moving', the 'EXP Blue', and he gave Mr Holihan the contact details of the third party company that produced and managed the artwork for their toner boxes, so that he could organise the litho printed sheets for the box.[1106]
860 After the meeting with Messrs Bachetto and Lewis, Mr Holihan contacted RTS Imaging's artwork supplier, Penfold Buscum. It appears that the third party artwork provider was having difficulties in matching the artwork to the job that Mr Lewis had requested, and it took them some time to identify the artwork that matched the job. And so it was not until the end of August 2004 that Mr Holihan was able to organise to have the art supplied to him, and once the disk arrived, he established that the art did not match the sample.
861 On 18 August 2004, Mr Silva notified Mr Holihan of another order that had been booked and routed in PICK to Le Breton, with a three week lead time for production. Mr Holihan responded that if such jobs were on the RTS Imaging account then Mr Silva no longer needed to advise him because '[t]hat will come'.[1107] Mr Holihan said that with a three week lead time Achilla would not have had any problem in producing that job if it had the film and the tooling and the samples that he had been requesting. He added that once they had the samples, 'it was obvious that we actually needed the film because the boxes required special printing which I ended up retrieving from Colin Lewis himself, Colin Lewis's third party supplier.'[1108]
862 In early September 2004, Mr Holihan sought to arrange a trial run for an RTS Imaging job. He instructed Andrew Tieu[1109] as to what was required, including the 'special instructions' and asked him to track down the existing knife for the job. Mr Holihan told Mr Tieu to 'place an order in the system for stock for 3 weeks' time' but asked him not to run the job on the laminator without Mr Holihan being there.[1110] The next day, Mr Holihan informed Mr Tieu that Mr Guy may have left a sample of this required job, and gave him the box code. The following week, Mr Holihan asked Mr Tieu to provide him with the job number and status of this trial.[1111] In order for Achilla to supply the first run that Mr Lewis required, Mr Bacchetto (or someone else at AFP) needed to set up a job within PICK so that the job could be dispatched to RTS Imaging.
863 In mid-September 2004, Mr Holihan procured from Penfold Buscum a CD containing 'all of the exp cartons'. He forwarded the email from Penfold Buscum to Mr Bacchetto, to let him know that there had been delays in obtaining the artwork, and to pass that on to Mr Lewis. He also sought clarification about which job they were to run for the trial because Mr Guy had apparently asked for a change on the job. Mr Bacchetto responded, saying that Mr Jacco Dijke had taken over as the account manager for the account and he would ask him to speak with Mr Lewis about this.[1112] Meanwhile, Mr Tieu was liaising with Achilla's third party printer, Ultra Print, to try to sort out which artwork was the correct one for the exact carton required to be produced, and keeping Mr Holihan informed.
864 By late September 2004, the position reached was that Achilla had not performed the trial run for RTS Imaging. But Mr Holihan said that was because neither Mr Lewis nor his third party art supplier had been able to provide the correct art work, and then there was a change in instructions late in the piece and confusion about which carton was to be the subject of the trial. Mr Holihan said that if they had been given the matching art work, they could have made the cartons within four or five days.[1113] He said the tooling was not a problem as the knives could have been made within a day.[1114]
865 Mr Holihan said that at some time between mid-September and mid-October 2004 they received the correct artwork, ordered print sheets, bought a new knife and produced the minimum quantity of 3,000 boxes. He made numerous calls to Mr Bacchetto to try and get the job set up in PICK, but without success, because Mr Bachetto said he was waiting on RTS Imaging to place an order for the 'EXP Blue' trial.[1115]
866 On 15 October 2004, before the job had been set up by AFP, Mr Holihan was copied in on an email from Mr Lewis to Mr Dijke, confirming that the EXP Blue box design had changed and thus RTS Imaging would not be able to procure the trial print run from Mr Holihan's company.[1116] Mr Lewis stated:
Jacco
You may have caught up with the possible future laminating and diecutting of our orders being transferred from Max Le Breton to Craig at ACB.
Craig, in his own time, was going to process a run of EXP Blue boxes to verify his operation could replace Max.
I wish to confirm with you that the EXP Blue box design has changed therefore the old [current] print will not be ordered in the future.
If Craig has proceeded with the current design for his experimental trial, we will not be able to procure from him that print run.
Would you discuss with Craig if you think it to be appropriate.[1117]
867 Mr Holihan replied promptly by email to Mr Lewis[1118] and then called him later that day. Mr Lewis told Mr Holihan that he was investigating moving his manufacturing operation to China and if that occurred he would no longer require boxes to be produced in Australia. Mr Holihan then sent him another email providing his contact details and wishing him 'good luck in China'.[1119]
868 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan confirmed that he did not send Mr Lewis any of the samples Achilla had prepared. He said that RTS Imaging was Amcor's customer and he did not want to step over the mark and breach that protocol.[1120]
869 It was put to Mr Holihan in cross-examination that by July 2004 there were, on the Holihan parties' case, more than 100 'breaches' alleged, where an outside supplier had performed work that Achilla could have done. Mr Holihan said that promises were made to him 'that [the work] will come'. He had been working on this for months and had 'jumped over all the hoops.'[1121] More recently, he said, he and Mr Bacchetto had met with Mr Lewis, who seemed comforted that Mr Holihan was very closely associated with Amcor.
870 To that point in time (end of September 2004), there were 128 jobs listed in the Le Breton suite of invoices (dated from 2003 to September 2004) that are claimed as 'breaches' by Achilla and said to represent a lost profit of $318,500. In cross-examination, it was put to Mr Holihan that in respect of those jobs that went to Le Breton there was no demonstrated capacity on the part of Achilla to be able to perform those jobs. Mr Holihan said that not one of those alleged breaches would have involved the trial for RTS Imaging. He said the jobs claimed for were separate jobs that Achilla would not have had any difficulty performing.[1122] Further, he said Achilla did jobs for other customers that were very similar to those claimed for and there was never any issue with quality or price, and save for a few isolated instances, there was no problem with service.[1123]
871 Mr Holihan gave evidence that once the sale agreement was on foot, he did not feel he could approach Mr Barnes and raise issues about the ACB Business with him. First, he said, that was because when Mr Barnes told him that he had permission from Mr Peter Brown, through Mr Jim Hodgson, to be involved in the business, it was on the condition that Mr Barnes 'stayed away from the business and would not get involved.'[1124] The second reason was the obvious one, namely that to ring Mr Barnes about an issue involving the ACB Business would have caused a conflict of interest between Mr Barnes, who was then effectively a co-owner of the business, and his employer, Amcor.[1125] He said that while Mr Barnes was with Amcor after the sale, he did not get involved in or with the Achilla business.[1126]
872 Mr Holihan said that he had followed up with Mr Nellies about a number of jobs that he believed should have gone to Achilla rather than Le Breton. He referenced his email to Mr Nellies of 22 June 2004 as an example - where he forwarded to Mr Nellies an email from Mr Silva listing 'orders currently over at Le-Breton's' and stated:
Darren, we will continue to review any orders placed in PICK. I'll let you know of any problems.
How are you going on those claims we spoke about. I'd like to close them out before year end.[1127]
873 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan explained that this email was sent in response to a conversation he had with Mr Nellies where he complained to him about this work. Mr Nellies' response was to the effect of 'what work?' and so Mr Holihan forwarded the email from Mr Silva giving more examples. Mr Holihan said that it was not Achilla's job to monitor what Amcor was doing and what he was effectively telling Mr Nellies was:
- - - that we've seen that there are, through our access to PICK we've seen these orders are currently going to Le Breton's and we'll let you know if there's any problems.
[DR McNICOL:] Did you say to him you were angry?---Yes.
Right. You did say in the email I'll let you know of any problems. Did you say that this was a problem - these particular jobs was a problem?---That email's relating to conversation I'd already had with Darren and he said the [sic.] he will fix it going forward. And so this email's saying I'll let you know if there's any more problems that come up.
So this email doesn't appear to be referring to any particular problem does it?---It's relating to the email - because it's - you can see it's attached, it's an email chain. The fact that there's no description of what the lower email's about is what I'm saying is because there was a conversation that took place, and so it didn't come to him as a surprise. That email was based on a conversation about fixing these jobs. It doesn't say, you know, "Hi Darren, below are the jobs", because we'd already had that conversation. So I don't remember the words that were said, but it was in response to that conversation and I was sending him the list and I said basically we'll continue to monitor it, and if I see any more problems I'll let you know.[1128]
874 Mr Holihan said that when he was following up jobs with Mr Nellies, he did not refer to jobs that he contended he ought to be getting as being 'a breach' of the agreement. Mr Holihan said that he would not have used those words.[1129] He also confirmed that he did not raise the issue of breach with either Mr Barnes or Mr Bayley at that time.[1130]
875 Each of Mr Silva and Mr Garcia also gave evidence about the RTS Imaging work. Under cross-examination, Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties confirmed with Mr Silva that his evidence was that Achilla had done work for RTS Imaging:
[DR McNICOL:] So is it your evidence that by July 2004, or August of 2004, Achilla had done RTS imaging jobs in the past before that?---Yes, it is.
Right. How many of these jobs had they done, do you know?---I don't know.
Had they done one or two, do you think?---No, it would have been more than that.
But you don't know how many?---No.
Do you recall if Achilla ever did the RTS work?---Yes, we did.[1131]
876 This was confirmed during re-examination of Mr Silva.
[MR MAIDEN:] You said to a question in the last five or ten minutes that before sometime in 2004 the ACB business had done work for RTS?---That's correct.
Do you remember what kind of work had been done?---Litho laminating and die cutting. [1132]
877 Mr Garcia also gave evidence about the RTS Imaging work, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now do you remember and I think this question Mr Garcia will be focused on the time while you're still working for Amcor, before 2005. Do you remember a customer called RTS Imaging?---Yes.
What do you remember about it?---I remember we have a lot of trouble with this company.
Why is that?---I don't know, there was - all way was a complaint for the customer. There was a lot of lighter laminate jobs. I don't know how many lines, I don't it was two, three, four or five jobs, I don't know, I cannot remember but I know it was a lot of trouble with this.
What sorts of boxes or products was Amcor making for RTS Imaging?---I think it was all lighter laminates. I am no [sic.] 100 per cent sure but what they wanted.[1133]
878 The Amcor parties contend that if the RTS Imaging work were to be moved across to Achilla, they would have encountered difficulties with the tooling because the litho laminating and die cutting work commonly done on that account involved the use of 'tooling' such as 'standing knives' in addition to the artwork. Mr Nellies explained the position with standing knives in the context of evidence he gave concerning invoices for another customer, Legend Australia. He said that a standing knife is 'common knife', being 'a knife that is used not only for this particular carton for Legend cartons, but potentially from a number of different customers using that same knife'[1134] and that a standing knife could cost 'anything up to $3-4,000'.[1135] In the case of the Legend Australia work, he said he would not have been able to reroute the Legend Australia work from Le Breton to Achilla because 'potentially it's not Amcor's knife.'[1136] He went on to explain that 'it could be a knife that belongs to Le Breton that they used to do this particular pack for a number of different customers'[1137] and so he wouldn't be able to get the knife out of Le Breton's and couldn't give the work to Wetherill Park. Mr Nellies said that with the expensive knives that were often made for a particular job 'you've got to look at your pay back on those sort of knives and in this case this job is only ordered once a year.'[1138] During cross-examination, Mr Nellies said that the '[g]eneral industry practice is that no one ever owns a knife' and rather '[y]ou only pay for a contribution to the knife.'[1139] He went on to explain that a standing knife in the hands of an OME supplier would be the OME supplier's knife and even in respect of knives that the OME supplier had had purpose-manufactured to do a job for Amcor and for which it had charged Amcor the cost of production, and he agreed that it was 'not necessarily' the case that Amcor could move those around between suppliers at will. He said 'it doesn't necessarily mean that Amcor own[ed] those knives'.[1140]
879 Mrs Le Breton also gave evidence about standing knives. She said they were knives which Le Breton had because they were used for 'repeat job[s]'.[1141]
880 The evidence shows that when it came to RTS Imaging, Mr Nellies sought to accommodate Mr Holihan's request that Achilla be given the opportunity to do that work. At that time (early to mid-June 2004), the work was being done by Le Breton, apparently on a 'repeat order' basis. It is unclear whether some RTS Imaging work involving litho laminating and die-cutting had been done by Achilla at an earlier point - Mr Silva gave evidence that it had and Mr Guy also recalled that some earlier work performed by Achilla had resulted in 'scuffing' (but Mr Holihan disputed that was the case). The Holihan parties sought to downplay Mr Silva's evidence in this regard, submitting that:
while Mr Silva gave evidence that Achilla had done litho laminating and die-cutting work for RTS Imaging in 2004, he did not work on the factory floor (he worked in logistics) and it is likely he was mistaken.[1142]
881 In any event, Mr Holihan acquiesced in an arrangement whereby the work would come across to Achilla gradually, and he was working towards that end when the customer, Mr Lewis, decided that he would take the RTS Imaging work offshore. In my view, the evidence shows that the RTS Imaging work was (or was largely) 'repeat work' that was being performed by Le Breton before the sale, and accordingly, it was not work which was required to be sent to Achilla. And to the extent that the performance of that work involved the use of 'standing knives' or 'knives' generally, there may well have been difficulties in moving the work across to Achilla in any event, that would render the exercise not viable in commercial terms. It follows that the Holihan parties' claim for the RTS Imaging work is not made out.
882 During the trial, the Amcor parties also focussed attention on the Legend Australia work as an example of a claim made by the Holihan parties that was demonstrably not sustainable.
883 On 11 August 2004, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Nellies with the subject matter 'Max Le Breton' and querying the routing for an order that had been placed the day before for a customer known as 'Legend Australia'.[1143] The job details as entered on PICK showed that this was the fourth time the product was to be made. Mr Holihan asked Mr Nellies 'what do we need to do to pull this back??' Mr Nellies responded, by forwarding Mr Holihan's email to Mr Azzopardi,[1144] and copying in Mr Holihan, with a request that the job be cancelled with Le Breton and that they re-route the master for Wetherill Park. Mr Nellies also requested that the order in PICK be cancelled and re-booked after the routing had changed. Mr Holihan, in turn, forwarded Mr Nellies' email to Mr Tieu[1145] and Mr Silva to let them know a new order was coming, and said '[t]here may be a need to get film from Le Bretons.'[1146]
884 A few days later, Mr Holihan contacted Mr Nellies by email dated 16 August 2004 to inform him of a problem with this job. The problem was that Le Breton had used a printer based in Melbourne, the same one that Achilla used, who informed Achilla that they had lost the film and whilst they had continued to use the plates they now find they are damaged and cannot be used. In his email, Mr Holihan told Mr Nellies:
We seem to have inherited a problem.
I'm not sure what to do next. The rep will need to advise the customer.
Possibly the customer may have some original stuff. This date will not be met.[1147]
885 Mr Nellies responded the next day, informing Mr Holihan that the job was 'not able to be cancelled with Le Bretons' but adding that he will 'make sure that the CSO [customer service officer] is aware and advises the rep.'[1148] Mr Holihan replied, asking 'how can it not be able to be cancelled when there is no film to run the job?? What would they have started?'[1149] Mr Holihan added that he was 'happy to let it go because it's a problem child.'[1150] Mr Nellies' response to him a few minutes later was to the effect that by the time that customer service got around to actioning the request, the job was already underway to Le Breton, but he said they have undertaken to re-route the job for next time.[1151] Mr Holihan forwarded this email exchange to Mr Tieu for information. In the meantime, Mr Tieu had been investigating who last printed the job, and had re-costed it through ACB using print sheets from Ultra Press.[1152]
886 Mr Holihan was cross-examined about whether he agreed this job was a 'problem child'.[1153] He responded saying that he agreed Amcor had tried to cancel the routing of the job to Le Breton but was too late. Le Breton had started the job, having received the order from Amcor, and Achilla had spent a lot of time and effort trying to get the job and following it up, only to find out later that it had already been started by someone else.[1154]
887 Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties challenged Mr Holihan as to how this job could be claimed as a breach when he had been happy to let it go, because (in his words) it was 'a problem child'. He was taken to the Le Breton invoice sent to Amcor Business Services,[1155] which described the job as 'Legend Australia-47847-003-4 Print, Laminate to corro supplied, Die-Cut from standing knife, strip, glue & pack' and claimed a total job cost of $6113.91 (with GST). Mr Holihan said that if Le Breton made and charged for this job, it would form part of the Achilla particulars and part of the claim.[1156] The job the subject of this Le Breton invoice is included in the Achilla quantum particulars as item 52A[1157]. Senior Counsel then put to Mr Holihan that Achilla is claiming lost profit of $2,159.88 for a job that he was 'pleased to get rid of.'[1158] He responded:
I still go back to the point, if it had have been fixed before the order was placed, we would have saved valuable time. We could have done the job properly and we would have made the delivery on time. Once the order had been placed for Le Breton, we were then constantly chasing our tail. Nowhere in the supply contract does it say that we were to monitor the PICK system to look for work, as Amcor breached. And it would be a farcical situation to try and chase our tails to constantly try and pull work back. And that's what this is about.[1159]
Mr Holihan agreed, however, that at the time these events took place, he did not ask for compensation.[1160]
888 In my view, the Holihan parties' claim for the Legend Australia work must also fail.
Issue 3(e)****: Did Achilla have knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or did the parties operate under a common assumption as to, the procurement of OME by APA from alternative suppliers
889 Issue 3(e) is framed in terms of whether Achilla had knowledge of, or acquiesced in, or whether the parties operated under a common assumption as to, the procurement of OME by APA from suppliers other than Achilla, and if so:
(i) does that knowledge or acquiescence relieve APA from liability for any failures to obtain that OME from Achilla, and if so, in respect of what supplies; or
(ii) is Achilla otherwise estopped from claiming a breach in respect of OME procured from other suppliers if it did not:
890 This issue is said to arise from the Amcor parties' response, in paragraph 29 of their defence, to the Holihan parties' allegation of breach,[1161] read with their Summary Particulars.[1162] The Holihan parties take issue with the adequacy of the Amcor parties' pleading, contending that the issue of acquiescence is raised only in their Summary Particulars. Accordingly, the focus of the Holihan parties' submissions is on the Amcor parties' primary claim of conventional estoppel, as was the thrust of their opening on this issue, namely that Achilla knew that OME supplies were being procured in breach of clause 12.2 and is estopped from claiming breach.[1163]
891 The Amcor parties' conventional estoppel is pleaded in paragraph 29(d) of their defence, as follows:
(d) Further or alternatively, between about July and October 2005:
(i) APA and Achilla adopted the assumption that APA was entitled to procure those OME supplies which it did obtain from suppliers other than Achilla;
(ii) APA and Achilla conducted their relationship on the basis of this mutual assumption;
PARTICULARS
[not reproduced]
(iii) each of APA and Achilla knew that the other was conducting the relationship on that basis;
PARTICULARS
[not reproduced]
(iv) if Achilla is now permitted to depart from that assumption it would cause APA detriment; and
PARTICULARS
[not reproduced]
(v) in the premises, Achilla is estopped from denying that APA was not contractually entitled to obtain OME Supplies from suppliers other than Achilla.
892 In the case of paragraph 29(d)(ii), the particulars given by the Amcor parties of the conventional basis for the alleged 'mutual assumption' refer to Achilla's failure to commence proceedings, terminate the supply agreement, request compensation or complain to one or more of Mr Barnes, Mr Sangster, Mr Bayley, Mr Hodgson or Mr Mihelic while those individuals remained in the employ of the Amcor group.
893 In the particulars subjoined to paragraph 29(d)(iii), the respective parties' knowledge that the other was conducting their relationship on the basis of the alleged mutual assumption is said to be 'inferred' from three things:[1164]
(1) Achilla could and did access the PICK system which contained APA's customer, routing and pricing information, and through PICK Achilla could, and did, monitor orders for OME supplies placed by or on behalf of APA.
(2) Mr Holihan had been the General Manager of the ACB Business prior to entry into the Second Sale Agreement and therefore had knowledge of the OME supplies usually procured by APA.
(3) In relation to Amcor Displays, Mr Daaboul, an employee of Achilla, was managing Amcor Displays from about 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Amcor Displays operated from the same Wetherill Park premises as Achilla from around mid-2004 to mid-2005.
894 In their reply, the Holihan parties deny the allegations made in paragraph 29 of the Amcor parties' defence and rely on the 'no waiver' clause set out in clause 15.5 of the Second Sale Agreement as applied to the Supply Agreement.[1165]
895 In items 7 and 8 of their Summary Particulars, the Amcor parties' acquiescence claim is mounted on two bases:
896 The Holihan parties deny both of the acquiescence claims.
897 As noted earlier, there is common ground about the elements required to found a conventional estoppel. But it is useful to set them out again here before turning to consider the evidence and the competing arguments advanced. For a conventional estoppel to be established, it must be shown that:
(a) the plaintiff has adopted an assumption as to the terms of its legal relationship with the defendant;
(c) both parties have conducted their relationship on the basis of that mutual assumption;
(d) each party knows or intends that the other will act on that basis; and
(e) departure from the assumption will cause detriment to one of them.[1166]
898 The Holihan parties contend that there is no evidence that the alleged mutual assumption, namely that 'APA was entitled to procure the OME supplies which it did obtain from suppliers', was in fact adopted by each of APA and Achilla. Nor, they say, is there evidence to support a finding that each of the parties acted on the basis of the mutual assumption.
899 The Holihan parties submit that the evidence given by each of Mr Nellies and Mr Garcia is contrary to the alleged mutual assumption having been adopted by APA. The thrust of the evidence given by them was that once a job was entered in PICK, the master coding (which Mr Garcia said recorded 'all the internal dimensions, you have the colours, the paper to be used, the stage to use it, the address to be delivered and the price the customer will pay'[1167]) would route the job automatically to the particular OME supplier and PICK would generate the pricing for the job and the timing for its completion without the need for the estimator to contact the OME supplier directly. Where the job involved 'repeat work', the job would be entered in PICK using the 'master' number and the work would be performed by the established supplier, without more. In those instances where there was to be a change of OME supplier, the 'master' for the job was required to be changed so as to accommodate the new routing and applicable price etc.
900 Against that background, the Holihan parties submit the evidence shows that, in the ordinary course, the procuration of OME supplies by APA did not require or involve any engagement between APA and Mr Holihan. In cases where OME work was not performed by Achilla, APA did not notify Mr Holihan as to which alternative supplier was performing the particular item of OME work. And Mr Holihan said that it was not his responsibility to keep checking on PICK to see which alternative supplier was performing what OME work for APA.
901 The Holihan parties contend that even if a 'business as usual' approach were adopted to identify the area of OME work available to be performed by Achilla, the evidence shows that after Commencement, APA continued to route 'new' work to other OME suppliers rather than to Achilla.
902 The evidence shows that there were times when Mr Holihan was clearly aware of OME work being performed by alternative suppliers. One instance is during (and immediately following) the disruption caused by the AMWU work bans. Both Mr Holihan and Mr Joyce gave evidence about work having been moved from Achilla to alternative suppliers in August 2003 during the period affected by the work bans, and Mr Holihan gave evidence about the collection of the tooling from Achilla at the time in order for other OME suppliers to do the work.
903 The Holihan parties submit that when Mr Holihan -
noticed that some work[1168] had been sent to Alternative Suppliers in breach of clause 12.2, he took steps to address the issue. For example, when he learned in late January 2004 that partitions work had been sent to Northwest Packaging rather than Achilla, he immediately raised the issue with Mr Nellies. Not long after that, Mr Holihan organised the 24 February 2004 meeting with Mr Nellies ... at which he took issue with work that was then being sent to J S Cutting and Le Breton.[1169]
904 In the case of the RTS Imaging work, in 2004 Mr Holihan set about trying to have the RTS Imaging account work moved across to Achilla from Le Breton. He first asked Mr Silva to interrogate PICK to ascertain what (if any) work going to other suppliers, he being aware at that time that J S Cutting was doing die cutting work for AFP and that Le Breton was doing litho laminating work including for RTS Imaging. Mr Holihan then sent an email to Mr Nellies on 24 February 2004, asking to set up a meeting regarding litho lamination and die cutting work, because he was not happy that work was going to other OME suppliers in circumstances where he had incurred expenses in the belief that Achilla would receive all of that work. Having followed the matter up with Mr Nellies, and having offered to perform a trial run of boxes for the customer, Mr Lewis of RTS Imaging informed Mr Holihan in October 2004 that he was investigating moving his manufacturing operation to China and if that occurred, he would no longer require boxes to be produced in Australia.
905 Throughout that time, however, when Mr Holihan was pursuing the prospect of clawing work back from Le Breton, he was aware that Mr Silva's interrogation of PICK was revealing other jobs, such as that of 'Legend Australia', where OME work was being performed by Le Breton.
906 Another instance of OME work being performed by alternative suppliers is the Kellogg's pallet work. Mr Holihan said that in around April 2004, Mr Azzopardi telephoned him and asked whether he thought he could supply the Kellogg's pallets that were currently being made by SPS Packaging. That enquiry resulted in Achilla making the pallets from June 2004 until about June 2006. Mr Holihan said he was not aware that they were being made by others from that point until the end of the contract. I find that somewhat surprising, given that Achilla's staff were monitoring the work that was coming through the ACB Business.
907 Mr Holihan gave evidence that by mid-2005, he had very strong 'suspicions' that AFP was outsourcing its OME work to other providers. He said that at this point they were 'suspicions' rather than known facts because 'there was always this one slipped through the net' or 'we'll fix that for next time', or 'it's too late, the order has been placed, it can't be cancelled'.[1170] And while some work was still going to Achilla, by mid-2005 there had been a substantial drop-off from the amount of work that had been provided in 2003. In addition, Mr Karnik Chichmanian, Achilla's factory manager, had come to Mr Holihan and told him that 'Amcor was pulling the tooling back, plates and knives and dies, and had asked some of my factory personnel to return tooling', and Holihan said 'this was something that was new.'[1171] Mr Holihan said that on 21 July 2005 he sent an email to Mr Chichmanian, asking him to record any requests by AFP for the return of tooling that was used by Achilla in the production of the OME for AFP.[1172]
908 Apart from the reporting given to him by Mr Silva, Mr Holihan said that on 1 July 2005, Ms Young sent him an email with an attachment containing, among other things, the rates (on an hourly basis) which applied as between AFP and Achilla for OME work done on machines and by hand for the month of June.[1173] The rates in this email were based on the agreed anticipated volume of OME work that Achilla would be performing for AFP. Mr Holihan said that by then, the actual volumes Achilla had been receiving were significantly down from those expected and costed, but he did not raise that with Ms Young or others because he was concerned that if the rates increased as a result of the work dropping off, it would have made Achilla more expensive and given AFP a reason not to use Achilla.[1174]
909 The Holihan parties describe the approach taken by Mr Holihan as being initially a 'softly, softly' approach.[1175] They submitted that in the first two years of a five year relationship, such an approach is plausible and understandable, particularly in circumstances where, as Mr Holihan said, he 'was being promised the work was coming, and [he] was working with the local state people, and every time [he] complained they were fixing it. ... They were promising [him] they were fixing it.'[1176] But by 22 November 2005, Mr Holihan changed tack and raised the matter formally in writing with Mr Ward, AFP's General Manager Marketing & Sales Administration.[1177]
910 The background to the matter being raised formally with Mr Ward is canvassed by Mr Holihan in his witness statement. The issue arose at a time after the Deed of Accession had been entered into, when APA was 'standing in the shoes of' ACB Co Vendor, and shortly before the PICK system was decommissioned. In effect, Mr Holihan says that on 2 August 2005, following an exchange of correspondence, he met with Mr Ward and Mr Walter Gross,[1178] both of AFP, to discuss issues associated with the decommissioning of the PICK system that was due to take place shortly. Mr Holihan said that at the meeting he also raised a concern about the decline in the amount of OME work coming from AFP and that work which Achilla was entitled to do was being sent to other suppliers. Mr Ward said that he would pass Mr Holihan's comments on to Mr David Beynon, who was part of AFP NSW's management team as he was the appropriate person to deal with any issues about the supply agreement, it being a 'state-based issue'. Mr Holihan followed up by calling Mr Beynon a number of times after that meeting, but without success.
911 On 16 November 2005, Mr Holihan sent an email to Mr Beynon, requesting a meeting with him.[1179] Shortly afterwards, Mr Beynon called Mr Holihan and apologised for the lack of a response to his earlier calls. Mr Holihan said to Mr Beynon that he wanted to discuss the decline in the amount of work that AFP had been sending to Achilla. Mr Beynon asked him to send through a meeting agenda, which Mr Holihan did on 17 November 2005.[1180]
912 As no response had been received from Mr Beynon by 22 November 2005, Mr Holihan sent the fax to Mr Ward about the issue of other suppliers being used.[1181] He said that he did this because he wanted to escalate his concerns to senior management. Mr Ward did not respond. But not long after the fax was sent, Mr Holihan received an email from Mr Beynon[1182] and a meeting was arranged for 24 November 2005 between him, Mr Beynon and Mr Nellies. On 24 November 2005, however, Mr Holihan received a call from Mr Beynon's assistant, conveying the news Mr Beynon had had to go interstate suddenly and would not make the meeting, but adding that he would catch up with Mr Holihan when he returned and that he should catch up with Mr Nellies nonetheless. The meeting with Mr Nellies went ahead that day, but Mr Holihan regarded it as rather unproductive.
913 The fax mentioned above, which Mr Holihan says he sent to Mr Ward, was addressed to 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia, Paul Ward, General Manager Marketing & Sales Administration' at Burwood East, Victoria and dated 22nd November (to which was added by hand, '2005'). In the fax, Mr Holihan states as follows:
Dear Paul
I write to advise that due to Amcor's inability to consistently supply product to the Australian Corrugated Box Company that we've been forced to secure a portion of our product from other sources.
This will start to take effect immediately and will increase into next year.
This has not been an easy decision but I've tired [sic.] on numerous occasion [sic.] to convene a meeting with local management to discuss the issues of declining service levels and the impact it has had on this business, but my repeated efforts have gone without a reply.
It's also become apparent that Amcor Fibre Packaging has been outsourcing a considerable amount of work that would be covered under my agreement to supply. The decision to outsourcing of this work to another supplier has not been discussed with me or any other employee of this company and represents a breach of the contact [sic.]
I'll be pleased to meet with you and discuss the detail letter or I can be contacted on (02) 9756 3311 or by mail at the address above.
Craig Holihan[1183]
914 The version of the faxed letter that was tendered at the trial is not on letterhead (so there is no 'address above' to respond to), the date is incomplete, no fax number for Mr Ward is shown, and the letter is unsigned. In his witness statement, Mr Holihan said that the letter was sent to Mr Ward by fax. Under cross-examination, however, he gave the following evidence:
[DR McNICOL] ... Now in that [CB 7:2379], it's a copy of a letter dated 22 November and at the top it's got a handwritten 2005?---Yes.
And it's not yours, it's not signed. Is it your practice to sign letters?---Yes.
So did you keep a copy of the signed letter?---No.
Did you keep a copy of the fax sent to Mr Ward?---I think in my statement I said fax, but I'm just looking at this again. The way it's been worded and drafted, it looks like it's a letter.
All right?---But it would have been on a letterhead and it would have been signed. I can't recall if that date in 2005 was there on the original. I do know that that was entered later, and this was - this was a copy.
Thank you. Do you know who wrote the year at the top?---I did.
You did, okay?---Yes.
Thank you. Now are you sure that this was actually - it's not a fax, you say. It's a letter. This letter actually went?---Yes.[1184]
915 Mr Holihan was then directed to the email chain (referred to above) that took place with Mr Beynon about re-scheduling a meeting. The cross-examination continued, with Mr Holihan giving evidence to the effect that when seeking to schedule a meeting, Mr Beynon had asked him what the meeting was about, and then Mr Holihan responded with the agenda items set out in his email, namely:
(In his witness statement, Mr Holihan said that the first three points on the agenda were all related to the decline in work that Achilla was receiving.[1186])
[DR McNICOL] So you didn't copy Mr Ward into that chain obviously. I can see that?---No.
No?---So clearly my statement is correct. It was a fax.
Right?---Yes, sorry, about that. It was definitely a fax. Just in the chain of events because David Beynon called me shortly afterwards.
After what, sorry?---After the fax was sent to Paul Ward. David hadn't responded on the - it started on the 16th I would arrange a meeting. On the 17th David rang me and said what - what are the agenda items.
...
Thank you?---...And then on the 17th through to the 22nd I hadn't heard. So on the 22nd I - I sent a fax. I could have sent a copy of it to - there's a letter as well, but I sent the fax through to Paul Ward and within hours I had a call from David Beynon. He said, "Sorry, it's taken so long. What about Thursday the 24th?"
So this email chain that we have in front of us we've been going through is connected with the Paul Ward letter, is it? Is that what you're saying, sorry?---Okay. It happened at the same time. They were happening simultaneously. David Beynon didn't mention the fax from Paul Ward and Paul Ward never responded to my letter.
So that might explain why Paul Ward is not mentioned in any of these emails or copied in?---That's right. I've just assumed the fact that within hours of the fax being sent David Beynon responded and said, "Sorry for the delay. Let's make it Thursday the 24th".
All right. So the - well, it's a fax now. When was the fax actually sent?---On the - on the 22nd. I don't have a specific time. It would have been in the morning.
On 22 November 2005, is that right?---Yes.
So can we go to the letter?---Yes.[1187]
917 In summary, the position is that Mr Holihan was unclear about whether he had sent a letter or a fax, or both, to Mr Ward. But whichever it was, he did not keep a copy of the document that was actually dispatched. Further, Mr Holihan did not receive a response from Mr Ward, and even though he had thought it necessary to elevate his 'concerns' to a senior management level, it appears he did not pursue Mr Ward any further.
918 Mr Ward, who was called by the Holihan parties, gave evidence that he did not recall receiving any such communication from Mr Holihan, be it by letter or fax. And no copy of any such communication has been found or logged as having been received at Amcor. The email exchange that took place between Mr Holihan and Mr Beynon does not make reference to the letter/fax, nor does the exchange refer to any alleged breach of the Second Sale Agreement along the lines raised in the letter/fax. Under cross-examination by the Amcor parties, Mr Ward gave evidence to the effect that if he had received correspondence containing an allegation of breach then he:
... would probably have probably have gone straight to our solicitors to get their advice on it because it's an accusation of a breach of contract.
[DR McNICOL:] Right?---I probably would have either received a response from them and responded to Mr Holihan. I might have rung Mr Holihan. I might have sent this to our New South Wales region to get them to respond to some of the allegations. But I'd certainly have taken some action pretty quickly.[1188]
919 Mr Ward said that if he had received the letter/fax, he would have replied to Mr Holihan but '[p]robably not without legal advice first.'[1189] When he was shown the email exchange that took place between Mr Holihan and Mr Beynon, Mr Ward confirmed that he could not see any similar allegation of breach of contract mentioned there.[1190]
920 In re-examination, Mr Ward was asked whether, if he had received the document from Mr Holihan, it is likely that he would have shown it to Mr Beynon. He responded:
---Ah, would I have shown it to Mr Beynon? If he was still in that role at that point it was likely that I would have, yes.[1191]
921 Mr Ward also gave evidence, again under cross-examination, that he did recall meeting Mr Holihan at some stage but did not recall a meeting at the Amcor carton site in Botany, and he could not remember if Walter Gross was present when they met or not. Mr Ward was then asked about whether Mr Holihan had expressed concern about a decline in OME work, as follows:
[DR McNICOL:] ...And do you remember Mr Holihan ever saying, and whether it being 2 August or any other time, to you that he was concerned about the decline in OME work coming from AFP?---Not a decline of work, no.
No. So do you remember Mr Holihan ever complaining to you that OME work that he was entitled to was going to other manufacturers?---I don't remember that, no.[1192]
922 Against that background, the Amcor parties submit that the Court does not have any evidence before it that the letter from Mr Holihan was faxed or sent to Mr Ward or anyone else at Amcor.
923 The Holihan parties sought to explain the email contact that took place between Mr Beynon and Mr Holihan at 1.51 pm on 22 November 2005 as something that was initiated in response to Mr Ward having received the letter from Mr Holihan. In this regard, they relied upon Mr Ward's evidence to the effect that if he had received the letter, he would likely have shown it to Mr Beynon. In the absence of some cogent evidence as to when the letter was actually faxed to Mr Ward, however, I do not accept the Holihan parties' submission that this 'led immediately to Mr Beynon contacting Mr Holihan as planned.'[1193]
924 If such a letter alleging a breach of the Second Sale Agreement had been sent to and received by Mr Ward, at his office in Victoria, it is unlikely that there would not be any record of it having been received, and it is inconceivable that no action would have been taken by way of response. This communication was one that was of real importance to Mr Holihan, and in a sense it marked a turning point in his contractual relationship with the Amcor parties - first, because he was raising the spectre of Achilla obtaining a portion of its (raw materials) product 'from other sources', and secondly, because he was alleging that AFP's outsourcing represents 'a breach of the contract', in circumstances where each matter would have been of concern to the Amcor parties.
925 Mr Holihan said he had elevated his complaint to a senior executive level to try to get some traction, yet he failed to keep a copy of what was sent and did not have any record of how it was sent. His version of events shifted between it being sent by fax, possibly by letter, or a combination of both. But having determined to send the letter/fax, and inform the Amcor parties that he proposed to obtain raw materials from an alternate supplier, and allege that they were in breach of their contract with him, it is surprising that he did not follow the matter up when he received no response from Mr Ward.
926 In my view, that version of events is simply not credible. In the circumstances, to the extent that there is a dispute between the competing versions of events given by Mr Holihan and Mr Ward, I prefer the evidence of Mr Ward. Even if the letter/fax was sent to Mr Ward, and I am not satisfied that it was, I accept Mr Ward's evidence that it was not received by him. Mr Powell also gave evidence that he had no recollection of seeing such a document.[1194]
927 In his email exchange with Mr Beynon, Mr Holihan sought to arrange a meeting 'to discuss a number of issues'. The agenda items he listed did not convey any sense of him alleging a breach on the part of the Amcor parties. On the contrary, it conveyed the impression that Achilla's need to convert more of its own products might impact on Amcor, and that Mr Holihan wanted to have an 'open discussion around both parties being able to use other suppliers.' No complaint was raised let alone any allegation of a breach of the Second Sale Agreement. It is difficult to accept that the email of 17 November 2005 and the letter of 22 November 2005 could have been written by Mr Holihan about the same contract at around the same time.
928 The Amcor parties contend that 'the first time Holihan claims he raised the question of OME breaches with anyone at AFP is in a meeting in early 2006.'[1195] Accordingly, their conventional estoppel (and acquiescence) defence is advanced for the period from about July 2003 to October 2005 only. However, it will be noted that that period of time includes 21 March 2005, which is the date when the Deed of Accession was entered into. It will be recalled that under clause 2.3 of that Deed, ACB Co Vendor, Achilla and Mr Holihan 'irrevocably and unconditionally consent[ed] to [APA] becoming a party to the [Second Sale Agreement]' and under clause 2.4 they 'release[d] and forever discharge[d] ACB Co Vendor from all its liabilities and obligations under the [Second Sale Agreement]', with effect on and from the Accession Date.
929 The Deed of Accession does not mention any existing or prospective claims made, or to be made by Achilla against APA (as opposed to ACB Co Vendor) for breaches of the Second Sale Agreement in respect of events arising before the Accession Date. There was no reservation of rights and the Holihan parties' consent to the novation, which as a matter of law gave rise to a new contract between APA (as Vendor) and the Holihan parties 'on the same terms as previously except that references to the Vendor shall be read and construed as if they were references to [APA]',[1196] was unconditional. If it were the case that Mr Holihan was of the view that conduct on the part of APA to that point was in breach of the Second Sale Agreement (no implied supply agreement of the kind he now contends for having been raised until 2013), it is somewhat surprising that no mention was made of any such alleged breach(es). As no submissions were directed to this point, however, I do not propose to pursue that aspect any further.
930 It is well-established that a conventional estoppel can only be made out if there is evidence of the alleged assumption in fact having been adopted by the parties as the conventional basis for their relationship.[1197] And the underlying assumption must manifest '[a] demonstrable acceptance of a particular state of things', as the foundation for the dealings between the parties and that 'the acts or conduct relied upon must point plainly, if not unequivocally, to the assumption put forward as the conventional basis of relations.'[1198]
931 I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that from the outset, the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties each adopted the notion of 'business as usual' as the conventional basis for their relationship. That is, it was envisaged on both sides that after the sale, the ACB Business would continue to do the OME work that historically had been routed through the ACB Business prior to the sale, using the same equipment and at the same premises. The position did not change when the Deed of Accession was entered into. APA simply stepped into the shoes of ACB Co Vendor and the 'business as usual' arrangement continued.
932 At the time of the sale, Mr Holihan was well aware that some of the OME requirements of customers of the corrugated box plants at AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby were being met by OME suppliers other than Achilla. That too was a feature of the 'business as usual' arrangement. And that position did not change when the Deed of Accession was entered into. To that point, the ACB Business was continuing to do the OME work that historically had been routed through the ACB Business prior to the sale, and the alternative suppliers were continuing to do repeat work and other OME work of the kind that historically had been routed through them.
933 The Amcor parties rely heavily on the notion that because the Holihan parties had access to the PICK system, they well knew (or had the means of knowing) what orders for OME work APA was placing with alternative suppliers.
934 Mr Holihan said that he did not access the PICK system himself. However, the evidence shows, and Mr Holihan accepts, that with assistance from Mr Silva, he managed to obtain information about some of the OME jobs that were being sent to Le Breton. But it is by no means clear that the Holihan parties had visibility of all of the OME work that was being performed by others during the period it was operational. In his witness statement, Mr Holihan said that 'the ACB Business had limited access to both PICK and PCS.'[1199] In examination-in-chief, Mr Nellies explained that after the sale, the set up was essentially the same as before the sale. The ACB Business at Wetherill Park remained on the PICK system, so from an estimating point of view, the estimators at Amcor could continue to route work to the machines that were in the Wetherill Park business, and they could ascertain the cost of the job and the availability of the machines and manual labour required to perform the work.[1200] Mr Garcia, who worked in the ACB Business both before and after the sale, gave evidence to the effect that his access to the PICK system whilst he was an Achilla employee was more limited, in terms of what he had visibility of, than when he was at Amcor. Under cross-examination, Mr Garcia explained the position as follows:
[MS MURPHY:] ... Now while you were working at Amcor you had access to the PICK system?---Yes.
And you had an individual log in to access the system?---Yes.
And that system had information relating to the machines that belonged to Amcor, and also the machines belonging to ACB - - -?---Yes.
- - - when it owned ACB. And it didn't have information relating to the machines of other OMEs?---No.
When you were working with ACB, so from January 2005, you also had access to the PICK system?---Yes.
And that was until ACB's access to PICK stopped - - -?---Yes, I think - - -
- - - in about October of 2005. And at ACB you had your own individual login to the PICK system?---M'mm.
...
MS MURPHY: Your login, your individual login to the PICK system when you were at ACB was a different login to what you had at Amcor?---Yes.
And your level of access to PICK at ACB was a different level of access to that that you had?---Yes.
And when you were at ACB you used PICK to cost jobs for ACB's own customers - - -?---Yes.
- - - to estimate them. And that was all that you used the system for?---M'mm.
And you had no visibility of where Amcor was sending the OME work?---No, no.[1201]
935 Mr Silva's evidence was to a similar effect. He explained that the PICK and PCS systems worked in tandem: PICK recorded the actual product design and PCS recorded the history of the orders, and he said that in the PCS system you were able to see orders being sent out to places like Le Breton. But Mr Silva said that even with access to each system, he did not think he could see all of the OME jobs. Under cross-examination, Mr Silva explained what he had visibility of when accessing PICK and PCS:
[DR McNICOL:] Right, okay. All right, sorry. Now Mr Silva, through your access to the PICK system, is it correct you could see all the OME jobs going to other suppliers?---No, it's not. I probably wouldn't be able to see all the jobs.
Could you see some of them?---Some of them, that's correct.
What about if you had access to the PICK system and its companion system, the PCS, could you see all the jobs going to the other suppliers?---Ah probably only just some of them.
Well, why would - well, which ones are the ones that you could see?---I don't remember.
But only some of them. So did you try and access it for others?---I don't recall.
Right, so how many - when you say just some of the OME suppliers, some of the external alternate suppliers, how many?---Probably about four or five of them.
...
Now is it correct that you would report back on what OME jobs were being placed with other suppliers? In other words, they were not being placed with Achilla, but they were being placed with other suppliers?---That is correct.
You'd report back about those?---M'mm.
Right, okay. So did you review the PICK system regularly for this purpose?---Not regularly, no.
No. How regularly - I mean, how often?---Every so long, yeah, it's hard to say. I really don't remember.
Right, you don't remember. Did you report on every OME job that you thought relevant to Mr Holihan and Achilla's business?---No, I didn't.[1202]
936 Mr Nellies gave evidence about the sort of factors that the estimators at Amcor took into account when routing work to the various OME suppliers, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] Now what factors did an estimator take into account when deciding between OME suppliers?---..., a lot of the OME suppliers had a certain type of work that they, that they did for us. ..., so we would in some case we were limited with who we could go to on different types of things, ..., things like, ..., litho lamination went to Max Le Breton, ..., but silk screening could go to a number of different places for Thompsons or for, ah, for Ace Screen Printing. ..., SPS Packing could do closure work or petition [sic.] work. Northwest could do petition [sic.] work or, or slotted work for us. So it was a determination of what was the product at the time and what was available and who could do what, and that knowledge sat with them. They had the expertise to know that these people could do this type of work.
So are there any other factors that would be taken into account other than what you just said then?---If there were a number of places that could ..., do the work that was specified, then, ..., sometimes price was taken into account to allow, ..., obviously the best possible, ah, pricing for our client.
Anything else?---..., their service as well also come into account sometimes. ..., so, ah, if they were, ..., notoriously late with work, then we wouldn't necessarily give them that work. ..., or the type of work that they did or we had quality issues or, all those sort of things were taken into account.[1203]
937 The evidence relied upon by the Amcor parties is essentially that there was no change to the status quo that persisted between the parties - they point to a failure on the part of Mr Holihan to take active steps, and in a timely way, to make known to the Amcor parties that he contended their conduct in procuring (and continuing to procure) OME supplies from alternative suppliers was in breach of the agreement, and, on the part of the Amcor parties, a continuation of their 'business as usual' approach, with them simply sending OME work to both the ACB Business and to the alternative suppliers who had performed that work, or work of that same kind, on earlier occasions.
938 As noted earlier, when Mr Azzopardi approached Mr Holihan in around April 2004 and asked him whether he thought he could supply the Kellogg's pallets that were currently being made by SPS Packaging, Mr Holihan's response was one of embracing the opportunity to do so. He did not convey a sense of grievance that he was learning for the first time that the Kellogg's pallet work was being performed elsewhere and nor did he contend that it should have been being performed by Achilla from the outset. On the contrary, he effectively acknowledged that before Achilla could perform that work he would first have to ascertain exactly how the Kellogg's pallets were being made by SPS Packaging.
939 Similarly, when the Deed of Accession was being entered into in early 2005, Mr Holihan did not raise with the Amcor parties any concern about alternative suppliers continuing to do OME work for them. Nor did he raise any such concern in his email exchange with Mr Beynon in mid-November 2005. In my view, when the first three of the agenda items he raised with Mr Beynon[1204] are read in context, they do not flag a concern on Mr Holihan's part that there was a decline in the OME work that Achilla was receiving. Relevantly, from at or about the time the Deed of Accession was entered into, Mr Holihan's conduct, when taken as a whole and viewed in context, manifests a 'demonstrable acceptance' of the state of things.
940 The Amcor parties submit that because Mr Holihan never raised any question of breach nor issued any notice under the contract, they 'continued to service their OME needs in accordance with the practice and understanding as to what was agreed between the parties'.[1205] That is, they say that OME jobs for their customers' supplies of product were placed with alternative suppliers and Amcor paid their invoices as rendered upon completion. They contend that for the Holihan parties to now claim a loss of profit in respect of that work which was performed by the alternative suppliers, in circumstances where Mr Holihan was aware the work was going elsewhere, and yet he continued to remain passive about it, means that the Amcor parties now face:
(a) a second demand for a sum representing the profit margin on that work, having already paid a profit margin to the relevant alternative supplier when the work was completed; and
(b) allegations of breach in respect of individual orders that were placed some eight to ten years after the work was ordered and long after the relevant witnesses have gone, documentation has been lost and the systems of work have been changed.
941 The Holihan parties maintain that the Amcor parties' claim concerning difficulties in defending the claim and the prospect of having to pay profit margins to alternative suppliers was raised for the first time in their closing submissions. The Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties should be confined to what is set out in their pleadings, where the detrimental reliance alleged is framed in terms of their potential liability 'for obtaining OME supplies from other suppliers in circumstances where there was a common assumption that it was entitled to do so'.[1206]
942 Further, the Holihan parties submitted that the Amcor parties did not adduce any evidence of detrimental reliance in fact by Amcor on the mutual assumption that was said to have been induced by Achilla, as '[n]ot a single Amcor witness was called, or questioned, on this point, and the Amcor parties have not discharged their burden of proof in this respect.'[1207]
943 It is true to say that the Amcor parties did not adduce evidence from an Amcor witness to the effect that they were at all material times acting upon the basis of the alleged common assumption, and understood Mr Holihan to be so acting also, and that they continued to operate as they did in sending OME work to alternative suppliers believing that Mr Holihan knew they were doing so, and without demur. Nevertheless, in my view it is clear that in circumstances where the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties had each adopted the notion of 'business as usual' as the conventional basis for their relationship, and Mr Holihan did not raise any question of breach, or issue any notice under the contract, any departure from that position by him would cause APA detriment as particularised and set out above. I accept the Holihan parties' submission that the Amcor parties' claim for detrimental reliance should be confined to that which is set out in their pleadings, and not the enlarged claim that was advanced for the first time in their closing submissions. Whether any damage was suffered, however, will only become apparent once the relevant 'breach' jobs have been identified.
Does the 'no waiver' clause operate to prevent any estoppel?
944 In their reply, the Holihan parties also relied on the 'no waiver' clause set out in clause 15.5 of the Second Sale Agreement as applied to the Supply Agreement[1208] as a further basis for denying the allegations made by the Amcor parties in paragraph 29 of their defence.
(a) A waiver by a party of a provision or of a right under this Deed is binding on the party granting the waiver only if it is given in writing and is signed by the party or an officer of the party granting the waiver.
(b) A waiver is effective only in the specific instance and for the specific purpose for which it is given.
(c) A single or partial exercise of a right by a party does not preclude another or further exercise of that right or the exercise of another right.
(d) Failure by a party to exercise or delay in exercising a right does not prevent its exercise or operate as a waiver.
946 In effect, the Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties' claims of estoppel and acquiescence cannot stand in the face of their express agreement as recorded in clause 15.5.
947 The Amcor parties dispute that position, contending first that the proper construction of 'waiver' in the context of the particular agreement read as a whole, is a reference to the unilateral conduct of a party to forego a right, which is to its exclusive benefit. Secondly, they argue that the clause says nothing about common law rights that arise as a matter of law, and note that clause 15.12 of the Second Sale Agreement provides expressly that rights contained within the agreement are cumulative with common law rights that arise as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Amcor parties submit that clause 15.5 will not operate to exclude a defence of estoppel, which is a different concept: see, for example, O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd[1209]; MP Investments Nominees Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd.[1210] Further, they submit that 'the construction contended for by the Holihan parties may well be contrary to public policy (as attempting to interfere with the Court's jurisdiction), and therefore ought not to be condoned by the Court.'[1211]
948 In my view, it is unlikely that clause 15.5, on its proper construction, operates to foreclose or preclude a defence of estoppel that arises as a matter of law. Accordingly, clause 15.5 does not preclude or prevent the Amcor parties raising and relying upon their defence of conventional estoppel.
Issue 4: Has there been a failure to retain appropriate records, and if so, what consequence follows?
949 In the Issues List, the parties note that '[e]ncompassed within this issue is the question of whether, where there is insufficient evidence available to identify what work was involved in an OME supply, a party has failed to retain appropriate records and discover them and, if so, what if any is the effect of s 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic)?'
950 The issue of the lack of availability of relevant documents first arose in the context of considering the question of breach and, in particular, whether the Holihan parties have proven that Achilla could have performed the work the subject of the 1,913 invoices for OME jobs that were performed by alternative suppliers. As the trial proceeded, however, it became apparent that the issue of the unavailability of relevant documentation was one of broader application.
951 In light of the Court's rejection of the implied supply agreement (and estoppel by convention) contended for by the Holihan parties and the construction of clause 12.2 arrived at by the Court, the position now reached is that the Holihan parties must demonstrate that APA was relevantly in breach of the Second Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession) in the period from 21 March 2005 to the end of the five year period. To discharge their onus concerning APA's alleged breach of clause 12.2, the Holihan parties must first identify the OME supplies that they contend APA should have procured from Achilla (or the ACB Business) effectively on a 'business as usual' basis during that period. Relevantly, by reference to the indicative document prepared by the parties showing the spread of the 1,913 jobs over the time period, the Holihan parties are required to identify which of the approximately 1,156 jobs performed after the Deed of Accession was entered into (of which approximately 553 were for Amcor Displays) they contend were OME supplies that APA should have procured from Achilla on a 'business as usual' basis. Then it is a matter for the Amcor parties to demonstrate in respect of the jobs so identified, those instances where they contend the exception was enlivened, thereby relieving APA from the obligation to procure those OME supplies from Achilla.
952 Generally speaking, the evidence before the Court shows that in the ordinary course, each OME job was recorded in a purchase order from the Amcor entity and an invoice from the relevant OME supplier. While the PICK system was operational, which relevantly was up until the end of September 2005, the details of the job would also be recorded in PICK. Thereafter, from about October 2005 when Amcor's SAP system became operational, product specification information was also contained in SAP.
953 Mr Holihan gave evidence about the process he went through in preparing the Holihan parties' liability particulars, using documentation that was discovered or produced by the Amcor parties (invoices and purchase orders and summary spreadsheets[1212]) or produced by third parties on subpoena.[1213] But it is clear from the examples of particular jobs to which attention was directed at the trial, that there were a number of instances where one or other of the relevant purchase orders or invoices were missing, or they were illegible or they described the work in only very general terms. The absence of, or deficiencies in, the documentation available made it difficult to identify the precise work involved in each of the 1,913 jobs sent to alternative suppliers for which Achilla has made claims. In seeking to prove the issue as to breach, the Holihan parties gave evidence through Mr Holihan, and based on his experience in the industry, to the effect that Achilla could have performed work of the kind involved. They also adduced evidence from the alternative suppliers as to the type of work they performed for Amcor during the relevant period and the equipment they used.
954 To the extent that relevant documents were not available, the Holihan parties relied upon s 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958. The Amcor parties resisted this, contending that in circumstances where there is insufficient documentation to identify the work involved in the job, there is no basis to find that Achilla had the ability to supply consistently and on a basis that is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.[1214]
955 In their written closing submissions, the Holihan parties set out a chronological account of the attempts they made to secure relevant documents and the steps ordered by the Court for the production of documents.[1215]
956 The Holihan parties issued their counterclaim against ACB Co Vendor on 21 January 2008.[1216] The counterclaim was amended on 4 October 2010[1217] (pursuant to orders made by Emerton J on 1 October 2010) so as to plead the Deed of Accession and add APA as the second defendant by counterclaim. Her Honour also made orders that day for the Amcor parties to file and serve an affidavit of documents relevant to the issues raised in the counterclaim.[1218] Thereafter, in response to further orders made by Vickery J on 11 May 2011, the Amcor parties filed affidavits of documents by making discovery of summary spreadsheets for the period 21 March 2005 to 30 July 2008 for OME work performed by All Pack, J S Cutting, Le Breton, Northwest Packaging, Sainsbury, SPS Packaging, Thompson and Ubeeco. His Honour made further orders on 10 May 2012, and the Amcor parties filed affidavits of documents and made discovery of their summary spreadsheets, invoices, purchase orders and delivery dockets relating to OME procured by APA, but not all such documents were discovered. Further orders were made by his Honour on 27 November 2012 requiring the Amcor parties to discover all purchase orders and product specification information documents pertaining to the OME supplies the subject of the counterclaim and to Achilla's alleged inability to supply, and to file an affidavit relating to the discovery of information from the PICK system. In December 2012, affidavits were filed on behalf of the Amcor parties in response. In the affidavit of Mr Sandy Antonuccio, the Chief Information Officer for Amcor, affirmed on 3 December 2012, he deposed to the effect that the PICK system was decommissioned in or about July 2011, [1219] but backed up on magnetic tape. He said that:
[6] The only data preserved or carried over from the PICK system that can be accessed on other Amcor systems is master data and limited sales history data which was retained and transferred to the SAP system. The PICK transaction data was not migrated in to SAP. Apart from this limited data, the data that was in the PICK system has not been stored or preserved on other systems used by Amcor. The entire PICK system and associated data was backed up onto magnetic tape and retained as a system of record.
[7] I have located the tape containing all of the data and information that was contained in the PICK system. That tape contains the data, programs and operating system for PICK. It is possible for Hewlett Packard to make a copy of the tape which could be provided to the Holihan parties. In order to review the data on the tape it would be necessary for the Holihan Parties to restore the back-up tape onto a HP Unix box system and to engage PICK programmers in the market place to re-build the system and create usernames for access to the data.[1220]
957 In an affidavit sworn on 14 November 2012 by Ms Jennifer Lynn DeJong, a member of the firm of Corrs Chambers Westgarth (the then solicitors for the Amcor parties), Ms DeJong deposed that she had been informed by Mr Antonuccio that:
...To continue the PICK system would have cost approximately $173,000 annually (comprised of a salary of at least $100,000 for a specialised person trained in the PICK system to maintain the system, payment of $15,000 to Hewlett Packard to maintain the box for the system, database support of $7,800 and disc storage of $50,000).[1221]
958 On 20 December 2012, Mr Antonuccio affirmed a further affidavit providing discovery of production specification information extracted from the SAP system, but not the product specifications themselves, and some quotes pertaining to jobs performed by All Pack, Northwest Packaging, Sainsbury and Thompson. In July 2014, the Holihan parties caused several subpoenas to produce to be issued to the alternative suppliers, seeking documents relating to the nature of the work performed by Amcor entities (defined to include ACB Co Vendor and APA) in the period from 30 July 2003 to 31 July 2008.
959 In their closing written submissions,[1222] the Holihan parties summarised the outcome of the subpoenas issued in July 2014 as follows:
Letter to the Prothonotary advising that documents had been destroyed.[1225]
No documents found and none produced.[1229]
Letter to the Prothonotary advising that they were unable to assist.[1231]
Inference to be drawn as a result of the Notice to Produce to the Prothonotary[1233] and the documents produced in answer that no documents produced.
Letter to the Prothonotary advising that they no longer held any information.[1235]
M Le Breton Graphics (Aust) Pty Ltd[1236]
Letter to the Prothonotary advising that they no longer held any information.[1237]
Letter from Schrader Legal, solicitors for Stadour Pty Ltd and Sainsbury Nominees Pty Ltd, advising that the documents the subject of the subpoenas to produce to their clients were not retained.[1239]
A compact disc was produced to the Prothonotary.[1242]
960 Relevantly, Mr Phillips gave evidence on behalf of the Amcor parties about what documentation was available. Mr Phillips had returned to Amcor, specifically to APA, in 2005 in a consulting role which he held between about March 2005 and June 2007. In that role, he performed a comprehensive review of APA's costing system as part of the transition from the PICK system to SAP. Thereafter, until at least May 2011, he consulted to Amcor in relation to various pieces of litigation that were on foot. Under cross-examination, Mr Phillips agreed that if, in 2008, he had been asked to produce a list of all of AFP's OME work in the period from 2003 to 2008, that would have been possible. He explained that the task would have involved him accessing the data warehouse through a tool called 'Panorama', which was functional through to at least February 2011. He said that Panorama could be used to determine that OME work had in fact taken place but to go further than that you would need access to the production order, and they were stored at the Amcor branch where the orders were actually produced.[1243] In earlier times, the production orders were in paper form and in more recent times they were electronic. Mr Phillips said that production orders are always stored in PICK, and that PICK could have been accessed in 2008 and for at least part of 2011.[1244] Further, in response to a question from the Court, he agreed that orders that were placed on PICK would have been transferred across to SAP and retained on SAP but added that he was 'not sure how far back it was and how much was actually transferred on'.[1245] Mr Phillips said that the normal practice was for the supplier to invoice work as the work was completed.[1246]
961 The evidence given by Mr Nellies, Mr Garcia and Mr Cichonski about the ordering process and the information held on PICK was to similar effect, namely that the PICK system held all of the information from costings, job histories, delivery information for work and invoicing information. In giving evidence about quoting, Mr Nellies made mention of another system called 'iSpec' that he said was also in use with quoting, and an external order processing system called the HLPPS system.
962 In cross-examination, Ms Julie McPherson, who has been Group General Counsel for Amcor Ltd since 18 April 2005, explained that Mr Jason Arnheim, who was relevantly General Counsel for the AFP business within the Amcor Australasia group, would have been involved in and responsible for the co-ordination of the relevant discovery. Ms McPherson was unable to explain why it was that the PICK system was decommissioned in mid-2011 while the counterclaim was on-foot:
[MR MAIDEN:] And so you can't add anything to the inquiry as to how it is that the PICK system happened to be shut down while the case was still on foot because it was Mr Arnheim who was directly responsible from a legal perspective?---Yes, he was. He was. I don't, you know, from reading his affidavits I don't think there was anything sinister in there, I think it was just a matter of they probably - well from what I understood the discovery would have been made and there was probably no reason to think that there was anything further required having - having satisfied the discovery. But I really can't make any other comment other than that. I certainly didn't direct anything and I'm sure, as I said, I'm not aware of any directions.[1247]
963 Mr Holihan gave evidence about the documents generated in the course of costing a job. Evidence given by the alternative suppliers, in particular Mr Pellizzari of Northwest Packaging and Mr Kent of Thompson, about the quoting process - the request for quotes made by Amcor and the quotes submitted by them - which was generally consistent with that given by Mr Holihan.
964 Other documentation was adverted to by various witnesses in the course of them giving evidence about the Amcor systems and processes for documenting aspects of the quoting and ordering of jobs and the work performed. An example of this is the evidence given by Mr Guy in the context of his evidence about RTS Imaging work about non-conformance reports or 'NCRs'. The Holihan parties submit that no documents have been discovered by the Amcor parties relating to NCRs. Nor, they point out, have any documents been discovered by the Amcor parties relating to the 'on time delivery reports' mentioned by Mr Nellies as being produced by email each day,[1248] or the HLPPS system, or the iSpec system. They submit that documents in each of those categories may have been relevant or potentially relevant to the issues raised on the Achilla counterclaim.
965 Further, Mr Powell gave evidence on behalf of Amcor about the books and records of the Sainsbury business that passed to Amcor upon its purchase of the business in early 2008. But the Holihan parties submitted that the Amcor parties have only discovered a summary spreadsheet for OME supplies performed by Sainsbury during the period from 21 March 2005 to 31 July 2008, and that no documents relating to supply by Sainsbury in the prior period have been discovered.
966 Accordingly, in respect of this body of additional documents, the Holihan Parties also rely upon s 56(2)(h) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), in addition to s 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic).
Section 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic)
967 In 2006, the Evidence (Document Unavailability) Act 2006 was enacted to amend the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) in relation to documents that are 'unavailable' in civil proceedings.[1249] In the second reading speech, the Attorney-General described the 'purpose of the bill' as being 'to enable the courts ... to intervene in civil proceedings where relevant documents are unavailable to ensure a fair outcome between parties in civil proceedings.'[1250] Nowadays, this suite of measures is relevantly found in sections 89A - 89C of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958.
968 Under section 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958, the Court is empowered to make a ruling or order, as may be considered necessary to ensure fairness to the parties, in relation to documents that are 'unavailable' where the unavailability of the document is likely to cause unfairness to a party (section 89B(1)). Section 89A provides that a document is relevantly 'unavailable' in a civil proceeding if -
(a) the document is, or has been but is no longer, in the possession, custody or power of a party to the civil proceeding; and
(b) the document has been destroyed, disposed of, lost, concealed or rendered illegible, undecipherable or incapable of identification (whether before or after the commencement of the proceeding).
969 In Little v Shell Refining Australia Pty Ltd & Ors,[1251] Zammit AsJ (as her Honour then was) said that it 'goes without saying that ... the unavailable documents must all fall within a discovery order or subpoena' for an order to be made under section 89B.[1252]
970 Section 89C sets out the matters the Court 'must have regard to' before making an order under section 89B, as being -
(a) the circumstances in which the document became unavailable; and
(b) the impact of the unavailability of the document on the proceeding, including whether the unavailability of the document will adversely affect the ability of a party to prove its case or make a full defence; and
(c) any other matter that the court considers relevant.
971 Section 89B(2) sets out, without limiting subsection (1), the ruling or orders the Court may make as being -
(a) that an adverse inference will be drawn from the unavailability of the document;
(b) that a fact in issue between the parties be presumed to be true in the absence of evidence to the contrary;
(c) that certain evidence not be adduced;
(d) that all or part of a defence or statement of claim be struck out;
(e) that the evidential burden of proof be reversed in relation to a fact in issue.
Section 56(2)(h) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)
972 Section 56(2)(h) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) also vests a discretion in the Court in relation to documents. Section 56(1) provides that the Court may make any order or give any direction it considers appropriate if it finds that there has been -
(a) a failure to comply with discovery obligations; or
(b) a failure to comply with any order or direction of the court in relation to discovery; or
(c) conduct intended to delay, frustrate, or avoid discovery of discoverable documents.
973 Without limiting s 56(1), s 56(2) then sets out the kind of orders or directions that the Court may make or give, including, in s 56(2)(h), an order or direction 'in respect of any adverse inference arising from the conduct referred to in subsection (1).' Section 58 makes clear that nothing in these provisions 'derogates from the operation of Division 9 of Part III of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958'.
974 In the recent decision in Talacko (as executor of Estate of Talacko) v Talacko,[1253] McDonald J had occasion to consider the powers of the Court under s 56(2)(h). His Honour said:
The power to 'make an order or give directions' in respect of any adverse inference arising from a failure to comply with discovery obligations should be read as conferring upon the court the power to record a finding of an adverse inference in a judgment. If this construction is not adopted the provision would be rendered nugatory.
Absent s 56(2)(h) of the Civil Procedure Act, it is well-established that where a party fails to comply with court orders for production of evidence such failure can constitute an implied admission or circumstantial evidence permitting an adverse inference. I infer that had the fourth defendant provided discovery of taxation and financial records for the period 2000 to 2002 such records would not have advanced the fourth defendant's defence of the allegation that in entering into the 2000 mortgage, the fourth defendant had a common purpose with the first to third defendants of seeking to take the Glenferrie Road property out of the reach of the plaintiffs.[1254]
975 His Honour also referred to the joint judgment of Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd, [1255] where, their Honours said:
The rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference, not that evidence not called by a party would have been adverse to the party, but that it would not have assisted the party. But the conclusion by the trial judge that the plaintiff - a party-witness - deliberately withheld evidence reflected a stronger reaction. It operated as a finding that there had been an admission. It could be inferred that the evidence was withheld, in breach of the witness's duty to tell the whole truth in answer to the question, because the plaintiff was conscious that success in the litigation would be rendered impossible or less likely if the material withheld were revealed. Depending on the circumstances, when a party lies, or destroys or conceals evidence, or attempts to destroy or conceal evidence, or suborns witnesses, or calls testimony known to be false, or fails to comply with court orders for the production of evidence (like subpoenas or orders to answer interrogatories), or misleads persons in authority about who the party is, or flees, the conduct can be variously described as an implied admission or circumstantial evidence permitting an adverse inference. The position must be the same where there is a failure of a party-witness to comply with the duty of a witness to tell the whole truth. There is a reason why failure to call a witness or failure to ask a particular question of a witness supports the possible inference that the witness's evidence would not have assisted the party, while failure of a party-witness to tell the whole truth may support an inference that the party suppressed evidence which would have been damaging to the party-witness. A litigant has no duty to call particular witnesses or to procure that any witnesses called by that litigant are asked particular questions. A litigant who enters the witness box, on the other hand, is under a positive duty to tell the whole truth in answer to the questions asked. [1256]
976 Against that background, the Holihan parties contend that the evidence before the Court suggests that there is a body of documents that are relevantly 'unavailable' for the purposes of section 89A, notwithstanding their efforts to secure the production of them by way of subpoena and requests for discovery etc. They submit that quotes for work, the production orders (or masters) stored on the PICK system, and invoices, delivery dockets and purchase orders for OME jobs are all likely to be relevant to their claim that Achilla could have done the OME work that was allocated to and performed by the alternative suppliers. In these circumstances, they contend that -
It would be unjust for the Amcor parties to take issue with the Holihan Parties' proof in circumstances where relevant documents are unavailable by reason of the Amcor parties' actions, or have not been discovered. The Court should:
(a) adopt a presumption that the necessary facts (i.e. that Achilla could have done the work) are true; alternatively
(b) draw inferences in favour of the Holihan parties wherever there is a gap in the evidence caused by the Amcor parties' failures.[1257]
977 Further, they submit that where the evidence suggests that complete discovery was not made in relation to the issues the subject of the Achilla counterclaim, inferences should be drawn pursuant to section 56(2)(h) of the Civil Procedure Act or otherwise in relation to such documents.
978 In response, the Amcor parties submitted that the Court should not entertain the Holihan parties' applications made under section 89B and section 56(2)(h) and should refuse to exercise the discretion to draw any adverse inference. The Amcor parties contend that in many cases, the relevant invoice or document complained about is available and has been discovered, and there is abundant other evidence available[1258] relevant to the nature of the alleged supply breaches, including direct evidence from representatives of the third party OME Suppliers about the type of work they did for Amcor and relevant volumes, invoices discovered by those companies, and evidence from Mr Holihan about Achilla's capacity. Accordingly, they say the documentation complained about does not satisfy the definition of 'unavailable' documents in section 89A. Moreover, they say when the Court follows the approach taken by Zammit AsJ in Little,[1259] and looks at what documents the Holihan parties already have, it is clear that they have adequate documentation available to them.
979 Further, the Amcor parties submit that the evidence before the Court demonstrates that there was no advertent destruction of any invoices and purchase orders that were not retained electronically in Amcor's Business Services system. And in the case of the de-commissioning of the PICK system, 'there was no advertent destruction of documents' and the Holihan parties did not seek specific documents prior to the de-commissioning of PICK, even though Mr Holihan had known since the Second Sale Agreement was executed that Amcor planned to replace that system.
980 The Holihan parties responded by pointing to the following matters:
(a) in the case of invoices - there are 69 jobs where the invoices were either not discovered, or were discovered but are illegible, in respect of which the Amcor parties contend there is no basis for Achilla to maintain that it could have done the work or where there is insufficient documentation available to identify the work. The Holihan parties contend that these invoices are needed to form a view as to the nature of work involved and/or to assist in the quantification of Achilla's claim for lost profits in relation to the jobs the subject of 'unavailable invoices'. The Holihan parties submit that to the extent the Amcor Parties have not discovered invoices (original or copy), or copy invoices only have been discovered but are illegible, the invoices are relevantly 'unavailable' (section 89B(1)(a) read with section 89A). Further, they say the Amcor Parties' failure to discover some invoices and to properly describe the invoices that were discovered amounts to a failure to make discovery: section 56(1)(a).
(b) in the case of purchase orders - there are 1,494 of the 1,913 jobs where purchase orders were not discovered. The purchase orders are important because they would disclose when the subject work was ordered, and in particular whether it was before or after Completion. The Holihan parties contend that they are clearly 'unavailable' (section 89B(1)(a) read with section 89A). Further, they say the Amcor Parties' failure to address this category of documents at all in their affidavits of documents amounts to a failure to make discovery: section 56(1)(a).
(c) in the case of quotes - only a small number of quotes was discovered by Mr Arnheim's 20 December 2012 affidavit, and as to the balance, he effectively said that they were documents that the Amcor parties once had, but as at 20 December 2012 no longer had, within their possession, custody or power. In the ordinary course, the quotes would contain detailed information about the work required to be performed for a particular job. The Holihan parties contend that the quotes, not being within the Amcor parties' possession, custody or power, are relevantly 'unavailable' (section 89B(1)(a) read with section 89A). Further, they submit that Mr Arnheim's failure to depose to the facts required by rule 29.04(1)(c) of the Rules amounts to a failure to comply with discovery obligations for the purposes of section 56(1).
(d) in the case of production orders - the evidence before the Court shows that while the production orders were stored on the PICK system, they became inaccessible when it was de-commissioned in 2011. Mr Antonuccio's evidence was that the back-up tape would need to be restored and rebuilt in order to access PICK data.[1260] Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that the effect of Mr Antonuccio's evidence is that the production orders are relevantly 'unavailable' as they are indecipherable without specialist equipment, expert assistance and major expense. Further, the Holihan parties submit that the Amcor Parties' failure to address the source documents at all in their affidavits of documents amounts to a failure to comply with their discovery obligations: rule 29.04(1)(a) and section 56(1)(a).
981 The Holihan parties dispute the notion advanced by the Amcor parties that the documentation available to them is 'adequate' and the Court need not concern itself with the absence of requests for quotes and production orders. On the contrary, they submit that detailed information about the precise steps involved in the work done by the alternative suppliers is critical to establishing breach of clause 12.2 (if the Court is not satisfied by direct evidence or inference) and is relevant to quantification of Achilla's loss on a D & D basis. In relation to quantification, the ideal method for calculating Achilla's lost profits involves analysing each step of a job, referencing those steps through the agreed budget (e.g. Exhibit H91A) and adding the margin for the relevant year. Without knowing precisely what steps were involved in each job, Achilla (and the experts) cannot perform that task and the Amcor parties and the Holihan parties developed their respective quantification methodologies accordingly.
982 The Holihan parties contend that the unavailability of invoices, purchase orders requests for quotes, quotes and production orders is likely to cause unfairness to the Holihan Parties and they are likely to suffer prejudice as a result. Accordingly, in the circumstances, they submit the Court should exercise its discretion under section 89B(2). Further, that the Court should actively consider drawing inferences of the kind sought by the Holihan Parties under section 56(2).
983 With the de-commissioning of the PICK system in or about July 2011, the quotes for OME work, the production orders (or masters), invoices, delivery dockets and purchase orders for OME jobs that were allocated to, and performed by, alternative suppliers, were effectively rendered inaccessible in the absence of expenditure of significant sums of money on an ongoing basis. The Amcor parties had apparently determined that it was no longer necessary for them to continue to incur the cost associated with maintaining the functionality of the PICK system on an ongoing basis, but they took the precaution of backing up the entire PICK system and associated data onto magnetic tape and they continue to retain it as a system of record. As a practical matter, however, despite the back-up tape being available, the PICK system is no longer operational and the information or documentation stored within the system warehouse is effectively 'destroyed, disposed of, lost or concealed', 'undecipherable' or 'incapable of identification' within the meaning of section 89A. In many instances, it would appear that no reproduction of the relevant document is available in place of the original, the Holihan parties having made comprehensive attempts to obtain the missing purchase orders, quotes and invoices from the alternative suppliers by service of subpoenas and the like.
984 As noted earlier, a major difficulty for the Holihan parties is to demonstrate what jobs or sort of work the ACB Business was performing prior to the sale that on a 'business as usual' basis it was entitled to continue to receive from AFP's Smithfield and Revesby box plants after the sale. The evidence suggests that while the PICK system was maintained, the jobs performed by the ACB Business would have been capable of being identified by the 'masters' but it is not clear whether other data such as the relevant order or invoice number would also have been required before one could effectively interrogate the system. Also, the evidence shows that some jobs may have been moved temporarily (in the case of an urgent job) or transferred from one OME supplier to another over time, and it is unclear whether the transaction history for the job would be capable of being viewed on PICK by using Panorama or one of the other interrogation tools mentioned so as to clarify the position. Further, in the absence of access to the master details, it is difficult to gain a clear picture of what level and type of repeat work was being performed over time by each of the OME suppliers.
985 At this point, it now seems clear that if access to the PICK system had been maintained so as to ensure the accessibility of that body of documentation, it would have assisted the Holihan parties to make out at least some of the instances of breach they contend for, and also the Amcor parties to the extent that they seek to rely upon the carve-out in clause 12.2.
986 The evidence is that the PICK system was decommissioned in or about July 2011, which was at or about the time the Achilla counterclaim was to be heard by Vickery J as part of the original proceeding. However, on 29 June 2011, his Honour vacated the trial date and adjourned the trial of the counterclaim sine die. At that point, the formulation of Achilla's counterclaim differed from the current version, in the sense that there was no mention of any implied supply agreement or estoppel by convention. And the Holihan parties did not provide particulars of the 1,913 instances of alleged breach they contend for until they filed their liability particulars dated 3 May 2013. Amcor's General Counsel, Ms McPherson, was herself unable to explain why the PICK system was decommissioned while the Achilla counterclaim was still on foot, and Mr Arnheim, who may have been able to do so, was not called. But the evidence shows that maintaining the functionality of the PICK system on an ongoing basis was likely to be an expensive exercise, particularly in circumstances where it had been replaced at an operational level by SAP.
987 Prior to entering into the Second Sale Agreement, Mr Holihan knew that the Amcor parties were going to update their operational systems and that a new platform was to be introduced approximately 12 to 18 months after the sale. Indeed, so much is evident from clause 9.3 of the Second Sale Agreement which expressly acknowledges that replacement of Amcor's existing system 'is currently contemplated'. Mr Nellies was handling the transition to SAP during 2005 and Mr Holihan was aware that the PICK system would be decommissioned once SAP was up and running and fully operational.
988 The Amcor parties point out that in the lead up to the decommissioning of the PICK system in mid-2011, there was no particularised request from the Holihan parties for delivery up of the specific documents required by them and 'at no time in any of the correspondence sent in March-April 2011 did Holihan's lawyers ask for specifications.'[1261] Further, the Amcor parties observe that as Achilla had decommissioned its 'Kiwi Plan' costing system (which was similar in operation to the PICK system) in 2010, Mr Holihan was also aware that the decommissioning of the PICK system would, as a practical matter, foreclose access to the documents contained on that system.
989 In my view, both parties have been hindered in the presentation of their cases by the 'unavailability' of the documentation in the PICK system and, in particular, their inability to access the functioning PICK system. And with the effluxion of time, the ability to gain access to documents held by the alternative suppliers has also been hampered. The unavailability of the body of transactional data and the inability to interrogate the PICK system has presented real difficulties for the Holihan parties in proving their case and also for the Amcor parties in making out their defence. In those circumstances, save in respect of documents pertaining to the Sainsbury business, I am not satisfied that the making of any order of the kind sought by the Holihan parties under section 89B and/or section 56(2) in respect of production orders, invoices, quotes or purchase orders would serve to promote or ensure fairness between the parties.
990 In the case of the Sainsbury business, which was relevantly an alternative supplier during the term of the Second Sale Agreement, the evidence is that from late 2007 through to July 2008, Amcor was in the process of acquiring it. The evidence given by Mr Roberts and Mr Powell demonstrates that once the acquisition of the Sainsbury business was completed, Amcor had available to it a ready-made short run capacity in the Sydney market, and the ability for it to supply board and paper to the Sainsbury business. The records of the Sainsbury business would likely have been transferred across to, or been accessible by the Amcor parties as part of the sale. Indeed, Mr Powell admitted that, as part of the sale, Amcor got all of its business records.[1262] But little in the way of documentation was made available on discovery or produced on the return of subpoenas directed to Sainsbury.
991 In the case of the other alternative suppliers, the Holihan parties were able to call evidence from persons involved in the alternative supplier's business. But in the case of Sainsbury, by the time the trial of Achilla's counterclaim took place, it was well and truly aligned with the Amcor parties and it was not reasonable for the Holihan parties to be expected to call evidence from persons involved in that business prior to, or after, the sale.
992 The purchase orders and invoices in respect of Sainsbury work which is claimed by the Holihan parties date from 14 July 2006 (to 31 May 2008).[1263] In each case, the purchase order is raised by 'AFP NSW Displays' and the invoice is rendered by Sainsbury to 'Amcor Displays'. Mr Holihan gave evidence that Sainsbury did screen printing, flexo printing, die cutting, gluing, slotting, litho laminating, cutting and packing in the Relevant Period.[1264] Save for litho lamination and cutting (as opposed to die-cutting), Mr Powell confirmed this was the type of work performed by Sainsbury, he having performed the due diligence in relation to Sainsbury from late 2007 before it was purchased by AFP.[1265] But Mr Powell was unable to assist the Court as to the work performed by Sainsbury in the period before late 2007 when the due diligence commenced. Mr Powell also gave evidence that Sainsbury did structural design and graphic design work for structures involved in displays,[1266] however none of the jobs claimed by the Holihan parties appear to involve such design work.
993 In these circumstances, the unavailability of the Sainsbury documentation is likely to cause some unfairness to the Holihan parties. It may also cause some unfairness to the Amcor parties too, but they were more obviously in a position to call evidence about the type of work performed etc. before and after the sale, and did not do so as part of their defence, save for the evidence given by Mr Powell. Accordingly, in respect of jobs invoiced by Sainsbury in the period from 14 July 2006 to late 2007 about which Mr Powell was unable to give evidence, the unavailability of the documentation has adversely affected the ability of the Holihan parties to prove their case. Save in respect of litho lamination and cutting, about which Mr Powell gave some evidence, and screen printing, about which I am not satisfied Achilla had the ability to perform other than by contracting it out, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to rule or order under section 89B that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it be presumed to be true that Achilla could have done the OME work that was sent to Sainsbury by the Amcor parties during that period.
994 I do not propose making any associated order under section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act.
995 Before turning to consider the expert evidence concerning the methodology for assessing any lost profit, it is necessary to expand upon the summary given earlier in these reasons about the D & D costs methodology that was in place under the Second Sale Agreement, and to explain briefly how it operated in each year of the contract.
996 It will be recalled that the expression 'D & D' referred to 'Direct' and 'Distribution' costs. The expression 'D & D' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean 'the applicable costing base of products for the purposes of calculating costs in relation to clause 12 as shown in Annexure 5'. Under the Second Sale Agreement, supplies of raw materials to Achilla under clause 12.1 were to take place 'at prices based on D & D costs to the Vendor' and in the case of finished products, clause 12.2 provided that they were to be supplied to the Vendor 'at prices based on D & D costs to [Achilla]'. Under clauses 12.1 and 12.2, the D & D pricing was specified for each contract year as being the D & D cost plus a margin (starting at 12% and increasing by two per cent each year).
997 The D & D pricing mechanism was further explained in Annexure 5 to the Second Sale Agreement. In essence, Annexure 5 was a matrix that set out the cost charge items that were to be included in calculating the D & D basis for the purposes of supplies made under clauses 12.1 or 12.2 or for 'D & D verification' conducted under clause 12.3. Relevantly, clause 12.3(ii) provided that:
[ACB Co Vendor] and Achilla will in writing or in meetings, or as otherwise deemed appropriate, verify and confirm the basis of D & D, to ensure that this is a true and accurate reflection of costs, such process to be carried out at or shortly before Completion, and upon each anniversary of Completion, or as otherwise agreed between the Purchaser and the Vendor.
998 The Holihan parties led evidence about the process engaged in between the parties at or around Completion, and in subsequent years, to agree upon the D & D costing that was to apply to supplies made under the agreement. Primarily, that evidence was given by Mr Papadimatos, who worked as an accountant in the ACB Business (under new ownership) from shortly before Completion until 2010. Prior to him joining Mr Holihan, he had worked at Amcor in various roles, including as management accountant for the New South Wales businesses of AFP from 2000 to 2002, where he was familiar with the mechanism used for cost recovery and charging. Mr Holihan and Mr Joyce also gave evidence about aspects of this process.
999 Mr Papadimatos said that once he commenced employment with Achilla, he spent much of his time dealing with AFP representatives in relation to the D & D costing that was to apply to supplies made by the ACB Business under the supply agreement. During that process, he worked from Annexure 5 and in consultation with AFP representatives, and in particular Ms Kerrin Niklas and Mr Joyce. Mr Papadimatos said he also spoke with the factory manager about particular machines so that he could use his knowledge 'to basically determine what percentages would be allocated' to particular machines, ink or glue 'factors' etc.[1267] He attended several meetings with Mr Joyce and Ms Niklas about this issue and had discussions and correspondence with both them and Mr Holihan about it,[1268] to the point where, in August 2003 or thereabouts, a spreadsheet document was agreed between the parties for the purposes of the Second Sale Agreement.
1000 On 25 August 2003, Mr Papadimatos sent Mr Holihan an email attaching the final version of the Recovery Spreadsheet for the first year of the supply agreement[1269] (the 'First Year Budget'). In the covering email, he described the attachment as the 'final rates' because by then, Mr Joyce and Ms Niklas had told him that AFP accepted those rates. In his email, he noted that a further change had been made to the rates to exclude 'distribution costs'. These costs were excluded because AFP undertook to organise, and pay for, the cost of sending corrugated board to the ACB business and collecting the finished products from it.[1270]
1001 Mr Papadimatos said that the process the ACB Business used for charging after the sale was based on the method of charging used by the business before the sale. While the process was largely unchanged, new costs, such as rent for the factory premises, were, however, required to be added in to the calculation of the D & D costs as directed by Annexure 5.[1271]
1002 The First Year Budget, headed 'AFP-Wetherill Park-Factory Recovery & Machine Rates-Period 1/07/03 to 30/06/2004 (12 months)', [1272] was based on Annexure 5. It assumed that the same volume would be manufactured in the 2003/04 year by the ACB Business under the new ownership as was (in fact) manufactured by the ACB Business under Amcor ownership in 2002/03.
1003 In his witness statement, Mr Papadimatos described the structure, mechanics and operation of the First Year Budget (referred to at trial as 'Exhibit H91A'[1273]), as follows:
[16] ... The First Year Budget:
(a) calculated the total anticipated D & D costs of running ACB's business in the first financial year of the supply agreement based on the previous year's D & D costs;
(b) estimated the volume of work that ACB [Co Purchaser] would produce in that year based on prior year production data;
(c) estimated the amount of time that would be required of each of ACB's machines and manual work types for that work using actual hours from prior year (from production data); and
(d) used the final figures from 2002/03 to create a budget containing the above information and an hourly rate to be charged to AFP for each machine and manual work type, with the intention that the total of the hourly charges for all of ACB's [ACB Co Purchaser's] anticipated work for 2003/04 (including that for AFP) would approximate ACB's [ACB Co Vendor's] actual total D & D costs for 2002/03.
[17] In particular, for the first financial year of the supply agreement, the D & D costs were budgeted on the actual total factory costs of ACB [ACB Co Vendor] in the 2002/03 financial year. These totalled $4,958,568 for the 2002/03 financial year (see row 153, column AE of the First Year Budget which states that the "Total Factory Costs P&L" (which are the costs from the previous year) were $4,958,568). I cannot remember who gave me the figures for those costs but, to the best of my recollection, they came from the general ledger for the ACB business for 2002/03 and I had regard to them in preparing the First Year Budget in consultation with Niklas and Joyce.
[18] In order to finalise the First Year Budget, adjustments were made to the previous year's figure of $4,958,568 to reach a theoretical (D & D) cost of manufacture in 2003/04 of $4,610,987 (refer row 167 column AE of the First Year Budget for this amount) (Theoretical Costs). These adjustments are shown in a "cost bridge" which I prepared from the 2003 P&L, which shows how the total cost changed from the previous year's actuals of $4,958,568 to $4,610,987 in the First Year Budget. The cost bridge is set out in rows 152 to 167 of column AE of the First Year Budget (with descriptions of each change in neighbouring column AD).
