E. If any of the Bids are successful the parties intend to enter into a formal Facility Management Agreement, but, in the meantime, intend this Heads of Agreement to be legally binding.
18 Clause 2.1 of the Heads of Agreement provided:
"If any of the Bids are successful, the Developer agrees that it shall appoint LMI as Manager of the Facility."
19 The Heads of Agreement defines "Bids" as the bids to be made by the developer (the second respondent) or the first and third respondents on behalf of the second respondent. LMI (a subsidiary of Leisure Management International based in Texas, USA) is the appellant. The Facility is the Colonial Stadium.
20 Barrett J found that although the respondents were the people who were awarded the Facility or as the appellant would have it, "won the job", yet it could not be said that the bids are successful. He thus found for the respondents on the part of the case which is the subject of this appeal. However his Honour said that should he be wrong he would and did give an indication as to how damages should be assessed. It would seem that the computation of damages assessed according to his Honour's guidelines would have been in the vicinity of $4,500,000.00.
21 It is virtually conceded that if the appellant fails in its submission that in fact the bid was successful then it would fail altogether. It is thus expedient to consider this point first. However, before I do so, I should note that in contract the appellant can only succeed against the second respondent which we are told is a $2 company. In order to succeed against the first or third respondents, the appellant must also succeed in showing that they or either of them induced a breach of contract. Barrett J held that this question did not arise but that if it did, then on analogy with the principles discussed by Jordan CJ in O'Brien v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295, 308-9, affirmed by the High Court of Australia (1942) 66 CLR 18, it was not actionable. I will discuss this in due course.
22 I should briefly sketch the history of the project after the entering into of the Heads of Agreement. The second respondent submitted two bids, a conforming bid and a non-conforming bid. The tender documents required nomination of a manager and the bids named the appellant as manager.
23 Barrett J said in [6] to [16] of his judgment, so far as is currently relevant, that:
"DSC (the second respondent Docklands Stadium Consortium Pty Limited) submitted the bids on behalf of a consortium consisting of itself, KPMG Corporate Finance (Vic) Pty Ltd, ISFM (Mr Watson's company and a 50% shareholder in LMIA (the plaintiff)) and Clifton Project Management & Associates Pty Limited. In each bid (that is, the conforming bid and the preferred bid), DSC included a section headed 'Consortium Structure'. This outlined in brief terms the contractual arrangements in place among the named consortium members. It contained the following paragraph:
'In addition, the bid company has entered into a Heads of Agreement with (the appellant) regarding its role as operator of the stadium. This agreement and a draft of the Facility Management Agreement for the stadium are contained in Part E of the bid document.'
"On 8 July 1997, DSC made a presentation to the Authority. Mr Simmons of LMI came from the United States for this (LMI is the American corporation LMI/HHI Limited). Over the following two weeks or so, dialogue continued between the Authority and DSC which, for the purpose, was represented mainly by Baulderstone personnel - principally Mr Steven Wise. …
"On 27 July 1997, DSC lodged with the Authority a bid addendum for both its conforming and preferred bids, together with a covering letter which read in part as follows:
'At our presentation in early July you challenged our Consortium to remove the risk to the government. We have risen to that challenge. We have delivered a bid that is significant enhanced which now offers a premium to secure the project.'
"By letter dated 4 August 1997, the Authority informed DSC that the DSC consortium was one of two short listed bidders, the other being the Melbourne Sports Stadium Consortium led by Transfield and Grocon. Also dated 4 August 1997 was a document from the Authority headed 'Unsatisfactory Parts of Your Bid as at 4 August 1997'. One of the items in that document was the following:
'Your management team of LMI/ISFM has no direct Australian Stadium management experience.'
"On or about 5 August 1997, representatives of DSC informed the plaintiffs through Mr Watson, of the concern raised by the Authority as to the lack of direct Australian stadium management experience. The following day, 6 August 1997, Mr Watson faxed to Mr wise of Baulderstone a letter which read in part as follows:
'In order to satisfy the Dockland Authority's concern regarding the operations of LMI/ISFM (no present operation within Australia) we will enter into discussions with Spotless immediately to consider their potential amalgamation in the overall operation of the facility.'
"Spotless … was and is an established company the activities of which include the provision of catering and related facilities at various locations, including sporting and entertainment venues. …
"On or soon after 22 August 1997, DSC received from the Authority, in preparation for a meeting scheduled for 25 August 1997, a document headed 'Outstanding Key Stadium Issues as at 22 August 1997'. One item on the list was 'superior management proposal' against which, in an 'Action' column, appeared 'DSC'.