[19] The First Year Budget assumed that the same volume would be manufactured in the 2003/04 year as was (in fact) manufactured in 2002/03. That volume was 11,325,000 sqm of corrugated products (row 14, column AB of the First Year Budget) (Assumed Volume).
[20] The First Year Budget uses complex calculations to reach the D & D rates for each machine or manual process. Each column of the spreadsheet represents the D & D costs and other information associated with each of the machines or processes used by ACB. For example:
(a) column Q contains all of the relevant information relating to ACB's laminator which was identified as 'machine 450' in the financial reports that I sent or received at the time; and
(b) column P contains all relevant information about hand gluing which was identified as 'machine 426' in the financial reports (even though it did not involve a machine).
[21] The First Year Budget pro ratas the Theoretical Costs and Assumed Volume across each 'machine' or manual process.
[22] The first few rows of the table (under the heading "Criteria") show the key information for each 'machine' such as the volume expected to pass through the 'machine' (i.e. the Assumed Volume, based on the 2002/03 actual volume) in the relevant year and the machine speed (in square metres per hour).
[23] The remainder of the spreadsheet shows the costs attributable to each 'machine' based on each type of cost (labour, overheads, energy, other materials, fixed costs, etc). These costs were based on Annexure 5 and are what I negotiated with Niklas and Joyce to reach the First Year Budget.
[24] In terms of fixed costs, 100% of ACB's Theoretical Cost for these was allocated to AFP via the D & D model. There was no apportionment of these costs prior to them being fed into the First Year Budget to reflect the proportion of costs attributable to work for ACB's non-AFP customers and that attributable to work for AFP.[1274]
[25] Row 138 of the spreadsheet shows the total D & D rate for each machine or process (see rates in row 138 following the heading "Total Calculated Rate"). For example, the relevant D & D rate for the 450 Laminator is $137.99 per machine hour. This is the rate that AFP would be charged, per hour, for work involving the laminator. The total D & D rate comprises a fixed overhead rate, a variable overhead rate and a rate for labour (each shown just above the total rate).
D & D costs and recovery for first year
[26] The D & D costing model has a direct relationship between 'machine hours' and volume (or square metres) produced. In other words:
(a) typically, the greater the volume, the more hours of operation; and
(b) the more square metres of cardboard that passed through a machine, the cheaper that machine would become in the following year. This is because the overall machine rate per hour includes a fixed costs component. As volume increases, the fixed costs do not increase (e.g. rent and depreciation). Only the variable costs increase as volume increases.
[27] The hourly rates from the First Year Budget were entered into the AFP/ACB computer system called PICK. They became the basis for the D & D costs charged in the first financial year of the supply agreement.
[28] PICK calculated the amount payable by AFP to ACB by:
(a) multiplying the number of hours notionally spent by ACB on work placed by AFP on each machine or manual work type by the hourly rate for that machine or manual work type as set by the annual budget; and then
(b) totalling the amount for each machine or manual work type, and applying the relevant mark-up percentage.
[29] If the actual time taken for a job by any particular machine or manual work type was less than the time allowed for that kind of job within PICK, it was to ACB's benefit, because ACB would be paid for time not spent (i.e. it would 'over-recover'). On the other hand, if the time taken was greater, it operated to ACB's disadvantage because the machine or manual work used time that ACB was not paid for (i.e. it would under-recover).
[30] Similarly, if AFP ordered more than the Anticipated Volume of work for any particular machine or manual work type in a year, ACB would over-recover the relevant fixed cost components of its D&D costs, whereas if AFP ordered less than the Anticipated Volume, ACB would under-recover for that component from AFP.[1275]
1004 Mr Papadimatos said that the total amount payable to ACB Co Purchaser was calculated by Ms Niklas from AFP's systems. During the first six months of the Second Sale Agreement, he received weekly reports, and thereafter they were sent monthly.[1276] Mr Papadimatos said those reports contained production data that was exported from the AFP production systems for the relevant period, which includes:
(a) "FRC640 Hrs" (machine hours run during the relevant period);
(b) "FRC640 Labour" (Labour costs (in dollars) calculated in the production system by multiplying machine hours run during the relevant period by the applicable labour rate);
(c) "FRC640 Variable" (Variable costs (in dollars) calculated in the production system by multiplying machine hours run during the relevant period by the applicable variable rate); and
(d) "FRC640 Fixed" (Fixed costs (in dollars) calculated in the production system by multiplying machine hours run during the relevant period by the applicable fixed rate).[1277]
1005 Mr Papadimatos explained that those costs, when totalled together, gave the total D & D cost applicable to the work that ACB Co Purchaser did during the relevant period, to which the applicable percentage mark-up was then applied (as per clause 12.2 - 12% up to 12 months after Completion etc), in order to arrive at the total amount payable to ACB Co Purchaser.[1278] Mr Papadimatos would cross-check the amounts shown in the reports to ensure that ACB Co Purchaser was paid correctly, and report to Mr Holihan. From time to time, discrepancies were identified and notified to Ms Niklas, and any necessary adjustments would be made. The correct amounts were then deposited into ACB Co Purchaser's operating account.
1006 In early July 2004, Mr Papadimatos prepared a reconciliation of the work that ACB Co Purchaser had done for the first 11 months of operation under the Second Sale Agreement and the amount that it had been paid. He gave evidence that in the reconciliation, he aggregated the D & D 'recovery' amount actually paid for each month from August 2003 to June 2004 and then compared it to an 11 month recovery report obtained from the PICK system. He informed Mr Holihan of the results of his reconciliation by email sent on 14 July 2004, stating that 'Amcor owe a further $95K.'[1279] He explained that the reconciliation shows:
(a) the ACB business had been paid (in the sense that it 'recovered' from AFP) $4,941,723.99 in the period;
(b) that amount included work for jobs that were sent to others (i.e. 're-routed') for whatever reason. I refer to these as 'flicked jobs'. They totalled $47,200.52 (excluding GST);
(c) the total 'recovery' by ACB for work done for AFP based on the First Year Budget rates was $4,889,803.42;
(d) that compared with the amount actually payable based on actual production (i.e. AFP's FCR640 reports) of $4,985,319.11; and
(e) this analysis resulted in a net amount due to ACB of $95,515.68.[1280]
1007 He said the difference of $95,515.68 was due to 'various minor errors in the weekly/monthly reports issued by Amcor compared to the yearly record from PICK.'[1281]
1008 Mr Papadimatos was also involved in the process of settling the D & D charges that were to apply for the second financial year of operation of the ACB business under the Second Sale Agreement. His recollection was that in early August 2004, he discussed revisions to the D & D rates with Ms Niklas in order to set the D & D rates for the 2004/2005 financial year.
1009 On 15 September 2004, Mr Papadimatos sent an email to Mr Greg Crouch, the AFP NSW Group Accountant, attaching the 2004/05 D&D calculation (the 'Second Year Budget').[1282] Mr Papadimatos said the Second Year Budget was calculated on the same basis as the First Year Budget, however it was based on the 2003/04 ACB actual volume.[1283] Further, he said, it was agreed between AFP and ACB Co Purchaser that based on the previous year's costs, the total D & D charges would move down to $4,433,341, a decrease of 4%, but the volume produced for the previous year was also lower, so the actual prices stayed relatively stable. Accordingly, he said:
[51] The Second Year Budget:
(a) was based on the 2003/04 actual volume and was 10,136,000 sqm, a decrease of 10.5% compared to the total volume produced by ACB in 2002/03 prior to commencement of the supply agreement; and
(b) budgeted for theoretical costs of $4,433,241 based on the actual costs for 2003/04.[1284]
1010 Mr Papadimatos added that because the volume used in the Second Year Budget had decreased but the costs had remained about the same, the machine rates would have increased in the second year due to the lower volume. He explained that with lower volume, 'you've got less volume to recover the theoretical costs over that period' and therefore, 'if costs remained the same, you would have less volume to recover those costs, hence a higher hourly rate, machine rate.'[1285]
1011 The machine rates derived from the Second Year Budget were entered into the PICK system (in place of those taken from the First Year Budget) and in terms of charging AFP for work performed by the ACB business, the same process as had applied in the first year took place.
1012 Mr Papadimatos said that from the point in time when ACB Co Purchaser ceased having access to AFP's PICK system, which was October 2005 or thereabouts, he nevertheless continued to cross-check the figures in Ms Niklas's reports in the same way as before because ACB Co Purchaser had retained the relevant agreed D & D rates and machine hours in its own system, called 'Kiwiplan'.[1286]
Setting of D & D rates post 2004/05 financial year
1013 Mr Papadimatos said he does not recall and does not have any records of D & D rates being set after the 2004/05 financial year.[1287]
Fixed costs attributable to work done for ACB Co Purchaser's other customers
1014 Mr Papadimatos was copied in to an email exchange between Mr Crouch and Mr Holihan on 11 October 2004 concerning a 'Change in invoicing methods from both sides'.[1288] He said that he did not remember receiving this email or any discussion about the issue of ACB Co Purchaser paying AFP a component of fixed costs attributable to work done for its own customers. Nor did he remember ACB Co Purchaser ever paying AFP for fixed costs. His evidence was that, to the best of his recollection, '100% of ACB [Co Purchaser]'s liability for fixed costs was factored into the D & D costing as between ACB [Co Purchaser] and AFP throughout the term of the supply agreement.'[1289]
1015 Under cross-examination, Mr Papadimatos was not challenged about the evidence he gave in relation to the First and Second Year Budgets, the attribution of fixed costs or the process by which the machine rates were arrived at.
For charging purposes, Displays work was tracked separately from AFP work
1016 During cross-examination, Mr Papadimatos was shown an email from Ms Young, the NSW Administration Officer for AFP, dated 1 July 2005, that was sent to him, Mr Holihan and Arthur Hilaris,[1290] with the subject 'OME' and attaching an excel spreadsheet document: >.[1291] Mr Papadimatos was also shown some extracts from the underlying worksheet. The first worksheet extract was headed 'ACB Charges' and 'Amcor Fibre Packaging - NSW' and 'Charges for ACB'. For June 2005, the worksheet extract recorded a 'Total Charge AFP' of $276,608.31 and a charge for 'Displays' of $9,929.07, with a 'Total paid to ACBC' of $286,537.39, being the total of those two amounts.[1292] When asked about this document, Mr Papadimatos said the worksheet extract shows 'how, ... the charges between AFP Displays and ACB occurred for internal transactions.'[1293] He agreed that the total charge was comprised of an AFP charge and a Displays charge, and that the worksheet showed that the charges for 'AFP' were tracked separately from the charges for 'Displays'. He said this was '[b]ecause they were separate business units and AFP wanted to track the profitability separate for those units.'[1294] He was then taken to other extracts from the workbook that demonstrated the operation of the charging mechanism, including the summary sheet for Displays, which he explained briefly.[1295]
1017 Neither Ms Niklas nor Mr Crouch was called by the Amcor parties to give evidence. Mr Joyce, however, was called by the Holihan parties.
Evidence given by Mr Joyce about the D & D costs methodology and accounting treatment
1018 Mr Joyce gave evidence about the agreed methodology developed between the parties for accounting for the transactions that took place post-sale in compliance with the agreement and the D & D costs methodology. He said that in the period after the Second Sale Agreement was executed, but before Completion occurred, a series of meetings took place between him, one of his staff, Ms Niklas, and Mr Holihan[1296] to develop a series of 10 or 11 transactional scenarios, which they then workshopped -
to try and make sure that at the end of that process, we had an agreed methodology for executing the transactions that was in compliance with the agreement and also enabled both entities, Amcor Packaging and the new Australian Corrugated Box, to be able to do their financial reporting.[1297]
1019 As part of that process, Mr Joyce prepared a document listing accounting transactional postings for what were 'the most obvious transactions we could think of that would likely occur in the normal course of business.'[1298] He said that:
What we were endeavouring to do was to ensure that these accounting transactional postings were consistent with the supply agreement, the agreed supply agreement methodology. But also enabled both companies to be able to appropriately report their financial statements.[1299]
1020 Mr Joyce gave evidence that he was not directly involved in negotiating the D & D costs chargeable under the Second Sale Agreement. He said he delegated to Ms Niklas the task of working through with Mr Papadimatos (who by then was working with Mr Holihan) the 'fine details as to how the unit rates were being calculated and the assumptions that went behind those unit rates.'[1300] Ms Niklas would refer back to Mr Joyce as and when required and then, if necessary, the two of them would consult with Mr Parker.
1021 Mr Joyce said that the negotiations between Ms Niklas and Mr Papadimatos took place, in large part, by an exchange of Excel spreadsheets. Ms Niklas and Mr Papadimatos would discuss particular items, and once the spreadsheet was in final form it would be agreed between the parties. Mr Joyce explained that the spreadsheets (which were in the form of Exhibit H91A) covered the individual converting machines used in the ACB Business and showed the individual cost elements down the left hand side of the Excel spreadsheet, reflecting the agreed cost elements in Annexure 5. He said that Annexure 5 'really only specifies the discrete cost elements that needed to be included in [the 'D & D rates'] formula'[1301] for determining the charging mechanisms, and then the spreadsheet 'expands upon those cost elements into even further detail - further line item cost elements and then applies that across all the individual converting machines that were sitting within the new company.'[1302] Further, he said, the spreadsheet takes the costs of the ACB Business and the historical actual throughput of the Wetherill Park plant and the converting machines that sat within that plant, and arrives at unit rates that are used as a reference point 'to determine a charge back to Amcor Packaging[1303] for provision of those materials or services.'[1304]
Evidence given by Mr Holihan about the D & D costs methodology
1022 Mr Holihan also gave evidence about the D & D costs along similar lines to that given by Mr Papadimatos.[1305] In essence, he said that the First Year Budget, Exhibit H91A, was the charging mechanism used under the Second Sale Agreement for the work that Achilla supplied to AFP and for which it was permitted to recover its agreed costs. Exhibit H91A used and reflected the same essential methodology and mechanism for the recovery of costs as had been used when the ACB Business was owned by ABC Co Vendor.
1023 Mr Holihan explained the 'Cost Bridge from Financials' segment of Exhibit H91A[1306] shows the 'total factory costs' of $4,958,568 derived from the profit and loss statement for the ACB Business for the financial year ended 30 June 2003 (i.e., as owned by ABC Co Vendor).[1307] He said that to arrive at the individual machine costs that were to be used for the 2004 financial year, a number of other costs not previously included in the machine rates, such as rent, were then added and others, such as depreciation, were deducted, to arrive at a forecast of the profit and loss for the ACB Business for the financial year ended 30 June 2004 (i.e., as owned by Achilla) of $4,610,987.[1308] This figure was then used to calculate and arrive at the agreed factory recovery and machine rates that would apply to the ACB Business as conducted by Achilla at Wetherill Park for the financial year ended 30 June 2004.
1024 The individual components that together form the total forecast sum of $4,610,987 are relevantly set out in columns for each machine (or work centre) by reference to various criteria headings, such as 'direct labour & on costs' and were predicated on a forecast volume of 11,325,000 sq. metres and 27,709 'open hours'.[1309] The costs involved in producing the total forecast sum of $4,610,987 were allocated across the machines listed. Each of these machines had an allocated number or code that was referable to the PICK system, as described by Mr Papadimatos. For e.g., the vertical slotter was machine #490, so that when a job was routed, if machine #490 was to be used in the manufacture of that job, the PICK system would recognise the use of the vertical slotter and charge the agreed rate (as calculated in Exhibit H91A) for its use in the costing of the job.
1025 Exhibit H91A also included a 'Note' listing several additional matters that required different treatment, as follows:
SEPARATE SUNDRY CHARGES FOR STOCK HELD OVER 1 WEEK (BRACKNELLS[1310] CHARGE $6 PER WEEK)
OTHER COSTS THAT WILL NOT BE COVERED BY MACHINE RATES
Amcor to pay for INSURANCE Amcor assets-Corrug, P84's, stock approx. $47K
1026 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Holihan explained each of these items that were noted, as follows. He said the 'separate sundry charge for stock held over one week' reflected the fact that Amcor was now taking on the responsibility for picking up the finished goods. The parties agreed that, if Amcor failed to pick up, there was an additional charge of $6 per week per pallet that would apply as an agreed charge outside the Exhibit H91A mechanism.[1311] The 'other costs that will not be covered by machine rates' were costs that were unknown and could not be predicted at the front end but once incurred were recognised and understood as being additional costs that were to be charged separately. He said an example would be paper, starch, litho, printed paper, knives and stereos that could not be put in a budget, and because they were unknown, could not be absorbed across the machines. He said that 'OME charges' were in a similar category. They related to a charge for something that Achilla could not perform itself, such as screen printing or litho printed sheets, and for which a cost would be incurred as and when required. The cost for such work could not be predicted and forecast in the budget. He said that the notation 'Kelloggs' referred to an AFP customer that received its products without a wooden pallet because they were food manufacturers. Kelloggs' boxes had to be strapped in such a way that there was no pallet. Mr Holihan said that the process was causing a 'bottleneck' and Achilla was going to look at doing that work as a separate item so as to take the bottleneck away.[1312]
1027 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan described the process by which the machine rates were agreed for the 2004/2005 financial year, as follows:
Machine rates for 2004/05 (September 2004)
[234] By mid-September 2004, Achilla and AFP reached agreement regarding the machine rates to apply under the Supply Agreement (and to clause 12 of the Sale Agreement). As with the 2003-2004 rates, Papadimatos negotiated those rates with Niklas and kept me informed about progress. [CB6/2093] is a spreadsheet setting out the rates that were finally agreed, which Papadimatos emailed me in December 2004.
[235] The 2004/05 machine rates were calculated on the same basis as those for 2003/04 but were based on 2003/04 volume and 2004/05 budgeted costs. The 2003/04 volumes included all work done by Achilla for Amcor Displays in that year. The D & D charge reduced to $4,433,341 based on Achilla's actual costs for 2003/04 plus an adjustment for the agreed budgeted increases and the budgeted volume was 10,136,000 sqm, based on the 2003/04 actual volume.
1028 Through Mr Holihan, the Second Year Budget (Exhibit H92.1) and the document showing the 11 months comparison for 'ACB-Wetherill Park Aug to June 02/03 vs 03/04 (11 months)' (Exhibit H92.2) were tendered.[1313] Exhibit H92.1 is a spreadsheet prepared along the same lines as Exhibit H91A save that it shows the recoverable costs for the ACB Business as budgeted for the financial year ended 30 June 2005. Likewise, Exhibit H92.2 is a spreadsheet that provides a comparison for the first year of operation of the ACB Business under Achilla, but based on the period 11 months, with the financial year ended 30 June 2003 while the ACB Business was operated by Amcor.
1029 In October 2004, Mr Crouch contacted Mr Holihan with a view to making a change to the invoicing method by which the ACB Business had been recovering its D&D costs.[1314] Mr Crouch was seeking that change because he said AFP was 'impacted by the Fixed costs attributable to all your [Achilla's] work.'[1315] He said:
I am not suggesting that we will not pay the fixed component on our own work, I am just saying that I no longer want to charge you or pay you for any work that you do at ACB that is for you.
So you are being over paid in summary by the fixed cost per machine for your own work.[1316]
1030 Mr Holihan was taken to this email exchange during cross-examination, and was asked to explain what Mr Crouch meant by 'work you do for your own product'. He responded:
---The way annexure 5 worked in the asset sale deed was that we could recover all of the costs, including fixed costs, across all of the volume. And Amcor would pay Achilla for that work, and what he's referring to there is he's wanting to back out that percentage of work that we were making for our own customers. He says that he wants to change. "I want to cease from October paying you for your work that you do for your own product."
[DR McNICOL:] Now your own product, does that mean that you had other customers that you were using your machines for?---Yes.
So you were using your machines not just to produce products for Amcor, but for other customers as well?---Yes.[1317]
1031 This email exchange effectively confirms the evidence given by Mr Papadimatos that to that point in time, the total of ACB Co Purchaser's liability for fixed costs was factored into the D & D costing. Mr Holihan rebuffed Mr Crouch's approach. The evidence given by each of Mr Holihan and Mr Papadimatos was that neither recalled there being any change to the D & D costs methodology.
Treatment of 'fixed costs' under the D & D basis
1032 It is clear that under the D & D basis as set out in Annexure 5, ACB Co Purchaser was to recover for the costs charge items listed, as and when it performed work for the Amcor parties. The matrix in Annexure 5 did not descend into the detail of how that costs recovery was to take place, but clause 12.3 of the Second Sale Agreement provided for there to be consultation about the D & D basis prior to Commencement, and thereafter on an annual basis, so as to ensure that it was 'a true and accurate reflection of costs'. Annexure 5 itself also allowed for changes to be agreed between the parties. The evidence led at trial shows that the parties well-understood the methodology, and the accounting treatment to be adopted by each of them, in order to ensure appropriate financial reporting took place.
1033 At the outset, the First Year Budget (Exhibit H91A) established the unit rates that were to apply to each item of machinery used in the production of the OME work performed by the ACB Business for the Amcor parties during the first year of operation. The First Year Budget was prepared by reference to the costs of the ACB Business under Amcor ownership and the historical actual throughput of the Wetherill Park plant and the converting machines that sat within that plant. Historically, the ACB Business had performed OME work for AFP's Smithfield and Revesby plants and also for non-AFP customers, and after the sale that arrangement was to continue. The historical costs of the ACB Business were used in setting the budget for the ACB Business under new ownership to arrive at the unit rates that would apply to cost recovery under the D & D methodology. Mr Papadimatos gave evidence that in arriving at the First Year Budget, there was no apportionment of the fixed costs component of ACB Co Vendor's Theoretical Cost to reflect the proportion of costs attributable to work performed for ACB Co Vendor's non-AFP customers and that attributable to work performed for AFP. The Second Year Budget was prepared in essentially the same way and on the same basis. Thereafter, it seems that the rates applicable in the second year were adopted and used in later years, such that throughout the term of the agreement, in effect, the total of ACB Co Purchaser's liability for fixed costs was factored into the D & D costing that applied as between ACB Co Purchaser and the Amcor parties.
1034 The agreed charging and recovery mechanism adopted by the parties was one that was designed to recover the forecast costs involved in the production of OME work on the basis of the forecast volume, such that any drop in actual throughput volume would result in an under-recovery of costs. But if, for example, only half of the budgeted volume of work eventuated, there would likely be a significant under-recovery of costs. On the other hand, if the volumes exceeded the forecast volume, there would likely be an over-recovery of costs. The mechanisms in place under the Second Sale Agreement, for 'D & D verification' and for 'D & D changes ... to be agreed' suggest the parties recognised that it was important for the throughput volumes in each year to (at least) reflect the forecast volumes, and for the forecast for the next contract year to reflect the actual results for the current year. If the ACB Business under new ownership continued to perform essentially the same work as was performed by the ACB Business historically, then the arrangement would be a mutually beneficial one and deliver benefits for both parties.
1035 The Second Sale Agreement was entered into against the background where it was accepted from the outset that there would be two streams of revenue for Achilla - one being the revenue that would come from doing the OME work for AFP's Smithfield and Revesby plants, and the other, the revenue derived from work done for its own customers.
1036 In my view, neither the Second Sale Agreement nor Annexure 5 gives any indication that there was to be any apportionment of the fixed costs of the ACB Business to reflect the proportion of costs attributable to the volume of work performed for Achilla's non-AFP customers and that attributable to work performed for AFP. Further, the evidence confirms that no such apportionment took place in the setting of the budgets for the first and second years of operation of the ACB Business under new ownership, and the unit rates arrived at under the Second Year Budget flowed through to the later years. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that Achilla was entitled to recover all its fixed costs across the volume of work performed for AFP (i.e., no apportionment by reference to the volume of work performed for AFP, as opposed to non-AFP customers).
1037 The Amcor parties submitted that 'it is not a "true and accurate reflection of costs" for Amcor to be charged a component of fixed costs referable to work not done for it.'[1318] I do not agree. Under clause 12.2 Achilla was effectively required to keep itself ready, willing and able to supply product to the Amcor parties as and when required, but no minimum (or indeed, maximum) supply condition was specified. In effect, Achilla was required to establish and maintain a ready capacity to supply, and thus it would have to incur all of the fixed costs necessary to have that capacity available to be called on. Achilla had no assurance that it would be called on, but when it was required to perform OME work at the request of the Amcor parties, it could charge only (or no more than) the amount determined by the PICK system using the D & D costing. In those circumstances, it was both reasonable and commercial that the fixed costs associated with establishing the capacity to perform the OME work required by the Amcor parties would be recoverable from that work alone. It follows that I do not accept the Amcor parties' submission.
Issue 5: If APA breached an obligation to purchase or procure OME supplies from Achilla, what is the appropriate methodology for assessing the lost profit (if any) and what is the quantum of any loss suffered?
1038 Each party recognised that if the Court were to find that the Amcor parties have breached the clause 12.2 obligation, the question will arise as to how any loss suffered by Achilla is to be quantified, and on what basis, or by reference to what principles. To that end, each party appointed a suitably qualified expert - Mr Gregory Meredith in the case of the Holihan parties, and Ms Dawna Wright in the case of the Amcor parties - and an expert's report was obtained from each of them and filed in advance of the trial commencing.[1319]
1039 Early in the trial, the Court informed the parties that it proposed to convene a conclave of the experts, and that they should prepare on that basis. The experts were called at the conclusion of the Holihan parties' lay evidence, and each expert gave evidence and was cross-examined one after the other. The Court then convened a conclave during which the experts were asked questions by Counsel and the bench, and also by each other. To facilitate the conclave, the experts consulted and prepared joint calculations[1320] and a joint report.[1321]
1040 The joint calculations were prepared by the experts on the premise that Achilla would be compensated for all 1,913 jobs claimed for, but recognising that those calculations would require revision in the event the Court were to find that Achilla is to be compensated for only some of those jobs.
1041 The general principle for awarding damages for breach of contract is that damages are awarded so as to place the injured party in the same situation as it would be if the contract had been performed.[1322] In Clark v Macourt, Hayne J explained the general principle as being that 'when a contract has been breached, the position in which the plaintiff is to be put, by an award of damages, is the position in which the plaintiff would have been if the contract had been performed.'[1323] His Honour went on to observe that in the great run of cases, courts are concerned to determine 'the loss of the value of what the promisee would have received if the promise had been performed.'[1324]
1042 The onus of proving and quantifying the relevant loss lies on the plaintiff[1325] (here, Achilla). In Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd, Hayne J said that the plaintiff must 'prove these matters [of loss and damage] on the balance of probabilities and with as much precision as the subject matter reasonably permitted.'[1326]
1043 In that regard, it is well established that something short of certainty may suffice. In JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou & Ors, Brooking J said:
It is often said that the amount of the damage must be proved with certainty, but this only means as much "certainty" as is reasonable in the circumstances. Where precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to have it; where it is not, the court must do the best it can.[1327]
1044 To similar effect, in Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd Hayne J observed:
It may be that, in at least some cases, it is necessary or desirable to distinguish between a case where a plaintiff cannot adduce precise evidence of what has been lost and a case where, although apparently able to do so, the plaintiff has not adduced such evidence. In the former kind of case it may be that estimation, if not guesswork, may be necessary in assessing the damages to be allowed.[1328]
1045 In Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd, Mason CJ and Dawson J confirmed that when assessing damages, the Court must simply do the 'best it can':
... mere difficulty in estimating damages does not relieve a court from the responsibility of estimating them as best it can. Indeed, in Jones v Schiffmann Menzies J went so far as to say that the "assessment of damages ... does sometimes, of necessity involve what is guess work rather than estimation". Where precise evidence is not available the court must do the best it can. And uncertainty as to the profits to be derived from a business by reason of contingencies is not a reason for a court refusing to assess damages.[1329]
1046 Where the evidence is uncertain, the court is entitled to take more of a 'broad brush' approach: see Rosser v Marine Ministerial Holding Corp;[1330] Britten v Bishop.[1331] Further, where the damages are uncertain because of a lack of available evidence, the courts generally resolve the difficulties of assessment 'against the party who could or should have provided the evidence.'[1332]
Preliminary matters raised by the Holihan parties
1047 The Holihan parties sought to raise two preliminary matters that they contended must be dealt with before the Court considered which of the available approaches to quantification to adopt. The first was the lack of documentation available for use in the quantification task. The second concerned the fact that the Holihan parties' claim in respect of the 1,913 jobs identified is likely to entail an understatement of the loss actually suffered.
Lack of documentation available for use in the quantification task
1048 The Holihan parties contend that the experts are in agreement that there is inadequate information from which to quantify Achilla's loss by applying the formula set out in clause 12.[1333] The further information that would be required is volumetric information, which they submit could have been obtained from Amcor's systems at the time that the counterclaim was on foot.[1334]
1049 It is regrettable that a full set of documentation is not available, but as indicated earlier, I do not propose making any orders under either section 89B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, save in respect of a limited subset of the Sainsbury work (discussed above), or under section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act. In my view, the Court is only in a position to deal with the claim as made by Achilla, and on the basis of the information that is before it. That other 'volumetric information' which is not available would have been of assistance is not to the point. When it comes to the assessment of damages, the task of the Court is to do 'as best it can' with the information available to it.
Any award of damages is likely to understate the true loss suffered by Achilla
1050 The Holihan parties submitted that any assessment of damages based only on the 1,913 jobs claimed in this trial is likely to understate the loss actually suffered by Achilla.
1051 First, it was said that the eight alternative suppliers that performed the 1,913 jobs the subject of Achilla's claim are not the only OME suppliers that APA might have sent work to in breach of the clause 12 purchase obligation. Mr Holihan's witness statement set out a list of the OME suppliers to the ACB Business prior to Completion.[1335] The Holihan parties submit that it is conceivable that any one of those suppliers might have received work from APA following Completion. Further, they submitted the oral evidence of Mr Nellies[1336] cannot reliably exclude the possibility that OME work might have been sent to other suppliers: Mr Nellies allowed for the existence of other suppliers, and the list that was put to him cannot have been a comprehensive list of all OME suppliers, as it excluded All Pack and Sainsbury.
1052 Secondly, the Holihan parties submitted that it is likely that OME supplies of Products were ordered from Sainsbury between July 2003 and July 2006, (but which do not form part of Achilla's claim), given:
(a) the fact that Sainsbury was an OME supplier to AFP prior to the Second Sale Agreement;[1337]
(c) the fact that OME work was sent to Sainsbury from 2006 to 2008;[1338]
(d) the fact that no invoices or purchase orders relating to OME supplies from Sainsbury were discovered for the period prior to 14 July 2006; and
(e) the fact that the Amcor Parties (now the owners of the Sainsbury business) led no evidence to the contrary.
1053 Thirdly, the Holihan parties submit that they sought discovery of material enabling the identification of all suppliers from whom APA obtained OME supplies of Products during the term. The Amcor parties resisted providing that discovery, and discovery beyond that relating to the eight named alternative suppliers was eventually refused by his Honour.[1339] Rather, on 10 May 2012, Vickery J ordered[1340] that the trial of the counterclaim should proceed in two stages, with 'the first stage' to deal with all aspects of the counterclaim other than allegations as to breach relating to any OME supply 'not described in one of the "summary spreadsheets" that had been discovered by the defendants to counterclaim [the Amcor parties] to date'.[1341] His Honour defined the latter category of matters he had excluded from the first stage as the 'excluded subject matter' and ordered that it be dealt with at a 'second stage' of the trial. However, the Holihan parties have now informed the Court that they will not be pursuing a claim regarding work given to any further suppliers (i.e. the 'second stage' authorised by Vickery J's 10 May 2012 orders).[1342]
1054 As there is simply no evidence of work sent to Sainsbury during the period before 14 July 2006, or of work sent to other suppliers during the term of the Second Sale Agreement, the Holihan Parties submit that it is more likely than not that Achilla has not made all of the claims that might have been open to it had all of the documentary evidence been available. In this regard, the Holihan parties refer to and rely upon the expert report of Mr Meredith, where he noted the potential for understatement of Achilla's loss in circumstances where the quantum particulars do not account for work that might have been directed to suppliers other than the eight named alternative suppliers.[1343]
1055 During the conclave, in an exchange with the bench, each of the experts confirmed that even if there were potential for Achilla's claim (as framed) to understate its true loss, they did not consider that would affect or influence the choice of methodology to be adopted by the Court. Ms Wright said:
---In my opinion Your Honour on the face of it, it shouldn't matter. I can't think of a reason why it would change the methodology. It would obviously change the answer, but I think I would still prefer the same methodology even if there were additional suppliers or additional supply that's found to be lost.[1344]
I agree with Ms Wright. I don't think it affects the choice of methodology. I think what it means is that both methodologies understate the loss.[1345]
1057 Later in the conclave, in response to a question from Counsel for the Amcor parties about the budget process, Mr Meredith observed that the volumes of work were decreasing over time and he said:
What it does point to is that the revised Amcor volume which goes from 10,735,000 in 04 to 9,329,000 in 05, to 7,241,000 in 06, to 6,734,000 in 07 rather indicates that the eight OME suppliers and the 1,913 supplies doesn't pick up all of the lost OME supplies. Unless there was some fundamental change in Amcor's business and its procurement such that it was always going to procure less - gradually less over those years. Now if - I'm not aware of evidence on that matter. If it was that Amcor wasn't going to procure less but it was business as usual then that drop off in volume, as I said, is probably indicative that we haven't captured all of the lost OME suppliers. And that is, if you like, just another complexity with seeking to get a viable methodology for Her Honour to calculate or quantify loss.[1346]
1058 In my view, once the experts confirmed that any potential for understatement of Achilla's loss would not influence or affect the choice of methodology to be adopted, that is the end of the matter. Achilla has confined its claim to one for recovery for the loss suffered in respect of the 1,913 instances of alleged breach. In those circumstances, it matters not that there might have been some potential for additional loss to have been claimed.
1059 Generally speaking, the experts were asked to consider and express their opinion as to what would be the appropriate methodology for quantifying Achilla's loss. One of the questions posed for their consideration was whether, on the information available, they were able to quantify Achilla's loss of profit by using the D & D charging mechanism set out in clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement. Each of the experts found that while that would be the appropriate methodology,[1347] based on the information available, it was not possible to use the clause 12.2 formula to quantify Achilla's loss.[1348] Mr Meredith summarised his conclusion on the (in)ability to use the D & D mechanism, as follows:
[120] In summary, it is not possible to quantify Achilla's loss using the D & D mechanism as I do not have the following information available to me:
(a) The actual volume (e.g. hours or square metres) of the OME Supplies that should have been produced by Achilla but were actually produced by other OME Suppliers. The OME invoices provided to me do not reveal this information and are limited to the eight discovered OME Suppliers; and
(b) The total actual volume that Achilla would have produced for the Amcor parties (i.e. the volume that was actually produced by Achilla plus the actual volume of the lost OME Supplies, not limited to the eight discovered OME Suppliers).
...
[175] ...
(a) I am unable to use the D & D mechanism contained in the [Second Sale] Agreement to quantify Achilla's loss as I have not been provided with the information required to do so.[1349] I note that if such information were available, in my view, this would likely be the most reasonable methodology to adopt.[1350]
1060 Against that background, in their reports the experts canvassed three methods for the assessment of damages, predicated in each case on the assumption that liability is proven for each of the 1,913 instances of breach claimed by Achilla. The three methods were as follows:
(a) The Achilla method:[1351] This method takes the gross price paid to the alternative supplier, and then subtracts the GST and the other amounts charged by that alternative supplier for tooling, freight and litho printing to reach a net price, from which is then subtracted the inferred cost of producing those goods (calculated by multiplying the alternative supplier's net price by the average variable cost incurred by Achilla for each dollar of goods that it sold during the relevant period). The resultant sum is treated as the profit that would be earned by Achilla.
(b) The Amcor method: This method takes the inferred cost of producing the goods that were supplied by the alternative supplier (see (a) above) and multiplies it by the D & D margin applicable under the Second Sale Agreement.
(c) The straight-line method: This method attempts to compensate for the absence of information available concerning the OME work obtained by APA from suppliers other than the eight named OME suppliers. It assumes that the volume of product purchased by APA from Achilla over the term of the Second Sale Agreement was the same as that budgeted or actually ordered by APA in the first or second full years of the Second Sale Agreement, and that Achilla's D & D costs remained the same throughout that period.[1352]
1061 Following the conclave, the Court, after consultation with the parties, determined that it would be of assistance to have the experts record in their joint report the substance of the evidence they had given during the conclave. To this end, a series of 'further questions' were drafted by the parties. The chapeau to those questions, as settled by the Court, stated:
Further questions are raised below to enable the experts to capture, in their final joint expert report, the substance of the responses they gave to certain matters that were raised during the concurrent expert evidence. The experts are not instructed to give new evidence. The intention of the further questions is to ensure what was said in the concurrent evidence session is conveniently captured in a summary way in the final report.[1353]
1062 Notwithstanding the clear instruction given, the final version of the Joint Report delivered by the experts (dated 1 September 2015)[1354] included new evidence in the form of opinions and calculations that were not expressed or discussed during the conclave.[1355] Both parties are agreed that the Court should not have regard to the new evidence component included in the Joint Report.[1356]
Factors that bear on the choice of methodology to be adopted - agreed response
1063 In their Joint Report, the experts addressed at the outset the question of what are the important criteria that the Court should focus on in choosing a methodology for calculating Achilla's loss. Their agreed response was as follows:
Experts' view as to which loss methodology is preferable and why
1064 In his expert report, Mr Meredith accepted that both the Achilla method and the Amcor method (in each case, with certain adjustments made by Mr Meredith[1358]) are potentially reasonable means for calculating Achilla's loss if the relevant assumptions on which the respective methods rely could be supported.[1359]
1065 In the Joint Report filed following the conclave, in answer to the question of which loss methodology is preferable and why, Mr Meredith reiterated his earlier view[1360] but with some minor refinement, as follows:
Either the Adjusted Amcor Methodology[1361] or the Adjusted Achilla Methodology depending on the Court's findings.
The question of which of the Adjusted Achilla and Adjusted Amcor methodologies is more reasonable is dependent on the interpretation of the operation of the contract. That is:
(a) If the Court finds the proper interpretation to be the literal wording of the contract, then in my view, based on the information currently available, the Adjusted Amcor Methodologies, with the inclusion of the recovery and profit on fixed costs, appear to be more reasonable as these methodologies most closely resemble Clause 12.2 of the Asset Sale Agreement. Further the Court would need to decide whether Achilla was entitled to recover its fixed costs from only the Amcor volume or as a proportion of the total volume; or
(b) If the Court finds the proper interpretation to be the practical application, then in my view, based on the information currently available, the Adjusted Achilla methodology, appears to be more reasonable as assuming Achilla was able to achieve the same sales revenue as the OME Suppliers, this methodology most closely resembles the profit that Achilla would actually have made. This methodology is also consistent with the standard formulation of lost profits, being lost revenue less incremental expenses.
If the Court is unable to distinguish between the methodologies on the basis of the criteria set out above but finds Achilla was entitled to recover all of its fixed costs from Amcor, then the adjusted Amcor Methodology (Annexure N to the Meredith Report) is preferable because the Adjusted Achilla methodology doesn't cater for the recovery of all fixed costs from Amcor volume.[1362]
1066 The 'practical application' to which Mr Meredith referred in the context of the adjusted Achilla methodology was explained in his expert report, as follows:
While the methodology adopted in the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule is not consistent with Clause 12.2 of the [Second] Sale Agreement, it appears to be broadly consistent with what happened in practice. That is, the parties agreed a D & D rate at the start of each contract year which Achilla was able to charge the Amcor Parties throughout the contract year. If Achilla was able to produce the OME Supplies for less than the agreed rate, Achilla would receive the benefit. ...[1363]
1067 Mr Meredith also explained the 'literal wording' reference he made in the context of the adjusted Amcor Methodologies, as follows:
The methodology adopted in the Amended Amcor OME Loss Schedule attempts to use the literal wording of the D & D mechanism set out in Clause 12.2, but is incomplete as it omits the component of D & D relating to fixed costs. This methodology has been adjusted on two alternative bases to include these fixed costs to make it more consistent with Clause 12.2. To make this adjustment, I have assumed that Achilla would be able to charge the same sales price as the OME Suppliers as in order to calculate a fixed cost rate we have:
(i) Calculated an implied volume for the lost OME Supplies and combined this with the actual volume produced for the Amcor Parties; and
(ii) Based on the fixed cost assumption, divided total actual fixed costs by either the revised Amcor volume or the total revised volume.[1364]
1068 In the conclave, Mr Meredith confirmed that, depending on the Court's findings, he remained of the view that either the adjusted Amcor methodology or the adjusted Achilla methodology is the most appropriate methodology. He said that he had spent some considerable time pondering the question of which methodology is the more appropriate or more reasonable than the other 'because it wasn't a simple question to answer'.[1365] He did not 'think that there is a black and white answer' and that is because 'what we're faced with is two potential methodologies both of which have merit but neither of which is perfect.'[1366] He then proceeded to elaborate upon the two methodologies.
1069 In the case of the adjusted Amcor methodology, he said the Court would need to decide what fixed costs should be included and recovered. Further, he said that because 'the D & D mechanism is a mechanism to enable Achilla to make a profit by recovery of its variable costs and recovery of its fixed costs',[1367] his view is that all fixed costs should be included. He said:
So if in that process, or in the analysis ... of that, ... we exclude, ... line items of fixed costs because they might not neatly align with the description in annexure 5 ... of the ... sale deed, then it means that the application of the methodology in my view doesn't work properly. So my view is that if we're applying the adjusted Amcor methodology all of the fixed costs should be - should be dealt with.[1368]
1070 But Mr Meredith said that if, on the other hand, the Court finds that the proper interpretation is one that accords with 'a practical application of what actually happened', then in his view:
... based on the information available to me, I think the adjusted Achilla methodology appears to be more reasonable, as assuming Achilla was able to achieve the same sales revenue as the OME suppliers, this methodology most closely resembles the profit that Achilla would have made. ..., this methodology is also consistent with the standard formulation for lost profits being lost revenue, less incremental expenses equals lost profit.[1369]
1071 Mr Meredith then added that there was one area where his view 'has evolved a little bit' overnight, and that is:
... if the court is unable to ... clearly distinguish between the methodologies and make a clear choice based on the information that's available, but the court finds as a legal matter that Achilla was entitled to recover all of its fixed costs from the Amcor volume alone, then I think the adjusted Amcor methodology is probably preferable because the adjusted Achilla methodology doesn't cater for the recovery of all fixed costs from the Amcor volume alone.[1370]
1072 But Mr Meredith continued, to observe that if he was 'pushed to make a choice' between one methodology or the other, then he -
... would favour the adjusted Achilla methodology and the reason for that is because it accords with the normal formulation for loss of profit being revenue less incremental costs equals loss of profits and it appears to be more in line with what the parties actually did particularly in contract years 1 and 2.[1371]
1073 During the conclave, in response to questions from the bench about the D & D mechanism, Mr Meredith explained that the purpose of the mechanism was two-fold and intended to be beneficial to both sides: 'to enable Achilla to earn a fair profit from the work it did on behalf of Amcor by it being able to recover its variable costs and its fixed claim and all of its fixed costs', and 'at the same time, it enabled Amcor to be guaranteed a supply arrangement at prices that were relatively predictable and were not going to escalate in, if you like, an uncontrolled manner.'[1372]
1074 In response to further questioning from the bench about the suitability of adopting the pricing charged by the alternative OME suppliers for particular jobs, in circumstances where Amcor had the ability to call on Achilla to supply the same product at the pricing generated by the D & D mechanism in place under the Second Sale Agreement, Mr Meredith said that in his view -
the third party OME supplier price is a reasonable proxy because if Amcor could get it at that price then it wouldn't have paid Achilla any more than that price, sensibly. ... So whilst we don't have any direct evidence on price I think it's reasonable to infer that that OME supplier price is a reasonable proxy for the price that Achilla could have obtained from Amcor.[1373]
1075 In her expert report, Ms Wright expressed the view that 'Calculation 3: Adjusted Amcor Methodology (fixed costs apportioned over total volume)' was the 'more appropriate' method and 'the closest to [her] preferred methodology' as it 'allocates fixed costs to both Amcor sales and other sales based on the proportion of total volume produced'.[1374] She added that some adjustment would be required to eliminate any of the 1,913 jobs that the Court may find Achilla was not entitled to perform.
1076 In the Joint Report, Ms Wright confirmed her earlier response and set out the reasons why she prefers the adjusted Amcor Methodology (with fixed costs apportioned over total volume), as follows:
(a) The method is based on the contractual agreement.
(b) It quantifies the lost sales at the price (cost +) at which Achilla would actually have charged Amcor (assuming the same products were supplied).
(c) Both the revenue and costs are based on actual information.
(d) It is based upon Achilla's own costs.
(e) It calculates the price that would apply to Achilla.
(f) It is based on 'known' (or assumed) specific instances of breach.
This method could be applied regardless of whether the Court finds that all of the fixed costs should be attributed to Amcor (but would require adjustment to take this finding into account).
If the Court finds that the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget constitute an agreement of rates by the Parties ..., then the methodology could also be adjusted to take this into account by substituting the rates for the first two years at Mr Meredith's Annexure J with the agreed rates.[1375]
1077 During the conclave, Ms Wright sought to assist the Court by explaining why the two methods, each of which starts by using the same information, produce different results. Commencing with the adjusted Achilla methodology, she said it starts with the OME invoices rendered by the alternative suppliers for supplies of essentially the same products as Achilla would have been supplying. It then assumes in each case that the price charged by the alternative supplier is the price that Amcor would have paid for those products had Achilla produced them, and then it allocates Achilla's costs, based on Achilla's financial statements, to those prices.
1078 Turning to the adjusted Amcor methodology, she said it also starts with the OME invoices and uses the same costs, but 'it makes one important adjustment' namely:
it takes the same invoices, but translates them into a volume that would have been produced and then applies Achilla's costs, based on that volume that Achilla would have produced in providing the same products or supplying the same products. And the reason it does that is to take away the need for an assumption that the prices would be the same, and it actually converts the price into the cost plus type of pricing that is contemplated in the agreement.[1376]
1079 She added that, in her opinion, the adjusted Amcor methodology is a better methodology because it translates the pricing from that charged by the competitor 'to what Achilla's would have been' had the supply taken place under the Second Sale Agreement.[1377] That is, it takes the supply of product made by the competitor and 'attempts to convert to the costs plus' methodology in place under the Second Sale Agreement, whereas the Achilla methodology uses revenue less incremental costs, 'starting from the revenue and going backwards', but 'because it's not Achilla's own revenue there is an important assumption there.'[1378] She explained this observation further, by saying:
... we can see in the materials that we've been provided that there are differences even in what appears to be a similar product can be charged at different prices on different invoices within the same, you know, similar period. So I think the assumption that prices are necessarily the same is not necessarily true in all instances, so there are examples where the pricing of the same product - or what appears to be the same product on my reading of the face of the invoice is different.[1379]
Factual matters relevant to the methodology to be adopted
The role of Annexure 5, the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget
1080 Annexure 5 to the Second Sale Agreement set out the 'D & D basis' charging mechanism that was agreed between the parties at the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement.[1380] During the conclave, at the request of the Court, Counsel for the Holihan parties presented, for the benefit of the experts, a brief and non-contentious summary of the practical operation of the D & D mechanism as set out in Annexure 5, the First Year Budget (Exhibit 91A) and PICK, and the operation of the D & D mechanism in the fixing of the machine rates in the PICK system.[1381]
1081 Following this summary, Ms Wright asked Mr Meredith whether the agreed set of rates were taken into account anywhere in the calculation of loss. He confirmed that the rates calculated are not used under the adjusted Amcor methodology ('because we don't have that granularity of information in order to apply them'[1382]) or the adjusted Achilla methodology, but he said '[w]hat was utilised out of the budgets was the cost classifications which were then referenced through the financial statements and included in annexure N and O.'[1383]
1082 In his expert report, Mr Meredith set out at 'Table 13: Components of D & D',[1384] the items which Annexure 5 specified could be included by Achilla in the calculation of D & D costs. He then classified each of those D & D cost items into two broad categories: fixed and variable (or incremental), described as follows:
(a) Fixed costs - those costs that would not generally be expected to increase in proportion to an increase in production; and
(b) Variable or incremental costs - those costs that would be expected to increase in proportion to an increase in production.
1083 In Table 14 of his report,[1385] Mr Meredith categorised the respective D & D cost items as fixed or variable (or partly variable), and then in Table 16,[1386] he compared the costs Achilla could include in D & D with the costs included in columns H,[1387] I[1388] or J[1389] of the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule,[1390] as follows:
Included in column H, I or J [of the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule]?
1084 Relevantly, for present purposes, Mr Meredith re-calculated or adjusted:
(a) the cost of tooling included in Achilla's column H - based on his review (and using Achilla's assumptions), he calculated that Achilla would have incurred tooling costs of $384,328 compared to the total of column H of $350,088, a variance of $34,240. He concluded that column H of the Amended Achilla OME Supply Schedule understates the cost of tooling by $34,420;[1397]
(b) the cost of direct materials and freight included in Achilla's column I - based on his review (and using Achilla's assumptions), he calculated that Achilla would have incurred direct materials/freight costs of $1,657,209 compared to the total of column I of $1,692,533, a variance of $35,324. He concluded that column I of the Amended Achilla OME Supply Schedule overstates the cost of direct materials/freight by $35,324.[1398]
(c) the cost of direct labour, on-costs, direct other, and energy included in Achilla's column J - based on his review (and using Achilla's assumptions) he calculated that Achilla would have incurred direct labour, on-costs, direct other, and energy costs of $1,982,929 compared to the total of column J of $1,612,134, a variance of $370,795. Mr Meredith included distribution, mobile equipment operating leases and hire and repairs in his calculation based on D & D inclusions set out in Schedule 5 of the Second Sale Agreement. He concluded that column J of the Amended Achilla OME Supply Schedule understates the cost of direct labour, on-costs, direct other, and energy by $370,795.[1399]
1085 In addressing the reasonableness of the methodology adopted by Achilla in the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule, Mr Meredith concluded that it does not appear unreasonable save in the following respects:
(a) Achilla's calculation of incremental costs - No component was included in Other Direct Costs to cater for the increase in the cost of repairs and maintenance that would be likely to have been incurred as a result of increased production.[1400] Accordingly, in Annexure L, Mr Meredith undertook an analysis of incremental costs including repairs and maintenance and prepared a calculation of the incremental cost rate including repairs and maintenance; and
(b) Achilla's assumption re direct materials and freight - Mr Meredith observed that the assumption made by Achilla in respect of direct materials and freight may not be reasonable as it seems that direct materials and freight charged by third parties may have been a component of D & D.[1401]
1086 Mr Meredith set out in Annexure M to his report his re-calculation of Achilla's loss using the methodology adopted in the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule but using the incremental cost rate he calculated in his Annexure L. Having made those adjustments, Mr Meredith arrives at a loss of $3,467,689 (whereas in the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule Achilla calculated its loss at $4,091,023).
1087 In the context of considering the Amcor methodology, Mr Meredith noted that the Amcor parties appear to have assumed that the costs calculated by Achilla in columns H, I and J of the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule are correct, because columns H, I and J of the Amended Amcor OME Loss Schedule contain the same figures.[1402] He went on to observe that because columns H, I and J of the Amended Achilla OME Loss Schedule include only the incremental cost of the production of the products for the Amcor parties and do not include the fixed costs that Achilla was entitled to claim as part of its D & D, the Amended Amcor OME Loss Schedule 'significantly understates the loss to Achilla by omitting the recovery of and profit on fixed costs.[1403] To address this issue, Mr Meredith then adjusted the Amcor methodology to include recovery of fixed costs, and profit on those costs, using two different (and alternative) assumptions:
(a) that Achilla was able to recover its total fixed costs from the Amcor parties - see Annexure N to his report;[1404] or
(b) that Achilla was able to recover its total fixed costs from the volume produced by the Amcor parties as a portion of the total volume of work - see Annexure O to his report.[1405]
1088 In his view, both of these adjusted methodologies are more reasonable than the methodology adopted in the Amended Amcor OME Loss Schedule.[1406] Mr Meredith said that application of those methodologies would result in a loss of $2,456,440 (see Annexure O: adjusted Amcor methodology: fixed costs apportioned over total volume in all years) or $3,901,883 (see Annexure N: adjusted Amcor methodology: total fixed costs recovered from Amcor).
1089 In her report, Ms Wright said that she concurs with Mr Meredith's methodology in relation to fixed and variable costs, as per Table 14 of his report, but 'disagree[s] with certain costs included in Mr Meredith's assessment of fixed costs, as in [her] opinion it includes items that are not set out in Annexure 5 to the Asset Sale Agreement'.[1407] In Annexure F to her report, Ms Wright compared Mr Meredith's Annexures N and O with Annexure 5 of the Second Sale Agreement to identify the items not specifically listed in Annexure 5. Later in her report when discussing the Adjusted Amcor Methodologies, she stated that:
... In my opinion Mr Meredith has incorrectly included certain overhead and fixed costs in the calculations because they are not listed in the D & D cost schedule at Annexure 5. I have set out at Annexure F a comparison of the line items in Annexures N and O to the Meredith Report with the line items in Annexure 5 of the Asset Sale Agreement. There are approximately $2.8 million[1408] of costs (over the five-year period) included in Mr Meredith's calculations for which the description does not appear to match a D & D cost item listed in Annexure 5 of the Asset Sale Agreement.[1409]
1090 During the conclave, however, Ms Wright said that she had not had regard to Exhibit 91A, the 'agreed First Year Budget' when preparing her Annexure F, and does not think that she 'had appreciated at the time that this agreed budget was an agreed budget.'[1410] She added that if it were found there was a commercial agreement or contractual arrangement in place between the parties, that should be taken into account, and she would take that into account in her analysis and calculation of loss.[1411]
1091 Ms Wright also sought clarification from Mr Meredith as to what the financial effect on the calculation of loss would be if there were a re-classification of the status of a cost that was shown initially in the loss calculation as a 'variable cost' but now was to be treated as a 'fixed cost'. Mr Meredith responded by explaining that:
the main reason for the if you like dramatic difference when you apply the methodology and you shift a cost from variable to fixed is that as Amcor have done it in their schedule, where you have a variable cost it's treated as an incremental cost, so it's a cost that is expended specifically for that production. And so you don't get - your profit doesn't include the cost itself, only the D & D percentage on that cost. But where that cost is a fixed cost and it gets treated as a fixed cost then conceptually your profit margin has to recover your fixed costs as well as your profit margin. And so in - the methodology contemplates in the recovery of the fixed costs at annexure N that you recover the whole of the cost plus a D & D margin on top of the cost. That's in essence why there's a marked difference when a cost is moved from being treated as a variable cost to being treated as a fixed cost.[1412]
1092 Mr Meredith also explained that under the D & D pricing mechanism as used in the PICK system, if Achilla operated less efficiently than was contemplated under the budget, it would actually recover less, and vice versa if it operated more efficiently. In response to a question from Ms Wright, he said that this aspect is one which is better dealt with by the adjusted Achilla methodology because -
what it takes as a starting point is the proxy sale price and then applies the costs from there. So - and the costs applied are actual costs which have been incurred. And so if the actual costs which have been incurred are lower than might have been contemplated by the machine rates from the first or second year budget and that they've manifested in the financial statements as costs, but lower than expected, then that would - that would be dealt with in the - in the adjusted Achilla methodology, I think. And I think also the reverse would apply.[1413]
Exhibit H91A (the First Year Budget) - fixed and variable charges
1093 The evidence given at the trial about the negotiations between the parties concerning the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget and the influence the budget has on the pricing of work performed under the Second Sale Agreement has already been discussed in some detail above.
1094 In dealing with the classification of costs as 'fixed' and 'variable' by reference to the First Year Budget (Exhibit H91A), during the conclave Mr Meredith commented on their classification as follows:[1414]
Fixed is a technically correct description (direct factory labour has a fixed element and a variable element - but in accounting analysis terms it is generally analysed as a variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Fixed is a technically correct description
(but typically analysed as an incremental or variable cost (see Annexure J))
Lines 52-66: Stereo materials, die costs, rotary dies, machine consumables, pallets, electricity, gas etc
1095 As noted above, Annexures N and O of Mr Meredith's expert report take categories of fixed costs from the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget.[1415] However, each of Mr Meredith[1416] and Ms Wright[1417] gave evidence that some categories of costs in the First Year Budget and in the Second Year Budget did not appear in Annexure 5 of the Second Sale Agreement, as was made clear by Ms Wright's Annexure F.
1096 By the time closing submissions were made, however, there was consensus between the parties that (a) the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget governed the pricing that applied in the first contract year and second contract year respectively; and (b) that the prices for the third to fifth contract years were set by reference to the prices that were applicable at the end of the second contract year - meaning that by a process of extrapolation, the prices set by the Second Year Budget effectively govern the pricing in the third to fifth contract years, and (c) that the Amcor parties organised the freight/distribution of OME work done by Achilla. [1418]
1097 In the context of the evidence given by the experts, however, a number of additional issues arose about factual matters and aspects of costs recovery that were relevant to an assessment of what costs were relevantly 'fixed costs' that Achilla could or did recover from Amcor (whether those costs be recovered wholly from Amcor or only in proportion to the work which it in fact did for Amcor).
Which methodology - the adjusted Achilla methodology or the adjusted Amcor methodology - is to be preferred?
1098 Following the entirety of the evidence given by the experts, there now appears to be broad agreement that the only realistic methodologies offered by the experts for the Court's consideration are the adjusted Achilla methodology and the adjusted Amcor methodology.[1419]
1099 The Amcor parties submit that the adjusted Achilla methodology is to be preferred. The Holihan parties submit that the adjusted Amcor methodology should be preferred. [1420]
1100 Following the conclave, the experts, in their Joint Report and Joint Calculations, agreed upon a 'baseline' calculation (drawn from Annexure M to the Meredith Report) of Achilla's loss arrived at using the adjusted Achilla methodology and they identified three major variables that might impact on quantification if that method were used by the Court. In essence, the three major variables they identified are:
• whether or not freight/distribution costs should be excluded from the costs that would be borne by Achilla in performing the jobs undertaken by the alternative suppliers (on the basis that distribution costs for Amcor work were borne by the Amcor parties[1421]);[1422]
• whether or not 'mobile equipment' was a fixed cost and therefore excluded from the costs that would be borne by Achilla in performing the jobs undertaken by the alternative suppliers;[1423] and
• what, if any, part of the repairs and maintenance costs were fixed and should therefore be excluded from the costs that would be borne by Achilla in performing the jobs undertaken by the alternative suppliers.[1424]
Freight/distribution costs should be excluded
1101 In oral closing submissions, Counsel for the Holihan parties observed that there was now consensus between the parties that the Amcor parties organised the distribution of OME work done by Achilla. That is, Mr Maiden said, 'the Amcor parties accept that Achilla was not responsible for distribution and so it's now common ground that distribution costs were not included in the D & D charges and they need to be backed out of the Achilla model calculation.'[1425]
1102 Mr Maiden then continued to explain that the exclusion of freight/distribution costs has an impact in two respects. The first, he said, is there is no need to make a reduction from the calculation of loss on the adjusted Achilla methodology to account for distribution costs. Using the Experts' 'Summary of Alternative Loss Calculations' sheet for the adjusted Achilla methodology, the amount of $244,038 which appears as variable A: 'Distribution costs not related to Amcor' is to be included in the final outcome (because Amcor organised and paid for the freight/distribution costs associated with its jobs).
1103 Secondly, he said, the exclusion of freight/distribution costs also has a potential impact on the quantification of loss pursuant to the Amcor method in respect of work that was done by alternative suppliers who provided the freight and charged for it separately. This aspect is discussed below in the context of the adjusted Amcor methodology.
1104 The only evidence about 'mobile equipment' and what that category referred to was given by Mr Holihan. He said that the item was effectively the cost of hire of forklifts,[1426] which is a fixed cost. That was evidence he gave under cross-examination. Thus, the Holihan parties contend that 'mobile equipment' expenditure should be treated as a fixed cost. Using the Experts' 'Summary of Alternative Loss Calculations' sheet for the adjusted Achilla methodology, the Holihan parties submit that the amount of $68,065 which appears as variable B: 'Mobile equipment is a fixed cost' is to be included in the final outcome.
1105 The Amcor parties contend that because 'forklift labour' is a variable cost, it cannot be the case that forklift hire cost is a fixed cost, because a point would be reached where the ACB business would require another forklift.[1427] The Holihan parties disputed that this was so, referring to the evidence given by Mr Cichonski about the ACB Business always having excess capacity available and of the ACB Business notifying Amcor that it was winding back to one shift rather than two.
1106 In my view, having regard to the evidence before the Court, and the absence of any contrary evidence, I agree that the 'mobile equipment' is a fixed cost for the reasons advanced by the Holihan parties. Accordingly, 'variable B' in the experts' joint calculation should be included in the final outcome.
Are repairs and maintenance a fixed cost or a variable cost, or both, and if so, in what proportions?
1107 The Holihan parties submit that at least 30 per cent of the repairs and maintenance costs should be treated as fixed costs. There is no written evidence addressing this split. Mr Holihan gave evidence that part of the repairs and maintenance cost item is a fixed cost and part of it is a variable cost. He explained this by saying that '[y]ou can't just double production and expect repairs and maintenance to double as well';[1428] rather, there is 'a base cost for repairs and maintenance' and the base level of repair would be fixed and the variable component would depend upon the machine hours used, in the sense that '[i]t goes up marginally.'[1429] Mr Holihan's view accords with the classification performed by Mr Meredith in Table 14 of his report (where he classified all of the costs listed in Annexure 5 as fixed or variable), in that 'repairs and maintenance' was the only item that he classified as 'partly fixed and partly variable'.
1108 During the conclave, the experts were asked a series of questions about how the Court might estimate the degree to which charges for repairs and maintenance were fixed or variable. The consensus amongst the experts was that the lowest monthly charge recorded in the accounts for the financial year is likely to be an indication - in effect, a conservative baseline estimate - that the monthly amount referable to fixed costs was no lower than that number. The experts were generally of the view that for the 2003-2004 financial year, where Achilla's profit and loss statement[1430] showed that the 'general R&M' expense never fell below $5,540, it was reasonable to assume[1431] that the fixed proportion of the repairs and maintenance costs for that financial year was at least 12 times that figure.[1432] In those circumstances, the Holihan parties submit:
[65] ... It follows that it is safe to assume that the fixed component of repairs and maintenance expense for the five years of the contract was at least the amount set out in column C of the following table:
[66] Based on the evidence described above, the Court can conclude, on a broad brush approach, that at least 30% of Achilla's repairs and maintenance expenses were fixed, with the effect that at least 30% of repairs and maintenance expenses should be excluded from the costs that would be borne by Achilla in performing the diverted jobs.
[67] Accordingly, if the Achilla method is preferred, the Court should find that an adjustment to the base Meredith Annexure M loss figure is to be made using the methodology applied for repairs and maintenance (similar to the Variable C or Variable D approaches in the Joint Achilla Calculations). The variable to be used will be determined by the Court and should be at least 30%.[1436]
1109 The Amcor parties contend that the evidence does not permit, let alone require, the finding that repairs and maintenance are in any way fixed for the purposes of the assessment of damages. I do not agree. In my view, the expert evidence suggests that it would be appropriate to recognise and allow for a component of the repair and maintenance costs as being fixed costs for the purposes of the loss calculation. I would, however, confine that component to one derived using the lowest monthly 'general R&M' figure as put to the experts in the conclave (i.e., $5,540 in FY 2004) rather than the total 'Maintenance' figure (of $7,079 in FY 2004) that the Holihan parties use in arriving at their 'broad brush' estimate of at least 30 per cent.[1437] Once that calculation exercise is performed afresh, the resultant percentage will reflect the component of Achilla's repairs and maintenance expenses that relevantly were fixed.
1110 Accordingly, in the case of the adjusted Achilla methodology, a new variable 'E'[1438] should be introduced which would show that resultant percentage of repairs and maintenance as being fixed costs. Once ascertained, that percentage of fixed repairs and maintenance expenses should be excluded from the costs that would be borne by Achilla in performing the relevant jobs.[1439]
1111 Following the conclave, the experts also prepared a 'Summary of Alternative Loss Calculations' using the adjusted Amcor methodology for the two fixed costs recovery scenarios, namely (a) All fixed costs are recoverable from Amcor (using Mr Meredith's Annexure N as a baseline), and (b) Fixed costs to be recovered from total volume (using Mr Meredith's Annexure O as a baseline).
1112 I note that the experts were agreed that if repairs and maintenance were fixed to any degree, then the fixed component would be included in both the calculation for the adjusted Achilla methodology and also the calculation for the adjusted Amcor methodology. However, as the summary sheet the experts prepared for the adjusted Amcor methodology does not include a separate variable to cater for the impact of including any fixed component for repairs and maintenance, a new variable will need to be added in.
1113 The experts' summary sheet lists a number of variables under each of the respective scenarios as follows:
Fixed/variable costs are split as per B13[1440] (i.e. First Year Budget, and not merely Annexure 5)
Exclude costs that in Ms Wright's view should be excluded
Exclude costs that in Ms Wright's view should be excluded AND costs where Ms Wright has been unable to form a view as to whether to include
1114 As noted above, Annexures N and O of the Meredith Report take categories of fixed costs from the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget.[1441] By the time closing submissions were made, there was consensus between the parties that the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget governed the pricing that applied in the first contract year and second contract year respectively.[1442] Further, as the evidence showed that no agreement was reached as to the D & D costs that were to apply under clause 12 for any year beyond 2004-2005, it follows that the charges that were last agreed would continue to apply as they were the charges used in the PICK system. Accordingly, in my view, the prices set by the Second Year Budget effectively govern the pricing applicable to jobs performed in the third to fifth contract years. I am also satisfied that the First Year Budget (Exhibit H91A) established the charges that Achilla was entitled to make for OME supplied to the Amcor parties in the first year, and that the Second Year Budget (Exhibit H92.1A and Exhibit H92.2) established the charges that Achilla was entitled to make for OME supplied to the Amcor parties in the second and subsequent years of the agreement.
1115 In the Joint Report, in their responses to Further Question 3, the experts confirmed that the amended Amcor methodology loss calculations prepared by reference to the cost categories in the First Year Budget and the Second Year Budget (refer to Annexures N and O to the Meredith Report) were applied for the entire five year term of the agreement.[1443]
1116 The experts noted that if the adjusted Amcor methodology is preferred by the Court, a further adjustment will be required to be made to the baseline loss figure in the Joint Calculations depending upon whether the Court is of the view that fixed costs are to be apportioned across the Amcor work only (i.e. variable E) or across all Amcor and non-Amcor work (i.e. variable I).
Are fixed costs to be apportioned across the Amcor work only or must they be apportioned across all Amcor and non-Amcor work?****[1444]
1117 As noted earlier, I am satisfied that Achilla was entitled to recover all its fixed costs wholly from the volume of work performed for the Amcor parties.
1118 Relevantly, the fixed costs are the 'costs that would not generally be expected to increase in proportion to an increase in production'.[1445] In the present context, that entails the 'factory' fixed costs required to establish Achilla's capacity to perform the OME work required by the Amcor parties.
Are repairs and maintenance a fixed cost or a variable cost, or both, and if so, in what proportions?
1119 The discussion of 'repairs and maintenance' above in the context of the adjusted Achilla methodology is equally applicable in the context of the adjusted Amcor methodology. Once the calculation exercise is performed afresh, the resultant percentage derived will reflect the component of Achilla's repairs and maintenance expenses that relevantly were fixed.
1120 I have already indicated above, in the context of discussing the adjusted Achilla methodology, that I agree 'mobile equipment' is a fixed cost for the reasons advanced by the Holihan parties,. Accordingly, 'variable F' in the experts' joint calculation should be included in the final outcome.
The impact of the freight charge arrangements in place with the alternative suppliers on the calculation of Achilla's loss
1121 In circumstances where there was consensus that the Amcor parties organised the distribution of OME work done by Achilla, such that Achilla was not responsible for freight/distribution, and those costs were not included in the D & D charges, the experts adverted to the prospect that the freight/distribution charging arrangements in place with the alternative suppliers 'may' affect the calculation of Achilla's loss. Additional Question 3 was framed as follows so as to elicit their views on this issue:
If the Court were to accept that one or more of the alternative OME suppliers charged Amcor for the distribution of work done for Amcor, either:
(a) as a separate charge shown on the invoices; or alternatively
(b) as a costs component of the price for a product (i.e. not separately charged) -
would that affect the calculation of loss and if so how?
1122 In their Joint Report, the response agreed by the experts concerning the Adjusted Amcor methodology was as follows:
Adjusted Amcor Methodology
(a) If the distribution cost was shown as a separate charge on invoices, the amount would be removed from columns H and J of the Amcor Schedule, resulting in a change (reduction) to the calculation of Achilla's cost in column N and a reduction in the D & D mark-up (lost profit) in columns O and P of the Amcor Schedule.
(b) If the distribution cost was not separately charged there would be no impact on the calculations under the Adjusted Amcor Methodology because the particular cost would not be able to be identified and adjusted. However, it would impact the validity of the assumption that the pricing is comparable between ACB [Co Purchaser] and the other OME suppliers. It may imply that, for those items, the pricing for the calculation of ACB's loss should be less than the price charged by the other OME supplier.[1446]
1123 Evidence of a general nature was given by Mr Nellies to the effect that all of the OME suppliers other than Achilla delivered the finished work that was done for Amcor. In Mr Nellies' evidence-in-chief, the following exchange took place:
[MR TRAN:] Do you remember if other OME suppliers handled delivery for Amcor?---Yeah, all - all OME suppliers delivered.
But not Mr Holihan's business?---No, no.[1447]
No evidence was given by Mr Nellies, however, of the costing arrangements that applied in the case of each of the OME suppliers.
1124 Evidence was also given by most of the alternative suppliers about the distribution arrangements in place for OME work performed by them for the Amcor parties and their customers.
(a) Thompson: Mr Kent gave evidence that Thompson had its own truck with which to do deliveries.[1448] For the most part, Thompson would deliver the finished products back to Amcor at Smithfield and they would deliver to the customer themselves.[1449] But on occasions, Amcor collected the finished work itself,[1450] and if a job was running a little behind time, Thompson might be asked to deliver direct.[1451] Most of the time, however, Thompson would not charge Amcor for delivery.[1452]
(b) Northwest Packaging: Mr Pellizzari gave evidence that Northwest Packaging would deliver finished products back to Amcor at Smithfield or Revesby.[1453] He said that the freight charge was 'already included' as part of the quoted cost 'so all delivery costs would always be included in our jobs.'[1454]
(c) SPS Packaging: Mr Pribilovics gave evidence that SPS Packaging owned a truck with which to do deliveries.[1455] But he said there was no fixed arrangement with the delivery of products to Amcor:
Sometimes their trucks would pick em up from our premises and do what they do with it, whether they go straight to their customers or take it back. Sometimes yes we did deliver.[1456]
He said that where goods were delivered, SPS Packaging did not charge Amcor extra for that service because 'it's included in the overall price.'[1457]
...it was just on a very rare occasion when ..., they needed at least one pallet urgently or if they had like 21 pallets and the truck would take only 20 and there was only one left over, we would take it.[1460]
It is not clear whether All Pack always charged for such deliveries or only did so on occasions.[1461] Under cross-examination, Mr Prasad agreed that All Pack did 'sometimes deliver products for some customers' and that 'sometimes [All Pack] would charge them for that service'[1462] and if so, the charge would appear in the body of the invoice. With reference to All Pack Invoice No. 00001080 (dated 9/11/2004),[1463] where the body of the invoice described the two jobs as 'Truck Smithfield-St Mary's' and 'Truck Smithfield-Ryde' respectively, he said:
...it's contained in the invoice we - we put delivery as an item, rather than putting it in the - as part of the added cost, we put it as an item and that's why it appears on the top block.[1464]
(e) Ubeeco: Under cross-examination, when Mr Borg was asked whether Ubeeco delivered products for Amcor after it had assembled them, he said 'sometimes we did' and 'sometimes we didn't'.[1465] He explained that all of Ubeeco's sales 'are inclusive of shipping costs' and that where Ubeeco handled delivery, the invoice would usually state 'Ship via our truck'.[1466] He added, however, that where the value of the order was under a certain limit, the amount of which he did not recall, 'it incurred a freight charge' and the invoice would separately identify the relevant freight charge.[1467]
(f) Le Breton: Mrs Le Breton gave evidence that Le Breton Graphics did not normally deliver the finished goods for Amcor.[1468] Rather, she said 'Amcor would come and pick up the goods and deliver them to their customer.'[1469] Under cross-examination, however, Mrs Le Breton agreed that there were occasions when Le Breton Graphics would deliver products for Amcor but she could not recall precisely what the relevant circumstances were. She said:
Maybe they had to get the job to the customer and they asked us if we could get a courier and they would reimburse us. Maybe - I don't know. I don't remember. Maybe their truck was not available. I don't know.[1470]
(g) J S Cutting: Mr Kierdal was not asked about freight.
(h) Sainsbury: No evidence was available from Sainsbury.
1125 The evidence of the alternative suppliers should be accepted and, in my view, should be preferred over the very general evidence about delivery that was given by Mr Nellies. Those witnesses were well-placed to know how their businesses operated and what the arrangements were concerning delivery and charging in the case of Amcor jobs.
1126 The Holihan Parties contend that the onus lies on the Amcor parties to prove that any reduction should be made to the loss calculation on account of freight charges made by the alternative suppliers. Nevertheless, they accept that if the Court determines that the adjusted Amcor methodology should be applied in calculating losses, then Achilla's loss should be reduced by the D & D mark-up on the cost of delivery for any job where the delivery cost was specified on the invoice.[1473]
1127 In my view, save where the invoice does record a specific charge for delivery by the alternative supplier, the evidence adduced before the Court does not provide any satisfactory basis for the Court to identify what component of the price charged by the alternative suppliers was referable to freight/delivery. The experts noted (in their agreed response to Additional Question 3) the potential for this issue to impact the validity of the comparable pricing assumption used in each of the adjusted Achilla methodology and the adjusted Amcor methodology, and they observed, somewhat tentatively, that:
It may imply that, for those items, the pricing of the calculation of ACB [Co Purchaser's] loss should be less than the price charged by the other OME supplier.[1474]
But they have not themselves suggested any mechanism that might be adopted to address this issue.
1128 In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis for the Court, doing the best it can, to discount (what would otherwise be) the quantum arrived at using the applicable methodology by reference to the freight arrangements of the relevant alternative suppliers. The evidence given by the alternative suppliers does not show that there is any invariable practice or pattern in the way by which they dealt with the delivery of finished work for Amcor and the means by which they charged for such deliveries. And Mr Meredith gave evidence that it is reasonable to infer that the third party OME supplier price is a reasonable proxy for the price that Achilla could have obtained from Amcor.[1475] In my view, it follows that when looking at the comparability of the pricing charged by the alternative suppliers, the Court cannot draw any conclusion to the effect that the price charged by Achilla might have been less than that charged by their competitor.
Conclusion as to the methodology to be adopted for calculating Achilla's loss
1129 In my view, the adjusted Amcor methodology is to be preferred and adopted as the methodology for calculating any loss suffered by Achilla. Both experts regard it as an appropriate methodology, and while Mr Meredith expressed a slight preference for the adjusted Achilla methodology, he acknowledged that if the Court were to find that Achilla was entitled to recover all of its costs from the Amcor volume alone (as the Court has), then the adjusted Amcor methodology is probably preferable.[1476] Further, the adjusted Amcor methodology better reflects the methodology set out in the Second Sale Agreement. As Ms Wright explained, the adjusted Amcor methodology takes the actual sales made by the alternative suppliers as recorded in their invoices, and translates them into a volume that would have been produced by Achilla, and then applies Achilla's costs based on that volume, and in that way it translates the pricing from that charged by the competitor to what Achilla's would have been had the supply taken place under the Second Sale Agreement. Mr Meredith also agreed that the adjusted Amcor methodology, 'with the inclusion of the recovery and profit on fixed costs' most closely resembles clause 12.2.
1130 Accordingly, the adjusted Amcor methodology, but with total fixed costs recovered from the Amcor volume only, is the methodology to be adopted. (In other words, the methodology used by the experts to reach the upper half of the Joint Calculations for the adjusted Amcor methodology (which is based on Mr Meredith's Annexure N methodology) is to be used.)
KEY ISSUE: What is the scope and effect of APA's alleged overcharging and undercharging of Achilla?
Issue 6: Alleged overcharging and undercharging
1131 Issue 6 raises the question of whether Achilla is entitled to damages as a result of APA charging it prices for the supply of Products (relevantly, raw materials) that were higher than the prices prescribed by clause 12.1 of the Second Sale Agreement. The claim for 'overcharging' concerns only Products that were supplied to Achilla[1477] in the period from 1 October 2005 to 30 July 2008 (i.e. after the commencement of the Deed of Accession, during which time it is common ground that the supply obligation fell on APA). A number of subsidiary issues then follow, ending with the question (Issue 6(g)) of whether APA is entitled to set-off any overcharging against any undercharging.
Issue 6(a)****: By what total amount, if any, did APA charge Achilla prices that were higher than the prices prescribed by cl. 12 of the Second Sale Agreement or of the implied supply agreement?
1132 Achilla, through Mr Holihan, prepared further particulars of the alleged breach of the clause 12.1 supply obligation.[1478] On the basis of documents sourced from the Amcor parties' discovery, Achilla calculates the total overcharge as $232,765.46 referable to the respective contract years as follows:
1133 Save for what are referred to in correspondence between the parties as two 'non product supplies',[1479] which Achilla now accepts are not supplies of Products,[1480] the Amcor parties accept that 'the Overcharge Particulars accurately record the overcharging' which APA made.[1481] However, the Amcor parties say that does not constitute an admission as to what was finally charged in total or what was paid, and they submit that the 'inability to admit any final quantum of what was charged and the difficulties with the document used for the calculations was set out in [Amcor's] Particulars filed in October 2014.'[1482] The Amcor parties then raise by way of defence and set-off, a host of instances of 'undercharging' which they contend result in a 'net' overcharge amount of approximately $30,000. Accordingly, they say there is a real issue as to what was actually paid.
1134 The Amcor parties also point to deficiencies in the primary data set which they submit render it unsafe to rely upon, and they effectively contend that the overcharge allegation ought not be persisted with.
1135 Nevertheless, the total value of the overcharge claimed by Achilla, and effectively admitted by APA, is $232,642.06.
Issue 6(b)****: Was any or all of any overcharge caused by a mistake on the part of APA?
1137 In their written closing submissions, the Amcor parties 'concede that no evidence supports their allegation that any undercharges [sic.] were made by mistake'.[1485]
1138 In those circumstances, it is not open to the Court to find that the overcharges were relevantly the result of a mistake.
Issue 6(c)****: Did Achilla (or any of the Holihan parties) suffer any loss by reason of the asserted overcharge?
1139 As noted above, Achilla claims the difference between the prices it paid and the prices that APA was entitled to charge for those raw materials under the Second Sale Agreement (i.e. $232,642.06) as damages.
1140 By way of defence, APA alleges that Achilla has suffered no loss as it charged its customers by reference to the price actually charged to it by APA, in the sense that Achilla factored the (over)charges into the prices it charged its customers, and so 'passed through' the overcharges to them. In this regard, the Amcor parties rely upon the principle commonly ascribed to the decision of the House of Lords in British Westinghouse Electric & Mfg Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd[1486] that a plaintiff will not recover a sum of damages for loss which the plaintiff has avoided.[1487] This principle is an outgrowth of the mitigation principle in contract damages,[1488] and the Amcor parties acknowledge that they carry the onus of proof on it.[1489]
1141 The Amcor parties refer to the evidence given by Mr Holihan about how the pricing worked in the period after the PICK system was decommissioned and Achilla and APA no longer had access to it. In his witness statement, Mr Holihan stated:
The effect of AFP's price lists
[336] After Achilla was removed from PICK, the process of placing orders on AFP was carried out by Achilla's customer service personnel, who would send a purchase order for the required product either by facsimile or by email to AFP. Each order would have an order quantity and a description of what the product was (with references to Achilla's PD, purchase order number, the dimensions of the product and the board grade). The order also stipulated the due date and the price of the item referred to as the rate per 1000 boxes. [CB7/2607[1490]] contains examples of such orders.
[337] AFP's prices were set by the AFP estimating department, and orders were placed in the system by AFP customer service personnel. The ordered quantity matched a pre-set quoted price (for a particular quantity of units) which was contained in the SAP system that AFP used after PICK (for example, $1,000 per 1,000 units for orders of 5,000 units). The prices in that system matched price lists that were provided to Achilla by AFP from time to time (discussed below). Accordingly the prices charged by AFP for any particular supply to Achilla were not input manually at the time of placing the order, they were prepopulated from these quoted prices. Any quantity ordered by Achilla that fell outside the quantities for which prices had been set was referred back to the estimating department to set a new price. The price on Achilla's purchase order originated from:
(a) for new orders, a quote for new work; or
(b) for repeat orders, the prices provided to Achilla by Crouch when Achilla came off PICK or a "price list" that AFP subsequently supplied Achilla from time to time, for example [CB7/2369, CB7/2398, CB7/2405 (attachment) and CB7/2483[1491]] (collectively, the Price List). The Price List remained static for products already on it, and was just updated from time to time to include the agreed 'ratchet' price increases under the Supply Agreement, and to add new products.
[338] Where a price on a purchase order was different to what AFP's system indicated, AFP would write the correct price on the Achilla purchase order and would send it back to the Achilla customer service person for the order to be amended. Where there was a disagreement and a price could not be agreed, those discrepancies would usually be brought to me for my attention.
1142 Mr Holihan also gave evidence about the negotiations that took place in order to reduce prices to customers. He stated:
Negotiations to reduce prices
[342] Where a product that Achilla sold to an Achilla customer required a component that was supplied to Achilla by AFP, Achilla usually charged its customer a price that was, at least in part, a function of the price charged to Achilla by AFP for that component. However, prices did not depend solely on the price charged by AFP to Achilla. Other variables that impacted on the prices that Achilla charged were freight, overheads, and storage costs. Where the AFP component required further processing by Achilla there was also the cost of labour and sundry components.
[343] Another major factor was the mark-up on the [sic.] all of those costs so as to derive a price which was very much determined by competitiveness in the market place. Achilla sometimes charged in a manner that was not related to a function of the price that it paid to AFP. This most frequently occurred where a customer asked Achilla to charge less than a quoted price. If this happened, the usual practice was to ask AFP if it would decrease its price. Such requests were usually made by Karoutzos to a staff member of AFP's estimating department. The AFP estimator would, in turn, take the request to either one of AFP's sales managers. Occasionally, I would make such requests directly to Azzopardi, then the head of AFP's estimating department. Sometimes, I would then receive a call from the AFP sales manager responsible for the sale, who would tell me that Azzopardi had told him about the request.
[344] The sales manager would sometimes agree to set the price lower, particularly if I could convince him that to do so would enable Achilla to win work from a competitor of Amcor's and so enable AFP to obtain the benefit of increased paper sales volume at the expense of its competitor. Examples of this are contained in [CB7/2396[1492]] and [CB7/2418[1493]], which are email exchanges between me and Azzopardi and between me and Noel Epifanino (who was an AFP account manager assigned to look after Achilla as a customer) respectively.
[345] Sometimes, AFP would not agree, in which case Achilla would make a decision about whether or not to reduce its quoted price (i.e. its margin) so as to make the sale, or refuse to reduce its quoted price and risk losing the sale altogether. I was the person who made that decision. An example is [CB7/2417[1494]].
[346] Achilla has paid for all supplies of Product made pursuant to clause 12.1 of the Sale Agreement. Where the prices charged by AFP for those supplies were factored into sales that Achilla made to its customers that occurred in the period from 2006 to 30 July 2008, it would be unrealistic (even if it were possible) for Achilla now to seek to recover additional amounts from customers who had the benefit of any undercharges.
1143 Mr Holihan was cross-examined about the approach to pricing he had adopted in the period after the PICK system was decommissioned (as described above), as follows:
[DR McNICOL:] ... So is this position that you've set out there in paragraph 346 consistent with both undercharging and overcharging amounts?---No.
No. And if there had been any overcharging would any of those costs have been passed on to your customers when they paid you for their products that you produced and delivered?---The price at which we charged our customers was a combination of products we bought from Amcor, plus our own costs, whether it being overhead costs or other costs, and then a margin was applied.
So it that a yes or a no, sorry?---I didn't think it was a yes/no answer or question. Give me the question again, sorry.
So would any of the costs that - the overcharging amounts, would they have been - any of those have been passed on to your customers?---Possibly in some instances.[1495]
1144 The Amcor parties also rely upon evidence given by Mr Garcia about the estimating process that applied from January 2005 when he was working for Mr Holihan, as follows:
[MR TRAN:] And where did Mr Holihan's business get its cardboard from?---From Amcor.
And when the ACB business was making products for its own customers did the ACB business pay for that cardboard?---Oh yeah.
And what sort of costs were factored in when you were quoting the price to the ACB customers?---Can you tell me that again - can you ask?
When you're quoting a price to ACB's customers, ACB's own customers?---M'mm.
What costs were taken into account when you were calculating the quote?---The all the material we use it, they labour we need, the freight, all these things.[1496]
...
If I could just take one step back. I was asking you some questions, Mr Garcia, about what costs would be factored in when you're quoting a price and you said the cost of material. I just wanted to ask what do you include - when you say "material" what do you mean by material?---The cardboard.
Anything else?---When we costing the - the starch we use on the corrugator, was cost in the materials.
And anything else?---I don't - I don't remember anything else.[1497]
it is to be expected that Achilla would factor in the cost of the board from Amcor (whatever that cost may be) in quoting a price to its own customers. The D & D plus margin formula (which was applied by Achilla generally) captures and passes on the costs of inputs to the end customer. ... And facilitating the process of Achilla quoting its customers must have been the purpose of the price lists and quoting that went on as between Achilla and Amcor. The price list or a quote from Amcor would permit Achilla to make a quote to its customer.[1498]
1146 Further, they contend that whether or not Achilla did, as Mr Holihan suggests, reduce its margin on a job occasionally so as to make a sale, is something that it is virtually impossible for the Amcor parties to prove or disprove. Rather, the practical reality is that all the Amcor parties can do is to show that in the ordinary course, Achilla would pass on its costs to its customers.
1147 The Holihan parties say that if APA had performed the Second Sale Agreement according to its terms, Achilla would have received the Products the subject of the overcharging but for lower prices. To put Achilla in the same position as it would have been in if APA had charged only what it was entitled to charge, Achilla would need to be refunded the difference between the contract price and the price paid (i.e. $232,642.06). The Holihan parties take issue with the contention advanced by the Amcor parties that the British Westinghouse principle somehow alters the well-settled position under Australian law that damages for breach of contract should put the promisee, so far as money can do it, in the same situation as if the contract had been performed as promised.
1148 In British Westinghouse, Viscount Haldane LC,[1499] in discussing the duty the law imposes on a plaintiff to mitigate his loss consequent on a breach of contract, said that:
...when in the course of his business [a plaintiff] has taken action arising out of the transaction, which action has diminished his loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered may be taken into account even though there was no duty on him to act.[1500]
1149 His Lordship illustrated the operation of the principle by reference to the case of Staniforth v Lyall,[1501] where the defendants, who had chartered a ship to New Zealand, found no cargo upon arrival and so the captain embarked upon a return journey via Batavia. That voyage, after allowing for the increased costs and expenses associated with the circuitous route, proved to be more profitable than the original venture to New Zealand would have been. His Lordship noted that in considering the claim for breach of contract, the Court of Common Pleas held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover all the damages he had incurred 'but that he was bound to bring into account, in ascertaining the damages arising from the breach, the advantages which had accrued to him because of the course which he had chosen to adopt.'[1502]
1150 In Clark v Macourt,[1503] Hayne J said it was indisputable that when a contract has been breached, the measure of damages is referable to the 'position in which the plaintiff would have been if the contract had been performed'[1504] and must be measured by reference to 'the loss of the value of what the promisee would have received if the promise had been performed.'[1505] His Honour noted that the task for the Court is then one of ascertaining the value of what the promisor did not receive, the answer to which depends upon determining the content of the unperformed promise.[1506]
1151 The Holihan parties contend that nothing in the British Westinghouse principle alters the position that Achilla is to be put in the same position as it would have been in if APA had performed the Second Sale Agreement according to its terms, namely that it would have received the raw materials the subject of the overcharge admissions for lower prices than it actually paid. The evidence before the Court is to the effect that it was not the invariable position that Achilla recovered the cost of any overcharge from its customers. On the contrary, Achilla was competing for work and the price charged reflected, and was determined by, the competitive forces in the market place. While Achilla usually priced the product to the customer by having regard to the price of the raw materials supplied by AFP, and the costs of freight, overheads, storage costs, labour costs and other sundry components such as starch, together with a margin, in some cases the price charged was not related to a function of the price that it paid to AFP.
1152 Furthermore, in the present case, unlike Staniforth v Lyall, there is no evidence that Achilla accrued any advantages by factoring in the overcharges into the prices it charged its customers. The Holihan parties submit that even if Achilla did recover an element of overcharge, it is not required to be brought to account because Achilla would have been able to obtain the same price from the customer for the products it sold. That is, they say, 'as in Clark v Macourt,[1507] once Achilla had paid the higher price to APA, selling Achilla's own products to its customers left it no better off than it was before it sold them.'[1508] Adopting the language of Viscount Haldane LC in British Westinghouse, the sale of Achilla's own products did not diminish its loss, because that loss was suffered at the time it overpaid for the goods.
1153 I agree, essentially for the reasons advanced by the Holihan parties, that Achilla did suffer loss by reason of the overcharge. Another reason that might be advanced in support of the position contended for by Achilla lies in the 'passing on' defence itself. Under Australian law, it is now well-established that 'there is no general defence to a claim in unjust enrichment that the plaintiff has "passed on" or recouped from a third party the value of the enrichment transferred to the defendant.'[1509]
1154 In Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd,[1510] an insurance company had overpaid duty on workers' compensation policies and the Court was faced with the question of whether it was unjust for the revenue authority to retain the amounts overpaid. The High Court held that the revenue authority was liable to refund the amounts overpaid, notwithstanding that the amounts had been passed on to policy holders. When dealing with the issue of whether 'passing on' operates as a good defence to a restitutionary claim, Mason CJ said:
Restitutionary relief, as it has developed to this point in our law, does not seek to provide compensation for loss. Instead, it operates to restore to the plaintiff what has been transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant whereby the defendant has been unjustly enriched. As in the action for money had and received, the defendant comes under an obligation to account to the plaintiff for money which the defendant has received for the use of the plaintiff. The subtraction from the plaintiff's wealth enables one to say that the defendant's unjust enrichment has been "at the expense of the plaintiff", notwithstanding that the plaintiff may recoup the outgoing by means of transactions with third parties.
On this approach, it would not matter that the plaintiff is or will be over-compensated because he or she has passed on the tax or charge to someone else. And it seems that there is no recorded instance of a court engaging in the daunting exercise of working out the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff and restricting the amount of an award to that measure.[1511]
1155 Brennan J, with whom Toohey J and McHugh J agreed, said:
The windfall gain defence
The fact that Royal had passed on to its policy holders the burden of the payments made to the Commissioner does not mean that Royal did not pay its own money to the Commissioner. The passing on of the burden of the payments made does not affect the situation that, as between the Commissioner and Royal, the former was enriched at the expense of the latter. It may be that, if Royal recovers the overpayments it made, the policy holders will be entitled themselves to claim a refund from Royal of so much of the overpayments made by Royal to the Commissioner as represents the amount paid to Royal by the policy holder. However that may be, no defence of "passing on" is available to defeat a claim for moneys paid by A acting on his own behalf to B where B has been unjustly enriched by the payment and the moneys paid had been A's moneys.[1512]
1157 Against that background, in circumstances where a passing on defence is raised, it seems unlikely that the Court would take a different view to the calculation of loss from that set out in Clark v Macourt,[1515] notwithstanding that, in some instances, a component of the overcharge may have been passed on to a customer.
Issue 6(d)-6(f)****: Aspects of alleged undercharging
Issue 6(g**): Is APA entitled to set-off any overcharging against any undercharging?**
1158 Issues 6(d)-6(f) raise the following questions in relation to alleged undercharging by APA:
(d) Did APA mistakenly charge Achilla prices that were lower than the prices prescribed by clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement or of the equivalent implied supply agreement, and if so in what amount?
(e) Has Achilla had and received the undercharge amount to the use of APA?
(f) Is APA estopped from claiming that the prices charged were undercharges?
1159 In their written submissions, the Holihan parties addressed these issues at some length.[1516] The responding written submissions of the Amcor parties were very brief and in a 'rolled-up' form. Relevantly, the Amcor parties said:
[348] The Amcor Parties concede that no evidence supports their allegation that any undercharges were made by mistake. Given that the quantum of each item for both the Overcharging and Undercharging Particulars are in a substantial number of cases less than $1.00 and even more are less than $10.00 the costs of proving each instance of mistake is neither proportionate or appropriate.
[349] The [sic.] remains however a live issue, as to whether Achilla suffered any loss as a result of the admitted overcharging.
1160 The Holihan parties' written submissions in reply summarise the position reached, as follows:
[358] The Amcor Parties pleaded that they mistakenly undercharged Achilla for work, that Achilla had and received those undercharges, and that when set off against the undercharges, the net value of Achilla's overcharge claim was only $30,414.44.
[359] For the first time, in their closing submissions, the Amcor Parties concede that there is no evidence to support their allegation that undercharges were mistakenly made. There being no basis for the claim that Achilla had or received undercharge amounts, the proposed set-off must be dismissed.
1161 In the circumstances, I do not propose to deal with these sub-issues, other than to observe, for the purposes of Issue 6(g), that there being no evidence that the alleged undercharges were made by APA by mistake, the set-off so claimed is dismissed.
Issue 7**: Did APA pay Achilla $414,000 in about September 2003, and if so must that amount be set-off against any damages awarded to Achilla?**
1162 This issue relates to the AMWU work bans[1517] that were in place between about 16 and 22 August 2003, preventing the supply of raw product by Amcor to Achilla. The Amcor parties allege that APA paid Achilla $414,000 in September 2003 for work that Achilla did not do due to the AMWU work bans. They say that the work was actually given to other OME suppliers to perform as a result of the work bans but that work was still noted in PICK as being routed to Achilla, and was paid for by APA.
1163 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan described the background to the issue, as follows:
Claim by AFP for refund of payments made during work bans (May 2004)
[179] At some time in early to mid-2004 Achilla received an invoice from AFP claiming $27,980 for work allegedly paid for but not performed during the period of the AMWU boycott of AFP. I declined to pay it, because I was of the view that Achilla had been ready, willing and able to do the work, was entitled to get the work, and had incurred all of the fixed expenses and employment expenses required to do that work in readiness to receive it - it was not Achilla's fault that AFP did not deliver the Raw Product required for Achilla to produce the OME work.
[180] On 27 May 2004 I received an email from Joyce regarding that subject [CB6/2120[1518]]. The email states in part that:
"ACB still received payments of $414K for the month of September regarding a theoretical recovery of work done under the formula we've had in place this year ... even though the work did not/could not pass through ACBCo."
[181] [struck out]
[182] Achilla did not receive a payment of $414,000 in September 2003 (or payments totalling that amount), and nor did ACB Purchaser.
[183] All payments under the Supply Agreement were made by Amcor Business Services into Achilla's operating account (BSB 012-468; account 1085-27509). Statements on that account for the period August 2003 to January 2004 are [CB5/1604[1519]]. Those statements show payments totalling $339,642.84 made by Amcor Business Services in September 2003. The only payments that Achilla received under the Supply Agreement that month were payments, on a weekly basis (in accordance with clause 5.5 of the Sale Agreement), for work in fact performed by Achilla.
[184] [CB6/2005[1520]] is a printed copy of an email that I sent to Kerrin Niklas, by which I forwarded my reply to Tony Joyce's email of 27 May 2004 (described above). I recognise Kerrin's handwriting at the top of the email.
[185] AFP continued to press for payment of the $27,980. I did not agree that it was entitled to be repaid that amount, but for the sake of the relationship I eventually agreed to pay it. I told Papadimatos of that and he emailed Greg Crouch on 20 January 2005, then sent me a copy [CB6/2132[1521]]. Achilla's cheque for that amount (numbered 2269) was banked on 31 January 2005 (refer [CB6/2125[1522]]).
1164 The email exchange between Mr Joyce and Mr Holihan commenced on 27 May 2004, when Mr Joyce set out (what AFP asserted was) the basis for the claim, relevantly as follows:
Craig,
I am lead to believe that we have some discussion ongoing regarding a claim that Amcor have made on ACBCo.
The facts as I understand it are that:
Amcor was the victim of a secondary boycott - regarding a union dispute between ACBCo and the AMWU around ACBCo "casualising" its workforce once the business was purchased from Amcor.
As a consequence bans were put in place by the AMWU at Smithfield and Revesby banning the transfer of work to ACBCo. Hence despite wanting to, we were unable to direct work to ACBCo and had no option but to put work out to alternate OME suppliers, and in doing so incurred the OME charge from the alternate suppliers as well as paying ACBCo a recovery as if they had done the work.
Settlement of the dispute between ACBCo and the AMWU came about through an exchange of letters largely facilitated by Jon Oyster due to his relationship with both the secretary of the AMWU and yourself.
Work was again bought [sic.] back to ACBCo as soon as practicable, once the dispute was resolved. Some work unavoidably remained with alternate suppliers given the lead times, materials were already on site and we had given the supplier a certain undertaking regarding particular jobs, but where practical this was limited and in some cases taken off alternative OME suppliers and given to ACBCo under Trevor Barnes' instruction. All of this being resolved mid September, to which ACB still received payments of $414K for the month of September regarding a theoretical recovery of work done under the formula we've had in place this year (ie: the route on the job assumed the work to be done at Wetherill Park - and the recovery formula gave ACBCo credit for this work - even though the work did not/could not pass through ACBCo).
Hence we feel our claim of $25K is fair in that we did not have a dispute with ACB, we were precluded from supplying ACBCo as a result of a dispute ACBCo had with the AMWU and as such should not be penalized by paying both the alternate OME supplier as well as ACBCo.[1523]
1165 As I read Mr Joyce's email, he is seeking to explain the rationale for the 'claim of $25K' Amcor had made, rather than him making a claim for the '$414K' apparently paid to Achilla for the month of September. This reading of the email appears to accord with the evidence that was given by Mr Joyce.
1166 Under cross-examination, Mr Joyce was taken to his email and asked to explain what the '$414K' figure refers to:
[MR TRAN:] Do you see there that you refer to $414,000?---I do.
Could you take a second to read that sentence or paragraph and explain to the court what you mean there, what that figure refers to?---Okay. Okay. So based upon the records that are in the PICK system, PICK had a routing of certain converting steps being undertaken at Wetherill Park. And in the normal course of business, the formula that we've been talking about, we calculate the amount of recovery that would go back to Australian - the new Australian Corrugated Box Company. In light of the events, and the 414,000 was a calculation for the month of September 2003. That was the month that this union event took place, and as such, Amcor Packaging was required to still meet its customers' expectations. So it had to send certain work to external third parties to complete that work so that Amcor did not disappoint its customers and their needs.
After the event, because of the formula, we discovered that the formula assumed that every bit of work was routed through the new Australian Corrugated Box Company. However I felt it was unreasonable, and hence the purpose of this email. I felt it was unreasonable for Australian Corrugated Box Company to receive a recovery for work that it did not complete. The work had been completed by an external third party and if Amcor was to pay new Australian Corrugated Box Company for that work, it was actually paying twice to an external, as well as to Australian Corrugated Box.[1524]
1167 In re-examination, Mr Joyce was taken back to this topic and asked about the underlying events. He said that reading the exchange of emails 'triggered my memory in terms of the events that took place in and around this industrial dispute' which he recalled lasted 'between one and two weeks'.[1525] He then explained the $414,000 and what it related to:
[MR MAIDEN:] And the $414,000 Mr Tran took you to, do you remember what that was in relation to, what that related to?---Yes, I do.
What's that?---For the month of September 2003, following the formula that had been agreed between the two parties, Amcor Packaging and new Australian Corrugated Box, following that formula, it had determined that Australian Corrugated Box should have been entitled to receive payments of $414,000 on the assumption that they had undertaken the manufacturing steps, the processing steps for all product in that month.
So the $414,000 relates to all of the product in that month. Is that right?---That's correct.
But the amount that was claimed from ACB co, how much was that? 25,000.
Do you know if that was ever paid? I do not recall.[1526]
1168 Mr Joyce said that the claim of $25,000 'would have been in the operating results of either the Smithfield or Revesby, ..., manufacturing P&Ls, profit and loss statements.'[1527]
1169 The Amcor parties did not tender any invoices rendered by APA seeking to recover the $414,000 or accounts of APA recording that sum as due and owing by Achilla. Nor did they lead evidence from other witnesses to support their claim for the $414,000 or to contradict Mr Holihan's evidence that he had paid the claim for $27,980 (rather than the $25,000 mentioned by Mr Joyce) in January 2005. Furthermore, the Amcor parties did not address this aspect of the claim in their written submissions on liability.[1528]
1170 In these circumstances, no occasion for any such set-off arises.
ISSUES ARISING ON THE COUNTERCLAIM REGARDING THE CHARGE
KEY ISSUE: What is the scope and effect of the Charge, what if any amount remains secured by it, is ACB Co Purchaser entitled to a discharge of it, and if so on what conditions?
1171 Under clause 5.6 of the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Purchaser, as 'Purchaser', agreed that it would 'at Completion execute and provide to the Vendor the Charge', a copy of which appears as Annexure 4 to the Second Sale Agreement.[1529] Accordingly, at or about the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Purchaser, as 'Chargor', and ACB Co Vendor and 'APA (trading as Amcor Fibre Packaging)' jointly and severally as 'Chargee' entered into a 'Fixed and Floating Charge' whereby ACB Co Purchaser charged all of its property, rights and undertaking to the Chargees.[1530]
1172 Each of Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail gave evidence about the background to the Charge being given by ACB Co Purchaser in connection with the sale of the assets of the ACB Business. It seems that ACB Co Vendor required that the Charge be given by ACB Co Purchaser as part of the sale and purchase arrangements essentially because the Holihan parties' purchase of the ACB Business was being 'vendor-financed'. That is, under the Second Sale Agreement, the Holihan parties were not required to pay any portion of the purchase price at Completion, but rather, were to pay the price of $1,000,000 by instalments commencing 12 months after Completion and ending 60 months after Completion.
1173 A draft of the Charge was first provided to Mr Holihan on 25 September 2002, probably by Mr MacPhail.[1531] In Mr MacPhail's letter of that date, sent by email to Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes, Mr MacPhail introduced the notion of the Charge. He attached a first draft of the Charge as a separate document, and he explained the reason for it, as follows:
During the 10 year period that a portion of the purchase price is outstanding from the Purchaser to Amcor,[[1532]] there will be a charge in favour of Amcor over the assets of the business. This fixed and floating charge will be released by Amcor once the final instalment of the purchase price is paid. The charge is attached as a separate document. It contains no unusual or out of the ordinary provisions. It has been pruned down from a lengthy, standard-form document customarily used in banking and financing transactions.
...
I look forward to receiving your comments and further instructions once you have reviewed the attached.[1533]
1174 Thereafter, the draft of the Charge was discussed variously between Mr Barnes, Mr Holihan and Mr MacPhail, in and around the drafting of the Second Sale Agreement, until it was ready to be engrossed in final form in order for execution along with the Second Sale Agreement. In the form in which the Second Sale Agreement was executed, the Charge also featured in clause 16.4. That clause imposed restrictions on the ability of ACB Co Purchaser to 'permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla' without the consent of ACB Co Vendor whilst the Charge remains in force.
1175 The dispute over the scope of the Charge first arose in June 2008, shortly before the Second Sale Agreement came to an end by effluxion of time. By then, ACB Co Purchaser had paid ACB Co Vendor the first four instalments of the purchase price, leaving only a final instalment of $300,000 that was due for payment on 30 July 2008 or thereabouts. Also, by that point in time, the principal proceeding was on foot, it having been commenced by the Amcor parties on 3 September 2007.[1534]
1176 By their counterclaim, the Holihan parties seek orders that upon payment by ACB Co Purchaser to APA of the sum of $300,000 - the final instalment amount of the purchase price for the ACB Business - it be released from the Charge.[1535] ACB Co Vendor and APA resist the making of such an order and by its cross-claim, APA seeks payment of the sum of $300,000 plus interest[1536] accruing on a daily basis from 31 July 2008.[1537] The Amcor parties say further that, pending the disposition of their claims in this proceeding (including any claim for costs), and pending the disposition of their appeal from the judgment in the principal proceeding, they are not obliged to release the Charge.[1538]
1177 Relevantly, for present purposes, there is no contest between the parties about the following background matters:
(a) ACB Co Purchaser paid ACB Co Vendor the first four instalments of the purchase price, leaving only a final instalment of $300,000 which was due for payment on 30 July 2008;[1539]
(e) by a letter from ACB Co Purchaser's solicitors to the Chargees' solicitors dated 24 September 2012[1546] (i.e. following the final judgment of Vickery J on the Amcor parties' claims against the Holihan parties in the principal proceeding), ACB Co Purchaser informed the Chargees that it would pay the final instalment to their solicitors' trust account on 28 September 2012 in exchange for a release of the Charge;[1547]
(g) on 18 October 2012, a solicitor acting for ACB Co Purchaser attended at the offices of the Chargees' solicitors and offered a bank cheque made out for $300,000 in exchange for a release of the Charge. A solicitor acting for the Chargees refused to accept the bank cheque in exchange for a release of the Charge.[1550]
1178 As will be apparent, the real issue in contention between the parties is whether the Charge secured more than merely the payment of the purchase price. In other words, did the Charge secure payment of the purchase price for the ACB Business only,[1551] or did it extend to providing security for any damages and equitable compensation awarded and costs etc that the Amcor parties might incur in connection with the principal proceeding? If the Holihan parties succeed in satisfying the Court that the Charge secured only the payment of the purchase price, they must then demonstrate that their offer to pay APA (via its solicitors) the sum of $300,000 before 30 July 2008 constituted an effective tender.
1179 The parties have identified six issues that are said to arise regarding the Charge, as follows:
8. Did the Charge secure payment of:
(a) any liability for costs or damages payable to the chargees other than in litigation brought to enforce the Charge or the Second Sale Agreement or for breach of those agreements; and/or
(b) interest under the Second Sale Agreement; and/or
(c) compensation of the type sought against ACB Co Purchaser in proceeding 8181 of 2007 [i.e. the principal proceeding]?
1180 In their reply, the Holihan parties plead that the Charge, on its proper construction, did not extend to secure payment of any liability for 'costs payable to the chargees other than in litigation brought to enforce the Charge or the Second Sale Agreement or for breach of those agreements' or for 'compensation of the type sought against ACB Co Purchaser in proceeding 8181 of 2007.'[1552] Further, they say that, at all material times from 4 June 2008 onward, 'there has been no liability answering the description of Secured Money under the Charge other than the liability to pay the $300,000 the subject of the tender',[1553] being the final instalment of the Purchase Price for the ACB Business.
1181 The Amcor parties dispute this, and contend that the meaning of 'Secured Money' under the Charge is 'an extremely broad definition' - one that is 'consciously and deliberately broad' and that 'expressly covered amounts far greater than just the instalment - price instalments.'[1554] Accordingly, they submit that the words of the definition are 'apt to include potential liability in the main proceeding[1555] and costs.'[1556]
1182 Before turning to the question of proper construction, it is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Charge.
1183 Clause 1.1 defined a number of expressions for the purposes of the Charge 'unless the context requires another meaning'. Clause 1.2 of the Charge dealt with 'Interpretation' and provided that:
(a) A term defined in the Asset Sale Deed, and not defined in this Deed, has the same meaning when used in this Deed.
(b) Clause 1.2 of the Asset Sale Deed[1557] applies to this Deed as if set out in full in this Deed.
(c) Words and expressions defined in or for the purposes of the Corporations Act have the same meaning in this Deed.[1558]
1184 Under clause 2.1, the 'Grant of Charge' was framed as follows:
The Chargor as beneficial owner charges the Secured Property to the Chargee by way of first ranking charge as security for the due and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Secured Money.
1185 The expressions 'Secured Money' and 'Secured Property' were each defined in clause 1.1 respectively as follows:
'Secured Money' means all money, obligations and liabilities of any kind that are or may in the future become due, owing or payable, whether actually, contingently or prospectively, including on account of principal, interest, fees, expenses, indemnity payments, losses or damages and irrespective of:
(a) the capacity of the Chargor or the Chargee (whether as principal, agent, trustee, beneficiary, partner or otherwise);
(b) whether the Chargor is liable as principal debtor or as surety;
(c) whether the Chargor is liable alone, jointly or jointly and severally with another person;
(d) whether or not the money, obligation or liability is owed to the Chargee or to its account as a result of an assignment, transfer or other dealing with or without the Chargor's consent; or
(e) whether the money, obligation or liability is owed or secured before or after the date of this Deed or any assignment of this Deed;
'Secured Property' means all of the property, rights and undertaking of the Chargor irrespective of:
(a) whether it is present or future;
(b) whether it is real or personal;
(c) whether it is tangible or intangible; and
(d) where it is located;
including share capital which is uncalled or called but unpaid.[1559]
1186 Clause 2.7 of the Charge provided for a 'Priority Amount' (which was defined in clause 1.1, to mean '$1,000,000'), as follows:
Despite any other term or condition of this Deed, the Secured Money is a limited amount. At any time, that limited amount is the Priority Amount. ...
Clause 2.7 then continued to set out the regime that would apply 'for the purpose only of determining priorities between the Charge and any other security interest under Part 2K.3 of the Corporations Act' (which provisions were later repealed[1560]).
1187 Clause 3.1 provided for the release of the Charge:
If the Chargee is satisfied that:
(a) all of the Secured Money is paid, discharged or performed in full;
(b) no money, obligation or liability is likely to become Secured Money within a reasonable time; and
(c) there is no reasonable possibility that:
(i) any money received or recovered by the Chargee and applied in payment of the Secured Money; or
(ii) any settlement, conveyance, transfer or other transaction made in satisfaction of or in connection with the Secured Money;
must be repaid or may be avoided under any law, including a law relating to preferences, bankruptcy, insolvency, administration or the winding-up of companies;
the Chargee will discharge the Charge at the request and cost of the Chargor.
1188 Provision was also made in clause 3.2 for the 'Partial release of Charge' at any time, and in clause 3.3, for 'Reinstatement of Charge' in the event that a payment or transfer etc in connection with the Secured Money 'is void or voidable' or a claim made to that effect is 'upheld, conceded or compromised'. In the event that the Chargee was required to disgorge any payment of the Secured Money, clause 3.3 provided that the Chargee was immediately entitled to the same rights against the Chargor and the Secured Property as it would have had if the payment of the disgorged amount had not occurred.[1561] Clause 3.3(b) provided that clause 3.3 'survives the discharge of the Charge.' Clause 3.4, 'headed 'Continuing security' provided that:
This Deed is a continuing security and remains in full force and effect, despite any settlement of account or any other matter or thing, until a final discharge is given to the Chargor.[1562]
1189 Clause 4.1 defined the 'Events of Default' under the Charge by reference to ten topics: 'non-payment of principal', 'other default', 'ownership of Secured Property', 'Insolvency Event', 'execution', 'expropriation', 'use and occupation', 'litigation', 'priority' and 'damage'. The Holihan parties contend that the specified events of default set out at clauses 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) are of most relevance to the construction question, and they provide as follows:
(a) non-payment of principal: the Chargor [ACB Co Purchaser] fails to pay any part of the Secured Money in accordance with clause 3.l(a) [sic] of the Asset Sale Agreement;
(b) other default: the Chargor [ACB Co Purchaser] fails to perform or observe any other obligation under the Asset Sale Agreement and:
(i) the Chargee considers that the failure or default cannot be remedied; or
(ii) the Chargee considers that the failure or default can be remedied, but it is not remedied to the Chargee's satisfaction 5 Business Days (or any longer period the Chargee approves) from the earlier of:
(A) the date the Chargor became aware of the default or ought reasonably to have become aware of the default; and
(B) receipt by the Chargor of a notice from the Chargee requiring it to remedy the default;
...
1190 (I note that clause 4.1(a) has two typographical errors, only one of which is of any significance.[1563] The reference to (the non-existent) 'clause 3.l(a)' of the Second Sale Agreement is clearly intended as a reference to clause 3.1, which specifies a purchase price for the ACB Co Business of $1,000,000 payable in five instalments, with the final instalment of $300,000 being due sixty months following Completion.)
1191 Clause 4.2 set out the consequences of an event of default, as follows:
(a) If an Event of Default occurs the Chargor must immediately pay the Secured Money in full to the Chargee on demand by the Chargee and in the manner notified by the Chargee.
(b) The Chargee may do or cause to be done all things, including the payment of any money, necessary to remedy any Event of Default but is under no obligation to do so. Any money paid by the Chargee for that purpose forms part of the Secured Money.
(i) The Chargee may enforce this Deed even if the Chargee accepts payment of any part of the Secured Money after an Event of Default has occurred.[1564]
1192 As noted above, the Holihan parties submit that it is only the events of default set out in clauses 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) that relate to the payment of money secured by the Charge, and further, that in each case, the events refer explicitly to the Second Sale Agreement. Put another way, they maintain that the only monetary event of default open to ACB Co Purchaser to rely upon (in contrast to events of defaults that do not rely on a failure to pay money to the Chargee, such as insolvency or damage to the secured property) could be one that is caused by a failure to pay moneys owing under the Second Sale Agreement.[1565] Thus, they effectively contend that the expression 'Secured Money' can only be a reference to moneys that are owing under the Second Sale Agreement.[1566]
1193 The Amcor parties, on the other hand, submit that the events of default specified in clause 4.1 of the Charge cannot be allowed to control the meaning of 'Secured Moneys', which they submit could not be plainer or broader. They contend that to treat the events of default as the leading provision and the definition as the subordinate provision is 'to let the tail wag the dog.'[1567]
Approach to proper construction of the Charge
1194 The Holihan parties contend that the Charge falls to be construed having regard to the context in which it came to be executed and by reference to the commercial purpose it was intended to serve, but otherwise according to the language used: see Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Windslow Corporation Pty Ltd (in liq);[1568] Ronan & Ors v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd;[1569] Re Bankrupt Estate of Murphy; Donnelly v Commonwealth Bank of Australia;[1570] Fountain v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association.[1571] Further, they say that in construing the Charge, it is appropriate to have regard to the whole of the transaction that was in the contemplation of the parties, including contemporaneous agreements that formed part of that transaction: McVeigh v National Australia Bank Ltd.[1572]
1195 The Holihan parties also submit that in construing the Charge, the Court should take heed of the cautionary note expressed by Santow J in Re Modular Design Group Pty Ltd,[1573] where his Honour adverted to the potential for the equity of redemption to impact on the interpretation or proper construction of 'all monies' clauses in mortgages and suggested that caution should be exercised where the interpretation contended for 'would lead to consequences where the equity of redemption would be impeded or constrained'.[1574]
1196 The Amcor parties, on the other hand, contend that when construing the Charge, the usual principles of contractual interpretation apply,[1575] although it may be accepted that any ambiguity is to be resolved in favour of the Chargor. Further, they say, the terms of the contract are controlling, and a security is not to be regarded as 'ambiguous', merely because its terms are drafted in a broad fashion 'to cover a multitude of possible events.'[1576] The Amcor parties submit that where the relevant clause is an 'all monies' clause, it 'must be construed in the light of the actual language used and having regard to the context in which this mortgage came to be executed and its commercial purpose.'[1577] They, like the Holihan parties, accept that the Court can have regard to other agreements making up the whole of the transaction between the parties,[1578] but they stress that the terms of the specific contract in issue are controlling.
1197 In my view, the Charge in the present case falls to be interpreted according to the same, or essentially the same, principles that apply when construing a contract. (Those principles have been set out earlier in these reasons in the context of considering the proper construction of clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement). However, I also accept that when construing the Charge, the Court should take heed of the cautionary note expressed by Santow J, as to ensure that the equity of redemption is not impeded or constrained.
1198 In the present case, the commercial purpose or object to be secured by the Charge was demonstrably to provide security to the Vendor in circumstances where the purchase price for the assets of the ACB Business was payable by Purchaser by instalments over time. The Second Sale Agreement provided that '[t]itle to and risk in the Assets will pass to the Purchaser on Completion'.[1579] But the purchase price of $1,000,000 was not payable to the Vendor at Completion - rather, the first instalment (of $100,000) was due at the end of the first year; the second instalment (of $100,000) was payable at the end of the second year; the third instalment (of $200,000) was payable at the end of the third year; the fourth instalment (of $300,000) was payable at the end of the fourth year, and the fifth and final instalment (of $300,000) was payable at the end of the fifth year.[1580] And while no money was payable to the Vendor at Completion, the Second Sale Agreement did, however, require the Purchaser to provide the executed Charge to the Vendor.[1581] Accordingly, in that way, by means of those arrangements, ACB Co Vendor and its parent, APA, as Chargees obtained a 'first ranking Charge as security for the due and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Secured Money',[1582] in circumstances where the Vendor would not receive the total of the Purchase Price until the Second Sale Agreement was (virtually) at an end.
1199 The expression the 'Secured Money' is drafted in broad and expansive terms. But the 'Secured Money' is also expressly subject to the monetary limit provided for in clause 2.7. In my view, when regard is had to the plain terms in which the introductory words of clause 2.7 are expressed, it is clear that they operate to confine the 'Secured Money' to the limited amount of $1,000,000. That it, clause 2.7, by its express terms makes clear that 'despite any other term or condition' of the Charge, the 'Secured Money is a limited amount'. That it is so limited, entails the consequence that the Charge granted under clause 2.1, on its proper construction, secures no more than the sum of $1,000,000, in total.
1200 In my view, such a construction accords with what a reasonable person in the position of the parties, aware of the object of the transaction and the suite of arrangements entered into between them, would have understood the Charge to mean. The contrary construction contended for by the Amcor parties is not one that is consistent with the object of the transaction, nor is it one that would promote and give effect to the notion that the parties intended to produce a commercial result. Their construction simply overlooks and elides the presence of the monetary limit that was expressly agreed between the parties, and seeks to render the Charge a security that operates at large, effectively akin to an 'all monies' mortgage.
1201 Accordingly, I would answer Issue 8 as follows:
8. Did the Charge secure payment of:
(a) any liability for costs or damages payable to the chargees other than in litigation brought to enforce the Charge or the Second Sale Agreement or for breach of those agreements
ANSWER: No
(b) interest under the Second Sale Agreement;
ANSWER: No
(c) compensation of the type sought against ACB Co Purchaser in proceeding 8181 of 2007 [i.e. the principal proceeding]?
ANSWER: No
Issue 9**: Did ACB Co Purchaser effectively tender the balance of the purchase price under the Second Sale Agreement on or before 30 July 2008?**
1202 In his witness statement, Mr Holihan gave evidence about the attempts he made, through his solicitors, to tender payment of the final instalment of purchase price to the Vendors' solicitors in July 2008, as follows:
Attempts to effect payment of fifth and final instalment of purchase price (July 2008)
[302] Correspondence passed between my solicitors, Mills Oakley, and Corrs Chambers Westgarth, the solicitors for the defendants by counterclaim, in the period 4 June 2008 to 27 September 2012 in relation to the Charge [CB7/2428 (letter dated 4 June 2008); CB7/2438 (letter dated 29 July 2008); CB7/2439 (letter dated 4 August 2008); [CB7/2441 (letter dated 24 September 2012); CB7/2443 (letter dated 27 September 2012)].
[303] In the month leading up to the date that the final payment was due (31 July 2008), Achilla generated more than adequate cash to have paid the $300,000 final payment. [CB7/2429] are copies of bank statements on Achilla's operating account for that period, which show total credits of $976,904. Had ACB Vendor not refused to accept the payment, $300,000 of that cash would have been used to pay the final instalment, and either declared as a dividend or loaned to ACB Purchaser by Achilla. ACB Purchaser made a net profit of $947,345 in that financial year. [F81] is a copy of its profit and loss statement for that year.
1203 In the letter from the Holihan parties' solicitors, Mills Oakley, to the Amcor parties' solicitors, then Corrs Chambers Westgarth, dated 4 June 2008,[1583] ACB Co Purchaser sought to make arrangements with them for payment of the final instalment and release of the Charge on or before 30 July 2008. They stated:
Pursuant to the Asset Sale Agreement the final payment is due by 30 July 2008. My client is in a position to provide the final payment pursuant to the Asset Sale Agreement and will do so upon exchange and the provision of a release of the fixed and floating charge your client has over the assets. Please confirm a suitable date for settlement and provide me with confirmation that you will provide a release of the charge upon receipt of $300,000. In order to make arrangements for settlement please allow at least ten business days notice of your readiness to settle.
I look forward to hearing from you.
1204 Corrs Chambers Westgarth responded to Mills Oakley, by letter dated 29 July 2008,[1584] stating:
For the record, we advise that in having regard to the allegations in the Statement of Claim [i.e., in the Principal Proceeding], we will neither receive the $300,000 nor provide a release of the fixed and floating charge.
1205 Mills Oakley then wrote to Corrs Chambers Westgarth by letter dated 4 August 2008,[1585] to inform them that ACB Co Purchaser remained ready to pay the final instalment in exchange for a release of the Charge. Relevantly, the solicitors' letter stated:
The position is and remains that my clients are in a position to make the payment due under the Asset Sale Agreement but given the very clear position your clients adopt there is little purpose served in my clients tendering $300,000.00 to complete its obligations noting your position is that you would neither accept that sum nor provide a release of the fixed and floating charge.
So that there is no misunderstanding my client's position is:
... If your clients are prepared to accept the balance due under the Asset Sale Agreement i.e. $300,000.00 and provide a release of its fixed and floating charge then upon reasonable written notice being given my clients will provide a bank cheque in satisfaction.
1206 Against that background, in their defence, the Amcor parties plead that -
...
(ii) ACB Co Purchaser did not pay the final instalment of the purchase price by 30 July 2008 as it was required under clause 3.1 of the Second Sale Agreement.
(iii) ACB Co Purchaser has failed or neglected to pay that final instalment since 30 July 2008.
(iv) ACB Co Purchaser has failed to make an unconditional tender of that final instalment since 30 July 2008.
(v) As a result of this breach, ACB Co Purchaser is liable to pay APA the amount of the final instalment plus interest pursuant to clause 3.4 of the Second Sale Agreement.
(vi) Further, in accordance with clauses 11.2 and/or 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement, Holihan is liable to indemnify APA in respect of this breach.
1207 In their reply, the Holihan parties plead that:
tender of all amounts secured by the charge ... was not conditional merely because the tenderer required a discharge of the Charge contemporaneous with payment.[1586]
1208 The Amcor parties submit that ACB Co Purchaser did not make a valid tender of the final instalment of the purchase price. Relying upon Ellis v Ellis,[1587] which was an action for the redemption of a mortgage, they contend that the Holihan parties' tender of that final instalment, while requiring a discharge of the Charge contemporaneous with the tender, is bad in law as it constitutes a conditional tender. In Ellis v Ellis, Poole J observed that:
An offer to pay, in order to be a legal tender, must be unconditional. If the terms on which the money was offered were such as to preclude the defendant from proceeding for any balance she might think was due, it was not a good tender. Of course, every person making a tender desires that the money shall be accepted in full settlement of all demands, but if he uses such words when offering the money that the acceptance of the money without more would prove acceptable in full settlement, then it is a bad tender.[1588]
1209 In Ellis v Ellis, Poole J addressed the facts of the case and held that the tender made by Mr Griffiths was not sufficient and did not amount to a valid tender. His Honour said:
In this case Mr Griffiths definitely said that he offered it in full settlement, and he asked that it be taken in full settlement. Had Mr Stow accepted that sum, the inference would have been that he accepted it as it was offered and as he was asked to accept it. The defendant would then have been precluded from proceeding for anything ultra. The tender was, on the authorities, not a valid legal tender.[1589]
1210 The Holihan Parties say that they asked for a release of the charge contemporaneous with payment of all moneys due, which in context is not relevantly to be regarded as a conditional tender.[1590] They refer to the early Victorian case of Shaw v Wright[1591] and the English case of Graham v Seal[1592] in support of their position.
1211 In Shaw v Wright,[1593] the plaintiff, in his capacity as an official assignee of a sequestrated estate, brought a suit for specific performance of a contract that permitted the re-purchase of certain gold mining shares from the defendant at a fixed price. On 20 August 1862, the plaintiff gave notice of his intention to re-purchase the shares, and also offered, upon being informed of the amount the defendant claimed as being due to him, to remit the same for the purpose of redeeming the shares, but without prejudice to his right to call upon the defendant to account for the dividends he had received. The defendant did not respond, and on 4 September 1862, a clerk of the plaintiff's solicitor tendered to the defendant a bundle of bank notes (said to contain notes to the amount of £500), as redemption money for the shares along with a deed of transfer of the shares in order for execution by the defendant. At the time of tender, the clerk stated that the tender so made was without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to claim 'back-dividends' if so advised. The defendant refused to accept the money tendered or to execute the deed, but made no objection to the sufficiency of the tender. Later that day, the plaintiff personally repeated the tender to the defendant, but once again he refused it, without any objection being made as to its sufficiency.
1212 At trial, before Molesworth J, the defendant insisted that the tender by the plaintiff was insufficient. But his Honour found the tender was 'quite sufficient, in equity, at all events' and he said:
I have no doubt that either the Plaintiff or [the clerk] had £500 in a bundle of notes, shown to the Defendant ready to be handed over to him if he would accept them. There is evidence that they were offered without prejudice to the right of the Plaintiff to claim back-dividends.[1594]
1213 Molesworth J then continued, to deal with the issue of whether the tender was bad:
I think a condition, to make a tender bad, must be one which, if the money be taken, would preclude the taker from disputing a matter which he has a right to dispute, not the preserving to the person making the tender his rights of litigation. It is objected to this tender that the Defendant was required to execute a deed of re-conveyance not previously submitted for his inspection. The materiality of this objection depends, I think, upon the conduct of the person to whom a deed is offered for execution. If he declines, upon the ground of being entitled to consider the details and language of the deed, his answer is in fact no refusal, and any person proceeding by bill to enforce the re-conveyance would be subject to the costs of his vexatious proceedings; but where the Defendant declined to execute the deed or any of its kind, without seeking examination, I think the Plaintiff was exonerated at once in filing his bill.[1595]
1214 The principle enunciated by Molesworth J continues to be good law, and was recently endorsed by Davies J in PGA Group Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 789) Ltd (formerly Symbion Health Ltd); Gunn v Idameneo (No 789) Ltd.[1596] Her Honour said, citing the bolded passage from Shaw v Wright above in support, that 'a tender is invalidated and is of no effect if the tender is made on terms that would adversely affect the rights of the person to whom the tender is made'.[1597]
1215 In Graham v Seal, the Court found a tender made by a mortgagor was a valid tender notwithstanding that the mortgagor had required the mortgagee to re-convey and deliver up the deeds of the mortgaged premises upon tender of the proper amount. In considering the question of whether there was a proper legal tender by the mortgagor that was sufficient to stop interest running, Swinfen Eady, M.R. said that there was. His Lordship explained the position stating:
The obligation of a mortgagee is, as against payment of what is due to him, to re-convey and deliver up the deeds of the mortgaged premises. It is like the obligation of a vendor to convey and hand over the title deeds and the conveyance as against payment of the purchase money. It contemplates that the handing over of the conveyance and payment of the purchase money shall be a simultaneous transaction, so that neither party is at risk for any time without either the money or the estate; so in paying off of a mortgage a mortgagee is not entitled to insist upon payment of the mortgage money with a view to re-conveying at some future time. The mortgagor is not required by law to be at any time at risk in the sense that he must pay off all the mortgage money to the mortgagee, and then at some future time obtain a re-conveyance of the mortgaged property. The transactions must be simultaneous, he paying off the mortgage money and obtaining a re-conveyance and delivery up of the title deeds. Under these circumstances the tender made by the plaintiffs on December 14 was a valid tender. There was no condition imposed other than that which the law enables the mortgagor to require, that is, that as against payment of the proper amount - and it is now finally determined that the amount offered was the proper amount - the mortgagee must simultaneously give up the deeds and re-convey the mortgaged property. In my opinion the law to that effect is well settled.[1598]
1216 Warrington LJ concurred, observing that one of the obligations to which the mortgagee was subject by virtue of their contract was, upon payment of the amount, to execute a re-assignment of the mortgaged property and to hand over the documents of title. His Lordship said:
The mortgagor does not, in my opinion, make his tender a conditional tender, so as to prevent it being a sufficient tender, if he merely insists on that to which he is entitled by virtue of his contract.' ... ...the tender may be an effectual tender for the purpose, though it be made conditional upon the re-conveyance, provided only that the form is observed of offering to the mortgagee a reasonable opportunity for executing that conveyance. [1599]
1217 Duke LJ likewise agreed that the mortgagee's case must fail for the reasons set out in the judgments of the Master of the Rolls and Warrington LJ.[1600]
1218 Some 40 years later, in Gardiner v Fitzgerald,[1601] Gibbs J (as he then was) referred to the position which applied in Graham v Seal and contrasted it with that in the case before him, observing that:
If it be correct to say that the plaintiffs were entitled to make a tender on condition that the mortgage be discharged and the Certificate of Title delivered to them, the fact is that they did not do so. In my opinion, it cannot be said that any conduct of the defendant dispensed with the necessity of a tender or that any other reason exists to entitle the plaintiffs to avoid payment of interest although no actual tender was made.[1602]
1219 The Holihan parties submit that, if the chargee indicates that tender will be refused when proffered, the chargor is excused from the requirement to make an actual tender: see AVS Property Pty Ltd v McMaster.[1603] The Amcor parties accept the principle that a chargee need not offer a tender if the other party has dispensed with the need for doing so,[1604] but assert that there was no effective dispensation in this case. They say that their refusal to accept ACB Co Purchaser's tender must be viewed and considered in the context in which it took place, namely, where both before and afterwards, ACB Co Purchaser's solicitors were insisting on a discharge of the Charge, and that accordingly, there was 'no clear dispensation'.[1605]
1220 In my view, the offer made by ACB Co Purchaser's solicitors in their letter to the Chargees' solicitors dated 4 June 2008,[1606] to provide the final payment of $300,000 required under the Second Sale Agreement upon exchange and the provision of a release of the fixed and floating Charge constituted an effective tender. Having found above that the sum of $300,000 was all that remained payable by the Chargor under the Charge, there was no reasonable basis for the Chargees to decline to discharge the Charge. Clause 3.1 of the deed provided that the discharge was to be 'at the request and cost of the Chargor.' The Chargor's solicitors made the request of the Chargees' solicitors well in advance of the due date for payment, requesting confirmation that they would provide a release of the Charge upon receipt of $300,000. Their response, delivered more than seven weeks later on 29 July 2008 or thereabouts, was to reject it in unequivocal terms: 'we will neither receive the $300,000 nor provide a release of the fixed and floating charge.' In those circumstances, there was no need for ACB Co Purchaser's solicitors to physically provide the money to the Chargees' solicitors. Indeed, to do so would demonstrably have been a futile exercise.
1221 The Holihan parties had requested 10 days' notice to make the necessary arrangements for payment. The evidence given by Mr Holihan was to the effect that had the tender not been refused, Achilla would have paid a dividend or made a loan to ACB Co Purchaser of the $300,000 necessary to pay the final instalment.[1607] As he was not challenged about this evidence, I am satisfied that at the time the final instalment was due, ACB Co Purchaser was ready, willing and able to pay that sum.
1222 The Amcor parties, in refusing ACB Co Vendor's request for confirmation that they would discharge the Charge contemporaneously with payment of the final instalment, did so at their own risk. In my view, the tender was valid and effective and ACB Co Purchaser is excused from the requirement to make an actual tender, it having been made clear that any such tender would be refused.
Issue 10**: Is ACB Co Purchaser liable to pay APA interest on the balance of the purchase price, and if so, in what amount?**
1223 In their defence, the Amcor parties plead that ACB Co Purchaser is liable to pay APA both the amount of the final instalment plus interest pursuant to clause 3.4 of the Second Sale Agreement.[1608] And in their rejoinder, the Amcor parties plead that even if the tender of the final instalment of the purchase price was effective, then ACB Co Purchaser has had the use of $300,000 at the expense of APA, and it should make restitution of that benefit. The Amcor parties assess the benefit as being the sum of $300,000 plus interest. [1609] Further, they say, if APA is not entitled to interest under clause 3.4 then it is 'entitled to a sum equivalent to the benefit which ACB Co Purchaser has obtained at APA's expense by reason of its retaining the $300,000 which benefit includes a sum representing interest'.[1610]
1224 In their surrejoinder, the Holihan Parties deny the restitutionary claim alleged by the Amcor parties on two bases: first, on the basis that equity can step in to disentitle a creditor from its usual ability to redeem interest, and secondly, that regardless of whether equity should intervene, there is relevantly no enrichment for ACB Co Purchaser to disgorge and provide by way of restitution. In further answer to the Amcor parties' rejoinder, they plead that:
on the proper construction of the Second Sale Agreement and the Charge, the obligation to pay the final instalment under the Second Sale Agreement was co-dependent with the chargees' obligation to release the charge, such that payment of the final instalment did not fall due for so long as the chargees demonstrated an intention not to release the charge upon receipt of that instalment, and thus ACB Co Purchaser never obtained any benefit at APA's expense.[1611]
1225 In the present case, it is important to appreciate that the right to interest arises under the Second Sale Agreement only, and not the charge. Clause 3.4 of the Second Sale Agreement provides that:
Interest will be payable upon:
(a) late payments of the purchase price instalments set out in clause 3.1 above, accruing from the due date for payment;
(b) any other outstanding amounts (other than amounts due for purchases of products which are not yet due for payment) accruing from the due date for such payment
such interest to accrue daily and be compounded at monthly intervals at the Interest Rate calculated up to and including the actual date of payment.[1612]
1226 The 'Interest Rate' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean '2% above the Reserve Bank of Australia's overnight cash rate from time to time'. Further, any interest accruing under the Second Sale Agreement was payable to the Vendor, who by July 2008 was APA.
1227 Given the construction of the Charge arrived at above, the limitation imposed by clause 2.7 renders the result that notwithstanding the apparent breadth of the definition of Secured Money, any interest that might accrue under the Second Sale Agreement by reason of late payment of an instalment is not secured by the Charge. That is, the maximum amount secured by the charge is $1,000,000, and both parties acknowledge that ACB Co Purchaser as Chargor has repaid $700,000, leaving relevantly only the sum of $300,000 secured by the Charge.
1228 The Holihan parties acknowledge that there is a line of authority to the effect that where tender is refused, interest continues to accrue under the mortgage unless, after the tender, the mortgagor sets aside what is due to the mortgagee.[1613] Gardiner v Fitzgerald[1614] (referred to above) is one such case. There, Gibbs J observed:
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that if the plaintiffs had made a good tender, interest would not have stopped running unless the sum tendered had been set aside and kept ready for payment at any time (Bank of New South Wales v O'Connor ([1889] 14 App Cas 273, at p 284); Edmondson v Copland ([1911] 2 Ch 301 at 310); Barratt v Gough-Thomas ([1951] 2 TLR 106, at p 110), and that in the present case there is no evidence that the plaintiffs set aside any money until they gave £65 to their solicitor on the 13th February, 1958.
I sympathise with the plaintiffs, but since it is clear that they made no tender before the 29th August, 1958,[1615] and that the conduct of the defendant did not prevent them from making a tender, or indeed payment, at the appointed place, the defendant's Bank, whenever they desired, I am bound to hold that interest continued to run after the 18th June, 1957.
...In the circumstances, I propose to permit the plaintiffs to file further material which will reveal how much, if anything, is owing under the mortgage at the present date on the footing that interest continued on all amounts unpaid until 29th August 1958, and if any amount remained unpaid at that date has continued to run thereafter. [1616]
1229 In Bank of New South Wales v O'Connor, Lord Macnaghten, in delivering the judgment of the Board, enunciated the proposition as follows:
No doubt it is the duty of the mortgagee, on proper notice, or without notice in a case where notice is not required, to accept a proper tender ... If a mortgagee rejects a tender he rejects it at his own risk ... Further a proper tender will stop the running of interest if the mortgagor keeps the money ready to pay over to the mortgagee: Gyles v Hall 2 P Wms 377. But there is no authority for saying that refusal to accept a proper tender is a breach of contract, for which an action at law will lie.[1617]
1230 The Holihan parties contend, however, that the principle is not treated as being absolute and that 'equity will consider whether the mortgagee by its conduct or fault may have disentitled itself from insisting on the usual conditions on which equity insists for redemption.[1618] In the recent case of Çukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd (No 4),[1619] which was a relief from forfeiture case heard by the Privy Council on appeal from the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal (British Virgin Islands), the appeal was restored for further hearing on the questions of whether it was appropriate to grant relief from forfeiture and, if so, on what grounds. One of the questions the Board was required to determine was whether equity has any power to identify particular circumstances making it exceptionally inequitable or unconscionable to insist upon redemption taking place on a basis which treats the loan as if it had remained continuously outstanding to date. But their Lordships' opinion on this issue was not unanimous. Lord Mance JSC (with whom Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore and Lord Clarke of Stone-Cum-Ebony JJSC agreed) delivering the reasons of the Board, was of the view that 'equity has such a power, albeit only exercisable in exceptional circumstances such as the present.'[1620]
equity can and should respond by a special order as to interest or costs in exceptional situations where the mortgagee has by words or conduct rejected, made impossible or delayed repayment of the mortgage debt, and that such a situation may exist where there is a tender or offer of repayment, particularly one backed by monies actually paid into court or an account.[1621]
1232 The Board continued, with reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Bank of New South Wales v O'Connor and added:
the Board would also question whether in modern conditions the wrongful rejection by a lender of properly offered repayment during the currency of a loan should not be viewed as constituting a positive breach of a loan agreement such as the present facility agreement which expressly provides for repayment and, in an event of default, acceleration. It is however unnecessary to go further into this last point.[1622]
1233 In Australia, an 'exceptional circumstances' approach was taken in Coughlan v George.[1623] There, the mortgage in question did not contain any covenant for the payment of interest, but when the tender of $32,000 was made by the solicitors for the mortgagor, Mr Coughlan, on 27 November 2001, the mortgagee's solicitor responded to the effect that he was returning the cheques but Mr George would be 'agreeable to settle the matter on payment of the sum of $60,000.00 plus compound interest at the rate of 7.5% with effect from 1 September 1998.' Hamilton J held that in circumstances where a mortgagee had refused tender of the amount secured by the mortgage, insisting on repayment of a larger amount, the need for tender had been disposed with and interest did not run after that date. In dealing with the question of interest, his Honour said:
At one stage it was suggested that if a tender were not accepted, in general terms the money must be put aside and kept so it was available for payment to the creditor at any time: see McPherson v Summerville [1905] NSWStRp 54; (1905) 6 SR (NSW) 1 at 4 per A H Simpson CJ in Eq. However, this has recently been said by Hodgson J (as his Honour then was) not to be a fixed rule: Kitson v Goodge (1997) 7 BPR 15,173 at 15,177. Since tender was not required in this case, I do not think that general rule in any event applies. Nor do I accept, as was pressed on me on behalf of Mr George, that I should find that Mr Coughlan would not have been able to find the money had $32,000 been called for by Mr George between the end of August 1998 and November 2001 when it was, in fact, paid. Mr Coughlan had some money in the bank, some money with his solicitor, kept money in cash and was able to pay the money in 2001.[1624]
1234 Hamilton J concluded that the mortgage should be discharged upon the tender of $32,000, without the payment of any interest in respect of any period either before or after the tender of the cheques on 27 November 2001.[1625]
1235 As noted by Hamilton J, in Kitson v Goodge,[1626] Hodgson J found that there was no 'fixed rule' about the mortgagee's right to recover interest. In response to a submission made by counsel for the defendant mortgagee to the effect that it was unreasonable that a mortgagor should make full use of a mortgagee's money without paying any interest, Hodgson J said:
In my opinion, the cases relied on for the defendants do not establish a fixed rule that interest continues to be payable at the mortgage rate if the sum tendered is not set aside for payment at any time. In my opinion, in a case such as the present, where the defendants' mortgage provided for interest at 20%, while the mortgage from which the plaintiffs were to obtain the funds to discharge the mortgage provided for interest at a rate of 9.45% per annum, the latter is the rate which the mortgagors should now pay as consideration for the continuing use which they have had of the mortgagees' money. The offer of finance in fact referred to a variable rate of 9.45% per annum, but so far as I am aware, neither side led evidence of any variations; and accordingly, subject to further submissions, I would fix the rate at 9.45% per annum.[1627]
The law of mortgages is that for interest to stop running there must be a proper tender. The tender must be duly made and refused, and if that happens then interest stops running: see _Bank of New South Wales v O'Conno_r [1889] UKLawRpAC 47; (1889) 14 App Cas 273 and Webb v Crosse [1911] UKLawRpCh 134; [1912] 1 Ch 323. The conduct of the mortgagee may in appropriate cases amount to a dispensation with the tender. A mere claim of more than is due will not have this effect, as a general rule, unless the creditor conducts itself in such a way to show that a tender of the amount properly due would not be accepted: see for instance Scarfe v Morgan [1838] EngR 253; (1838) 4 M and W 270; 150 ER 1430.
The onus is on the cross-defendants to show that had the amount due under Double Bay have been paid it would have been accepted and the mortgage at least been discharged so that the re-financing institution could have got its charge. The evidence is a bit equivocal. I think that I am not able to find that there was a proper tender or that the tender was dispensed with, but that on taking accounts between the mortgagor and the mortgagee the Master must take into account any difference in the interest rates that were payable under the contractual mortgage and which would have been payable in the market generally or under the finance which was available from the other financial house. This is because the conduct of the mortgagee in insisting that provision be made for the Lloyds debt stopped the mortgagor obtaining cheaper finance, if that be the case. If there is no evidence that the substitute finance was at a cheaper rate, then, of course, the contractual rate will apply.[1630]
1237 A year or so later, in Challenge Bank Ltd v Hodgekiss, Young J said:
... there has not been a dispensation from the requirement to tender and, even if there had been, the authorities show that it is only if the mortgagor shows that it has available the money to pay off the mortgagee, which it has held without receiving interest, that it may be entitled to stop paying the interest under the mortgage; Edmondson v Copland [1911] UKLawRpCh 58; [1911] 2 Ch 301; Gardiner v Fitzgerald [1962] Qd R 29. In the instant case there is no evidence at all that the money was available to the mortgagors. It would not be appropriate to order the mortgagee's interest to stop if the mortgagors were not paying interest to anybody.[1631]
1238 In Challenge Bank Ltd v Hodgekiss, counsel for the mortgagor referred to Young J's decision in GWH Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia and submitted that the circumstances in the present case were 'appropriate for the account to be taken on the basis that the commercial rate of interest should be charged, rather than the contractual rate.' However, his Honour did not accede to that request, observing that 'the GWH case was a special case and the order in that case was moulded to do equity.'[1632]
1239 The Holihan parties contend that the decisions in Kitson v Goodge, GWH Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Challenge Bank Ltd v Hodgekiss, 'demonstrate that the entitlement to interest, if any, is restitutionary' such that 'if the mortgagee is entitled to payment of any interest at all, it should only be the interest that was saved (i.e. the benefit that was gained) by the mortgagor as a result of not having repaid the debt at the time of tender.'[1633] In that regard, they refer to the early Victorian case of Conroy v Mason,[1634] where Molesworth J held that where the amount tendered by the mortgagor was sufficient, interest stopped from the day of tender, but the mortgagee was entitled to receive all interest on the sum tendered that was actually obtained by the mortgagor after the tender. In rejecting the mortgagee's claim for an additional three months interest over and above the period of six months' notice given by the mortgagor, His Honour said:
When a mortgage is overdue there must be some way of paying it, and stopping interest. ...
As the Defendant's claim for three months' interest was unfounded, and has caused the suit, I shall order him to pay the costs of it. There is some doubt as to the Plaintiff being liable to interest on the money so far as he has made interest on it, notwithstanding the tender - Fisher, p 941. Gyles v Hall [1726] EngR 450; (2 P Wms, 378) puts the question on the money having been always ready, which here I think it was. There is some evidence it was on bank deposit bearing interest. The point was not raised by the Defendant's answer, nor sifted on examination of the witness. The sum is too trifling to be worth a reference, but I shall order the Plaintiff to make an affidavit on the subject, and pay what he has to admit.[1635]
1240 In the present case, the issue of whether any interest at all is payable arises only because the Chargees rejected the tender several weeks after it was notified and in circumstances where the Chargor had indicated it would require time to arrange the monies. That is, under the Second Sale Agreement, interest would only accrue once the final instalment was not paid on time. Because the Chargees notified their rejection of the tender on 29 July 2008, the practical reality was that the Chargor did not make, and was effectively denied the opportunity to make, the arrangements it would otherwise have made in order to be in a position to effect the payment of the final instalment on or before 30 July 2008. The funds that Mr Holihan said he would have used to pay the final instalment were not called up and they were not invested in any separate fund. Following rejection of the tender, ACB Co Purchaser's solicitors wrote to inform the Chargees' solicitors by letter dated 4 August 2008, that:
1241 In my view, the conduct of the Chargees in wrongfully refusing the tender, deprives APA as the then vendor under the Second Sale Agreement of any right it might otherwise have had to receive interest arising as a result of ACB Co Purchaser's failure to actually pay the final instalment of purchase price on or about 30 July 2008. There are no fixed rules about when interest is payable following rejection of a valid tender and, in my view, this case falls within the category of cases that warrant an 'exceptional circumstances' approach of the kind taken by Hamilton J in Coughlan v George.[1637] The circumstances here also resonate with the observation made by the Privy Council in Çukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd (No 4), where the Board said it 'would also question' but did not have to decide 'whether in modern conditions the wrongful rejection by a lender of properly offered repayment during the currency of a loan should not be viewed as constituting a positive breach of a loan agreement such as the present facility agreement'. [1638]
1242 In the present case, the Chargees, by their unequivocal refusal of the tender, in effect created the opportunity for interest to become payable once the final instalment was not paid. Furthermore, were it not for their rejection, I am satisfied, having regard to Mr Holihan's unchallenged evidence, that the necessary funds would have been made available by Achilla declaring a dividend or loaning the money to ACB Co Purchaser, and paid to APA in a timely way. It follows that if the funds had been obtained by way of dividend, no interest would have been payable, and the money to pay the final instalment would have been provided to ACB Co Purchaser without cost. In that event, there is no saving to be disgorged and passed on to the Chargees by way of restitution.
1243 Apropos the interest claimed by APA or the Amcor parties, even if (contrary to my view) interest were payable, I note that no evidence was led by the Amcor parties by way of establishing what the relevant or applicable rate was. That is, the 'Interest Rate' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean '2% above the Reserve Bank of Australia's overnight cash rate from time to time', but there is no evidence before the Court as to what that overnight cash rate was at the relevant times.
Issue 11**: What amount remains payable by ACB Co Purchaser under the Charge?**
1244 In my view, while the 'tender' made by the Holihan parties is a sufficient answer to the Amcor parties' claim that there was a breach on the part of ACB Co Purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price, it does not answer the claim in debt. As the High Court observed in Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd,[1639] the tender answers 'only the breach of obligation and not the debt'. Their Honours explained the position stating:
The common law does not and never did conceive of indebtedness in a sum certain for an executed consideration as a mere breach of contract : it is rather the detention of a sum of money and that was so whether the creditor enforced his demand by an action of debt or by indebitatus assumpsit. Were it otherwise it would not be necessary for a defendant who sets up a plea of tender to bring into court the amount of the debt with his plea. The reason he must do so is that the tender answers only the breach of obligation alleged and not the debt. This is explained by the following statement by Wilde C.J. in Dixon v. Clarke (1848) 5 C B 365 (136 E.R. 919) : "In actions of debt and assumpsit, the principle of the plea of tender, in our apprehension, is, that the defendant has been always ready (toujours prist) to perform entirely the contract on which the action is founded; and that he did perform it, as far as he was able, by tendering the requisite money; the plaintiff himself precluded a complete performance, by refusing to receive it. And, as, in ordinary cases, the debt is not discharged by such tender and refusal, the plea must not only go on to allege that the defendant is still ready (uncore prist), but must be accompanied by a profert in curiam of the money tendered. If the defendant can maintain this plea, although he will not thereby bar the debt (for that would be inconsistent with the uncore prist and profert in curiam), yet he will answer the action, in the sense that he will recover judgment for his costs of defence against the plaintiff" (1848) 5 C.B., at p 377 (136 E.R., at pp 923, 924).[1640]
1245 Against that background, the legal position is as described in Halsbury's Laws of Australia namely, that where 'a debtor owes money to a creditor under a contract and the creditor refuses to accept a legal tender, the buyer is not discharged from the obligation to pay the debt.'[1641]
1246 Having regard to the views I have expressed above in answer to the earlier questions concerning the Charge, in my view, ACB Co Purchaser remains indebted to APA for the final instalment only, namely the sum of $300,000.
Issue 12**: Is clause 3.1 of the charge void as a clog on the equity of redemption?**
1247 In their reply, the Holihan parties plead that to the extent that clause 3.1 of the Charge purports to operate to deny their right of redemption, it is void as a clog on ACB Co Purchaser's equity of redemption.[1642] They contend that clause 3.1 is framed in terms which purport to allow the Chargees to refuse redemption of the Charge in their absolute discretion.
1248 Clause 3.1 deals with the 'Release of Charge' and provides:
If the Chargee is satisfied that:
(a) all of the Secured Money is paid, discharged or performed in full;
(b) no money, obligation or liability is likely to become Secured Money within a reasonable time; and
(c) there is no reasonable possibility that:
(i) any money received or recovered by the Chargee and applied in payment of the Secured Money; or
(ii) any settlement, conveyance, transfer or other transaction made in satisfaction of or in connection with the Secured Money;
must be repaid or may be avoided under any law, including a law relating to preferences, bankruptcy, insolvency, administration or the winding-up of companies.[1643]
1249 The Holihan parties focus upon the subjectivity inherent in the use of the word 'satisfied', and the additional scope for subjectivity in the use of the expressions 'is likely' and 'reasonable possibility', both of which they submit allow for significant gradations of probability. They contend that those expressions, taken in combination, have the result of purporting to make redemption a matter that is effectively within the discretion of the Chargees.[1644] Further, they say that the apparent capacity of the Chargees to withhold redemption, based on their satisfaction of certain states of affairs, purports to impose a significant fetter on the exercise of the right of redemption.[1645]
1250 The mortgagor's 'equity of redemption' arises as soon as the mortgage or charge is made.[1646] The equitable doctrine or principle against 'clogging the mortgagor's equity of redemption' was explained in Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co Ltd,[1647] where the House of Lords held that:
There is now no rule in equity which precludes a mortgagee, whether the mortgage be made upon the occasion of a loan or otherwise, from stipulating for any collateral advantage, provided such advantage is not either (1) unfair and unconscionable, or (2) in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption, or (3) inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual and equitable right to redeem.[1648]
1251 This equitable doctrine 'applies to all types of mortgages, whether legal or equitable, by way of floating charge or otherwise.'[1649]
1252 The Amcor parties acknowledge that equity has long recognised that a mortgagor is entitled to redeem secured property by payment of the money secured and that equity would protect the equity of redemption by striking down and rendering void 'any stipulation that has the effect of making the mortgagee the absolute owner of the mortgaged property or otherwise extinguishing the essential right of the mortgagor to redeem that property by paying the secured moneys.'[1650] But they submit[1651] that under Australian law, there is a divergence of opinion between the courts of New South Wales and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, as follows:
... In Sun North Investments Pty Ltd (as trustee of Sun Development Trust) v Dale, Henry J held that the traditional approach remained good law in Australia, and that anything which stops the mortgagor from redeeming upon payment of that which is due is intrinsically unconscionable and therefore objectionable in equity.[1652] In New South Wales, the position is that a provision or conduct could only be void as a clog on the equity of redemption if there is something unconscionable or unconscientious about it over and above stopping the mortgagor from redeeming the property.[1653]
1253 The Amcor parties submit, however, that it is unnecessary for the Court to enter into and resolve this divergence of opinion, because even on the traditional approach adopted by Henry J, there is no question of a clog here. They say the issue between the parties has always been one of whether or not that which is due has in fact been paid, rather than whether the mortgagor can redeem its property upon payment of that which is due. Thus, the Amcor parties contend the question of clogging is premature.
1254 Given the views I have expressed above in answer to the earlier questions of construction, it is unnecessary for me to resolve any divergence of opinion in the cases. In my view, given the construction of the Charge I have arrived at, ACB Co Purchaser can redeem the Charge upon paying the final instalment of $300,000 to APA.
Issue 13**: Is ACB Co Purchaser entitled to a release or discharge of the Charge upon payment of the amount which remains payable by ACB Co Purchaser under the Second Sale Agreement?**
1255 For the reasons set out above, in my view, ACB Co Purchaser is entitled to a discharge of the Charge upon payment to APA of the sum of $300,000, being the final instalment of purchase price.
KEY ISSUE: Did ACB Co Purchaser breach the Second Sale Agreement or any implied supply agreement by reason of a change of control, and if so, what is the effect of that breach and what if any liability for it is borne by ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and/or Mr Holihan?
1256 Issues 14 to 20 raise a host of issues concerning the Amcor parties' cross-claim wherein they allege that there was a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in or around May or June 2004 and/or in October 2005.
1257 As noted in the Introduction, following the exchange of written submissions, the parties are in agreement that there are four main issues in contention on the cross-claim.[1654] First, should the cross-claim be refused because of Anshun estoppel or abuse of process? The second issue is whether ACB Co Purchaser breached the Second Sale Agreement by not informing ACB Co Vendor of a change in control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in June 2004 or by not informing APA of a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in October 2005? The third issue is, if the Court finds there was such a breach, did that breach cause any loss to APA and, if so, how is APA's compensation for that breach to be calculated? The final issue on the cross-claim is, if the Court finds that Achilla is obliged to compensate APA, to what, if any, degree is Mr Holihan personally liable to make that compensation?
Background to the alleged change of control in 2004 and/or 2005
1258 In the principal judgment, Vickery J found that Amcor had approved a sale of the ACB Business to Mr Holihan and his associated companies (ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla), and not to Mr Holihan and his associated companies and other parties. His Honour stated:
[934] I am satisfied that at no time prior to the sale of the ACB Business was Amcor informed that Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic had taken or intended to take an interest in the business. There was therefore no consent by Amcor for those individuals or their associated companies to take an interest in the business.
[935] I accept that Amcor provided authorisation or approval for the sale of the ACB Business to the party that it understood it was dealing with - Holihan and his associated companies, ACB Australia Pty Ltd and Achilla Pty Ltd. What was approved was a sale to Holihan and his company, not to Holihan, his companies and other parties.
[936] Lachal gave evidence that it was not until May 2006 when he met with Holihan in his role as Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, that Holihan told him that Barnes was his partner in the ACB Business. Until, then he had no knowledge that Barnes had acquired an interest in the business.
[937] Brown's evidence was that he was not asked to give permission for Barnes to take an interest in the ACB Business together with Holihan. He did not know that Barnes was also to take an equity interest in the ACB Business.
[938] Still less did Amcor give permission for Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic to take an interest in the ACB Business together with Holihan and Barnes.
[939] Barnes relied on the letter to Hodgson dated 29 May 2003 (but which he says he drafted in March 2003) as documentary evidence of Amcor's authorisation and approval of his participation in the acquisition of the ACB Business. However, Barnes knew Brown was the only person within Amcor with the authority to grant the permission he was seeking.
[940] I reject the Barnes letter to Hodgson dated 29 May 2003 as constituting an appropriately directed request for permission from Amcor for him to participate in the acquisition of the ACB Business. Not did Hodgson have any authority to grant the request. Further, I am satisfied that the request from Barnes was not passed on by Hodgson to Brown.
[941] Each of Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and Hodgson, whilst admitting they did not seek approval for their participation or inform Amcor that they intended to take an interest in the ACB Business, contended that there was no need to do so because they did not in fact take an interest.
[942] Brown approved in principle the sale of the ACB Business to its then manager, Holihan, including approval of the price. However, he did not approve the involvement of any other party in the purchase, still less the involvement of Amcor executives.
1259 Further, in the context of dealing with claims for breach of fiduciary duty, Vickery J observed that the 'identity of the purchaser of the ACB Business and the ongoing trading partners referred to in the Second Sale Agreement were matters of importance to Amcor' and there were terms of the Second Sale Agreement which provided a restriction on a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla without the consent of ACB Co Vendor.[1655]
1260 Relevantly clauses 16.4 and 16.5 of the Second Sale Agreement provided that:
16.4 Change of control of Purchaser
(i) The provisions of this clause 16.4 apply only for so long as the Charge remains in force or is not discharged.
(ii) The Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor, which consent may be delayed or withheld by the Vendor in its sole and absolute discretion. If notwithstanding there is a change in control of the Purchaser or Achilla without the Vendor's consent, then the Vendor may at its sole option provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days of written notice. If at the end of that period the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) has not returned to the status quo ante, the Vendor may thereafter -
(a) terminate this Deed on further 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser and Achilla; and
(b) acquire the Purchaser's Business, for the consideration and as referred to in clause 16.3 (with any necessary changes).
16.5 Change of control of Purchaser
The Vendor's rights under clauses 16.3 and 16.4 are independent of and without prejudice to its rights under or pursuant to the Charge.[1656]
1261 Separately, under clause 16.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Vendor also had the power to terminate the rights and obligations arising under clause 12 'immediately (or with effect from any later date that it may nominate)' by written notice to the Purchaser if, relevantly for present purposes:
(a) the Purchaser or Achilla breaches any provisions of this Deed and, if it can be rectified, that breach has not been rectified within 20 Business Days' written notice to the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be).[1657]
Issue 14: Was there a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla within clause 16.4(iii) of the Second Sale Agreemetn (or the implied supply agreement), and if so, did ACB Co Purchaser permit, allow or suffer that change in control?
Did ACB Co Purchaser breach the Second Sale Agreement or the Implied Supply Agreement in or around May or June 2004 or in October 2005?
(a) Was there a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser and / or Achilla within cl 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement and the equivalent term in the Implied Supply Agreement?
(b) If so, did ACB Co Purchaser permit, allow or suffer that change in control?
1263 In the Amcor parties' defence and cross-claim, they allege, both as a defence to the breach allegations brought by the Holihan parties and as a separate cross-claim, that there were two unauthorised changes of control in each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla, in June 2004 (or thereabouts) and in October 2005. In effect they say that had the relevant Amcor party been notified of either change of control, it would have provided a notice to rectify, and that notice would not have been complied with by the Holihan parties; and the relevant Amcor party would have terminated the clause 12 supply agreement. Accordingly, by reason of the alleged breach of the obligation to notify them of the change of control, the Holihan Parties have caused them loss and damage in that they have lost the opportunity to terminate the clause 12 supply obligation; further or alternatively to terminate the agreement for repudiation and issue a demand or proceedings for damages.
1264 The Amcor parties contend that the respective changes of control arise from:
1265 The Amcor parties contend each such change of control constituted a breach of clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement (and/or the implied supply agreement, if the Court were to find it exists) because the change of control was procured without first obtaining Amcor's prior written consent.
1266 The backdrop to the Amcor parties' change of control claim is a series of findings made by Vickery J in the principal proceeding that are not in issue between the parties to the Achilla counterclaim and the Amcor parties' cross-claim for the purposes of this trial. As noted earlier, the Holihan parties formally stated that they did not object to the Amcor parties relying on the findings made by Vickery J in the principal judgment at paragraphs [1087], [1088], [1147] and [1149] (and effectively did not contest them) for the purposes of the trial of the Amcor parties' cross-claim only. The Amcor parties, however, went further and contended that these paragraphs gave rise to 'issue estoppel' findings. I heard argument on the point and ruled that save for one finding (shown in bold below), they did not give rise to an issue estoppel but I said that I would nevertheless treat the relevant findings made by his Honour as relevant background.
1267 The relevant 'findings' relied upon by the Amcor parties are found in the principal judgment under the heading 'Findings as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed'. Reorganised to make chronological sense, those findings made by Vickery J are as follows:
[1147] I am satisfied that the former managers (the defendants) acquired their interests in the ACB Business from about 26 May 2003 crystallizing upon the sale of the ACB Business on 2 June 2003 and settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 June [sic.] 2003. ...
[1087] The version of events as stated by Holihan and Barnes to the effect that it was in May or June 2004 that Barnes informed Holihan as to the identity of the other shareholders Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley is accepted to a point. Given the uncertainty of the evidence as to the precise date of this conversation between Holihan and Barnes, I find that it was by 30 June 2004 that Holihan was advised as to the identity of the other shareholders.
[1088] However, I do not accept that part of the conversation between Holihan and Barnes which is said to have occurred in May or June 2004 wherein Holihan was allegedly advised by Barnes first that the other shareholders had earlier decided not to proceed with the transaction and as between them and Barnes the transaction had been cancelled, and second that the ownership of the ACB Business would revert to a 50/50 split between Holihan and Barnes.
[1147] ... Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest until about October 2005 when the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement was entered into and backdated to 28 May 2003 and the original 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was endorsed "cancelled". By this means, in October 2005, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley renounced any interest in the ACB Business and renounced any entitlement for them or companies associated with them to any share in the profits of the ACB Business.
[1149] In the present case, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest in the ACB Business until about October 2005 when by their conduct, and with the knowledge of Holihan, mutually abandoned or abrogated the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, and with that, renounced any rights or entitlements under it.[1658]
1268 During the course of cross-examination of Mr Holihan, the Amcor parties sought a ruling in respect of paragraphs of the principal judgment that were said to be relevant in the context of the Amcor parties' allegation that there was a 'change of control' for the purposes of the supply agreement. After hearing argument, on 17 and 18 June 2015 I ruled that the findings made by Vickery J in the following paragraphs of the principal judgment gave rise to an issue estoppel in the Blair v Curran[1659] sense:[1660]
[1023] I am satisfied that the identity of the other ultimate beneficiaries, other than Barnes, was not disclosed to Holihan on or prior to 26 May 2003. The Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement recorded that Holihan was "not aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares". The agreement also contained a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause which is later described.
[1024] Further, there is no evidence that Holihan became aware of the identity of the shareholders in the ACB Business, other than Barnes, for at least a year following entry into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreements.
...
[1031] Holihan said that on receipt of the advice from Barnes as to the identity of the other shareholders, he was "shocked when Barnes told [him] who the other people were".
...
[1430] As to the participation of the other Defendants in the ACB Business, as I have found, this was not disclosed to Holihan by Barnes until May or June 2004, well after he ceased his employment with Amcor.
[1431] The fact that in the period leading up to settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 July 2003 Holihan knew that there were to be other unidentified shareholders in the ACB Business holding a proportion of 80 per cent of the business in company with Barnes, did not in all the circumstances give rise to a duty in Holihan to disclose that fact to Amcor, even though the possibility existed that this interest could have been taken by an opposition company or even by other managers in Amcor, whether present or past, or any other person which was not to the liking of Amcor. This was a risk which Amcor assumed from the outset in determining to part with the ACB Business. Following the sale, Amcor was not in a position to control the financial or equity structure of the ACB Business.
...
[1437] Although Holihan acknowledged at least the possibility that the other shareholders could have been other Amcor managers, I accept his answer given in cross-examination that he didn't think this was the case at the time. This is reinforced by Holihan's observation given in evidence that he was "shocked" when the identity of the other Defendants was ultimately disclosed to him by Barnes in mid 2003.
[1438] Given the confidentiality regime which Barnes had imposed in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, which was clearly adhered to and jealously guarded by Barnes and the other Defendants under the spectre of considerable penalty in respect of breach, and given the inherent unlikelihood of other managers of Amcor becoming involved in the ACB Business during the currency of their employment without the knowledge or consent of Amcor, and thus being in breach of their fiduciary duties to their employer, I am not satisfied that Holihan either knew about or was reckless as to their breaches of duty in the relevant sense.
[1439] I am not satisfied that Holihan had actual knowledge of the other Defendants and their participation in the ACB Business at the relevant time. Nor am I satisfied that he wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make. Nor am I satisfied that he possessed knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person.
[1440] Further, I find that Holihan did not give "knowing assistance" to the Defendants in relation to the initial sale of the ACB Business.
[1441] Given that Holihan was the controlling mind of both Achilla and ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd, it follows that these companies too did not give "knowing assistance" to the Defendants in relation to the sale of the ACB Business.
[1442] It follows that Amcor's claim against Holihan and his companies under Barnes v Addy must fail in relation to the circumstances surrounding the initial sale of the ACB Business.
1269 At the trial of the cross-claim, it was accepted that the Amcor parties would not have terminated the Second Sale Agreement (or the implied supply agreement) if the only means available for doing so involved them exercising the power under clause 16.4, with its corollary requirement to repurchase the business, as opposed to simply exercising the power under clause 16.1(a) of the agreement to terminate the rights and obligations which arise under clause 12.
The relevant concept of 'control' - s 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
1270 In clause 1.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, the expression 'control' is defined to mean, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the meaning set out in section 50AA of the Corporations Act'.
1271 Section 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is headed 'Control' and provides as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an entity controls a second entity if the first entity has the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about the second entity's financial and operating policies.
(2) In determining whether the first entity has this capacity:
(a) the practical influence the first entity can exert (rather than the rights it can enforce) is the issue to be considered; and
(b) any practice or pattern of behaviour affecting the second entity's financial or operating policies is to be taken into account (even if it involves a breach of an agreement or a breach of trust).
(3) The first entity does not control the second entity merely because the first entity and a third entity jointly have the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about the second entity's financial and operating policies.
(4) If the first entity:
(a) has the capacity to influence decisions about the second entity's financial and operating policies; and
(b) is under a legal obligation to exercise that capacity for the benefit of someone other than the first entity's members;
the first entity is taken not to control the second entity.
1272 The definition of 'control' in section 50AA has its origin in Accounting Standard 1024: Consolidated Accounts.[1661] Relevantly, in Accounting Standard 1024 the companion expressions of 'control' and 'capacity' are defined as follows:
"control" means the capacity of an entity to dominate decision making, directly or indirectly, in relation to the financial and operating policies of another entity so as to enable that other entity to operate with it in pursuing the objectives of the controlling entity;
"capacity" means ability or power, whether direct or indirect, and includes ability or power that is presently exercisable as a result of, by means of, in breach of, or by revocation of, any of or any combination of the following:
(a) trusts;
(b) relevant agreements; and
(c) practices;
whether or not enforceable.[1662]
1273 The Amcor parties contend that the test of control under section 50AA is broad and much wider than merely a question of shareholdings. They say that 'control' is 'something that is exercisable rather than something that has been exercised'[1663] and submit that the ascertainment of 'control' focusses on 'the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions' and looks at 'practical influence' and evidence of any practice or pattern of behaviour rather than evidence of actual exercise of such control.[1664]
1274 The parties referred to a number of cases, reported and unreported, concerning the meaning of 'control' both under statutory regimes, such as the Corporations Act and the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (Cth), and at common law and decisions of the Australian Takeovers Panel concerning substantial interest and the (quite different) concept of control that applies in the context of the takeover provisions of the Corporations Act. These decisions demonstrate that the concept of 'control' can vary from case to case and by reference to the particular criteria involved.
1275 There is little in the way of case law that informs the meaning of section 50AA. Of the cases referred to, perhaps the most helpful is Hancock v Rinehart,[1665] a case involving the administration of the Hope Margaret Hancock Trust, where Brereton J was considering a contractual provision in a joint venture agreement that contained a 'change of control' clause. In considering the meaning of the phrase 'wholly owned and controlled by' Hancock Family Group Members 'and/or entities wholly owned or controlled by them' his Honour had regard to the statutory definition of control in section 50AA, and described the general concept of control as being concerned with the (practical) ability of an entity to determine the outcome of decisions of the entity. His Honour said:
[152] The concept of "control" of an entity is concerned with the ability to determine the outcome of decisions of the entity: compare s 50AA of the Corporations Act; Glencore International AG v Takeovers Panel [2006] FCA 274; (2006) 151 FCR 77, [83] per Emmett J. In the context of a company, this ordinarily means the ability to carry a resolution by majority at the general meeting - and thus to determine the composition of the board of directors. ...
[153] Control is concerned with decision-making, rather than proprietorship, and control, like ownership, can be indirect: there are circumstances in which those who have the ability to carry a resolution may become bound to act on the direction of another (for example, a mortgagee). The "control" requirement is directed to the ultimate power to decide how an entity acts, as distinct from beneficial ownership, and also as distinct from the delegated power of directors or officers. Although typically those who wholly own a company will control it, this is not necessarily so; it is not unknown for those entitled to exercise voting power to become bound or accustomed to exercise their voting rights in accordance with the direction of another (as would be the case, for example, if under her settlement with Mrs Rinehart, Hope were bound to vote in accordance with Mrs Rinehart's direction). In such a case, that other person will "control" the company if he or she has a sufficient accumulation, directly or indirectly, of voting power to carry the general meeting.[1666]
Capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about 'financial and operating policies'
1276 The phrase 'financial and operating policies' as used in section 50AA is not defined in the Corporations Act.[1667] The Amcor parties submit that 'financial and operating policies' is a reference to small 'p' policies, not capital 'P' policies. Senior Counsel explained that what the Amcor parties mean by that is that 'policy' is not just a concept or an idea, it is also the implementation of that idea.[1668] Further, Dr McNicol QC said, the policy does not need to be something that is written down. Rather, she said:
a policy is a course of action, an idea, a course of action, an agreed response, but it's not just a high level idea. It also extends to the implementation and the adoption of that high level idea. And you design a policy and you implement it. It's both. It has two limbs, and it's a delivered system of principles that guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes.[1669]
1277 Dr McNicol QC submitted that, in general terms, 'financial policies' of companies relate to matters which are to do with finance - such as raising capital, changing the share capital, borrowing, determining who the company's auditors will be and how and when they change, who the auditors report to, how the company may give security in any contracts, who operates the bank accounts, the investments, how to create new bank accounts, how to pledge the credit, what are the company's minimum levels of liquidity, how will financial risk be measured etc. So understood, she said, they are financial policy decisions of a company which are determined at the board level.[1670]
1278 On the other hand, she said, 'operating policies' are things like the business plans, and who decides about acquiring another business, how the business can be diversified, or expanded or shrunk, who can determine occupational health and safety and human resources, who can sign major contracts, what the strategic imperatives of the company will be, how the budget is approved and reviewed, how the constitution is to be amended, who can change the company's share structure, and who decides the salaries etc.[1671]
1279 The Amcor parties contend that in the present case, the relevant 'financial policies' and 'operating policies' are those set out in clause 10 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement (discussed below) in respect of which the former Amcor executives might have obtained 'rights of veto'.
1280 The Holihan parties referred the Court to the decision of Kyrou J in Multinet Gas (DB No 1) Pty Ltd v Alinta Asset Management Pty Ltd,[1672] as a decision which might assist the Court in arriving at the meaning of 'financial and operating policies', particularly the distinction between the policies themselves and the operation of the company within the scope of those policies. In Multinet Gas, his Honour was considering financial and operating policies in the context of two different accounting standards (AASB 1017 and AASB 124), as opposed to section 50AA, in order to determine whether one entity was a 'related party' of a partnership (comprised of two corporate entities). In the context of considering an argument, which his Honour rejected, that the phrase 'financial and operating policies' is confined to written policies, his Honour expressed the view that:
[T]he reference to financial and operating policies includes, in addition to formal written policies (such as the asset management plan) and formal board and shareholder resolutions, important decisions of the company which set the framework for the operation of its business, meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and achieving its financial and other corporate objectives, as distinct from day to day decisions made within that framework.[1673]
1281 In the context of the present case, the Holihan parties submit that the matters in respect of which the other executives might have obtained 'rights of veto' (as they are called by the Amcor parties) under clause 10, are to be regarded as matters that arise within the scope of the policies, and that they are not matters that concern the formulation or adoption of the policies themselves.[1674]
Conclusion on the relevant concept of control
1282 In the present case, the control or change of control that is relevant is that mentioned in clause 16.4(ii), and what ACB Co Purchaser must not do is 'permit, allow or suffer' a change in its control or the control of Achilla without the Vendor's written consent. The parties' adoption of the section 50AA definition of control for the purposes of that contractual requirement conveys the notion that the sort of 'control' that is relevant in the clause 16.4(ii) context is control at the level of capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about 'financial and operating policies' of the company, and whether or not there is a change in control is to be ascertained by looking at the practical influence that can be exerted when making, and influencing the outcome of, decisions about 'financial and operating policies', rather than by focussing on the legal rights capable of being exercised or enforced. Further, when looking at the capacity of an entity to determine the outcome of such decisions, any practice or pattern of behaviour is to be taken into account. It follows, in my view, that one does not discern or ascertain whether there is a change of control by simply looking at the number of shares held at any particular time, or to strict legal rights, or to the rights of directors etc. Rather one must look to see whether the entity has the capacity, in a real and practical sense, to determine the important decisions of the company that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives, as distinct from the day to day decisions made within that framework.
The first alleged change of control: May/June 2004
1283 In their cross-claim, the Amcor parties plead that entry into the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholding Deed, the disclosure by Mr Barnes to Mr Holihan in late May or June 2004 that each of Messrs Hodgson, Mihelic, Sangster and Bayley (or their respective companies) was a beneficial owner, and the absence of any notification from Mr Holihan that he was withdrawing from the agreement, 'trigger automatic powers'[1675] under the agreement and/or the deed such that by at or around May or June 2004:
(a) Each beneficial owner acquired the ability to direct or influence the behaviour of ACB Co Purchaser.
(b) Further or alternatively, each beneficial owner acquired the ability to control ACB Co Purchaser within the meaning of section 50AA(1).
(c) Each beneficial owner also acquired the ability to direct or influence the behaviour of Achilla.
(d) Further or alternatively, each beneficial owner acquired the ability to control ACB Co Purchaser within the meaning of section 50AA(1).[1676]
They contend that in these circumstances, there was a change of control in each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla within the meaning of clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement (and the equivalent term in any implied supply agreement).[1677]
1284 Turning to the factual background, it is undisputed (for the purposes of this trial) that at least until October 2005:
(a) all of the shares in Achilla were owned by ACB Co Purchaser;
(b) the shares in ACB Co Purchaser were owned as to 80% by LeoRose Pty Ltd[1678] and as to 20% by Holihan Investments Pty Ltd;
(c) all of the shares in LeoRose were owned by Holihan Investments Pty Ltd, as trustee for Astra Corporation Pty Ltd, Mr Barnes's company;
(d) Mr Holihan was the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla, LeoRose Pty Ltd and Holihan Investments Pty Ltd;
(e) all of the shares in Astra Corporation Pty Ltd were held by Brobel Investments Pty Ltd, 20% beneficially and the remaining 80% on trust for companies associated with Mr Hodgson, Mr Sangster, Mr Mihelic and Mr Bayley, respectively.
1285 The 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement[1679] was entered into between Messrs Barnes and Holihan on or about 26 May 2003[1680] to 'govern the affairs of each of the trading company [Achilla], the holding company [ACB Co Purchaser] and the shareholding company [LeoRose]',[1681] and expressed to 'continue for so long as any of the trading, holding or shareholding companies conducts the business and/or unless and until it is terminated.'[1682] In the principal judgment, Vickery J observed that the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement is 'the management agreement' referred to in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed signed on the same day. His Honour said:
[993] On 26 May 2003 Holihan attended the office of his solicitor Roe with Barnes and executed the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. The parties to the agreement were Barnes and Holihan.
[994] After certain corrections were made to the shareholdings of the participating entities, the structure of the arrangement between Holihan and Barnes giving rise to the 80/20 ownership split was:
(a) ACB Purchaser held all the shares in Achilla;
(b) LeoRose held all the shares in ACB Purchaser;
(c) Holihan held 10 shares in LeoRose which were divided as follows:
(i) two of the shares were held beneficially by Holihan; and
(ii) the remaining eight shares I [sic] held non-beneficially for Astra, which had 10 ordinary issued shares, all of which were owned by Brobel. Brobel had one ordinary issued share, which was owned beneficially by Barnes.[1683]
1286 The recitals to the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement recorded the following matters, describing them as 'FACTS':
(A) Each of ACB (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 670) [ACB Co Purchaser] ('the holding company) Achilla Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 581) ("the trading company") and LeoRose Pty Limited (ACN 104 857 247) ("the shareholding company") is a company registered under the Corporations Act.
(B) Holihan ("the director") is the sole director of each of the holding company, the trading company and the shareholding company.
(C) The holding company owns all of the shares in the trading company.
(D) The shareholding company owns eighty percent (80%) of the shares in the holding company.
(E) Holihan Investments Pty Limited (ACN 104 851 247) ("Holihan's company") owns twenty (20%) percent of the shares in the holding company and LeoRose Pty Limited (ACN 104 857 247) (the shareholding company) holds the remaining eighty (80%) percent of the shares (the trust shares) as trustee.
(F) Holihan's company holds all of the shares in the shareholding company as trustee for Astra Corporation Pty Ltd (ACN 104 784 438) (Barnes' company).
(G) Barnes is the sole director and shareholder of Barnes' company.
(H) All shares in Barnes company are held by another company, in which there are ten (10) shares issued, of which Barnes holds two (2) shares beneficially and the other eight (8) (the trust shares) on trust.
(I) Holihan is not aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares.
(J) The holding company proposes to acquire the goodwill, plant and equipment of the corrugating packaging supply business known as Australia Corrugated Box Co at 159 Newton Road Wetherill Park ("the business") and to cause the trading company to conduct that business.
(K) The trading company proposes to change its name to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Limited.
(L) The trading company will conduct the substantial portion of its business with the Amcor Group of Companies.
(M) This agreement will govern the affairs of each of the trading company, the holding company and the shareholding company (the companies).[1684]
1287 Clause 1 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement provided that the agreement was to have paramountcy over the constitutions of the companies, as follows:
The parties shall comply with the provisions of this agreement notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the constitution of each of the companies and shall so far as is lawful exercise their rights as directors and shareholders of each of the companies in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.
1288 Clause 7 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement provided that Mr Holihan was to 'serve and be employed as full-time managing director of each of the companies during the continuance of this agreement on terms and conditions as agreed from time to time.' Under clause 8, Mr Holihan was to make '[d]ecisions relating to the day to day running of the companies'[1685] and in respect of other matters, the directors were to make the decisions 'by a simple majority vote of directors' provided that no such decisions can be made at a meeting 'unless Holihan is present.'[1686]
1289 Clause 10, which is headed 'Actions prohibited without consent', listed a series of actions that could not be undertaken without the prior agreement of each other party, as follows:
No party shall do or acquiesce in doing any of the following in relation to any of the companies without the prior agreement of each other party:-
(a) Signing of any cheque or authority on the company's bank account save in accordance with the present mandate or as otherwise agreed PROVIDED THAT Holihan is empowered to incur and pay liabilities on behalf of the trading company up to an amount of $50,000.00 in respect of any individual transaction and
FURTHER PROVIDED THAT this restraint does not relate to acts in performance of any agreement between the trading company [Achilla] and Amcor.
(b) Pledging of the company's credit or entry into any contract (save in the ordinary course of business) for a period in excess of sixty (60) days or involving a liability or acquisition or sale of any assets other than in the ordinary course of business.
(c) Any borrowing.
...
(k) Transfer or transmission of any shares in the company save as herein provided.
...
(s) Any other act outside the usual course of business of the company.
(t) Any act which, were the shares held by the parties respectively separate classes of shares in the company, would be a variation of the class rights of the relevant shares.[1687]
The Amcor parties referred to these actions as 'rights of veto'.
1290 Clause 5 dealt with 'Company finance'. It provided:
(a) The parties must ensure that each of the companies has sufficient working capital to conduct its business in accordance with any business plan adopted by the directors.
(b) Such working capital shall be funded from (in order):-
(i) firstly external borrowings by the company, or
(ii) secondly loans by the shareholders to the company in the proportions in which they own their shares, or
(iii) thirdly loans by shareholders other than in such proportions on terms agreed in writing with lender shareholder(s).
(c) Each company shall provide such security for external borrowings as it is able so to do and as is reasonably required to satisfy the requirements of any financier.
(d) If any of the companies cannot provide security sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of such financier, each of the shareholders must provide such further security as is required in proportion to their respective shareholdings in that company. If any shareholder's shareholding in the company increases or decreases during the term of the loan so secured the obligation of each shareholder to provide security shall vary accordingly.
(e) Any decision of any of the companies to meet funding requirements by means other than referred to in this clause must be by unanimous resolution of all shareholders.[1688]
1291 Clause 14 was headed 'Sale of Shares'. Relevantly, clause 14(a) provided that '[n]o shares in any of the companies can be transferred without the consent of the beneficial owners of all other shares in each of the companies.'[1689]
1292 Clause 20 dealt with 'Additional Parties' and relevantly provided for the disclosure of the identity of the beneficial owners to Mr Holihan prior to the end of the first year of the agreement, as follows:
(a) Barnes represents himself and the beneficial owners of the trust shares (the beneficial owners) each of which is a company.
(b) Barnes has lodged written notification of the identity of at least two (2) of the beneficial owners and of the identity of the person (the representative) whom each of those beneficial owners nominates as its representative to be a party to this agreement with David Roe, solicitor of Gosford, with instructions to disclose those identities to Holihan at such times within one (1) year from the date of this agreement as Barnes shall specify.
(c) The representative of each beneficial owner must be a director and promoter of the beneficial owner.
(d) Within 30 business days of the date of a disclosure to him pursuant to subclause (b) hereof, Holihan can notify Barnes in writing that he withdraws from this agreement, which notice shall be deemed to be a sale notice in respect of his shares.
(e) If Holihan does not notify Barnes pursuant to subclause (d) hereof:-
(i) Holihan will be deemed to ratify this agreement and to accept each representative as a party;
(ii) each representative shall become a party to this agreement and be bound by its terms from the date of the notice given under subclause (b) hereof; and
(iii) each representative must forthwith ratify this agreement in writing.
1293 Clause 3 dealt with 'Directors'. Relevantly, clause 3.2 provided that :
If, after the notification provided in clause 20(b) hereof, Holihan ratifies this agreement as provided in clause 20(d) hereof, any of the representatives of the beneficial owners can at anytime thereafter require that he (that representative) be appointed a director of the holding company.
Clause 3.4 stated that the number of directors of the holding company 'can not exceed six (6) at any time.'[1690]
1294 Shareholders were addressed in clause 4, which provided:
After the disclosure pursuant to clause 20 hereof, during the continuance of this agreement, unless otherwise agreed by all of the parties:-
(a) Holihan's company must own not less than twenty (20%) percent of all shares issued in the holding company, and
(b) The holding company must beneficially own all the shares in the trading company.
(c) Until a disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b) hereof Holihan and Barnes shall each have one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
(d) As each disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b) each beneficial owner will, on disclosure, acquire voting rights proportionate to its beneficial ownership in each of the companies, subject to Holihan's rights under subclause 4(e).
(e) The shares held by Holihan's company must carry not less than one third of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.[1691]
1295 When clause 20 is read against the background of the recitals, it will be seen that it established a regime whereby the beneficial owners were to remain secret or undisclosed to Mr Holihan for a period of up to one year. At some point during that period, Mr Barnes (through Mr Roe) would disclose to Mr Holihan the identity of the beneficial owners. This in turn would trigger a period of 30 business days during which Mr Holihan could withdraw (in writing) from the agreement, or if he chose not to, he would be deemed to have ratified the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, and to have accepted the representative of each beneficial owner becoming a party to the agreement.
1296 The related deed, referred to by Vickery J in the principal judgment as the '26 May 80/20 Shareholding Deed', was also made on or about 26 May 2003 between each of Mr Barnes, Mr and Mrs Hodgson, Mr and Mrs Bayley, Mr and Mrs Mihelic and Mr Sangster in their personal capacity and on behalf of their respective shareholding company. Neither Mr Holihan nor Holihan Investments was a party to the deed.
1297 In similar fashion to the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholding Deed, recited a number of 'FACTS', as follows:
(A) Barnes has today made an agreement (the agreement) with Craig Anthony Holihan (Holihan) in respect of interest in, the affairs, operation and management of various companies specified in the agreement relating to the proposed business specified in the agreement (the business). Copy of the agreement is attached hereto.
(B) The holding company named in the agreement (the holding company) proposes to acquire the business.
(C) Barnes will hold the shares in Astra beneficially and on the trusts set out in schedule 3 hereto.
(D) Barnes is the sole director of Brobel [Brobel Investments Pty Ltd].
(E) This agreement will govern the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of:-
(i) the agreement
(ii) the beneficial ownership of the shares in Brobel, and
(iii) the affairs and operations of the companies specified in the agreement
(iv) the relationship between the parties hereto the companies specified in the agreement, Brobel, Astra [Astra Corporation Pty Ltd], the directors, shareholders and beneficial shareholders of the companies named in the agreement and parties to this agreement.
1298 Under clause 1, the parties agreed 'to be bound by and adhere to' the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, a copy of which was attached, 'as if they were parties to it.'[1692] Further, under clause 2, the parties agreed that on disclosure of the identity of any of the shareholder companies pursuant to clause 20(b) 'each such shareholder and its representative must ratify the agreement and sign and deliver to Holihan written form of ratification in such form as he may require.' [1693]
1299 Under clause 3, each of the shareholder companies and each of the shareholder representatives jointly and severally covenanted:
to indemnify Barnes, Brobel and Astra from so much of all or any claims, demands, suits or actions (the claims) under the agreement or under this deed or in relation to the business as the number of shares shown in schedule 3 to which each shareholder company is beneficially entitled bears to the total number of shares in Brobel shown in schedule 3.[1694]
1300 Clause 4 of the deed recorded the agreement made between the parties not to disclose the existence of the deed or the identity of any of the shareholder representatives or any information relating to the affairs of any of the companies or the interests of any person in any of those companies.
Vickery J found that by 30 June 2004, Barnes had informed Holihan of the identity of the other shareholders
1301 As noted above, Vickery J found that by 30 June 2004, Mr Barnes had told Mr Holihan of the identity of the other shareholders, being Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster.[1695] Mr Holihan gave evidence about his conversation with Mr Barnes, stating to the effect that Mr Barnes did not say to him that he was giving notification of beneficial owners for the purposes of clause 20(b) of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, and Mr Holihan did not take him to be doing so.[1696] Further, he said that he never received from his solicitor, David Roe, any notification pursuant to clause 20(b) nor has he ever received either (a) any written ratification of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by a 'representative' whether pursuant to clause 20(e)(iii) of that agreement or otherwise, or (b) any request that a person become, or notice that a person required that he/she be appointed as, a director of ACB Co Purchaser, whether pursuant to clause 3.2 of that agreement or otherwise.[1697]
The parties' rival contentions concerning the first alleged change of control
1302 Mr Holihan says that at all material times during the term of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, he:
(a) held one half of the voting rights in general meetings of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla;
(b) was the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser;
(c) was the sole director of Achilla;
(d) served as the managing director of each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla;
(e) made all significant decisions relating to the day to day running of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla. Other decisions were made by staff who ultimately reported to him; and
(f) made all decisions relating to the finances and financial policies of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla.[1698]
1303 Further, he stated that Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster 'never made any decision in relation to the running of Achilla's business'.[1699] In particular, he says he never involved Mr Barnes (or LeoRose for that matter) in decisions relating to the control of the finances of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, he made 'all significant operational decisions relating to ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla', and as far as he was concerned, 'the two companies were [his] and [he] was responsible for running all aspects of them.'[1700]
1304 In the circumstances, the Holihan parties contend that the conversation that his Honour found took place between Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan in June 2004 is inadequate to constitute notification under the terms of clause 20(b), with the effect that clauses 3.2 and 4(d) cannot have taken effect and no change of control can have occurred.[1701]
1305 The Amcor parties, on the other hand, rely on clause 20(e)(ii) and clause 3.2 as entitling each of Messrs Hodgson, Mihelic, Bayley and Sangster to appoint themselves as a director of ACB Co Purchaser. Further, by reading clause 20 along with clauses 4 and 10, the Amcor parties contend that once disclosure of the identity of the beneficial owners occurs, the beneficial owners would acquire voting rights in proportion to their beneficial ownership and would also acquire veto rights relating to the affairs of all three companies.
1306 The Amcor parties contend that the Holihan parties' reliance on the absence of any formal notification from Mr Roe under clause 20 as a basis for defeating any finding that the deeming provisions of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement were enlivened is 'untenable and unmeritorious'.[1702] They submit that disclosure of the identity of the beneficial owners having taken place through a conversation with Mr Barnes, rather than as a result of Mr Barnes instructing Mr Roe to disclose the interest holders is without consequence, because 'whether Barnes or Roe makes the disclosure to Holihan is immaterial as it is effectively the same source of information.'[1703]
1307 Mr Holihan was cross-examined about the evidence he had given concerning notification, to the effect that receiving the oral notification from Mr Barnes was not the same as receiving written notice from Mr Roe on Mr Barnes's direction, as follows:
DR McNICOL: Do you agree that if Mr Barnes had told you the identity of the other two shareholders you would be still getting knowledge of the identity of the other two shareholders?---If Barnes was telling me who two shareholders were, yes, I would be getting acknowledgment of who two shareholders were, yes.
So the outcome would be the same. That is, if you don't understand that, it means if Barnes had told you you would have found out who they were, if Rowe [sic.] had told you you would have found out who they were. They both amount to getting knowledge of the other - - - ?---No, I'd say they're - I'd say they're different.
Either?---Yes.
How are they different?---Because Roe - one would have been in writing to Roe at the time of execution of the agreement, and one would have been Barnes telling me at some point in time, could have been anybody else. He could have made it up. They are different.
...
So you wouldn't have obtained knowledge of the identity of the shareholders if Mr Barnes had told you who the shareholders were?---I would have been very suspect and I would have queried it and gone back to David Roe and said, "I demand to see the written instructions".
So, are you saying that you were not given knowledge?---I didn't say that. You asked if they're the same and I'm saying they're not the same.
So in what circumstance would you have been suspicious that it was made up?---Well, one was in writing to be held with David Roe and then you're asking me would I just accept if Barnes named two people.
Named two people? The identities of the shareholders?---I would have been suspicious in entering into any relationship with two people that were thought of by Barnes at some point, when clearly there was a written procedure, which I accepted and signed with Barnes to say this is the way it should work.
Now - - - ?---And Roe instructed me on this, as well. So these were clear instructions on how it should work. So Barnes later on shows two people. I would like to know that they are the same two people.
But would you agree that clause 20(b) says it's Barnes who is lodging with Mr Roe the identity of the shareholders. That's the very first word of clause 20(b). It's Barnes who's giving him the identity to start with?---I agree. But we're talking of two different periods in time. One is at execution of this document, which is 26 May 2003 and now I think you're putting to me if that didn't occur would I have accepted an oral notification? And I'm saying I would go back to David Roe and ask him to verify.[1704]
1308 The Amcor parties submitted that this evidence given by Mr Holihan, to the effect that Barnes could have been making up the names he communicated to him is 'implausible and disingenuous',[1705] particularly when viewed against the background of the evidence set out in his witness statements filed in the principal proceeding and the evidence given before Vickery J. In the principal judgment, Vickery J summarised the relevant evidence about the disclosure to Mr Holihan of the identity of the beneficial owners, as follows:
Disclosure to Holihan of Identity of Other Shareholders
[1025] As earlier observed, clause 20(b) of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement provided a mechanism for the identities of the other parties to be disclosed to Holihan "at such time within one (1) year from the date of this agreement as Barnes shall specify".
[1026] In or about May or June 2004, the precise date being uncertain, some 12 months after entry into the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, Holihan said that he raised the question with Barnes as to the identity of the other shareholders. This was information he said he felt he was entitled to.
[1027] The conversation was said by Holihan to have proceeded as follows:
[1028] Holihan said that in May or June 2004, "12 months after the First Shareholders Agreement had been signed" he felt "entitled to know who the other shareholders were". He said that Barnes informed him in a conversation at this time who the others "were supposed to be", namely Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster, "but they decided not to proceed".
[1029] This version of events accords broadly with the evidence of Barnes who said that it was not until May 2004 (cf. Holihan's evidence that this took place in May or June 2004) that he informed Holihan that each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic had decided, some 12 months earlier in May 2003, not to proceed with their acquisition of an interest in the ACB Business. As they still worked for Amcor, Barnes advised Holihan that they didn't want their intentions or their participation in the ACB business known and for this reason the confidentiality clause was included in the First Shareholders Agreement, however they were now prepared to divulge their identities to Holihan. Barnes also said as to this: "[It]...probably took about a year to resolve before I spoke to Holihan."
[1030] Barnes proposed that they return to the 50/50 split between them as had been originally agreed. Barnes was still employed by Amcor at this time.
[1031] Holihan said that on receipt of the advice from Barnes as to the identity of the other shareholders, he was "shocked when Barnes told [him] who the other people were".
[1032] Holihan said that he was annoyed that Barnes had not told him that these persons never took an interest in the ACB business and that his shareholding was effectively 50% and not 20%. He said further as to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, that he was nevertheless "pleased as it meant that [he] still had a 50 per cent shareholding in the Achilla Business which was performing well at the time as opposed to owning 20 per cent of an entity that to date had not evolved".[1706]
1309 Further, the Amcor parties also point to the Holihan parties' pleaded defence to their change of control allegations, observing that the defence effectively consists of bare denials and the response that 'if there was a change in control as alleged, [Achilla] did not permit, allow or suffer that change in control.' Further, the particulars provided simply stated that 'if the change in control occurred, it was the unavoidable consequence of the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.'[1707]
1310 The Amcor parties' submission appears to misunderstand the evidence that Mr Holihan gave, at least to the extent that it is said to suggest that when Mr Barnes informed him of the identity of the beneficial owners, Mr Holihan was of the view that Mr Barnes could have been making them up. Mr Holihan did not say that he did not believe what Mr Barnes told him in June 2004. Rather, his evidence was that he did not accept that there was no difference between Mr Barnes telling him their names and the receipt of the written notification from Mr Roe disclosing the names. He then sought to explain what that difference was.
1311 In any event, in my view, the finding made by Vickery J, that by 30 June 2004 Mr Holihan was advised as to the identity of the other shareholders, is definitive and leaves no scope for this Court to now entertain any debate or speculation about the authenticity of the information conveyed to Mr Holihan.
Was the communication by Barnes effective to constitute notification for the purposes of clause 20(b)?
1312 The Amcor parties submit that the medium of the disclosure (whether directly through oral advice by Mr Barnes to Mr Holihan, rather than through the mechanism established in clause 20 for disclosure by Mr Roe to Mr Holihan on instructions from Mr Barnes) is not relevant. They say that 'the evidence is clear and unequivocal' in that 'Holihan did have the identity of the beneficial shareholders disclosed to him - at the election or decision of Barnes - and the parties continued to perform the agreement, therein ratifying the disclosure and the remaining terms.'[1708]
1313 The Holihan parties, on the other hand, contend that the conversation between Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan was inadequate or ineffective to constitute notification under or for the purposes of clause 20(b). In essence they rely on the fact that the parties reached agreement as to the manner in which any disclosure of the identity of the other beneficial owners was to be made, such that there was a written procedure, which Mr Holihan accepted and signed with Mr Barnes, stating the way it would work.
1314 I do not accept the Holihan parties' contention. In the principal judgment, Vickery J records that the conversation between Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes took place in circumstances where Mr Holihan raised with Mr Barnes the question of the identity of the other shareholders, on the basis that he felt this was information to which he was entitled. In those circumstances, he must be taken to have determined not to follow the procedure set out in clause 20 for eliciting their identities but instead to raise the matter himself directly with Mr Barnes. In my view, having sidestepped the formal procedures for obtaining the identity of the beneficial owners, Mr Holihan cannot now resort to the formalities of the agreement and insist on compliance with them, so as to render ineffective the disclosure made to him.
1315 However, the fact that an informal method was employed rather than the formal one established in clause 20 (disclosure to Mr Holihan by Mr Roe on instructions from Mr Barnes), may give rise to some difficulty or tension in the construction or interpretation of companion provisions.
What is the operation and effect of clause 20(e)?
1316 Once disclosure was made, the provisions of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, and in particular clause 20, were enlivened. As Mr Holihan did not exercise the option to withdraw from the agreement, by giving notice in writing to Mr Barnes pursuant to clause 20(d),[1709] the provisions of clause 20(e) commenced operation, as follows:
(e) If Holihan does not notify Barnes pursuant to subclause (d) hereof:-
(i) Holihan will be deemed to ratify this agreement and to accept each representative as a party;
(ii) each representative shall become a party to this agreement and be bound by its terms from the date of the notice given under subclause (b) hereof; and
(iii) each representative must forthwith ratify this agreement in writing.
1317 Accordingly, under clause 20(e)(ii) (and subject to clause 20(e)(iii)), each of Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic were to become a party to the agreement, and be bound by its terms, 'from the date of the notice' given under subclause 20(b), being the written notification lodged by Mr Barnes with Mr Roe, and were to forthwith ratify the agreement in writing. It is unclear whether the relevant 'notice' date is the date of the written notification lodged by Mr Barnes with Mr Roe, or whether it is a reference to the date that clause 20(b) provides Mr Barnes 'shall specify' as the date for Mr Roe to disclose those identities to Mr Holihan.
1318 As the written notification lodged by Mr Barnes with Mr Roe is not in evidence, neither its date, nor the date Mr Barnes specified therein for disclosure to be made, can be ascertained. In the case of the written notification, clause 20(b) states that 'Barnes has lodged written notification of the identity...' with Mr Roe, thereby suggesting that the written notification was dated on or before 26 May 2003 when the agreement was made. If 26 May 2003 were regarded as the operative date, that would produce the result that the representatives of the beneficial owners were bound by the terms of the agreement from its inception, even though they were not actually parties to it on that date, and had not ratified the agreement. However, under the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, they had separately agreed 'to be bound by and adhere to the terms of the agreement as if they were parties to it.'[1710] If, on the other hand, the relevant date were interpreted as being the date specified by Mr Barnes, then it would be a date within one year from the date of the agreement, and thus logically on or before 26 May 2004. In my view, as a matter of construction, the latter of the two dates is more likely to be the relevant date.
1319 The Court's finding that even though the procedural mechanism for disclosure set out in clause 20 was not followed, the conversation between Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan was nevertheless adequate or effective to constitute notification by Mr Barnes to Mr Holihan of the identities of the shareholders for the purposes of clause 20(b), gives rise to some difficulties when applying other clauses of the agreement, such as clause 4. It will be recalled that clause 4(c) of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement specified the voting rights in general meeting of Messrs Holihan and Barnes prior to disclosure being made, and clause 4(d) provided for the acquisition of voting rights by each beneficial owner once disclosure was made, as follows:
...
(c) Until a disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b) hereof Holihan and Barnes shall each have one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
(d) As each disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b) each beneficial owner will, on disclosure, acquire voting rights proportionate to its beneficial ownership in each of the companies, subject to Holihan's rights under subclause 4(e).
(e) The shares held by Holihan's company must carry not less than one third of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
1320 In my view, clause 4 is to be construed against the background of clause 20, and in light of the procedure set out for disclosure, and in particular the requirement in clause 20(e)(iii) that each representative of a beneficial owner must forthwith ratify the agreement in writing. I interpret the latter requirement as being one that is necessary to be completed in order to communicate to Mr Holihan that the representative accepts he or she is bound by the terms of the agreement and to enliven the rights of the beneficial owner.
1321 It follows that in circumstances where the procedural mechanism for disclosure set out in clause 20 has not been adhered to, and an informal process of notification has been adopted and acquiesced in by the parties to that agreement but without notice to the beneficial owners who will be affected by it, the provisions of clauses 4(c) and 4(d) must be interpreted so as to ensure that the construction arrived at is one that accords commercial sense, and is not productive of any unfairness to the representatives of the beneficial owners. In my view, it is implicit in clause 4(d) that the acquisition of voting rights by the representatives of the beneficial owners will only take effect once the representative has ratified the agreement in writing, as required by clause 20(e)(iii).
1322 The Amcor parties interpret clause 20(e)(ii) as operating by reference to the date which Vickery J found Mr Holihan had been advised as to the identity of the other shareholders, namely by 30 June 2004. In their written closing submissions on liability, the Amcor parties contend:
[452] As set out above each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic automatically became parties to the 26 May 2003 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement upon the disclosure of the beneficial shareholders to Holihan.
[453] Upon becoming parties to the 26 May 2003 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement (by 30 June 2004) each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic acquired and assumed the rights, powers and interests as set out in that agreement. The terms of these rights and powers were considerable, paramount to the constitution of the companies, held individually not jointly. They vested in those individuals the power and capacity to influence and make the decisions about each of ACB Purchaser's and Achilla's financial and operating policies.
[454] That is, the vesting of the powers as set out in the 26 May 2003 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, in each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in May or June 2004 constituted a change in control in each of ACB Purchaser and Achilla for the purpose of clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement.[1711]
1323 As will be apparent, however, they submit that once the information was communicated to Mr Holihan, each of Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic 'automatically' became a party to the agreement, and was bound by its terms, 'from the date of the notice' given under clause 20(b).
1324 In the Amcor parties' oral closing, Senior Counsel submitted that back in May 2003, when the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement was signed and executed, the group of five executives received their 80 per cent shareholding interest.[1712] But, it was said that upon disclosure to Mr Holihan in June 2004, the group of five 'automatically acquired' many more rights and powers including the veto rights conferred under clause 10, the voting rights, the right to become directors, and automatically they became parties to the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.[1713] Further, Senior Counsel contended, the group of five ratified that agreement by signing their own deed, which was the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, that had attached to it the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.[1714] In their written closing submissions, the Amcor parties elaborated upon the position they contended for, as follows:
Each of Hodgson Barnes Mihelic Sangster and Bayley had on 26 May 2003 executed their own deed (Ex H6) which expressly referred to the shareholder agreement entered into by Barnes and Holihan at Recital or Fact A and then provided that each of them "agreed to be bound by and adhere to the terms of the [26 May 2003 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement] as if they were parties to it." The ratification had been provided. It must otherwise be deemed or inferred as having been provided.[1715]
1325 The relevance of the date of disclosure is that in the event that Mr Holihan did not notify Mr Barnes that he wished to withdraw (and thereby was deemed under clause 20(e)(i) to have ratified the agreement), and subject to ratification by the representatives of the beneficial owners under clause 20(e)(iii) (discussed below), clause 3.2 enabled any of the representatives of the beneficial owners to require that they be appointed as a director of ACB Co Purchaser. Further, clause 4(c) provided that until disclosure was made, Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes each had one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies, but upon disclosure, clause 4(d) provided that each beneficial owner acquired voting rights proportionate to its beneficial ownership in each of the companies.[1716]
1326 The evidence suggests that the operation of clause 20(e) was enlivened in about July 2004 (i.e., at the conclusion of the period of 30 days specified in clause 20(e)(i)), at the point where it became clear that Mr Holihan, having been notified of the identity of the other shareholders by Mr Barnes, did not notify Mr Barnes that he wished to withdraw from the agreement. Thereupon, clause 20(e)(i) 'deemed' Mr Holihan to ratify the agreement and to accept each representative as a party. In the case of the representatives, however, there was no deeming provision. Rather, clause 20(e)(ii) provided for 'each representative to become a party to the agreement and be bound by its terms' from the date of the notice given under clause 20(b), and clause 20(e)(iii) required that 'each representative must forthwith ratify this agreement in writing'. Furthermore, each of the beneficial owners, as parties to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, had undertaken by clause 2 of that deed that upon disclosure of the identity of any of the shareholder companies pursuant to clause 20(b), 'each such shareholder company and its representative must ratify the agreement and deliver to Holihan written form of ratification in such form as he may require.' Accordingly, each of them must be taken to have known that ratification was required to be communicated to Mr Holihan.
1327 In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how the signing of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed by the group of five, which apparently took place in May 2003, could be construed or interpreted as satisfying in July 2004 or thereabouts the requirement that they 'must forthwith ratify this agreement [i.e., the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement] in writing.' In my view, when the provisions of paragraphs (i) and (iii) of clause 20(e) are compared, it is clear that in the case of the representatives there was to be no 'deemed' ratification and clause 20(e)(iii) required ratification by each representative to be manifested by the taking of an active step that was documented in writing.
1328 In their oral submissions, the Amcor parties also submitted that 'the dividend evidence' is important to show the ratification of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by the representatives of the beneficial owners. The 'dividend evidence' referred to is a reference to evidence that was canvassed before Vickery J in the principal proceeding, as set out in paragraphs [1096] to [1123] of the principal judgment and in particular the findings recorded at paragraphs [1119] to [1123].
The Holihan parties object to the dividend argument being raised
1329 The Holihan parties took issue with this 'new' argument being raised for the first time in closing submissions. In their closing oral submissions in reply, Counsel for the Holihan parties objected strenuously, submitting that this dividend argument was not pleaded or opened in any real sense on the hearing of the counterclaim and cross-claim, nor was it the subject of cross-examination with Mr Holihan.[1717] Rather, they say, it was mentioned for the first time in the Amcor parties' oral closing when they sought to rely upon statements made by Vickery J regarding dividends paid out of Achilla, as a basis for this Court to conclude that some control was being exercised by the executives, other than Mr Barnes, over the agreement. In any event, the Holihan parties contend that no such inference can be drawn from his Honour's findings concerning the dividend evidence as those findings are not binding.
1330 In the principal judgment, when Vickery J set out the evidence and reasoning in support of his findings as to why he did not accept the former executives' cases as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, his Honour made reference to what he called the 'dividend evidence'. In essence, as summarised by his Honour, the dividend evidence was relevantly that as at 30 June 2004, the ACB Business enjoyed a net profit of $1,067,000 after tax. In October 2004, a dividend of $749,000 was declared by LeoRose to the shareholders in the ACB Business. The dividend was declared as to 20% in favour of Holihan Investments (equating to a sum of $149,000) and 80% in favour of Mr Barnes's company, Astra (equating to a sum of $600,000). The paperwork recording these dividend declarations was prepared by Mr Holihan's accountants, Wheeler Grenfell, who were first retained by Mr Holihan in June 2004. By letter dated 2 July 2004 Wheeler Grenfell confirmed their instructions from Mr Holihan that the Holihan interests held 20 per cent of 'ACB' and the remaining 80 per cent was held by Astra Pty Ltd, being the holdings equivalent to those set out in the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement. In cross-examination, Mr Barnes admitted that a dividend was declared and actually paid by LeoRose to Astra at that time in the sum of $600,000, being 80% of a total dividend of $749,000 declared by LeoRose to shareholders in the ACB Business. Mr Holihan denied that the dividends were ever formally declared but he nevertheless acknowledged that, of the $749,000 proposed dividend, Holihan Investment's share was $149,800, which was exactly 20 per cent of $749,000. In cross-examination, he admitted that the declaration of a dividend from LeoRose was effected on 30 October 2004 and that there was an actual payment to Holihan Investments of $149,000. He conceded that this payment represented 20% of the $749,000 (rounded to $750,000) but said this did not represent his equity position with LeoRose. Vickery J found this explanation from Mr Holihan to be implausible and he did not accept it.[1718]
1331 His Honour also noted that in cross-examination, Mr Holihan conceded that a decision to declare a fully franked dividend of $300,000 was made in the following year, in about September or October 2005. Mr Holihan also conceded that he signed the minute of LeoRose declaring this dividend in October 2005, however the minute of the resolution was backdated to read on its front page '30 October 04'. The purported effect of this transaction on its face was to substitute a fully franked dividend of $749,000 payable by LeoRose to its shareholders in October 2004, with a fully franked dividend of $300,000. As Mr Holihan explained it, this came about not because he had asked Wheeler Grenfell to re-do the dividend statements and minutes for the previous year, but in order to reflect a 50/50 split in the equity positions between himself and Mr Barnes through their respective companies, Holihan Investments and Astra. In cross-examination, Mr Holihan said that Wheeler Grenfell had initially proposed a dividend reflecting an 80/20 arrangement, but that at a meeting with Mr Gair of that firm on or about 3 October 2004, he had stated that the ownership of LeoRose was in fact 50/50 between Holihan Investments and Astra. His Honour observed that if Mr Gair had received those instructions in October 2004, Wheeler Grenfell would, in all likelihood, have prepared a balance sheet for Holihan Investments to reflect ownership of 50% of LeoRose. But the balance sheet for Holihan Investments, which was finalised on or about 17 December 2004, did not achieve this. His Honour also observed that Mr Holihan's assertion that he gave these instructions to Wheeler Grenfell in October 2004 is inconsistent with the fact that in October 2005 he instructed that firm to create a new minute of resolution of LeoRose, which was backdated to October 2004, to declare a total dividend of $300,000, such that $150,000 was declared payable to each of Holihan Investments and Astra, reflecting a 50/50 ownership. His Honour noted that the preparation of this backdated minute occurred at around the time of the execution by Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan in October 2005 of the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, which was also backdated from October 2005, but in this case to 28 May 2003.
[1119] I find that the backdating of dividend statements in October 2005 did not reflect the true ownership structure of the ACB Business as at October 2004. It created a wrong impression that, on 30 October 2004, LeoRose declared a total dividend of $300,000 to Holihan Investments and Astra reflecting 50/50 ownership. In fact, as at 30 October 2004, the dividends that were declared and paid out reflected the true 80/20 ownership which existed at that time.
[1120] It was not until September 2006, that Wheeler Grenfell produced further backdated documents for Holihan, to reflect the position that LeoRose had been owned 50/50 between Astra Corporation and Holihan Investments since September 2003. These documents consisted of share certificates relating to shares issued in LeoRose to Holihan on 26 May 2003 and 5 September 2003 and documents recording declarations by Holihan that the shares he held in LeoRose were held on trust for Holihan Investments and Astra, again reflecting a 50/50 ownership structure. Holihan subsequently executed those backdated documents.
[1121] I do not believe Holihan when he asserted that, as at late October 2004, through his company Holihan Investments, he held a 50 per cent share in the ACB Business together with Barnes who held the other 50 per cent through his company Astra.
[1122] The Dividend Evidence, which concerned the period from July 2004 to October 2004, is inconsistent with the Defendants' account that the 80/20 arrangement was cancelled on 28 May 2003 and replaced with a 50/50 arrangement, and that Holihan was informed of this fact in May or June 2004.
[1123] I find that as at late October 2004 Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster continued to hold between them an 80% share in LeoRose and by this means ultimately each held a 16% interest the ACB Business.
1333 The Amcor parties rely upon these findings made by Vickery J[1719] as demonstrating or evidencing a ratification of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by the representatives of the beneficial owners. The Court was not taken to the underlying 'dividend evidence' that was before his Honour at the trial of the principal proceeding, and for the most part it was not tendered or sought to be tendered as evidence on the counterclaim and cross-claim, and Mr Holihan was not cross-examined about it. However, before the trial commenced, and pursuant to paragraph 6 of Orders made by the Court dated 18 May 2015, the Amcor parties did inform the Court and the Holihan parties that they proposed to rely upon passages of, and findings made by, Vickery J in paragraphs [1101], [1105], [1107[, and [1119]-[1123] of the principal judgment. Those paragraphs are not the subject of an issue estoppel ruling, but I regard them as falling within the category of paragraphs to which the Court may have regard. Accordingly, that is the course I propose to adopt.
1334 The Amcor parties' oral submission did not descend into any detail as to what it was in these findings about the dividend evidence that they contend demonstrates or evidences the ratification of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by the representatives of the beneficial owners of the trust shares. For example, the dividend evidence referred to by Vickery J does not show Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster taking any part, let alone an active part, in either the declaration of the dividends or their backdating that might be said to manifest an acceptance on their part of the provisions of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. The findings made by his Honour to the effect that 'as at 30 October 2004, the dividends that were declared and paid out reflected the true 80/20 ownership which existed at that time' and 'that as at late October 2004 Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster continued to hold between them an 80% share in LeoRose and by this means ultimately each held a 16% interest the ACB Business' are consistent with the executives respectively representing beneficial owners of the trust shares. But the companies represented by the beneficial owners attained their status as beneficial owners of the trust shares in May 2003, when the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement was executed, and achieving that status was not dependent upon ratification by them of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.
1335 Further, the payment of dividends or 'profit distributions' were provided for in clause 6 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, as follows:
The net profits of each of the companies available for distribution after payment of operating expenses shall be applied:-
(i) first, in paying such reasonable directors' fees as the parties may determine;
(ii) second, towards such retentions and reserves as the parties may agree; and
(iii) third, in payment of preferential dividends
(iv) fourth, in payment to the shareholders by way of dividends proportionate to their shareholdings.
1336 His Honour's finding that 'as at 30 October 2004, the dividends that were declared and paid out reflected the true 80/20 ownership which existed at that time' appears to reflect the regime established under clause 6(iv) of the agreement, but it does not evidence any ratification of the agreement by the representatives of the beneficial owners.
1337 Other conduct by a representative of a beneficial owner, for example the giving of a notice to Mr Holihan and/or Mr Barnes requiring that he or she be appointed as a director of the holding company under clause 3.2, might be capable of being interpreted or construed as constituting ratification of the agreement in writing for the purposes of clause 20(e)(iii). But I was not referred to any material of that kind. When Mr Holihan was cross-examined about when he became the sole director and secretary of each of Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser, he answered in each case that it was from May 2003, and that he has remained the sole director and secretary through to the present day.[1720]
No ratification by the representatives of the beneficial owners
1338 In the circumstances, I am not satisfied there is evidence that at any point after Mr Holihan was deemed to have ratified the agreement, any of the representatives of the beneficial owners ratified the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement in writing, as required by clause 20(e)(iii). The fact that each of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed expressly required that the representatives of the beneficial owners must ratify the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, and in the case of the deed that such ratification be in writing, suggests that it was a matter of importance. Viewed objectively, the requirement that there be ratification in writing operates as a mechanism for binding the representatives of the beneficial owners to the terms of the agreement made as between Messrs Barnes and Holihan, recording their acceptance that they are so bound, and informing Mr Holihan accordingly, in circumstances where each of the representatives of the beneficial owners was not a signatory to the agreement as executed. In the absence of evidence of such ratification having taken place, I do not accept that Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic became parties to the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement on or about 30 June 2004 by reason of the disclosure to Mr Holihan of the identity of the other beneficial owners.
1339 I note that in the principal judgment, Vickery J found as follows:
[1086] I find that the two Agreements of 26 May 2003, being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were entered into and carried into effect by Holihan, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and interests associated with them and continued to be given effect to, until at or around October 2005.
1340 I ruled that this 'finding' does not give rise to an issue estoppel, and I do not regard it as having any binding effect for the purposes of the issues raised for determination on the counterclaim and cross-claim. The 'change of control' issue was not raised before his Honour (because the Amcor parties did not issue their cross-claim until mid-2013) and Vickery J did not address (or seemingly have occasion to address) the requirement for ratification of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by the representatives of the beneficial owners.
1341 In my view, the starting position is as described by his Honour at paragraph [1147] of the principal judgment, to the effect that:
[1147] I am satisfied that the former managers (the defendants) acquired their interests in the ACB Business from about 26 May 2003 crystallizing upon the sale of the ACB Business on 2 June 2003 and settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 June [sic.] 2003. ....
1342 The Amcor parties accept that the group of five executives acquired their 80 per cent shareholding interest in May 2003, when the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement was signed and executed.[1721] Accordingly, the group of five executives held that 80 per cent interest at the time when the Second Sale Agreement (or any implied supply agreement) was made, namely in June 2003. It does not follow, however, that because the group of five executives held that interest on and from May 2003 they had the ability to exercise any voting rights attached to the shares. In my view, unless and until their identities were disclosed to Mr Holihan under clause 20(b) and written ratification took place by them, clause 4(c) continued to operate.
Conclusion re the first alleged change of control
1343 Clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement requires that for so long as the Charge is operative, ACB Co Purchaser 'may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor'. In my view, there was no 'change in control' in the relevant companies as a result of or by reason of Mr Holihan being informed as to the identity of the representatives of the other beneficial owners on or about 30 June 2004. Rather, in the absence of evidence of any ratification by them, clause 4(c) continued to operate such that it remained the case as at 30 June 2004 that Messrs Barnes and Holihan each had 'one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.' Furthermore, in the absence of ratification, the veto rights under clause 10 that the Amcor parties rely upon were not enlivened. It follows that I am not satisfied that after disclosure was made to Mr Holihan, the beneficial owners relevantly had any capacity in a real and practical sense to determine the important decisions of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives.
1344 In the circumstances, there was no relevant 'change' in capacity to determine the companies' financial and operating policies and Mr Holihan continued to be bound to manage the companies pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. It follows that ACB Co Purchaser did not, within the meaning of clause 16.4 'permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor.'
The second alleged change of control: October 2005
1345 The Amcor parties contend that a second change of control occurred in October 2005, when Messrs Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic divested themselves of the interests which they had acquired since 26 May 2003.[1722] They plead that by a written agreement between Messrs Holihan and Barnes executed in October 2005, (that is, the '28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement'), and which only came into operation upon its execution in October 2005, each party made promises regarding the affairs of ACB Co Purchaser including the re-arrangement of the beneficial ownership of shares in that company.[1723] They also rely upon findings made by Vickery J in the principal judgment at paragraphs [1085] and [1086] and the shareholding structure set out in Appendix B of the principal judgment.[1724]
1346 Relevantly, his Honour's findings were as follows:
[1085] I also do not accept what Holihan and Barnes said to the effect that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, which provided for a 50/50 split between them, although in fact executed in or about October 2005, reflected an earlier oral agreement made by those parties on or about 28 May 2003.
[1086] I find that the two Agreements of 26 May 2003, being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were entered into and carried into effect by Holihan, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and interests associated with them and continued to be given effect to, until at or around October 2005.
1347 The 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement is expressed to be 'made 28th May 2003' between Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes but it was not executed until October 2005.[1725] In similar fashion to the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, recorded the following matters, describing them as 'FACTS':
(A) Each of ACB (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 670) [ACB Co Purchaser] ('the holding company) Australian Corrugated Cox Co Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 581) [Achilla] ("the trading company") LeoRose Pty Limited (ACN 104 857 247) ("the shareholding company") Holihan Investments Pty Limited (ACN 104 851 247) (Holihan's company) and Astra Corporation Pty Limited (ACN 104 784 438) ("Astra") is a company registered under the Corporations Act.
(B) Holihan ("the director") is the sole director of each of the holding company, the trading company and the shareholding company.
(C) Barnes is the sole director of Astra.
(D) The holding company owns all of the shares in the trading company.
(E) The shareholding company owns all of the shares in the holding company.
(F) Holihan owns all of the issued shares in the shareholding company. Of those he holds:-
Five shares as trustee for Holihan's company
Five shares as trustee for Astra.
(G) Barnes is the sole director and shareholder of Astra.
(H) The holding company owns the goodwill, plant and equipment of the corrugated packaging supply business known as Australian Corrugated Box Co at 159 to 163 Newton Road Wetherill Park ("the business"). The trading company conducts that business.[1726]
1348 The 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement contained clauses dealing with matters such as 'Paramountcy over constitution', 'Term', 'Directors', 'Shareholding', 'Company finance', 'Profit distributions', 'Directors and Directors Decisions', 'Personal commitments', 'Actions prohibited without consent', 'Removal of Directors', 'Restraint on Transfer of Shares', 'Sale of Shares', 'Valuation of Shares', 'Payment and Resignation', 'Regulatory provisions', 'Restraints after sale of shares', 'Guarantees and Contributions to losses', 'Confidentiality', 'Terms' (interpretation of), 'Dispute Resolution', 'Service' and 'Binding effect'.
1349 Relevantly, clause 4 of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement provided that:
During the continuance of this agreement unless agreed otherwise by both parties:-
(a) Holihan and/or Holihan's company [Holihan Investments] must beneficially own not less than fifty per cent (50%) of all shares issued in the shareholding company [LeoRose],
(b) Barnes and/or Astra must beneficially own not less than fifty per cent (50%) of all shares issued in the shareholding company [LeoRose],
(c) The shareholding company must beneficially own all the shares in the holding company [ACB Co Purchaser],
(d) The holding company must beneficially own all the shares in the trading company [Achilla].
(e) Holihan and Barnes shall each have one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
1350 Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend that, pursuant to the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, the shareholdings in the companies were re-arranged with the result that:
(a) Mr Holihan or Holihan Investments came to hold beneficially fifty per cent of the shares in LeoRose, being the owner of all of the issued shares in ACB Co Purchaser.
(b) Mr Barnes or Astra came to hold beneficially fifty per cent of the shares in LeoRose.
(c) Each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic and/or their respective shareholding companies gave up or lost their beneficial interests in LeoRose.[1727]
1351 In this regard, the Amcor parties rely upon findings made by Vickery J in the principal judgment at paragraphs [1132] and [1133], as follows:
[1132] I am satisfied that as part of the rearrangement of the business interests, Holihan and Barnes executed the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement at or around October 2005 pursuant to which the 80/20 split of the ACB Business, which to that time had been in place, became the 50/50 arrangement. As part of this arrangement, the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was back dated to 28 May 2003, and more than likely, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was marked "cancelled".
[1133] Further, in October 2005, Barnes and Holihan, through their companies, rearranged the 80/20 dividend payments to 50/50. In so doing they "topped up" the amount that had been received by Holihan in 2004 from $149,800 to a total of $374,500. At the same time, $374,500 was paid to Astra. The payments effected in October 2005 are "recorded" in documents created by Wheeler Grenfell that are backdated. The evidence shows they were not created until October 2005 although they are dated October 2004.
1352 The Amcor parties plead that as a result of 'the rearrangement of the business interests', each of the beneficial owners represented by Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic respectively:
(a) lost its interest in LeoRose, and therefore in ACB Co Purchaser as well as Achilla;
(b) lost the ability to direct or influence the behaviour of ACB Co Purchaser;
(c) further or alternatively, lost the ability to control ACB Co Purchaser within the meaning of section 50AA(1) of the Corporations Act;
(d) lost the ability to direct or influence the behaviour of Achilla;
(e) lost the ability to control Achilla within the meaning of section 50AA(1) of the Corporations Act.[1728]
1353 Accordingly, the Amcor parties contend that there was relevantly both a 'change of control' and a 'change of ownership' in each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla within the meaning of clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement (and the equivalent term in the implied supply agreement), and ACB Co Purchaser did not obtain the consent of APA for those changes in control.
Evidence given by Holihan about the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement
1354 In his witness statement in reply and on the cross-claim, Mr Holihan states:
Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement
[59] I am a party to a second agreement with Barnes dated 28 May 2003 which provides for a 50/50 split of shares between us (Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement) [CB4/1411].
[60] There was no change in the operation or management of the business in October 2005.
[61] At all material times during the term of the Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, I:
(a) held one half of the voting rights in general meetings of ACB Purchaser and Achilla;
(b) was the sole director of ACB Purchaser;
(c) was the sole director of Achilla;
(d) served as the managing director of each of ACB Purchaser and Achilla;
(e) made all significant decisions relating to the day to day running of ACB Purchaser and Achilla. Other decisions were made by staff who ultimately reported to me; and
(f) made all decisions relating to the finances and financial policies of ACB Purchaser and Achilla.
[62] Barnes never made any decision in relation to the running of Achilla's business.
Involvement of Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster
[63] Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster never had nor exercised any voting rights in ACB Purchaser or Achilla.
[64] I never spoke to Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic or Sangster about the operation of ACB Purchaser or Achilla at all.
[65] Had any of them or Barnes tried to direct me in the running of the business, its finances or operations, I would not have followed that direction.
1355 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan acknowledged that the agreement was signed in October 2005[1729] but he says it was dated 28 May 2003 because Mr Roe suggested that date as the effective date, it being around the date when the others - being Mr Barnes's partners - pulled out.[1730] Mr Holihan identified Mr Barnes's partners as being Messrs Sangster, Hodgson, Mihelic and Bayley. He added that there were entities involved with them and sometimes their wives also.[1731] He said:
My understanding is that they cancelled their agreements on 26 May 2003 at the time that - the time that, um, Jim Hodgson's boss, Brown, Peter Brown, had intended to resign. Notified that he was leaving Amcor, and so Hodgson, Bailey, Mihelic and Sangster cancelled their agreement they had with Barnes.[1732]
1356 However, it will be recalled, Vickery J did not accept that the agreements had been cancelled in May 2003. Rather his Honour found that 'Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest until about October 2005 when the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement was entered into and backdated to 28 May 2003 and the original 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was endorsed "cancelled".'[1733]
1357 As will be apparent, the Holihan parties' case is effectively that, notwithstanding entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, there was no change in the operation or management of the business in October 2005.
Was there a change in October 2005 in the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions?
1358 The Amcor parties refer to Vickery J's finding that:
[1149] In the present case, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest in the ACB Business until about October 2005 when by their conduct, and with the knowledge of Holihan, mutually abandoned or abrogated the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, and with that, renounced any rights or entitlements under it.[1734]
They contend that the 'incontrovertible and binding fact on the Court therefore is that this constituted a second change of control in the Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser companies.'[1735]
1359 I ruled that Vickery J's finding does not give rise to an issue estoppel but that it was a finding to which I would have regard as relevant background. I do not accept that his Honour's 'finding' of itself constitutes or manifests a change of 'control'. That question can only be answered by looking at the factual position before and after October 2005 and assessing it against the criteria set out in section 50AA. Indeed, the Court of Appeal, in their reasons allowing the Amcor parties to introduce the change of control amendments into their defence and to issue their cross-claim, recognised that his Honour's findings as to 'interest' did not inhibit the Court in dealing with the question of 'control' . In their reasons, Hansen and Tate JJA stated:
[55] The Amcor parties do not, by the amendments, seek relief on a basis that is inconsistent with the findings. The issue sought to be raised is one of control in connection with the contractual change of control provisions. That is not the same as the question of 'interests', as to which the judge has made findings. The question of control would be determined in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances which include the 'interests' found in the trial judgment. It is a distinct point which has not been litigated. The findings in the Principal Judgment would not 'inhibit' the parties or the Court in this exercise; rather, they are, or are sought by the applicants to be, part of the facts with regard to which the Court would conclude on the issue of 'control'. But the issue is a new one and technically the parties are not bound by them for this purpose; that was common ground. Of course, insofar as the respondents are concerned, the findings could only 'inhibit' them if they wanted to run a case contrary to them, as it is open to them to do. But the case on control is a different case. If the amendments are made, at a trial the respondents can go into evidence and ask questions as to the practical matter of control and matters that bear on that, without controverting the findings on 'interest'. On the matter of calling witnesses, and the former employees giving evidence, we accept the applicants' submission that those who relevantly gave evidence at the trial will need do so again on the Achilla Counterclaim. As to giving contrary evidence, the fact is that the evidence would be directed to a different point. Moreover, no evidence has been placed before us (or before the judge) that would indicate likely prejudice in this respect. In the circumstances, we consider that the matter of 'inhibition' did not warrant refusal of the application.[1736]
1360 Turning then to the exercise of looking at the factual position as at October 2005 and assessing it against the criteria set out in section 50AA, it is useful to compare (side-by-side) the management arrangements that were established (and in operation) under the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement with those introduced in October 2005 by the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement.
Directors
Holihan shall be the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose
Holihan shall at all times be a director of each company
The number of directors of ACB Co Purchaser cannot exceed six at anytime
If a vacancy occurs, the remaining directors can by unanimous resolution appoint a replacement director.
Directors
Holihan shall be the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose
Holihan shall at all times be a director of each company
- - -
If a vacancy occurs in the office of director of any of the companies, the remaining directors can by unanimous resolution appoint a replacement director.
Managing Director
Holihan shall at all times be the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose
Holihan shall serve and be employed as full-time managing director of each of the companies during the continuance of this agreement on terms and conditions as agreed from time to time.
Managing Director
Holihan shall at all times be the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose
Holihan shall serve and be employed as full-time managing director of each of the companies during the continuance of this agreement on terms and conditions as agreed from time to time.
Directors and Directors Decisions
Clause 8:
(a) Decisions relating to the day to day running of the companies will be made by Holihan.
(b) Decisions of the directors, other than in respect of the day to day running of any of the companies, will be made by a simple majority vote of directors.
(c) No decisions can be made pursuant to subclause 8(b) at a meeting unless Holihan is present.
Directors and Directors Decisions
Clause 8:
(a) Decisions relating to the day to day running of the companies will be made by Holihan.
(b) Decisions of the directors, other than in respect of the day to day running of any of the companies, will be made by a simple majority vote of directors.
(c) No decisions can be made pursuant to subclause 8(b) at a meeting unless Holihan is present.
Shareholding
Recited FACTS:
ACB Co Purchaser holds all of the issued shares in Achilla
Holihan Investments owns twenty (20%) percent of the shares in ACB Co Purchaser
LeoRose holds the remaining eighty (80%) percent of the shares in ACB Co Purchaser as trustee
Holihan Investments holds all of the shares in LeoRose as trustee for Astra (Barnes's company)
Barnes is the sole shareholder of Astra. All the shares in Astra are held by another company, in which ten (10) shares are issued, of which Barnes holds two (2) shares beneficially and the other eight (8) shares are held on trust.
Shareholding
Recited FACTS:
ACB Co Purchaser holds all of the issued shares in Achilla
- - -
LeoRose holds all of the issued shares in ACB Co Purchaser
Holihan owns all of the issued shares in LeoRose. Of those he holds:-
Clause 4:
(a) Holihan Investments must own not less than twenty (20%) percent of all shares issued in ACB Co Purchaser, and
(b) ACB Co Purchaser must beneficially own all the shares in Achilla.
(c) Until a disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b), Holihan and Barnes shall each have one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
(d) As each disclosure is made pursuant to clause 20(b) each beneficial owner will, on disclosure, acquire voting rights proportionate to its beneficial ownership in each of the companies, subject to Holihan's rights under subclause 4(e).
(e) The shares held by Holihan Investments must carry not less than one third of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.
Restraint on Transfer of Shares
Clause 13:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution of any of the companies, unless otherwise agreed in writing by all parties and all shareholders, no transfer shall be permitted of any party's shares unless all his shares in each of the companies are transferred at the same time.
Restraint on Transfer of Shares
Clause 13:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution of any of the companies, unless otherwise agreed in writing by all parties and all shareholders, no transfer shall be permitted of any party's shares unless all his shares in each of the companies are transferred at the same time.
Sale of Shares
Clause 14:
(a) No shares in any of the companies [ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose] can be transferred without the consent of the beneficial owners of all other shares in each of the companies.
...
Sale of Shares
Clause 14:
(a) No shares in any of the companies [ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose] can be transferred without the consent of the beneficial owners of all other shares in each of the companies.
...
Company finance
Clause 5:
(a) The parties must ensure that each of the companies has sufficient working capital to conduct its business in accordance with any business plan adopted by the directors.
(b) Such working capital shall be funded from (in order):-
(i) firstly external borrowings by the company, or
(ii) secondly loans by the shareholders to the company in the proportions in which they own their shares, or
(i) thirdly loans by shareholders other than in such proportions on terms agreed in writing with lender shareholder(s).
(c) Each company shall provide such security for external borrowings as it is able so to do and as is reasonably required to satisfy the requirements of any financier.
(d) If any of the companies cannot provide sufficient security as is required in proportion to their respective shareholdings in that company. If any shareholder's shareholding in the company increases or decreases during the term of the loan so secured the obligation of each shareholder to provide security shall vary accordingly.
(e) Any decision of any of the companies to meet funding requirements by means other than referred to in this clause must be by unanimous resolution of all shareholders.
Company finance
Clause 5:
(a) The parties must ensure that each of the companies has sufficient working capital to conduct its business in accordance with any business plan adopted by the directors.
(b) Such working capital shall be funded from (in order):-
(i) firstly external borrowings by the company, or
(ii) secondly loans by the shareholders to the company in the proportions in which they own their shares, or
(i) thirdly loans by shareholders other than in such proportions on terms agreed in writing with lender shareholder(s).
(c) Each company shall provide such security for external borrowings as it is able so to do and as is reasonably required to satisfy the requirements of any financier.
(d) If any of the companies cannot provide sufficient security as is required in proportion to their respective shareholdings in that company. If any shareholder's shareholding in the company increases or decreases during the term of the loan so secured the obligation of each shareholder to provide security shall vary accordingly.
(e) Any decision of any of the companies to meet funding requirements by means other than referred to in this clause must be by unanimous resolution of all shareholders.
Profit distributions
Clause 6:
The net profits of each of the companies available for distribution after payment of operating expenses shall be applied:-
(i) first, in paying such reasonable directors' fees as the parties may determine;
(ii) second, towards such retentions and reserves as the parties may agree; and
(iii) third, in payment of preferential dividends
(iv) fourth, in payment to the shareholders by way of dividends proportionate to their shareholdings.
Profit distributions
Clause 6:
The net profits of each of the companies available for distribution after payment of operating expenses shall be applied:-
(i) first, in paying such reasonable directors' fees as the parties may determine;
(ii) second, towards such retentions and reserves as the parties may agree; and
(iii) third, in payment of preferential dividends
(iv) fourth, in payment to the shareholders by way of dividends proportionate to their shareholdings.
Actions prohibited without consent
Clause 10:
No party shall do or acquiesce in doing any of the following in relation to any of the companies [Achilla, ACB Co Purchaser, and LeoRose] without the prior agreement of each other party:-
(a) Signing of any cheque or authority on the company's bank account save in accordance with the present mandate or as otherwise agreed PROVIDED THAT Holihan is empowered to incur and pay liabilities on behalf of the trading company up to an amount of $50,000.00 in respect of any individual transaction and
FURTHER PROVIDED THAT this restraint does not relate to acts in performance of any agreement between the trading company and Amcor.
(b) Pledging of the company's credit or entry into any contract (save in the ordinary course of business) for a period in excess of sixty (60) days or involving a liability or acquisition or sale of any assets other than in the ordinary course of business.
(c) Any borrowing.
...
(k) Transfer or transmission of any shares in the company save as herein provided.
...
(s) Any other act outside the usual course of business of the company.
(t) Any act which, were the shares held by the parties respectively separate classes of shares in the company, would be a variation of the class rights of the relevant shares.
Actions prohibited without consent
Clause 10:
In respect of any of the companies [ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose], no party shall do or acquiesce in doing any of the following in relation to any of the companies without the prior agreement of each other party:-
(a) Signing of any cheque or authority on the company's bank account save in accordance with the present mandate or as otherwise agreed PROVIDED THAT Holihan is empowered to incur and pay liabilities on behalf of the trading company up to an amount of $500,000.00 in respect of any individual transaction and
FURTHER PROVIDED THAT this restraint does not relate to acts in performance of any agreement between the trading company and Amcor.
(b) Pledging of the company's credit or entry into any contract (save in the ordinary course of business) for a period in excess of sixty (60) days or involving a liability or acquisition or sale of any assets other than in the ordinary course of business.
(c) Any borrowing.
...
(k) Transfer or transmission of any shares in the company save as herein provided.
...
(s) Any other act outside the usual course of business of the company.
(t) Any act which, were the shares held by the parties respectively separate classes of shares in the company, would be a variation of the class rights of the relevant shares.
1361 The side-by-side comparison reveals that notwithstanding the rearrangement of the business interests effected upon entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement in October 2005, and the fact that each of the beneficial owners represented by Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic respectively lost its (or their) interest in LeoRose (and therefore in ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla as well), and Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes each became beneficial owners as to fifty per cent, there was no 'change of control'.
1362 In the first place, clause 13 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement provided that no shares in any of the companies (ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose) could be transferred without the consent of the beneficial owners of all other shares in each of the companies. There is no evidence of any such consent having been provided. This tends to confirm that none of the beneficial owners represented by Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic respectively had ratified the agreement or were bound by it.
1363 Secondly, both before and after entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement in October 2005, Mr Holihan was and remained the sole director of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and LeoRose. As the sole director, and as managing director, he was (and remained) empowered by clause 8 to make decisions relating to the day to day running of the companies (cl 8(a)), and to make 'decisions of the directors, other than in respect of the day to day running of any of the companies' (cl 8(b)).
1364 Thirdly, in the case of the 'veto rights' upon which the Amcor parties rely, I have found that in the absence of ratification they did not apply to (and were not exercisable by) the beneficial owners represented by Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic respectively. That entails the consequence that, before October 2005, the doing of any of the matters set out in clause 10 effectively required only the agreement of Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, and it remained the case after October 2005.
1365 In my view, notwithstanding the apparent change in the shareholding arrangements, it is not clear that with entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement there was any effective change in the identity of the person(s) or entities having the capacity in a real and practical sense to determine the important decisions of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives. It follows, that I am not satisfied that there was relevantly any change of control in either ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla by reason of entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement.
Issue 15**: Was ACB Co Purchaser obliged to inform APA of any change of control?**
1366 Given the findings above that there was no change of control in May/June 2004 or in October 2005 it is not necessary to determine this issue. Nevertheless it is useful to record the arguments advanced by the parties lest the matter go further.
1367 The Holihan Parties accept that, under clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement (or any implied supply agreement), ACB Co Purchaser was obliged to inform APA of any change of control.[1737] They say that is because ACB Co Purchaser was required to obtain the consent of the 'Vendor' before permitting, allowing or suffering a change of control, and it would have been impossible to obtain that consent without notification.[1738]
1368 The Holihan parties take issue, however, with the notion advanced by the Amcor parties that there could be a breach of the Second Sale Agreement by merely failing to inform the Vendor of a 'proposed' change of control. They submit that a failure to seek consent did not, of itself, give rise to a breach of the Second Sale Agreement. Rather, they say, any breach of clause 16.4 was relevantly constituted 'by the act of permitting, allowing or suffering the change of control without the prior written consent of the Vendor (and that consent, of course, could not have been obtained without first informing the Vendor of the change of control proposed).'[1739] Further, they say that there was no contractual requirement for any notification to include information about the new 'controller(s)' but they recognise that a failure to do so may have led to the Vendor refusing its consent.
1369 The parties also disagree about whether, on the proper construction of clause 16, the Vendor would be entitled to terminate only the clause 12 supply agreement under clause 16.1 in the event of an un-remedied breach of the change of control provisions. The Amcor parties submit that in the event of a change in control, the Vendor could exercise the right under clause 16.1 and terminate only the clause 12 supply agreement, whereas the Holihan parties contend that it could not.
1370 This divergence in view between the parties raises the question of the proper construction of clause 16.4 on the one hand and clauses 16.1 and 16.3 on the other. For convenience, the suite of relevant provisions in clause 16 is set out below:
16. Termination and Option
16.1 Termination
The Vendor may terminate rights and obligations which arise under clause 12 immediately (or with effect from any later date that it may nominate) by written notice to the Purchaser if:
(a) the Purchaser or Achilla breaches any provisions of this Deed and, if it can be rectified, that breach has not been rectified within 20 Business Days' written notice to the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be);
(b) a controller, administrator, liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy or similar person is appointed to the Purchaser or Achilla or to any of their respective property or any step is taken to do so;
(c) the Purchaser or Achilla resolves to enter into, or enters into, any moratorium, arrangement, compromise or composition with any of its creditors, other than in the ordinary course of its business;
(d) the Purchaser or Achilla is or is presumed to be insolvent or applies to be deregistered;
(e) anything having a substantially similar effect to any of the events specified in paragraphs (b) to (d), inclusive, of this provision happens to the Purchaser or Achilla under the law of any jurisdiction; or
(f) the Purchaser or Achilla ceases or threatens to cease to carry on all or a substantial part of its respective business, or disposes or proposes to dispose of all or a substantial part of its respective business involving Products.
16.2 Termination by Purchaser
The Purchaser may terminate this Deed immediately by service of a written notice on the Vendor if any of the acts, omissions or events referred to in clauses 16.1(a) to 16.1(e) (inclusive) (with all necessary changes) are done by, or occur to or in relation to, the Vendor.
16.3 Option for default
In the alternative to its right to terminate this Deed [sic.[1740]] pursuant to clause 16.1, the Vendor may at its sole option acquire the Purchaser's Business upon written notice to the Purchaser (or, if appropriate, any person referred to in clause 16.1(b)), at the exercise price set out in clause 13.2, or at fair market value, whichever is lower. If there is any dispute as to such exercise price or valuation, it will be determined in accordance with clause 6.5 (with any necessary changes).
16.4 Change of control of Purchaser
(i) The provisions of this clause 16.4 apply only for so long as the Charge remains in force or is not discharged.
(ii) The Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor, which consent may be delayed or withheld by the Vendor in its sole and absolute discretion. If notwithstanding there is a change in control of the Purchaser or Achilla without the Vendor's consent, then the Vendor may at its sole option provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days of written notice. If at the end of that period the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) has not returned to the status quo ante, the Vendor may thereafter -
(a) terminate this Deed on further 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser and Achilla; and
(b) acquire the Purchaser's Business, for the consideration and as referred to in clause 16.3 (with any necessary changes).
16.5 Rights under charge
The Vendor's rights under clauses 16.3 and 16.4 are independent of and without prejudice to its rights under or pursuant to the Charge.
1371 The Amcor parties contend that the obligation embodied in the first part of clause 16.4(ii) is an obligation to inform ACB Co Vendor before any change of control takes place. They submit that under clause 16.4(ii), as a matter of construction, before any change in control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla is effected, ACB Co Purchaser was obliged to advise ACB Co Vendor of the proposed change in control, and to provide it with full details. That is, they contend ACB Co Purchaser was obliged to inform ACB Co Vendor of the identity of the parties or entities that would be assuming the control, and what was the nature and extent of that control, in order that ACB Co Vendor could make an informed decision as to whether or not it would consent. And the Vendor could delay or withhold consent 'in its sole and absolute discretion'.
1372 In my view, it is implicit in the requirement that the Purchaser 'may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor' that the Purchaser must give notice to the Vendor before it permits, allows or suffers a change in its control or the control of Achilla. But that does not render the failure to give notice a breach of clause 16.4. A 'breach' is only manifest at the point where it is demonstrated that the Purchaser has 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed] a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor'. In circumstances where a change in control has taken place without the Vendor's consent having been obtained, the Vendor may, at its option, proceed with the cure notice procedure. If, however, the Vendor does not wish to pursue that option, the question arises whether it may avail itself of the rights under clause 16.1 and proceed to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement.
1373 Clause 16.1 would permit the Vendor to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement by written notice to the Purchaser if it were clear that the Purchaser or Achilla has breached a provision of the Second Sale Agreement - here, relevantly, the Vendor would contend for a breach of clause 16.4(ii), by ACB Co Purchaser having (allegedly) 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed] a change in its control or the control of Achilla' without first obtaining the written consent of ACB Co Vendor - and, the right to terminate could be invoked where the breach has not been rectified within the period of 20 Business Days' written notice given to the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be). That is, notice of the breach must have been given and the breach must not have been rectified within the period of 20 Business Days before the Vendor can proceed to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement. And in the alternative to its right to terminate pursuant to clause 16.1, the Vendor may, at its option, acquire the Purchaser's Business pursuant to clause 16.3.
1374 It is interesting to compare and contrast the relief available to the Vendor under clauses 16.1 and 16.3 in the case of breach, with that available to it under clause 16.4. As noted above, clause 16.4(ii) in terms acknowledges that a change in control of the Purchaser or Achilla may occur notwithstanding that the Vendor has not given consent, in which event the Vendor may at its sole option invoke the 'cure' notice provisions. Should the Vendor wish to do so, it must provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days of written notice, requiring the Purchaser to cure the change of control.[1741] If at the end of that period, the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may) be has not returned to the status quo ante - read in context, clearly a reference to the control position that applied before the relevant change of control took place - then the Vendor may terminate the Second Sale Agreement after having given a further 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser or Achilla and acquire the Purchaser's Business for the consideration specified in clause 16.3.
1375 Accordingly, it will be seen that where a change of control takes place without the consent of the Vendor, there are two contractual courses of action available to the Vendor:
1376 Under either of the available routes, it is clear that the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) must first be given an opportunity to return to the status quo ante or rectify the alleged breach before the Vendor exercises either the right to terminate the rights and obligations arising under clause 12 or the right to acquire the Purchaser's Business.
1377 It will be noted that clauses 16.1 and 16.3 are not expressed to be subject to clause 16.4, and clause 16.4 is not expressed to apply to the exclusion of clauses 16.1 and 16.3. The Holihan parties contend that if the Second Sale Agreement were interpreted so as to allow the two contractual courses of action or rights to have a concurrent operation, as I have found they do, then clause 16.1 could be used to avoid ACB Co Purchaser's rights under clause 16.4 (but none in particular were referred to), with the result that in the case of an un-remedied change of control, the Vendor could terminate the clause 12 supply agreement without paying any compensation.[1742] Accordingly, they contend that when interpreting clause 16, the general provision must give way to the specific provision,[1743] with the result that clause 16.1 does not respond to a breach of the change of control provision set out in clause 16.4(ii). Thus, they submit, it follows that a right to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement alone (as opposed to the entire Second Sale Agreement) could never arise in the event of an un-remedied breach of clause 16.4.
1378 I do not agree. In my view, when clause 16.4 is read in the context of the agreement as a whole, and particularly having regard to the whole of clause 16, it will be seen that the clause 16.4 remedy is a provision that is inserted for the benefit of the Vendor, to protect it but only for so long as the charge remains in force or is not discharged. In effect, it gives the Vendor the option to pursue the cure period provisions where a change in control has occurred without the Vendor's consent, and if the status quo ante is not restored, then it can proceed to terminate the Deed and acquire the Purchaser's Business. But if the Vendor does not wish to pursue the cure period provisions it is not foreclosed from exercising the rights available under clauses 16.1 and/or 16.3. Under clause 16.1, the Purchaser or Achilla would have 20 Business Days available to rectify the breach whereas under clause 16.4(ii) a cure period of only 10 Business Days is available to the Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) to return it to the status quo ante, although the Deed may not be terminated until a further period of 10 Business Days has passed. In this sense, the clause 16.4(ii) provision is more favourable to the Vendor while its financing is at risk, in terms of the Vendor being able to restore the status quo ante in a short time frame or take steps to terminate the Deed and acquire the Purchaser's Business in a timely way.
Issue 16**: If APA had been aware of the breach, would APA have terminated the implied supply agreement, the Second Sale Agreement, or clause 12 of each of those Agreements?**
1379 This issue is predicated on the (contested) assumption that the Court finds that ACB Co Purchaser 'permitted, allowed or suffered' a change of control in breach of the Second Sale Agreement. Here again, given the findings made above that there was no change of control in May/June 2004 or in October 2005 it is not necessary to determine this issue. Nevertheless it is useful to record the arguments advanced by the parties lest the matter go further.
(a) Would ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla have cured the breach within the time allowed by any cure notice?
(b) If there was an un-remedied breach of clause 16.4, did APA have the right to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement without purchasing the business as would be required by clause 16.4(ii)(b)?
(c) If there was a right to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement alone, would APA have exercised that right?
Would ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla have cured the breach?
1381 In the Amcor parties' defence to counterclaim and as repeated in the cross-claim, APA alleges that if it had become aware of the changes of control in either of June 2004 or October 2005, it would have provided ACB Co Purchaser with a cure period of 10 business days under clause 16.4(ii)[1744] and would then (relying on the breach, which it says could not have been rectified[1745]) pursuant to clause 16.1, have terminated the rights and obligations arising under clause 12; further or alternatively it would have terminated the implied supply agreement for repudiation and issued proceedings for damages.[1746] Further APA says, in the premises, Achilla would not have been able to prosecute its claims under the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession.[1747]
1382 Under clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement, the cure period that must be given is '10 Business Days of written notice' and if, at the end of that period, the status quo ante has not been restored, then the Vendor may terminate the Deed on a further 10 Business Days' notice and proceed to acquire the Purchaser's Business.
1383 Mr Holihan gave evidence as to what he would have done if he had received a notice under clause 16.4. In his reply witness statement, he said:
Notice under Sale Agreement
[66] ACB Purchaser never received any notice from ACB Vendor pursuant to clause 16.4(ii) of the Sale Agreement (whether in relation to ACB Purchaser or Achilla), nor from APA under the Implied Supply Agreement (Cure Notice).
[67] If ACB Purchaser had received a Cure Notice, I would have:
(a) caused ACB Purchaser and/or Achilla (as the case may have been) to challenge service of the Cure Notice on the basis that there never was a change of control of ACB Purchaser or Achilla. If necessary, I would have caused the relevant company or companies to seek urgent injunctive relief preventing ACB Vendor or APA from acting on any Cure Notice; and
(b) if, which I deny, there had been a change of control of ACB Purchaser and/or Achilla at the time of service of any Cure Notice, I would have:
(i) immediately caused ACB Purchaser to pay out the balance of the purchase price (as specified in clause 3.1 of the Asset Sale Deed) and seek the discharge of the Charge (as defined);
(ii) if necessary, caused ACB Purchaser to seek urgent injunctive relief for the discharge of the Charge before the end of the cure period specified in any Cure Notice; and
(iii) if necessary, written to all persons having control (which is denied) asking them to relinquish any control that they did have, so as to cure the change of control within the time specified in the Cure Notice.
1384 Further, he stated that at all material times 'ACB Purchaser had the funds available to it to pay out the balance of the purchase price' and 'to take legal action to protect itself'.[1748] Evidence of ACB Co Purchaser's capacity to pay the purchase price is to be found in the cash and trade debtors balances available to ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla on 30 June 2004, and on each of 30 June 2005 and 30 June 2006 (from which it can be inferred that the balances between those two dates would not have been substantially lower).[1749] That evidence was supported by the financial records of the two companies. Furthermore, Achilla could have made its funds available to ACB Co Purchaser via loans or dividends.
1385 In their written closing submissions, the Holihan parties observe that 'Mr Holihan's evidence about the willingness and capacity of Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser to pay out the purchase price if required was not challenged in any respect.'[1750] Further, they submit that 'given what would have been at stake if the Amcor Parties intended to exercise a right to terminate at the relevant times, there is no reason for the Court not to accept Mr Holihan's testimony.'[1751]
1386 The Holihan parties contend that once the purchase price was paid, ACB Co Purchaser was entitled to a release of the Charge, and clause 16.4 would cease to operate (or the Chargees would cease to be entitled to rely on a breach of clause 16.4 for so long as they refused to release the Charge).
1387 In the alternative, the Holihan parties contend that the Court should infer that if:
(a) it was open to the Amcor Parties to issue a cure notice in June 2004; and
(b) for some reason the Holihan Parties could not or would not have remedied the breach by paying the purchase price and so obtaining a discharge -
then they would have procured arrangements with the former executives to return control of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla to the position that applied prior to the alleged changes of control.
1388 Further, the Holihan parties submit that if it were the case that the former executives held interests in ACB Co Purchaser that would have been endangered by the service of a cure notice and the prospect of a loss of same, then if Mr Holihan had approached them with 'a suggestion that entitled them to retain an economic interest in the ACB Business but lose any "control" that they enjoyed by reason of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Deed (e.g. by converting their shareholdings into non-voting interests and removing any entitlement to act as directors for so long as cl 16.4 remained operative)', then it follows that they would 'have taken any steps necessary to achieve that objective, because the alternative would be the loss of any economic interest that they might have had in the ACB Business.'[1752]
1389 The Holihan parties readily acknowledge that while Mr Holihan did not give evidence to this effect, because it could be no more than mere hypothesis, logic suggests it would be the sensible course. Further, they say, no adverse inference can be drawn from the absence of evidence from any of the former executives, in particular because none of them was in the same 'camp' as Mr Holihan and Vickery J had accepted that Mr Holihan relevantly only had dealings with Mr Barnes (and only on the basis of his understanding that Mr Barnes had Amcor's imprimatur to take an interest in the business), and that he did not know of the involvement of the other former executives until June 2004. The Holihan parties submit that none of the former executives, each of whom had given evidence at the trial before Vickery J, would have any interest in giving evidence at the trial of the cross-claim. That is, they submitted, in circumstances where his Honour had found the evidence the former executives gave not to be true, were they to give further evidence on the cross-claim they would risk exposing themselves to cross-examination in respect of their earlier testimony and the prospect of them giving evidence that would contradict the earlier findings made by Vickery J.
1390 Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that it follows that if ACB Co Vendor (in June 2004) or APA (in October 2005) had issued a valid cure notice, the Holihan Parties would have taken such steps as were necessary to cure it, with the effect that any breach of the obligation to notify would not have given rise to any right to terminate the Second Sale Agreement or any part of it.
The rights available to the Vendor in the event of an un-remedied breach of clause 16.4
1391 In their defence to counterclaim, and as repeated in their cross-claim, the Amcor parties plead that had they been notified of the changes in control they would have terminated the supply agreement, being the rights and obligations arising under clause 12 and/or the clause in the implied supply agreement equivalent to clause 12.[1753] Accordingly, the Court need only consider the question of whether there was a right to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement, and leave the remainder of the Second Sale Agreement intact.
1392 As was noted above, I have found that if it were demonstrated that the Purchaser had breached clause 16.4(ii), for example, by ACB Co Purchaser having 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed] a change in its control or the control of Achilla' without first obtaining the written consent of ACB Co Vendor, then ACB Co Vendor could, in circumstances where the breach has not been rectified within the notice period of 20 Business Days, invoke the right under clause 16.1 to terminate only the clause 12 Supply Agreement.
Even if a right under clause 16.1 were available to the Vendor, if there was an un-remedied change of control, would APA have exercised that right?
1393 As noted above, APA pleads that if it had become aware of the alleged changes in control in June 2004 or October 2005, it would have exercised the right under clause 16.1 to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement. The Amcor parties adduced evidence from Mr Darryl Roberts in respect of the first change of control in June 2004, and from Ms Julie McPherson concerning the second change of control in October 2005.
Evidence concerning the first alleged change of control in June 2004
1394 Mr Roberts was a former Amcor employee, having commenced with Amcor in the Containers Packaging Division in November 1994. Between 1994 and mid 2004 he was responsible for Amcor's Metals division in its various configurations. ('Metals' was a division of APA in the same way as 'Corrugating' (or AFP) was a division of APA.) He reported to the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, initially Mr Peter Brown (January 2000 to September 2003) and then Mr Peter Sutton (from September 2003).
1395 In his witness statement, Mr Roberts said that he was part of the senior executive group that included all who headed up the various divisions of Amcor Australasia, and that he attended 'Amcor Australasia Executive Group Meetings' and would review reports provided by the respective heads of division but 'did not have day to day involvement in the operations of other divisions such as the Corrugated/AFPA division or business.'[1754] During April to September 2004, Mr Roberts managed an internal project for Amcor, called 'Project Nxt', which focussed on reducing the overheads of all of Amcor Australasia's businesses.[1755] On 4 October 2004, he became the Group General Manager for AFPA, with a reporting line to Mr Sutton. However, when Mr Sutton left Amcor on 7 December 2004, Mr Roberts became the acting Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, a position he held until mid-July 2005. From there, he 'took over the fibre packaging business again, but on an expanded role.'[1756] Mr Roberts was made redundant with effect from 1 July 2008.[1757]
1396 Mr Roberts said that through his participation in the executive group he 'knew about the sale of the ACB Business in mid-2003 by one of APA's subsidiaries'[1758] to Mr Holihan and his companies. He said he may have seen a summary of the sale of business details but did not see the Second Sale Agreement itself.[1759]
1397 Mr Roberts also said that he had read the principal judgment of Vickery J and as a result learned for the first time of many of the matters recorded in his Honour's findings. In particular, Mr Roberts stated:
At no time in 2004 (or at any time until being advised of the findings in the Principal Judgment) did I know that:
(a) Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic or Sangster had each acquired an interest in or any rights in a company with which APA or any of its subsidiaries had ongoing trading relationships or agreements.
(b) Holihan knew by 30 June 2004 that his co-owners of the ACB Business were Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster.[1760]
1398 Relevantly, he stated that had he been told of any of these facts set out above and/or learnt of any request by Mr Holihan for consent from APA or its subsidiary for any of Messrs Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic or Sangster to acquire any interests and rights in Achilla or ACB Co Purchaser, he would have:
(a) Immediately discussed such with [his] fellow executives in the APA executive team (other than Hodgson).
(b) Ensured that Holihan was told we did not consent to Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley Mihelic and/or Sangster acquiring any interests in and or rights in the Holihan companies called ACB Purchaser or Achilla.
(c) Taken steps to ensure the relevant Amcor entity terminated the ongoing trade relationships with those entities.
(d) Taken steps to ensure the employment of Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster was terminated if they were still employees at the time [he] learnt of the facts.
(e) Ensured that we sought legal advice as to such other steps that APA or ACB Vendor or Amcor could take in order to protect its rights and recover any loss suffered as a result of this conduct.[1761]
1399 The Holihan parties contend that the action referred to in subparagraph (a) above is of no moment, and in respect of those referred to in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d), the position is that Mr Roberts simply did not have the power to ensure that they would have happened, as he frankly conceded under cross-examination, although he said that he 'would have kept going right through to the Amcor board, like a dog with a bone'.[1762]
1400 During cross-examination, Mr Roberts effectively acknowledged that his witness statement was prepared for him and then presented to him for approval:
[MR MAIDEN:] .... Did you put this statement together yourself Mr Roberts or was it presented to you for you to approve?---It was presented to me for my proof.
So they're not your words?---No, I'm not a lawyer.[1763]
1401 Later in the cross-examination, Mr Roberts said that he was asked to give evidence about what he knew in 2004 and that in preparing his statement, he was shown Vickery J's findings and asked 'did [he] agree or disagree with them'. He said '[b]ut in 2004, I knew nothing about these arrangements and that was the purpose of my witness statement, which I'll stand by.'[1764] He agreed that he was not asked to turn his mind to whether or not he should include other matters as well.
1402 The substance of the evidence given by Mr Roberts under cross-examination was that from the moment he took over as acting Managing Director of Amcor Australasia on 7 December 2004, his job was to focus on running the business, keep the factories working, deal with the customers and ensure that product was being delivered. The process concerning the Anton Piller orders was being managed by Amcor's external solicitors, and Ms McPherson, Amcor's Group General Counsel, was also heavily involved in that aspect once she came on board in mid-April 2005. Mr Roberts said that in late November 2004, during the period following the Anton Piller searches and the review by the external solicitors of the information seized, he disobeyed instructions and glanced at the cover sheet of a document that was located in the data room established by the external solicitors. He said that the document he saw had the name of ACB on the front of it and when he flipped it over he saw the names of the five former Amcor executives on it and the reference to beneficial shares. He said he did not read the document and did not know whether or not it had been signed but added that 'at that stage I became suspicious about the fact that there were probably other - other shareholders, ah, in the, um, in the ACB deal.'[1765] Mr Roberts said that later he was severely chastised for having looked at that document, because the Anton Piller orders precluded Amcor people seeing any information seized, and he was told to 'shut up and not mention it ever again.'[1766]
1403 Mr Roberts also gave evidence to the effect that in mid-2006, while he was the group general manager of AFPA, he was aware that Mr Lou Lachal had had a meeting with Mr Holihan at which Mr Holihan disclosed that Mr Barnes had a 50 per cent interest in the ACB Business, and he said they were very shocked to hear that Mr Barnes was Mr Holihan's business partner.[1767]
1404 Under cross-examination, Mr Roberts was challenged about the evidence he had given as to what steps would have been taken if he had been aware of the change of control:
[MR MAIDEN] You were still the group general manager of AFPA in mid-2006 when Mr Holihan told Mr Lachal about Mr Barnes' interest?---Yes.
So it wasn't at all out of your hands, you were the person who called the shots in that business?---Lou Lachal was as well, so was - so was Julie McPherson and so were - - -
And if you were so willing to take the steps that you say in paragraph 13 of your witness statement in 2004 - - - ?---Look, mate, I - listen, I - - -
Let me finish my question please; you're here to answer it. If you were so willing to take the steps that you said you would have taken in June 2004 when those circumstances came to your attention why didn't you do it in 2006?---I - I had had the discussion with every one of those people that I've talked about that - that if we could terminate it we should, and I was just told to butt out, I had information that I shouldn't have had, just get on with running the business and leave us to sort out the legals.
And that was the case in mid 2006 - - - ?---Correct.
- - - after Mr Lachal's - - - ?---Correct.
So despite Mr Lachal having been told that by Mr Holihan the business made a decision not to terminate the supply agreement?---The business didn't make the decision, it would have been - you'd have to have - you said you were going to hear from Julie McPherson, you should ask her that question, not me. I was told to run the business and butt out of all this legal stuff.
So somebody made a decision not to do it?---Sorry?
Somebody made a decision not to do it, not to try and terminate the supply agreement?---Well I don't know who that was, certainly wasn't me; if I could have, I would have.
I see. And what finally happened in the months leading up to - in September 2007 was that Amcor sued Mr Holihan and his companies not to terminate the supply agreement, but to in effect reverse the entire sale. That is, Amcor sued Mr Holihan to try and either get the business back or get the shares in the companies that owned the business. You're aware of that?---I do recall hearing that.
And that was done in September 2007 when there were only about nine months or ten months left to run on the supply agreement?---Yep.[1768]
1405 Mr Roberts also gave evidence, under cross-examination, that he was not involved in, or consulted about, the Deed of Accession that was entered into between the parties in March 2005:
[MR MAIDEN:] Now if I were to tell you that this is an agreement which provided among other things for the transfer of the right to receive a million dollar payment from Mr Holihan's businesses, you'd accept that this was an agreement that you would have to have agreed to before it was executed?
---Goodness me. I - well I wasn't involved in this of course, so - what date was this?
March of 2005?---Well I was - I wasn't - I wasn't consulted on it, I can tell you that now.
You would have been - - - ?---I know nothing about it.
You would have been - I'll give you another fact because it might be helpful. The transfer was within Amcor, that is the rights were being moved from one Amcor company to another - - - ?---I mean, I rest my case - - -
But the rights - - - ?---I would never have been consulted on that.
I see?---That's what I'm saying, the executives don't always get involved in these, um, corporate or statutory type transactions. And certainly not in the property deals.
No?---You're responsible for running the business and looking after customers.
And so Mr Lewis and Mr Clayton it's fair to say would have had the authority to execute that deed without reference to you, is that right?---Yes.[1769]
1406 Mr Roberts frankly acknowledged that the entirety of his witness statement was not his own words and that it was effectively prepared and presented to him to approve. But I did not understand that concession to mean that he had no involvement whatsoever in its preparation. The evidence Mr Roberts gave at trial, under cross-examination, demonstrates quite clearly that notwithstanding his role as acting managing director of Amcor Australasia from 7 December 2004, his job was to focus on running the business, keep the factories working, deal with the customers and ensure that product was being delivered. Mr Roberts was not involved in 'corporate or statutory type transactions' about the ACB Business, as is demonstrated by the fact that he was simply unaware of the entry into the Deed of Accession in March 2005. But it is unclear whether he was involved in important strategic operational decisions concerning the ACB Business. The evidence given conveys the impression that as a result of his failure to follow the instructions he was given concerning the documents the subject of the Anton Piller orders, he was effectively 'side-lined' and told to focus on running the business. Mr Roberts was not a director of ACB Co Vendor. The evidence shows that between June 2003 and March 2005 or thereabouts, when ACB Co Vendor and APA executed documents such as the Second Sale Agreement, the Charge and the Deed of Accession, they were entered into by Mr Lewis and Mr Clayton in each case. In my view, Mr Roberts is not qualified to give evidence concerning what ACB Co Vendor and/or APA would or might have done if they had become aware in May or June 2004 of an unauthorised change of control in ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla.
Evidence concerning the second alleged change of control in October 2005
1407 The Amcor parties called Ms McPherson, the Group General Counsel and Company Secretary for Amcor Ltd since 18 April 2005. She gave evidence about matters including what would have been done by way of response had the Amcor parties been aware in October 2005 that the five former executives had taken an interest in the ACB Business in 2003 and maintained it until October 2005, when Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic restructured their arrangements such that Messrs Barnes and Holihan became 50/50 owners of the ACB Business in October 2005.
1408 At the time Ms McPherson joined Amcor, it had for some months been involved in the proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in which the Anton Piller orders were obtained.
1409 In her witness statement filed in this proceeding, Ms McPherson described the exercise she had undertaken of reading the findings of Vickery J as recorded in the principal judgment concerning the execution and performance of the 26 May Holhan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed. She said she did not know the status of these agreements and facts until Vickery J delivered the principal judgment. Further, she noted other findings made by his Honour concerning the non-disclosure to Amcor by Messrs Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster or Mihelic of the fact that they had acquired an interest in the ACB Business, that during their employment with Amcor none of them had sought permission from Amcor to do so, and that the identity of the purchaser of the ACB Business and the ongoing trading partners were matters of importance to Amcor.
1410 Ms McPherson stated that she had also read the findings made in the principal judgment in respect of the structure of interests in the ACB Business in 2005, starting with the drafting of the further management agreement in 2005 (known as the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement) that was not executed until October 2005 or thereabouts, the rejection of the argument of Messrs Holihan and Barnes that that 50/50 Agreement reflected an earlier oral agreement made between them in around late May 2003, the rejection of their argument as to the alleged cancellation of the original 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, the re-structuring of their arrangements that was said to result in the 80:20 split becoming the 50:50 split between Messrs Barnes and Holihan, and finally the mutual abandonment or abrogation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, and with that, the renunciation by each of Messrs Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley of any rights or entitlement under it. Once again, she stated that she did not know the status of these facts until the principal judgment was delivered.[1770]
1411 Ms McPherson stated that at no time in 2005 or thereafter was she or anyone else at Amcor contacted by Mr Holihan seeking consent for a change in control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla. She then proceeded to address the hypothetical scenario, outlining what she would have done had she learned in October 2005 of the facts as found by Vickery J or been told of any request by Mr Holihan (or any other representative of Achilla or ACB Co Purchaser) for consent, as follows:
... I would have:
(a) immediately told my fellow executives in Amcor of the information and facts set out above;
(b) instructed Holihan that the Amcor Parties did not consent to the change of control in ACB Purchaser or Achilla should such request for consent have been received;
(c) given notice of the termination of clause 12 pursuant to clause 16.1 of the Second Sale Agreement; and
(d) sought further legal advice as to the recovery of damages and or what further action or steps the Amcor Parties could take including legal advice as to the termination of the Second Sale Agreement in its entirety and further steps as to the proceedings on foot at that time in the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Federal Court of Victoria [sic.].[1771]
1412 The Amcor parties submitted that while Ms McPherson had knowledge for the first time in April 2006 of the documents obtained via the Anton Piller searches, nevertheless she was seriously constrained in her use of that documentation because she was bound by a confidentiality undertaking not to use the documents.[1772] In that regard, at or about the time when Ms McPherson was sworn and adopted her witness statement, the Amcor parties also filed an affidavit from her sworn on 4 August 2015 deposing to the relevant constraints on disclosure of documents obtained under the Anton Piller orders.[1773]
1413 In her affidavit, Ms McPherson stated that following her execution of a confidentiality undertaking, approximately 60,000 Anton Piller documents were disclosed to her, which included the following pieces of information:[1774]
(a) an unsigned copy of the 80/20 Agreement between Holihan and Barnes (located in the home office of an accountant named John Vickery (Vickery));[1775]
(b) an unsigned copy of the Shareholders Deed between Hodgson, Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and their companies (also located in Vickery's home office);[1776]
(c) an undated draft letter titled 'Dear John' from Barnes to Vickery (located on the computer of Tania Selever in Barnes' home);[1777] and
(d) the 'Barnes Letter Information', a note that indicated that each of Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley had taken an interest in the Service Packaging Business, a business which had been sold to another Amcor employee, Ian Hottes, who prior to the sale had managed the business along with Amcor's displays business (located in the 'slack space' of a file on the computer of Tania Selever in Barnes' home).[1778]
1414 In addition, she mentioned that amongst the documents that Mr Barnes discovered on 28 July 2006 was a letter from him to Mr Hodgson on the letterhead of AFP Australasia dated 29 May 2003 together with a handwritten response from Mr Hodgson (which is undated but written on the letter from Mr Barnes) (the 'Dear Jim letter').[1779]
1415 The Dear Jim letter from Mr Barnes to Mr Hodgson, which was on the letterhead of 'Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia' and marked 'Private and confidential' stated:
Dear Jim,
Further to our recent discussions and following your personal advice regarding your participation in the sale of Australian Corrugated Box, I wish you to confirm details of our agreement.
I agree to delay my resignation until later next year to assist with the transition to the new business restructure.
As directed I will keep this agreement confidential and continue an arms length relationship with Craig Holihan until my departure.
Jim, I would like you to confirm that this represents an accurate summary of what has developed and given my undertakings that you are happy for me to continue in taking up an equity position in Australian Corrugated Box post the conclusion of the sale.
Regards,
Trevor Barnes.
1416 Endorsed on that letter, in handwriting (apparently that of Mr Hodgson), is the following:
Trevor - this is correct & confirmed.
Please ensure you remain @ arms length during this process & until you leave Amcor.
Regards
Jim Hodgson
Group G.M. AFPA
(signed J Hodgson)[1780]
1417 During cross-examination, Ms McPherson was taken to interrogatories dated 24 November 2010 that were administered by the Amcor parties to Mr Holihan in the principal proceeding.[1781] Reference was also made to the 'Answers to Interrogatories' given by Mr Holihan and filed on 8 April 2011[1782] with a view to testing the veracity of matters set out in her witness statement by reference to matters that she would have been aware of prior to the delivery of Vickery J's judgment.[1783] Ms McPherson confirmed that she was the person at Amcor who was responsible for providing instructions to Amcor's lawyers throughout the principal proceeding before Vickery J and at the trial of the counterclaim and cross-claim, and said that she would have been made aware of the interrogatories[1784] and Mr Holihan's answers to them.[1785] For convenience, the relevant questions and answers to which reference was made are set out below, in a side-by-side format.
(a) Did you sign the First 26 May 2003 Agreement? [i.e. the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement]
(b) If yes to the previous question, in what circumstances (when, where, in whose presence) did you sign it?
1(b) On or about 26 May 2003, at the offices of David Roe Solicitors in Main Street Gosford, NSW, in the presence of Trevor Barnes and David Roe.
(a) Did you sign the First 28 May Agreement? [i.e. the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement]
(b) If yes to the previous question, in what circumstances (when, where, in whose presence) did you sign it?
...
2(b) On or around October 2005, at Trevor Barnes' house at Rhodes in Sydney, in the presence of Barnes and Tanya Selever.
(e) Mr Mihelic,
to obtain the benefit of the ACB Business [i.e., the specialty business conducted at Wetherill Park] once it had been sold by ACB [ACB Co Vendor]?
1418 When Ms McPherson was taken to the answers to the interrogatories, she acknowledged that those answers were consistent with the position that Mr Holihan had presented when he gave evidence at the trial before Vickery J. She also acknowledged that she had received documents from 2006 through to 2011, including from the Anton Piller searches and information from the answers to interrogatories, but said that -
...it was not until the end of the trial when the judgment was received that findings were made as to exactly what the impact was. Because the position of the defendants was that the 80/20 didn't go ahead.
[MR MAIDEN:] Yes?---And justice - and in fact I think, I actually remember, it was right at the very end of the trial when we got access through the crime fraud exception to privilege, whatever it's called, that we got access to the dividends and the fact that Mr Holihan had been involved in backdating dividends and trying to undo what had happened to, to, you know, basically support if you like the position that it was always going to be 50/50. So my position has always, you know, my position as I said I thought every carefully about these words, is that I received a lot of information some of which I could use some of which I couldn't, and it was not until the findings of Justice Vickery that I was in a position to be able to understand exactly what had and what hadn't happened, because the version of events put forward by the defendants was not ultimately accepted by Justice Vickery.
I see. So what you say in paragraph 5 [of the witness statement] is until Justice Vickery delivered his judgment which is the final word if you will as to the legal effect of all of these facts, you weren't certain as to what had actually occurred?---That's correct.[1786]
1419 Ms McPherson continued to explain, under cross-examination, that even though an order was sought and made by Harper J of this Court on 4 April 2006 permitting her to have access to the Anton Piller documents once she had signed a confidentiality undertaking, it was not until after Vickery J delivered his judgment in March 2012 that she knew what the impact was of all these documents and arrangements.
1420 Ms McPherson accepted that the purpose for seeking an order permitting her to have access to the Anton Piller documents was to enable her to give instructions to Amcor's external solicitors so that they could file an amended defence and counterclaim in the (separate) Hodgson proceeding. In that amended pleading as filed, the Amcor parties alleged equitable fraud, in effect alleging that Mr Hodgson had taken a secret interest in a business being sold by his employer, and also that he had aided and abetted, counselled, procured and/or was knowingly involved in the acquisition of interests in the ACB Business by Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and/or entities associated with them and concealed such interests from the Amcor parties. Yet, under cross-examination, Ms McPherson agreed that, notwithstanding having pleaded those matters, the Amcor parties nevertheless did not take any steps at that time to try and terminate the supply agreement conferred under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
1421 Under cross-examination, Ms McPherson also confirmed that she was aware that in about early May 2006, when Mr Lachal was the managing director of Amcor Australasia, he had met with Mr Holihan and was informed by him that he and Mr Barnes were each the owner of 50 per cent of the ACB Business; and that Mr Barnes confirmed that advice to Mr Lachal when the three of them met subsequently at Melbourne Airport on 28 August 2006. Ms McPherson said that Mr Lachal had been shocked to hear this news and Ms McPherson agreed that she too was surprised when she learned from Mr Lachal that Mr Barnes had an interest in the business. She explained that the reason she was so surprised when Mr Lachal reported back was that 'it was the first time that there had been, to my knowledge, any concession, anyone other than Craig Holihan, owned the ACB Business.'[1787] She added she understood that Mr Holihan was at that time contending 'that it was always agreed that he and Trevor Barnes could own the business.'[1788]
1422 During the course of her cross-examination, Ms McPherson was asked several times, but in different ways, in effect why it was that she took no action under the Second Sale Agreement once she was made aware that the ACB Business was owned by Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes, in effect, 50/50. First, she said the advice she had received was not that there was a change of control in the ACB Business, but rather that from day one it was always agreed that Messrs Holihan and Barnes could own the business. Secondly, the 'Dear Jim' letter suggested that Mr Barnes had Mr Hodgson's permission to take an interest in the business. Thirdly, the information conveyed to Mr Lachal by Mr Holihan did not suggest a 'change' of control. She said that it was only once Vickery J had found that at the outset of the Second Sale Agreement Mr Holihan and the five former executives were actually the beneficial owners that there was any scope for a 'change of control' argument to be raised as at June 2004.
1423 When cross-examined about the specific relevance of the 'Dear Jim' letter, Ms McPherson gave evidence to the effect that the letter formed part of the information available to her, which taken as a whole explains why she did not take steps to terminate the Second Sale Agreement . She said that:
Now I would have been very happy...in 2006 to have put an end to the whole supply contract if I felt based on ... the legal advice at the time that we could have terminated the arrangements, but we did not. We did not have sufficient evidence was the advice at the time to...be certain that these executives had had covertly, including Mr Barnes, acquired an interest.[1789]
Now I wasn't in the business in...June 2004 so I can't give a view on what would or wouldn't have happened had someone known [about a change in control] in 2004. However I was there in October 2005...[1790]
1424 Despite confirming (above) that she was at Amcor at the time of the second alleged change of control, Ms McPherson effectively went on to say that even by 2007, when the Amcor parties commenced the proceedings against Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, they still did not consider that they had information suggesting there had been a change in control, because the position that had been advanced by Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan was that they had always owned the ACB Business 50/50. She said that it was only once the principal judgment was delivered that there were findings by Vickery J that:
on day one, there was an 80/20 shareholding between Holihan and the Hodgson executives and that in June 2004, there was a provision of information to Mr Holihan which, ..., revealed the secret partners and that as a result of that, then those secret partners had certain rights in relation to the business. ...but we ... didn't have that information until after the Vickery findings, because at no stage were the defendants providing any information in relation to that. They were denying it. They were denying the whole thing and they were restructuring to make out that ... their case of 50/50 was in fact what happened and that was not accepted. But until we had that information and Justice Vickery made his findings, I wasn't able to argue a change of control.[1791]
1425 Ms McPherson was also cross-examined about the evidence she gave in her witness statement as to what she would have done had she been aware of the particular facts in October 2005. She said words to the effect that she would have given notice of termination of clause 12 pursuant to clause 16.1 of the Second Sale Agreement and instructed Mr Holihan that the Amcor parties did not consent to a change of control. Counsel for the Holihan parties then put to Ms McPherson that she lacked the capacity to do either of those things without the imprimatur of the business:
[MR MAIDEN] Without the imprimatur of the business?---I had the imprimatur of the business to do whatever we could to get the business back. That was quite clearly what the business wanted. I mean there was clearly no point in going down this path if the business ... didn't really care if the thing ... came back or stayed on foot or whatever. The absolutely clear position from the business was that they wanted it back. And so the only issue that was preventing us doing that was having sufficient basis to achieve that. And so I had - - -
But terminating - I beg your pardon, I'll let you finish?---Sorry?
...---Okay, all right. So armed with that objective then had I known of that information in October 2005 then I can assure you that I would have caused the whole agreement to be terminated and to bring the proceedings that - that we ultimately brought. I would have - - -
That's based on your understanding that the business - I beg your pardon, that Amcor wanted the whole business back?---Yes.
And in fact that was the thrust of the proceeding that was brought to get the whole business back?---Correct.
In - - -
My question relates not to that?---Yes.
But to the narrower allegation, which is the one that the Holihan parties are faced with in the cross-claim, which is that Amcor would have terminated just the supply agreement and left the rest of the business - left the rest of the sale agreement on foot. The allegation in the cross-claim is clause 12 would have been terminated using clause 16.1 - - - ?---Can I just read the contract?
Do you need the contract? It's volume 4?---No, hang on. Yes, I've got it here, yep. Clause 12. Yes. No, that's correct. So what we would have done had I known of the facts determined by Justice Vickery in October 2005 is I would have terminated - and I'll use the terms, I would have caused 12 to be terminated using 16.1 because at that point I would have had the imprimatur of the business to do that. And at the same time I would have brought proceedings to get the business back. And the reason that I would have done that is that had I known of the facts in October 2005 and had the senior executives who were present within Amcor in October 2005 then the clear objective was that they would not have wanted to continue a relationship with the ACB business knowing that it wasn't just Mr Holihan but it was Mr Hodgson, Mr Barnes, Mr Mihelic, Mr Sangster - and I might have left one off again.
Mr Bayley?
HER HONOUR: Mr Bayley?---Mr Bayley. Thank you, Your Honour.[1792]
1426 Counsel for the Holihan parties focussed Ms McPherson's attention on the difference between the evidence she had given to the effect that 'Amcor wanted the business back' and she had the imprimatur from the business to do whatever was properly needed to do that, and the position now contended for on the cross-claim namely of taking steps to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement and leave the business on foot. She responded by accepting that they were different propositions, and added:
But we would not have kept the supply contract on foot for the very reason that ... Amcor did not want to have a commercial relationship with Mr Holihan and his companies being aware that Mr Hodgson and others were owners of the business. It would just simply have been untenable.[1793]
1427 Ms McPherson then continued to explain that, with the benefit of the Vickery J findings, it was clear that the whole transaction was tainted from day one, in the sense that 'Amcor did not have the benefit of an arm's length commercial negotiation' and had Amcor known of this 'Amcor would not have wished to continue the supply contract with Mr Holihan knowing that the whole transaction was tainted.'[1794] She said that 'the fact that you've only got Mr Barnes instead of the other four or five doesn't really change the position that the whole thing was tainted.'[1795]
1428 As to 'getting the business back', Ms McPherson said that in October 2005, Amcor was relying on her as to what actions they could take.[1796] But she accepted, under cross-examination, that in the hypothetical October 2005 scenario, acting by reference to Vickery J's findings, she personally could not have acted without reference to others. She said:
---Well I'm just saying - okay, so let's just unpack that a bit, so in terms of the information, if I've got the findings of Justice Vickery I can share them with the other Amcor executives, that has to be the proposition.
Yes?---So at the time that I'm doing this I've got the information, I have already been advised by the business that they want the business back.
Yes?---And therefore I could have caused with the consent of the business obviously which wanted it back, I would have caused formal documentation to be executed which would have given rise to that. Now I wouldn't have, I wouldn't have signed in my own right that information, but we could have caused that termination to take place by having the documents issued because that's what the business wanted.[1797]
1429 The tenor of Ms McPherson's oral evidence was that once Amcor became aware that there was a change of control, whereby in addition to Mr Holihan, Mr Barnes and/or the other former executives were also in effect parties to the Second Sale Agreement, then Amcor would wish to terminate the entire agreement, and not simply the supply agreement under clause 12. This position was at odds with what was stated in her witness statement at paragraph 11(c) where she said that she would have 'given notice of the termination of clause 12 pursuant to clause 16.1 of the Second Sale Agreement'. But when the proposition that Amcor would not have terminated the supply agreement without also terminating the Second Sale Agreement was put to her, Ms McPherson did not agree:
[MR MAIDEN] Now the question is, I'll put the proposition to you, it's not the case that the business would necessarily have instructed you to terminate the supply agreement and leave in place the rest of the sale if that was the option that was open to it. More likely the instruction would have been so you get the business back which is in fact what you eventually did?---No, I don't agree with anything that you've said there, and I go back to the earlier position is that based on the Tony Joyce information which was the first briefing that I had, and based on my own review of the ACB sale arrangements, and based on the view of the business, this whole contract was uncommercial.[1798]
1430 That is, Ms McPherson did not accept the Holihan parties' thesis, as put to her in cross-examination, that the Second Sale Agreement created commercial benefits for Amcor because it 'guaranteed a domestic market for raw paper and cardboard made from raw paper through ACB for the entire period of the supply arrangement'.[1799] Further, she said that notwithstanding findings to the contrary made by Vickery J, the Amcor parties regarded the whole contract as uncommercial and the business would not have wanted to persist with the arrangements because they were not favourable to Amcor but rather 'they were favourable to Mr Holihan and Mr Hodgson and his cohorts.'[1800]
1431 In their written submissions, the Amcor parties sought to explain why Mr Roberts, rather than the other executives, was called to give evidence. They submitted:
[552] Each of Lewis, Clayton, Lachal and Sutton have long since ceased to have any employment with Amcor.
[553] Sutton departed in December 2004 in difficult circumstances in connection with the ACCC investigations that lead to proceedings.
[554] Lewis, long now retired, when employed had company secretarial and statutory compliance functions. He was less senior than Roberts.
[555] Clayton and Lachal have also been retired for many years. Clayton retired in July 2008 Lachal retired in December 2008. They were not more senior than Roberts in mid 2004 and less senior to Roberts following his promotions in October 2004 and again in December 2004.
[556] As the Principal Judgment records Clayton was the GM of Finance and Operations based in Melbourne, not NSW where the operations with Achilla were based. His statement of 2011 recorded that in this role he was responsible for the Finance Group, Purchasing Group, Information Technology Services and the Shared Services Group, together with the capital approval processes and reviewing the operating results for Amcor Australasia. He was also Company secretary of Amcor Australasia and Lewis reported to him
[557] Lachal was the GM of Operations also based in Melbourne, not where the operations with Achilla were based. Between July 2001 to Nov 2004 Lachal was the GM of Operations and then from December 2004 to June 2005 he was the COO of Amcor.
[558] No inference of any kind can be drawn from calling Roberts (who was put in charge of AFP and APA in the second half of 2004) rather than these men.[1801]
1432 In the context of contesting the account put forward by the Amcor parties as to what they would have done had they known of the change(s) of control, the Holihan parties referred to actions taken by the Amcor parties in the period between late 2004 and July 2008, contending that they demonstrated 'a calculated effort to remove business from Achilla.'[1802] In particular, reference was made to evidence given about the request Mr Roberts (as Group General Manager of AFP) made of Mr Paul Ward (then General Manager, Sales & Marketing, AFP) in mid-2005 to investigate the contractual arrangements in place between AFP and the ACB Business.[1803]
1433 The Holihan parties had called Mr Ward to give evidence. Mr Ward said that he set about his investigative task by seeking advice as to what AFP's obligations were under the Second Sale Agreement, meeting with lawyers on 4 July 2005 and seeking information from Mr Crouch to facilitate him doing so.[1804] On 6 July 2005, Mr Ward sent an email to Messrs Beynon, Manser and Crouch in the following terms:
CONFIDENTIAL
Gents
If ACB and Amcor parted ways, could you source your work from other entities (or internally) and how quickly would you be able to do that. What would be the estimated impact on PBlT positive or negative. Please be careful how you couch questions if you need to source this information from other personnel.[1805]
1434 Relevantly, Mr Ward described the roles of each of them as follows. He said that 'from memory', Mr David Beynon was the Regional General Manager of New South Wales, with responsibility for 'total profitability, responsibility and accountability for the New South Wales business, including the specialty business in New South Wales at the time'.[1806] He added that if Amcor Displays was part of the specialty business, his responsibility would also have included Amcor Displays.[1807] Mr Ward said that he and Mr Beynon were 'on the same exec team.'[1808] As to Mr Manser, Mr Ward was 'pretty sure' that Mr Manser ran the specialty business and/or the Displays business for New South Wales at that time.[1809] And in the case of Mr Crouch, Mr Ward said he was the group commercial manager or financial controller for New South Wales, and that Mr Crouch would also be performing 'the financial consultation [sic.]' for Amcor Displays but not the day to day accounting work.[1810]
1435 Mr Ward was unable to recall with any clarity why it was that he had written the email of 6 July 2005. Initially when asked he said:
Again, I can't recall. It could be one of about three reasons ... it could be because there were some issues around the separation at the time and that was getting tense. It could - and I don't know the timelines on all this. It could be because I know Mr Holihan was getting very upset with a supplier [sic.] out of New South Wales. I think he was threatening at one stage to leave. And it may also be because we were checking out the commerciality of the contract and whether we had to - whether we were obliged to stick with the commercial terms of the contract.[1811]
1436 Under cross-examination, the topic was raised again. Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties put to Mr Ward a somewhat different rationale for him making the email enquiry, which he acknowledged was a possible explanation for him doing so, as follows:
[DR McNICOL:] ... Now from what you said in reply in evidence in-chief, would it be fair to say - and you were asked why did you make that enquiry. Would it be fair to say that it is possible that you were preparing - you, in your new role, preparing for what I would describe as a plan B, in case Mr Holihan walked away from the contract?---Yes.
Thank you. So you wanted to be able to make sure that you had a fallback position?---Yes.
In case Mr Holihan was no longer going to be providing his services under the contract?---That's certainly possible.
Yes and you didn't have any other ulterior motive. Was there anything that you were - apart from what you've said in your answer in evidence-in-chief, was there a suggestion that you might have been trying to pull out of the contract yourself?---No, I um - I didn't think it was - particularly a commercial contract, um, but I wasn't in a position, I wouldn't have thought, to be able to pull out of the contract myself.
Right. And as it happened, as it transpired, nothing happened did it? The contract - are you aware that the contract persisted?---Ah yeah, I can't - I can't recall in my time that something did happen, because - - -
Right, so Mr Holihan did not walk away from the contract?---No, not that I - - -
And neither did Amcor or AFP, I beg your pardon?---Not that I'm aware of.[1812]
1437 In re-examination, this topic was re-visited by Counsel for the Holihan parties. As to 'the issues around separation' that Mr Ward had mentioned initially, in re-examination he said the source of his belief that separation issues were one potential cause was 'correspondence that showed there were emails going back and forth that I was included on at the time'.[1813] But the only emails he could recall were those that he had re-acquainted himself with for the purposes of preparing for the proceeding.[1814] And he could not recall clearly seeing any such document that was dated earlier than 26 July 2005.[1815] Further, in his letter to Mr Holihan of 29 July 2005, Mr Ward wrote that 'we do not understand' what Mr Holihan meant when he had written that discussions around separation had broken down.[1816]
1438 In responding to questions about the evidence he had given to the effect that Mr Holihan was 'threatening at one stage to leave',[1817] Mr Ward said that he was unsure of the timing of this and he could not recall the sequencing of events, given that it all took place ten years ago.[1818] Mr Ward said that the 'threat' was probably made verbally[1819] rather than in a document,[1820] and he had no specific reason to believe that it had been made at the time he sent the 6 July email.[1821] Mr Ward said it was unlikely that he had spoken with Mr Holihan about any threat to terminate before writing his letter but added 'I just don't know.'[1822] A little later, in response to further questioning, Mr Ward responded as follows:
[MR MAIDEN:] And was that conversation likely to have predated your 29 July 2005 letter?---I don't know but I doubt it.
Would that mean that you might have been mistaken when you said that Mr Holihan threatening at one stage to leave might have been one of the three reasons for you to send the 6 July email?---Not necessarily if someone had raised those concerns with me at the time.
I see. Do you remember whether anybody raised them with you?---I don't recall, no.[1823]
1439 The Holihan parties submitted that when the totality of Mr Ward's evidence is examined, the only remaining explanation is the accurate one - namely that Mr Ward was 'checking out the commerciality of the contract and whether we had to - whether we were obliged to stick with the commercial terms of the contract.'[1824] Further, they said this explanation is consistent with the reason that Mr Ward gave for him having asked Mr Crouch for his opinion about the prices that were being paid. When Mr Ward was asked why he needed to know by what percentage Mr Crouch thought they were overpaying for supplies from ACB he answered:
---Ah, look I can't recall the time, but it's likely to do with the fact and whether I deemed them to be a commercial price or whether we could buy those products at a better price elsewhere - sorry, whether we could even manufacture themselves at a better price. So it was probably to do with the commerciality of the arrangement. [1825]
1440 The second person named as a recipient on Mr Ward's email of 6 July 2005 was Mr David Manser. Mr Manser worked for AFP from 1999 to February 2006. He was the Commercial Manager Speciality Group from about 2002 to October 2004, and the Acting General Manager of the Speciality Group from October 2004 to February 2006.[1826] In his role as Commercial Manager, Mr Manser was based in Melbourne and was responsible for the financial results for the specialty group, including Amcor Displays.[1827] Mr Manser said that he recalled that late in his tenure there were some discussions 'about Amcor talking about moving away from ACB' and he thought that was mentioned in an email from Mr Ward.
1441 Mr Manser said that he did not remember any discussions around the email from Mr Ward. When asked if he recalled how he had responded to it he said:
---Um, I think, ah, I would have said that I was not probably aware of the discussions about Amcor parting ways with ACB. But at the same time I'd been working on moving Displays New South Wales to Displays Victoria which had nothing to do with Amcor parting from ACB.[1828]
1442 Mr Manser was then shown his response to Mr Ward's email, dated 8 July 2005, where he stated:
CONFIDENTIAL
With the restructuring of Displays NSW & Vic based on the manufacturing foot print in Melbourne our reliance on ACB has been severed except for the jobs in the system at the moment all should be completed by 31/07/2005. All tooling and stock held by ACB on behalf of Displays NSW will all be transferred and stored at Enfield[1829] or Central Coast Cartons if not already done.
George Daaboul contracted Manager for Displays [who was an ACB employee] contract has not been renewed and he has left the business as at 30/06/2005.
The impact on PBIT is very hard to quantify it will be a positive impact based on last years results it could be as high as $250K+.
Central Coast Cartons are working with David Beynon and his team to take on work done by 3rd parties including ACB for customers based around the Northern edge of Sydney metro to the other side of Coffs Harbour this should also be a positive impact to PBIT.
I am not aware of the AFP strategy for NSW but Specialty Group had been working on a business plan for setting up a manufacturing foot print in the Sydney metro probably based at Enfield once Flexibles vacate the site late December 2005. This is on hold until new GM is appointed and a total strategy plan is finalised for the Specialty Group. Again this would be a positive impact to PBIT for Specialty Group.[1830]
1443 The third person named as a recipient on Mr Ward's email of 6 July 2005 was Mr Greg Crouch. He is still employed by APA but was not called to give evidence. Mr Crouch was the recipient of an email sent by Mr Nellies dated 8 July 2005 with the subject heading 'ACB machines 07/04 to 06/05.xls', to which was attached a spreadsheet headed 'Amcor Fibre Packaging - NSW: Work going through Wetherill Park Machines July 04 till June 05'.[1831] The spreadsheet described the amount of work that Achilla was producing on each of its machines during that period and how much of that work was being produced for AFP.
1444 In evidence-in-chief, Mr Ward was shown the email from Mr Nellies to Mr Crouch dated 8 July 2005. Mr Ward said he remembered Mr Nellies and thought he might have been running customer service in New South Wales at the time. He thought he had seen the email at the time, and had seen it more recently as part of this proceeding. He explained what the spreadsheet describes, saying:
---I think what it describes is the amount of square metres that the ACB business was producing on each machine and a subset of those is how many of those square metres were produced for the fibre packaging business.[1832]
1445 Mr Ward said he did not know why Mr Nellies was providing that information to Mr Crouch at that time but he assumed that it had something to do with the email he had sent on 6 July 2005, and that it 'determined what the likely impact would be if we (indistinct). Basically tells us that we were purchasing through ... the ACB Business probably seven million square metres worth of product.'[1833]
1446 Also in evidence was a similar summary document dated 8 July 2005 endorsed with the handwritten notation at the top of the page: 'ACB - Wetherill Park'. This summary document reproduced essentially the same information as that set out in the first four columns of the summary Mr Nellies had sent to Mr Crouch but another two columns headed 'Future Source Options' and 'PBIT Impact' were added. The 'Future Source Options' were listed variously as 'Northwest/Amcor SA', 'Amcor SA', 'Smithfield', 'Westend', 'Le Bretons/Amcor Ctns', Stans Diecutting', 'Stans/Thompsons', 'Smithfield/Allpack', 'Northwest/Brooklyn', 'Central Coast Cartons', 'Smithfield/CCC', 'Set up new facility', 'Tool up/CCC', 'Northwest', 'Revesby', 'Allpack' and 'Tool up/Allpack'. The position as set out in the document was summarised at the foot of the page, as follows:
In summary, given capital for the Ward at Smithfield to enable it to slot, crewing of slitter at Revesby and a new facility being set up for our P84s, then this can be achieved cots [sic.] neutral (gut feel). This is because the freight cost will be offset by either efficiency or cost reduction.[1834]
1447 No witness was able to identify the author of that document.
APA moves to bring the specialty work 'in-house'
1448 In the first quarter of 2006, APA was also investigating where the specialty work was being performed and what could be moved 'in house'. Mr Bruce Powell gave evidence to the effect that acting on instructions from Mr Roberts, he asked Mr Nellies and Mr Tony Larkin to work together to determine what short run work was being outsourced to OMEs and what proportion of that work could be moved to Central Coast Cartons.[1835] Relevantly, at that time, Mr Powell was Specialty Manager (New South Wales) in APA's corrugated fibre packaging division.[1836] In that role, he reported to Mr Beynon (until early 2006), and then to Mr Matthew McGowan (until sometime in 2009) and then to Mr John Koot.
1449 In December 2005, when Mr Powell became Specialty Manager, Amcor's remaining specialty businesses in New South Wales included Amcor Displays and Central Coast Cartons, a Berkeley Vale business that operated in the specialty box market and had manufacturing capacity. Amcor had bought out the former proprietor of Central Coast Cartons,[1837] Mr Tony Larkin, but he continued to work in the business once it became part of the Specialty Group under Mr Powell. Mr Powell gave evidence that the Central Coast Cartons business was located 90 kilometres north of Sydney, servicing the geographical areas around Wyong, Gosford, Newcastle, Taree and some parts of the Hunter Valley, and was run separately by Mr Larkin at that time. In addition to short run work, Central Coast Cartons brokered the sale of boxes manufactured within other parts of Amcor, serviced customers whose boxes Central Coast Cartons had converted and also sold industrial consumables such as brown paper, tapes, safety shoes and gloves.
1450 At about the time when Mr Powell commenced as Specialty Manager, Mr Roberts told him that one of his objectives in the role was to rebuild the specialty businesses in New South Wales following the sale of both the ACB Packaging Business and the ACB Business. Mr Powell said that at around this time, Mr Beynon also informed him that they were 'to use the ACB Business until 31 July 2008 for short run specialty box manufacturing requirements unless these requirements could be fulfilled internally or if the ACB Business did not have the ability to produce a required product at a price, quality and availability that was commercial and viable.'[1838]
1451 In the context of the short run work exercise referred to above, and assessing what short run work was being outsourced to OMEs and what proportion of that work could be moved to Central Coast Cartons for manufacture in house so as to keep the margins down, Mr Powell was cross-examined about the capacity of Central Coast Cartons to do this short run work on a competitive basis. Counsel for the Holihan parties took Mr Powell to statements he had made in an earlier witness statement prepared for use in the trial before Vickery J (but the relevant passages of which were not read before his Honour). At paragraph 19 of his earlier witness statement Mr Powell had stated as follows:
Central Coast Cartons could not effectively compete in Sydney due to its geographical location in Berkeley Vale. A key competitive factor in supplying corrugated cardboard boxes is the cost of transporting the finished products to the customers. While Central Coast Cartons could run a competitive business in its local area, it could not profitably compete in the Sydney metropolitan market, because the additional distance from the manufacturing plant to the customers meant additional freight costs. Those additional freight costs meant the finished products could not be supplied at a competitive price.[1839]
1452 Mr Powell confirmed that he had provided that evidence as part of his statement that was filed with the Court on the last occasion, and that it was true.[1840]
1453 Counsel for the Holihan parties also canvassed with Mr Powell the substance of the evidence he had given before Vickery J about his understanding of the contractual arrangements with the ACB Business, and his knowledge that since early 2006 Amcor alleged that Mr Hodgson had secretly obtained a benefit from the Service Packaging Business that had been sold to Mr Hottes. In this proceeding, Mr Powell had filed a witness statement in which he described the process he had initiated to bring ACB work back in house,[1841] and also his work with Mr Nellies and Mr Larkin. At that time, Central Coast Cartons was a company that was fully owned by Service Packaging Pty Ltd. In essence, Mr Nellies and Mr Larkin were assessing whether or not jobs that were being handled by the ACB Business could be produced by Central Coast Cartons at a cost and quality that was more commercially viable for Amcor. Mr Powell described the process that was underway at that time, as follows:
---... Look the context of that work was that I came into the business at the end of 05 and there was a lot of hiatus going on in the business. We were losing market share hand over fist, and one of the, the tools that you have available to you when you're managing businesses are either to get more business or to optimise your costs.
Now it is better to be able to manufacture internally and have the money run around the business inside rather than to contract out and pay a premium in margin to an external party. So we brought as much work in as we possibly could, and I asked Mr Nellies and Tony Larkin who worked for me to actually make those assessments, work out what work we had subbed out, or that was subbed out to other providers whether they be Northwest Packaging or ACB or whoever they were, look at those jobs, determine which jobs could be brought in, if they needed to be redesigned in order to be brought in we'd bring them in house, and that meant that we would - we would not have to pay a premium to an external, an external provider. It was just very good, sound, ah, business practice.[1842]
1454 Later in his cross-examination, Mr Powell was again challenged about the benefits of bringing work 'in house' to eliminate premiums, as follows:
[MR MAIDEN:] You couldn't have been aware that there would have been an increased cost position without doing a lot of due diligence on the prospect of building a new business?---Sorry, I don't understand that question.
You just said in terms of bringing margins in-house and having a decreased costs position it made sense. You can't have known that building your own business would necessarily reduce the costs of doing that work? It could have been that ACB could have done the work cheaper than you could?---Well what you do you is - is a simple comparison model and you model them - you model up the - you model up what it might look like, and that's what we did.
But when it came time to bring the work back - to bring work to, say, Central Coast Cartons, that separate company, you didn't even determine whether ACB could do it more cheaply?---I don't understand what that's got to do it. The point that I keep making is that when you have an outside manufacturing entity you are paying a premium for that service. And if you can bring it in-house it means that premium disappears and your costs of production, your cost to produce a product gets lowered - - -
But that's not necessarily the case, is it?---- - - and the profit - and the profit therefore is increased. And that's the name of this business.
That's not necessarily the case. It's possible that the outside manufacturer could do the work more efficiently than Amcor could do it itself?---And that's why you do the analysis. And so when we brought work in-house it was because it was more, ah, beneficial to the Amcor business.
But that wasn't the case because you never investigated whether or not ACB - - - ?---I don't agree with that.
- - - could do it more cheaply?---That's an assertion that I just don't agree with.[1843]
1455 One of the decisions made was for Amcor to move its carton erecting conversion machinery (known as P84s that were used to manufacture sculptured fruit trays) in-house, which work to that point was outsourced to, and being performed by, the ACB Business. Thereafter, the P84 carton erecting work was being performed 'in-house' by Central Coast Cartons, rather than the ACB Business. Mr Powell sought to explain why this decision did make commercial sense, based on the numbers and the ability to service a customer, and also because fruit trays are supplied in the regional areas where there is a freight component. He said that he could not recall what the split was between existing customers supplied by Central Coast Cartons on the one hand and the ACB Business on the other, but all of the carton erecting work was taken away from the ACB Business and thereafter performed by Central Coast Cartons. Mr Powell said that 'by bringing it inside, Central Coast Cartons was actually able to increase its profitability.'[1844] Further, he said:
In the case of the ... conversion of these P84s, all that Central Coast Cartons did was, in effect, act as an outsourcer for AFP, ..., except that it was done internally and the money and the premium that would otherwise have been paid outside to ACB was kept ... in‑house, so, ... all that Central Coast Cartons did was get paid an erecting fee for each carton.[1845]
1456 Counsel then challenged Mr Powell as to the credibility of this justification, by pointing to the increased freight cost that would be involved in shipping fully erected boxes from Central Coast Cartons back to the Sydney metro area, as opposed to shipping flat sheets of corrugated board to an OME supplier, and observing that the number of trucks that would be needed to send the flat sheet to Central Coast Cartons would be considerably less than the number of trucks required to bring back the erected cartons. Mr Powell did not accept that the outcome was not a commercial one. He said that if it was not a better outcome they would not have made the change, and explained:
It was about improving the profitability of the Central Coast and AFP businesses, making sure that we didn't pay premiums - additional costs outside the business. That is just a very normal, sensible thing to do. Make sure one optimises its procurement position.[1846]
1457 Further, Mr Powell said that in 2008, in the period leading up to the end of the contract with the ACB Business, he requested Mr Nellies to perform a similar exercise of assessing the short run work that had been outsourced to the ACB Business and to 'facilitate the transition of any work that could be pulled from ACB and performed using Amcor's internal capabilities within the group and to obtain new costings from other suppliers.'[1847] He acknowledged that, at that time, the ACB Business was not sounded out about doing that work, adding that at that point 'we'd been in litigation with the business'.[1848] Further, he said:
..my recollection is that when we moved work away from ACB we actually improved our gross margins. We put work into Northwest Packaging, ... - some more of it went to Central Coast Cartons, some of it was reassigned and done out of Smithfield and Revesby and it was all done so that we would make more money and that's what happened.[1849]
1458 In the latter part of 2007, Mr Powell began investigating the possibility of Amcor acquiring the Sainsbury business.[1850] In a capital expenditure request that Mr Powell prepared, he noted that 'AFP NSW does not currently have any Sydney basin short run manufacturing facilities having sold ACBCo in 2003' and he set about outlining the strategy for purchasing the Sainsbury business as follows:
Strategic Urgency
Two imperatives drive the timing of this acquisition:
*Note that while a national Specialty strategy is under development, this acquisition will not be impacted because of its complementary position in relation to the NSW manufacturing footprint, the ACBCo Supply contract expiry, lack of short run facilities in the Sydney basin and growth requirements.[1851]
1459 Amcor's acquisition of the Sainsbury business was completed in about July 2008.[1852] Once completed, Amcor had available to it a ready-made short run capacity in the Sydney market, and the ability to supply board and paper to the Sainsbury business, which would deliver incremental and significant upstream profits for AFP conversion and paper supply.[1853]
1460 The Holihan parties contend that the evidence given by Mr Roberts and Mr Powell demonstrates that 'it was in AFP's commercial interest that the Supply Agreement remain on foot for as long as possible, at least while ACB Co Purchaser retained the assets of the ACB Business.'[1854] They submit that because Amcor did not have its own short run capacity in the Sydney basin until the acquisition of the Sainsbury business was completed, the practical reality is that Amcor would not have terminated the clause 12 supply agreement prior to July 2008 because that would have resulted in the loss of certainty as to provision of its short run capacity (then provided by the ACB Business) and also the loss of the valuable opportunity to sell board to the ACB Business, particularly in circumstances where domestic sales were more profitable than those made overseas. Mr Powell gave evidence, under cross-examination, to the effect that had the prospect of termination of the arrangements with the ACB Business been raised before the Sainsbury business was purchased, they would have survived by going through the exercise and re-allocating the work elsewhere. But, as the Holihan parties observed, Mr Powell nevertheless agreed that if given the choice, they would have left the arrangement on foot until it expired.[1855]
1461 If it were demonstrated that there was a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) as at October 2005 and that ACB Co Purchaser had 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed] a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor', then it was open to APA (then relevantly the 'Vendor') to pursue the rights available to it under clause 16.4 or clause 16.1.
1462 The evidence of Ms McPherson, viewed as a whole, suggests that in that event she would have advised APA to invoke the right under clause 16.1 to terminate the clause 12 supply agreement. If that course were pursued by APA, then APA was required to give written notice to ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla (as the case may be) specifying the alleged breach and requiring that it be rectified within 20 Business Days, failing which it would terminate the rights and obligations which arise under clause 12, and stating the date when the proposed termination would take effect (i.e., either immediately or from any later date it may nominate).
1463 As noted earlier, under this scenario, the Holihan parties would have 20 Business Days to rectify the (alleged) breach, and rectify the (alleged) change of control. The findings made by Vickery J in the principal judgment were to the effect that prior to October 2005, in addition to Holihan and Barnes, each of 'Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest in the ACB Business until about October 2005'.[1856] Accordingly, if (contrary to my view) a change of control were made out, then rectifying the change of control would involve the Holihan parties taking steps to restore the former position and maintain it after October 2005, for so long as the Charge remains in force or is not discharged.
1464 It will be recalled, however, that the evidence Ms McPherson gave under cross-examination was to the effect that a scenario whereby APA was faced with continuing a relationship with the ACB Business in circumstances where not just Mr Holihan, but also the five former executives were involved, was one that APA would not tolerate. She said 'I would have caused 12 to be terminated using 16.1' and 'at the same time I would have brought proceedings to get the business back'. [1857]
1465 Of course, until such steps were taken by APA to re-acquire the ACB Business, ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla would continue to occupy the Wetherill Park premises under the sub-lease from APA (which was for an initial term of 5 years, with a 5 year option),[1858] and would have the ability to compete for AFP's short-run customers using the assets of the ACB Business.
1466 The Holihan parties pointed to the fact that the directors of APA at all relevant times were Ian Lewis, Colin Clayton, Louis Lachal and (in June 2004) Peter Sutton.[1859] The directors of ACB Co Vendor were Mr Lewis, Mr Clayton, (in June 2004) Mr Sutton and John Crawford and (in October 2005) Mr Lachal.[1860] None of those directors was called to give evidence at the trial (although Mr Lewis, Mr Clayton and Mr Lachal all gave evidence before Vickery J). Nor was any explanation proffered by the Amcor parties as to why they were not available to give evidence on the cross-claim. Indeed, under cross-examination, Ms McPherson accepted that she knew of no reason why Mr Lachal could not be called to give evidence.[1861] In the circumstances, the Holihan parties contend that the Court should conclude that none of these directors could have given evidence that would have assisted the Amcor Parties' case.
1467 The evidence that Mr Holihan gave in the (hypothetical) context of responding to a cure notice is equally applicable to this (hypothetical) scenario of responding to a notice to rectify under clause 16.1. In effect he said that first, he would cause the service of the notice to be challenged on the basis that there never was a change of control of ACB Purchaser or Achilla, and if necessary, would seek urgent injunctive relief preventing ACB Vendor or APA from acting on the notice. Secondly, he would immediately cause ACB Co Purchaser to pay out the balance of the purchase price (as specified in clause 3.1 of the Second Sale Agreement) and seek the discharge of the Charge (as defined). Thirdly, he said that he would, if necessary, have written to all persons alleged to have control (which is denied) asking them to relinquish any control that they did have, so as to cure or rectify the change of control within the time specified.
1468 Given that a period of 20 Business Days would be available under clause 16.1, some or all of those steps may well have been capable of being pursued by the Holihan parties with some measure of success. And faced with the prospect that the ACB Business would lose the benefit of the clause 12 supply agreement if the alleged change of control were not rectified within time, there was a commercial imperative for the Holihan parties to do so.
1469 In the circumstances, were it necessary for me to express a view about this hypothetical scenario, I am not satisfied that there is any cogent evidence before the Court that is capable of demonstrating in any satisfactory way or with the requisite degree of confidence what the response of the Amcor parties (or APA) would have been in either May/June 2004, or in October 2005 to the alleged change(s) in control, or what outcome might have resulted.
1470 On the cross-claim, the Amcor parties (or APA) bore the onus of proof. It was a matter for them to establish that it was more likely than not that the Amcor parties (or APA) would have terminated the clause 12 supply agreement.[1862] I am not satisfied that the evidence before the Court permits that conclusion to be drawn.
Issue 17**: Has APA suffered any loss by reason of any breach?**
1471 In their defence to counterclaim, at Part H, the Amcor parties plead what are described as 'Breach claims against ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla',[1863] which are then repeated by APA by way of cross-claim against Achilla (as to sections H1 to H4 only) and ACB Co Purchaser (as to sections H1 to H4 only) and Mr Holihan (as to section H5 only).
1472 In the first instance, the 'breach claims' advanced by the Amcor parties as part of their defence are predicated on the following basis:
...if it is found that:
(a) the implied Supply Agreement came into existence as alleged (which is expressly denied); and/or
(b) the defendants by counterclaim have breached the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession and as alleged (which is expressly denied).[1864]
1473 The 'breach claims' are then set out under the following headings:
First claim against Achilla for breach of the implied Supply Agreement in May-June 2004
Second claim against Achilla for breach of the implied Supply Agreement in October 2005[1865]
APA's first claim against ACB Co Purchaser & Achilla for breach of the Second Sale Agreement [i.e., in May/June 2004]
APA's second claim against ACB Co Purchaser & Achilla for breach of the Second Sale Agreement in October 2005
The liability of Craig Holihan in respect of the breaches on the part of Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser
1474 The implied supply agreement relied upon by the Amcor parties in their breach claims is pleaded in different terms to the Holihan parties. The Amcor parties plead that:
The parties to the implied Supply Agreement were relevantly APA, Achilla and Holihan and it contained the same terms with any relation to the supply obligations as in the Second Sale Agreement including those in clauses 11, 12 and 16 (save that under the implied Supply Agreement APA had the rights and obligations that ACB Co Vendor had under the Second Sale Agreement).[1866]
Amcor parties' allege that by reason of change(s) of control in May-June 2004 and in October 2005, Achilla breached the implied supply agreement
1475 In Part H1, APA pleads that if it had become aware of the fact that there was a change in control of ACB Co Purchaser in May or June 2004, it would have terminated the implied supply agreement and issued proceedings for damages, and would also have summarily terminated the employment of each of Messrs Barnes, Mihelic, Bayley, Sangster and Hodgson. APA also contends that by reason of this breach of the implied supply agreement, it lost the opportunity to avoid making the 'Management Incentive Program' payments it made to each of Messrs Barnes, Mihelic, Bayley and Sangster for the financial year ended 30 June 2004 (each one of which was approved by Mr Hodgson) and to avoid the amount paid to Mr Hodgson (which included amounts for payment in lieu of notice, a bonus payment under the Management Incentive Program, interest and costs). In respect of each of these payments, APA relies upon findings made by Vickery J in the principal judgment. APA contends that if it is found liable to compensate Achilla, as alleged in the counterclaim (which is denied), then APA is entitled to set-off the amount of its loss and damage against any amount awarded to Achilla.[1867]
1476 In Part H2, the Amcor parties plead a similar claim for breach of the implied supply agreement and a claim by APA for termination of the implied supply agreement and the issue of proceedings for damages is pleaded in respect of the alleged change in control of ACB Co Purchaser in October 2005. The Amcor parties also contend that, in the premises, Achilla would not have been able to prosecute its claims against APA under the implied supply agreement. Further, APA contends that if it is found liable to compensate Achilla as alleged in the counterclaim (which is denied) then APA is entitled to set-off the amount of its loss and damage against any amount awarded to Achilla.[1868]
Amcor parties' allege that by reason of change(s) of control in May/June 2004 and in October 2005, Achilla breached the Second Sale Agreement
1477 In Part H3, the Amcor parties plead that in breach of clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement, ACB Co Purchaser did not obtain the consent of ACB Co Vendor for the changes of control in each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla that (allegedly) took place in or around May or June 2004,[1869] being the changes of control said to have taken place as a result of the operation of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholding Deed and read in the context of the findings made by Vickery J at paragraphs [992], [1086], [1125]-[1131] and [1149] of the principal judgment and the shareholding structure set out in Appendix A thereto. The shareholding structure which was set out in Appendix A to the principal judgment is reproduced as Appendix A to these reasons, but with a minor revision so as to accord with the findings made by Vickery J at [1003] of the principal judgment. ACB Co Vendor pleads it suffered loss and damage as a result, being the loss of the 'valuable opportunities' to:
(a) terminate clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement pursuant to clause 16.1 therein;
(b) further or alternatively, terminate the Second Sale Agreement for repudiation and issue a demand or proceedings for payment of the purchase price for the ACB Business; and
(c) avoid any liability to ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla from any breaches of the Second Sale Agreement.[1870]
1478 In Part H4, the Amcor parties plead that 'in breach of clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession, ACB Co Purchaser did not obtain the consent of APA for the changes in control pleaded in paragraphs 58 and 59'[1871] of their defence to counterclaim, being the changes of control alleged as a result of the entry into and/or operation of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement executed in October 2005 and read in the context of the findings made by Vickery J at paragraphs [1132] and [1133] of the principal judgment. APA pleads that if it had become aware of this breach in October 2005 it would have taken certain (pleaded) steps, and that it suffered loss and damage as a result of not being able to do so, being the loss of the 'valuable opportunities' to:
(a) terminate the rights and obligations arising under clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession (pursuant to the clause 16.1 therein);
(b) further or alternatively, terminate the Second Sale Agreement for repudiation and issue a demand and/or proceedings for the balance of the purchase price for the ACB Business; and
(c) through the termination of the Second Sale Agreement, avoid or eliminate any liability to Achilla in respect of that party's claims herein (being claims based on alleged breaches of clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession).[1872]
1479 In respect of the breach claims set out in Part H of the Amcor parties' defence to counterclaim, and as repeated in the cross-claim, APA in effect alleges that it has suffered the following losses:
(a) any damages awarded against it for breaches of the Second Sale Agreement in the period after the time at which APA would have terminated that agreement;
(b) 'management incentive payments' that were paid to each of Mr Hodgson, Mr Barnes, Mr Bayley, Mr Sangster and Mr Mihelic on or after September 2004; and
(c) amounts totalling $806,926 paid to Mr Hodgson attendant upon his employment.
APA's claim to set-off amounts paid to Mr Hodgson
1480 In respect of the damages claim made in respect of payments made to Mr Hodgson, the figure of $806,926 is comprised of a bonus of $160,000 and a payment in lieu of notice of $646,926. It will be recalled however, that this claim for damages was not pleaded until after Vickery J made findings in the principal proceeding, and it is those findings that APA now relies upon to prove this aspect of the loss claimed.
Hodgson's Termination
[386] Further, I am satisfied that Amcor did not terminate Hodgson's employment on the ground of imminent redundancy. Rather, it elected to terminate Hodgson's employment on the basis of differences in management style and clashes between Hodgson on the one hand and his superior, Sutton on the other. It determined to appoint Roberts in his place.
[387] It appears that Sutton made this decision to terminate Hodgson's employment in April 2004.
[388] Discussions and negotiations took place between Amcor and Hodgson in August 2004 concerning the terms on which Hodgson's employment would end.
[389] Hodgson contends that notice of termination of his employment was given to him on 5 August 2004, and confirmed on 11, 13 and 18 August 2004.
[390] On the other hand, Amcor's position is that, although the parties discussed Hodgson's departure from Amcor in August, those discussions did not amount to Amcor giving Hodgson notice that his employment would terminate as of 1 October 2004. Rather, it was put that the parties were engaged throughout that time in a process of negotiation concerning Hodgson's departure from Amcor. Such matters as the date of his departure, the amount he would be paid, whether he would be retained (and paid) in a consultancy capacity, whether he would accept a longer restraint period and the like Amcor said were the subject of discussions, principally between Hodgson and Sutton.
[391] The negotiations did not result in any agreement.
...
Events Commencing 5 August 2004 Leading up to Hodgson's Dismissal with Effect 1 October 2004
...
[400] It was abundantly clear from the meeting between Sutton and Hodgson of 11 August 2004 and the provision of the documents to Hodgson at that meeting that Hodgson was being told that his employment with Amcor pursuant to the Employment Contract was over.
[401] In my opinion the letter dated 11 August 2011 signed by Sutton, together with its attachment, the proposed "Deed of Release", the accompanying document entitled "Termination Package for JH", and the document entitled "Total Fixed Remuneration - JH", together constituted a written notice of termination of Hodgson's employment with Amcor pursuant to his contract of employment effective from 1 October 2004.
[402] The fact that the documents also purported to offer components of a separation package beyond that specified in Hodgson's Employment Contract, did not alter the fundamental nature of the notice. Nor was the notice given under the contract affected by the failure of Hodgson to accept the additional terms offered to him. The notice of termination, as reflected in the letter, was not made contingent upon further agreement being achieved between Amcor and Hodgson as to the terms on which he would depart from Amcor. If no agreement was achieved, the legal position was that the terms of Hodgson's departure from Amcor would be governed by his Employment Contract as it stood, unvaried by an [sic.] further arrangement.
[403] Pursuant to clause 13.1(b) of the Employment Contract, Amcor was entitled to unilaterally terminate Hodgson's contract at any time, and for any reason whatsoever, provided it gave 12 months' notice to him. This it did by the letter dated 11 August 2011 and the accompanying documents.
[404] However, pursuant to clause 13.1(b)(i) Amcor could at its option elect to make payment in lieu of any such notice. This is what it elected to do by providing to Hodgson on 11 August 2004 the document "Termination Package for JH". This document included the following phrase: "Lump sum payment, including 12 months pay in lieu of notice (based on TFR) and 03/04 MIP, all treated as ETP - $912,000.00". The 12 months pay in lieu of notice (based on TFR or "Total Fixed Remuneration") amounted to $752,000 and the "03/04 MIP" ("Management Incentive Program" bonus) amounted to $160,000, which together totalled $912,000.
...
Payment in Lieu of Notice
[476] Hodgson claims an entitlement to $752,000 being one year of his total fixed remuneration, as a payment in lieu of notice.
[477] In my opinion, Hodgson, having been given notice on 11 August 2004 with effect on and from 1 October 2004, a period of 51 days, is entitled to $646,926.23, being his total fixed yearly remuneration ($752,000), less 51 days' worth of that income (51 days x $2060.27 per day = $105.073.77).
[478] This results in the sum of $646,926.23 which is due to Hodgson for payment in lieu of notice.
MIP Bonus
...
[507] I find that Hodgson is entitled to a bonus of $160,000 under the Amcor MIP scheme for the 2003/2004 year.
Summary of Hodgson's Entitlements on Termination
[540] For these reasons, Hodgson is not entitled to any payment for redundancy, which has been found not to have occurred.
[541] Consistently with my findings, Hodgson's entitlements are as follows:
Long Service Leave (168.49 days x $752,000/260)
if the Court is entitled to look to Vickery J's findings in respect of this question, Amcor "elected to terminate Hodgson's employment on the basis of differences in management style and clashes between Hodgson on the one hand and his superior, Sutton on the other": Hodgson v Amcor [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, 71 [386]. It also chose not to give Mr Hodgson 12 months' notice, electing to make the payment in lieu: Hodgson v Amcor [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, 71 [401] - [404]. It was only as a result of those elections that Mr Hodgson became entitled to payment in lieu of notice.[1873]
1483 Perhaps more relevant, however, is his Honour's observation (at [387]) that it appears Mr Sutton made the decision to terminate Mr Hodgson's employment in April 2004; being a month or so before any alleged change of control occurred. In other words, that observation suggests that the employment of Mr Hodgson would have been terminated irrespective of whether or not ACB Co Purchaser 'permit[ted], allow[ed] or suffer[ed] a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor' in either May or June 2004 or October 2005.
1484 If it be the case that the decision to terminate Mr Hodgson's employment was made in April 2004, and pre-dated any alleged change of control then, as a matter of causation, the sum of $806,926 paid in respect of Mr Hodgson (comprised of a bonus of $160,000 and a payment in lieu of notice of $646,926) is not referable to conduct on the part of the Holihan parties.
APA's claim to set-off amounts paid to Messrs Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic
1485 In the case of the payments made to the other former executives, the Amcor parties relied upon findings made by Vickery J that bonuses, in the form of Management Incentive Program payments, were paid to each of Messrs Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic for the financial year ending 30 June 2004, as follows:
Barnes's Employment Contract
...
[109] Prior to his resignation on 28 September 2004, for the financial year ending 30 June 2004, Barnes received a salary package of $374,988 which comprised a salary component of $284,200 together with a Management Incentive Program payment of $90,788.
Sangster's Employment Contract
...
[156] For the financial year ending 30 June 2004, Sangster received a salary package of $374,064 which comprised a salary component of $283,500 together with a Management Incentive Program payment of $90,564.
Bayley's Employment Contract
...
[181] For the financial year ended 30 June 2004 Bayley received financial remuneration in the sum of $271,807 which comprised a salary of $206,000 and a Management Incentive Program payment of $65,807.
Mihelic 's Employment Contract
...
[203] ... For the financial year ended 30 June 2004 Mihelic received a salary package of $262,768 which comprised a salary component of $199,150 and a Management Incentive Program payment of $63,618.
1486 The Management Incentive Program payments paid to these former executives total $310,777.
1487 The evidence given by Mr Roberts regarding the alleged change of control in May/June 2004 was to the effect that Amcor would have terminated the employment of each of Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster with immediate effect. These terminations would therefore have taken place during May/June 2004 or at latest by 30 June 2004. The evidence also makes clear that the bonuses were not approved until September 2004 when they were signed by Mr Hodgson and then subsequently by Mr Sutton, the (then) Managing Director of APA.[1874]
1488 The Amcor parties contend that these amounts would not have been paid to any of the (former) executives had they been terminated on 30 June 2004 with immediate effect given their serious breaches and misconduct.
1489 The Rules pertaining to the Management Incentive Program provided, relevantly:
1490 Accordingly, the rules make clear that in order to be eligible for an MIP payment, the relevant executive must be employed by a member of the Amcor Group, at the MIP payment date (usually, September), and the performance of the executive's division or business group is the reference point against which the comparative performance of the executive is to be measured. Relevantly, Mr Ward gave evidence that the bonuses of the former executives for the financial year ended 30 June 2004 were approved in each case, first by the General Manager for Human Resources for AFP, and then by Mr Hodgson in his capacity as General Manager of AFP, and Mr Sutton as the Managing Director of APA performed the final sign off on 6 September 2004.[1876]
1491 The Holihan parties contend that as each of the former executives had been employed by Amcor Limited and not APA, the amounts claimed cannot be a loss suffered by the Amcor parties to this counterclaim.
1492 Mr Ward explained, under cross-examination, that the MIP bonus would be borne by and recorded 'in the books of accounts down at the lowest level of where the person is'[1877] and it would then be consolidated into the result of the division, and then into AFP. When asked if he knew which entity actually paid the bonuses to these executives, Mr Ward responded 'Oh, in this instance, it would have been AFP.'[1878]
1493 As will be apparent, none of the executives to whom bonuses were paid for the year ended 30 June 2004 were employees of ACB Co Vendor. In my view, such evidence as there is before the Court shows that each was relevantly an employee within the AFP division of APA. And APA did not become a party to the Second Sale Agreement until the Deed of Accession was executed on 21 March 2005 or thereabouts. In this regard, it will be noted that the claims for damages in respect of the payments made to the former executives are pleaded by APA by way of set-off in response to the Holihan parties' claims for breaches of the implied supply agreement only (to which APA is said to be a party), and not in respect of the Second Sale Agreement.
1494 If (contrary to my view) there was an implied supply agreement and there were found to be a breach of the implied supply agreement by reason of the first alleged change of control in May/June 2004, then APA would be entitled to set-off the amounts paid to these former executives, namely Messrs Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster, each of whom was employed within the AFP division of APA.
1495 The Amcor parties do not repeat these claims in respect of the alleged breach of the Second Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession) that is referable to the change of control alleged to have occurred as a result of the entry into and/or operation of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement that was executed in October 2005.[1879]
1496 Issue 17 also posed a number of subsidiary questions, namely:
(a) Would Achilla have been able to prosecute its claims under its counterclaim?
(b) With respect to the May or June 2004 breach, would APA have avoided or eliminated any Management Incentive Payments that it made to Mr Barnes, Mr Mihelic, Mr Bayley or Mr Sangster, and are these too remote to be recoverable for a breach of contract?
(c) With respect to the May or June 2004 breach, would APA have avoided any amount paid to Mr Hodgson, and is this too remote to be recoverable for a breach of contract?
(d) Was loss (if any) suffered by reason of the breach or by reason of APA not becoming aware of the breach?
1497 In the circumstances, given the findings made, it is not necessary for me to deal with any of these subsidiary questions.
Issue: 18**: What is the quantum of any damages?**
1498 Under Issue 18, the parties posed two discrete questions, namely:
(a) Can APA set-off any such loss against any amount awarded to Achilla?
(b) Is APA entitled to damages over and above Achilla's claim?
1499 As will be apparent, Issue 18(a) can only be answered once the outcome of Achilla's counterclaim is known and any liability has been quantified, and then only if (contrary to my view) a change of control were made out. In the circumstances, having found that there was no change of control in either May/June 2004 or in October 2005, it is unnecessary to answer Issue 18(a).
1500 Similarly, in the case of Issue 18(b), as no change of control has been made out, it is unnecessary to address this issue. However, lest the matter go further, it is convenient to summarise the arguments advanced by the parties.
(a) as against Achilla - for so much of its alleged loss and damage as exceeds any amount required to satisfy any amount awarded to Achilla as a result of Achilla's claims;
(i) that ACB Co Purchaser is liable in damages to APA in respect of the loss and damage pleaded in sections H1 to H4 (discussed above);
(ii) that ACB Co Purchaser is liable to pay APA the sum of $300,000 plus interest calculated in accordance with clause 3.4 of the Second Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession); and
(iii) that APA and ACB Co Vendor are entitled to a declaration that they are not required to release the Charge unless or until there is a situation in which there are no actual or contingent liabilities of any kind within the definition of 'Secured Money' in the Charge.
1502 The Holihan parties contend that if the Court were to find that APA suffered loss as a result of the Vendor losing an entitlement to terminate the supply agreement, it must bring to account the profits that it made under that agreement in the period since the hypothetical termination date. That is, they say that pursuant to clause 12.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla was obliged to (and did) purchase Products (in the form of corrugated board and corrugated cartons) from APA at prices set according to a formula set out therein. But if the Vendor had terminated the supply agreement early, then profits made on those supplies for the remainder of the agreement would not have been made because Achilla would not have been bound to purchase them from APA.[1880]
1503 The Holihan parties submit that the proof of the profits made by the Vendor under clause 12.1 is a matter that lies in the hands of the Amcor parties, but no evidence of those profits has been led before the Court.[1881] In those circumstances, the Holihan parties provided an estimate of the 'immediate profits made on the sale of Products to Achilla', calculated by reference to the gross amounts charged to Achilla and the applicable margin included in those amounts under clause 12.1, as follows:
Purchases of corrugated products from ACB [Co Vendor] and APA by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla[1882]
Total for November 2005-July 2008 (assuming FY 2006 pro-rated across November-June)
Those figures do not account for:
(a) lost profit on work for short run customers that might have been lost had the Supply Agreement been terminated and had APA been unable to continue to service those customers in the immediate term, or had Achilla used its knowledge of those customers' requirements to poach their business; and
(b) other ancillary benefits obtained by APA as a result of the Supply Agreement, including the upstream profits generated by its paper businesses as a result of having a 'captive' specialty supplier.[1883]
1505 Accordingly, they contend that if, contrary to their submissions, damages are to be awarded in favour of APA on the cross-claim, those damages cannot be quantified until sufficient information is discovered and analysed to enable a precise quantification of the benefits that would have been lost had the supply agreement been terminated.
Issue 19**: Liability of Holihan, Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser**
1506 Issue 19 focusses on what (if any) is the liability of Mr Holihan, Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser pursuant to clauses 11.2, 11.3 and/or 17.2 of the Second Sale Agreement in respect of any breach. A number of underlying questions have also been posed by the parties, as follows:
(a) Do the matters pleaded by APA by way of cross-claim give rise to a 'Claim' as defined in the Second Sale Agreement for the purposes of Mr Holihan's contractual indemnity?
(b) Was any liability of Mr Holihan discharged by the tender of the final instalment of the purchase price?
(c) Does the Anshun doctrine preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the claims in section H of the cross-claim?
(d) Is Mr Holihan liable to APA for any loss?
(e) Is Achilla liable to APA for any loss?
1507 As noted above, in Part H5 of their defence to counterclaim, the Amcor parties set out the grounds upon which they rely for their claim that Mr Holihan is liable for the breaches on the part of Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser, which are then repeated by APA by way of cross-claim against Mr Holihan. In effect, the Amcor parties seek to extend liability to Mr Holihan (via clauses 11.2 and 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement) for:
(a) breaches of the change of control provisions, as alleged in Parts H1 to H4 of their defence to counterclaim; and
(b) payment of the final instalment of the purchase price (together with the interest due thereon) as alleged in Part G and paragraph 87 of their defence to counterclaim.
1508 The Amcor parties also rely upon clause 17.2 of the Second Sale Agreement to render each of Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser jointly and severally liable for the loss and damage suffered by ACB Co Vendor by reason of the alleged breaches of the control provisions in May or June 2004 and in October 2005, as pleaded in Parts H3 and H4 of their defence to counterclaim.[1884] Clause 17.2 provides:
17.2 The Purchaser and Achilla
Obligations, covenants, responsibilities and the like expressed on the part of the Purchaser and Achilla, or the Purchaser or Achilla, will bind them jointly and severally.
1509 The indemnity given by Mr Holihan appears in clause 11 of the Second Sale Agreement, which is headed 'CH Warranty and indemnity'. Clause 11.1 records that Mr Holihan gives the indemnity in consideration of the Vendor agreeing to enter into the Second Sale Agreement with ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla at his request, and he expressly acknowledges the receipt of valuable consideration from ACB Co Vendor for him incurring obligations and giving rights under clause 11.
1510 Relevantly, clauses 11.2 and 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement provide as follows:
11.2 Guarantee
CH [Mr Holihan] unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees to the Vendor the due and punctual performance and observance by Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations under or in connection with this Deed including all obligations to pay money. If the Purchaser or Achilla does not comply with those obligations on time and in accordance with this Deed, then CH agrees to comply with those obligations within 60 days of being required to do so by the Vendor. The maximum total liability of CH under this clause 11.2 will on no account exceed $200,000.
11.3 Indemnity
As a separate undertaking, CH [Mr Holihan] unconditionally and irrevocably indemnifies the Vendor against all Claims arising from or incurred in connection with the breach or failure by the Purchaser or Achilla to comply with any of their respective obligations under the Deed including a breach of the obligations to pay money. It is not necessary for the Vendor to incur expense or make payment before enforcing this right of indemnity.
1511 The issue of the liability of Mr Holihan and Achilla only arises for consideration in the event that the primary breaches alleged against ACB Co Purchaser are made out.
Issue 19(a)****: Do the matters pleaded by APA by way of cross-claim give rise to a 'Claim' as defined in the Second Sale Agreement for the purposes of Mr Holihan's contractual indemnity?
1512 In Part G of their cross-claim, the Amcor parties contend that in the event that a breach by ACB Co Purchaser of the change of control provisions is made out, Mr Holihan is liable, under clause 11.3, to indemnify APA for any loss and damage suffered as a result of that breach.[1885]
1513 The Holihan parties dispute that proposition, submitting that the matters pleaded in Parts G, H3 and H4 of the Amcor parties' defence to counterclaim do not give rise to a 'Claim' (within the meaning of that term in clause 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession) against which Mr Holihan would be required to indemnify APA.[1886] Alternatively, they say that to the extent that the matters pleaded in Part G might be found to give rise to a 'Claim', that liability was discharged by the tender made to APA via its solicitors.[1887]
1514 The Holihan parties submit that 'Claim' in clause 1.1, and thus the indemnity in clause 11.3, is limited to 'third party' claims. And as the claims brought by the Amcor parties in their cross-claim against the Holihan parties are not third party claims, the Holihan parties contend the personal indemnity given by Mr Holihan is not engaged. The Amcor parties dispute this construction of the expression 'Claim'. They submit that 'Claim', on its proper construction, is not restricted to third party claims and accordingly, submit that the cross-claim does enliven Mr Holihan's personal indemnity in clause 11.3.
What is a 'Claim' for the purposes of clause 11.3?
1515 The expression 'Claim' is defined in clause 1.1 in the following terms, unless the context otherwise requires:
"Claim" means any third party claim, cost, damages, debt, expense, Tax[1888] liability, loss, allegation, suit, action, demand, cause of action or proceeding of any kind irrespective of:
(c) whether or not it is in respect of legal or other costs, damages, expenses, fees or losses;
(d) whether or not it is in respect of a breach of trust or of a fiduciary or other duty or obligation; and
(e) whether or not it arises at law or in any other way.
1516 The Holihan parties contend that logically the introductory words, 'third party', must be read so as to qualify the entirety of the matters set out in the definition, and that the comprehensive list of claims that follows, commencing with the general term 'claim' are intended to demonstrate the universality of that general term, rather than to carve-out matters from it. Further, they say the fact that clause 11.3 is expressed to be 'a separate undertaking' to clause 11.2 (which guarantees payment of the purchase price to ACB Co Vendor) demonstrates an intentional division between obligations to make good loss caused to ACB Co Vendor by ACB Co Purchaser, and obligations to make good loss to ACB Co Vendor caused by liabilities to third parties. In the premises, they submit that the expression 'Claims', as defined, extends only to claims made by third parties, and therefore does not embrace claims made by ACB Co Vendor (or APA, following the Deed of Accession), with the result that clause 11.3 does not provide a basis for the claim brought by the Amcor parties against Mr Holihan.
1517 The Amcor parties dispute the notion that the definition of 'Claims' extends only to claims made by third parties, and that consequently, clause 11.3 does not enliven the personal indemnity given by Mr Holihan. First, they say, the clause is expressed in language that is demonstrably broad and all-encompassing. They submit that, as a matter of construction, there is no reason in the text or structure to read-down the language as imposing any kind of limitation on the kind of claims to which the indemnity responds.
1518 Secondly, they say the context of the Second Sale Agreement confirms that the definition is not limited to third party claims. They note that the capitalised term 'Claim' appears in several clauses of the Second Sale Agreement but submit that two are especially important for present purposes:
(a) Clause 10.4, which contains 'General limitations', refers to the Purchaser and Achilla not being entitled to make a 'Claim' in respect of certain listed matters.
(b) Clause 10.7, which contains 'Specific limitations on terms', contains an acknowledgment by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla that they will not bring a 'Claim' against ACB Co Vendor or its Related Bodies Corporate in respect of the Assets.
1519 The Amcor parties submit that those clause 10 provisions will work only if the definition of 'Claim' in clause 1.1 extends beyond 'third party claims', because ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla, being parties to the Second Sale Agreement, could not bring a 'third party claim' against ACB Co Vendor.
1520 Thirdly, the Amcor parties submit that the express 'separate undertaking' nature of clause 11.3, when read with clause 11.4, makes clear that the indemnity in clause 11.3 is not to be read down by reason of the monetary limit mentioned in clause 11.2. Clause 11.4 provides:
11.4 Separate and principal obligation
CH [Mr Holihan] agrees that the indemnity contained in clause 11.3 is a separate and distinct obligation and will not be restrictively interpreted by reason of the guarantee in clause 11.2. CH agrees that his liability under this clause 11 is that of principal debtor.
1521 The Amcor parties observe that clause 11.4 clearly does not impose any cap on the monetary limit of liability under clause 11.3 and they contend there is no foothold in either the text or structure of the Second Sale Agreement for divining an intention to impose any cap.
1522 The Holihan parties, in support of their construction, also sought to rely upon evidence given by Mr MacPhail, the external solicitor engaged by the Amcor parties to assist with the drafting of the Second Sale Agreement. The Holihan parties submit that evidence given by Mr MacPhail at the trial confirms that the interpretation they contend for is supported by the facts known to all parties at the time the Second Sale Agreement was negotiated and executed. The Amcor parties reject this submission on grounds that Mr MacPhail's understanding is irrelevant to the issue of proper construction.
1523 The evidence given by Mr MacPhail that the Holihan parties seek to rely upon was given by him in examination-in-chief when he was explaining, by reference to his handwritten notes,[1889] what took place at his initial meeting with Mr Holihan on 20 September 2002. At the top of page 2 of his notes, Mr MacPhail had written:
* Purchaser not resp. for V.[1890]
1524 When Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties asked him to explain what those words mean, Mr MacPhail responded:
---So I've written there, "Purchaser not responsible for V", ... and an asterisk and underlined, which I guess would have been my way of noting it, an important point. ..., and that I recall was that ... he was concerned that...any warranties or guarantees or indemnities that he was going to be giving back to the vendor ... were not so as to guarantee or indemnify the vendor per se, but he would accept third party liability. So that basically if he stuffed up post sale ..., and there was a third party claim, then he would be liable. But otherwise, not so.[1891]
1525 A little further down that page, he had written:
- reword cl. 11 - only Amcor 3rd pty liability
When Mr MacPhail was asked to explain this notation, he said:
"Re-word clause 11, only Amcor third party liability". I think that's a reference to what I was saying above, which is that the - that's possibly the guarantee or indemnity would only be so as to cover Amcor for third party liability.[1892]
1526 A few days later, on 25 September 2002, Mr MacPhail sent a letter to Mr Barnes, from whom he was taking instructions, which states:
General comments
...
(ii) Craig will provide a limited guarantee of the Purchaser's obligations. In particular, he will guarantee and indemnify only in relation to third party claims against Amcor (see definition of "Claims" and clause 11).[1893] In other words, he is not guaranteeing the obligations of the Purchaser vis a vis Amcor, except to the extent that this may result in a third party claim against Amcor.[1894]
1527 The Holihan parties submit that in circumstances where there is no evidence to contradict that of Mr MacPhail, it follows that the definition of 'Claims' extends only to claims made by third parties, and therefore does not grasp claims made by ACB Co Vendor (or APA, following the Deed of Accession). Accordingly, they contend clause 11.3 does not provide a basis for the claim made by the Amcor parties against Mr Holihan.
1528 The evidence given by Mr MacPhail, which was led by the Amcor parties without objection from the Holihan parties, is evidence of what took place during the negotiations for the Second Sale Agreement. As such, it is not relevant to the issue of proper construction, and there is no claim for rectification to which such evidence may conceivably be relevant. Accordingly, I do not propose to have regard to it.
1529 In approaching the question of proper construction of 'Claim' in the context of and for the purposes of clause 11.3, it is necessary to understand the structure of the Second Sale Agreement and the role of each of the provisions in clause 11, and any related provisions.
1530 The drafting of clause 11 makes clear that the guarantee given by Mr Holihan in clause 11.2 and the indemnity given by him in clause 11.3 are separate obligations. Clause 11.4 confirms that the indemnity is a 'separate and distinct obligation' and one that is not to be 'restrictively interpreted by reason of the guarantee in clause 11.2', the latter being a reference to the fact that under clause 11.2 the total maximum liability of Mr Holihan under the guarantee is $200,000. Clause 11.4 also records Mr Holihan's acknowledgment that his liability under clause 11 'is that of principal debtor' and under clause 11.5, he waives 'any right he may have of first requiring the Vendor to commence proceedings or enforce any other right against the Purchaser or Achilla or any other person' before claiming against him under clause 11. Clause 11.6 provides that the indemnity (as opposed to the guarantee) given by him 'is a continuing security' and 'is not discharged by any one payment and will remain in full force and effect' until all of the obligations of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla under the Second Sale Agreement 'are satisfied in full'.
1531 Clause 15 of the Second Sale Agreement, headed 'General Provisions', also provides in clause 15.3 that:
The indemnities contained in this Deed are:
(a) continuing, separate and independent obligations of the parties from their other obligations, and survive the termination of this Deed; and
(b) absolute and unconditional and unaffected by anything which otherwise might have the effect of prejudicing, releasing, discharging or affecting the liability of the party giving the indemnity.
1532 Clause 11.9 imposes certain restrictions on the ability of Mr Holihan, ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla to take action, such as raising a set-off or counterclaim against ACB Co Vendor in reduction of their liability under clause 11, without ACB Co Vendor's prior written approval. Clause 11.11 provides that any moneys payable by Mr Holihan under clause 11 'must be paid in full without set-off or counterclaim and free and clear of any present or future Taxes, deduction or withholding of any kind.'
1533 Clause 11.12 contains an acknowledgment by Mr Holihan that no representations have been made by ACB Co Vendor, as follows:
11.12 No representations by Vendor
CH agrees that he has not executed this Deed as a result of, by reason of, or in reliance upon, any warranty, representation or information of any kind whatsoever given by or on behalf of the Vendor or Achilla, their respective related bodies corporate or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or advisers.
1534 As the foregoing demonstrates, the clause 11.2 guarantee given by Mr Holihan, and the indemnity given by him in clause 11.3 are directed to different scenarios, and with quite different consequences. Under the guarantee, Mr Holihan has guaranteed to ACB Co Vendor 'the due and punctual performance and observance by [ACB Co] Purchaser and Achilla of each of their respective obligations under, or in connection with the Deed including all obligations to pay money'. Thus, the guarantee will respond where ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla have not complied with their obligations but only in the event that ACB Co Vendor requires or calls upon Mr Holihan to do so, and then only up to a maximum liability of $200,000.
1535 Turning then to the indemnity given by Mr Holihan in clause 11.3, it is demonstrably an indemnity given to ACB Co Vendor against all 'Claims', where they arise from, or are incurred in connection with, 'the breach or failure by the Purchaser or Achilla to comply with any of their respective obligations under the Deed including a breach of the obligations to pay money'. The expression 'Claim' is defined in clause 1.1 to have a particular meaning unless the context otherwise requires. The definition (set out in full above) commences with the words:
"Claim" means any third party claim, cost, damages, debt, expense, Tax liability, loss, allegation, suit, action, demand, cause of action or proceeding of any kind irrespective of ...
(emphasis added)
1536 As a matter of drafting, the location of the words 'third party' as the introduction or starting point for the definition operates to narrow the scope of the language that follows, which would otherwise be capable of being viewed as all-embracing and of wide application. That is, the location of the words 'any third party' at the beginning of the definition strongly suggests that each of the words that follow is to be viewed and interpreted through the prism of 'any third party...' and means 'any third party cost', 'any third party damages', 'any third party debt' etc. Indeed, if the parties had intended that a third party claim were to be regarded as just one example of the myriad of claims covered by the definition, logic suggests that the descriptor phrase would, as a matter of drafting, be added in at the end (e.g., 'including any third party claim') rather than at the commencement of the definition. In my view, as drafted, the definition of 'Claim' covers all manner of third party claims, but does not cover non-third party claims.
1537 Accordingly, when one turns to clause 11.3, if 'Claims' is confined to 'third party claims' etc, the indemnity would operate only in respect of third party claims that arise from, or in connection with, any breach by ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla of their respective obligations under the Second Sale Agreement. When one examines the provisions of the Second Sale Agreement in order to identify a breach that could conceivably give rise to a third party claim, it is useful to focus, just by way of example, on 'a breach of the obligations to pay money', which is expressly included within the scope of clause 11.3. Clauses relevant to the obligation to pay money are set out below. It will be noted that under the Second Sale Agreement, the obligations of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla to pay money are, for the most part, obligations to pay money to ACB Co Vendor, but there are a few instances where there is some potential for a third party claim to arise:
Payment obligation of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla
Going concern
...should any amount (including any resultant interest or penalty) be assessed as payable by the Vendor on account of GST as a consequence of any supply made by the Vendor to the Purchaser under this Deed (a "GST amount") the Purchaser must pay the Vendor such GST Amount within 10 Business Days after notice has been given to the Purchaser of such GST Amount. The Vendor may, prior to payment, nominate in writing that all or part of the GST Amount is to be paid to the Australian Taxation Office in lieu of the Vendor. ...
[i.e., some potential for a third party claim to arise]
Calculation of the Purchase Price
The purchase price for the purchase of the Business (other than the Stock...) is $1,000,000, payable as follows ...
[i.e., payable by instalments to the Vendor]
Sale of Stock
The purchase price for the Stock[1895] will be payable 12 months from Completion in the amount calculated pursuant to the Stocktake under clause 6.
[i.e., payable to the Vendor]
Interest
Interest will be payable upon:
(a) late payments of the purchase price instalments...
(b) any other outstanding amounts (other than amounts due for purchases of products which are not yet due for payment)...
[i.e., in each case, payable to the Vendor]
Dispute Resolution
The costs of the Expert [selected to resolve any disputes on the Completion Statements] will be borne by the parties in accordance with the Expert's determination.
[i.e., some potential for a third party claim to arise]
Indemnities
The Purchaser shall indemnify the Vendor with respect to any claim arising out of the Purchaser's offer of employment with the Purchaser and/or the Employees' employment with the Purchaser.[1898]
[i.e., some potential for a third party claim to arise]
Assignment and novation
To ensure that following Completion the Purchaser or Achilla (or both) as far as practicable obtains supplies of starch, inks, waste, energy and other similar materials and services at prices and on other terms which are no worse than those upon which the Vendor obtains the same, for a period up to 12 months following Completion the Vendor will order such materials and services on behalf of the Purchaser or Achilla and the Purchaser or Achilla will pay such suppliers direct or will promptly reimburse the Vendor in respect of the same. ...
[i.e., some potential for a third party claim to arise]
Supply by Vendor of raw materials
... Achilla (and if appropriate the Purchaser) will for that period obtain all supplies of Products from the Vendor ....[at D & D + margin]
[i.e., amounts for supply of raw materials are payable to the Vendor]
1538 Thus, in the case of obligations to pay money, there is the potential for a third party claim to arise in circumstances where:
• ACB Co Vendor nominates (under clause 2.2(b)) and directs ACB Co Purchaser to pay a GST amount directly to the Australian Taxation Office in lieu of to the Vendor and ACB Co Purchaser fails to pay same.
• An expert appointed under clause 6.5(f) to resolve any disputes on the Completion Statements directs that the costs of the Expert will be borne by the parties in accordance with the Expert's determination and ACB Co Purchaser fails to pay its share.
• Under clause 7.3.2, in the case of any employee who transfers across to ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, and makes a claim related to his or her employment.
• Under cl 9.1(d), in the period up to 12 months following Completion the Vendor orders supplies of starch, inks, waste, energy and other similar materials and services on behalf of the Purchaser or Achilla and the Purchaser or Achilla fail to pay such suppliers direct.
1539 Accordingly, it cannot be said that by construing the expression 'Claim' as confined to third party claims would entail the consequence that it has no possible application and would effectively render the indemnity of no utility.
1540 When regard is had to the Second Sale Agreement as a whole and the various contexts in which the defined expression 'Claim' and the undefined 'claim' are used throughout the agreement, it is possible in most cases to discern the underlying logic to the approach taken.
1541 Under clause 9.5 of the Second Sale Agreement, headed 'Breaches before and after Completion', indemnities are given by each of ACB Co Vendor on the one hand, and ACB Co Purchaser on the other in respect of 'Claim[s]' as follows:
(a) With effect as at Completion, the Vendor warrants that it is not aware of, and has no reason to believe that there are any facts or circumstances which may give rise to, any Claim against the Vendor by any party which is a party to any of the Contracts.[1899]
(b) The Purchaser indemnifies the Vendor from and against all actions, suits, Claims, demands, losses, obligations, liabilities and damages arising directly or indirectly after Completion.
(c) The Vendor indemnifies the Purchaser from and against all actions, suits, Claims, demands, losses, obligations, liabilities and damages arising directly or indirectly prior to Completion.
(emphasis added)
1542 It will be noted that in each of clauses 9.5(b) and 9.5(c), the draftsman has used the expression 'Claims' but has added in also 'all actions, suits, Claims, demands, losses, obligations, liabilities and damages arising directly or indirectly',[1900] presumably to ensure a wider coverage. Indeed, these additional words would be superfluous and unnecessary if the defined expression 'Claim' was all embracing.
1543 Clause 10 of the Second Sale Agreement deals with 'Warranties and indemnity'. Under clause 10.1, each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla provided an indemnity in favour of the Vendor, framed in the following terms:
10.1 Indemnity by Purchaser and Achilla
Each of Purchaser and Achilla unconditionally and irrevocably indemnifies the Vendor from and against all actions, suits, claims, demands, losses, obligations, Liabilities and damages whether arising directly or indirectly, and any costs, charges and expenses incurred in connection with:
(a) any breach of this Deed by the Purchaser or Achilla or both; and
(b) any breach of the Contracts by the Purchaser or Achilla or both after Completion, including those referred to in clause 9.1 above.
(emphasis added)
1544 It will be noted that the phraseology used in clause 10.1 ('all actions, suits, claims, demands, losses, obligations, Liabilities and damages whether arising directly or indirectly') resembles that used in clauses 9.5(b) and 9.5(c) ('all actions, suits, Claims, demands, losses, obligations, liabilities and damages arising directly or indirectly'), save that clause 10.1 uses the undefined 'claims' and the defined expression 'Liabilities'[1901] whereas clauses 9.5(b) and 9.5(c) use the defined 'Claims' and the un defined expression 'liabilities'.
1545 Clause 10.4 sets out certain 'General Limitations' upon the 'Claim[s]' that ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla were entitled to make against the Vendor in respect of any matter, as follows:
10.4 General Limitations
Without in any way limiting clauses 10.2 [Warranties by Vendor], 10.3 [No reliance by Purchaser on other matters] and 10.5 [Statutory actions], neither the Purchaser nor Achilla will be entitled to make any Claim in respect of any matter:
(a) in the public domain;
(b) which would be revealed by a search of any public records held by, or by making enquiries of, any Government Agency including the Australian Securities & Investments Commission;
(c) which would be apparent from an inspection of the Assets;
(d) which the Purchaser or Achilla, any of their respective shareholders, any of their respective Related Bodies Corporate or their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, or advisers is aware of if it makes reasonable enquiries in the circumstances; and
(e) which the Purchaser or Achilla, any of their respective shareholders, any of their respective Related Bodies Corporate or their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, or advisers ought reasonably to be aware of as affecting a business similar to the Business and all matters which are a matter of public record or within the public domain.
(emphasis added)
1546 As the Amcor parties observe, if the expression 'Claim' were limited to 'third party claims', as contended for by the Holihan parties, clause 10.4 would be rendered nonsensical, simply because it would not be possible for either ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, as parties to the Second Sale Agreement, to bring a 'Claim'.
1547 Clause 10.6 sets out the obligations of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla in the event that any claim, demand or legal proceedings are served, presumably by a third party, which may lead to liability on the part of ACB Co Vendor. Clause 10.6 provides as follows:
10.6 Obligations of the Purchaser
(a) Within 10 Business Days of receiving any claim or demand or being served with any legal proceedings which may lead to liability on the part of the Vendor under any Claim, the Purchaser or Achilla must give written notice to the Vendor setting out full details of the claim, demand or legal proceedings.
(b) The Purchaser and Achilla must not allow any Related Body Corporate of the Purchaser or Achilla to accept, compromise or pay any claim or demand or agree to arbitrate, compromise or settle any legal proceedings which may lead to liability on the part of the Vendor under any Claim without the prior written approval of the Vendor.
(c) Upon receiving from the Vendor an indemnity against all loss which may result the Purchaser and Achilla must take and must ensure that each Related Body Corporate of the Purchaser and Achilla takes any action and provides any assistance the Vendor reasonably requires to avoid, contest, compromise or defend any claim, demand or legal proceedings which may lead to loss on the part of the Vendor under any Claim including, but not limited to:
(i) providing witnesses and documentary or other evidence; and
(ii) allowing the Vendor and its legal advisers to inspect and take copies of all relevant books, records, files and documents.
(d) The Vendor will not be liable to the Purchaser or Achilla for a Claim unless the Purchaser and Achilla comply with the obligations of the Purchaser and Achilla under this clause 10.6 in relation to that Claim.
(emphasis added)
1548 As will be apparent, each of the defined expression 'Claims' and the undefined 'claim' is used throughout clause 10.6. It would appear that under paragraph (a), once a 'claim' or demand or legal proceeding is served, the Purchaser or Achilla is required to ascertain whether it 'may lead to liability on the part of the Vendor under any Claim', and if so, 'give written notice to the Vendor setting out full details of the claim, demand or legal proceedings'. When read as a whole, the drafting of paragraph (a), and the juxtaposition of 'claim' and 'Claim' strongly suggests that the defined expression is narrower in scope than the undefined 'claim'.
1549 In paragraphs (b) and (c), a similar pattern is evident in the drafting. Paragraph (d) then turns to address the position of the Vendor and confirms that the Vendor will only be liable to the Purchaser or Achilla for a 'Claim' where the Purchaser or Achilla have complied with their obligations under clause 10.6 in relation to that Claim. Here again, the drafting conveys the impression that a 'Claim' which may involve liability on the part of the Vendor is a subset of the wider category of 'claim' or 'demand' or 'legal proceedings' that might be served upon ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla.
1550 Clause 10.7 contains acknowledgements on the part of each of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla concerning the opportunity to inspect the Assets offered for sale, that each has relied on its own investigations and assessment, and not relied on any representation. Further, in clause 10.7(a)(i)(C), each acknowledges that:
it will bring no Claim against the Vendor or its Related Bodies Corporate, officers, employees, agents or advisers about the dimensions, description, condition, fitness for use, safety or legal compliance status of the Assets.
(emphasis added)
1551 Here again, as with clause 10.4, the Amcor parties observe that if 'Claim' were limited to 'third party claims', clause 10.7 would be rendered nonsensical, simply because it would not be possible for either ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, as parties to the Second Sale Agreement, to bring a 'Claim'.
1552 Against this background, there is an inconsistency between the meaning of 'Claim' conveyed by clauses 10.4 and 10.7 on the one hand and that conveyed by clauses 9.5(b) and 9.5(c), 10.1 and 10.6 on the other. In the case of each of clauses 10.4 and 10.7 it is clear that 'the context otherwise requires' such that the definition in clause 1.1 would not apply. But otherwise a coherent and logical meaning is conveyed by the use of the word 'Claim' throughout the Second Sale Agreement in circumstances where it is construed as meaning 'third party claims'.
1553 For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the Holihan parties' submission that the expression 'Claim' in clause 1.1, and thus the indemnity in clause 11.3, in each case is limited to 'third party claims'. It follows that the matters pleaded in Parts G, H3 and H4 of the Amcor parties' defence to counterclaim do not give rise to a 'Claim' (within the meaning of that term in clause 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession) against which Mr Holihan would be required to indemnify APA.
Issue 19(b)****: Was any liability of Mr Holihan discharged by the tender of the final instalment of the purchase price?
1554 As noted earlier, the Holihan parties contend that their offer to pay APA (via its solicitors) the sum of $300,000 before 30 July 2008 constituted an effective tender of the balance of the purchase price. They say that ACB Co Purchaser was ready, willing and able to tender the final instalment of the purchase price when it fell due, but the Amcor parties rejected their approach and thereby dispensed with the need for them to tender in unequivocal terms. Accordingly, the Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties' wrongful refusal of their offer operated to discharge Mr Holihan's liability under the guarantee.
1555 Further they say, in 2012, after Vickery J determined that ACB Co Purchaser was not liable to the Amcor parties on the claims then made, the Amcor parties again refused to accept the proffered tender of the outstanding purchase price.
1556 The Holihan parties submit that 'the tender of the amount owed by the principal debtor will discharge a guarantor of liability under the guarantee, even if the tender is improperly refused: Williamson v Tait[1902] and Williamson v Tait.[1903]' And that 'it follows that where the creditor has dispensed with the requirement for tender, the guarantor must likewise be discharged.'[1904]
1557 In Williamson v Tait,[1905] bonds given by the directors of a gold mining company were to be held as collateral security for a loan secured by a mortgage over the company's plant. Upon default by the company, the plaintiff lender exercised the power of sale but before the sale was completed, the company tendered the sum secured by the mortgage. The plaintiff refused the tender on the ground that it was too late, as he had by then found a purchaser. Afterwards, through no fault of the plaintiff, but by the fault of the mortgagor company, the sale went off and the plaintiff then sued the directors on their bonds. The defendants pleaded as an answer to the plaintiff's claim the tender by the mortgagor company of the amount of the advance secured by the bill of sale over the company's plant and the bonds, and the plaintiff's refusal to accept it.
1558 The case proceeded by way of a special case stated by Hood J. The question to be decided was whether the tender by the mortgagor of the money due to the plaintiff was an answer to the plaintiff's claim in the action. The Full Court (Higinbotham CJ and Hood J; A'Beckett J dissenting) held that the tender was not a good tender because it was made too late and accordingly, that it did not operate to discharge the defendants from their obligations under the bonds. Higinbotham CJ noted that there was no question that the tender was made after the property had passed, and stated:
If there has been default, followed by a valid though not enforceable sale by the mortgagee changing the property, a tender by the mortgagor is, in my opinion, clearly too late and is a bad tender. The mortgagor, on making a valid tender, is entitled to receive from the mortgagee, not merely possession of the goods, but the goods themselves free from any charge or encumbrance. ... The mortgagee, after default and before tender, exercised the power of sale given to him by the mortgage. I think that he had a right to do this, and that he was not deprived of that right by the fact that he could not enforce the sale against the will of the purchaser. My answer to the question reserved is, that the tender of the money in this case is not an answer to the claim of the plaintiff, and that the defendants are not discharged by the tender from their obligations on their bonds.[1906]
1559 Hood J likewise found that the power of sale having been bona fide exercised prior to the tender of the money, there was no basis to find that the mortgagors were entitled to compel the mortgagee to repudiate his honest bargain entered into with the purchaser.[1907]
1560 The Holihan parties appear to rely on this case for the inferred or unstated proposition that if the tender had been made in a timely way, then the Court would have found that the tender was effective to discharge the defendants from their obligations under the bonds. They argue that ACB Co Purchaser was ready, willing and able to tender the final instalment as and when it fell due, but when the Amcor parties made clear that they would not discharge the charge contemporaneously, the Amcor parties rendered it unnecessary for ACB Co Purchaser to tender the sum in unequivocal terms. Then, by analogy with Williamson v Tait, the Holihan parties submit that the Amcor parties' wrongful refusal of the tender in July 2008 operated to discharge Mr Holihan's liability under the guarantee.
1561 In Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd,[1908] the High Court had occasion to consider the circumstances in which a surety will be discharged from liability under a contract of suretyship. The plurality, having noted that 'support can be found in the authorities for a variety of discordant propositions relating to the discharge of the surety,' then proceeded to state briefly what their Honours regarded as the relevant principles of the general law of contract as they apply to the discharge of the surety's obligation, as follows:
Breach of an essential term or a breach going to the root of the contract will of course discharge the surety from future liability if the surety elects to rescind for breach. The expression "essential term" perhaps needs some elaboration in the context of suretyship because it is said sometimes that a surety is discharged by non-fulfilment of a condition precedent and at other times that a surety is discharged by the creditor's breach of a condition. A condition precedent may be unfulfilled without any breach of contract, but when performance by the creditor of a contractual promise is a condition precedent to the liability of the surety under a contract of suretyship which otherwise involves no more than a guarantee of payment of the debt owing to that creditor, the creditor's promise is necessarily an essential term of the contract. The terms of the contract itself demonstrate that the surety would not have entered into the contract of suretyship unless he had been assured of a strict performance of the promise: see Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd v Luna Park (NSW) Ltd; Associated Newspapers Ltd v Bancks; DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v. Mona Homes Pty Ltd.
Conversely, when a contractual promise is a condition, performance of the promise, if the promisee so elects, is treated as a condition precedent to the promisee's executory obligations. ...
In the context of suretyship contracts there has been a natural tendency to refer to the creditor's promise as a condition precedent rather than as a condition. This is because many guarantees are unilateral instruments, containing no promises on the part of the creditor except in so far as the recital of the consideration may refer to such a promise ... which, though not involving a guarantee, concerned a unilateral undertaking. ...
In deciding whether a promise has the status and effect of a condition, courts are not too ready to construe a term as a condition and, at least where other considerations are finely balanced, will hold that a term is of such a kind that breach of it does not give rise to an automatic right to rescind. This approach is explained by a preference for a construction that will encourage performance rather than avoidance of contractual obligations.[1909]
1562 Their Honours then turned to examine the 'special principle' said to apply in the case of a suretyship contract that 'the surety is discharged from its obligations by the creditor's breach of that contract, so long at any rate as the breach materially prejudices the interests of the surety.'[1910] In the course of doing so, they observed that the authorities demonstrate that the 'special principle' is 'the by-product, not so much of the general law of contract, as of the special relationship between creditor and surety arising out of the suretyship contract upon which equity fastened to protect the surety when the creditor's conduct affected the surety's liability.'[1911] They referred to Croydon Gas Co v Dickinson[1912] as being a case in which the creditor had, by arrangement with the debtor, altered the relationship by 'extending the time within which the debtor was bound to make payments, the arrangement being made without the surety's assent.'[1913]
According to the English cases, the principle applies so as to discharge the surety when conduct on the part of the creditor has the effect of altering the surety's rights, unless the alteration is unsubstantial and not prejudicial to the surety. The rule does not permit the courts to inquire into the effect of the alteration. The consequence is that, to hold the surety to its bargain, the creditor must show that the nature of the alteration can be beneficial to the surety only or that by its nature it cannot in any circumstances increase the surety's risk, e.g., a reduction in the debtor's debt or in the interest payable by the surety. The mere possibility of detriment is enough to bring about the discharge of the surety.
The foundation of the rule is that the creditor, by varying the principal contract or extending time, has altered the surety's rights without consulting it though the surety has an interest in the principal contract, and that the creditor cannot be permitted to do: see Rees v. Berrington. Thus the liability of the surety was seen to be strictissimi juris and the suretyship contract was construed strictly in his favour. In the United States the rule of strict construction, though applied in favour of sureties who receive no reward, is not applied to a compensated surety, i.e., a surety for reward. On the contrary the suretyship contract is construed against the compensated surety. This is largely because surety bonds are thought to resemble insurance contracts, the premiums are calculated against estimated risks and the contracts incorporate forms prepared by the surety. The United States approach may be partly due to a belief that the rule of strict construction, as it has been applied in England, is over-zealous in its protection of the surety: see ...[citations omitted] According to the law as it has developed in the United States, the surety company must show some injury before it will be absolved from the contract ..., and then it will be discharged pro tanto to the extent of the damage or prejudice it suffers: American Jurisprudence (2d) vol. 74, "Suretyship", s259. In accordance with this approach, a surety company is discharged by the creditor giving the debtor an extension of time only if it is shown that the extension is a material variance in the sense that it results in material harm or prejudice to the surety: Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co. [1914]
1564 Against that background, their Honours articulated the approach to be adopted when determining whether or not a surety will be discharged from liability under a contract of suretyship, as follows:
If the surety is to be discharged for breach of a promissory term in the suretyship contract, the justification for the discharge must be that the creditor has failed to comply with a provision that, as a matter of interpretation, requires strict performance as a condition precedent to the surety's obligation or at least requires substantial performance of the promise such that the surety would not have entered into the contract if it had not been assured that there would not be a breach such as the breach which in fact occurred. If on its true interpretation the term is not intended so to operate, it is not easy to understand why the surety should be discharged by its breach. Of course, in construing the contract the court is entitled to look to the general setting in which the contract has come into existence: see, for example, the discussion in Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Hansen-Tangen.[1915]
1565 The plurality found that in the circumstances of the case, the relevant obligations in the two provisions in question were to be treated as conditions, breach of which, at Ankar's option, discharged it from performance under the Security Deposit Agreement to the extent to which they related to the sum of $125,000 (paid by Ankar to Lombard pursuant to the terms of the Security Deposit Agreement).
1566 Deane J reached the same result, but on the ground that the surety was automatically discharged by the owner's breach. In the course of his reasons, his Honour separately examined at some length the 'special principle' or 'special rule' that is said to apply in the case of a suretyship contract. He stated:
If the breach by the creditor is of an essential or fundamental term or constitutes repudiation of the contract between the surety and himself, the surety will, of course, be entitled to rescind the contract in accordance with general principle. That is not, however, the special rule which is here under discussion. That special rule is that, in the ordinary case where a surety agrees to be liable for the default of another upon the terms of the contract of suretyship, a significant departure by the creditor from the terms of that contract will, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, operate to preclude the existence or continued existence of the circumstances in which the surety has agreed to be bound. That being so, there is no need for the surety to rescind the contract for repudiation or breach of an essential or fundamental term. In the absence of any question of waiver or estoppel, the situation is simply that the circumstances of his liability as surety do not exist (cf., e.g., United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd. v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd; Eshelby v Federated European Bank, Ltd; Bank of British Columbia v Turbo Resources Ltd; Corporation of Chatham v McCrea; Sullivan v Willson; but note e.g., Bank of Montreal v Wilder). In some of the cases, one finds that the promissory obligations of the creditor under the surety agreement are described as conditions precedent of the surety's liability. While the difference would seem to be of little real importance, it is preferable to speak of those promissory obligations in terms of their constituting part of the general circumstances in which the surety has agreed to become liable for the default of the principal debtor rather than to categorize them as conditions precedent. One reason for that is the obvious difficulty in reconciling the unqualified fulfilment required of a true condition precedent with the apparently established qualification to the effect that an obviously immaterial and insignificant failure by the creditor fully to discharge his promissory obligations will not preclude the liability of the surety (see below). A more fundamental reason is that the basis and, for present purposes, the limits of the rights and liabilities of the parties to the particular relationship of guarantor and principal creditor are consensual and it is impermissible to approach the identification of the special rules defining the prima facie limits of the consensual rights and liabilities of the parties to a particular category of relationship in a way that effectively denies their special character by forcing them into the formalized terms appropriate to the expression of universal principle. Put differently, special rules which prima facie (in the sense of being subject to contrary agreement) define the rights and liabilities of the parties to a particular category of consensual relationship, such as that between guarantor and creditor or that between partners, are essentially concerned with presumptions of contractual intention. There is no warrant, either in principle or in utility, for distorting them into statements of immutable and overriding principle.[1916]
1567 Turning then to the guarantee given by Mr Holihan to ACB Co Vendor in clause 11.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, it will be seen that Mr Holihan 'unconditionally and irrevocably' guaranteed the 'due and punctual performance and observance' by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations under, or in connection with, the Second Sale Agreement 'including all obligations to pay money' but subject to a 'maximum total liability' of no more than $200,000. And if ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla did not comply with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement, then Mr Holihan 'agree[d] to comply with those obligations within 60 days of being required to do so by the Vendor.'
1568 As will be noted, the guarantee is not enlivened unless ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla failed to comply with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement.
1569 In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that in the case of the final instalment of purchase price, ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, through their solicitors, were pro-active in seeking to make arrangements to facilitate payment of the final instalment and discharge of the Charge contemporaneous with payment. However, in response, the solicitors for the Amcor parties refused to accept payment of the final instalment and refused to provide a release of the Charge.
1570 Mr Holihan contracted with ACB Co Vendor to provide a guarantee of the 'due and punctual performance and observance' by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations. He did so in a context where the term of the Second Sale Agreement, and in particular, the date for payment of the instalments of purchase price, was to expire on or about 30 July 2008. In my view, in circumstances where ACB Co Purchaser (or Achilla) has (or is to be regarded as having) complied with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement, Mr Holihan's obligation to guarantee the 'due and punctual performance and observance' by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations is simply not enlivened. That is, the pre-condition to ACB Co Vendor (or APA) being able to call upon the guarantee has not been satisfied, nor has ACB Co Vendor (or APA) invoked clause 11.2 and 'required' Mr Holihan 'to comply with those obligations'.
1571 If, however, a different view of the evidence were taken, and it was found that there is scope in the present case to find that ACB Co Purchaser (or Achilla) had not complied with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement, and also that ACB Co Vendor (or APA) had given notice to Mr Holihan requiring him to comply with those obligations, such that the guarantee is enlivened, then the question arises of whether the 'tender' in July 2008 operated or was effective to discharge Mr Holihan from his surety obligations. In my view, it was effective to do so, essentially for the reasons of principle given by the High Court in Ankar. The rejection by ACB Co Vendor (or APA) of the 'tender' made in a timely way by ACB Co Purchaser, operated to preclude the existence or continued existence of the circumstances in which Mr Holihan, as surety, had agreed to be bound. That being so, for the reasons given by Deane J, there was no need for Mr Holihan to rescind the contract for repudiation or breach of an essential or fundamental term. Rather, the position is that the circumstances of his liability as surety do not exist.
Issue 19(c)****: Does the Anshun doctrine preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the claims in section H of the cross-claim?
1572 This issue has been re-numbered by the Holihan parties as Issue 20, as it is more convenient to deal with it separately from the issues of construction raised by the other parts of Issue 19.
Issue 19(d)****: Is Mr Holihan liable to APA for any loss?
1573 This issue is said to be a 'catch all' for the remaining questions as to whether Mr Holihan is liable to APA for any loss under clause 11.2, and it only arises for determination if the Court finds that the guarantee has not been discharged.
1574 The guarantee given by Mr Holihan to the Vendor under clause 11.2 is expressed to be 'unconditional' and 'irrevocable', and in circumstances where ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla fail to perform their respective obligations duly and punctually, Mr Holihan has guaranteed to comply within 60 days of being requested to do so by the Vendor.
1575 Mr Holihan gave evidence that he has never been called upon to comply with any obligation of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla under the Second Sale Agreement. In his witness statement, he said:
Claim on guarantee
[357] Save for payment of the final instalment of the purchase price (which was refused by Amcor in the circumstances described above) I am not aware of any obligation of ACB Purchaser and/or Achilla under the Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession) as not having been complied with.
[358] APA has never called on me, directly or through my legal representatives, by demand or otherwise, to comply with any obligation of ACB Purchaser and/or Achilla under the Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession).
1577 In their closing written submissions, the Amcor parties seek to characterise the exchange of correspondence that took place between their solicitors and the solicitors for the Holihan parties regarding payment of the final instalment of purchase price as being 'in substance a call upon Mr Holihan', contending that '[t]hat is the only way in which he could be made liable to pay the instalment, which remains unpaid.'[1917]
1578 Logically, the correspondence relied upon by the Amcor parties is a reference to the letter from Corrs Chambers Westgarth to Mills Oakley dated 27 September 2012, in which the only relevant content that might be considered a request for payment of the principal sum was the following passage:
On receipt of both the $300,000 and the applicable amount of interest owed, our client will provide a release of its charge over your client's assets.[1918]
1579 Further, the Amcor parties say there is now real reason to be concerned about whether either ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla will have the funds to pay the sum of $300,000 notwithstanding that they have admitted it remains payable.[1919] Further, the Amcor parties submit:
Pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act it is appropriate to have this claim included in this matter given the number of years the parties have already been in litigation. That there has been litigation on foot does not at all make it unreasonable to call upon Mr Holihan under the guarantee. The $200,000 cap on the guarantee goes the distance in making the call not unreasonable. By contrast, it would be a gross injustice if the Holihan Parties at the end of this litigation advised the Amcor Parties that the companies did not have the funds to pay the last instalment amount they admit is owing.[1920]
1580 In my view, when the relevant correspondence between the solicitors is read in the context in which the exchange took place, it is clear that it does not constitute a 'call' upon Mr Holihan under the guarantee. To be sure, Mills Oakley were at the relevant time apparently acting as the solicitors for each of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan. But as the (alleged) 'call' made reference to payment of 'both the $300,000 and the applicable amount of interest owed', it far exceeded the maximum liability of Mr Holihan under the guarantee, and was incapable of constituting a valid call upon Mr Holihan.
1581 The Holihan parties contend that where liability under a guarantee is contingent on demand being made of the guarantor, there is implied in the contract of guarantee an obligation that demand be given within a reasonable time following default.[1921] They submit that if the non-payment of the final instalment of the purchase price constituted an event of default, the default occurred on 31 July 2008 and to date Mr Holihan has not been required to make payment of the sum of $200,000 by way of compliance (or part compliance) with the obligations of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla to pay the final instalment (of $300,000) under the Second Sale Agreement.[1922]
1582 In circumstances where the guarantee given was framed in terms directed to achieving the due and punctual performance of the obligations of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla under the Second Sale Agreement, including all obligations to pay money, were it not the case that the guarantee has been found to have been discharged, it would in my view be unreasonable for the guarantee to now be called on.
Issue 19(e)****: Is Achilla liable to APA for any loss?
17.2 The Purchaser and Achilla
Obligations, covenants, responsibilities and the like expressed on the part of the Purchaser and Achilla, or the Purchaser or Achilla, will bind them jointly and severally.
1584 The Holihan parties do not dispute that in the event ACB Co Purchaser is found liable for any loss, then clause 17.2 applies to make Achilla jointly and severally liable for such loss. However, they deny that there is any loss for which ACB Co Purchaser is liable.
Issue 20**: Does the Anshun doctrine or abuse of process preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the cross claims in section H?**
1585 In their reply, the Holihan parties plead that the 'change of control' allegations made by the Amcor parties under Part H of their defence to Achilla's counterclaim raise issues that:
[58] ...
(a) were relevant to the subject matter of Supreme Court of Victoria proceeding 8181 of 2007 [i.e., the principal proceeding heard by Vickery J];
(b) could have been raised at or before the trial of that proceeding by Amcor, APA and ACB Co Vendor, had they exercised reasonable diligence; and
(c) it was unreasonable of Amcor, APA and ACB Co Vendor not to have raised at that time -
with the effect that Amcor, APA and ACB Co Vendor are now estopped from making those allegations pursuant to the principle in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589.
1586 Further, they plead that those allegations are an abuse of process, as follows:
[59] By Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal proceeding numbered S APCI 2012 0045, Amcor, APA and ACB Co Vendor seek orders including orders that the Second Sale Agreement be set aside.
[60] By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 58 and 59 above, the allegations pleaded under heading H of the FADFAC are abusive of the process of the Court, such that Amcor, APA and ACB Co Vendor ought be refused the right to rely on them.
1587 The Holihan parties repeat these allegations, so far as relevant, by way of response to the similar allegations made by the Amcor parties in their cross-claim.
Anshun estoppel - applicable legal principles
1588 There is no dispute between the parties as to the legal principles applicable to Anshun estoppel. The form of estoppel nowadays referred to as 'Anshun estoppel' has its origin in, or is an emanation of, the 'Henderson principle' enunciated by Sir James Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson in the following terms:
where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.[1923]
1589 More than a century later, in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd,[1924] Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ in their seminal joint judgment effectively re-stated the relevant test in the modern Australian context. In Anshun, against the background of Henderson v Henderson, and later cases applying the Henderson principle in which courts had spoken in terms of it being an abuse of process to allow a new proceeding because the issue in question was so clearly part of the subject matter of the initial litigation that it could have been raised, their Honours observed that the abuse of process test is 'not one of great utility.' Rather, they said:
In this situation we would prefer to say that there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding. In this respect, we need to recall that there are a variety of circumstances, some referred to in the earlier cases, why a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings e.g. expense, importance of the particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few. ...
It has generally been accepted that a party will be estopped from bringing an action which, if it succeeds, will result in a judgment which conflicts with an earlier judgment. ...
...
The likelihood that the omission to plead a defence will contribute to the existence of conflicting judgments is obviously an important factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the omission to plead can found an estoppel against the assertion of the same matter as a foundation for a cause of action in a second proceeding. By "conflicting' judgments we include judgments which are contradictory, though they may not be pronounced on the same cause of action. It is enough that they appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect of the same transaction.
It is for this reason that we regard the judgment that the Authority seeks to obtain as one which would conflict with the existing judgment, though the new judgment would be based on a different cause of action, a contractual indemnity.[1925]
1590 In Anshun, their Honours upheld the conclusion of the Full Court that there was an estoppel essentially because the contractual indemnity matter sought to be agitated by the Authority 'was a defence to Anshun's claim in the first action'. Their Honours found that:
It was so closely connected with the subject matter of that action that it was to be expected that it would be relied upon as a defence to that claim and as a basis for recovery by the Authority from Anshun. The third party procedures were introduced to enable this to be done. If successful, the indemnity case would have obviated an enquiry into contribution. If reserved for assertion in a later action, it would increase costs and give rise to a conflicting judgment.[1926]
1591 In the 35 years since, there have been a raft of cases in which the courts have had to grapple with difficult questions of whether claims of Anshun estoppel are made out in the context of the facts presented in the particular case. And, as the Amcor parties observe in their written submissions in this proceeding, while much of what has been written addresses facts specific to the individual case presented before the court, the principles that emerge are to the effect that:
The courts look to substance over form,[1927] determining whether Anshun estoppel applies in the light of "realities",[1928] "practicalities"[1929] and "the proper conduct of modern litigation."[1930] The courts make a "broad merits-based judgment", taking into account "the public and private interests involved" and "all the facts of the case".[1931]
1592 Importantly, in the recent decision of the High Court in Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) v Collins,[1932] the plurality reiterated that an Anshun estoppel 'is not based upon degrees of similarity, which may be a matter of impression'[1933] but rather on considerations of relevance and reasonableness. Their Honours said:
It was made clear in Anshun that there could be no estoppel "unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it" (emphasis added).[1934]
1593 In Victoria, with the introduction of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic),[1935] the notion of the 'proper conduct of modern litigation' and the public interests at stake would also include the 'overarching purpose' of facilitating the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute' to which practitioners, parties and the Court must give effect.[1936] In substance, the Civil Procedure Act reinforces the traditional rationales for Anshun estoppel, which include avoiding inconsistent judgments,[1937] avoiding multiplicity of proceedings[1938] and promoting 'the efficient use of court resources and time'.[1939]
The Court of Appeal granted leave to bring the cross-claim
1594 In the present case, some time after the delivery of judgment in the principal proceeding (which took place on 20 March 2012), in the course of attending to interlocutory steps pertaining to the counterclaim, the Holihan parties sought and obtained (on 22 April 2013) leave to amend their counterclaim, so as to introduce allegations of an implied supply agreement, estoppel by convention and release of the Charge. A little later, on 20 June 2013, the Amcor parties also sought leave to amend their defence to the Achilla counterclaim and to introduce a cross-claim and join Mr Holihan as a defendant to the cross-claim. Vickery J, in an ex tempore ruling, allowed the application in part, including the joinder of Mr Holihan, but importantly for present purposes, refused leave in respect of the suite of allegations made in (what is now) Part H of the Amcor parties' pleading.
1595 The Amcor parties then sought leave to appeal. On 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeal granted leave and having done so then allowed the appeal.[1940] In effect, their Honours said that when regard is had to the matter overall and the submissions made, they were 'persuaded that the allowance of the amendments would not cause the respondents irremediable prejudice' and that the new issue (apparently a reference to the change of control) could be run without injustice or prejudice to the Holihan parties.[1941]
1596 The Court of Appeal noted that in the principal proceeding, which was the trial of both the Hodgson proceeding (No. 9420 of 2004) and the Barnes proceeding (No. 8181 of 2007), Vickery J made 'severe adverse findings against the former employees on account of the deception engaged in to conceal their actions' and that in this regard, the position of Mr Holihan differed somewhat from that of Mr Barnes and the other individuals. In short, their Honours said, 'the judge accepted that Holihan had not known that Amcor employees acquired interests in ACB.'[1942] Amcor has appealed from the principal judgment but the appeal has not yet been heard.
1597 In the course of their reasons, their Honours referred to and commented upon an observation made by Counsel for the Holihan parties at the outset of his submissions concerning 'Anshun' estoppel. They said:
[50] At the outset of his submissions counsel for the respondents said that his Honour had determined the case "on a matter ... properly described as prejudice. Not in the usual manner of prejudice for amendments, but prejudice which was more akin to Anshun". Nevertheless, counsel did not press this contention, recognising that Anshun was more appropriately to be pleaded as a defence. Indeed, it was not appropriate to ask this Court to engage in the analysis that a defence based on Anshun would require. That was particularly so as his Honour had declined to deal with the contention, which meant we were without the benefit of the trial judge's consideration of the issue.[1943]
1598 Their Honours continued, noting that with the separation of the trial of the counterclaim from the principal proceeding 'there was a risk that inconsistent findings might be made on the subsequent determination of the issues raised in the proceeding by counterclaim.'[1944] Further, their Honours said:
[54] Anyway, what has happened in the conduct of the case has happened. His Honour has delivered the Principal Judgment, with findings on which the Amcor parties wish to rely in the establishment of the claims in their proposed amendments. Whether the subject amendments are made or not, those findings will stand unless and to the extent they are set aside on appeal. But they will not be set aside. The respondents have not appealed against them. The Amcor parties have appealed but not against the relevant findings, which they accept, and base their amendments upon.
[55] The Amcor parties do not, by the amendments, seek relief on a basis that is inconsistent with the findings. The issue sought to be raised is one of control in connection with the contractual change of control provisions. That is not the same as the question of 'interests', as to which the judge has made findings. The question of control would be determined in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances which include the 'interests' found in the trial judgment. It is a distinct point which has not been litigated. The findings in the Principal Judgment would not 'inhibit' the parties or the Court in this exercise; rather, they are, or are sought by the applicants to be, part of the facts with regard to which the Court would conclude on the issue of 'control'. But the issue is a new one and technically the parties are not bound by them for this purpose; that was common ground. Of course, insofar as the respondents are concerned, the findings could only 'inhibit' them if they wanted to run a case contrary to them, as it is open to them to do. But the case on control is a different case. If the amendments are made, at a trial the respondents can go into evidence and ask questions as to the practical matter of control and matters that bear on that, without controverting the findings on 'interest'. On the matter of calling witnesses, and the former employees giving evidence, we accept the applicants' submission that those who relevantly gave evidence at the trial will need do so again on the Achilla Counterclaim. As to giving contrary evidence, the fact is that the evidence would be directed to a different point. Moreover, no evidence has been placed before us (or before the judge) that would indicate likely prejudice in this respect. In the circumstances, we consider that the matter of 'inhibition' did not warrant refusal of the application.
[56] The question of greater difficulty is whether the respondents might have conducted the case differently if the amendments had been made when the trial was conducted. That leads also to the question as to why the amendments had not been sought at that earlier time.
[57] It is convenient to commence with the latter point. Counsel sought to provide an understanding of the applicants' position at the earlier stage in the litigation. With that assistance we yet are now looking back with hindsight. In doing so there might seem force to the respondents' submission that the amendments could and should have been sought earlier.
[58] We consider, however, regarding the matter overall, that the position was otherwise for the reasons stated by the applicants. One commences with the fact that the applicants were under the disadvantage of having had sand thrown in their eyes, and that the fog did not become clear until the judge made his findings in the Principal Judgment. To be clear, his Honour's judgment for the first time disclosed to the applicants that interests had been relinquished in 2005, which exposed the basis for raising a breach of the change of control provisions. (A change of control is also alleged in 2004.) Thus it was that as a result of the defendants' concealment of facts, the applicants were not in a position to plead and run a case alleging 'change' in control. Hence, the Amcor parties' submissions (in the form of a 'draft judgment') did not mention 'control'. However, we do not entirely accept the applicants' submission that they were not in a position to raise the issue of control because the Implied Supply Agreement had only been raised by the respondents for the first time in April this year. For, while until then the applicants could not have pleaded to that allegation, they could have pleaded to the Second Sale Agreement, and that pleading would have been to the same effect.[1945]
1599 Their Honours then turned to address the difficult question of whether the Holihan parties might have conducted the trial differently if the amendments had then been made. In reaching their decision that the allowance of the amendments would not cause the respondents irremediable prejudice, their Honours said:
[63] While every allowance is to be made for the respondents' submissions, and for the difficulty after the event to identify how a case might have been conducted differently, it is important to keep steadily in mind the issue sought to be litigated. The claim sought to be made is for damages for breach of contract for loss of the chance to have taken steps that might have been taken had the relevant Amcor parties been aware of the change of control found by his Honour. If that case be established, damages assessed are also sought from Holihan under his guarantee and indemnity of the first and second respondents' obligations under the Second Sale Agreement and the Implied Supply Agreement. That is the case against Holihan. Thus understood, it is a narrow case, and quite different from the Amcor parties case at trial. And, so too, as mentioned is the change of control case against the first and second respondents; the scope of the evidence will depend on whether, and to the extent that, the question of control differs from the issue of 'interest'. How far it differs is at this stage a matter of pure speculation. Neither the parties nor the judge will be bound, in respect of the issue of 'control', by reason of the findings on 'interest'.
[64] These considerations lead us to the position that we do not accept that the case might have been conducted differently; in our view the possibility is not demonstrated.
[65] On an application to amend the party opposing amendment bears an evidential onus of adducing evidence on the question of prejudice, while the applicant for amendment bears the burden of persuasion that the amendment will not cause irremediable prejudice to the other party.
[66] Of course the prejudice to the applicants if the amendment is not permitted is obvious. But the question is whether the possibility of injustice or prejudice to the respondents has been excluded. If not the application must be refused. It must also be refused if the Court concludes that it cannot decide whether or not it is just to allow the amendments.[1946]
1600 Against that background, it seems clear that the Court of Appeal accepted that the issue of whether or not there was relevantly any Anshun estoppel of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties was a matter to be pleaded by them as a defence to the cross-claim, and thus one that would fall for determination by the trial judge hearing the counterclaim and cross-claim. Furthermore, as noted earlier, their Honours confirmed that at such hearing, neither the parties nor the judge would be bound, in respect of the issue of 'control', by reason of the findings made by Vickery J on 'interest'.[1947]
Was it 'unreasonable' for the Amcor parties not to have raised the change of control allegations in the principal proceeding?
1601 It is common ground that the change of control allegations were not raised in the principal proceeding before Vickery J.
1602 The evidence given by Ms McPherson about the conduct of the litigation from the time of her employment as Group General Counsel and Company Secretary for Amcor Limited in April 2005, her access to the Anton Piller documents from about April 2006, and the strategy adopted by the Amcor parties through to the present has been summarised earlier in these reasons. The evidence shows that Ms McPherson was very involved in the conduct of the litigation, including attending at the trial of the principal proceeding (albeit not every day), giving instructions to the external solicitors throughout the proceeding, and generally being made aware of and receiving information relevant to the proceeding such as the answers to interrogatories given by Mr Holihan.
1603 Under cross-examination, Ms McPherson said that within two or three months of her joining Amcor, she became aware that Mr Joyce had raised some concerns during his 'exit interview' in relation to the sale of the Service Packaging business (sold to Mr Hottes) , the ACB Business, the 'QuadPak business'[1948] and also in relation to the 'Gribbles and Davidson consultancy agreement'. Around the same time there was also some unusual correspondence from 'Adrian Walmsley'[1949] seeking consent to the transfer of shareholdings in Service Packaging, and then subsequently withdrawing his request for consent to the transmission of the shares. Then, in the mediation with Mr Hodgson, he asked that Amcor give a release to him, and each of Messrs Barnes, Mihelic, Bayley and Sangster and Carter Holt Harvey, which she said 'raised alarm bells' to her.[1950] All of this apparently prompted Ms McPherson to read the ACB Sale Agreement and the Service Packaging Agreement, and look at the QuadPak and Gribbles and Davidson arrangements for herself and then to seek advice from Senior Counsel. Following that meeting, she instructed a separate firm of external lawyers - Corrs Chambers Westgarth - with copies of the sale agreements and asked them to review them and let her know whether they thought they raised any issues for Amcor. That marked the beginning of the investigation into these transactions and these proceedings.[1951]
1604 In the Hodgson proceeding, which was heard and determined at the same time as the Barnes proceeding, the Amcor parties had pleaded in Confidential Annexure C to their Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 21 April 2006 that:
...
(c) acquired an interest in the ACB business for himself and/or entities associated with him, including, without limitation, Bankson, and concealed such interest or interests from the Defendant [Amcor] and from the Defendant's subsidiary company ACB;
(d) aided, abetted, counselled, procured and/or was otherwise knowingly involved in the acquisition of interests in the ACB business by Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and/or entities associated with them and concealed such interests from the Defendant and from the Defendant's subsidiary company ACB.
1605 Ms McPherson confirmed that these allegations, which were denied by Mr Hodgson, were made on her instructions 'with the advice of Allens Arthur Robinson based on the access that we were entitled to use the Anton Piller documents.'[1952] In cross-examination, Ms McPherson was tested about the basis for the Amcor parties making these allegations at that point, as follows:
[MR MAIDEN:] No, but you did have enough documents - you did have sufficient documents to make an accusation in legal proceedings that Mr Hodgson, Mr Barnes, Mr Mihelic, Mr Sangster and Mr Bayley had taken an interest in the company?---Yes, I did. However the supply agreement was with Mr Holihan.
Yes and you were aware of course that the taking of interests in that company and the effect of taking those interests is the subject of the change of control allegations that are presently being made in the cross-claim?---That's correct.[1953]
1606 Ms McPherson was also taken to an affidavit that she swore in the Hodgson proceeding in June 2007, where she deposed to the contents of her discussion with Mr Lachal in mid-2006 to the effect that:
[3.25](a) On 17 May 2006, Mr Lachal met Mr Holihan at Achilla's premises at Wetherill Park to discuss Amcor Limited's concern in relation to the terms of the ACB Sale Agreement and to communicate Amcor Limited's intention to procure the return to Amcor Limited of the ACB Business. During that discussion, Mr Holihan made statements to the following effect:
(i) that Mr Holihan was not the only owner of the ACB business;
(ii) that Mr Barnes owns 50% of the ACB Business and always has; and
(iii) that prior to the ACB Transaction, Mr Barnes had advised Mr Holihan that further undisclosed parties would (at the time of or shortly after the ACB Transaction) become owners of the ACB Business, in which case Mr Holihan's share in the ACB Business would be reduced to 20%, but that this situation did not eventuate and accordingly Mr Holihan continued to own 50% of the ACB business and Mr Barnes the other 50%.
(b) On 28 May 2006 [sic],[1954] Mr Lachal met Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan at Melbourne Airport to discuss further matters relating to the ACB Business, and during that discussion, Mr Barnes made a statement to the effect that Mr Barnes owns 50% of the ACB Business.
[3.26] Having regard to all of the information and circumstances I describe above in relation to the ACB Transaction, there appears to be a real likelihood that the terms of the ACB Transaction (including as set out in the ACB Sale Agreement) were not at 'arms length', and that the business of ACB was sold at an undervalue, on uncommercial terms and without any or sufficient knowledge on the part of the management of Amcor Limited of those terms or the true value of the assets sold. Having regard to the statements of Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes to Mr Lachal, I am concerned that Mr Barnes may have improperly obtained an interest in the ACB business at the time of or after its sale.[1955]
1607 Ms McPherson said that she was aware, shortly after Mr Lachal's meeting with Mr Holihan, that Mr Lachal was 'seriously shocked' when he learned that Mr Barnes had a 50 per cent interest in the ACB Business.[1956] She also said that when Mr Lachal reported back 'it was the first time that there had been, to my knowledge, any concession, anyone other than Craig Holihan, owned the ACB Business.'[1957] And under cross-examination, she accepted that this concession was a potentially valuable thing because it was the first occasion that she had a piece of evidence that not only suggested, but in fact admitted, that Mr Barnes had a 50 per cent interest in the ACB Business.[1958] Ms McPherson said that the 'Dear Jim' letter (from Mr Barnes to Mr Hodgson on the letterhead of AFP Australasia dated 29 May 2003)[1959] and what was conveyed to Mr Lachal did not indicate a change of control but rather that 'from day 1 Craig Holihan and Trevor Barnes took a 50/50 interest in the business' such that no 'change of control' was manifested.[1960]
1608 Ms McPherson said that they obtained discovery of 'some of these original deeds and cancelled deeds' and the 'Dear Jim' letter (with Mr Hodgson's handwritten response endorsed thereon) in the Hodgson proceeding -
So ... what was being presented through discovery at the time was that Amcor had consented to an ownership by Trevor Barnes, through the consent of Jim Hodgson. Now subsequently Justice Vickery did not accept that.[1961]
1609 Ms McPherson also gave evidence that an affidavit of documents filed by Mr Barnes on 28 July 2006 pursuant to an order for non-party discovery in the Hodgson proceeding,[1962] listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1: 'Documents relating directly or indirectly, to the sale by the Second Plaintiff by Counterclaim to ACB (Australia) Pty Limited on or about 2 June 2003 or otherwise relating, directly or indirectly, to the ACB Business whether before or after such sale', as follows:
Deed between Trevor Mark Barnes, Astra Corporation Pty Ltd Brobel Investments Pty Limited & Ors (as cancelled by handwritten annotations)
Agreement between Craig Anthony Holihan and Trevor Mark Barnes
Letter from Trevor Barnes to Jim Hodgson and handwritten annotation thereon
Dividend Statement - LeoRose Pty Ltd in favour of shareholder Craig Anthony Holihan ATF Astra Corporation Pty Ltd
Dividend Statement - LeoRose Pty Ltd in favour of shareholder Craig Anthony Holihan ATF Astra Corporation Pty Ltd
1610 During the course of cross-examination in relation to the revelation of the interest of Mr Barnes in the ACB business, Ms McPherson was asked why it was that she did not take steps then to give notice of termination of the supply arrangement, and she responded as follows:
[MR MAIDEN:] If that were the case, when you discovered in 2006 that the shareholding of the ACB business was in fact 50 per cent Holihan, 50 per cent Barnes, why didn't you take those steps then?---The reason I didn't take the steps then is that - and I think before lunch we discussed the discovery by Barnes in the Hodgson proceedings where it was basically presented that Amcor had consented to Trevor Barnes taking a 50 per cent interest and that was the essence of the Dear Jim letter.
So in order to terminate the agreement I needed to have sufficient level of comfort, and based on legal advice at the time that we could have terminated based on that information. And the difficulty that we had was that whilst Craig Holihan advised Lou Lachal that Trevor Barnes owned 50 per cent, at around the same time Trevor Barnes also produced documents which said that Amcor knew. Now that knowledge was, and I'll put it in in inverted commas, was Jim Hodgson consenting in a handwritten letter. So at the time, I didn't have sufficient evidence based on the advice I was getting at the time to terminate.
I mean you have to realise that it was completely unpalatable for Amcor to want to continue a business relationship with Craig Holihan where he was a front man for want of a better word, for executives who had covertly acquired an interest. I mean it was just, it was just an untenable position to want to have to take. But until we had sufficient evidence to do that there was very little we could do. We had allegations in the Hodgson proceedings that were being denied by Jim Hodgson. We had, you know, a simultaneous investigation going on by Corrs, which I have to say in the Quadpak [sic.] business being returned out of the blue. All of a sudden Michael Carriage decides he doesn't want the Quadpak [sic.] business anymore so that just came back. That was one of the ones that Tony Joyce was suspicious about. And in early 07 as a result of Corrs' discussions independently of, of the Anton Piller documents with Adrian Walmsley, the Service Packaging business arrived back.
So at the time, the preference of the business was to actually get the business back. That was our, you know, our prime objection was to get the business back. Had I had sufficient information to at the same time to terminate the supply contract with, you know, what I consider to be fraudulent transaction then we certainly would have taken that action. But the advice at the time was that there wasn't sufficient basis to make that call. And I can only assume that had we actually tried to terminate that contract that we would have been met with immediate, um, you know, court application saying that we weren't entitled to do that.
Your preference was to get the business back?---Yes.
Getting the business back would necessarily have involved the end of the supply relationship though wouldn't it?---It would have. It would have, yes. So the preference was to unwind the whole transaction - - -
Yes?--- - - - and put Amcor back in the position that it would have been had there not been a, a covert and fraudulent transfer of the business. That was, that was the objective.[1963]
1611 In re-examination, Ms McPherson said that Mr Bayley, Mr Mihelic and Mr Sangster were each joined to the proceeding in around 2008, probably because of further information received by the Amcor parties about their involvement, as a result of the various subpoenas that were served.[1964]
1612 The question for the Court is whether the change of control allegations now pleaded by the Amcor parties in Part H of their defence and cross-claim were so relevant to, or so closely connected with, the subject matter of the principal proceeding that, if it were to be agitated, it was to be expected that it would be relied upon by them as a defence to that claim, and would have been unreasonable for them not to have raised it at that time.
1613 In their written closing submissions, the Holihan parties submit that by the time of the trial of the principal proceeding before Vickery J, each of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed and the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement had been discovered and there were no confidentiality restrictions preventing their use in the litigation by the Amcor parties. Indeed, they say, those agreements were effectively the foundation for the Amcor parties' claim that the former executives had taken an interest in the ACB Business, and they are also 'the fundamental basis of the allegation, crucial to the cross-claim, that control of ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla changed in June 2004 and October 2005.'[1965] Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that therefore there 'can be no doubt'[1966] that the change of control issues now raised on the cross-claim properly belonged to the principal proceeding and that the Amcor parties were capable of bringing those claims at the earlier time. That is, the Holihan parties submit that from 'at latest May 2011', Ms McPherson and the Amcor parties 'had sufficient facts to make the [change of control] allegations'.[1967]
1614 In addition, the Holihan parties say that running the change of control issue by way of cross-claim separately from and after the determination of the principal proceeding creates a real injustice[1968] and is productive of unfairness in the prosecution of the claims.[1969] They contend that in circumstances where the cross-claim is now being heard and determined after judgment in the principal proceeding has been delivered, and findings have been made by Vickery J that are contrary to the evidence given by the former executives, the Holihan parties were placed in a position where, as a practical matter, there was no realistic prospect of them being able to call the former executives as witnesses to give evidence (unaffected by the findings of Vickery J) as to the degree of control granted by taking an interest in the ACB Business, and the capacity to cure any breach. The Holihan parties submitted that:
If any of them had been called to give evidence on the cross-claim, he would have been placed in the unenviable position of either giving evidence inconsistent with earlier findings (knowing that the Court would not accept that evidence) or giving evidence that his earlier account was wrong (potentially exposing himself to sanctions).[1970]
1615 This aspect was elaborated upon by Counsel for the Holihan parties in oral submissions:
The capacity to obtain testimony from the executives unaffected by the findings that Justice Vickery made at the main trial has been ineradicably removed. Justice Vickery's findings are what they are and no-one in the position of any of the executives could now get in a witness box and be asked questions about the interest and control without being put in a position of discomfort, to try and put it neutrally.[1971]
1616 The response of the Amcor parties was to submit that the Holihan parties were being 'misleading and disingenuous' by pointing to the documentary trail that was made available to them. First, they say that while they had copies of the documents, they were unsigned copies that were provided to Ms McPherson in April 2006 pursuant to confidentiality undertakings.[1972] Secondly, they say that despite the allegations pleaded by them in the Hodgson proceeding, the response of all of the defendant parties, including Mr Holihan, was to assert that the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement had never been implemented.
1617 Thirdly, they say the Holihan parties never admitted that the arrangements concerning the ACB Business had ever been anything other than 50/50 between Messrs Barnes and Holihan, and the participation of Mr Barnes in the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was said to have been undertaken with the permission of Amcor, Mr Hodgson having purportedly approved Mr Barnes' request in his handwritten response to the 'Dear Jim' letter.[1973] Furthermore, although Mr Holihan conceded in his answers to the interrogatories administered by the Amcor parties on 24 November 2010 that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement had been signed in October 2005 (and not 2003), this response was filed on 8 April 2011, only a few weeks before the trial of the principal proceeding commenced, and their case at trial remained that the 50/50 Agreement had always been in existence and performed since 28 May 2003, and that the later document was merely the recording of that agreement albeit at the later point in time.
1618 On the question of the timing of the bringing of the change of control claims, the Amcor parties rely heavily upon the view the Court of Appeal expressed when granting leave to bring the cross-claim, that:
... the applicants [the Amcor parties] were under the disadvantage of having had sand thrown in their eyes, and that the fog did not become clear until the judge made his findings in the Principal Judgment [regarding the holding of interests in the ACB Business]. To be clear, his Honour's judgment for the first time disclosed to the applicants that interests had been relinquished in 2005, which exposed the basis for raising a breach of the change of control provisions. (A change of control is also alleged in 2004.) Thus it was clear that as a result of the defendants' concealment of facts, the applicants were not in a position to plead and run a case alleging 'change' of control.[1974]
1619 In contrast, the position of the Holihan parties is that:
...it is standard behaviour for defendants to deny allegations. But that does not stop the allegations being made. It is up to a plaintiff properly to review the available evidence and then to plead its allegations, as alternatives if necessary. A plaintiff cannot simply throw its hands up in the air and say it did not make the allegations because the defendants denied them when the evidence is available. [1975]
In oral argument, they further submitted that 'the mere fact that [the Amcor parties] couldn't have been certain of [the claim's] success because the defendants raised defences to it at the time is no answer to that.'[1976]
1620 The Amcor parties contend that what the Holihan parties' submissions:
...[seek] to ignore is that bare denials coupled with the production of a misleading and deceptive documentary trail and the withholding of other critical relevant documents or information is not standard behaviour and cannot be condoned or rewarded.[1977]
1621 In oral submissions, Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties contended that the other cases in the Anshun line of authorities are distinguishable from the present case 'because none of those cases contained a finding of deception and fraud and concealment and lies' and that where there are clear findings of iniquity and wrongfulness of the kind here, 'the court should not be seen to be giving curial approval to wrongdoing' and 'should not countenance it.'[1978]
1622 In my view, while it would now appear (with the benefit of hindsight) that it was theoretically possible for the Amcor parties to have raised 'change of control' allegations in the principal proceeding, it was not 'unreasonable' for them not to have done so. From 21 April 2006 or thereabouts, they had pleaded in the Hodgson proceeding that each of the former executives or entities associated with them had covertly acquired an interest in the ACB Business,[1979] but the Amcor parties were then met with denials that such was the case, and the revelation by Mr Holihan to Mr Lachal that from the outset he and Mr Barnes were 50/50 partners and that the 50/50 Agreement had always been in existence and performed, which Mr Barnes also confirmed was the case. The documentary trail was, at best, confusing and Mr Holihan's answers to interrogatories, which only became available late in the piece, served to confirm the advice conveyed to Mr Lachal that the arrangement was effectively 50/50 from the outset. Further, Mr Hodgson's handwritten note suggested that Amcor was cognisant of, and had approved, that arrangement.
1623 The alleged change(s) of control in May/June 2004 and October 2005 pleaded by the Amcor parties are predicated on the findings made by Vickery J and the terms of the various agreements entered into between the former executives. That is because, as Ms McPherson said:
it was not until the end of the trial when the judgment was received that findings were made as to exactly what the impact was. Because the position of the defendants was that the 80/20 didn't go ahead.[1980]
1624 In the principal judgment, his Honour found, contrary to the evidence given by the former executives, that Messrs Holihan and Barnes executed and performed the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and that upon disclosure of the identity of the beneficial owners to Mr Holihan in late May or June 2004, he elected to ratify and perform the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. Further, that pursuant to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholding Deed, each of the beneficial owners acted as if they were bound by the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and ratified it.[1981] And that these events took place in circumstances where neither of Messrs Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic had permission from Amcor to take an interest in the ACB Business. Then, with the execution of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement in October 2005, there was scope for the Amcor parties to plead that a second change of control took place, without the consent of APA.
1625 Relevantly, his Honour summarised his findings as follows:
[1147] I am satisfied that the former managers (the Defendants) acquired their interests in the ACB Business from about 26 May 2003 crystallizing upon the sale of the ACB Business on 2 June 2003 and settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 June 2003. Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest until about October 2005 when the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement was entered into and backdated to 28 May 2003 and the original 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was endorsed "cancelled". By this means, in October 2005, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley renounced any interest in the ACB Business and renounced any entitlement for them or companies associated with them to any share in the profits of the ACB Business.
...
[1149] In the present case, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest in the ACB Business until about October 2005 when by their conduct, and with the knowledge of Holihan, mutually abandoned or abrogated the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, and with that, renounced any rights or entitlements under it.
[1150] After October 2005 the ACB Business has continued to be owned by Holihan and Barnes in equal shares, through companies associated with each. This was the position when the Barnes proceeding commenced by the issue of the writ on 3 September 2007.
1626 Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties pointed out that the findings made by Vickery J did not accord with the position either party had contended for. The Amcor parties asserted that there was an 80/20 split for the duration of the period, whereas the Holihan parties maintained it was a 50/50 split from day one. She said:
Justice Vickery came right down the middle and said, "No, there's another version which is it was 80/20, but only up until October 05 and then upon abandonment or renouncing of the interest it fell back to 50/50".
Now, that was a version that hadn't been aired and ventilated as a possibility because, in effect, it was right down the middle. The Amcor parties had one version on one side and the defendants had a version on the other, and he came down the middle.[1982]
1627 The Amcor parties' pleading of the change of control allegation demonstrates that they were reliant on those 'findings' as a matter of fact to give rise to, and enable them to plead, the alleged 'change' of control in each case.
1628 The 'findings' made by his Honour were not directed to, and were not made in a context where it was alleged there was any change of control. For the purposes of the trial of the counterclaim and cross-claim, I ruled that none of these findings gave rise to any 'issue estoppel' but said that in the context of considering the notion of 'control', as opposed to the mere concept of 'interest' raised before me, 'I regard them as findings to which I will have regard', and added that they are 'not determinative of the question of control.'[1983] (And for the reasons set out above, I have formed the view that there was relevantly no 'change of control' in either May/June 2004 or in October 2005.)
1629 In my view, given that a finding about 'interest' does not, without more, entail a consequence in terms of 'control', the current case, unlike Anshun, is not one where there is a risk of inconsistent findings.
1630 Apropos the Civil Procedure Act, to be sure, there has been some disruption to the efficient conduct of the hearing, and the Holihan parties have pointed to them having suffered some unfairness as a result of the lateness of the pleading of the change of control allegations. But the Court has to decide the issue as it finds it. And in circumstances where the decision to split the trial of the counterclaim from that of the proceeding was made back in 2011 or thereabouts whilst the trial of the principal proceeding was underway, and the trial of the counterclaim and cross-claim has now proceeded before a different judge, the Court in the exercise of its powers must further the overarching purpose and, in particular, by having regard to what course will best facilitate the just determination of the proceeding and the fair and just determination of the real issues in dispute. In my view, allowing the change of control allegations to be heard and determined is the course that will best facilitate that objective.
1631 Accordingly, in my view, the Anshun doctrine does not preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the cross-claims in section H.
1632 The Holihan parties also sought to have the Court dismiss the change of control allegations under its general discretion to prevent an abuse of process. Once again, the relevant legal principles are not in dispute. It is sufficient for present purposes to note the summary provided by Robson J in Re AWB Limited (No 10),[1984] a case where the focus was on duplicate proceedings. The relevant principles enunciated by his Honour included:
(1) The court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to stay its proceedings as an abuse of process if the proceedings are unjustifiably oppressive and vexatious or manifestly unfair or otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251 and PNJ v R [2009] HCA 6; (2009) 252 ALR 612; Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 43.
(2) The jurisdiction should only be exercised in exceptional cases or sparingly with the utmost caution: Jago v The District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 76 per Gaudron J.
(3) The jurisdiction to stay for abuse of process is not limited to cases where the proceedings have been brought for an improper purpose or where there is no possibility of the court affording the affected party a fair hearing: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251.
(4) The circumstances in which abuse of process may arise are extremely varied and the courts have refrained from limiting the circumstances to fixed categories: Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1981] UKHL 13; [1982] AC 529; Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256.
(5) In considering whether to grant a stay as an abuse of process, the court should undertake a weighing process involving a subjective balancing of a variety [sic.] factors and considerations: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 398 per Mason CJ and Deane and Dawson JJ. [1985]
1633 The Holihan parties submit that applying those factors, the cross-claim is abusive of process because:
(a) the facts relevant to the proof of the allegations on the cross-claim (most importantly, the execution and effect of the relevant shareholders' agreements) were central to the determination of the principal action;
(b) the Amcor Parties had every opportunity to plead and litigate the Amcor breach allegations, and did not do so;
(c) no relevant fresh evidence has emerged that was not available to the Amcor Parties prior to the trial of the principal action;
(d) the relief sought on the cross-claim is inconsistent with that sought in the principal action, which Amcor persists in seeking by appealing from the judgment of Vickery J. The result is that Amcor seeks inconsistent relief from two branches of the same court; and
(e) right-minded people would abhor the thought that the Amcor Parties could commence complicated litigation against Mr Holihan, spend five years bringing their claims to finality and then, having failed, commence a new proceeding making fresh claims arising out of the same facts, and seek relief in relation to those claims inconsistent with that which they are pursuing on appeal.[1986]
1634 I do not agree. The power to strike out or dismiss for abuse of process is one that is to be exercised sparingly and upon an examination of the circumstances of the particular case. The basis on which the cross-claim has been brought, and the reason for its lateness, have been discussed at length above in dealing with the Anshun estoppel defence advanced by the Holihan parties. I have set out the reasons why I have found it was not unreasonable for the Amcor parties to bring the cross-claim. For essentially the same reasons, I would also dismiss the Holihan parties' abuse of process defence.
The Holihan parties' failure to call Barnes to give evidence
1635 At several points throughout their written submissions, the Amcor parties noted that Mr Holihan did not call Mr Barnes, with whom he negotiated the Second Sale Agreement, to give evidence. Relevantly, they submit that as Mr Barnes was the co-owner of the ACB Business with Mr Holihan and his business colleague over many years, it is notable that he was not called to give evidence in support of the Holihan parties' case. First, in the context of the negotiations for the sale/purchase of the ACB Business and the Holihan parties' assertion that 'in negotiations, Achilla and APA expressed a common intention ...', the Amcor parties submit that if such a common intention was expressed, Mr Holihan should have put in evidence via Mr Barnes, and given the failure to do so, the Court should draw the conclusion that no such common intention was expressed.[1987] Secondly, in response to the Holihan parties' alleged implied supply agreement, the Amcor parties contend that no evidence was led of any intention to bring into existence any contract that was separate and independent from the Second Sale Agreement, and noting that the Holihan parties did not call Mr Barnes to give evidence.[1988] Thirdly, in the context of the Holihan parties' argument that 'APA' relevantly included 'Amcor Displays' such that the intention of the parties was that the OME requirements of the business operated by Amcor Displays were always encompassed within the Second Sale Agreement, the Amcor parties again observe that Mr Barnes was not called. However, the Amcor parties do not advance a Jones v Dunkel submission in relation to Mr Barnes in respect of these matters.
1636 The Holihan parties take issue with the Amcor parties' assertion that Mr Holihan negotiated, or principally negotiated, the Second Sale Agreement with Mr Barnes, contending that it overstates the evidence.[1989] They acknowledge that Mr Barnes had 'some involvement' in the process but say that Mr Holihan did not 'negotiate the agreement' with him. They submit that the submissions made by the Amcor parties paint an inaccurate picture of the agreement as having been negotiated exclusively between Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, or even predominantly between them.[1990] Rather, they say, there was evidence of the direct involvement of Mr Parker, Mr Crouch, Mr Joyce and Mr MacPhail. They contend the evidence shows that Mr MacPhail did not negotiate under the exclusive instructions of Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, because he was clearly in direct contact with Mr Parker concerning the sublease and Annexure 5, and then Mr Clayton and Mr Lewis signed off on the Second Sale Agreement.
1637 Further, the Holihan parties say that the 'common intention' is reflected in the documents and that there was no reason for them to call Mr Barnes because the only useful evidence he could have given was that he instructed Mr Holihan to work with Mr MacPhail. This was not a matter in dispute, so there was no reason to call Mr Barnes. The Holihan parties also dispute the notion that Mr Barnes, along with Messrs Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic, is 'in Mr Holihan's camp' so to speak.[1991]
1638 The Amcor parties submit that Mr Barnes was not available to be called by them. They say that Mr Holihan and Mr Barnes were effectively co-owners of the ACB Business. He was a defendant to Amcor's case as plaintiff in the principal proceeding, which is currently on appeal, where serious allegations have been made against him by Amcor.
1639 Given the conclusions I have reached in respect of the arguments advanced by the Holihan parties concerning the 'implied supply agreement' and whether or not the Amcor Displays' work was encompassed within the Vendor's obligations under clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement, it is not necessary to draw any inference or make any finding or comment concerning the Amcor parties' submission that it was relevant or significant that the Holihan parties failed to call Mr Barnes to give evidence in this regard.
The Holihan parties' failure to call Mr Daaboul and Mr Dailey to give evidence
1640 The Amcor parties submit that there were two people who could well have shed light on how Amcor Displays operated and why things happened the way they did. The first is Mr Daaboul, an Achilla employee who took over the management of Amcor Displays from mid-July 2004 for about 12 months, and the second is Mr Dailey, who worked as an estimator at Amcor Displays until some time in 2005 when he was made redundant. The Amcor parties contend that the choice made by the Holihan parties not to call Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul must expose them to Jones v Dunkel consequences.[1992]
1641 The Holihan parties submit that neither Mr Daaboul nor Mr Dailey is 'in their camp' and that each could easily have been called by the Amcor parties to give evidence. In the case of Mr Dailey, the Amcor parties' response is that he now works for Wellen Pty Ltd.[1993] The Holihan parties had prepared and filed a detailed outline of expected evidence for Mr Dailey and, on the initial estimates of the time for trial, it was anticipated that there would be no evidence-in-chief given by Mr Dailey and his outline would stand as his evidence-in-chief. In the case of Mr Daaboul, he was an employee of Achilla and reported directly to Mr Holihan for several years, including for the entirety of the time when he managed the Amcor Displays business. The Holihan parties had prepared a witness statement for Mr Daaboul, but he was not called and the statement was not tendered.
1642 The Holihan parties informed the Court on Monday, 22 June 2015 that Mr Dailey might not be called, depending on the outcome of Mr Manser's evidence.[1994] Once Mr Manser had given his evidence, the Court was informed on 24 June 2015, that it might be possible to avoid calling Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul if a few questions could be asked of Mr Silva to introduce evidence that Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul might otherwise have given.[1995] After Mr Silva gave evidence, the Holihan parties confirmed that neither Mr Daaboul nor Mr Dailey would be called.[1996]
1643 In their written submissions, the Holihan parties explained that it was not until the Amcor parties' oral opening that it became apparent to them that the defence being advanced at trial in respect of Amcor Displays was different to that which was pleaded. They said that it was only during the oral opening that they became aware that allegations concerning the relationship between the AFP business and Amcor Displays would be made separately to the pleaded allegations concerning Service Containers.[1997] Until that point, the question concerning Amcor Displays centred on the legal ownership of the Displays business - in effect, that the Holihan parties were not entitled to Amcor Displays work because Amcor Displays was owned by Service Containers - a matter that neither Mr Dailey nor Mr Daaboul could be expected to shed any light on.
1644 The Holihan parties said that the issue Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul could give evidence about - namely, how Amcor Displays operated - was the subject of evidence given by a number of other witnesses who were called ahead of them.[1998] Accordingly, the Holihan parties say that by the time they had called those other witnesses, they no longer needed the evidence of Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul. Some of the evidence to be given by them was addressed by Mr Silva. The Holihan parties submitted that:
Insofar as the Jones v Dunkel submissions regarding Mr Daaboul and Mr Dailey are concerned, it's our case that Mr Silva filled in some remaining gaps in their evidence and a forensic decision was made not to call them. Now the Amcor parties can pick apart aspects of the Silva evidence, we've done what we can to illustrate to Your Honour the role that those two witnesses were to play, by reference to the statements of evidence that were filed with the court and it wouldn't be productive to pick that apart any further.[1999]
1645 The Holihan parties contend that their decision not to bring Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul from Sydney to give evidence was an appropriate forensic decision, made by them in light of, and in accordance with, their obligations under the Civil Procedure Act to facilitate the efficient and timely resolution of the matter. They submit that the decision was an appropriate one, particularly in circumstances where the trial had been running for some weeks and the parties' initial 19 day estimate had been exhausted but the trial had not even reached the point where the Holihan parties could close their case. Accordingly, and given that it was open to the Amcor parties to subpoena and call Mr Dailey and/or Mr Daaboul had they chosen to do so, the Holihan parties contend that no adverse inferences can be drawn against them for not calling Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul.
1646 The Amcor parties do not accept the evidentiary reasons advanced by the Holihan parties for not calling Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul. Rather, they speculated that it was 'far more likely that there's a different and unarticulated reason the Holihan parties did not call Dailey and Daaboul,' and they submitted that the appropriate Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn. [2000]
Relevant principles concerning when the appropriate Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn
1647 It is not uncommon for a party to submit that a court should draw a Jones v Dunkel inference in circumstances where an available witness is not called by the other side. While Jones v Dunkel lays down principles about which a jury is entitled to be instructed in such circumstances, it also has relevance in the context of a trial by judge alone. It is clear, however, that there is no compulsion on the trial judge to draw any such inferences.
1648 In Manly Council v Byrne,[2001] the New South Wales Court of Appeal explained that generally, if a witness is not called, two different types of result may follow:
The first is that the tribunal of fact might infer that the evidence of the absent witness, if called, would not have assisted the party who failed to call that witness. The second is that the tribunal of fact might draw with greater confidence any inference unfavourable to the party who failed to call the witness, if that witness seems to be in a position to cast light on whether that inference should properly be drawn.[2002]
1649 In the present case, both parties agree that the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Payne v Parker,[2003] and in particular the judgment of Glass JA,[2004] sets out the relevant principles to be applied by the Court when considering whether or not any Jones v Dunkel inference should be drawn. His Honour said:
(6) Whether the principle can or should be applied depends upon whether the conditions for its operation exist. These conditions are three in number: (a) the missing witness would be expected to be called by one party rather than the other, (b) his evidence would elucidate a particular matter, (c) his absence is unexplained.
1650 Glass JA then continued in his judgment to explain each of those conditions. As to the first, he said:
(7) The first condition is also described as existing where it would be natural for one party to produce the witness: Wigmore, par 286, or the witness would be expected to be available to one party rather than the other: O'Donnell v Reichard [1975] VicRp 89; [1975] VR 916, at p. 921, or where the circumstances excuse one party from calling the witness, but require the other party to call him: ibid [1975] VicRp 89; [1975] VR 916, at p. 920, or where he might be regarded as in the camp of one party, so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him: ibid [1975] VicRp 89; [1975] VR 916, at p. 920, Regina v Burdett (1820) 4 Barn & Ald 95; 106 ER 873, or where the witness' knowledge may be regarded as the knowledge of one party rather than the other: Earle v Castlemaine District Community Hospital [1974] VicRp 86; [1974] VR 722, at p. 733, or where his absence should be regarded as adverse to the case of one party rather than the other: ibid [1974] VicRp 86; [1974] VR 722, at p. 734. . . . If the witness is equally available to both parties, for example, a police officer, the condition, generally speaking, stands unsatisfied. There is, however, some judicial opinion that this is not necessarily so: ibid [1974] VicRp 86; [1974] VR 722, at p. 728. ...
1651 As to the second condition, that the evidence of the missing witness would elucidate a particular matter, Glass JA said:
(8) According to Wigmore, par 285, the second condition is fulfilled where the party or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated. Under other formulations, the condition is made out when the witness is presumably able to put a true complexion on the facts: Jones v Dunkel, [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, at p. 308 might have proved the contrary: ibid, at p. 312; would have a close knowledge of the facts: O'Donnell v Reichard [1975] VicRp 89; [1975] VR 916, at p. 921, or where it appears that he had knowledge: Nuhic v Rail & Road Excavations [1972] 1 NSWLR 204, at p. 211. I would think it in-sufficient to meet the requirements of principle that one party merely claims that the missing witness has knowledge, or that, upon the evidence, he may have knowledge. Unless, upon the evidence, the tribunal of fact is entitled to conclude that he probably would have knowledge, there would seem to be no basis for any adverse deduction from the failure to call him.
1652 In dealing with the third condition, where the witness's absence is unexplained, Glass JA said:
(9) The third condition is satisfied if no explanation is offered for the absence of the witness, or the tribunal thinks that the explanation given is unsatisfactory. The explanation tendered may be that the witness is ill, overseas, dead or refuses to waive his privilege: Wigmore, par 286.
1653 The sort of inferences that may be drawn by a court 'are ones which are drawn, if at all, once all the evidence in the case is in.'[2005] But as the Court of Appeal noted in Manly Council v Byrne, before any Jones v Dunkel inference may be drawn, 'there must first be available to be drawn, on the evidence which has been admitted, an inference against that party.'[2006]
1654 The position as to when an inference is available to be drawn or may 'fairly be drawn from the other evidence' was explained by Spigelman CJ in State Bank of NSW v Brown,[2007] as follows:
"As expressed in Cross on Evidence, ..., at [1215]:
... the rule in Jones v Dunkel permits an inference that the untendered evidence would not have helped the party who failed to tender it, and entitles the trier of fact to take that into account in deciding whether to accept any particular evidence which relates to a matter on which the absent witness could have spoken, and the more readily to draw an inference fairly to be drawn from the other evidence by reason of the opponent being able to prove the contrary had the party chosen to give or call evidence ... [Emphasis added[2008]]
The formulation "fairly to be drawn from the other evidence" reflects the terminology of Windeyer J in Jones v Dunkel at 312, ... :
... where an inference is open from facts proved by direct evidence and the question is whether it should be drawn, the circumstance that the defendant disputing it might have proved the contrary had he chosen to give evidence is properly to be taken into account as a circumstance in favour of drawing the inference. [Emphasis added[2009]]
(See also Insurance Commissioner v Joyce [1948] HCA 17; (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 49; [1948] ArgusLawRp 69; 55 ALR 356.)[2010]
1655 In other words, before the Court may proceed to consider whether any Jones v Dunkel inference may be drawn, the evidence which has been admitted before the Court must first give rise to an available inference against that party in the sense that enough has been proven as to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, in the absence of explanation or contradiction.[2011]
1656 As to the first condition, the Amcor parties contend that Mr Daaboul and Mr Dailey would be expected to be called by the Holihan parties, particularly in circumstances where a witness statement had been prepared for Mr Daaboul, and an outline of expected evidence had been prepared for Mr Dailey.[2012] The Holihan parties dispute this, pointing out that the test is not whether the witness was proposed to be called, and then not called. Rather, they say, the question of 'expectation' under Jones v Dunkel is whether the witness has an affinity with one party rather than the other and as such would be expected to be called by that party.
1657 In the case of Mr Dailey, the Holihan parties contend that there is no evidence that Mr Dailey is in the Holihan parties' 'camp'. He had worked as an estimator with Amcor until 2005, and was later employed with Wellen Pty Ltd. The Holihan parties submit there is no evidence that Mr Holihan is associated with Wellen Pty Ltd, but they acknowledge that until August 2010 Mr Holihan's wife had a fixed and floating charge over the assets of Wellen Pty Ltd. The Holihan parties arranged for a subpoena to be issued to ensure that Mr Dailey would be available to attend and give evidence, and they had prepared an outline of the evidence it was proposed he would give. In my view, none of that entails the consequence that Mr Dailey was in the Holihan parties' camp. Rather, the position is that he was equally available to both parties.
1658 In the case of Mr Daaboul, he was a former employee of Achilla but he was effectively seconded to Amcor Displays to run that business for a period of 12 months or so from mid-July 2004. The Holihan parties had prepared and filed a statement from him in advance of the trial, but they later determined not to call him. While there is no 'property in a witness', and theoretically it remained open to the Amcor parties to call him to give evidence, the indications are that Mr Daaboul was aligned with the Holihan parties.
1659 Turning to the second condition, what evidence might Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul be expected to have given, the Amcor parties submit that their evidence 'would be expected to be centrally relevant to whether Amcor Displays was bound to obtain work from Achilla' and 'to why it is that Amcor Displays did not obtain all its OME supplies from Achilla.'[2013] In response, the Holihan parties first take issue with the notion that the subjective view of either of Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul about the operation and effect of the contractual arrangements could be relevant. They submit that in neither case could the Court reasonably conclude that Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul 'probably would have knowledge'[2014] as to whether Amcor Displays was bound. I share that view. As to the second aspect, that it was to be expected that their evidence would also be 'centrally relevant to why it is that Amcor Displays did not obtain all its OME supplies from Achilla', the Holihan parties say it is mere conjecture that they might have been able to give evidence on this issue, and that is not enough for a Jones v Dunkel inference. The case that the Amcor parties ran at trial concerning Amcor Displays was a nuanced version of their pleaded case (which centred on the legal ownership of the business by Service Containers). In their opening, the Amcor parties shifted the emphasis away from legal ownership by Service Containers to a position where it was said that Amcor Displays was separate from the AFP box plants at Smithfield and Revesby. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis for believing that either Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul could have given cogent evidence on this ownership issue. In my view, it is likely that Mr Dailey could have given evidence about what he did in his role as an estimator with Amcor Displays. It does not follow that he would have been able to give any probative or cogent evidence about why Amcor Displays did not obtain all its OME supplies from Achilla. Similarly in the case of Mr Daaboul, who performed essentially a management role at Amcor Displays under the terms of the Management Agreement that was entered into with the Holihan parties whilst he was an employee of Achilla.
1660 As to the third condition, whether a satisfactory explanation was given for not calling Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul, the Amcor parties submit that the proffered explanation, namely that the Holihan parties did not consider it forensically necessary to do so, does not permit them to escape Jones v Dunkel consequences.[2015] They submit that each of Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul were key staff at Amcor Displays, Amcor Displays is a key issue in dispute, and that other than Mr Manser (the Commercial Manager for the Specialty Group whom the Holihan parties did call to give evidence), no other witness was qualified to say what Amcor Displays did. In my view, the Holihan parties gave a satisfactory explanation for not calling each of them. The evidence that I do accept Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul would be expected to have given about how Amcor Displays operated, the type of work it did and what OME work it ordinarily required to be performed and by whom or using what equipment, was evidence that was canvassed in large part by other witnesses.
1661 In light of the conclusions I have reached about the construction of the Second Sale Agreement and the Amcor Displays work, it is not necessary for me to make any finding or draw any Jones v Dunkel inference. But lest the matter go further, it is preferable that I indicate that, were it necessary to form a view on this issue, I would not draw any Jones v Dunkel inference concerning the Holihan parties' failure to call either Mr Dailey or Mr Daaboul.
Amcor parties allege that the Holihan parties could have called Mr Bayley
1662 The Amcor parties submit that Mr Bayley could also have shed light on the Amcor Displays business. It will be recalled that Mr Bayley signed the 'Amcor Displays Australasia New South Wales Contract Management Agreement' in relation to Mr Daaboul's management of Amcor Displays,[2016] and was at that time Head of the Specialty Group.[2017] The Amcor parties contend that Mr Bayley's understanding of the Amcor Displays business at the time when Mr Daaboul was installed as manager would have been particularly relevant.
1663 Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan gave evidence that Mr Bayley was based in New Zealand in mid-2003 but he ended up coming back to Australia and 'doing something with Mr Barnes.'[2018] In mid-2004, he took over from Mr Alan Caldow and was the Specialty Group Manager. Mr Holihan said that the documents concerning the management agreement pertaining to Mr Daabol's services 'were produced by Manser, working with his lawyer' and that he 'was given the documents by Manser' but did not recall discussing them with him.[2019] Nor did he recall discussing them with Mr Bayley, but Mr Bayley executed the agreement. He said that when the variation of the management agreement was under negotiation in August 2004, increasing the fees payable for the services Achilla provided via Mr Daaboul, he discussed the document with Mr Manser, and his day to day contact was always through him.[2020] When time came for the variation agreement to be signed, Mr Bayley was again the signatory. Mr Holihan said that Mr Bayley came across to their reception area and signed it, and it was witnessed by a customer service person.[2021]
1664 The Holihan parties dispute the notion that Mr Bayley's evidence concerning the Amcor Displays business would be relevant because it postdates the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, and also because Mr Bayley executed the Daaboul management agreement but did not negotiate it. They submit that based on the documentation before the Court in the counterclaim proceeding, it cannot be observed that Mr Bayley had any substantive input into Amcor Displays.
1665 The Amcor parties contend that the conduct alleged by the Holihan parties in their estoppel by convention case, as well as their implied contract case, is in respect of continued conduct following the Completion of the Second Sale Agreement. They submit the relevance of Mr Bayley's evidence is therefore not ousted simply because it postdates the execution of the agreement. They say each of Mr Holihan and Mr Bayley signed the Amcor Displays management agreement made between Achilla and Amcor in around July 2004, when Mr Holihan knew that Mr Bayley was effectively one of his co-owners in the ACB Business. Mr Holihan also met with Mr Bayley at the Wetherill Park site in August 2004 so as to sign the variation to the Amcor Displays management agreement.
1666 The Holihan parties contend that Mr Bayley is not in the Holihan camp, and say that there is no evidence of any current relationship between Mr Holihan and Mr Bayley. The mere fact that Mr Bayley is a defendant in the principal proceeding, where serious allegations had been made, and is now the subject of an appeal, does not evidence a current relationship.
1667 Here again, lest the matter go further, I shall summarise my views of this issue. In my view, no occasion arises for drawing any Jones v Dunkel inference in light of the Holihan parties not calling Mr Bayley to give evidence. First, Mr Bayley is not relevantly in the Holihan parties' camp. Secondly, as Mr Holihan did not negotiate either the management agreement or the variation of it with Mr Bayley, no inference logically arises that he had any substantive input into the management agreement or the operation of the Amcor Displays' business vis-à-vis matters pertaining to Achilla. The evidence is that the negotiations took place with Mr Manser, whom the Holihan parties did call. Further, the documentary evidence concerning Amcor Displays does not suggest that Mr Bayley was actively involved in matters concerning the arrangements in place between Amcor Displays and Achilla. In any event, as both Mr Bayley and Mr Holihan are defendants to the principal proceeding, in which Vickery J has made findings against each of them, and an appeal is on foot, I am satisfied that an appropriate explanation has been given by the Holihan parties for them not calling Mr Bayley.
Amcor parties allege that the Holihan parties could have called Mr Hodgson, Mr Sangster and Mr Mihelic and also Mr Barnes and Mr Bayley
1668 In their oral closing submissions, the Amcor parties submitted that a Jones v Dunkel inference should also be drawn in relation to the failure of the Holihan parties to call the group of five former executives, Messrs Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley.[2022] In the context of the change of control allegations made on the cross-claim, the Amcor parties say that the Holihan parties' defence was that Mr Holihan was accustomed to exercising all of the financial and operating decisions of both ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla, and the five former executives were each accustomed to not exercising such decisions. However, as none of those five executives was called by the Holihan parties to give that evidence, there is no supporting evidence from any of them to that effect.[2023]
1669 The evidence of Mr Hodgson, Mr Sangster and Mr Mihelic, and also of Mr Barnes and Mr Bayley is relevant to the Amcor parties' cross-claim. The Holihan parties assert that if (contrary to their submissions) there was a change of control, then ACB Co Purchaser could have remedied any breach by simply reversing the change of control. They invite the Court to draw the inference that if the cure notice had been served, Mr Holihan would have approached the other five executives, Messrs Hodgson, Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes, and told them to give up any control component of their interest in the company. But, as the Amcor parties point out, there is no evidence before the Court from any of these five executives that would be capable of supporting the drawing of such an inference. The Holihan parties effectively submit that these men demonstrably have no interest in coming to Court to give evidence in support of the Holihan parties' claim and the Court should infer that they would be reluctant to expose themselves to cross-examination.
1670 In the context of their submission that the Amcor parties' cross-claim should be the subject of an Anshun estoppel, the Holihan parties explained why they contend it was unlikely that any of those executives would be amenable to giving any further evidence in the proceeding and allow themselves to be cross-examined, and the resultant unfairness to the Holihan parties. They submitted:
[895] What is now section H of the DEF was not pleaded in the principal action because the Amcor Parties either chose not to, or, as Ms McPherson has said, it was not put to her by Amcor's lawyers. Either way, it was unreasonable not to have raised them, because:
(a) The facts relevant to the determination of those allegations formed a crucial part of the factual matrix that the Court was required to consider in determining the allegations the subject of the principal action.
(b) They are matters on which many witnesses in the principal action other than Mr Holihan could have given evidence. For example, each of Messrs Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and Roe might have given evidence concerning the realities of the control of ACB Co Purchaser relevant to the question of whether there really was a change of control of that company consequent upon the agreements reached; each might also have given evidence of what he would have done had Mr Holihan attempted to rectify any breach of the change of control clause.
(c) Each of those witnesses and Mr Holihan gave evidence regarding the various agreements without consideration of the change of control allegations that have subsequently been made. Some of the evidence of those witnesses was not accepted by the Court. If any of them had been called to give evidence on the cross-claim, he would have been placed in the unenviable position of either giving evidence inconsistent with earlier findings (knowing that the Court would not accept that evidence) or giving evidence that his earlier account was wrong (potentially exposing himself to sanctions).
(d) It follows that because the change of control allegations were not made in the principal action, the Holihan Parties were deprived of the opportunity to make properly-informed forensic decisions in the formulation, preparation and presentation of their case (including consideration of settlement negotiations) and in the presentation of their evidence and their examination of witnesses on the cross-claim.
1671 The Court has now rejected the Holihan parties' submission that the Amcor parties' cross-claim should be the subject of an Anshun estoppel. That outcome, however, highlights the real and practical difficulty the Holihan parties face in defending the allegations of change of control in circumstances where the cross-claim did not exist when evidence was given by the former executives in the principal proceeding, and adverse findings about their evidence have been made by his Honour. The severing of the trial on Achilla's counterclaim from that of the principal proceeding, coupled with the commencement of the cross-claim some time after judgment had been delivered, and the effluxion of time has taken this litigation outside of the normal course of events. Had the counterclaim not been hived off from the principal proceeding to be heard separately, each of the former executives would have been before the Court. Moreover, had it been heard before the principal judgment was delivered by Vickery J, none of the executives would be in the 'unenviable position' described (above) by the Holihan parties. And if the cross-claim had been brought by the Amcor parties at the same time as the counterclaim, the findings his Honour made as to 'interest' could not be relied upon as a predicate for (similar) findings to be made as to 'control' or 'change of control'.
1672 When regard is had to all of the unique circumstances at play in the present proceeding, I am not satisfied that the five former executives are aligned with the Holihan parties or 'in their camp'. First, when one looks at the evidence that was given by the former executives before Vickery J about the shareholding deed and the arrangement between them having been cancelled shortly after it was entered into, it is untenable to suggest that there is any realistic prospect of them giving evidence at the hearing of the counterclaim and cross-claim to the effect that notwithstanding the cancellation of those arrangements, they nevertheless retained a 'capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about ... financial and operational policies' of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla.
1673 The thrust of the evidence given by them before Vickery J was to the effect that they cancelled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed on 28 May 2003. His Honour noted and commented upon the evidence given by each of them as follows:
Barnes
[1057] Barnes claimed that the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed arose as a consequence of advice he received from Hodgson in late May 2003. Barnes said that in late May, Hodgson advised him, he believed by telephone, that the shareholders agreement involving Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and himself was premature and should be cancelled pending the approval and involvement of Amcor.
[1058] On Barnes' case, by the time the Second Sale Agreement was executed on 2 June 2003, Hodgson and their three other colleagues, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster, having pulled out of the proposal to obtain equity in the ACB Business, which occurred within about two to three days of 26 May 2003, the 50/50 split arrangement between Barnes and Holihan sprang into life.
[1059] Barnes said further that initially, documents were meant to be prepared on the basis that Holihan Investments Pty Ltd would own 20% of the shares in ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd, with LeoRose Pty Ltd holding the other 80% on trust for Astra Pty Ltd. ...
[1060] Barnes said further that on 28 May 2003 the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was cancelled, by endorsing the word "cancelled" and ruling a line through every page, and having such endorsement initialled by all of the parties. He said that he had not made the necessary changes to the ASIC documentation at this point in relation to the Astra shareholding structure and these never materialised as a result of the cancellation.
[1061] He said that he held off informing Holihan that the arrangement had reverted to a 50/50 arrangement until May 2004 (or June according the Holihan) when Holihan enquired as to who the other parties were under the agreement. Barnes explained to Holihan that the others had not proceeded. Given that Holihan held the shares in LeoRose he requested Holihan to consider redoing the 80/20 agreement to reflect the 50/50 shareholding as has been originally intended. Barnes said that Holihan agreed to this proposal.
[1062] Barnes also said that he personally held the only share in his company Brobel and that this never changed. No other party took an interest in his company.
[1063] However, there were significant discrepancies in the Barnes case as to when it was that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was actually cancelled.
[1064] In his pleadings Barnes claimed that he could not remember where the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed occurred.
[1065] However, Barnes' evidence in his witness statement was that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on 28 May 2003, having been endorsed by him with the word "cancelled" and the endorsement having been initialled by all of the parties to the deed.
[1066] Then again, in the course of giving evidence at trial Barnes claimed that he could not remember when the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled save to say that it occurred before the execution of the Second Sale Agreement on 2 June 2003.
[1067] As to the circumstances of the cancellation, Barnes claimed that he may have initialled the word "cancelled" in the presence of others, but that he could not recall any of Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic initialling the word "cancelled" on the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed in his presence.
Sangster
[1068] Sangster claimed that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on or about 28 May 2003. He later gave evidence that it was cancelled within two days or so of signing.
[1069] Sangster could not recall where he gave effect to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed by initialling or who was present, or the identity of the person who marked the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed with the word "cancelled".
[1070] In his pleadings Sangster admitted that he became aware that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed had been cancelled following a phone call from Hodgson to that effect. At trial Sangster gave evidence that he had been advised by Hodgson that the Deed was premature as Hodgson had failed to successfully sell the Channel Partner Strategy to Brown.
[1071] However, again there was no evidence that Hodgson had ever discussed with Brown the so called Channel Partner Strategy.
Mihelic
[1072] Mihelic's evidence was that the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed arose as "Hodgson told me that we all had to cancel the Deed - that it did not have any support".
[1073] At trial he clarified his position stating that it was his understanding that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled as it "didn't have any support from Peter Brown".
[1074] However, again there was no evidence that Hodgson had ever discussed with Brown the possibility that any of the Defendants could be involved in taking an interest in the ACB Business or had ever sought his approval for any of the Defendants to be involved with the business in this way or at all.
[1075] Mihelic varied his position as to the timing of his part in the alleged cancellation of the deed. In his witness statement Mihelic gave evidence that he initialled his agreement to the cancellation on 28 May 2003. He later claimed that the cancellation took place no later than 28 May 2003. At trial he then said that, save to say that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was marked with the word 'cancelled' before he initialled it, he could not remember when it was cancelled, and said that he "can't be sure it was executed on that date [28 May 2003]".
[1076] As to the circumstances of the alleged cancellation by Mihlic [sic.], his evidence was that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed to effect its cancellation at his home. He said in his pleadings that Barnes and his wife Meredith Mihelic were present when he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed to effect its cancellation. However, Barnes did not corroborate this, and Meredith Mihelic was not called to give evidence.
Bayley
[1077] In his pleading Bayley claimed that he initialled the word "cancelled" on the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed at his home in Raby Bay, Queensland in the presence of his wife Betty Bayley but that he was not present when any of Hodgson, Sangster, Barnes or Mihelic recorded their initials recording the cancellation.
[1078] Bayley's evidence was that he initialled his agreement to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed on or about 28 May 2003.
[1079] At trial he gave evidence that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed "about 28 May ... or a few days after the 26th or whatever". He also said that he could not recall where he gave effect to the cancellation and that he did not do so at the same time as his wife Betty Bayley who witnessed his initials to the document. He said that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed and then provided it to his wife who subsequently initialled it, "most probably in Queensland".
[1080] Betty Bayley was not called to give evidence.
1674 Notwithstanding the evidence given by the former executives, his Honour made findings as follows:
Findings as to the Alleged Cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed
[1084] I do not accept the cases maintained by the Defendants as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed.
[1085] I also do not accept what Holihan and Barnes said to the effect that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, which provided for a 50/50 split between them, although in fact executed in or about in about [sic.] October 2005, reflected an earlier oral agreement made by those parties on or about 28 May 2003.
[1086] I find that the two Agreements of 26 May 2003, being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were entered into and carried into effect by Holihan, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and interests associated with them, and continued to be given effect to, until at or around October 2005.
1675 Against that background, in my view, no occasion arises for drawing any Jones v Dunkel inference in light of the Holihan parties not calling the five former executives to give evidence.
Amcor parties allege that the Holihan parties could have called Mr Roe
1676 In their oral closing submissions, the Amcor parties also submitted that the Holihan parties should have called Mr Roe to give evidence.[2024] They say that it is uncontroversial that Mr Holihan received legal advice from Mr Roe in relation to the Second Sale Agreement, and 'he could have given evidence about the advice that he gave in relation to the contract, ... and the negotiations' and '[i]mportant evidence could have been elucidated from Mr Roe in respect of the whole preparation of the agreement.'[2025] It was also asserted that 'he was the solicitor who drafted the secret shareholding agreements ... and the deed'[2026] and that as the draftsperson, 'he would have been privy to the intended workings of those shareholder structures and he could have given pertinent evidence on the matters of the cross‑claim, including the control and the rights of the executives and the notification issue', and whether or not notification and disclosure actually eventuated.[2027] The Amcor parties contend that the Court should draw 'appropriate inferences' and that the second type of inference from Manly Council v Byrne[2028] should be drawn, not just the first.
1677 In their oral closing submissions, the Holihan parties pointed out that 'Mr Roe was called to give evidence at trial before Justice Vickery by the Amcor parties, but nothing from that trial has been put before Your Honour.'[2029] In the principal judgment, his Honour made mention of Mr Roe at several passages in the context of both the Second Sale Agreement and the 'secret' agreements the subject of the change of control allegations, relevantly to the effect that:
Genesis of the Involvement of Barnes in the ACB Business
...
[967] In early November 2002 Barnes put a proposition to Holihan to the effect that if he got permission from Amcor to join Holihan in the ACB Business, Holihan should reduce his shareholding in the ACB business to 20%. ... Holihan left the matter on the basis that he would obtain some advice. Holihan subsequently raised the matter with his solicitor, Roe.
...
[971] By the end of November [2002], Holihan asked Roe for advice on how a transaction could be structured so that unknown investors could be nominated at a later time.
...
[974] In about early February 2003 Barnes said that he had a further conversation with Holihan in which an agreement was arrived at to the effect that if the transaction involving the 60% shareholding of the unnamed party or parties did not proceed, then they both would revert to a shareholding of the ACB Business on a 50/50 basis, and if Barnes did not obtain the permission of Amcor to participate, then Holihan would proceed on his own in any event.
...
[975] Holihan then gave instructions to Roe to draw up an agreement to reflect the discussions between himself and Barnes to that point.
...
Barnes Involves the Other Shareholders
...
[981] On 21 March 2003 Roe, who was Barnes' solicitor, provided a draft of what was to become the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement to Holihan. This was the subject of some comments from Barnes when it was provided to him. Amendments were then introduced into the draft.
...
[987] Barnes received further drafts from his solicitor Roe of what was to become the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement on or about 24 April, 21 May and 22 May 2003.
...
[990] The necessary documentation was prepared in early May [2003] to facilitate the inclusion of Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and, later in May 2003, Hodgson. Barnes provided instructions to his solicitor, Roe (who he then shared in common with Holihan), for the drafting of the documentation.
...
The 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement
[993] On 26 May 2003 Holihan attended the office of his solicitor Roe with Barnes and executed the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. The parties to the agreement were Barnes and Holihan. This is the management agreement referred to in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed signed on the same day, which is later described.
...
Confidentiality as to the ACB Business Structure
[1007] Following entry into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreements ownership of the ACB Business was concealed by two mechanisms.
[1008] The first mechanism was the complicated corporate structure and trust structure for the acquisition of the ACB Business which has been earlier described. This was designed to eliminate the facility to trace the true ownership of the business by searches conducted on the public record.
[1009] The second mechanism involved the inclusion of elaborate confidentiality provisions in the ACB Business documentation. These provisions notably included a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause which exposed the signatories to liquidated damages of $200,000 for disclosing the existence of the Deed, the fact that any other party was a party to the Deed or the identity of any of the shareholder representatives. These confidentiality provisions arose from instructions set out in a facsimile from Holihan to the solicitor acting in the transaction Mr David Roe ("Roe") dated 1 April 2003. Holihan explained this document set out instructions from both himself and Barnes in respect of the shareholders agreement.
...
...
28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement Executed October 2005
...
[1039] Holihan's evidence was that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was not drafted by Roe until mid to late 2005. Holihan claimed that while the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was not executed until 2005, it was dated 28 May 2003 so as to reflect the fact that he had always held a 50 per cent shareholding in Achilla Pty Ltd.
1678 In the absence of the Court being apprised of the evidence given by Mr Roe before Vickery J, but nevertheless proceeding on the basis of the extracts from the judgment set out above, it seems clear that there was evidence before his Honour about Mr Roe's role and his involvement in the drafting of the agreements between Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan, and between Mr Barnes and the other executives. In circumstances where Mr Roe was called by the Amcor parties to give evidence in the principal proceeding, I do not accept that he is now to be regarded as being aligned with the Holihan parties or 'in their camp' in the relevant sense for the purposes of the trial of the counterclaim or the cross-claim. It follows that I am not satisfied that the occasion arises for drawing any Jones v Dunkel inference in light of the Holihan parties not calling Mr Roe to give evidence.
The Holihan parties contend that the Amcor parties should have called executives other than Mr Roberts and Mr Powell - for e.g., Mr Lachal and Mr Clayton - to give evidence on the cross-claim
1679 In respect of the cross-claim, the Holihan parties contend that the Amcor parties would not have terminated the supply agreement under clause 16.1 because to do so would have risked them giving up significant revenue and potential market share in three markets: first, the specialty market itself; secondly, the market for the supply of cardboard through the specialty product channel, and thirdly, the market for the supply of paper itself.
1680 The evidence before Vickery J was that under Mr Brown's leadership, Amcor wished to get out of the short run specialty business, because the ACB Business was not meeting its ROFE benchmark.[2030] The specialty business was sold to the Holihan parties on a commercially pragmatic basis, being one that obliged the ACB Business to continue to source all its supplies of Products (corrugated board and paper) from the AFP Smithfield and Revesby plants. Indeed, the structuring of the sale of the ACB Business itself, with the supply obligation in clause 12.1, demonstrates that it was important for the AFP Smithfield and Revesby plants to continue to have the ACB Business as a customer following the sale.
1681 Mr Brown, who was the managing director at the time of the sale of the ACB Business, left Amcor before any cartel conduct was exposed and before the employment of each of Messrs Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley was terminated. Once those former executives departed, however, there was a changing of the guard and in December 2004, Mr Roberts was installed as the acting Managing Director of Amcor Australasia. He then set about re-establishing an internal capacity to do specialty work, apparently believing that the ACB Business was a valuable business that should never have been sold. The Holihan parties say that as part of Mr Roberts' strategy, Amcor bought the Sainsbury business (which was relevantly a competitor of Achilla and an alternative OME supplier), and they also sent OME work to Central Coast Cartons, which by then was owned by Amcor, and this resulted in a decline in the amount of work that was sent to Achilla.
1682 The Holihan parties contend that even if there were a change of control, the Amcor parties would have acted exactly as they did - that is, by commencing proceedings to get the ACB Business back, and not simply by seeking to terminate the clause 12 supply arrangement. That is because the latter course would have left Achilla with ownership of all of the machinery, the knowledge about the Amcor parties' customer base, and the ability to compete with them and take the market share for the supply of raw materials (cardboard and paper) to a rival such as Visy Board or Carter Holt Harvey. Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that simply terminating (only) the clause 12 supply arrangement is an unlikely scenario.
1683 Further, the Holihan parties observed that while Mr Roberts and Ms McPherson gave evidence about what they say would have been done by the Amcor parties if there were a change of control, nevertheless there is an absence of evidence from any of the directors of the relevant companies who were in control at the relevant time and making the relevant decisions on the ground. They submit that Mr Crawford, Mr Clayton, Mr Lewis and Mr Lachal could have been called by the Amcor parties to give evidence, but they were not.[2031]
1684 In response, the Amcor parties submitted that:
[552] Each of Lewis, Clayton, Lachal and Sutton have long since ceased to have any employment with Amcor.
[553] Sutton departed in December 2004 in difficult circumstances in connection with the ACCC investigations that lead to proceedings.
[554] Lewis, long now retired, when employed had company secretarial and statutory compliance functions. He was less senior than Roberts.
[555] Clayton and Lachal have also been retired for many years. Clayton retired in July 2008 Lachal retired in December 2008. They were not more senior than Roberts in mid 2004 and less senior to Roberts following his promotions in October 2004 and again in December 2004.
[556] As the Principal Judgment records Clayton was the GM of Finance and Operations based in Melbourne, not NSW where the operations with Achilla were based. His statement of 2011 recorded that in this role he was responsible for the Finance Group, Purchasing Group, Information Technology Services and the Shared Services Group, together with the capital approval processes and reviewing the operating results for Amcor Australasia. He was also Company secretary of Amcor Australasia and Lewis reported to him.
[557] Lachal was the GM of Operations also based in Melbourne, not where the operations with Achilla were based. Between July 2001 to Nov 2004 Lachal was the GM of Operations and then from December 2004 to June 2005 he was the COO of Amcor.
[558] No inference of any kind can be drawn from calling Roberts (who was put in charge of AFP and APA in the second half of 2004) rather than these men.[2032]
1685 The Holihan parties contend that the failure to call those persons as witnesses gives rise to a Jones v Dunkel inference and with Manly Council v Byrne[2033] consequences. First, they say the Court should draw the conclusion that the evidence of those people who were on the ground at the relevant time, and were capable of giving the Court an insight into the controlling mind and will of the relevant companies, could not have assisted the Amcor parties to make out their case that they would have terminated the clause 12 supply agreement. Secondly, they say, in the absence of such evidence, the Court can and should draw the alternative inference that the Holihan parties contend for. Further, they say, it is surprising that the two people who were called by the Amcor parties to give evidence about their response to a change of control in May/June 2004 and in October 2005 respectively were persons who did not give evidence at the trial before Vickery J.
1686 Relevantly, each of Mr Lachal, Mr Clayton and Mr Lewis were aligned with the Amcor parties and 'within their camp'. While each had retired some time ago, there was seemingly no inability on their respective parts to attend and give evidence if called upon to do so. In reality, they were in no different position in that regard to Mr Roberts. The Amcor parties submit that Mr Roberts was more senior than each of them at the relevant time. That may be so, but the evidence given by Mr Roberts suggests that notwithstanding his apparent seniority, he was not involved in, or consulted about, at least some of the decisions made by the Amcor parties in relation to the ACB Business at the relevant time. For example, it will be recalled that under cross-examination, he gave evidence that he was not involved in, or consulted about, the Deed of Accession that was entered into between the parties in March 2005. He said he knew nothing about it. Rather, he said, executives were 'responsible for running the business and looking after customers' and he agreed that Mr Clayton and Mr Lewis would have had the authority to execute that deed without reference to him.[2034] Mr Clayton and Mr Lewis, on the other hand, were the signatories to both the Second Sale Agreement and the Deed of Accession. While they would likely have been able to give evidence about the formal execution of each of those agreements, it is unclear whether that had any real involvement in the underlying business transactions and the internal processes involved in reaching and making the strategic corporate decisions involved. As noted earlier, the evidence shows that the Deed of Accession had its origin in email correspondence from Mr Lewis, in his role as company secretary of APA, to Mr Mitsonis, an accountant with AFP, headed 'Liquidations' in mid-December 2004. In evidence given before Vickery J, Mr Lewis described the process he set in motion as one that he commenced 'in keeping with Amcor's practice of cleaning up such shell companies'.[2035]
1687 In the case of Mr Lachal, he was based in Melbourne and thus was not directly involved in matters concerning Achilla save that he was the harbinger of the news that Mr Barnes had been a co-owner of the ACB Business from the outset.
1688 The evidence given by Mr Roberts on the cross-claim was directed to the hypothetical scenario of what the Amcor parties would have done had they been informed of the change of control in May/June 2004. Having canvassed the evidence that was given, however, I am not satisfied that he was qualfieid to do so. Certainly Mr Clayton and Mr Lewis were involved in (what Mr Roberts called) the relevant 'corporate or statutory type transactions', but the evidence does not go so far as to show that they were the real or operative decision makers, and suitably qualified to give evidence about what would have been done in a strategic business sense. It is not clear that either Mr Clayton or Mr Lewis would have been obviously better or more suitable candidates than Mr Roberts. Similarly in the case of Mr Lachal. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the occasion arises for drawing any Jones v Dunkel inference of the kind contended for by the Holihan parties regarding the Amcor parties' failure to call Mr Clayton, Mr Lewis and Mr Lachal to give evidence.
1689 Given the length of these reasons and the number of issues addressed, it is convenient to set out, in a summary way, the views I have reached by reference to the six 'Key Issues' identified by the parties.
1690 The Holihan parties contended that there was an implied supply agreement between APA and Achilla containing terms identical to clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. The Amcor parties disputed this, and submitted that their agreement is as recorded in the Second Sale Agreement (as written) and the Deed of Accession.
1691 The task of implying a contract is one that is to be approached with caution - there should be a positive indication of the particular agreement in question, the conduct relied upon must 'necessarily' provide evidence of acceptance, and the particular facts of the case will be all-important.
1692 In the present case, for the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis, or necessity, for the Court to imply an agreement between Achilla and APA containing terms identical to those set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
1693 The presence, or absence, of an intention to be legally bound by an agreement or arrangement, which may be express or implied, will depend on the facts of the particular case. But having now canvassed the relevant evidence, I am not satisfied that the Holihan parties have demonstrated that APA, as opposed to ACB Co Vendor, manifested an intention to enter into a legally binding arrangement with Achilla in relation to the sale of the ACB Business.
1694 In my view, prior to entry into the Deed of Accession, there is no evidence of an objective intention on the part of APA to be legally bound by the supply arrangements set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement. An examination of the whole of the circumstances of this case, viewed objectively, reveals no common intention on the part of APA and Achilla that APA was to be the party bound by clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement, rather than the named party, ACB Co Vendor. Rather, the evidence shows that the common intention of ACB Co Vendor on the one hand, and ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan on the other, was that following the sale of the ACB Business, the arrangement was to be 'business as usual'. That is, following the sale, the ACB Business would continue to perform the work that was, and historically had been, routed through the ACB Business, including the work that it performed for the AFP operations conducted at the corrugated box manufacturing sites at Smithfield and Revesby in New South Wales. And other short run work from the Smithfield and Revesby plants would continue to be outsourced externally to other OME suppliers.
1695 Following the entry into the Deed of Accession, from 21 March 2005, APA became the party that was bound by the Second Sale Agreement. The Holihan parties submit that the Deed of Accession was correcting a mistake and really putting into place, or formally recording, what was the existing practice between the parties. In my view, the objective evidence does not support that position. It is not one that is recorded or otherwise evident in either the contemporaneous correspondence exchanged between the parties or the recitals to the Deed, and does not reflect what was the (then) existing practice between the parties. Furthermore, there was no discussion between the parties about enlarging the scope of the contractual undertaking so as to encompass all of Amcor Displays' OME requirements within the clause 12.2 obligation. Were that proposed to occur, it was necessary for the Amcor parties to discuss the matter with Achilla. That is because any change to the scope of the clause 12.2 obligations would have implications for Achilla, particularly in circumstances where it was required to supply finished products to the Vendor 'at prices based on D & D costs to Achilla'.
1696 The Holihan parties also advanced an estoppel by convention argument in the alternative to their alleged implied contract. They maintain that during the negotiations that culminated in the execution of the Second Sale Agreement, Achilla (through Mr Holihan) and APA (through its representatives) expressed a common intention that the effect of the agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12. The Holihan parties relied on the parties' correspondence and conduct before and after execution of the Second Sale Agreement to support the existence of both the implied supply agreement and the estoppel by convention.
1697 In my view, when the objective evidence about the course of dealing that took place between the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties is examined, the clear impression conveyed is that each side intended that the OME work which had been routed through the ACB Business prior to the sale would continue to be routed through the ACB Business after the sale. Indeed, it was Mr Holihan who said to Mr MacPhail, in response to his question about whether AFP was going to continue to do business after the sale, that '[i]t's going to be the same - it's going to be business as usual, it's going to be the same ... exact trading relationship as currently pertains between the entities or within the Amcor group.'[2036] And Mr MacPhail said that he understood Mr Holihan's reference to 'business as usual' to be an apt description for the deal that was being done, in the sense that he understood that 'the legal ownership and management of the business unit would change ... [b]ut that the actual flow of product and the prices paid for it would remain exactly the same.'[2037]
1698 In my view, the Holihan parties' conventional estoppel argument suffered from the same essential vice as their implied contract argument. It proceeded on the footing that 'APA' was involved in negotiations with Achilla that culminated in the Second Sale Agreement and that, in so doing, APA adopted the same assumption as that allegedly adopted by Achilla, namely that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12, and that each of them knew that the other was conducting their relationship on that basis. However, as I have found in the context of the implied supply agreement, there is no evidence of an objective intention on the part of APA to be legally bound by obligations equivalent to those set out in clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
1699 It follows that I am also not satisfied that the 'common intention' alleged by the Holihan parties in their particulars, that the effect of the Second Sale Agreement would be that APA would be the party bound by clause 12, is made out. Accordingly, no estoppel by convention operates to prevent APA from denying that it was bound by terms equivalent to those alleged in the implied supply agreement.
1700 As I have rejected the notion that there was any implied supply agreement, it is necessary to deal only with clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement.
1701 Clause 12 of the Second Sale Agreement establishes reciprocal supply and purchase obligations that apply to ACB Co Vendor as Vendor, and to ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla as Purchaser of the ACB Business. Under clause 12.1, the 'supply obligation', ACB Co Vendor agreed it would supply corrugated board and corrugated cartons to ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla at prices based on D & D costs to ACB Co Vendor. Achilla (and if appropriate, ACB Co Purchaser) on the other hand undertook to 'obtain all supplies of' such Products from ACB Co Vendor at the D & D prices specified, save for those that Achilla manufactures for itself (or ACB Co Purchaser), and agreed it would not purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to ACB Co Vendor's 'inability to supply consistently...' etc. Accordingly, for a period of five years, ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla were effectively required to obtain their raw materials from ACB Co Vendor and not from any other source.
1702 Similarly, under the clause 12.2 'purchase obligation', Achilla undertook to supply 'Products' (in context that must be construed to mean finished products and not corrugated board and cartons) to ACB Co Vendor at prices based on D & D costs to Achilla. ACB Co Vendor on the other hand agreed that during the five year period it would 'obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla' and would not 'purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently...' etc.
1703 When the provisions of clause 12 are viewed in the context of the whole agreement and the surrounding circumstances, the obligations imposed on ACB Co Vendor under clause 12.2 to obtain 'all its OME supplies' from Achilla were as follows:
(a) On its proper construction, the purchase obligation imposed on ACB Co Vendor under clause 12.2 is to be construed as an obligation on the part of ACB Co Vendor to continue to provide to Achilla after the sale, effectively all of the same sort of work that the ACB Business had been doing prior to the sale, save in circumstances where the exception was enlivened. That is, notwithstanding the sale, the ACB Business (under new ownership) would effectively continue on the same basis as before (i.e., when conducted by ACB Co Vendor). Thus, in the ordinary course, customers' work that was entered in the PICK system with a master denoting the ACB Business would be routed to Achilla notwithstanding the change in ownership. Similarly, in the case of new jobs that involved work of the kind that was performed by the ACB Business prior to the sale, in the ordinary course, a quote would be generated using the PICK system, and work would be routed to Achilla unless the exception was enlivened. In this way, Achilla would continue to perform the work that historically had been undertaken by the ACB Business, and essentially on the same basis as before, including that its supplies of raw material would continue to be sourced from the AFP businesses conducted at the Smithfield and Revesby sites in New South Wales.
(b) As to whether Amcor Displays' work was captured within the clause 12.2 purchase obligation, on the evidence, it seems clear that while the ACB Business was doing some work for Amcor Displays prior to the sale, it was not doing all or even a significant proportion of the Amcor Displays' work. The evidence suggests that a small component of the Amcor Displays work was being performed by the ACB Business notwithstanding the arrangement then in place with ACE Print, and that it was being recorded separately from the other work performed for the businesses conducted by AFP at its Smithfield and Revesby sites. In the period prior to the Deed of Accession being entered into, as a general proposition, the Amcor Displays' work was not encompassed within the scope of clause 12.2. However, given that I have found that on a 'business as usual' construction of the clause 12.2 obligation, Achilla would likely have received some small amount of Amcor Displays' work of the kind that the ACB Business had been doing for it prior to the sale (save for circumstances where the relevant exception was enlivened), clause 12.2 entitled Achilla or the ACB Business to continue receive a small amount of the same sort of Amcor Displays' work.
(c) In the period following execution of the Deed of Accession, the scope of clause 12.2 remained unchanged from the position described above. That is, the substitution of APA as 'Vendor' in place of ACB Co Vendor did not relevantly enlarge the scope of the clause 12.2 purchase obligation.
1704 Achilla seeks compensation totalling $4,091,022.55 in respect of the 1,913 jobs that the Amcor parties sent to suppliers other than Achilla. Its claim for breach is predicated on alternative scenarios. First, it relies upon the implied supply agreement (read together with the Deed of Accession) as covering the period from Completion to the date five years after Completion. But if the implied supply agreement is not made out, as I have found to be the case, it relies upon the Second Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession) in respect of the period on and from 21 March 2005 to the date five years after Completion.
1705 The starting point for consideration of the question of breach is that following the sale, Achilla was entitled to receive the 'business as usual' type of work that the ACB Business performed prior to the sale. That remained the position following entry into the Deed of Accession, in that the substitution of APA as Vendor in place of ACB Co Vendor did not enlarge the scope of the clause 12.2 obligation.
1706 As the Court has found that there was no implied supply agreement, it is only OME supplies that were procured from the alternative suppliers during the period from entry into the Deed of Accession that fall to be considered. That is, in light of the Court's rejection of the implied supply agreement (and estoppel by convention) contended for by the Holihan parties and the construction of clause 12.2 arrived at by the Court, the position now reached is that the Holihan parties must demonstrate that APA was relevantly in breach of the Second Sale Agreement (as amended by the Deed of Accession) in the period from 21 March 2005 to the end of the five year period.
1707 To discharge their onus concerning APA's alleged breach of clause 12.2, the Holihan parties must first identify the OME supplies that they contend APA should have procured from Achilla (or the ACB Business) effectively on a 'business as usual' basis during that period. Relevantly, by reference to the indicative document prepared by the parties showing the spread of the 1,913 jobs over the time period, the Holihan parties are required to identify which of the approximately 1,156 jobs performed after the Deed of Accession was entered into (of which approximately 553 were for Amcor Displays) they contend were OME supplies that APA should have procured from Achilla on a 'business as usual' basis. Then it is a matter for the Amcor parties to demonstrate in respect of the jobs so identified, those instances where they contend the exception was enlivened, thereby relieving APA from the obligation to procure those OME supplies from Achilla.
1708 In my reasons, I have set out my findings with respect to each of the various categories of claims set out in the Joint Statement of Issues. In many cases, the categories overlap and intersect with one another, and in others there is a cascading sequence of questions to be addressed. Rather than attempting to summarise them, it is preferable to refer the reader to the substantive treatment of each Issue where it appears earlier in these reasons.
1709 The Amcor parties also raised in their defence the issue of whether Achilla had knowledge of, or acquiesced in, or whether the parties operated under a common assumption as to the procurement of OME by APA from alternative suppliers. The Amcor parties contend that 'the first time Holihan claims he raised the question of OME breaches with anyone at AFP is in a meeting in early 2006.'[2038] Accordingly, their conventional estoppel (and acquiescence) defence is advanced for the period from about July 2003 to October 2005 only. However, it will be noted that that period of time includes 21 March 2005, which is the date when the Deed of Accession was entered into.
1710 The Deed of Accession does not mention any existing or prospective claims made, or to be made by Achilla against APA (as opposed to ACB Co Vendor) for breaches of the Second Sale Agreement in respect of events arising before the Accession Date, and there was no reservation of rights.
1711 It is well-established that a conventional estoppel can only be made out if there is evidence of the alleged assumption in fact having been adopted by the parties as the conventional basis for their relationship. And the underlying assumption must manifest '[a] demonstrable acceptance of a particular state of things', as the foundation for the dealings between the parties and that 'the acts or conduct relied upon must point plainly, if not unequivocally, to the assumption put forward as the conventional basis of relations.'[2039]
1712 At the time of the sale, Mr Holihan was well aware that some of the OME requirements of customers of the corrugated box plants at AFP Smithfield and AFP Revesby were being met by OME suppliers other than Achilla. That too was a feature of the 'business as usual' arrangement. And that position did not change when the Deed of Accession was entered into. Indeed, when the Deed of Accession was being entered into in early 2005, Mr Holihan did not raise with the Amcor parties any concern about alternative suppliers continuing to do OME work for them. Nor did he raise any such concern in his email exchange with Mr Beynon in mid-November 2005.
1713 Having canvassed all of the available evidence, in my view, it is clear that in circumstances where the Holihan parties and the Amcor parties had each adopted the notion of 'business as usual' as the conventional basis for their relationship, and Mr Holihan did not raise any question of breach, or issue any notice under the contract, any departure from that position by him would cause APA detriment as particularised and set out above. However, I accept the Holihan parties' submission that the Amcor parties' claim for detrimental reliance should be confined to that which is set out in their pleadings, and not the enlarged claim that was advanced for the first time in their closing submissions. Whether any detriment was suffered by the Amcor parties, however, will only become apparent once the relevant 'breach' jobs have been identified.
1714 With the assistance of the expert evidence given by Ms Dawna Wright and Mr Greg Meredith, I have also found that the appropriate methodology to be adopted for assessing any loss suffered by Achilla is the adjusted Amcor methodology but with total fixed costs recovered from the Amcor volume only. (In other words, the methodology used by the experts to reach the upper half of the Joint Amcor Calculations (which is based on Mr Meredith's Annexure N methodology) is the methodology to be used.)
1715 Now that I have made my findings in respect of which categories of work can be considered an 'OME supply of Product' that would have been provided to Achilla on a 'business as usual' basis between 21 March 2005 and 31 July 2008, and the methodology to be adopted for the assessment of any loss, in the absence of the parties reaching agreement as to the relevant invoices that reflect such jobs, and/or the quantum of any loss, I propose to appoint an expert under section 65M of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) to assist with the process and any calculation or categorisation exercise required to be performed. Once the parties have had an opportunity to consider these reasons, and consult with one another, I will hear from them as to the appropriate form of any order required to be made.
1716 Achilla claims to be entitled to damages as a result of APA charging it prices for the supply of Products (raw materials) in the period from 1 October 2005 to 20 July 2008 that were higher than the prices prescribed under the D & D costing mechanism in clause 12.1 of the Second Sale Agreement. The total value of the overcharge claimed by Achilla, and effectively admitted by APA, is $232,765.46.
1717 By way of defence, APA initially alleged that any overcharges were the result of a mistake on the part of APA. But in their written closing submissions the Amcor parties ultimately conceded that no evidence supports their allegation that any undercharges (sic.) were made by mistake. In those circumstances, it is not open to the Court to find that the overcharges were relevantly the result of a mistake.
1718 The Amcor parties also contended by way of defence that Achilla suffered no loss because it charged its customers by reference to the price actually charged to it by APA, in the sense that Achilla factored the (over)charges into the prices it charged its customers, and so 'passed on' the overcharges to them. Essentially for the reasons advanced by the Holihan parties, I have rejected that argument and found that APA cannot reduce its liability by contending that some or all of the overcharged amount would have been 'passed on' by Achilla to a third party.
1719 Accordingly, I find that APA overcharged Achilla $232,642.06 for the supply of raw materials, and APA's set-off claim should be dismissed.
1720 As to the Charge, the real issue in contention between the parties was whether the Charge secured more than merely the payment of the purchase price for the ACB Business, and if so, did it extend to providing security for any damages and equitable compensation awarded and costs that the Amcor Parties might incur in connection with the principal proceeding.
1721 Relevantly, I have found that the Charge did not secure payment of:
(a) any liability for costs or damages payable to the Chargees other than in litigation brought to enforce the Charge or the Second Sale Agreement or for breach of those agreements;
(c) compensation of the type sought against ACB Co Purchaser in proceeding 8181 of 2007 (the principal proceeding).
1722 I have also found that ACB Co Purchaser's tender of the balance of the purchase price under the Second Sale Agreement on or before 30 July 2008 was valid and effective. In the circumstances, ACB Co Purchaser is excused from the requirement to make an actual tender, it having been made clear by the Amcor parties that such tender would be refused.
1723 Further, in my view, the conduct of the Chargees in wrongfully refusing the tender, deprives APA (as the then Vendor under the Second Sale Agreement) of any right it might otherwise have had to receive interest arising as a result of ACB Co Purchaser's failure to actually pay the final instalment of purchase price on or about 30 July 2008. There are no fixed rules about when interest is payable following rejection of a valid tender and, in my view, this case falls within the category of cases that warrant an 'exceptional circumstances' approach of the kind taken by Hamilton J in Coughlan v George.[2040] Accordingly, ACB Co Purchaser is not liable to pay APA interest on the balance of the purchase price and it remains indebted to APA for the final instalment only, namely the sum of $300,000. ACB Co Purchaser is entitled to a discharge of the Charge upon payment of this amount.
1724 The Amcor parties allege that ACB Co Purchaser breached the Second Sale Agreement by not informing ACB Co Vendor of a change in control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in May/June 2004 and/or by not informing APA of a change of control of ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla in October 2005. The respective changes of control are alleged to arise from:
• In the case of the 'first change of control' - a written agreement made between Messrs Holihan and Barnes dated 26 May 2003 (the '26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement') whereby each of Messrs Holihan and Barnes made promises regarding matters including the affairs and management of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and a third company LeoRose, which held shares in ACB Co Purchaser; and
• In the case of the 'second change of control' - the written agreement between Messrs Holihan and Barnes that was expressed to be 'made 28th May 2003' (the '28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement') but was executed in October 2005 and only came into operation on that date, whereby each party made promises regarding the affairs of ACB Co Purchaser including the re-arrangement of the beneficial ownership of shares in that company.
1725 The control or change of control that is relevant is that mentioned in clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement, and what ACB Co Purchaser must not do is 'permit, allow or suffer' a change in its control or the control of Achilla without the Vendor's written consent. In clause 1.1 of the Second Sale Agreement, the expression 'control' is defined to mean, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the meaning set out in section 50AA of the Corporations Act'.
1726 The parties' adoption of the section 50AA definition of control for the purposes of that contractual requirement conveys the notion that the sort of 'control' that is relevant in the clause 16.4(ii) context is control at the level of capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about 'financial and operating policies' of the company, and whether or not there is a change in control is to be ascertained by looking at the practical influence that can be exerted when making, and influencing the outcome of, decisions about 'financial and operating policies', rather than by focussing on the legal rights capable of being exercised or enforced. Further, when looking at the capacity of an entity to determine the outcome of such decisions, any practice or pattern of behaviour is to be taken into account. It follows, in my view, that one does not discern or ascertain whether there is a change of control by simply looking at the number of shares held at any particular time, or to strict legal rights, or to the rights of directors etc. Rather, one must look to see whether the relevant person or entity has the capacity in a real and practical sense to determine the important decisions of the company that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives, as distinct from the day to day decisions made within that framework.
Conclusion as to the first alleged change of control
1727 In my view, there was no 'change in control' in the relevant companies as a result of or by reason of Mr Holihan being informed as to the identity of the representatives of the other beneficial owners on or about 30 June 2004. Rather, in the absence of evidence of any ratification by them, clause 4(c) continued to operate such that it remained the case as at 30 June 2004 that Messrs Barnes and Holihan each had 'one half of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.' Furthermore, in the absence of ratification, the veto rights under clause 10 that the Amcor parties rely upon were not enlivened. It follows that I am not satisfied that after disclosure was made to Mr Holihan, the beneficial owners relevantly had any capacity in a real and practical sense to determine the important decisions of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives.
1728 In the circumstances, there was no relevant 'change' in capacity to determine the companies' financial and operating policies and Mr Holihan continued to be bound to manage the companies pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. It follows that ACB Co Purchaser did not, within the meaning of clause 16.4 'permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor.'
Conclusion as to the second alleged change of control
1729 In my view, notwithstanding the entry by Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, which Vickery J found took place in October 2005, it is not clear that it effected any relevant 'change' in capacity to determine ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla's financial and operating policies. Having considered the evidence and the agreements, I am not satisfied that by reason of entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement there was any effective change in the identity of the person(s) or entities having the capacity in a real and practical sense to determine the important decisions of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla that set the framework for the operation of the business, in meeting its legal and regulatory obligations and in achieving its financial and other corporate objectives. It follows, that I am not satisfied that there was relevantly any change of control in either ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla by reason of entry into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement.
1730 It follows that ACB Co Purchaser did not breach clause 16.4 of the Second Sale Agreement by 'permit[ting], allow[ing] or suffer[ing] a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor'.
1731 Under Issue 19, which raises the question of what (if any) is the liability of Mr Holihan, Achilla and ACB Co Purchaser pursuant to clauses 11.2, 11.3 and /or 17.2 of the Second Sale Agreement in respect of any breach, a number of underlying questions were posed, which have been answered as follows:
(a) Do the matters pleaded by APA by way of cross-claim give rise to a 'Claim' as defined in the Second Sale Agreement for the purposes of Mr Holihan's contractual indemnity?
1732 I agree with the Holihan parties' submission that the expression 'Claim' in clause 1.1, and thus the indemnity in clause 11.3, in each case is limited to 'third party claims'. It follows that the matters pleaded in Parts G, H3 and H4 of the Amcor parties' defence to counterclaim do not give rise to a 'Claim' (within the meaning of that term in clause 11.3 of the Second Sale Agreement as amended by the Deed of Accession) against which Mr Holihan would be required to indemnify APA.
(b) Was any liability of Mr Holihan discharged by the tender of the final instalment of the purchase price?
1733 Mr Holihan contracted with ACB Co Vendor to provide a guarantee of the 'due and punctual performance and observance' by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations. He did so in a context where the term of the Second Sale Agreement, and in particular, the date for payment of the instalments of purchase price, was to expire on or about 30 July 2008. In my view, in circumstances where ACB Co Purchaser (or Achilla) has (or is to be regarded as having) complied with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement, Mr Holihan's obligation to guarantee the 'due and punctual performance and observance' by ACB Co Purchaser and Achilla of their respective obligations is simply not enlivened. That is, the pre-condition to ACB Co Vendor (or APA) being able to call upon the guarantee has not been satisfied, nor has ACB Co Vendor (or APA) invoked clause 11.2 and 'required' Mr Holihan 'to comply with those obligations'.
1734 If, however, a different view of the evidence were taken, and it was found that there is scope in the present case to find that ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla had not complied with those obligations 'on time and in accordance with' the Second Sale Agreement, and also that ACB Co Vendor or APA had given notice to Mr Holihan requiring him to comply with those obligations, such that the guarantee is enlivened, then the question arises as to whether the 'tender' in July 2008 operated or was effective to discharge Mr Holihan from his surety obligations. In my view, it was effective to do so, essentially for the reasons of principle given by the High Court in Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd.[2041] The rejection by ACB Co Vendor (or APA) of the 'tender' made in a timely way by ACB Co Purchaser, operated to preclude the existence or continued existence of the circumstances in which Mr Holihan, as surety, had agreed to be bound.
(c) Does the Anshun doctrine preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the claims in section H of the cross-claim?[2042]
1735 In their reply, the Holihan parties pleaded that the 'change of control' allegations made by the Amcor parties under Part H of their defence were relevant to the subject matter of the principal proceeding heard by Vickery J, could have been raised at or before the trial of that proceeding, and it was unreasonable of the Amcor parties not to have raised them at that time. Accordingly, the Holihan parties contend that the Amcor parties are now estopped from making those allegations pursuant to the principle in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd.[2043] In my view, while it would now appear (with the benefit of hindsight) that it was theoretically possible for the Amcor parties to have raised 'change of control' allegations in the principal proceeding, it was not 'unreasonable' for them not to have done so. Accordingly, the Anshun doctrine does not preclude the Amcor parties from bringing the cross-claims in section H.
1736 The Holihan parties also sought to have the Court dismiss the change of control allegations under its general discretion to prevent an abuse of process. The power to strike out or dismiss for abuse of process is one that is to be exercised sparingly and upon an examination of the circumstances of the particular case. The basis on which the cross-claim has been brought, and the reason for its lateness, have been discussed at length above in dealing with the Anshun estoppel defence advanced by the Holihan parties. I have set out the reasons why I have found it was not unreasonable for the Amcor parties to bring the cross-claim. For essentially the same reasons, I would also dismiss the Holihan parties' abuse of process defence.
1737 This issue is said to be a 'catch all' for the remaining questions as to whether Mr Holihan is liable to APA for any loss under clause 11.2, and it only arises for determination if the Court finds that the guarantee has not been discharged.
1738 In their closing written submissions, the Amcor parties sought to characterise the exchange of correspondence that took place between their solicitors and the solicitors for the Holihan parties regarding payment of the final instalment of purchase price as being 'in substance a call upon Mr Holihan', contending that '[t]hat is the only way in which he could be made liable to pay the instalment, which remains unpaid.'[2044]
1739 In my view, when the relevant correspondence between the solicitors is read in the context in which the exchange took place, it is clear that it does not constitute a 'call' upon Mr Holihan under the guarantee. To be sure, Mills Oakley were at the relevant time apparently acting as the solicitors for each of ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla and Mr Holihan. But as the (alleged) 'call' made reference to payment of 'both the $300,000 and the applicable amount of interest owed', it far exceeded the maximum liability of Mr Holihan under the guarantee, and was incapable of constituting a valid call upon Mr Holihan.
1740 The Holihan parties do not dispute that in the event ACB Co Purchaser is found liable for any loss, then clause 17.2 applies to make Achilla jointly and severally liable for such loss. However, they deny that there is any loss for which ACB Co Purchaser is liable.
1741 In due course, I will hear from the parties as to the appropriate form of final orders.
AMCOR FIBRE PACKAGING AUSTRALASIA (Corrugating/AFPA)
Structure of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement
(FORMERLY AMCOR PACKAGING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD) (ACN 004 275 165)
SPECIALTY PACKAGING GROUP PTY LTD (FORMERLY SERVICE CONTAINERS PTY LTD) (ACN 005 319 666)
AUSTRALIAN CORRUGATED BOX CO PTY LTD (FORMERLY ACHILLA PTY LTD)
AUSTRALIAN CORRUGATED BOX CO PTY LTD (FORMERLY ACHILLA PTY LTD)
(FORMERLY AMCOR PACKAGING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD) (ACN 004 275 165)
(FORMERLY AMCOR PACKAGING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD) (ACN 004 275 165)
AUSTRALIAN CORRUGATED BOX CO PTY LTD (FORMERLY ACHILLA PTY LTD)
[1] In the Hodgson Proceeding, Mr James Hodgson ('Hodgson') as plaintiff claimed amounts he alleged were due to him under his contract of employment with Amcor consequent on the termination of his employment with that company which he claims to have occurred on 1 October 2004. Mr Hodgson, at the time of his departure from Amcor, occupied a senior position as Group General Manager of Amcor's corrugating division known as Amcor Fibre Packaging Australia.
[2] In the Barnes proceeding, the Amcor parties alleged that the former executives, namely Messrs Trevor Barnes ('Barnes'), Craig Holihan ('Holihan'), Ian Sangster ('Sangster'), Roger Bayley ('Bayley') and Albert Mihelic ('Mihelic'), and the first defendant by counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding, Hodgson, as former senior managers of Amcor's corrugating division, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australia, breached various contractual, equitable and statutory duties they owed to the company.
[3] Mr Barnes is the first defendant in the Barnes' proceeding.
[4] In the principal judgment, Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, Vickery J said (at 25-26 [77]-[78]) that in 2000, Amcor reorganised its global operations and all of Amcor's Australasian businesses became one division called 'Amcor Australasia'. Mr Brown became the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia and he continued to report to Mr Russell Jones, then Managing Director of Amcor.
[5] See the Fourth Amended Counterclaim of the Fourth Defendant, dated 16 February 2015 (the 'counterclaim').
[7] A reference to the obligation in clause 12.2 (concerning finished products).
[8] A reference to the obligation in clause 12.1 (concerning raw materials).
[9] See ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd & Anor v Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] VSCA 223, at [6].
[10] Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2012] VSC 434, at [86] (citations omitted).
[11] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 1; [2012] VSC 94.
[13] Ibid, at [128]-[129] (emphasis added).
[15] See Holihan parties' amended submissions on effect of earlier judgments and list of findings to which no objection is made, dated 18 June 2015.
[16] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [46]-[48].
[17] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [102].
[19] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [138].
[20] Apparently a reference to ACB Co Vendor.
[21] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [256]-[296] (emphasis added - in bold).
[22] See principal judgment, esp., at [1215] ff. 'Uncommercial transaction - ACB Business Sale'.
[23] Note: Throughout, this is a reference to Mr MacPhail.
[24] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [555].
[25] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [621].
[26] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [622].
[27] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [623].
[28] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [566].
[29] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [557].
[30] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [561].
[31] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [558].
[32] This was the year that Amcor commenced the Barnes Proceeding.
[33] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [848].
[34] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [849].
[35] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [863]-[872] (emphasis added).
[36] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [873]-[885] (emphasis added).
[37] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [895]-[896].
[38] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [904]-[914].
[39] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [932]-[933] (emphasis added). As noted above, his Honour made a similar finding about the effect of the First Sale Agreement.
[40] See Transcript 08/09/15, at 3781 (Mr Maiden).
[41] See Transcript 08/09/15, at 3781-82 (Mr Maiden).
[42] References to the evidence given by the respective witnesses will be shown using the following abbreviations: 'XIC' for examination-in-chief; 'XXN' for cross-examination, and 'RE-XN' for re-examination.
[43] Exhibit H 93.1 and referred to in these reasons as 'Holihan WS1'.
[44] Exhibit H 93.2 and referred to in these reasons as 'Holihan WS2'.
[46] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1891-1897.
[47] Exhibit H402 and referred to in these reasons as 'Papadimatos WS'.
[48] The PICK system recorded the actual product design or 'master' for the work ordered.
[49] Exhibit H407 and referred to in these reasons as 'Cichonski WS'.
[50] Exhibit H410 and referred to in these reasons as 'Silva WS'.
[51] Exhibit H368 and referred to in these reasons as 'Whitechurch WS'.
[52] Mr Holihan purchased the Grassi No 3 and the two Eterna die-cutters through Mr Whitechurch of Converta (see Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [156], [157], [170], [219], [236], [259] and [261]).
[53] Exhibit A91 and referred to in these reasons as 'MacPhail WS'.
[54] The acronym 'SAP' apparently stands for 'Systems Applications and Products'.
[55] Exhibit A88 and referred to in these reasons as 'Roberts WS'.
[56] Exhibit A89 and referred to in these reasons as 'Phillips WS'.
[57] Exhibit A92 and referred to in these reasons as 'Powell WS'.
[58] Exhibit A90.1 and referred to in these reasons as 'McPherson WS'.
[59] Exhibit A90.2 and referred to in these reasons as 'McPherson affidavit'.
[60] Exhibit A93 and referred to in these reasons as 'Guy WS'.
[61] In the sense that it did not perform well according to Amcor's internal 'ROFE' (return on funds employed) benchmark.
[62] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [19]-[22].
[63] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1924.
[64] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [23]; Profit and loss statement for ACB Co Vendor for FY 2003: CB 7: 2497-2510 (Exhibit H15); list of sales to external customers of ACB Business for FY2003: CB 5: 1787-1788 (Exhibit H50).
[65] The work that the ACB Business did for AFP was ultimately for customers of AFP (for which the ACB Business charged AFP).
[66] Amcor Displays did not manufacture products. Rather, it was a sales division within AFP that was involved in the sale of products made from corrugated sheets (typically point of sale displays).
[67] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [22].
[68] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [24].
[69] It is typically 240 dots per inch squared compared to, for example, screen printing which is typically 80 dots per inch square.
[70] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [25].
[71] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [26], [28].
[72] The Smithfield site was located at the corner of Warren and Percival Roads, Smithfield.
[73] The Revesby site was located in Fitzpatrick Street, Revesby.
[74] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [27].
[75] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [29].
[76] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [33].
[77] Mr Holihan received an email from Mr Crouch on 31 January 2002 confirming those numbers: see CB 3:954-955 (Exhibit H105).
[78] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [47]-[49].
[79] The cost per 'machine hour' or 'man hour' for a particular year was calculated by reference to the actual costs incurred the previous year, and took into account the actual volume of work performed the previous year.
[80] The 'other costs' were separate to, and on top of, the 'estimated costs' because they were unknown at the start of the year when the cost per machine hour was estimated.
[81] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [34].
[83] See the principal judgment at [291]-[292].
[84] See the principal judgment at [293].
[85] The Second Sale Agreement is at CB 4:1492-1558 (Exhibit H2). That written agreement is referred to in these reasons as the 'Second Sale Agreement' to distinguish it from the First Sale Agreement entered into between Amcor and Mr Hottes.
[86] Holihan parties' Opening Outline, at [18].
[87] Holihan parties' Opening Outline, at [20].
[89] Save for its premises at Wetherill Park, the corrugator and four pieces of machinery, all of which were sub-leased or made available to Achilla to run the ACB Business after the sale was completed.
[90] Holihan parties' Opening Outline, at [20].
[91] Holihan parties' outline of opening submissions, at [21] (footnotes omitted).
[94] Holihan parties' outline of opening submissions, at [23].
[96] Achilla counterclaim, at paragraph [3AA].
[97] Transcript 08/09/15, at T3867-3868.
[98] Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1, at [1752].
[99] This was confirmed by Mr Maiden during the Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (see Transcript 15/09/15, at T4442).
[100] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [58].
[101] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [58].
[102] Amcor parties' outline of opening submissions, at [13]. Reference was made to clause [2.4].
[103] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [14]. [For e.g., the parties are agreed that, on an 'indicative basis' only, the Amcor Displays work accounted for 120 jobs (out of the approximately 757 jobs) that constitute the pre Deed of Accession alleged instances of breach and 553 jobs (out of the approximately 1,156 jobs) that constitute the post Deed of Accession alleged instances of breach]
[104] Retirement Services Australia (RSA) Pty Ltd v 3143 Victoria St Doncaster Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 134; (2012) 37 VR 486 ('Retirement Services').
[105] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Ms Murphy), Transcript 08/09/15, at T3868.
[106] The Second Sale Agreement is at CB 4:1492-1558 (Exhibit H2).
[110] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [32], [262].
[111] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [279].
[112] It will be noted that even though each of clause 12.1 and clause 12.2 refer to supply of 'Product', in the case of the former the supply is of 'raw materials', as the heading of the clause makes clear, and in the latter it is of a finished (or a more finished) product.
[113] The expression 'Tax' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean:
a tax, levy, charge, impost, deduction, withholding or duty of any nature (including stamp and transaction duty and goods and services, (value added) or similar tax) at any time:
(b) required to be remitted to, or collected, withheld or assessed by, any Government Agency; and
any related interest, expense, fine, penalty or other charge on those amounts.
[114] 'Completion' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean 'completion of the sale and purchase of the Assets under this Deed'.
[116] The 'Accrual Amount' was defined in clause 1.1 to mean the amount equal to the total of:
(a) all deposits and prepayments (inclusive of GST) received by the Vendor up to close of business on the Completion Date for the supply of products or services by the Business after that time under the Contracts or otherwise; and
(b) all expenses and outgoings of the Business of a recurring or periodical nature (inclusive of GST) incurred but not paid by the Vendor for the period prior to close of business on the Completion Date.
[117] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [35].
[118] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [110].
[119] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [110].
[120] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3056.25-28.
[122] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [115].
[127] CB 5:1679 (Exhibit H175) and Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [183]. The Amcor parties record however, that how Achilla commencing operations affects invoices in and about this period of time is a matter in dispute.
[128] Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties said Achilla issued its counterclaim against ACB Co Vendor in January 2008. The counterclaim was amended in September 2010 so as to plead the Deed of Accession, and the counterclaim remained a claim as against ACB Co Vendor under the Second Sale Agreement but APA was added as the second defendant by counterclaim because of the claim made in respect of the Deed of Accession. The concern as to the capacity or the role of ACB Co Vendor was raised by the Holihan parties for the first time in 2013, when they pleaded the concurrent implied supply agreement: see Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript, 09/09/15 at T4044-4045. In ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd v Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 223, at [9] the Court of Appeal recorded that on 22 April 2013 Vickery J granted leave to amend the counterclaim, which introduced the allegations of an implied supply agreement, estoppel by convention and release of a charge.
[129] Achilla counterclaim, at [3AA].
[130] The evidence was that Mr Patrick Ryan was a partner in the firm of Allens Arthur Robinson, the (then) solicitors for Amcor.
[131] Apparently a reference to the First Sale Agreement and the arrangements in place between Mr Hottes and Amcor.
[132] A number of discovered documents were referred to as supporting that position.
[133] A list of discovered documents was set out as supporting that position.
[134] Holihan parties' opening (Mr Maiden), Transcript, 25/05/15, at T18-19.
[135] Holihan parties' opening (Mr Maiden), Transcript, 26/05/15, at T177-178.
[136] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 08/09/15, at T3786.
[137] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [57].
[138] See Second Further Amended Defence to Fourth Amended Counterclaim of the Fourth Defendant and Cross-Claim dated 5 August 2015 ('Amcor defence & cross-claim'), at [9]-[21].
[139] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [10(b)].
[145] 'Service Containers' is a reference to Service Containers Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of APA 'specialising in the provision of bespoke packaging solutions, moving boxes, signs and point of sale displays': ibid, at [12].
[146] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [13].
[150] Holihan parties' liability submissions, [3].
[151] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [3].
[152] Roberts WS (Exhibit A 88), at [2].
[153] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [12].
[155] Amcor parties' opening (Dr McNicol),Transcript, 28/05/15, at T416.
[156] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [144].
[158] This appears to be a shorthand reference to 'the ACB Business'.
[159] Senior Counsel for the Amcor parties said that clause 2.4 'clearly gives contractual support to the proposition that ACB Co Vendor was the proper party' but she added that 'we have no evidence whether that was triggered or invoked at any stage, but it was there' (Transcript 09/09/15, at T4052). Further, she said ACB Co Vendor 'could choose to invoke clause 2.4, but there's no evidence that that pathway was undertaken' (Transcript 09/09/15, at T4054).
[160] Here again, this appears to be a shorthand reference to 'the ACB Business'.
[161] In context, this appears to be a reference to the 'Smithfield and Revesby box plants'.
[162] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript 10/09/15, at T4090.
[163] Counsel for the Holihan parties also used this expression in their opening - see Transcript 25/05/15, at T98.
[164] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript, 10/09/15, at T4092.
[167] [1940] AC 1014 ('Nokes').
[168] [1880] UKLawRpKQB 3; (1880) 5 QBD 149 ('British Waggon').
[170] [1940] AC 1014, at 1019.
[179] Ibid, at 224. In fact, the words relied upon by the Holihan parties are taken from the judgment of May LJ in The Elli 2 [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep 107, at 115. In The Aramis, Bingham LJ referred to passages in the judgments in The Elli 2 and other cases to similar effect and said ([1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 213, at 224):
These cases may be said to decide no more than that whether a contract is to be implied is a question of fact and that a contract will only be implied where it is necessary to do so. ... There does not, however, appear to have been a case in which a contract has been implied from the mere facts (a) that an endorsee, entitled as holder of the bill of lading to demand delivery, does so, and (b) that the ship-owner, bound by contract with his shipper (and perhaps his charterer) to deliver goods to any party presenting the bill of lading, duly makes such a delivery. Whether on such facts (without more) a contract may be implied must be considered in the light of ordinary contractual principles.
Most contracts are, of course, made expressly, whether orally or in writing. But here, on the evidence, nothing was said, nothing was written. So regard must be paid to the conduct of the parties alone.
Bingham LJ went on to observe (at 224) that it would 'be fatal to the implication of a contract if the parties would or might have acted exactly as they did in the absence of a contract.'
[180] Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111; (2001) Aust Contract R 90-129 at 91,575.
[181] [2008] VSCA 111 ('Homecare').
[184] (2002) 209 CLR 95, at 105 [25].
[185] [2008] VSCA 111, at [74].
[187] The factual matters which Forrest AJA regarded as supportive of that finding of an implied contract between the retailer and the worker were conveniently summarised by North and Bromberg JJ in Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 37; (2015) 228 FCR 346 at [164] as follows:
The factual matters which Forrest AJA regarded as supportive of an implied contract between the retailer and the worker included that the worker sold the retailer's products for the retailer's benefit; the retailer determined whether the worker would sell its products, where she would work and what goods she would sell; all the goods, catalogues and documentation for the sales were prepared and provided by the retailer; if the worker engaged in activities prejudicial to the retailer's interests, she was in breach of her distributor agreement; the worker's mode of selling, rate of commission and accounting for her sales was determined by the retailer; it was up to the retailer to decide whether it accepted sales orders obtained by the worker; on occasions the worker would account directly to the retailer for the sale of its products; there was no re-selling of goods by the Area Manager to the worker. In that setting, Forrest AJA reasoned, there were mutual benefits to both the retailer and the worker - the retailer sold its products and the worker received payments for such sales.
[188] [2015] FCAFC 37; (2015) 228 FCR 346 ('Quest').
[189] (2003) 133 FCR 438 ('Damevski').
[190] [2015] FCAFC 37; (2015) 228 FCR 346, at [153] ff.
[194] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [113].
[196] Ibid, at [45] (appeal dismissed in Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 40; (2006) 149 FCR 395).
[197] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [49].
[198] Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153, at 195 [162] (Ipp AJA).
[199] Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44 at [9] (Macfarlan JA, Beazley JA agreeing); Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] NSWCA 96; (2009) 14 BPR 26,717, at 26,737 [117] (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA agreeing); RJ Baker Nominees Pty Ltd v Parsons Management Group Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 128 at [93] (Newnes JA, Owen JA and Murphy J agreeing); Diploma Construction (WA) Pty Ltd v Best Bar Pty Ltd [No 2] [2015] WASC 230 at [146] (Allanson J).
[200] Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499 at [39] (Sundberg J).
[201] (2002) 209 CLR 95, at 105 [24].
[202] See also Homecare Direct Shopping Pty Ltd v Gray [2008] VSCA 111, [61]-[74] and Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 37; (2015) 228 FCR 346, at [151]-[171].
[207] (1877) 2 App Cas 666 ('Brogden').
[209] [1994] VicRp 53; [1994] 2 VR 32 ('Vroon').
[210] [1987] VicRp 15; [1987] VR 167, especially at 195-211.
[211] (1988) 5 BPR 97326, at 11,117-11,118 (per McHugh JA on behalf of the Court).
[213] [1994] VicRp 53; [1994] 2 VR 32, at 81.
[214] See Seddon, Bigwood and Ellinghaus, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract, 10th Australian edition, LexisNexis Butterworths, at [3.23].
[215] Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44, at [5]-[9] (Macfarlan JA). See also Industrial Rollformers Pty Ltd v Ingersoll-Rand Australia Ltd [2001] NSWCA 111; (2001) Aust Contract R 90-129 at 91,573 - 91,576.
[216] Kriketos v Livschitz (2009) 14 BPR 98357 at 26,737-26,738 (McColl JA, Macfarlan JA concurring).
[217] [1994] VicRp 55; [1994] 2 VR 106 ('Ken Morgan').
[218] [1994] VicRp 55; [1994] 2 VR 106, at 178.
[221] Holihan WS 1, [52] (Exhibit H93.1).
[222] CB 7:2598 (Exhibit H17) and Holihan WS 1, at [52] (Exhibit H93.1).
[223] CB 7:2598 (Exhibit H17) and Holihan WS 1, at [52] (Exhibit H93.1).
[224] CB 7:2594-2597 (Exhibit H18), Holihan WS1, at [52] (Exhibit H93.1).
[225] CB 7:2594-2597 (Exhibit H18), at 2594-2595.
[226] CB 7:2594-2597 (Exhibit H18), at 2595-2596.
[227] Holihan WS1, at [52] (Exhibit H93.1).
[228] Holihan WS1, at [54] (Exhibit H93.1).
[229] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 19/06/15, at T2076.
[230] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 19/06/15, at T2076.
[231] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 19/06/15, at T2076-2077.
[232] Cichonski XXN, Transcript, 23/06/15, at T2308.
[233] Cichonski RE-XN, Transcript, T 23/06/15, atT2325.
[234] Holihan XXN, Transcript 19/06/15, at T2075-2076.
[235] At that time, Mr Nellies was the Customer Service Manager for AFP in NSW.
[236] Nellies XXN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3154 -3155.
[238] Mr Joyce was an accountant, who served in the role of Commercial Manager, Operations, AFP (between early 2001 and late 2003 or early 2004).
[239] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1904.
[241] Holihan WS1, at [55] (Exhibit H93.1).
[247] Clause 13.4 (which was an early iteration of the final clause 12.2) provided:
The Purchaser will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply fibreboard OME to the Vendor at prices based on direct cost and distribution ("D&D") costs to the Purchaser. The Vendor will for the period obtain all its OME supplies of fibreboard materials from the Purchaser and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of fibreboard materials from any other party other than due to the purchasers inability to supply. For the periods referred to below prices to the Vendor will be as follows for all new work:
Each year prices will increase by 2% on all established work at the end of each twelve month period from the completion date.
[248] See CB 3:964 (Exhibit H19), at 972 (emphasis added). Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T780.
[249] MacPhail WS (Exhibit A91), at [4].
[250] MacPhail XIC, Transript, 10/8/15, at T3545.
[252] CB 3:973-980 (Exhibit H20), at 973-974. Note the version in CB 3 at 974 is incomplete.
[253] Holihan WS 1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [60].
[254] CB 3:981-986 (Exhibit H21), at 981. Note the version in CB 3 at 981 is incomplete.
[256] CB 3:987-995 (Exhibit H21). Note the version in CB 3 at 988 is incomplete.
[258] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T851.
[259] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T858.
[261] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T863.
[262] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T862.
[263] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3545-3546.
[264] Email correspondence from Mr MacPhail in May 2003 [CB 4:1372-1382] (Exhibit H146) mentions, and is sent to, Mr Roe but its content suggests that Mr MacPhail has not been dealing with him in regards to the documentation of the agreement to this point. See also letter from Mr MacPhail to David Roe dated 2 June 2003 - [CB 4:1490-1491] (Exhibit H162). In his witness statement filed in the principal proceeding (see SCB 2:S540 ff), Mr Holihan describes his contact or involvement in the initial negotiation period as follows (see SCB 2:S589, [223]-[224]) (Exhibit A34A).
[223] During the Initial Negotiation Period I liaised with Roe about some of the terms of the Asset Sale Deed and the setting up of new companies to purchase part of the ACN Box Business. I received a number of letters from Roe or his employees during this time about the form of the Asset Sale Deed and how I should structure any companies which were to purchase the Subject Assets [document numbers specified but omitted for present purposes because they were not before the Court on the counterclaim and cross-claim].
[224] I used Roe as a sounding board. He was a family friend of mine and it wasn't unusual for me to call up for some advice every now and then regarding many aspects of my life. During my time working for both Visy and Amcor I spent a lot of time reviewing contracts - supply contracts, customer contracts and leases - so I had experience in reading and understanding terms of agreements. I saw this as an uncontroversial transaction.
[265] CB 3:995-997 (Exhibit H16), at 995.
[266] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3550.
[267] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3551.
[268] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3552.
[269] CB 3:995-997 (Exhibit H16), at 996.
[270] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3552.
[273] Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T775-776.
[276] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3556.
[281] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3565- 3567.
[282] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3557-3558.
[283] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3558.
[284] The then-current draft of the Second Sale Agreement provided that the purchase price was payable in ten annual instalments of $100,000 each: see CB 3 987-995 (Exhibit H22) at 990, cl 3.1(a).
[286] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3572.
[287] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3577.
[288] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3572.
[289] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3572-73.
[290] CB 3:1014-1025 (Exhibit H109), at 1014.
[291] Holihan WS1, at [67(a)] (Exhibit H93.1).
[292] See Exhibit H432, email from Baker & McKenzie to Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan dated 25 November 2002. Note that the 'marked up' version of the revised draft Asset Sale Agreement is not part of the exhibit.
[295] See MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3572-3573.
[296] CB 3:1026-1028 (Exhibit H24), at 1027.
[297] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3573-3574.
[298] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3574.
[299] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3574.
[302] CB3:1031-1041 (Exhibit H112), at 1031.
[304] Mr Parker held various positions within the Amcor group over time. He was not called to give evidence at the trial of the Achilla counterclaim and Amcor cross-claim. In the principal judgment, Vickery J (at [39]) described Mr Parker as the General Manager of the Commercial department of Corrugating/AFPA and reporting directly to Mr Hodgson. Further, Vickery J said (at [871]) that in November 2001, in his role as AFPA's general manager - finance, Mr Parker prepared the calculations of the value of the assets of the ACB Business and wrote all of the financial parts of the "Blueprint for Further Improvement" document.
[305] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1857.
[309] CB 3:1049 (Exhibit H25) (emphasis added).
[310] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1897.
[313] Joyce RE-XN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1941.
[314] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1861.
[320] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1894-1896.
[321] CB 3:1053-1060 (Exhibit A29), at 1053.
[322] Holihan WS1, at [72] (Exhibit H93.1).
[323] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1546-1547.
[324] CB 3:1074-1080 (Exhibit H26), at 1075.
[325] Ibid, at 1074. Holihan WS1, at [73]-[74] (Exhibit H93.1).
[327] CB3:1082-1083 (Exhibit H118) In that email, Mr Holihan forwarded to Mr Barnes the definition that Mr Crouch had earlier sent to him, explaining that the charge 'from AFP to [Wetherill Park] is D & D + 10' and that '[Wetherill Park] charge AFP Machine [Labour] [Variable] & Fixed + 15%'.
[328] CB 3:1083B.-1083C (Exhibit H27).
[340] Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T783.
[344] In the principal judgment, Vickery J referred to Mr Dwyer as having a Human Resources role with AFP, and he was based at Burwood.
[347] Holihan WS1, at [78] (Exhibit H93.1).
[349] CB 4:1331 (Exhibit H33), Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T786.
[352] CB 4:1342 (Exhibit H35), 1368-1369 (Exhibit H36), 1370-1371 (Exhibit H37); Holihan WS1 at [80(b)] (Exhibit H93.1).
[353] CB 4:1400-1403 (Exhibit H38). This final iteration of the matrix was emailed to Mr MacPhail by Mr Parker on 28 May 2003, copied to Mr Barnes and Mr Holihan.
[354] Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T786-787.
[355] One of the redlined changes was the inclusion in clause 12.1 (Supply by Vendor of raw materials) of the reference to APA's standard terms and conditions.
[360] CB4: 1492-1558 (Exhibit H2) at 1556. (See also CB4: 1437-1475 (Exhibit H151) at 1454-1455 which is a textual description of the D&D basis shown in the matrix. Mr Holihan followed up with an email to Mr Parker and Mr MacPhail on 30 May 2003 [CB 4:1476-1477 (Exhibit H152)] pointing out 'the changes required' to the Second Sale Agreement. In respect of Annexure 5, he stated (at CB 4:1477): 'Annexure 5 is defined in the matrix and the first page has a lot of contradictions. I believe it's best to run with the matrix only.' By this point, however, the language used in the headings in the matrix had already been changed to read ''From the Vendor to Achilla', 'From Achilla to the Vendor' and 'Corrugated work for the Vendor by Achilla'.)
[361] CB4: 1492-1558 (Exhibit H2) at 1520.
[362] MacPhail XXN, Transcript 10/08/15, at T 3577-3578.
[364] MacPhail RE-XN, Transcript 10/08/15, at T 3581-3582.
[366] CB 4: 1492-1558 (Exhibit H2) (Full Agreement).
[369] Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309, at 336.
[370] In their particulars and as set out in their liability submissions, at [71].
[371] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3555.
[372] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3557.
[373] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1904.
[374] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1897.
[375] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1904.
[376] Joyce RE-XN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1941.
[377] MacPhail XXN, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3566.
[378] Holihan WS1, at [96] (Exhibit H93.1).
[379] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T780-781.
[380] See Holihan liability submissions, at [65].
[384] See paragraph (e) of the (marked-up version of the) particulars subjoined to paragraph [3AA] of the counterclaim. The relevant words, 'Achilla would obtain the benefit of the business which was at that time provided to ACB [Co Vendor] by APA', have been struck out.
[386] There are some differences between the documents listed in paragraph (e) of the particulars subjoined to paragraph [3AA] of the counterclaim and those listed in paragraph [71] of the Holihan parties' liability submissions.
[387] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [73].
[388] See GST Ruling No GSTR2000/10, at [13].
[390] The acronym 'SAP' stands for 'Systems Applications and Products'. Mr Nellies gave evidence (Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15 at T3062) that 'PICK was ... the precursor to SAP'.
[391] CB 5:1674-1676 (Exhibit H45), at 1674.
[393] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1879.
[394] CB5:1644 (Exhibit H46). See also Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1879.
[395] See GST Ruling No GSTR2000/10, at [13].
[396] CB 5:1594 (Exhibit H39) and see Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [108(a)].
[397] CB 5:1597 (Ex H41) and see Holihan WS1 [108(b)] (Exhibit H93.1).
[398] CB 5:1595-1596 (Ex H40) and Holihan WS1, [109] (Exhibit H93.1).
[399] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1876-1877.
[400] Holihan WS1 at [130] (Exhibit H93.1), CB 5:1787-1788 (Exhibit H50).
[401] Holihan WS1 at [130] (Exhibit H93.1).
[402] CB 5: 1841 (Exhibit H51), Holihan WS1, [153] (Exhibit H93.1).
[403] Amcor Limited board paper entitled 'Update on AFPA Improvement Plans' see SCB Vol.S6, at 2586-2589 (Exhibit H68), at 2587.
[404] CB 5:1857-1858 (Exhibit H52) and Holihan WS1, at [158] (Exhibit H93.1).
[406] CB 6: 2039-2040 (Exhibit H53), at 2040.
[407] CB 6: 2039-2040 (Exhibit H53), at 2039.
[408] CB 6:2039 -2040 (Exhibit H53), at 2039.
[410] CB 6:2069-2071 (Exhibit H54) and Holihan WS1, at [241] (Exhibit H93.1).
[411] As noted earlier, Mr Beynon was part of the AFP New South Wales management team.
[414] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [95].
[415] At that time ACB Co Vendor was still named 'Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd'.
[418] See CB 6:2149-2156 (Exhibit H4), at 2152-2153 (cl. 2).
[419] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [99]. In other words, at the time the Deed of Accession was entered into, the first instalment had been paid: Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [218]. (The remaining four instalments were outstanding but not due for payment until later on.)
[420] Holihan parties' oral reply submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4442.
[421] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [39].
[423] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [10(d)].
[424] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [100].
[425] See witness statement of Mr Lewis, at [68] (extracted above).
[426] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T887-889.
[427] CB6:2118 (Exhibit H59). (The entity 'ACN002693843 Box Pty Ltd' is ACB Co Vendor.)
[430] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1867-1868.
[431] CB 6:2141-2146 (Exhibit H248). See Holihan WS1, at [251] (Exhibit H93.1).
The Vendor may separately assign its rights under this clause 11 [headed 'CH Warranty and indemnity'] to any corporation or other entity to which it may assign this Deed in accordance with and on the same terms as set out in clause 15.9 below.
[434] CB6:2157 (Exhibit H249). The copy of the email in the Court Book does not include the 'amended (and marked up) deed'. See Holihan WS1, at [252] (Exhibit H93.1).
[436] Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T831.
[437] Holihan WS1, at [253] (Exhibit H93.1).
[438] CB 6:2149 (Exhibit H4). See Holihan WS1, at [253] (Exhibit H93.1).
[441] Roberts XXN, Transcript, 04/08/15, at T3254.
[443] [1969] HCA 3; (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 388.
[444] Vickery v Woods [1952] HCA 7; (1952) 85 CLR 336 at 345 per Dixon J.
[446] [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429, at 437.
[447] [1999] NSWCA 323; (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, at 493 (per Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA).
[449] Ibid, at 346 [12] (per French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (emphasis added).
[450] Ibid, at 350 [29] (footnotes omitted).
[451] See Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), Vol 1: General Principles, at 19-089.
[452] Deed of Accession (Exhibit H4), at clause 2.1(b)
[453] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [102].
[454] CB 7:2344-2368 (Exhibit H49); Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [120].
[455] Cichonski WS (Exhibit H407), at [18], [20].
[456] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [7(b)].
[457] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [103].
[458] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [306].
[459] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [10(d)].
[460] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [10(b)], [10(c)].
[461] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [91].
[463] The 'Purchase Obligation' is a reference to Achilla's allegation that for the duration of the Relevant Period, APA was obliged to (in terms of the language in clause 12.2): "obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability" (Purchase Obligation).
[464] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [121].
[467] Ibid, at [178] (citations omitted).
[470] Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317, at 393 [431]-[433]. See also Con-Stan Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1986] HCA 14; (1986) 160 CLR 226, at 244-245, and Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65; (2007) 69 NSWLR 603, per Tobias JA at 645, [200] (Mason P and Campbell JA agreeing).
[471] Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Wilmoth Field Warne (a firm) (2007) 18 VR 250, at 268-269 [71]-[73], where the Court of Appeal accepted that, consistently with the approach adopted by Callaway JA in Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v St Vincent's Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70, an assumption as to the binding nature of a contract can be regarded as an assumption of fact.
[472] Holihan parties' oral submissions in reply (Mr Maiden), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4441.
[473] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [90].
[474] See Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [92].
[475] [2012] VSCA 134; (2012) 37 VR 486 ('Retirement Services').
[476] [2012] VSCA 134; (2012) 37 VR 486, 522 [137]-[138]. See also Simon v Wotif.com Holdings Ltd [2013] NSWSC 124 at [54] (Macready AsJ).
[477] (1990) 23 NSWLR 190, 195.
[478] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [52].
[479] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [15].
[480] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [134].
[481] In their reply submissions, however, the Holihan parties acknowledge (at 172(c)] that 'Mr Joyce was only involved in reviewing the Agreement at an early stage, in January 2003' and 'did not have any direct role in the negotiation of the Agreement.' (See also Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1859.) His conversations with Mr Holihan were confined to the D & D charging mechanism.
[482] Holihan parties' oral submissions in reply (Mr Maiden), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4498-4499.
[483] Mr Alvarez was part of the AFP NSW management team.
[484] Achilla counterclaim, particulars subjoined to sub-paragraph [3AB(d)].
[485] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [94].
[486] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [129].
[488] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [95].
[489] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [59].
[491] Transcript, 08/09/15 (Mr Maiden), at T3862.
[492] [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 ('Electricity Generation'), at 656-657 [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), at 662 [53] (Gageler J).
[493] [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104 ('Mount Bruce Mining'), (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), at 116-117 [46]-[52], (Kiefel and Keane JJ), at 131-133 [107]-[113], (Bell and Gageler JJ), at 134-135 [119]-[123].
[494] (1982) 149 CLR 337 ('Codelfa').
[496] [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104, at 116-117 [46]-[52], cited with approval in State of Victoria v Tatts Group Limited [2016] HCA 5; (2016) 328 ALR 564, at [51].
[497] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 656 [35]; [2014] HCA 7.
[498] Codelfa (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350 (citing Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995-996; [1976] 3 All ER 570 at 574), 352; [1982] HCA 24. See also Sir Anthony Mason, "Opening Address", (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 1, at 3.
[499] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 656 [35].
[500] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 656-657 [35].
[501] Codelfa (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352. See also Sir Anthony Mason, "Opening Address", (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 1 at 3.
[502] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 657 [35], citing Codelfa (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 350, in turn citing Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995-996; [1976] 3 All ER 570 at 574.
[503] Codelfa (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995-996; [1976] 3 All ER 570 at 574.
[504] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 657 [35], citing Re Golden Key Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 636 at [28].
[505] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 at 657 [35], citing Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales [2004] HCA 56; (2004) 218 CLR 530 at 559 [82].
[506] [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 ('Alphapharm'), 179 [40] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
[508] Ibid. See also Pacific Carriers [2004] HCA 35; (2004) 218 CLR 451, at 461-462 [22].
[509] [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640, at 656-657 [35].
[511] [2009] EWCA Civ 636, at [28].
[512] Electricity Generation [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640, at 656-657 [35], citing Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales [2004] HCA 56; (2004) 218 CLR 530, at 559 [82] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
[513] Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99, at 109 (Gibbs J).
[514] The notion of 'ambiguity' and its role as the criterion or gateway that permits a Court to go beyond the text of the document and have regard to 'surrounding circumstances' in the process of arriving at the proper construction of a provision of a contract is discussed in Bisognin v Hera Project Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 75, at [143]-[157].
[515] The ambiguity can readily be demonstrated by contrasting the use of the word 'Products' (as defined) in the first sentence of clause 12.1 with the word 'Products' in the first sentence of clause 12.2 and then also with the expression 'its OME supplies of Products' in the second sentence of clause 12.2.
[516] Transcript 15/09/15, at T4443-4444 (Mr Maiden).
[517] The relevant definitions are set out below under the heading 'The surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction'.
[518] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T781.22-23.
[519] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [96].
[520] See Recital B to the Second Sale Agreement.
[521] See Recital D to the Second Sale Agreement.
[522] Mr Nellies explained the operation of PCS and PICK: see Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3062, 3074-3076.
[523] See Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3501. Mr Garcia said that when Amcor bought the ACB Business (sometime after 2000) he and another person spent two or three months manually entering everything on to the PICK system.
[524] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809.
[525] See Silva XXN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2427.10-20, 2431.14-16; possibly Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2297.19-27. See also Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3496, 3500-3501, Garcia XXN at T3523.
[526] Under cross-examination, Mr Phillips gave evidence (Transcript 04/08/15, at T3335-3336) that the 'Panorama' tool could be used to access the data warehouse which housed all information regarding production. He said it would have been possible to interrogate that information to determine what OME work had been done and by whom, but it was necessary to refer to the production orders for work (in hard copy and electronic form) to determine where the OME work had gone.
[527] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3498.
[529] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [60].
[530] Admitted in the Holihan parties' reply to the Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [14(b)].
[531] See the Holihan parties' opening oral submissions - Transcript 25/05/15 at T98 (Mr Maiden).
[532] Holihan WS1, at [22] (Exhibit H93.1). No signed final version of the ACE Print contract was able to be located (see Transcript 04/06/15 (Dr McNicol QC) at T759-760) but unsigned copies of two letter agreements were produced and tendered (see CB 3:936-947 (Exhibit A28)).
[533] Holihan XIC, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T784; Holihan XXN, Transcript, 16/06/15, at T1545, See also Holihan parties' oral submissions in reply (Mr Maiden); Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4453.
[534] Holihan WS1, [72] (Exhibit H93.1) and CB 3:936-947 (Exhibit A28).
[536] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3111-3112.
[538] Nellies XXN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3113.
[539] Transcript, 10/09/15, at T4093-94. Mr Holihan gave detailed evidence about the work that the ACB Business did, both before and after Completion, as well as the equipment that the business had to do the work. His evidence was that both before and after Completion, the work performed by the ACB Business included work for Amcor Displays, including corrugated point of sale displays and litho lamination: see Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [17]-[18] and [22], and [132(k)]. See also the email from Mr Holihan to Mr Manser re 'Litho Lam for Displays' dated 15 July 2004 at CB 6:1963 (Exhibit H204).
[541] Transcript, 08/09/15, T3839 (Mr Maiden).
[542] In their written submissions on liability, the Amcor parties state (at [107]) that they 'do not press the claim that Amcor Displays was operated by Service Containers up to 30 July 2008' and 'accept that the evidence shows that it was owned, at July 2003, by APA.'
[543] See the Amcor parties' opening, Transcript 27/05/15, at T 352, 376 and 402 (Dr McNicol).
[544] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [159].
[545] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [159].
[546] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [161]; CB 3:933-934 (Exhibit A20).
[548] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [160].
[553] CB 5: 1859-1870 (Exhibit H63), Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [204].
[555] Clause 5.1 at CB 5: 1863 (Exhibit H63).
[556] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [205], CB 7:2604-2606 (Exhibit H213).
[557] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [207].
[558] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [208], CB 6:2003 (Exhibit H215).
[559] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [209].
[560] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [210]-[211].
[561] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [254]-[255].
[562] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1858.3-17.
[563] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1858.
[564] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1924-25.
[565] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1925.
[566] Cichonski statement (Exhibit H407), at [3].
[567] Cichonski XXN, Transcript, 23/06/15, at T2290.
[568] Cichonski statement (Exhibit H407), at [16].
[569] Cichonski RE-XN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2322.
[570] Mr Nellies gave similar evidence about the 'first step' in the production of a cardboard display: see Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3113.
[571] Cichonski RE-XN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2323-2324.
[572] Cichonski statement (Exhibit H407), at [26].
[573] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1858-1859.
[574] Joyce XIC, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1872-1873.
[575] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1906.
[576] Garcia XIC, Transcript, 06/08/15, at T3494.
[577] Garcia XIC, Transcript, 06/08/15, at T3496-3497.
[578] Garcia XIC, Transcript, 06/08/15, at T3512.
[579] Garcia XIC, Transcript, 06/08/15, at T3512-3513, 3515. Neither Mr Dailey nor Mr Roddy was called to give evidence.
[580] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3198-3199.
[581] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3198.
[582] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3198.
[583] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3199.
[584] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3199.
[585] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3200.
[586] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3200.
[587] The Holihan parties acknowledge that Amcor Displays was not separately listed on the list of customers of the ACB Business.
[588] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3204.
[589] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3204.
[590] Silva statement (Exhibit H410), at [5].
[591] Silva XIC, Transcript, 24/06/15, at T2419.
[592] Silva statement (Exhibit H410), at [5].
[593] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89), at [57]-[58] and Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3342-3343.
[594] Holihan WS 1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [23(a)].
[595] CB 7:2497-2510 (Exhibit H15), at 2503 and 2501, 2502.
[596] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [112].
[597] Joyce XXN, Transcript, 18/06/15, at T1906.
[598] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T837.
[599] MacPhail XXN, Transcript 10/08/15, at T3577-3578.
[600] CB 3:1045-1052 (Exhibit H25) at 1049 (emphasis added).
[601] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1862.
[603] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1876.30-1831.4.
[604] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [249].
[605] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [179(c)].
[606] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [72].
[607] CB 3:1053-1060 (Exhibit A29), at 1057.
[608] The typed version is at CB 3:1074-1080 (Exhibit H26), at 1078.
[609] (1982) 149 CLR 337 ('Codelfa'), 352 (Mason J with Stephen and Wilson JJ concurring).
[610] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript, 03/08/15, at T3199.
[611] Transcript 11/09/15, at T4315 (Mr Tran).
[612] That is, a reference to the sum of $172,097.83 shown in Exhibit H15 as representing 'Management Unit C' being work performed by the ACB Business for 'Amcor Displays' in the 2002/03 financial year.
[613] Transcript 11/09/15 at T4333-34.
[615] CB 6:2141-2146 (Exhibit H248), at 2141. See Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [251].
[616] CB 6:2141-2146 (Exhibit H248), at 2141.
[617] CB6:2157 (Exhibit H249). The copy of the email in the Court Book does not include the 'amended (and marked up) deed'. See Holihan WS1, at [252] (Exhibit H93.1).
[618] The allegation of breach is pleaded in paragraph [6] of the Achilla counterclaim.
[619] The liability particulars are a lengthy (electronic) document: see item 7 of the Court Book.
[620] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [29(b)].
[621] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [29(a)] and [22].
[622] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [29(c)].
[623] See the particulars subjoined to paragraph 29(c) of the Amcor defence & cross-claim.
[624] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [29(d)].
[625] See paragraph 29(d) of the Amcor defence & cross-claim and the particulars thereto.
[626] Amcor parties' Response to Liability Particulars of paragraph 6 of the Third Amended Counterclaim of the fourth defendant dated 7 June 2013.
[628] Transcript, 11/09/15, T4205, 4305, and 4359.
[629] The number of Amcor Displays' jobs was calculated by the parties by reference to the jobs that the Amcor parties have identified in their response to the liability particulars as being Service Containers/Displays jobs. The parties agree on the number of jobs which are the subject of the Service Containers/Displays allegations, but the Holihan parties deny the Amcor parties' allegations.
[630] See, for example, McLennan v Insurance Australia Ltd (t/as NRMA Insurance) (2014) 286 FLR 453, an insurance case, per Beazley P, Meagher and Ward JJA, at [30], [31] and [37].
[631] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [174].
[632] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [174].
[633] (2014) 286 FLR 453 ('McLennan').
[634] [1942] NSWStRp 19; (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 231 ('Kodak').
[635] [1940] NSWStRp 20; (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 512 ('Gordon').
[636] [1942] NSWStRp 19; (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 231, at 237.
[637] The passage is conveniently reproduced by the Court of Appeal in McLennan (2014) 286 FLR 453, at 456-457, [12].
[638] [1942] NSWStRp 19; (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 231, at 237.
[640] (2014) 286 FLR 453, at 462, [31].
[642] MacPhail RE-XN, Transcript 10/08/15, at T3582-3583.
[645] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [204].
[649] Source documents have not been provided in respect of each line item. Where a purchase order was provided, an entry was made in columns G (setting out the named entity), and H (setting out the name of the invoiced entity).
[652] The costs that would have been incurred by Achilla are broken up in this way so as to distinguish between sums that fell within 'D & D' costs (i.e., Direct and Distribution) and those that fell outside it. Under cl 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement the price that Achilla was entitled to charge for supplies made was the 'D & D' cost plus a margin, beginning at 12% for the first year of the contract term and ratcheting up by two per cent for each of the four years thereafter. Sums that fell within 'D & D' costs would be subject to the profit margin and therefore relevant to the calculation of Achilla's profit. Sums that fell outside 'D & D' costs would be recovered directly.
[653] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/2015, at T1376.
[654] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1385.
[655] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1380.
[656] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1184.6-23.
[657] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/2015, at T1199-1200.
[658] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1190.
[659] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1190.
[660] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1190.
[661] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1192.
[662] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1192.
[663] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1251.
[664] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1203.
[665] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/2015, at T1208.
[666] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/2015, at T1229.
[667] ASB 5: A2059 (part of Exhibit H299).
[668] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/2015, at T1233.
[669] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1236.
[670] Pellizzari RE-XN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1271.
[671] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1194.25-27. The invoices are found at Alternative Suppliers Bundle A4: A1650-A2285 (Exhibit H299)
[672] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1195.1-2. The purchase orders are found at Alternative Suppliers Bundle A5: A2286-A2341 (Exhibit H306)
[673] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1257.
[674] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1254-55.
[675] ASB 5:A2127 (part of Exhibit H299).
[676] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1243-1244.
[677] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1198.
[678] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1244.
[679] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1244.
[680] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2105-2106.
[681] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2106.-2109.
[682] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2110.
[683] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2111-T2112.
[684] According to an ASIC search (Exhibit H 365), the business was conducted under the name J S Cutting Formes Pty Ltd from 21 February 2003.
[685] The ASIC search (Exhibit H 365) records Mr Kierdal as having been appointed as a director and as secretary on 29 August 2002.
[686] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1151.
[687] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1150.
[688] Kierdal XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1145.
[689] Kierdal XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1145 and T1157.
[690] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1155.
[691] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1156.
[692] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1157.
[693] See ASB Vol. 1: A330 (Exhibit H283), A331 (Exhibit 284) and ASB Vol. 1: A332-A390 (Exhibit H297).
[694] Kierdal XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1147.
[695] See ASB Vol. 1: A333 (part of Exhibit H297).
[696] See ASB Vol. 1: A334 (part of Exhibit H297).
[697] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1158.
[698] Kierdal XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1148. Mr Holihan confirmed that he does not make any claim against the Amcor parties in relation to the manufacture of knives (as opposed to the supply of tooling, including knives: see Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [23].
[699] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084.
[700] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084.
[701] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1089.
[702] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084.
[703] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084.
[704] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1120.
[705] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084, T1085 and Kent XXN at T1092, T1093, T1095-1096.
[706] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1084 and T1085.
[707] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1096-1097.
[708] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1085 and Kent XXN T1093.5.
[709] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1085 and Kent XXN at T1093.
[710] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1095-1096.
[711] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1085.
[712] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1086.
[713] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1133.
[714] Exhibits H292, H293, H302, H308, and H312.
[715] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1089.
[716] See ASB Vol 6: A2616-A2669 (part of Exhibit H312).
[717] See generally ASB Vol 6: A2684-A2750 (part of Exhibit H312).
[718] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1116.
[719] See ASB Vol 6: A2614-A2615, and A2674-A2676 (parts of Exhibit H312).
[720] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1113.
[721] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1118.
[722] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1119.
[723] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1095.
[724] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1100.
[725] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1089.
[726] See for e.g., ASB Vol 6: A2595 (part of Exhibit H308), being a purchase order from Amcor Displays which specified 'use existing dies': Kent XXN, 10/06/15 at T 1108-1111.
[727] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1090.
[728] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1090.
[729] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1093.
[730] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1094.
[731] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1090.
[732] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1097.
[733] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1099.
[734] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1106.
[736] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1105.
[737] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1106-1107.
[738] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1108.
[739] ASB Vol 6: A2524 (part of Exhibit 302).
[740] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1112.
[741] ASB Vol 5: A2490 (part of Exhibit 302).
[742] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1126-1127.
[743] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1127-1128.
[744] The prefix 'SX' on the Purchase Order denotes that this job was requested by Amcor Displays.
[745] ASB Vol 6: A2528 (part of Exhibit H302).
[746] ASB Vol 6: A2638 (part of Exhibit H312).
[747] ASB Vol 6: A2535 (part of Exhibit H302).
[748] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1131.
[749] ASB Vol 5 : A2391-A2457 (Exhibit H301).
[750] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1276 and T1278 (pallets only).
[751] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1275.
[752] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1284.
[753] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/2015, at T1293.
[754] ASB Vol 5 :A2391-A2457 (Exhibit H301).
[755] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1396.7-9.
[756] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1396.12-31.
[757] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1397.11-12.
[758] ASB Vol 7: A3052-3056 (part of Exhibit H313).
[759] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1398.
[760] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1400.20-30.
[761] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1401.20-27.
[762] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1402.2.
[763] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1400.
[764] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1400.
[765] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1401.11-12.
[766] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1401.28.
[767] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1402.18 and T1402.24-27.
[768] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1401.
[769] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1411.
[770] Tax Invoice No. 99028, ASB Vol 7: A3049 (part of Exhibit H303).
[771] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1401.
[772] Tax Invoice No. 71856, ASB Vol 7: A2965 (part of Exhibit H303).
[773] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1402.
[774] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1418.
[775] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1418-1419.
[776] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1410.
[777] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1412.
[778] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1413.
[779] Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1404.18-20 and T1405.9-10. See also ASB Vol 7: A2758-A3050 (Exhibit H303).
[780] ASB Vol 7: A2943 (part of Exhibit H303).
[781] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1427.
[782] ASB Vol 7: A2967 (part of Exhibit H303).
[783] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1428.
[784] ASB Vol 7: A2990 (part of Exhibit H303).
[785] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1428.
[786] ASB Vol 7: A3010 (part of Exhibit H303).
[787] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1429.
[788] ASB Vol 7: A3019 (part of Exhibit H303).
[789] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/2015, at T1429.
[790] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/2015, at T3633.
[791] Powell WS (Exhibit A92), at [31].
[792] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/2015, at T3655.
[793] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/2015, at T3633.
[794] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [315(g)].
[795] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T839-840.
[796] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [173].
1A. Was the date of completion of the Second Sale Agreement (Completion) 30 July 2003 (as the Amcor parties contend) or 31 July 2003 (as the Holihan parties contend)?
1B. Did Achilla commence operations of the ACB Business on 4 August 2003 (as the Amcor parties contend) or 1 August 2003 (as the Holihan parties contend)?
[799] Clause 12.2 relevantly provided that:
... The Vendor will for that period [5 years from Completion] obtain all its OME supplies of Products from Achilla and will not during that period purchase or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. ...
[800] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [175], [186].
[801] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [175].
[802] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [22].
[803] Ms Young was an assistant to the accountants at AFP Smithfield.
[804] CB 4:1205-1212 (Exhibit H103) and Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [31].
[805] Cichonski WS (Exhibit H407), at [11]-[12]. See also Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15 at T2292-2293.
[806] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1924.
[807] See for example, Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1203. See also Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1092. See also at T1114 where Mr Kent said that OME is outside work.
[808] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [22].
[809] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [187].
[810] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [191].
[812] Nellies XIC, 03/08/15, T 3057-3058.
[813] CB 4/1205-1212 (Exhibit H103) and Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [31].
[814] Nellies XIC, 03/08/15, at T3058-3060.
[816] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89), at [55], [68]-[69]. See also Phillips XIC, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3329-3330.
[817] Garcia XIC, 06/08/15, at T3505-3506.
[818] See item 2 of the Summary Particulars.
[819] See items 3 and 4 of the Summary Particulars.
[820] See the Quantum Particulars of paragraph 6 of the Second Amended Counterclaim at CB 1:84. The Holihan parties' evidence is that Completion took place on 31 July 2003 rather than 30 July 2003. Accordingly, they concede the first invoice at item 0 of the quantum particulars, being an invoice issued by Le Breton in the amount of $10,820.70.
[821] See item 2 of the Summary Particulars which sets out the parties' respective positions.
[822] Items 0 to 21A of the Quantum Particulars of paragraph 6 of the Second Amended Counterclaim at CB 1:84.
[823] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [195] (footnotes omitted).
[824] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [226].
[826] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [196].
[827] Renwick produced various printed paper and displays products for customers across a range of retail, wholesale, sporting and entertainment industries.
[828] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89)), at [46].
[829] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [194].
[830] Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3340-3341.
[831] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [32].
[833] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3073 and XXN at T3141.
[834] Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2294.10-13.
[835] Kierdal XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1148.
[836] Kierdal XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1158.
[837] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2112-2113.
[838] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1221 and T1226.
[839] ASB Vol 4: A1650-A1660 (part of Exhibit H299).
[840] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1195.9-16 and T1196.12-17.
[841] As at January 2006, the month in which the invoice he was taken to was issued (see ASB Vol 5: A2000 (part of Exhibit H299)). See also Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1228.12-15.
[842] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1236.16-19.
[843] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1507.31-1508.2.
[844] ASB Vol 5: A2391 (part of Exhibit H301).
[845] ASB Vol 5: A2392 (part of Exhibit H301).
[846] ASB Vol 5: A2393 (part of Exhibit H301).
[847] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1276.21-22.
[848] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1277.
[849] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1277.
[850] ASB Vol 5: A2391 (invoice for Bush's Meats) (part of Exhibit H301). See also Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1277 as to a different invoice also for 'Bush's Meats' (ASB Vol 5: A2395 (part of Exhibit H301).
[851] ASB Vol 5: A2392 (part of Exhibit H301).
[852] ASB Vol 5: A2393 (part of Exhibit H301).
[853] ASB Vol 5: A2494 (part of Exhibit H301). See also Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1277 referring to the other invoice also for 'Bush's Meats'.
[854] That is a reference to the small portion of converting work Mr Joyce described as pertaining to the $172,097.83 of work performed by the ACB Business in the 2002/03 financial year.
[855] Mr Holihan knew the ACE Print contract was on foot: see Holihan XXN, Transcript, 16/06/15, at T1545.
[856] See item 15 of the Summary Particulars and paragraphs [28(c)] and [29(d)(iii)] of the Amcor defence & cross-claim.
[857] See paragraph [12(a)] of the Holihan parties' reply.
[858] See paragraphs [12(b)] and [12(d)] of the Holihan parties' reply.
[859] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3058.
[860] Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3519-3520.
[861] Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3519-3520.
[862] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [219].
[863] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1443.
[864] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [312(d)]; Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1453, T1455-1456, T1465.
[865] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [77], [160], [162]-[166]. See also Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1085-1086; Kent XXN at T1103. See, further, Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1476-1484.
[866] Mr Holihan said that he did not say anything along these lines to Mr Kent-see Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1483.
[867] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [213(d)].
[868] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [312(d)]; Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1453, T1455-1456.
[869] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [317]; Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1456.
[870] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89), [72]-[73].
[871] Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3345-T3346.
[872] Item 21 of the Summary Particulars.
[873] See items 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Summary Particulars.
[874] See Item 15 of the Summary Particulars: 'Screen printing excluded from the supply agreement', which relates to 113 jobs with a total value of $733,852.24.
[875] See Item 10 of the Summary Particulars: 'No contracting out', which relates to 336 jobs with a total value of $700,293.63.
[876] See Transcript, 09/09/15, at T4001-4002.
[877] Item 23 in the Summary Particulars: 'Knife', which relates to 3 jobs with a total value of $1,350.00.
[878] Item 25 in the Summary Particulars: 'CTP imaging', which relates to 4 jobs with a total value of $4,109.86. The acronym 'CTP' refers to 'Computer To Plate'.
[879] In the Summary Particulars, Item 24 'Kettle outers' relates to 1 job with a total value of $4,109.86; Item 26: 'IP board A2' relates to 1 job with a total value of $122.00; Item 27 'Paper' relates to 5 jobs with a total value of $27,270.72; and Item 28 'Printed sheets' relates to 1 job with a total value of $561.20
[880] Invoices rendered to Amcor Displays numbered 39098 (ASB Vol 5: A2345, dated 31 July 2006), 41982 (ASB Vol 5: A2353, dated 23 March 2007), 41983 (ASB Vol 5: A2354, dated 23 March 2007), 42620 (ASB Vol 5: A2364, dated 18 May 2007), 42621 (ASB Vol 5: A2363, dated 18 May 2007) and 42622 (ASB Vol 5: A2362, dated 18 May 2007), found in Exhibit H300.
[881] Invoices rendered to Amcor Business Services numbered 8566 (ASB Vol 2: A875, dated 7 June 2007), 8678 (ASB Vol 2: A942, dated 29 February 2008), 8709 (ASB Vol 2: A954, dated 15 May 2008), 8710 (ASB Vol 2: A955, dated 15 May 2008), 8714 (ASB Vol 2: A958, dated 22 May 2008) and 8723 (ASB Vol 2: A963, dated 5 June 2008), found in Exhibit H298.
[882] See item 34 of the Summary Particulars: 'Re-seller', which relates to 12 jobs with a total value of $33,881.27.
[883] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1542-1523.
[884] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [108(c)(i)]; Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1535; Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1542-1543.
[885] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [108(c)(iv)].
[886] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [108(c)(v)].
[887] See, for example, Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [108(c)(i)]. See also at [33] and [34].
[888] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), [24].
[889] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [312(r)]; WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), [24].
[890] See ASB Vol 2: A755 (part of Exhibit H298).
[891] Item 31 of the Summary Particulars: 'Die-cutter set up is not an OME product', which relates to 1 job, with a total value of $121.86.
[892] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2115.
[893] See ASB Vol 5: A2404 (part of Exhibit H301).
[894] Pribolovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, T 1277.
[895] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T 3077.
[896] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, T 1526-1527, 1530.
[897] Pribilovics XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, T1276.5-8 and T1278.10-15 (pallets only).
[898] See Transcript, 09/09/15, at T4001-4002.
[899] Item 10 of the Summary Particulars: 'No contracting out', which relates to 336 jobs, with a total value of $700,293.63.
[900] Item 14 of the Summary Particulars: 'Printing not work which Achilla could do. No contracting out', which relates to 212 jobs, with a total value of $543,025.38.
[901] Item 17(b) of the Summary Particulars: 'Printing' was work which Achilla could not do without contracting out'.
[902] All of the particular grounds raised in Item 17 together total 319 jobs, with a total value of $1,190,187.59.
[903] In items 14 and 17 of the Summary Particulars.
[904] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809; Phillips WS (Exhibit A89) at [27];
[905] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809, T826; Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1443.
[906] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89) at [31]
[907] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89) at [35].
[908] See generally Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [312].
[909] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [232].
[910] Transcript 03/06/15, at T690.5-13.
[911] In cross-examination, Mr Holihan disputed that there would be a double margin. He said (Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1485):
...I believe that I would have bought screen print work cheaper than what Amcor was going to be buying it for. So I would have put a margin on top, but it included the additional other steps beyond screen printing that we would have done as well. It was a total package.
So would Achilla be entitled to charge a margin on the margin charged by Thompsons?---Yes.
Right. So do you think that would have been a good commercial result for Amcor?---If the overall package for Amcor was that they had a one stop shop for buying their product, yes, that would make more commercial sense. And number two, if that was tested and overall the prices were commercial, I would say yes.
[912] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Tran), Transcript 10/09/15, at T4186-4187.
[913] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15 at T1090.
[914] Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union.
[915] See Item 3 of the Summary Particulars: 'Inability to supply consistently on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable (Alternative 1)', which relates to 27 jobs, with a total value of $36,759.68.
[916] See Item 4 in the Summary Particulars: 'Inability to supply consistently on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable (Alternative 2)', which relates to 33 jobs, with a total value of $37,168.65.
[917] Mr Holihan said (Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1) at [135]) that on 1 August 2003, Forstaff employed 15 factory personnel to start on the first shift which began at 6.50 am on Monday, 4 August 2003, and three administration personnel for the office. There was a second shift, managed by Karnik Chichmanian, then Achilla's factory manager, and Mr Papadimatos, that began work on the same day after the first shift finished work, at around 2.30 pm. Achilla also employed 11 staff to work in administration, each starting either on 1 August, 4 August or 11 August 2003.
[919] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3066; Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, T 3122-3123.
[920] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [30].
[921] Mr Pribilovics gave evidence to the effect that the work done by SPS Packaging did not require any particular skill and casual staff could be, and were in fact, used on occasion. In the case of a laminator, he said it would take 'a couple of days' to train someone to use the machine: Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1285. Mr Prasad said that All Pack used casual staff from time to time in the relevant period. He said the work was 'pretty easy, simple jobs' and he found the casual staff were efficient and just as good at doing the work as his usual staff: Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1385. Mr Borg gave evidence to the effect that the fibreboard assembly work that Ubeeco did for Amcor was essential manual work that was not difficult. He said that with 'a small amount of training ... the team would be able to assemble': Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1401.
[922] Mr Pellizzari of Northwest Packaging gave evidence that casual staff could not be used to operate the machines or do any jobs requiring mechanical interaction because it would create potential OH&S issues: Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1210. Northwest Packaging itself employed dedicated staff to operate each particular machine, who were 'multitasked or multiskilled': Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1209.
[923] Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2302-2303.
[924] Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2303.
[925] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [281].
[927] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [141].
[932] Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385, 417.
[933] It is common ground that the AMWU work bans were in place preventing the supply of raw product by Amcor to Achilla from about 16 August 2003 to about 22 August 2003: see Amcor parties' liability submissions at [274] and Holihan parties' liability submissions at [350].
[934] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [276].
[935] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [143].
[936] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1921.
[937] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3072-3073.
[939] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3071-3072.
[940] CB 5:1828-1829 (Exhibit H94), at 1828.
[941] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, T821-822.
[942] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3074.
[943] See Holihan parties' reply submissions at [282], citing the quantum particulars of paragraph 6 of the Second Amended Counterclaim at CB 1: 85.
[944] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [351], [353].
[945] It is common ground that Achilla never owned a screen printing machine: see Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809, T826; Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15 T1443; Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15 at T1112 and T1127.
[946] Mr Garcia said that before the sale, the ACB business did have a laminator and he thought it was doing litho laminating work: see Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3503, 3504. But he also gave evidence that both before, and after the sale, Le Breton would do the print sheets for Amcor's litho laminate jobs: see Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3505, 3506. It is common ground that Achilla never owned a litho laminating machine: see Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809; T826.
[947] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [203(b)].
[948] Among others, evidence to this effect was given by Mr Holihan, Mr Silva and Mr Cichonski. See also Mr Holihan's January 2002 proposal at CB 7:2598 (Exhibit H17) which expressly contemplated the supply of litho laminated products. Mr Garcia, who was called by the Amcor parties, also gave evidence that the ACB Business could litho laminate (see Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15 at T3504 and Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3520).
[949] Albeit that the ACB Business did not itself screen-print. See, for example, Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3507 and Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3519-T3520.
[950] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [272].
[951] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [237].
[952] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809-811.
[953] See also the evidence of Mr Garcia to similar effect: Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3505, 3506.
[954] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1127-T1128.
[955] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1485.
[956] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3507.
[957] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1093.
[958] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T829.
[959] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T944.
[960] Phillips WS (Exhibit A89) at [31].
[961] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [232].
[962] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [252(a)], [252(c)].
[963] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [363].
[964] See Quantum Particulars of paragraph 6 of the Second Amended Counterclaim, at CB 91, items 296, 299, 300, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10. 13, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 27.
[965] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [24(g)], and [132(f)]. See also Cichonski WS, [16] and [26], and Silva WS, [3].
[966] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [132(f)].
[968] CB 5: 1913-1915 (Exhibit A22) at 1914.
[970] The 'three sites' was a reference to the job travelling from AFP (Smithfield or Revesby) to Wetherill Park and then on to Tarlington Place where Achilla performed its partition work. See CB 5: 1913-1915 (Exhibit A22).
[971] See CB 5: 1913-1915 (Exhibit A22) at 1913.
[972] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1440.
[973] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1440-1441.
[974] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1441.
[975] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1442.
[976] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1449.
[977] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1449.
[978] CB 6: 1964-1965 (Exhibit H206), at 1964.
[983] Holihan XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1450-1451.
[984] As set out in his witness statement - see extract above, at paragraphs [194(a)[-[194(c)].
[985] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [389].
[987] See extract from Holihan WS1 set out above, at paragraphs [195]-[198].
[988] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3091.
[989] CB 5: 1783-1874 (Exhibit H43) and Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3152.
[990] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3157.
[991] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3155.
[992] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3064.
[993] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3064.
[994] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3068.
[995] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3156-3158.
[996] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [199].
[998] Mr Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3526.
[999] See Amcor parties' liability submissions at Part IV.C
[1000] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [367].
[1001] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3498.
[1002] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3498.
[1003] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3499.
[1004] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3517-3518.
[1005] Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3520.
[1006] Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3523-3524.
[1007] Cichonski XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2295.
[1008] Phillips XIC, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3331.
[1009] Phillips XIC, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3331-3332.
[1010] Transcript, 03/06/15, at T630-631.
[1011] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [189(b)]. The Holihan parties submitted that this was not the case that was pleaded or opened by them.
[1012] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [191].
[1013] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [224].
[1014] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3062.
[1015] Nellies RE-XN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3195.
[1016] Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3345. Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan also gave evidence (Transcript, 04/06/15, at T907) to the effect that the batch or repeat number only tells you the number of times the particular job has been ordered, and not who made each batch. He said that information might be contained in a 'special comment' somewhere in PICK.
[1017] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3062-3064.
[1018] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, T3496-3497.
[1019] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3497-3498.
[1020] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [226].
[1021] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1378.
[1022] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1379.
[1023] Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3344.
[1024] An affidavit of Ms Gerke was tendered by consent and she was not cross-examined by the Holihan parties.
[1025] Affidavit of Charlotte Gerke sworn 7 August 2015 ('Gerke affidavit') (Exhibit A98), at [4].
[1026] Gerke affidavit (Exhibit A98), at [4].
[1027] Gerke affidavit (Exhibit A98), at [11].
[1028] Gerke affidavit (Exhibit A98), at [11].
[1029] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1231-1232.
[1030] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1912.
[1031] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1912-1914.
[1032] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3092.
[1033] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3092.
[1034] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3094.
[1035] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3093.
[1036] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, T3093-3094.
[1037] ASB Vol 6 at A2898 (Ubeeco) (part of Exhibit H303); ASB Vol 5 at A2391 (SPS) (part of Exhibit H301); CB7:2447 (Achilla) (part of Exhibit H197).
[1039] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1293.
[1040] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1294.
[1041] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1294.
[1045] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809.
[1046] Mr Holihan stated that 'the order history for work made by Achilla for AFP whilst on PICK was not made available to Achilla when AFP separated Achilla from PICK': see Holihan WS1 (Exhibit 93.1), at [355(d)].
[1047] Holihan parties' liability submissions at [459].
[1048] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1914.
[1049] Holihan statement at [172]. Mrs Kay Le Breton confirmed that Le Breton's had done the RTS Imaging for a number of years but she could not recall when they commenced doing it: see Le Breton XXN, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2144.
[1050] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1) at [173].
[1052] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T823-824.
[1053] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T824-825.
[1054] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T825-826.
[1055] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3078-3079.
[1056] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3080, 3078.
[1057] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3083.
[1058] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3079.
[1061] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T936-937.
[1063] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T938.
[1066] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T938.
[1069] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T948.
[1070] CB 5:1911-1912 (Exhibit A21), at 1912.
[1073] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T948.
[1074] CB 5: 1909-1910 (Exhibit H202).
[1076] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T951.
[1077] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T952.
[1078] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15, T 3690.3-12.
[1079] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15, T3690.13-25.
[1080] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15, T3703.29-30.
[1081] Guy WS (Exhibit A93), at [36]-[38].
[1082] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3704.
[1083] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3706.
[1084] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3709 (emphasis added).
[1085] Guy RE-XN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3711-3712.
[1086] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, T828.
[1087] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, T829-830.
[1088] Guy XIC, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3685.
[1089] Guy RE-XN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3711.
[1090] Guy XIC, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3686.
[1091] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3692.
[1092] Guy XXN, Transcript 13/08/15 at T3693- 3695.
[1096] CB 5: 1931 (Exhibit A39). See also Holihan XXN Transcript 05/06/15, at T956.
[1097] Holihan XXN Transcript 05/06/15, at T956.
[1098] Holihan XXN Transcript 05/06/15, at T956.
[1099] CB 6: 1942 (Exhibit A40), 1956 (Exhibit A41).
[1102] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [220].
[1103] CB 6: 1986 (Exhibit H230). Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T965.
[1104] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T966.
[1105] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T966.
[1106] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [223].
[1108] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T966-967.
[1109] Mr Tieu was an Achilla staff member but there was no evidence as to his precise role.
[1113] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T976.
[1114] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T976.
[1115] Holihan WS 1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [230]-[231].
[1120] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T992-994.
[1121] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T968-969.
[1122] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T977-978.
[1123] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T 978-979.
[1124] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T980.
[1125] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T980.
[1126] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T982.
[1128] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T999-1000.
[1129] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1000-1001.
[1130] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1001.
[1131] Silva XXN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2449-2450.
[1132] Silva RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2457.
[1133] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3511-3512.
[1134] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3087.
[1135] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3149.
[1136] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3087.
[1137] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3087.
[1138] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3148.
[1139] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3151.
[1140] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3152.
[1141] Le Breton XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2111.
[1142] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [274(e)].
[1144] And to a Ms Glenyce Perz, however, there was no evidence as to her role.
[1145] As noted earlier, Mr Tieu was an Achilla staff member but there was no evidence as to his precise role.
[1147] CB 6: 1997-1998 (Exhibit H205), at 1997.
[1152] CB 6: 1995-1996 (Exhibit A46), at 1995.
[1153] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1004.
[1154] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1005.
[1155] ASB Vol 2: A558 (part of Exhibit H298).
[1156] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1009.
[1157] CB 1:92. Relevantly the quantum particulars record: Amcor ref 00072173-Le Breton M Graphics-27/08/2004-the 'raw cost' to ACB/APA is $6,113.91 and the revenue to supplier (raw cost-10$ GST) is $5,558.10 and the claimed lost profit is $2,159.88.
[1158] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1011.
[1159] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1011-1012.
[1160] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1013.
[1161] The Holihan parties plead the relevant breach in paragraph 6 of their Fourth Amended Counterclaim as follows:
6. In breach of the terms described in paragraph 5 above, during the relevant parts of the Period, APA did not purchase or procure the supply of all its OME supplies from Achilla, and purchased or procured supplies of products from parties other than Achilla, for reasons other than Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which was commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability.
[1162] See items 7 and 8 in the Summary Particulars. Item 7 is framed in terms of 'Acquiescence (Alternative 1)' and relates to 964 jobs, with a total value of $1,636,623.25. Item 8 is framed in terms of 'Acquiescence (Alternative 2)' and relates to 2 jobs, with a total value of $21,150.63.
[1163] Amcor parties' written outline of opening submissions, at [6(b)[ and [23].
[1164] See the particulars to paragraph [29(d)(iii)].
[1165] See paragraph [14A] of the Holihan parties' reply.
[1166] See the Holihan parties' liability submissions at [122] and the Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [80].
[1167] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3496.
[1168] They say their emphasis on 'some' is important. A handful of emails from Mr Silva about orders being placed with Alternative Suppliers in the Period, in the context of 1,091 supplies over the Period, is telling.
[1169] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [527].
[1170] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1015.
[1171] Holihan XXN, Transcript 05/06/15, at T1016.
[1173] CB 6:2194-2207 (Exhibit H247), at 2194.
[1174] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [266].
[1175] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [283].
[1176] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T871.
[1178] Mr Gross was AFP's General Manager of Packaging Solutions.
[1184] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1751.
[1186] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [282].
[1187] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1753-1754.
[1188] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2271-2272.
[1189] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2272.
[1190] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2273.
[1191] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2469.
[1192] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2269.
[1193] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [311].
[1194] Powell XIC, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3597-3598.
[1195] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [330].
[1196] See clause 2.1(b) of the Deed of Accession.
[1197] See, for example, Con-Stan Industries Pty Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd [1986] HCA 14; (1986) 160 CLR 226, at 244-245, and Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65; (2007) 69 NSWLR 603, per Tobias JA at [199].
[1198] Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40, at 46 (McPherson J, Andrews CJ and Demack J agreeing).
[1199] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [32]. It will be recalled that PICK was a costing and sales order processing system and PCS (or Product Control System) was the machine loading and feedback system.
[1200] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3063-3064.
[1201] Garcia XXN, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3518-3519.
[1202] Silva XXN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2436-2437.
[1203] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3065-3066.
• The need for ACB to convert a lot more of its own products and the impact it may have on Amcor.
• An open discussion around both parties being able to use other suppliers.
[1205] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [331].
[1206] Paragraph [29(d)(iv)] of the Amcor defence & cross-claim.
[1207] See Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19; (2014) 251 CLR 505, a case concerning equitable estoppel. It was cited with approval in relation to the burden of proof of detriment in the context of conventional estoppel in Sze Tu v Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Doueihi [2014] NSWSC 1717; (2014) 17 BPR 33,457 at [447].
[1208] See paragraph [14A] of the Holihan parties' reply.
[1209] (2013) 16 BPR 98585 at 31,729 (Ward JA, with whom Beazley P and Macfarlan JA agreed).
[1210] [2012] VSC 43, at [91] (Judd J). See also Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 40; (2006) 149 FCR 395, at [107]-[118].
[1211] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [342].
[1212] For the period 30 July 2003 to 21 March 2005:
Exhibit H281 (All Pack), Exhibit H283 (JS Cutting), Exhibit H285 (Le Breton), Exhibit H287 (Northwest Packaging), Exhibit H290 (SPS Packaging), Exhibit H292 (Thompsons) and Exhibit H294 (Ubeeco).
Exhibit H282 (All Pack), Exhibit H284 (JS Cutting), Exhibit H286 (Le Breton), Exhibit H288 (Northwest Packaging), Exhibit H289 (Sainsbury), Exhibit H291 (SPS Packaging), Exhibit H293 (Thompsons) and Exhibit H295 (Ubeeco).
[1213] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [311].
[1214] See item 11 of the Summary Particulars: 'No basis to say commercially and reasonably acceptable where insufficient documentation', which relates to 307 jobs, having a total value of $493,576.86.
[1215] See Holihan liability submissions, at [553]-[576].
[1218] Reproduced in the transcript of proceedings before Vickery J on 06/05/11 at T39 - see SCB Vol.S6, at S2409 and S2443.
[1219] In cross-examination, Mr Phillips agreed that decommissioning in 2011 was 'about the right time' (Phillips XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3338.5).
[1220] CB 8:2813-2815 (Exhibit H82) at [6]-[7].
[1221] CB 8:2790-2807 (Exhibit H80) at [13].
[1222] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [576].
[1223] On 12 June 2015, the Holihan parties issued a Notice to Produce to the Prothonotary seeking, in summary, production of any documents produced by the alternative suppliers in answer to the July 2014 subpoenas, any correspondence relating to any of the subpoenas and any record of the Prothonotary that recorded the response (or lack thereof) to the subpoenas: CB 9: 3070-3071 (Exhibit H383).
[1224] CB 8:2917-2929 (Exhibit H366).
[1225] CB 8:2930 (Exhibit H367). See also CB 9:3113 (Exhibit H389) and Pribilovics RE-XN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1305-1306 - he said 'The IT guys could only retrieve from 2010 onwards'.
[1226] CB 8 :2931-2945 (Exhibit H369).
[1227] Prasad XIC, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1359 and T1360 - he said 'my main customer was Amcor' but All Pack did not produce any documents in answer to the subpoena.
[1228] CB 8: 2946-2961 (Exhibit H370). (This includes Pandapak Pty Ltd).
[1229] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1198 and T1199.
[1230] CB 8: 2962-2976 (Exhibit H371).
[1231] CB 9: 3095-3098 (Exhibit H386), at 3096.
[1232] CB 8: 2977-2991 (Exhibit H372).
[1233] CB 9: 3070-3071 (Exhibit H383).
[1234] CB 8: 2992-3006 (Exhibit H373).
[1235] CB 9: 3084-3095 (Exhibit H385).
[1236] CB 8: 3007-3021 (Exhibit H374).
[1237] CB 9: 3072-3083 (Exhibit H384).
[1238] CB 8: 3022-3037 (Exhibit H375).
[1239] CB 9: 3110-3112 (Exhibit H388).
[1240] CB 8: 3038-3053 (Exhibit H376).
[1241] CB 8: 3054-3069 (Exhibit H377). See also Borg XIC, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1398.8-21 - Ubeeco produced a summary spreadsheet capturing the information sought.
[1242] CB 9: 3099-3109 (Exhibit H387). See also contents of the compact disc reproduced in A7: A3052-A3351 (Exhibit H313).
[1243] Phillips XXN, 04/08/15, at T3336.
[1244] Phillips XXN, 04/08/15, at T3337-3339.
[1245] Phillips XXN, 04/08/15, at T3338.
[1246] Phillips XXN, 04/08/15, at T3341.
[1247] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3466.
[1248] Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T 3123-3124.
[1249] The bill for the Act formed part of the legislative response to the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in the McCabe tobacco case: see British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (Representing the Estate of McCabe (deceased)) [2002] VSCA 197; (2002) 7 VR 524.
[1250] Hansard, Assembly, Wednesday, 31 May 2006, at p. 1470 (Mr Hulls).
[1251] [2014] VSC 546 ('Little').
[1254] Ibid, at [113]-[114] (citations omitted).
[1255] [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361 (citations omitted).
[1256] Ibid, at 385, [64] (emphasis added).
[1257] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [602].
[1258] Alder v Khoo [2011] QCA 298 at [12]. See also Kingisland Meatworks and Cellars Pty Ltd v Piero Mastromanno & Anor [2012] VCC 25, at [171]-[175] where Judge Lewitan found there was not an abundance of other documents in existence and made an order under section 89B.
[1259] [2014] VSC 546, at [32].
[1260] See CB 8:2813-2815 (Exhibit H82) referred to in the Holihan parties' liability submissions at [572].
[1261] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [176(j)].
[1262] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3633.
[1263] ASB Vol 5: A2342-A2387. The invoices appear at pages A5: A2344-A2379 (Exhibit H300) and the purchase orders appear at pages A5: A2380-A2387 (Exhibit H307).
[1264] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [315(g)].
[1265] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3655.
[1266] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3655.
[1267] Papadimatos XXN, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2164.
[1268] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [14].
[1269] CB 5:1804-1825 (enclosing what is now Exhibit H91/H91A - see footnote below), at 1804.
[1270] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [15].
[1271] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [12]. The rent was shown in Annexure 5 as a cost that was to be recovered in the machine rates when work was performed by the ACB Business.
[1272] The First Year Budget is at CB 5: 1804-1825 (Exhibit H180).
[1273] When Mr Holihan was giving evidence, replacement A3 size pages of CB 5: 1805 and 1806 (tendered and marked as Exhibit H91) were used. Exhibit H91A is a further A3 replacement version containing row and column headings, as used by Mr Papadimatos when giving evidence. For convenience, in these reasons when the First Year Budget is being referred to, reference is made to Exhibit H91A rather than to any of the other iterations.
[1275] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [16]- [30].
[1276] Clause 5.5 of the Second Sale Agreement provided that for a period of up to 6 months following Completion, the Vendor would pay for all purchases which it obtains from the Purchaser or Achilla weekly in arrears upon production of an invoice.
[1277] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [35].
[1278] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [36].
[1279] CB 6:1957-1961 (Exhibit H226), at 1957.
[1280] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [45].
[1281] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [46].
[1282] CB 6:2014 (Exhibit H414) and CB 7:2590 (Exhibit H415).
[1283] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [49].
[1284] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [51].
[1285] Papadimatos XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2159.
[1286] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [42].
[1287] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [53].
[1288] CB 6:2039-2040. (This documentation is referred to earlier in these reasons: see Issue 1(c) and 'Discussions regarding fixed cost (October 2004)').
[1289] Papadimatos WS (Exhibit H402), at [54].
[1290] Mr Holihan described Mr Hilaris as the 'Specialty Commercial Manager for AFP in Victoria'` and said that he succeeded Mr Manser in that role: see Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [213(e)]. Under cross-examination, Mr Holihan said Mr Hilaris was supporting Mr Manser in the accounting role, so 'he was like an accountant.' (See Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1565-1566).
[1293] Papadimatos XXN, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2168-2169.
[1294] Papadimatos XXN, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2169.
[1296] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1907.
[1297] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1871.
[1298] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1872. An example of the accounting transactional postings sheet appears at CB 7:2599 (Exhibit H171).
[1299] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1872.
[1300] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1880.
[1301] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1878.
[1302] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1891.
[1303] Earlier in his evidence Mr Joyce said that when using the expression 'Amcor Packaging', he was referring to the Smithfield and Revesby operations: see Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1870.
[1304] Joyce XIC, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1893.
[1305] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [126]-[128].
[1306] The 'Costs Bridge from Financials' appears at the bottom right hand corner of Exhibit H91A.
[1307] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T796-797.
[1308] Exhibit H91A states that the forecast for financial year 04 is 'Based on 0203 actuals + 1.5% CPI, 4% wages and 3.5% Gas & Electricity.'
[1309] Mr Holihan said these volumes included work that had been done for Amcor Displays: see Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T812.
[1310] Bracknells is a third party warehousing company.
[1311] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T807-808. The final rates that were agreed between the parties have 'distribution' charges taken out of the machine rates as Amcor pays them: see CB 5:1804 (Exhibit H180).
[1312] Holihan XIC, Transcript 04/06/15, at T809.
[1313] Exhibit H92.1 is a replacement for the spreadsheet which appears at CB 6: 2094-2096. Exhibit H92.1A is a further A3 replacement version containing row and column headings, as used by Mr Papadimatos when giving evidence. For convenience, in these reasons, when the Second Year Budget is being referred to, reference is made to Exhibit H92.1A rather than to any of the other iterations.
[1317] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1732-1733.
[1318] Amcor parties' quantum submissions, at [46].
[1319] The expert report of Mr Gregory Pollard Meredith dated 6 October 2014 is found at CB 2: 562-741 (Exhibit H418) ('Meredith Report'). The expert report of Ms Dawna Kathleen Wright dated 26 February 2015 is found at CB 2: 742-777 (Exhibit A85) ('Wright Report').
[1320] Emailed to the Court and the parties by Mr Meredith on behalf of the experts on 18 August 2015 (Joint Calculations) (Exhibit H445).
[1321] Emailed to the Court and the parties by Ms Wright on behalf of the experts on 1 September 2015 ('Joint Report') (Exhibit H446).
[1322] See Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56; (2013) 253 CLR 1, 7, 11, 30.
[1323] Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56; (2013) 253 CLR 1, at 6 [7] (Hayne J) (emphasis in original). See also Robinson v Harman [1848] EngR 135; (1848) 1 Exch 850, at 855[1848] EngR 135; , [154 ER 363, at 365].
[1324] Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56; (2013) 253 CLR 1, at 7 [9] (Hayne J) (emphasis in original).
[1325] Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64, at 80 (Mason CJ and Dawson J).
[1326] (2003) 77 ALJR 768, at [6], [37].
[1327] [1994] VicRp 16; [1994] 1 VR 237, at 241 (citations omitted).
[1328] (2003) 77 ALJR 768, at 774 [38] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ agreeing).
[1329] [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64, at 83, quoting Jones v Schiffmann [1971] HCA 52; (1971) 124 CLR 303, at 308.
[1330] [1999] NSWCA 72, at [65].
[1331] Unreported, WASC FC, 25/09/1996, BC9604659.
[1332] See, e.g., NCON Australia Ltd v Spotlight Pty Ltd [No 5] [2012] VSC 604, [291] (Robson J); Grainger v Williams [2009] WASCA 60, [170]; LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74, [12].
[1333] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [9], [16(a)], [118]-[120], [175(a)]. Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at para [4.4.4] (to be inferred).
[1334] See the Holihan parties' liability submissions, section E.10, and particularly section E.10.2.2 at [577]-[580], and the Holihan parties' reply submissions, section E.12.
[1335] Holihan WS 1 (Exhibit H93.1), [31]; CB 4:1205 (Exhibit H103).
[1336] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3058-3059, Nellies XXN, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3136- 3137.
[1337] In Mr Joyce's 'Notes on Proposed ACB Contract' dated 7 January 2003 (CB 3:1045-1052 (Exhibit H25), at 1049), Sainsbury is referred to under clause 12.1 (i.e., purchase of raw materials) as an 'other customer/OME'.
[1338] No summary spreadsheet was discovered for Sainsbury for the period 30 July 2003 to 21 March 2005. Cf each of the other suppliers:
• A4: A1637-A1640 (Exhibit H287) - Northwest Packaging;
The orders listed in the summary spreadsheet for Sainsbury for 21 March 2005 to 20 July 2008 commence on 14 July 2006: see ASB 5: CB A1:A2343 (Exhibit H289).
[1339] See the Holihan parties' reply submissions, at section M.2.
[1340] CB 8: 2734-2741 (Exhibit H62), at [8] and [20].
[1341] As at 10 May 2012, the Amcor parties had discovered summary spreadsheets relating to the eight alternative suppliers (for the period 21 March 2005 to 31 July 2008) (See the affidavit of documents of Ms McPherson sworn on 16 May 2011 - SCB S6: S2731-S2739 (Exhibit H439)). They subsequently discovered the remaining summary spreadsheets for the pre-Deed of Accession period via the affidavit of Mr Jason Arnheim dated 29 May 2012 (CB 8: 2747-2751 (Exhibit H79)). The Amcor Parties have not discovered summary spreadsheets for work sent to other suppliers. This work is apparently the 'excluded subject matter'.
[1342] See Holihan parties' quantum submissions, at [18].
[1343] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [178].
[1344] Conclave (exchange between the bench and both experts -Wright evidence), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2981.
[1345] Conclave (exchange between the bench and both experts -Meredith evidence), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2981.
[1346] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2993-2994.
[1347] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [175(a)]; Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at [4.2.1], [4.2.3].
[1348] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [9], [16(a)], [118]-[120], [175(a)]. Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at [4.4.4] (to be inferred), [5.4.7] (to be inferred).
[1349] (Reference made to paragraph [120] of his report, set out above).
[1350] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [120], [175].
[1351] The basis for this method is described by Mr Holihan at Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [319]-[321].
[1352] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at section H and Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at section 5.4.
[1353] The extract from the email correspondence with the experts is reproduced in the Holihan parties' quantum submissions, at [31].
[1355] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), at pages 9-13.
[1356] Holihan parties' closing (Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T4004.
[1357] Experts' Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Methodology response, at 1. The Holihan parties point out (in their submissions on quantum at footnote 27) that while six issues are listed, the 'choice of the usual methodology for calculating lost profit, i.e. lost sales less incremental costs, was expressed as two issues and is really one issue and its answer.' See also Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T 2934-2935; conclave (Wright) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T 2957.13-2958.27.
[1358] In the case of the Achilla methodology, the relevant adjustments are discussed in the Meredith Report (Exhibit H418) at [84]-[107]. In the case of the Amcor methodology, the relevant adjustments are discussed in the Meredith Report (Exhibit H418) at [128]-[139].
[1359] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [17].
[1360] See Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [180].
[1361] Note that the Amcor parties point out that the 'adjusted Amcor methodology' was so named and analysed by Mr Meredith, based on a Court document prepared by the Amcor parties. The adjusted Amcor methodology, in its final form as suggested by Mr Meredith, is not a methodology that originated with the Amcor parties.
[1362] Experts' Joint Report (Exhibit H446), at 1-2 (emphasis added).
[1363] See Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [175(d)].
[1364] See Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [175(e)].
[1365] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2935.
[1366] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2935.
[1367] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2936.
[1368] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2936-2937.
[1369] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2937.
[1370] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2937.
[1371] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2938.
[1372] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2943-2944.
[1373] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2949-2950.
[1374] Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at [5.3.10].
[1375] Experts' Joint Report (Exhibit H446), at 1-2.
[1376] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2960.
[1377] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2960.
[1378] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2961.
[1379] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2961-2962.
[1380] See Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [80] and the documents cited.
[1381] Conclave, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2984-2986.
[1382] Conclave (Meredith), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2996.
[1383] Conclave (Meredith), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2996.
[1384] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [89].
[1385] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [91].
[1386] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [127].
[1388] Cost of direct materials/freight.
[1389] Cost of direct labour, on-costs, direct and other, and energy.
[1390] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at Annexure F.
[1391] Relevantly, the 'Machine variables' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Strapping, Ink, Coatings, Glue or tape, and Stretch or shrink film.
[1392] Relevantly, the 'Other materials' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Pallets (OME), OME Sundry (litho, plastic, timber etc).
[1393] Relevantly, the 'Repairs and maintenance' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Labour and materials.
[1394] Relevantly, the 'Fixed factory costs' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Rates and taxes.
[1395] Relevantly, the 'Direct other costs (net of energy)' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Safety, Chep/Loscam, and Forklift hire.
[1396] Relevantly, the 'Distribution' components were listed in Table 13 as being: Dispatch labour, and Freight.
[1397] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [59], [61] and Annexure G, column labelled 'Variance'.
[1398] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [64], [67] and Annexure I.
[1399] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [73], [75(b)], [76] and Annexure K.
[1400] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [95]-[97] and Annexure L, and [107(a)].
[1401] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [103]-[106], [107(b)].
[1402] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [124].
[1403] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [128]-[129].
[1404] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [131-134].
[1405] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [131]-[133], [135]-[136].
[1406] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [137]-[139].
[1407] Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at [4.6.2].
[1408] $7,633,997 per the Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), less $4,772,923 per the line items that match an item in Annexure 5 of the Asset Sale Agreement.
[1409] Wright Report (Exhibit A84), at [5.3.11].
[1410] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2977-2978.
[1411] Conclave (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2978.
[1412] Conclave (Meredith), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2999.
[1413] Conclave (Meredith), Transcript 31/07/15, at T3005.
[1414] Conclave (Meredith), Transcript 31/07/15, at T2945-2948.
[1415] See Meredith XIC, Transcript 28/07/15, at T2525-2526, Meredith XXN, at T2606.
[1416] See Meredith XXN, Transcript 29/07/15, at T2682-2686.
[1417] See Wright Report (Exhibit A84); Exhibits A86.1, A86.2, A86.3 and A86.4; Wright XIC, Transcript 29/07/15, at T2753-2755, Wright XXN, at T2793.
[1418] Holihan parties' closing (Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T4003.
[1419] See Transcript 31/07/15, at T2959. See also Transcript 09/09/15, at T4004.
[1420] See Transcript 09/09/15, at T4008-4009.
[1421] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Additional Question 2 (page 4).
[1422] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Additional Question 3 (page 5).
[1423] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Additional Question 4 (page 6).
[1424] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Additional Question 5 (page 7).
[1425] See Transcript 09/09/15, at T4017. See also the 'Response agreed by the Experts' to Additional Question 2, Joint Report (Exhibit H446), (page 4).
[1426] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T 1702.
[1427] Note that in Table 14 of his report, Mr Meredith has classified 'forklift labour' as a fixed cost.
[1428] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1693.
[1429] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1704.
[1430] The spreadsheet pertaining to Achilla's profit and loss statement for the 2003-2004 financial year appears at Financials Tender Bundle 1:F82-F130 (Exhibit H275), at F97.
[1431] Ms Wright said this was on the assumed premise that there was some rigour in the preparation of the accounts and expenses were correctly allocated: Conclave evidence (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T3021.2-4.
[1432] Conclave evidence (Wright), Transcript 31/07/15, at T3021.7-13. Mr Meredith implicitly accepted that analysis but said that the fixed component was likely to be an amount greater than that amount: T 3023.11-25.
[1433] This is the total Maintenance figure, not just the 'general R&M' figure put to the experts in the conclave.
[1434] Monthly breakdowns for FY 2007 are not available: affidavit of Craig Anthony Holihan sworn 3 August 2015 (Exhibit H425), [4].
[1435] Monthly breakdowns for FY 2008 are not available: affidavit of Craig Anthony Holihan sworn 3 August 2015 (Exhibit H425), [4].
[1436] Holihan parties' quantum submissions at [65]-[67].
[1437] It appears that the Annual Total of the monthly 'General R&M' for the 2003-2004 financial year was $285,663; for the 2004-2005 financial year the lowest monthly 'General R&M' was $2,490 and the Annual Total was $414,467; for the 2005-2006 financial year the lowest monthly 'General R&M' was $13,438 and the Annual Total was $439,954; for the 2006-2007 financial year monthly breakdowns are not available but the Annual Total for 'R&M General' was $260,169.69 (see Exhibit H278, at F76); for the 2007-2008 financial year monthly breakdowns are not available but the Annual Total for 'R&M General' was $288,936.41 (see Exhibit H279, at F79).
[1438] Variable 'C' deals with 50% and variable 'D' deals with 100%.
[1439] Following the methodology set out in the Holihan parties' table and using the figures noted above, the resultant percentage is likely to be in the order of 25.42 per cent or thereabouts.
[1440] In Mr Meredith's Consolidated Index of Documents document 'B13' is described as email from Nick Papadimatos to Craig Holihan re Factory Wetherill Park Recovery 0304 Final and Attachment (First Year Budget) dated 25/8/2003 - CB 5:1804 (now Exhibit H180). The attachment is Exhibit H91A.
[1441] See Meredith XIC, Transcript 28/07/15, at T2525 - T2526, Meredith XXN, at T2606.
[1442] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T4003.
[1443] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), Further Question 3 (page 15).
[1444] Joint Report Exhibit H446), Additional Question 1 (page 3).
[1445] Meredith Report (Exhibit H418), at [90(b)].
[1446] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), response agreed by the experts to Additional Question 3 (page 5) (emphasis added).
[1447] Nellies XIC, Transcript 03/08/15, at T3074.
[1448] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1089.
[1449] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1094.
[1450] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1118.
[1451] Kent XXN, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1094.
[1452] Kent XIC, Transcript 10/06/15, at T1118.
[1453] Pellizzari XIC, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1196-1197.
[1454] Pellizzari XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1251. (See also at T1256).
[1455] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1288.
[1456] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1288.
[1457] Pribilovics XXN, Transcript 11/06/15, at T1288-1289.
[1458] Prasad XIC, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1363.
[1459] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1373.
[1460] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1373. See also Prasad XIC, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1363.
[1461] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1373-1374.
[1462] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1373.
[1463] A35 (part of Exhibit H296: Alternative Supplier Bundle records for All Pack).
[1464] Prasad XXN, Transcript 12/06/15, at T1374.
[1465] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1414.
[1466] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1414-1415.
[1467] Borg XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T1415.
[1468] Le Breton XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T2141.
[1469] Le Breton XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T2141.
[1470] Le Breton XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T2141.
[1471] Le Breton XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T2142.
[1472] Le Breton XXN, Transcript 15/06/15, at T2139-2140; T2141-T2142.
[1473] Holihan parties' quantum submissions, at [100].
[1474] Joint Report (Exhibit H446), at page 5 (emphasis added).
[1475] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2949-2950.
[1476] Conclave (Meredith) evidence, Transcript 31/07/15, at T2937.
[1477] Implicitly, these supplies were for work to be performed by Achilla for its own customers, because Achilla was not charged for raw materials that were referable to work to be performed for AFP customers.
[1478] CB 1:156-200. The line items forming the overcharges are listed in the schedule to the particulars at CB 1:158-200.
[1479] That is, items which are not accepted to be overcharging because they are not 'products'. Refer to the Corrs Chambers Westgarth letter dated 21 September 2012 (Exhibit H1).
[1480] See the Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [614].
[1482] See the Amcor parties' liability submissions at [345] and CB 8:2729 (Amcor parties' further and better particulars of amended defence to counterclaim).
[1483] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [30(b)].
[1484] Holihan parties' reply, at [15].
[1485] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [348]. In context the reference to undercharges is a reference to 'overcharges'.
[1487] See also Koch Marine Inc v D'Amica Societa di Navigazione Arl (The Elena D'Amico) [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 75, at 88 where Goff J (citing McGregor on Damages (13th edn) with approval) said '[p]ut shortly, the plaintiff cannot recover for avoided loss.' See also Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, at 406; Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (18th edn, 2009) at [7-006]; Hugh Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (30th edn, 2008) at [26-115].
[1488] See Powercor Australia Ltd v Thomas [2012] VSCA 87; (2012) 43 VR 220, at 232 [52]-[53] (per Osborn JA, Warren CJ and Bongiorno JA agreeing); Love v Thwaites [No 4] [2012] VSC 521 at [56] (Dixon J) (upheld on appeal in Love v Thwaites [No 4] [2014] VSCA 56 at [46]- [48]).
[1489] Ruthol Pty Ltd v Tricon (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 443; (2005) 12 BPR 23,923, at 23,932 [44] (Giles JA, Santow JA and Hunt AJA agreeing); Tasman Capital Pty Ltd v Sinclair [2008] NSWCA 248; (2008) 75 NSWLR 1, at 8 [72] (Giles JA, McColl JA and Young CJ in Eq agreeing).
[1491] See Exhibits H265, H319, H316, and H317.
[1495] Holihan XXN, Transcript 17/06/15, at T1747.
[1496] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3509.
[1497] Garcia XIC, Transcript 06/08/15, at T3510.
[1498] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [355].
[1499] With whom Lords Ashbourne, Macnaghten and Atkinson agreed.
[1500] [1912] UKLawRpAC 43; [1912] AC 673, at 689.
[1502] [1912] UKLawRpAC 43; [1912] AC 673, at 690.
[1504] Ibid, at 6 [7] (original emphasis).
[1505] Ibid, at 7 [9] (original emphasis).
[1506] Ibid, at 8 [12]-[13]. See also per Crennan and Bell JJ at 11 [25] and per Keane J at 32 [111].
[1508] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [627].
[1509] See Edelman and Bant, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd ed, 2016, Hart Publishing), at 401.
[1510] [1994] HCA 61; (1994) 182 CLR 51 ('Royal Insurance').
[1511] Ibid, at 75 (citations omitted).
[1512] Ibid, at 90-91 (citations omitted).
[1513] [2001] HCA 68; (2001) 208 CLR 516 ('Roxborough').
[1514] Ibid, at 529 [25] and 530 [28] (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ).
[1515] Clark v Macourt [2013] HCA 56; (2013) 253 CLR 1, at 9 [19].
[1516] See Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [628]-[646].
[1517] The work bans are discussed above under Issue 3(d)(i).
[1523] CB 6:2120, at 2122 (Exhibit H198) (emphasis added).
[1524] Joyce XXN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1921.
[1525] Joyce RE-XN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1946.
[1526] Joyce RE-XN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1946.
[1527] Joyce RE-XN, Transcript 18/06/15, at T1948.
[1528] See the Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [363].
[1529] See CB 5:1559-1571 (Exhibit H3).
[1530] It is not in issue between the parties that the Charge was executed at or about the same time as the Second Sale Agreement: see counterclaim, at [9]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [32(a)].
[1531] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), [66]; CB 3:998-999 (Exhibit H23). Draft charge follows at CB 3:1000-1013 (Exhibit H108).
[1532] In the then-current draft of the Second Sale Agreement, the purchase price was payable in ten yearly instalments of $100,000 each: see CB 3:987-995 (Exhibit H22) at CB 3:990, cl. 3.1(a).
[1533] CB 3:998-999 (Exhibit H23). Draft charge follows at CB 3:1000-1013 (Exhibit H108).
[1534] See principal judgment, at [1150] and [1763].
[1535] Counterclaim at [9]-[17] and prayer for relief at paragraphs D and E.
[1536] Pursuant to clause 3.4 of the Second Sale Agreement (see CB 4:1492-1558 (Exhibit H2)).
[1537] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [33].
[1539] Counterclaim at [10]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [33].
[1541] Counterclaim at [11]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [34].
[1543] Counterclaim at [12]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [35].
[1545] Counterclaim at [13]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [36].
[1546] CB 7: 2441-2442 (Exhibit H87) at 2442.
[1547] Counterclaim at [14]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [37].
[1549] Counterclaim at [15]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [38].
[1550] Counterclaim at [16]; Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [39].
[1551] As calculated and payable in accordance with clause 3.1 of the Second Sale Agreement.
[1552] See Holihan parties' reply, at [19(a)]. The relief which the Amcor parties sought against ACB Co Purchaser in proceeding No. 8181 of 2007 included damages, equitable compensation and an account of profits.
[1553] See Holihan parties' reply, at [19(b)].
[1554] Amcor parties' liability submissions, Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4395 (Dr McNicol).
[1555] Cf. Meldov Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2015] NSWSC 378, at [75].
[1556] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [389].
[1557] Clause 1.2 is headed 'Interpretation'.
[1558] CB 5:1559-1571 (Exhibit H3), at 1561.
[1559] See CB 5:1560-1561 (Exhibit H3).
[1560] Chapter 2K was repealed by No 96 of 2010, s 3, Sch 1, Pt 2 [18] (effective 30 January 2012).
[1561] CB 5:1565 (part of Exhibit H3).
[1562] CB 5:1566 (part of Exhibit H3).
[1563] The Charge defines 'Asset Sale Deed' rather than 'Asset Sale Agreement' as 'the deed dated the same date as this Deed made between [ACB Co Vendor, APA, Achilla and Holihan]' and the Second Sale Agreement has a clause 3.1 but not a clause 3.1(a). The Holihan parties argued that the latter was an error, and this was not contradicted by the Amcor parties.
[1565] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3956.
[1567] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [390(b)].
[1568] [2008] WASCA 80; (2008) 36 WAR 342, at 359-360 [42], [44].
[1569] [2000] VSCA 77; (2000) 2 VR 531, 550 (VSCA).
[1570] (1996) 140 ALR 46, 53 (FCA, Hill J).
[1571] (1992) 5 BPR 11,817 at 11,819-20 (NSWCA).
[1572] [2000] FCA 187; (2000) 278 ALR 429, at 438-440, 451 (FCA).
[1574] (1994) 35 NSWLR 96, at 102.
[1575] See Meldov Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2015] NSWSC 378, [39], [72] (Slattery J).
[1576] Hall v Westpac Banking Corporation (1987) 4 BPR 9578, 97303 (Mahoney JA, Kirby P and McHugh JA agreeing).
[1577] Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) v Malaysian Kuwaiti Investment Co Sdn Bhd (MKIC) [2003] VSC 495, [36] (Redlich J);
[1578] McVeigh v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] FCA 187; (2000) 278 ALR 429.
[1579] See clause 5.2 of the Second Sale Agreement (Exhibit H2), at CB 4:1507.
[1580] See clause 3.1 of the Second Sale Agreement (Exhibit H2), at CB 4:1505.
[1581] See clause 5.6 of the Second Sale Agreement (Exhibit H2), at CB 4:1508.
[1582] See clause 2.1 of the Charge (Exhibit H3), at CB 5:1561.
[1586] See Holihan parties' reply, at [20].
[1590] See Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3957, Holihan parties' reply, at [20] and Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [368].
[1594] (1863) 2 W & W (E) 57, at 70.
[1595] Ibid, at 70-71 (emphasis added).
[1598] (1918) 88 LJ Ch 31, at 35-36.
[1603] [2010] FCAFC 81; (2010) 79 ACSR 89, at 95-96 and cases cited therein at [23]-[26].
[1604] See Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [372].
[1607] Holihan WS1 (Exhibit H93.1), at [303].
[1608] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [33(a)(v)].
[1609] Amcor parties' Rejoinder to Reply to the Further Amended Defence to Fourth Amended Counterclaim ('Amcor rejoinder'), at [1].
[1612] CB 4:1506 (part of Exhibit H2).
[1613] See Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [699] citing Lutton v Rodd (1675) 2 Chan Cas 206; Gyles v Hall (1762) 2 P Wms 377; Bank of New South Wales v O'Connor [1889] UKLawRpAC 47; (1889) 14 App Cas 273, 283-4; Kinnaird v Trollope [1889] UKLawRpCh 88; (1889) 42 Ch D 610, 617-618, Edmondson v Copland [1911] UKLawRpCh 58; [1911] 2 Ch 301, 310; Barratt v Gough-Thomas (No 3) [1951] 2 All ER 48, 49-50; Gardiner v Fitzgerald [1962] Qd R 29, 36; Challenge Bank Ltd v Hodgekiss (1995) 7 BPR 14,399; [1996] ANZ ConvR 364; (1995) NSW ConvR 55-756; BC9505293 at 8-9.
[1615] On 29th August 1958, the mortgagors paid a sum into Mr Fitzgerald's bank account which represented the balance of the principal and interest calculated to 18th June 1957.
[1616] [1962] Qd R 29, at 36-37.
[1617] [1889] UKLawRpAC 47; (1889) 14 App Cas 273, at 283-284.
[1618] See Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [700] citing Çukurova Finance International Ltd & Anor v. Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd (No 4) [2015] 2 WLR 875; [2013] UKPC 20, 923 [35], relying on Manning v Burgess (1663) 1 Ch Cas 29, 63 ER 678; Webb v Crosse [1911] UKLawRpCh 134; [1912] 1 Ch 323; Rourke v Robinson [1911] UKLawRpCh 11; [1911] 1 Ch 480; Lord Midleton v Eliot [1847] EngR 317; (1847) 15 Sim 531, 317 ER 725 and Chalikani Venkataryanim v Zamindar of Tuni (1922) LR 50 Ind App 41.
[1620] Ibid, at 916 [15]. Each of Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC separately disagreed with the Board, and in each case for essentially the same reasons.
[1630] (1994) 6 BPR 97543, at 14,088.
[1632] (1995) 7 BPR 97561, at 14,403.
[1633] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [705].
[1638] [2015] 2 WLR 875, at 924-925 [42].
[1640] [1956] HCA 51; (1956) 99 CLR 560, at 567-568 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ).
[1641] See Halsbury's Laws of Australia, [110 Contract/VI Performance and Breach/(1) Performance Obligations/ (C) Discharge by Performance of Contract/ (II) Method of Performance], at [110-8065] citing, by way of example, Williamson v Tait [1892] VicLawRp 134; (1892) 18 VLR 649.
[1642] Holihan parties' reply, at [19(d)].
[1643] See Charge (Exhibit H3) at CB 5: 1564-1565 (emphasis added).
[1644] See Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [689].
[1646] Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co Ltd, [1914] AC 25 at 48.
[1647] [1914] AC 25 ('Kreglinger').
[1648] [1914] AC 25, at 61 (Lord Parker of Waddington).
[1649] See John McGhee (ed), Snell's Equity, (33rd ed, 2015, Thomson Reuters), at [38-007], citing Kreglinger [1914] AC 25 and De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v British South Africa Co Ltd [1911] UKLawRpAC 68; [1912] AC 52.
[1650] Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) v Merrill Lynch International [2009] NSWSC 7; (2009) 73 NSWLR 404, at 426 [108] (Barrett J).
[1651] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [393].
[1653] See Westfield Holdings Ltd v Australian Capital Television (1992) 32 NSWLR 194; Sam Management Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2009] NSWCA 320, [60]; Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) v Merrill Lynch International [2009] NSWSC 7; (2009) 73 NSWLR 404.
[1654] See Transcript 08/09/15, at T3781-82 (Mr Maiden).
[1655] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 214-215, [1385].
[1656] CB 4: 1529 (emphasis added) (part of Exhibit H2).
[1658] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 169 and 176.
[1660] See Transcript 17/06/15, at T1800 and Transcript 18/06/15, at T1822-1837.
[1661] The Explanatory Memorandum for the Company Law Review Bill 1997 noted (at [12.60]) that '[t]he definition of control in section 259E of the Bill is based on the current accounting standards definition (AASB 1024).' The provision as introduced appears as section 259E of the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).
[1662] Accounting Standard AASB 1024: Consolidated Accounts (May 1992), at [9].
[1663] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [425].
[1666] [2015] NSWSC 646; (2015) 106 ACSR 207, at 250 [152]-[153]..
[1667] Nor was there any definition in Accounting Standard 1024.
[1668] Transcript, 15/09/15, at 4377.
[1669] Transcript, 15/09/15, at 4377.
[1670] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4378.
[1672] [2009] VSC 18 ('Multinet Gas').
[1673] [2009] VSC 18, at [184].
[1674] Transcript 15/09/15, at T4496-4497.
[1675] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [436].
[1676] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [49].
[1677] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [50].
[1678] LeoRose was formed for the purpose of holding all the shares in ACB Co Purchaser, on trust for Mr Holihan and his wife Katherine (through Holihan Investments) and Mr Barnes.
[1680] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [52].
[1683] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 158, [993]-[994].
[1684] CB: 1352-1353 (Exhibit H7) (emphasis added).
[1687] CB: 1352 (Exhibit H7), at 1357-1358.
[1692] CB: 1346-1351 (Exhibit H6) at 1346, cl. 1.
[1694] Schedule 3 showed the shareholding in Brobel Investments Pty Limited as follows:
2. 2 shares as trustee for Merrymen Pty Limited [Sangster]
3. 2 shares as trustee for Bankson Pty Limited [Hodgson]
4. 2 shares as trustee for Sampson Solo Pty Limited [Mihelic]
5. 2 shares as trustee for CBB Investments Pty Limited [Bayley]
[1695] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 169, [1087].
[1696] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [54].
[1697] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [55]-[56].
[1698] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [57].
[1699] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [58].
[1700] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [58].
[1701] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [731].
[1702] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [443].
[1704] Transcript 19/06/15, at 2038-2040 Holihan XXN.
[1705] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [449].
[1706] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 163-164.
[1707] Holihan parties' reply, at [30].
[1708] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [451].
[1709] Mr Holihan confirmed that he never exercised that option: Transcript 19/06/15, at 2041.
[1710] Clause 1 of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed (Exhibit H6).
[1711] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [452]-[454].
[1712] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol QC), Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4379-4380.
[1713] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol QC), Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4379-4380.
[1714] Transcript, 15/09//15, at 4380.
[1715] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [441(d)].
[1716] This was, however, subject to the proviso in clause 4(e), that the shares held by Mr Holihan's company 'must carry not less than one third of the voting rights in general meeting of each of the companies.'
[1717] Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4488.
[1718] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 172, [1108].
[1719] Transcript, 15/09/15, at T4389.
[1720] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 19/06/15, at T2030-2031.
[1721] Transcript, 15/09//15, at T4379-4380.
[1722] Amcor parties' outline of opening submissions, at [28].
[1723] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [56].
[1724] Reproduced as Appendix B to these reasons.
[1725] See CB: 1411-1423 (Exhibit H8).
[1726] Ibid, at 1411 (emphasis added).
[1727] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [58].
[1728] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [59].
[1729] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T876.
[1730] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T877.
[1731] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T877.
[1732] Holihan XXN, Transcript, 04/06/15, at T877-878.
[1733] (2012) 264 FCR 1, at 176 [1147].
[1735] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [471].
[1736] See Amcor v Australian Corrugated Box Co [2013] VSCA 223, at [55].
[1737] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [744].
[1738] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [391].
[1740] Logic suggests this should read 'terminate rights and obligations which arise under clause 12'.
[1741] That the notice is to require the Purchaser to cure the change of control is made clear by the words that follow - 'has not returned to the status quo ante' - and also the introductory words of clause 16.4(ii).
[1742] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [769].
[1743] See Charben Haulage Pty Ltd v Environmental & Earth Sciences Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 403; William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1993] EWCA Civ 14; [1994] 1 WLR 1016, 1024.
[1744] Amcor cross-claim, repeating paragraphs [52(a)], [62(a)], [67(a)], [73(a)] of the defence to counterclaim.
[1745] By way of particulars, the Amcor parties state:
The inability of ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla to cure the change in control is evidenced by the mandatory and deeming provisions of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement pursuant to which the Beneficial Owners automatically became parties and assumed the voting and veto and other rights therein. The inability is also evidenced by the confidentiality clause in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement which rendered Holihan and those companies unable to disclose the change of control to the ACB Co Vendor or APA.
[1746] Amcor cross-claim, repeating paragraphs [52(b)]-[52(c)], [62(b)]-[62(c)], [67(b)]-[67(c)], [73(b)]-[73(c)] of the defence to counterclaim.
[1747] Amcor cross-claim, repeating paragraph [73(d)] of the defence to counterclaim.
[1748] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [68].
[1749] Holihan WS2 (Exhibit H93.2), at [68]-[69].
[1750] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [749].
[1752] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [752].
[1753] See Amcor defence to counterclaim at paragraphs [52(b)]-[52(c)], [62(b)]-[62(c)], [67(b)]-[67(c)], [73(b)]-[73(c)] and as repeated in the cross-claim.
[1754] Roberts WS (Exhibit A88), at [4].
[1755] Mr Manser described 'Project Nxt' as a project which was about reducing costs and overheads, especially in those areas that were not profitable: see Manser XIC, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2335.
[1756] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3225.
[1757] Roberts, XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3225.
[1758] Roberts WS (Exhibit A88), at [7].
[1759] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3225.
[1760] Roberts WS (Exhibit A88), at [10].
[1761] Roberts WS (Exhibit A88), at [13].
[1762] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3251 (where he agreed that he had no executive role within the AFP Business at that time).
[1763] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3232.
[1764] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3313-3314.
[1765] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3267-3268.
[1766] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3268. He said he had followed those instructions save that he did mention it to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission during a compulsory examination conducted on 14 December 2004 and also to the Court when giving evidence.
[1767] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3239, 3265, 3309-3310.
[1768] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3309-3310.
[1769] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3253-3254.
[1770] McPherson WS (Exhibit A90.1), at [9].
[1771] McPherson WS (Exhibit A90.1), at [11].
[1772] Transcript 05/08/15, at T3368.
[1773] This affidavit was tendered without objection on 5 August 2015, as Exhibit A90.2.
[1774] See affidavit of Ms McPherson sworn on 4 August 2015 (Exhibit A90.2), at [6].
[1775] See Exhibit 'JFM-1 to Ms McPherson's affidavit (part of Exhibit A90.2), at pp. SCB S705-S718.
[1779] See Exhibit 'JFM-4 to Ms McPherson's affidavit (part of Exhibit A90.2), at p. SCB S719.
[1781] SCB 6: S2169-S2285 (Exhibit H426).
[1782] SCB 6: S2286-S2291 (Exhibit H427).
[1783] A matter discussed in the absence of the witness: see Transcript 05/08/15, at T3385.
[1784] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3379.
[1785] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3387-3388.
[1786] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3392.
[1787] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3437-3438.
[1788] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3438.
[1789] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3444.
[1791] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3458-3459.
[1792] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3467-3469 (emphasis added).
[1793] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3470.
[1801] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [552]-[558].
[1802] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [785].
[1803] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15 at T3307; Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15 at T2182.
[1804] See Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15 at T2186, and Emails between Paul Ward and Greg Crouch dated 16-30 June 2015 (Exhibit A75).
[1806] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15 at T2190- 2191.
[1808] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2468.
[1809] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2191.
[1812] Ward XXN, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2209-2210.
[1813] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2463-2464.
[1817] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2188.
[1818] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2466.
[1823] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2467.
[1824] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2188.
[1825] Ward RE-XN, Transcript 24/06/15, at T2468.
[1826] Manser XIC, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2330.
[1828] Manser XIC, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2332.
[1829] Enfield was the Flexibles site.
[1830] CB 6:2218-2219 (Exhibit H404).
[1831] CB 6:2220 (Summary) and supporting documents at 2221-2337 (Exhibit H405).
[1832] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2195.24-27 and CB 6:2220 (Summary) and supporting documents at 2221-2337 (Exhibit H405).
[1833] Ward XIC, Transcript 22/06/15, at T2195.29-31, 2196.1-3.
[1835] Powell WS (Exhibit A92), at [19], [21].
[1836] Mr Powell is currently the General Manager of Specialty Packaging for Orora Fibre Packaging.
[1837] Mr Manser confirmed this: see Manser XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2349.
[1838] Powell WS (Exhibit A92), at [20].
[1839] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3601-3602.
[1840] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3602.
[1841] Mr Powell agreed with that summary - see Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3604.
[1842] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3605-3606.
[1843] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3618-3619.
[1844] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3609.
[1846] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3612.
[1847] Powell WS (Exhibit A92), at [29].
[1848] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3614.
[1851] See Exhibit H434, Project 18, January 2008 cost expenditure request, at p 3.
[1852] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3632-3633.
[1853] See Exhibits H434 and H435 (Project 18-Final Recommendation).
[1854] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [805].
[1855] Powell XXN, Transcript 12/08/15, at T3651. Note that there was a transcript recording malfunction before the luncheon adjournment that day, and so Counsel read out the substance of the questions and answers, and had Mr Powell acknowledge them at the outset of the afternoon session.
[1856] See principal judgment, at [1147], [1149].
[1857] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3468.
[1858] See Annexure 6 to the Second Sale Agreement, at CB Vol 5: 1557 (part of Exhibit H2).
[1859] CB 3: 890-913 (Exhibit H9) at 893 - 894.
[1860] CB 3: 858-874 (Exhibit H10) at 860 - 861.
[1861] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3422.
[1862] See Henderson v Queensland [2014] HCA 52; (2014) 255 CLR 1, at 27-31 (Gageler J).
[1863] See paragraphs [41]-[78] .
[1864] Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [41].
[1865] As noted earlier, the Holihan parties have since clarified that their case is that once the Deed of Accession was entered into in March 2005, the implied supply agreement no longer operated.
[1866] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, at [42].
[1873] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [416].
[1874] See CB 6: 1994 (Exhibit A78), CB 6: 2010-2012 (Exhibit A79) and CB 6:1943-1946 (Exhibit A80).
[1875] CB 5: 1871 (re Mihelic) (Exhibit A76); CB 5: 1872 (re Barnes) (Exhibit A77) ; CB 8: 2843 (re Sangster) (Exhibit A77A).
[1876] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2279-2280.
[1877] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2277.
[1878] Ward XXN, Transcript 23/06/15, at T2278.
[1879] Presumably, this is because the evidence shows that the Management Incentive Program payments for the financial year ended 30 June 2004 were made prior to October 2005, when the second change of control is alleged to have taken place.
[1880] See Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [417].
[1882] Reproduced from Table 27 of the Expert Report of Mr Owain Stone dated 14 February 2011, CB2:487-494 (Exhibit H362), at 491.
[1883] See Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [419].
[1884] See Amcor defence & cross-claim, especially at [68]-[71] and [74]-[75].
[1886] See the Holihan parties' reply, at [55] and [56(a)].
[1887] Ibid, at [55] and [56(b)].
[1888] In clause 1.1, 'Tax' is defined to mean 'a tax, levy, charge, impost, deduction, withholding or duty of any nature (including stamp and transaction duty and goods and services, (value added) or similar tax) at any time:
(b) required to be remitted to, or collected, withheld or assessed by, any Government Agency; and
any related interest, expense, fine, penalty or other charge on those amounts'.
[1890] CB 3: 995, at 996 (Exhibit H16).
[1891] MacPhail XIC, Transcript 10/08/15, at T3549.
[1892] MacPhail XIC, Transcript 10/08/15, at T3551.
[1893] The text of the definition of 'Claims' and clause 11 in the first draft proposed by Mr MacPhail is not in evidence before the Court. Mr MacPhail's redrafted version of the Asset Sale Agreement was an attachment to his letter but it was not included in the Court Book (see CB 3:998ff). A 'redlined version of the amended draft' was emailed to Mr Holihan by Mr MacPhail's assistant on 21 October 2002, but only extracts of the version were included in the Court Book (see CB 3: 1014ff).
[1894] CB 3: 998-999 (Exhibit H23) - commencing at (ii) at the end of page 1 of the letter.
[1895] In clause 1.1, 'Stock' is defined to mean 'all raw materials, supplies, packaging and containers, work-in-progress, finished products, parts and components and other inventory of the Business including items of stock in transit or on consignment to customers'.
[1896] In clause 1.1, the 'Prepayments Amount' is defined to mean 'the amount equal to the total of:
(a) prepaid expenses or outgoings of the Business (inclusive of GST) of a recurring or periodical nature, paid by the Vendor prior to the close of business on the Completion Date, but relating to the period after Completion; and
(b) payments in advance and deposits (inclusive of GST) paid by the Vendor for:
(i) goods ordered but not received or services contracted for but not provided to and by the Business prior to the close of business on the Completion Date; and
(c) any other relevant prepayments as at the Completion Date.'
[1897] In clause 1.1, the 'Accrual Amount' is defined to mean 'the amount equal to the total of:
(a) all deposits and prepayments (inclusive of GST) received by the Vendor up to close of business on the Completion Date for the supply of products or services by the Business after that time under the Contracts or otherwise; and
(b) all expenses and outgoings of the Business of a recurring or periodical nature (inclusive of GST) incurred but not paid by the Vendor for a period prior top close of business on the Completion Date.
[1898] Note that clause 7.2, headed 'Vendor Employment Offer', provides that the 'Vendor may offer employment to any of the Employees with effect from the Completion Date on such terms as the Vendor shall see fit subject to any statutory obligations' (emphasis added). There is no similar provision concerning the Purchaser.
[1899] In clause 1.1, 'Contracts' is defined to mean 'any contracts and agreements (whether written, oral or arising through a course of trading, or a combination of any of these) which relate to the Business and to which the Vendor is a party or by which the Vendor may be bound at Completion, including for the avoidance of doubt contracts and agreements for supply to Customers', and 'Customers' is defined to mean 'the customers of the Business or other persons to which the Business supplies or supplied products or services at the Completion Date or during the period of 12 months before that date ...'.
[1901] In clause 1.1, 'Liabilities' is defined to mean 'all liabilities, whether actual or contingent, present or future, quantified or unquantified or incurred jointly or severally with any other person.'
[1904] See Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [834].
[1906] [1892] VicLawRp 134; (1892) 18 VLR 649, at 653.
[1908] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549 ('Ankar').
[1909] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 555-557 (Mason ACJ, Wilson, Brennan & Dawson JJ) (citations omitted).
[1910] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 557.
[1911] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 559.
[1912] [1876] UKLawRpCP 83; (1876) 2 CPD 46, at p 51.
[1913] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 559.
[1914] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 559-560.
[1915] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 561.
[1916] [1987] HCA 15; (1987) 162 CLR 549, at 570-571.
[1917] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [590].
[1918] CB 7:2443-2444 (Exhibit H88), at 2444. In their reply submissions, the Holihan parties also made reference to a later letter from Corrs Chambers Westgarth to Mills Oakley dated 17 October 2012 (CB 7:2445) but that letter was not tendered by either party.
[1919] In the Amcor parties' written submissions (at [591]), reference was made to this having been articulated in a security for costs application before Vickery J in early 2015.
[1920] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [592].
[1921] See United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 104, at 107, 111, 112; see too Midland Counties Motor Finance Co Ltd v Slade [1951] 1 KB 346, at 353. More generally, see York Air Conditioning & Refrigeration (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1949] HCA 23; (1949) 80 CLR 11, at 62 and Scheuer v Bell and Ors [2004] VSC 71, at [81].
[1922] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [841] and [843].
[1923] [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100, at 115; [1843] EngR 917; 67 ER 313, at 319.
[1924] [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 ('Anshun').
[1925] [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589, at 602-604.
[1926] [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589, at 604.
[1927] See Bazos v Doman [2001] NSWCA 347, at [44] (Stein JA, Priestley and Beazley JJA agreeing); Sheraz Pty Ltd v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 4; (2015) 48 WAR 93, at 121 [122] (Murphy JA, Buss JA and Chaney J agreeing).
[1928] Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski [2010] NSWCA 33; (2010) 75 NSWLR 245, at 265 [114]-[115] (Handley AJA);
[1929] Gibbs v Kinna [1998] VSCA 52; [1999] 2 VR 19, at 20 [1] (Ormiston JA); Solak v Registrar of Titles [2011] VSCA 279; (2011) 33 VR 40, at 56 [79] (Warren CJ, Neave JA and Hargrave AJA agreeing).
[1930] Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski [2010] NSWCA 33; (2010) 75 NSWLR 245, at 247 [3] (Allsop P); Ekes v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] NSWCA 336; (2014) 313 ALR 665, at 687 [68] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Emmett JA agreeing); Telesto Investments Ltd v UBS AG [2013] NSWSC 503; (2013) 94 ACSR 29, at 72 [229] (Sackar J); Kong v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1345; (2011) 199 FCR 375, at 388 [34] (Flick J); C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397, at [62] (Campbell JA), [159] (Handley AJA); HM Hire Pty Ltd v National Plan and Equipment Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 274; [2014] 2 Qd R 44, at 50 [12] (Applegarth J).
[1931] Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, at 31 (Lord Bingham); Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, at 194 [34] (French CJ); Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski [2010] NSWCA 33; (2010) 75 NSWLR 245, at 247 [3] (Allsop P), 260 [79] (Giles JA), 264 [111]-[112] (Handley AJA);
[1933] [2016] HCA 44, at [56] (per French CJ, Kiefel, Keane and Nettle JJ).
[1934] Ibid, emphasis in original text.
[1935] Hereafter referred to the 'Civil Procedure Act'.
[1936] Civil Procedure Act, s 7(1), 8(1), 9(1) and 10(1). See also C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Noon [2011] NSWCA 397, [157]-[158] (Handley AJA); HM Hire Pty Ltd v National Plan and Equipment Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 274; [2014] 2 Qd R 44, 50 [13] (Applegarth J).
[1937] Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 76; (2011) 248 FLR 193, 218 [125] (McLure P).
[1938] Dow Jones and Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 604 [36] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Haidari v The Queen [2014] VSCA 91, [53] (Weinberg JA, Santamaria JA agreeing); Shaw v Gadens Lawyers [2014] VSCA 74, [61] (Maxwell P, Tate JA and Garde AJA agreeing).
[1939] Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Clambake Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 76; (2011) 248 FLR 193, 218 [125] (McLure P); Kong v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1345; (2011) 199 FCR 375, 388 [34] (Flick J); Ling v Commonwealth [1996] FCA 1646; (1996) 68 FCR 180, 182 (Wilcox J).
[1940] Amcor v Australian Corrugated Box Co [2013] VSCA 223.
[1941] Ibid, at [67] (per Hansen and Tate JJA).
[1945] [2013] VSCA 223, at [54]-[58] (citations omitted).
[1946] [2013] VSCA 223, at [63]-[66] (citations omitted).
[1947] [2013] VSCA 223, at [63].
[1948] The Amcor parties contend that throughout the period between about November 2003 and November 2004, Mr Holihan was dealing with his solicitor, Mr Roe, about the structuring of a proposal for the acquisition of 'QuadPak', a Queensland packaging company that was to be purchased by Mr Holihan, Mr Barnes, Mr Bayley, the Carriage family and two other unnamed beneficial owners.
[1949] In the principal judgment (at [616], [621]), Vickery J refers to Mr Walmsley as being Mr Hottes' lawyer, who was involved in the drafting of the First Sale Agreement relating to the Service Packaging Business.
[1950] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3413-3414.
[1952] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3409.
[1953] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3410.
[1954] Ms McPherson accepted that the date shown may be incorrect and that the correct date was likely to be August 2006: see McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3412.
[1955] See SCB 5: S2001-2014 (Exhibit A7), at S2009-2010.
[1956] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3416-3417.
[1957] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3437-3438.
[1958] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3438.
[1959] See Exhibit 'JFM-4 to Ms McPherson's affidavit (part of Exhibit A90.2), at p. SCB S719.
[1960] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3442.
[1961] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3419.
[1962] See exhibit 'JFM-3' to Ms McPherson's affidavit sworn on 4 August 2015 (part of Exhibit A90.2).
[1963] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3430-3432.
[1964] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, T3476.
[1965] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [867(c)].
[1968] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3984.
[1969] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3988.
[1970] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [895(c)].
[1971] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3985.
[1972] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3397-3398.
[1973] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [32].
[1974] Amcor v Australian Corrugated Box Co [2013] VSCA 223, at [58].
[1975] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [888].
[1976] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 09/09/15, at T3989.
[1977] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [34].
[1978] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript 10/09/15, at T4200.
[1979] In the Hodgson proceeding, they pleaded that in or about 2003, the Plaintiff [Mr Hodgson]:
(a) acquired an interest in the ACB business for himself and/or entities associated with him, including, without limitation, Bankson, and concealed such interest or interests from the Defendant [Amcor] and from the Defendant's subsidiary company ACB;
(b) aided, abetted, counselled, procured and/or was otherwise knowingly involved in the acquisition of interests in the ACB business by Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and/or entities associated with them and concealed such interests from the Defendant and from the Defendant's subsidiary company ACB.
[1980] McPherson XXN, Transcript 05/08/15, at T3392.
[1981] Vickery J noted (at [1056]) that:
While the Defendant parties are at one in claiming that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on or about 28 May 2003, their recollections of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation were vague and varied considerably.
When making findings, his Honour (at [1084]) did 'not accept the cases maintained by the defendants as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed.' Rather, he said (at [1086]):
I find that the two Agreements of 26 May 2003, being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were entered into and carried into effect by Holihan, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and interests associated with them, and continued to be given effect to, until at or around October 2005.
The evidence and reasoning his Honour cited in support of his findings as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed are set out at paragraphs [1090]-[1134] of the principal judgment.
[1982] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions, Transcript 10/09/15, at T4199 (Dr McNicol).
[1983] Transcript 18/06/15, at T1849-1850.
[1986] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [899].
[1987] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [15].
[1989] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [133]-[134].
[1990] Holihan parties' oral submissions in reply (Mr Maiden), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4498-4499.
[1991] Holihan parties' liability submissions, at [753].
[1992] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [132].
[1993] Wellen Pty Ltd is a fibre packaging business run by Mr Barnes.
[1994] Transcript 22/06/15 (Mr Maiden), at T2220- 2221.
[1995] Transcript 24/06/15 (Mr Maiden), at T2380-2381.
[1996] Transcript 24/06/15 (Mr Maiden), at T2442-2443.
[1997] Holihan parties' reply submissions, at [102].
[1998] In the Holihan parties' reply submissions they set out at Annexure B and Annexure C respectively an analysis of the evidence that it was proposed Mr Dailey and Mr Daaboul would give, and indicate how the Holihan parties have proven the necessary facts that were to be the subject of evidence given by them.
[1999] Transcript 15/09/15 (Mr Maiden), at T4501.
[2000] Transcript 15/09/15 (Dr McNicol), at T4405.
[2001] [2004] NSWCA 123 ('Manly Council v Byrne').
[2002] Ibid, at [51] per Campbell J (with whom Beazley JA and Pearlman AJA agreed).
[2004] Ibid, at 201-202 (albeit dissenting as to outcome).
[2005] Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123, at [54].
[2007] [2001] NSWCA 223; (2001) 38 ACSR 715, at [17]-[18].
[2010] State Bank of NSW v Brown [2001] NSWCA 223; (2001) 38 ACSR 715, at [17]-[18]. That reasoning of Spigelman CJ was adopted by Hodgson JA at [104] (with whose reasons Handley JA agreed).
[2011] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, at 321 per Windeyer J, citing R v Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95 [106 ER 873].
[2012] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [133(a)].
[2013] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [133(b)].
[2014] Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191, at 202.
[2015] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [133(c)].
[2016] CB 5:1859-1870 (Exhibit H63), at 1870.
[2017] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1561,1577.
[2018] Holihan XXN, Transcript 04/06/15, at T898.
[2019] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1567.
[2020] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1570.
[2021] Holihan XXN, Transcript 16/06/15, at T1570-1571.
[2022] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4376.
[2024] Amcor parties' oral closing submissions (Dr McNicol), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4408.
[2028] See Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123, at [51]. It will be recalled that the second type of inference is that the tribunal of fact might draw with greater confidence any inference unfavourable to the party who failed to call the witness, if that witness seems to be in a position to cast light on whether that inference should properly be drawn.
[2029] Holihan parties' oral closing submissions (Mr Maiden), Transcript 15/09/15, at T4489.(emphasis added)
[2030] In the principal judgment, Vickery J noted (at [256]) that at all relevant times, 'Amcor employed a management tool which required that each of its businesses achieve a 'threshold' 15% return on funds employed ("ROFE" or the "ROFE Benchmark")'.
[2031] Vickery J found that they were relevantly directors of APA at the following times:
Mr Lewis was appointed Company Secretary in July 1999, a position Mr Clayton also held from October 1995 to July 2008.
[2032] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [552]-[558].
[2033] See Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123, at [51].
[2034] Roberts XXN, Transcript 04/08/15, at T3253-3254.
[2036] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3555.
[2037] MacPhail XIC, Transcript, 10/08/15, at T3557.
[2038] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [330].
[2039] Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd v Coutts Townsville Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 40, at 46 (McPherson J, Andrews CJ and Demack J agreeing).
[2042] This issue was re-numbered as Issue 20, for convenience.
[2044] Amcor parties' liability submissions, at [590].
Amcor Ltd & Ors
Barnes & Ors [2016] VSC 707
(1969) 120 CLR 365
(2006) 151 FCR 77
(2012) 264 FLR 1
(1981) 147 CLR 589
(1993) 177 CLR 378
(1994) 181 CLR 251
(2009) 252 ALR 612
(1989) 168 CLR 23
(2006) 226 CLR 256
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1948) 77 CLR 39
(2012) 37 VR 486
(2002) 209 CLR 95
(2015) 228 FCR 346
(2003) 133 FCR 438
(2015) 256 CLR 137
(2006) 149 FCR 395
(2001) 53 NSWLR 153
(1988) 14 NSWLR 523
(1985) 2 NSWLR 309
(1952) 85 CLR 336
(1999) 47 NSWLR 473
(1968) 118 CLR 429
(2012) 245 CLR 338
(2014) 89 NSWLR 317
(1986) 160 CLR 226
(2007) 69 NSWLR 603
(2007) 18 VR 250
(1990) 23 NSWLR 190
(2014) 251 CLR 640
(2015) 256 CLR 104
(1982) 149 CLR 337
(2016) 328 ALR 564
(2004) 218 CLR 530
(2004) 219 CLR 165
(2004) 218 CLR 451
(1973) 129 CLR 99
(2014) 286 FLR 453
(1989) 168 CLR 385
(2014) 251 CLR 505
(2002) 7 VR 524
(2011) 243 CLR 361
(2013) 253 CLR 1
(1991) 174 CLR 64
(2003) 77 ALJR 768
(1971) 124 CLR 303
(2012) 43 VR 220
(2008) 75 NSWLR 1
(1994) 182 CLR 51
(2001) 208 CLR 516
(2008) 36 WAR 342
(2000) 2 VR 531
(1996) 140 ALR 46
(2000) 278 ALR 429
(1994) 35 NSWLR 96
(1956) 99 CLR 560
(2009) 73 NSWLR 404
(1992) 32 NSWLR 194
(2012) 264 FCR 1
(1939) 62 CLR 464
(2014) 255 CLR 1
(1987) 162 CLR 549
(1949) 80 CLR 11
(2015) 48 WAR 93
(2010) 75 NSWLR 245
(2011) 33 VR 40
(2014) 313 ALR 665
(2011) 199 FCR 375
(2009) 239 CLR 175
(2011) 248 FLR 193
(2002) 210 CLR 575
(1996) 68 FCR 180