"On 1 September 1997, the Authority announced that DSC was the successful bidder. Four days previously, on 28 August 1997, Stadium Operations Limited (SOL) a wholly owned subsidiary of Baulderstone was formed. On 3 September 1997, an agreement entitled Stadium Development Agreement was executed, the parties to it being the Authority, a company in the AW Baulderstone Group called Stadium Management Limited, National Mutual Trustees Limited and SOL. …
The agreement included clause 15.6:
"The Developer must execute a Stadium Management Agreement with the appointed Stadium Manager by no later than 30 days before the date for Practical Completion and must perform and observe all obligations imposed upon it by the Stadium Management Agreement.
"Before appointing a Stadium Manager and executing a Stadium Management Agreement, the Developer will consult in good faith with the Authority and, so far as the Authority reasonably requires, the AFL, with a view to ensuring that the management arrangements to be contained in the Stadium Management Agreement reflect commercial arm's length arrangements equivalent to the arrangements that it would be reasonable to expect the Developer could have negotiated were the appointment of the Stadium Manager to have been conducted by way of a competitive tender open to Australian and international operators and managers of stadia equivalent to the Stadium."
"'AFL' is a reference to the Australian Football League.
"On 10 August 1998, the agreement contemplated by clause 15.6 of the Stadium Development Agreement was made. But the appointed manager was not (the appellant). It was Nationwide Venue Management Pty Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Spotless. LMI Melbourne Pty Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of the appellant) was appointed a consultant to Nationwide Venue Management and agreed to provide defined services in support of that company's activities as manager of the stadium. When LMI Melbourne accepted this appointment, the appellant expressly reserved its rights under the heads of agreement. The appointment was, in June 2000, terminated in accordance with the agreement when Nationwide Venue Management ceased to be the manager of the stadium."
24 I should note that ISFM is a company controlled by one Graeme Watson who is also a director of the appellant. The appellant is a company which is jointly owned by ISFM and Leisure Management International.
25 Returning to the construction of the Heads of Agreement, Barrett J said at [40]:
"The meaning to be attributed to 'If any of the Bids are successful' must be gathered from the circumstances which existed when the heads of agreement were concluded. The question whether the condition was satisfied requires examination of the facts concerning the bidding process and its outcome".
26 The appellant does not cavil with this. However, his Honour continued at [67] to [71]:
"I return now to the central question whether, in the events which happened, it can properly be said that either of the bids submitted by DSC 'was successful'. I have concluded that neither such bid was successful. This is so because of two important departures which caused the arrangements eventually reflected in the Stadium Development Agreement to differ in a material way from the arrangements proposed in the bids.
"The first such departure is in relation to funding and financial structure. It is summed up in the following statement of Mr Wise in cross-examination:
'But the heads of agreement was for a bid placed on 27 or 30 June, which was $150 million short of underwriting and required the Victorian Government to provide that. The bid on 1 September was fully and absolutely underwritten by private equity. The bid had changed.'
"The change involved the introduction of new parties committed to providing the finance that original consortium members would not or could not provide. The balance of influence within the bidding group shifted to the equity providers.
"The second departure - of more immediate relevance, in the present context - was in relation to management of the stadium. The bids of June proposed LMIA as manager. The arrangements embodied in the Stadium Development Agreement did not adopt that proposal and left the choice of manager for future decision. The feature of the bids involving appointment of LMIA as manager thus did not find a place in the concluded agreement arising from those bids.
"Related companies of DSC were 'successful' in becoming two of the three companies which together became 'the Developer' under the Stadium Management Agreement. That 'successful' outcome would not have been achieved but for DSC's having submitted its two bids to the Authority. But neither of those bids was 'successful' because neither was in substance translated from proposal to contract. Intervening events and negotiations brought about substantial differences and departures in relation to parties, in relation to funding and financing and in relation to management and identity of the manager.
"It follows from this that the condition to be satisfied before DSC was obliged by the heads of agreement to bring about the appointment of LMIA as manager of the stadium on the basis stated in the heads of agreement was never satisfied. It also follows that, according to the correct construction of the heads of agreement, no breach of its express terms occurred through non-appointment of LMIA as such manager. In saying this, I do not resort to any strict or literal approach at the expense of an approach consonant with business reality."
27 His Honour then referred to the submission of counsel for the LMI Group relying on Pan Foods Company Importers & Distributors Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 74 ALJ 791 and McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579, citing what Kirby J had said in the former case at 794:
"Commercial documents … should be construed practically, so as to give effect to their presumed commercial purposes and so as not to defeat the achievement of such purposes by an excessively narrow and artificially restricted construction."
28 Barrett J then went on to say at [72]:
"I do not consider that the approach I have taken to the pre-condition 'If any of the Bids are successful' runs counter to this. On the contrary, once it is recognised that the contractual promise to appoint LMIA was given and, more importantly, received in circumstances where the process about to be embarked upon was a process of negotiation which might see DSC obliged, in its own interests, to depart significantly from its own original desires in order to obtain the ultimate benefit for itself … the practical business construction becomes one which must accommodate the possibility that an element of the proposal unacceptable to the Authority will be jettisoned in the course of that negotiation. The negotiation process was one in which it was clear from the outset that the Authority placed great weight on the qualities of the proposed manager and would play an active role in accepting or rejecting the party put forward as intended manager by a bidder. The Authority simply did not accept LMIA."
29 His Honour then at [73] to [77] of his judgment dealt with the case put by the appellant that there were two relevant implied terms in the Heads of Agreement, first a term that the parties would act in good faith in the performance of their contractual rights and obligations, and secondly, a term that each party would do all things necessary on its part to enable the other party to have the benefit of its contractual rights. His Honour noted that implied terms of this nature were incapable of rising above express terms. He said that any implied term did not require DSC to risk its own interests "once it encountered substantial resistance from the Authority, DSC was free to modify its proposal to overcome the problem." His Honour considered that was reinforced by clause 15 of the Heads of Agreement which provided that:
"Neither party shall have any claim against the other if a Bid is not lodged or if none of the Bids lodged is successful or if one of the Bids lodged rather than any other is selected."
30 His Honour said at [77]:
"If, as this provision shows, DSC was free to change its mind about lodging a bid at all, it could scarcely be contended that, having lodged its bids, it was compelled to pursue them in unamended form, however hopeless the prospects of achieving a positive outcome in that form might be."
31 On the appeal, Mr Sullivan QC appeared for the appellant with Mr Weber SC and Miss K M Richardson. They took us through the principles of legal interpretation and the whole of the matters which they considered was the background material which his Honour should have considered when construing the contract.
32 Mr Sullivan started with citing the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromidge Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912-3 where his Lordship said that "Almost all the old intellectual baggage of 'legal' interpretation has been discarded" and re-summarised what he considered to be the principles in five propositions. Mr Sullivan then took us to Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251, both to the leading judgment given by Lord Bingham and also to para 39 of the speech of Lord Hoffmann at 269 where he "clarified" some of what he had said in the Investors Compensation Scheme case. We then, of course, went to Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, 347-352 and the cases there cited, Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 76 ALJR 246, 248 [11] and Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002) 76 ALJR 436, 444-5.
33 Mr Sullivan concedes that his Honour applied the right test but said, "What his Honour did wrong in applying the right test, in a nutshell was this. His Honour says quite rightly that what is shown here, when one looks at all the big documents and the like, that this was an evolving process, that the mere bid itself wasn't going to be on a take it or leave it basis but rather the parties had in mind that there would be negotiations and discussions down the track before the ultimate winner was announced. His Honour seems to use that as justification for saying that therefore because those negotiations in fact produced the anticipated result, namely substantial changes, that the bid wasn't successful. We say the correct approach is the absolute reverse of that, or the obverse of it. That because the parties had in mind that there was virtually no possibility of the bid being accepted unadorned, unaltered or unenhanced, that in fact when they used the words "Bid was successful" they meant it in a more generic sense that if ultimately the developer was successful in winning the job. So that we actually say one needs to look at those background circumstances, that his Honour, although looking at the background circumstances, derived the wrong conclusion from them."
34 It is probably necessary at this stage to embark upon a substantial digression. Mr Sullivan QC asked us to enter into a full consideration of the surrounding circumstances. These surrounding circumstances that we were asked to look at included three periods: (a) before the bids were submitted; (b) the negotiation between the parties at about the time the bids were submitted; and (c) negotiations between the parties after the bids were submitted.
35 Barrett J was invited to do the same exercise. This meant that there were seven days of oral evidence before his Honour, most witnesses being in the box for the whole day and one unfortunate for two days. In addition, there were 2,524 pieces of paper placed before his Honour, not only including the substantial agreements and various drafts of them, but almost every piece of paper that passed between the parties. All this to work out the meaning of the word "successful".
36 Under what Lord Hoffmann would doubtless call the "old rules of legal interpretation", almost none of this material would have been tendered and the case would doubtless be over in half a day. That is because 50 years ago courts paid great respect to the rule that if parties had put down their contract in a written document, one construed their writing and the parol evidence rule was applied to exclude extraneous material. That may have been too draconian an approach. However, the reverse approach which permits every piece of paper to be put before the court is causing tremendous expense in commercial litigation. That expense might be justified in a case such as the present where something like $4.5 million might be at stake. However, it is not at all uncommon for the same approach to be used in small commercial disputes involving amounts not greater than the District Court ceiling.
37 However, it is difficult for a trial judge to exclude this material because of the very wide statements that are being made by the High Court and the House of Lords about what must be considered.
38 It is probably appropriate to note briefly what the current state of the law is in this respect. In the Investment Compensation Scheme case, Lord Hoffmann's first three rules at 912-13 were: