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[2016] VSC 75
Supreme Court of Victoria
2016-03-04
SLOSS J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CONTRACT - Sale of Land - Sale of lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision - Construction of terms - Contract contained a special condition specifying date when contract could be terminated if plan of subdivision not registered - Whether the contract could be terminated unilaterally or whether mutual agreement is required - Whether the special condition is ambiguous - Reference to text, context and purpose to aid construction - Alternatively, whether the special condition should be rectified.
CONTRACT - Sale of Land - Sale of lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision - Planning permit required that agreements with relevant authorities for the provision of services to each lot be entered into before the plan of subdivision could be registered - Contract obliged the purchaser to use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the plan of subdivision - Contract obliged the vendors to use their best endeavours to co-operate with the purchaser and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision - Whether vendors or purchaser were required to enter into agreements and pay fees and bonds for the establishment or provision of services.
CONTRACT - Sale of Land - Best endeavours clause - Whether the vendors were in breach of their obligation to use best endeavours - Plan of subdivision was not registered by date specified in contract - Effect of delay - Whether vendors are disentitled from terminating the contract.
1 The plaintiffs, Mr Gino Bisognin and Mrs Leah Bisognin ('the vendors'), are jointly the registered proprietors of the land known as 1 Adrian Street Cranbourne East, being the whole of the land described in Certificate of Title Volume 9776 Folio 892. The parcel of land, which is a rural block of 8,276 square metres in size (approximately 5 acres) with an old weatherboard home on it, adjoins Ballarto Road and is located in an 'urban growth zone'. The certificate of title bears an endorsement that the land is the subject of a notification from the Growth Areas Authority that a growth areas infrastructure contribution may be payable.[1]
2 Mr and Mrs Bisognin run a poultry business in the local area. Their matrimonial home is located on the northern portion of the land, where they have lived for more than 20 years. Nowadays they also breed and train greyhounds on their property.
3 In 2012, the vendors received an unsolicited approach from Mr Stephen Parsons, on behalf of a developer named Joslin Street SA Developments Pty Ltd ('Joslin'), who was seeking to buy the southern portion of their land, an area of 12,850 square metres (approximately 3 acres), as a site for the development of a supermarket. Mr Parsons provided the vendors with a concept plan which showed the portion of the land that Joslin wished to purchase and the approximate location of the 'full-line supermarket'[2] it proposed to develop on that site. By that time, Joslin had been in contact with the local council, the City of Casey, to discuss what could be developed on that site given the constraints of the Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan.
4 On 29 February 2012, Mr and Mrs Bisognin entered into a contract with Joslin for the sale of the southern portion of the land for a price of $3.6 million (the '2012 contract').[3] As the subject land was a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision,[4] the sale was expressly subject to the provisions of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic). A deposit of $1,000,000.00 was payable, of which $10,000.00 was paid on signing. Under the contract, which was prepared by Mr and Mrs Bisognin's solicitor, Waters Lawyers Pty Ltd ('the vendors' solicitor'), settlement was due to take place on 31 December 2012 'unless the land is a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision, in which case settlement is due on the above date or 14 days after the vendor gives notice to the purchaser of registration of the plan, whichever is later.' Accordingly, it was necessary for a plan of subdivision to be prepared and registered before settlement could take place.
5 The 2012 contract included a number of 'special conditions' as follows:
The Purchaser shall at its own cost and expense prepare a Plan of Subdivision in respect of the land comprised in the Parcel in or to the like effect of the Plan of Subdivision annexed hereto and submit the same to the City of Casey for sealing in accordance with the provisions of Part 1 of the Act and shall use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the said Plan pursuant to the provisions of Part II of the Act;
The proposed Plan of Subdivision is attached hereto[5] and shall not be amended without the consent of the Vendors;
The Purchaser shall have the right and the Vendors will do all things necessary to assist the Purchaser or their agents having access to the property for the purpose of surveys and studies with a view to prepare a Plan of Subdivision.
6 On 26 July 2013, Joslin as purchaser under the contract of sale with the vendors, nominated Hera Project Pty Ltd ('Hera') as 'substitute purchaser/s' to take a transfer or conveyance of the southern lot, once created, in lieu of the purchaser.
7 In late 2013, Hera commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court against Mr and Mrs Bisognin.[6] In its statement of claim, Hera sought an order that Mr and Mrs Bisognin be required to undertake all works required to procure an Urban Design Framework for the Adrian Street precinct and pay any necessary Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution (and/or pay damages for misrepresentation to the effect that no such contribution was payable). Hera also sought declarations to the effect that a purported rescission notice served by the vendors was of no effect and that it had an interest in the subject land sufficient to enable it to lodge a caveat.
8 Hera's proceeding was subsequently transferred to the County Court of Victoria. A mediation was held on 25 November 2014. Terms of settlement were entered into between the parties that day, whereby they agreed to settle the proceeding. The Terms of Settlement provided that the parties had agreed to enter into and execute a (new) contract of sale of land in respect of the southern lot in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 2012 contract but with some modifications and variations. Importantly, for present purposes, they agreed that '[i]f the said plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 either party may, by notice in writing to the other, end this contract.' The new contract for the sale of the southern portion of the land was finally executed on 13 March 2015.
9 The plan of subdivision of the 1 Adrian Street land was certified by the Council on 3 August 2015 and Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor on 6 August 2015 enclosing a copy of the certification. On 1 August 2015, the vendors' solicitor served a notice of default on Hera. The default was relevantly said to be Hera's failure to pay the balance of the deposit of $990,000.00 in accordance with special condition 1 of the contract. That is, the vendors contended that the balance of the deposit was payable within 7 days of the plan of subdivision being 'certified' (as opposed to 'registered' at the Land Titles Office). Hera disputed the correctness of this position.
10 On 17 August 2015, the vendors commenced this proceeding against Hera by way of Originating Motion, seeking answers to questions about the Contract of Sale pursuant to s 49(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic).[7] Three questions were raised for determination by the Court as follows:
(a) Question one: On its true construction, does special condition 1 of the Contract provide for the balance of the deposit in the sum of $990,000 to be paid within seven days of the relevant plan of subdivision being certified by the City of Casey pursuant to s 6 of the Subdivision Act 1988 or within seven days of the plan of subdivision being registered by the Registrar of Titles pursuant to s 22 of that Act?
(b) Question two: On its true construction, does special condition 8 of the Contract provide that if the relevant plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 then either party may end the Contract by notice in writing to the other party?
(c) Question three: On its true construction, apart from any Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution Payment, does special condition 10 of the Contract require the plaintiffs to make any payment to a third party that is necessary to be made to secure registration of the plan of subdivision?
11 The matter initially came on for hearing before Cameron J in the Practice Court on 20 and 21 August 2015. The critical issue for determination by her Honour at that point in time was Question 1, and relevantly whether the balance of the deposit was payable on registration of the plan of subdivision with the Registrar of Titles, as contended for by Hera, or on certification or approval by the Council, as contended for by the vendors. Her Honour ruled that the balance of the deposit was payable within seven days of registration of the plan of subdivision with the Registrar of Titles.[8] Questions 2 and 3 were not argued at that time and the matter was set down for further hearing on the remaining issues. Since issuing their Originating Motion, the vendors had also issued a summons seeking rectification of special condition 8 of the contract. In essence, they contended that if the Court were to hold that, on its proper construction, special condition 8 did not permit either party to end the contract by notice in writing to the other party if the relevant plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015, then the contract as executed did not reflect the parties' mutual intention as recorded in the Terms of Settlement. Hera responded by filing a summons dated 21 August 2015 seeking to restrain the vendors from relying on special condition 8 of the new contract.
12 The date of 25 August 2015 passed without the plan of subdivision having been registered. The vendors continue to seek to have the contract with Hera brought to an end. Hera, on the other hand, wishes to keep the contract on foot, contending that conduct on the part of the vendors has effectively prevented it from obtaining a statement of compliance that would enable the plan of subdivision to be registered, and in those circumstances, the vendors should not be permitted to rely upon their own wrongful conduct as a ground for termination of the contract.
13 The trial of the substantive matter took place over a period of five days in December 2015.[9] The vendors tendered affidavits from their solicitor, Mr Waters, sworn 18 August 2015, 1 September 2015 and 7 December 2015, from Mr Bisognin sworn on 16 November 2015 and 7 December 2015, and from Mrs Bisognin sworn 7 December 2015. In addition, by direction from the Court, contentious matters were the subject of oral evidence given by Mr Waters and Mr and Mrs Bisognin, and each of them was cross-examined.
14 On behalf of Hera, affidavits were tendered from Mr Konstandellos sworn 19 August 2015, 4 November 2015, 19 November 2015, 23 November 2015 and 2 December 2015,[10] Hera's former solicitor, Mr Tasiopoulos, sworn 4 November 2015 and 23 November 2015, Hera's planning consultant, Mr Perry, sworn 5 November 2015 and 23 November 2015, Hera's urban design consultant, Mr Axford, sworn 9 November 2015, representatives of Taylors Development Strategists Pty Ltd, the planning consultants engaged by the Limoli family, namely Mr Lake sworn 12 November 2015 and 19 November 2015 and Ms Davidson sworn 12 November 2015 and 19 November 2015, Mr Stephen Parsons sworn 23 November 2015, Mr Kaziakouras sworn 3 December 2015, and Hera's financier, Mr Herzberg, sworn 11 December 2015. Statements of expected evidence from planning officers from the City of Casey, namely, Mr Rao (adopted on 10 December 2015) and Ms Richardson (adopted on 10 December 2015) were also tendered. Of those witnesses, only Mr Konstandellos and Ms Richardson were cross-examined. In respect of Mr Parsons' affidavit, the affidavit was received subject to an agreement that was reached between the parties.[11]
15 The parties also provided to the Court a joint tender list of the documents in the Court Book (comprising three lever arch folders) relied upon, prepared by reference to Court Book page numbers.
16 In light of the competing claims made and the relief sought by the respective parties it is necessary to set out the relevant factual background in considerably more detail than is set out in the brief introduction.
17 Following the vendors and Joslin entering into the 2012 contract on 29 February 2012, Mr Parsons and other representatives of Joslin were in contact with the Council to discuss their proposal for the development of a supermarket on the 1 Adrian Street site. They informed Mr Asok Rao, the Council's 'Team Leader, City Strategy' that they had entered into contractual arrangements with Mr and Mrs Bisognin in regard to purchasing the subject land. By letter dated 20 April 2012, Mr Rao informed Joslin that as part of Council's review of its 'Activity Centres Strategy' Council proposed to nominate the proposed Neighbourhood Activity Centre ('NAC') at 1 Adrian Street as a Medium Level NAC which would entail provision of 'one full line supermarket above 3,000m2 (gross leasable floor area) as well as a range of local services and specialty retail.' Mr Rao explained that in light of this, 'Council strategically supports one full line supermarket at the Adrian Street NAC'. He added, however, that the supermarket proposal is subject to a permit and this expression of support does not mean that the proposed planning permit will be approved by Council. Mr Rao suggested that Joslin should continue its discussions with Council officers to ensure that more detailed planning and development issues 'are resolved and expectations from all parties are clear'. Against that background, Joslin continued discussions with Woolworths Limited ('Woolworths'), which had earlier expressed interest in leasing a 3,200 sq m supermarket and 200 sq m liquor store in Joslin's proposed development at Cranbourne East.
18 On 26 October 2012, in response to correspondence from Joslin complaining about the delay in Council ratifying the amendment of its Medium Level NAC, Mr Rao wrote to Joslin to confirm that 'Council would still support a full line supermarket on [the 1 Adrian Street] site' regardless of whether the draft Activity Centres and Non-Residential Uses Strategy is adopted in a timely manner or not.
19 On 27 February 2013 the vendors' solicitors wrote to Joslin 'out of an abundance of caution' seeking confirmation that Joslin remains committed to performing the contract and seeking a current estimate of when settlement of the contract would take place. As there was no response to that letter, the vendors' solicitors again wrote to Joslin on 21 March 2013, noting that they were instructed that Mr Parsons had met with Sam and Rosa Limoli, the owners of the property located at 2 Adrian Street (opposite the Bisognins), to discuss pursuing an Urban Design Framework, but understood that nothing further had taken place.
20 On 26 July 2013, Joslin as purchaser under the 2012 contract nominated Hera as 'substitute purchaser/s to take a transfer or conveyance [of the southern lot] in lieu of the Purchaser'.
21 A meeting was held at the vendors' solicitor's office on 14 August 2013. The meeting was attended by Mr Nikolaos Konstandellos (representing Hera), Mr Vasilios ('Laki') Tasiopoulos (Hera's solicitor), Myles Snow and Luciano Pozzebon (Town Planner, Charter Keck Kramer), and Mr and Mrs Bisognin and their solicitor, Mr Waters. Mr Konstandellos said that at the meeting the representatives of Hera provided to the Bisognins and their solicitor a folder of plans and drawings concerning the supermarket development, and showing its proposed location. Mr Bisognin agreed that during the meeting the town planner put a folder on Mr Waters' desk, but he said it was closed and he did not look at the contents - the folder was left in Mr Waters' office and no-one looked at it - and Mr Bisognin said he had not seen the contents of the folder until the drawings were shown to him during cross-examination.[12]
22 On 18 October 2013, Hera entered into an agreement for lease with Woolworths of the supermarket and associated retail premises to be developed on the southern portion of the land. In essence the development was for a 'full-line supermarket' with an additional space of 200 sq m. The agreement for lease included a 'proposed site plan' (identified as 'Plan Q3') showing the approximate location of the supermarket, associated retail and car parking spaces. The layout proposed was for the supermarket and associated retail space to occupy the northern portion of the site (closest to the portion of the land retained by the Bisognins) and for the car parking spaces to fill the land between there and the Ballarto Road frontage.
23 On 21 October 2013, the vendors' solicitor sent a rescission notice to Hera's solicitor. The particulars of default stated that the purchaser 'is unable to obtain approval of a Plan of Subdivision in accordance with special condition 3 of the Contract of Sale'. Hera's solicitor responded by letter dated 1 November 2013 contending that the notice was premature and therefore defective and of no effect. In essence, they maintained that at the meeting held on 14 August 2013 the process associated with the plan of subdivision was discussed and a timeline was put in place for that to be completed. There was also discussion about a sale of the entirety of the land which led to new contracts being drawn up but they were not proceeded with. In those circumstances, Hera's solicitor contended that Hera must be given an opportunity to complete the plan of subdivision and allowed a reasonable time for settlement to take place. Further, the letter informed them that Hera would be lodging a caveat on the property in order to preserve its rights under the contract.
24 On 3 October 2013, Mr Konstandellos sent an email to Mr Frank Perry of Perry & Associates requesting that he provide a quotation to Hera for the provision of 'all services, reports and fees as a total package' for the development of the Adrian Street/Ballarto Road site. Mr Perry followed up with the Council and obtained quotations for the work required to be undertaken. On 13 November 2013, Mr Perry emailed Hera's solicitor and informed him as follows:
I rang the Council following our meeting and the following is clear:
The plan that we have been provided with is indicative only and we would need the precise dimensions of the land to be subdivided together with a copy of the existing title in order to proceed with the subdivision proposal.
I have asked Allister Sarris [Architectural Design Consultant] to provide a cost for the planning drawings for the supermarket. As soon as I have the information on the dimensions of the land and the title details I will obtain a quote from a surveyor.
Other quotations I will obtain include landscape and traffic.
25 On 26 November 2013, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor by way of further response to the rescission notice issued on behalf of the vendors and stated in relation to the plan of subdivision, as follows:
Pursuant to Council requirements prior to the Plan of Subdivision being lodged for approval by Council it is also incumbent upon your client to complete and submit to the Council the Urban Design Framework. This process also involves the preparation of an Urban Master Plan with the neighbour [a reference to the Limoli family at No 2 Adrian Street] which we understand your client has already commenced discussions. Given our client's involvement any such material to be submitted to the Council must first be approved in writing by our client to ensure its rights are not in any way compromised.
26 The vendors' solicitor responded by letter the next day. The vendors maintained that the contract had been rescinded and also pointed out that the concept plan attached to the contract 'does provide measurements'. Further, the vendors' solicitor stated '[i]t was not incumbent on our client to complete and submit to the Council an Urban Design Framework.' The vendors' solicitor followed up by making application to the Registrar of Titles pursuant to s 89A of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) to remove Hera's caveat over the land.
27 As was noted in the introduction, in late 2013, Hera commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court against Mr and Mrs Bisognin.[13] In its statement of claim, Hera sought an order that Mr and Mrs Bisognin be required to undertake all works required to procure an Urban Design Framework for the Adrian Street precinct and pay any necessary Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution. Hera also sought declarations to the effect that the purported rescission notice was of no effect and that it had an interest in the subject land sufficient to enable it to lodge a caveat.
28 On 10 January 2014, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor taking issue with the matters raised and pointing out the reasons why they believed the Statement of Claim was misconceived. On 6 February 2014 they served Mr and Mrs Bisognin's defence and request for further and better particulars. In particular they contended that Joslin, the previous purchaser, was aware that it was their responsibility to file an Urban Design Framework for the Adrian Street precinct and that this was discussed at the conference held on 14 August 2013. Further, in respect of the GAIC, their position was that the contribution is not payable until settlement and they were in any event exempt from this contribution.
29 In the meantime, while the litigation was underway, representatives of Hera, namely Mr Perry and Ms Aileen Chin, met with officers of the Council on 7 February 2014 to discuss the requirements for an Urban Design Framework for the Adrian Street precinct.
30 In April 2014, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor to inform them that they had received advice that the contract of sale was void for uncertainty because the subject land was not sufficiently well described. They encouraged Hera to discontinue the proceeding and withdraw its caveat whereupon the deposit of $10,000.00 would be refunded. They enclosed a copy of their proposed amended defence and indicated that they would be seeking summary judgment.
31 Correspondence ensued between the solicitors for the parties. Hera's solicitor 'categorically rejected' the proposal for resolution, pointing out that their client had relied upon the contract as prepared by the vendors' solicitor and, once nominated as the substitute purchaser, Hera had expended considerable amounts in briefing consultants and entered into an Agreement to Lease with Woolworths. Further, they enclosed a preliminary plan of subdivision which had been prepared by or on behalf of Hera identifying the subject land. Hera's solicitor also stated that they believed Mr and Mrs Bisognin 'are seeking to take advantage of the substantial improvements to the property including the securing of the long term lease with Woolworths Supermarket which has [sic] will result in a substantial increase in the value of the property.' They regarded the conduct of Mr and Mrs Bisognin as 'clearly unconscionable' in circumstances where they would gain from being at liberty to sell the property to a third party for a higher consideration.
32 In September 2014, Sam and Rosa Limoli engaged Taylors Development Strategists Pty Ltd ('Taylors') to prepare an Urban Design Framework for the Adrian Street Medium Neighbourhood Activities Area.
33 On 20 October 2014, following a telephone conversation with Mr Perry, Hera's solicitor emailed Mr Perry to inform him that the vendors' solicitor had written to them in respect of the proposed plan of subdivision, enclosing a copy of the Precinct Structure Plan, and stating:
That the proposed Plan of Subdivision provided in the Section 32 and the proposed Plan of Subdivision recently provided by your client will not be accepted by the City of Casey on the grounds that the City of Casey require the whole of the commercial development to be along Adrian Street with the residential development at the rear.
34 The vendors' solicitor followed up by letter to Hera's solicitor dated 21 October 2014 in the following terms:
We refer to our telephone conversation on the 20 October 2014 and advise Taylors who have been engaged by Limoli to do an UDF plan advises us that the Council would not support the plan of subdivision attached to the section 32 as it does not appear to be in accordance with the Indicative Adrian Street Neighbourhood Activity Centre Plan as set out at Figure 2 Page 49 of the PSP which we provided to you recently.
Would you please get instructions as to whether your client will proceed with this matter or not.
We do not want to go to the expense of going to mediation if it appears that the Plan of Subdivision prepared by your client will not be accepted by Council.
35 In the meantime, on 20 October 2014, Mr Perry submitted Perry Town Planning's fee proposal to Hera for the preparation of an Urban Design Framework to allow for the subdivision of the 1 Adrian Street land.
36 On 28 October 2014, in preparation for the County Court mediation and at the request of Mr Konstandellos, Mr Parsons forwarded to Mr Konstandellos an email that he had sent to Mr and Mrs Bisognin at some earlier point (the date has been removed from the version of the email as forwarded) confirming the terms on which Joslin would acquire the land. Mr Konstandellos said that he received the document from Mr Parsons because he had spoken with him 'to clarify' matters and wanted 'something clear'.[14] The email stated:
1. Price: $3.6 million which includes a $100,000 consultancy fee to us.
A $10,000 non-refundable fee is payable on the signing of Heads of Agreement.
37 In late October 2014, Taylors prepared a draft Urban Design Framework and provided it to Mr Sam Limoli for review prior to a meeting with the Council on 30 October 2014. Ms Amy Davidson of Taylors asked Mr Limoli to 'print the document and show to Gino [Bisognin] to make sure he is happy with the references to his land and the images shown.' Figure 6 of the draft UDF showed the 'Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan' with a 'primary retail anchor' and adjoining 'non retail commercial' located in the southern portion of the land towards the Ballarto Road frontage. Taylors provided the draft UDF to the Council in advance of their proposed meeting with Council and adjacent landowners.
38 On 28 October 2014, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor to inform them that the Council had confirmed that the draft design plan Mr Parsons had earlier prepared was inconsistent with the Cranbourne East Precinct Structure, and requested that they discontinue their proceeding and provide a withdrawal of caveat. The vendors' solicitor enclosed a letter of even date from Mr Asok Rao, the Council's Team Leader, City Strategy, confirming verbal advice that another Council officer had given earlier in respect of 1 Adrian Street, to the effect that the draft design plan for the supermarket prepared by Joslin Street SA Developments in 2012 'was inconsistent with the strategic directions of the Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan as the supermarket did not orientate towards Adrian Street frontage.' In the letter Mr Rao also stated:
Council supports a full line supermarket and specialty shops on the 1 Adrian Street site and the design and use of the land is subject to an Urban Design Framework (as required by the Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan). The landowners, LH & GA Bisognin, have also requested a full line supermarket on their land.
The Urban Design Framework applies to all the land known as 1 Adrian Street and 2 Adrian Street, Cranbourne East.
To date, no Urban Design Framework has been submitted to Council.
39 On 28 October 2014 Taylors prepared a further draft of the UDF for Mr Limoli in preparation for a meeting with the Council on 30 October 2014. Taylors asked Mr Limoli to print a copy and give it to Mr Bisognin 'to make sure he is happy with the references to his land and the images shown.' That version of the UDF reproduced the Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan schematic for the Adrian Street precinct but did not include a layout of the proposed development.
40 At the meeting with Council on 30 October 2014, one of the Council officers, requested some input and ideas from Mr Bisognin. This led to him producing some hand-drawn sketches. Mr Bisognin said that he did these drawings because he was requested to produce some ideas, and not because he was promoting a development plan of his own. Under cross-examination, the following exchange took place with Mr Bisognin:
MR CLARKE: This drawing shows a supermarket partly on the sold land and partly on your land? That's correct isn't it?---I can't answer that because it's not to scale. I'm not a draftsman. I just got told, "Draw a picture". It's the same - the council told to - for the UDF to have no measurements. They want mud maps. They want colour pictures of - ah, supermarket's going there. Shops are going there. SOHO's going there because they've all said it comes to the planning and permit stage. They said it's totally irrelevant so how can I interfere? I'm not a town planner. I was asked for my ideas, drawings. Not one of them is a master plan.
That is a plan that relates to both lots doesn't it?---I can't honestly answer you because I don't know what the council's going to accept. I was told to draw a picture. I drew a picture. Now, then it is up to the developer or whoever's in charge to work out the sizes.
Well, one - - -?---If I asked you to draw a picture and it doesn't fit on the page is that my fault?
You knew I suggest at the time that this was drawn by you that the supermarket - that the land that you sold had to fit the (indistinct) a supermarket?---That's correct. That's the whole concept of the sale.
Exactly and this - - -?---And that's why rooftop parking was suggested for Hera's benefit so it could fit all its elements into the parcel of land.
Yes, and do you say this drawing has all of the elements of the supermarket on the land that you sold?---It has all of the elements that the PSP [Precinct Structure Plan] has required. The supermarket elements again is back to the developer because I have not signed a lease or an agreement or a contract with the supermarket. My agreement is to have a full-line supermarket on Lot 1. That's the lot, what it's called.
The southern lot?---All right, the southern lot and that's what I was working towards.
Yes, and your evidence to Her Honour is that this is a stepping along the way to having a full-line supermarket located on the land that you sold to Hera?---That's correct. It is an idea because that's what I was asked for and that's what I produced.[16]
41 By letter dated 31 October 2014, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor in relation to proceedings between the parties which by now had been transferred from the Supreme Court to the County Court. The letter also made reference to the UDF as follows:
We confirm our advices to you that we are seeking not only our client's instructions but also the advice of our client's town planner regarding the issue of the Urban Design Framework and the Precinct Structure Plan. Once we are in receipt of those instructions we shall provide you with our response.
In the meantime we confirm our advices as conveyed to you in our telephone conversation on 29 October 2014 that our client's development is consistent with the requirements of the Council insofar as it relates to the land that our client has purchased. If our client's plans require redesign in order to better comply with the PSP and UDF once drawn, this is a matter for our client.
...
You state in your recent letter that Limoli (who is your clients' relative) has appointed Taylors to prepare the Urban Design Framework for submission to Council. Given our client's interest in the land, no document should be lodged with the Council and, in particular, without our client's prior written consent. All communications with the Council regarding the development should be directed to our client for its review and comment. Our client requires complete details of all discussions and communications that your clients and/or Limoli or their agents have had with the Council, particularly if your clients have prepared a UDF and are communicating with the planning department of the Council.
We have no objection to the UDF being prepared by Taylors on the strict condition that the property which is the subject of the proceeding contains a full line supermarket and, further, conditional on the final version of the report being approved by our client prior to its submission with the Council.
42 As noted in the introduction, a mediation of the County Court proceeding took place on 25 November 2014. The mediation was attended by Mr and Mrs Bisognin as vendors and by Mr Konstandellos acting on behalf of Hera, pursuant to a power of attorney. After a lengthy mediation, the parties entered into Terms of Settlement later that day which were prepared by counsel for the Bisognins. In essence, the parties agreed to enter into and execute a new contract of sale of land in relation to the southern portion of the land, the form of which was to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 2012 contract, save as follows:
(c) Special condition 2, which made the sale 'subject to the City of Casey amending the Strategic Plan to accommodate a full line supermarket with associated shops on the site herein', will be deleted.
(d) For the purposes of clause 3(b), the plan of subdivision is the plan mentioned in clause 1 of the Terms of Settlement, namely 'the proposed plan of subdivision prepared by Kevin Barge and dated 12 March 2014', a copy of which was attached.
(e) At the end of special condition 3(b), add in the words 'save for any amendments of a technical nature required by any relevant authority to enable approval to be granted.'
If the said plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 either party may, by notice in writing to the other, end this contract.
[The vendors] will provide all and any documents in relation to the draft Urban Design Framework (UDF) by 2 December 2014.
[The vendors] will use their best endeavours to co-operate with [Hera], sign all documents and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval and registration of the plan of subdivision and to give effect to the UDF including making the duplicate title available for the purposes of registration, and will make any GAIC payment promptly if required by the relevant authority.
43 The parties also agreed that upon the execution of the new contract, the 2012 contract 'shall be deemed to be cancelled and at an end and of no effect'[17] and that the 2012 contract would remain in full force and effect and with the variations agreed (as described above) 'incorporated into the old contract until execution of the new contract'[18] by the vendors and Hera. Hera was also required to procure the purchaser named in the 2012 contract, namely Joslin, to 'confirm the cancellation of the old contract.'[19] Further, upon exchange of the signed new contract, the parties would consent to an order that the County Court proceeding be dismissed with no order as to costs and 'release each other from all claims in the proceeding.'[20]
44 The next day, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor and requested that they provide the Urban Design Framework by 2 December 2014 together with any additional documents that are relevant, and also the contract of sale and section 32 certificate for perusal in order to give effect to the terms of settlement. That same day, Mr Ross Foenander, the Conveyancing Manager with the vendors' solicitors, sent an email to the State Revenue Office advising that part of the 1 Adrian Street land had been sold and seeking guidance about the GAIC implications of the sale. In his email dated 26 November 2014, Mr Foenander stated:
...The Contract will contain a Special Condition that the Purchaser obtain all consents & permits required to Register the Plan of Subdivision at the Land Titles Office.
Registration of the plan will be the trigger for settlement to be effected.
As the Vendor has a GAIC, who is responsible to pay the GAIC or enter a payment plan or obtain a "No Liability" on the 12,850m2 being transferred/sold?
45 On 1 December 2014, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor enclosing a copy of the draft UDF prepared by Taylors on behalf of the Limolis and a draft revocation of contract agreement, and inviting their comments. The vendors' solicitor noted that they would forward the contract of sale and section 32 in due course and reiterated their request for payment of the sum of $330.00 in relation to the cost of room hire for the mediation. The parties to the draft revocation of contract agreement were shown as Mr and Mrs Bisognin as vendor, Joslin as the purchaser and Hera as the nominated purchaser, and the agreement sought to record the terms and conditions upon which the parties had agreed to the mutual rescission of the 2012 contract.
46 Hera's solicitor acknowledged receipt of the draft UDF and requested that the vendors' solicitor provide the contract of sale and section 32 statement 'as a matter of urgency so that [they] may finalise this matter.'
47 Once the draft UDF was to hand, Hera's solicitor forwarded a copy of it to Mr Perry on 2 December 2014. Later that day Mr Perry responded, noting that the draft UDF prepared by Taylors 'requires considerable additional work'. He pointed out that it does not include 'a plan demonstrating how the site is to be developed' and said that in order to protect Hera's interests it 'needs to show the location of the supermarket and the general positioning of pedestrian paths, car parking and the arrangement of buildings and works'. Mr Konstandellos acknowledged, under cross-examination, that Mr Perry was of the view that a lot of work needed to be done in December, but he said that he was in a position to deal with Taylors himself - he did not need town planners and was in a position to deal with the Council about the UDF himself.[21]
48 On about 2 December 2014, Mr Konstandellos asked Mr Perry to provide a quotation for reviewing the UDF prepared by Taylors.[22] On 4 December 2014, Mr Perry provided to Hera's solicitor his fee proposal for the review of the UDF and preparation of a planning application for a supermarket at 1 Adrian Street. In his covering email, Mr Perry suggested that if the proposal 'looks ok' they 'should get into it immediately.' A revised fee proposal was submitted by Mr Perry under cover of an email dated 9 December 2014 and copied to Mr Konstandellos. In his email, Mr Perry stated:
Here as discussed is a revised fee proposal together with an idea as to how the UDF plan would have to look. We consider that features of the plan should include a clear depiction of the core retail elements on 1 Adrian Street with supporting retail on number 2 Adrian Street. Parking would be shared and there would have to be excellent pedestrian connections between the sites.
If the proposal is acceptable I request that we receive confirmation by email. I believe that it is important that we produce the UDF in order to protect our client.
49 On 3 December 2014, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitors to chase up the contract of sale and section 32 certificate. It seems that they had not been provided thus far because the vendors' solicitors were following up the provision of a GAIC certificate by the State Revenue Office for inclusion in the section 32 statement, as required by the Sale of Land Act.[23] Hera's solicitor sent a further letter to the vendors' solicitors on 12 December 2014 following up the whereabouts of the contract of sale and section 32 statement. They also requested that the vendors' solicitors confirm that they have advised Taylors to cooperate with Perry Town Planning in order to ensure that the UDF prepared by Taylors is finalised. To this point, however, Hera had not engaged Perry Town Planning.
50 The vendors' solicitors responded to Hera's solicitor on 15 December 2014 to inform them that they were 'still waiting the GAIC Certificate' and would forward the contract and section 32 statement as soon as it is to hand. On 17 December 2014, they also obtained an ASIC search of Hera, which showed that from 11 December 2014 'Christopher Pizone'[24] [sic] was both the director and secretary of Hera, in place of Mr John Kaziakouras, and also the holder of all of the issued shares formerly held by AEM Investments Pty Ltd.
51 On 18 December 2014, Mr Oldaker of the State Revenue Office replied to Mr Foenander's email enquiry about the GAIC, and copied it to Mr Waters. Mr Oldaker attached 'a current GAIC Certificate of Estimate' for the land at 1 Adrian Street and explained the 'GAIC event' regime as follows:
The liability to pay GAIC arises when the first of the following trigger events (GAIC event) occurs in respect of land in the contribution area:
1. the issue of a statement of compliance for a plan of subdivision;
For a subdivision of land, GAIC must be paid within three months after the liability arises, unless there is a staged payment approval.
Please note that there are a number of exemptions that could apply in the event of a statement of compliance being issued for a plan of subdivision.
I have attached a copy of our GAIC practitioners guide for your reference.
Additionally, please find attached a current GAIC Certificate of Estimate for the land at 1 Adrian Street, Cranbourne East.[25]
52 The GAIC Certificate stated that the total GAIC that would be imposed if a GAIC event were to occur in respect of the whole of the 1 Adrian Street land in the financial year ended 30 June 2015 is $187,568.34. The next morning, the vendors' solicitors emailed the contract of sale and section 32 statement to Hera's solicitor 'for comment'. Mr Waters said that when preparing the contract, Mr Foenander conducted an ASIC search of Hera whereupon they became aware of a change in the director of Hera. Accordingly, the contract of sale prepared by the vendors' solicitors showed the new director, 'Christopher Pizone', as the named person to sign on behalf of Hera and also as the guarantor.
53 Once the contractual documents were received by Hera's solicitor on 19 December 2014, they were forwarded on by email to Mr Konstandellos and to Mr Simon Raleigh of Best Hooper for consideration. Mr Konstandellos said that Mr Raleigh was considering investing in the project.[26] He said it was Mr Raleigh who had first noticed Mr Pizone (rather than Mr Konstandellos and his son in law, Mr Kaziakouras) was shown as a director of Hera on the draft contract and he had conducted an ASIC search of Hera which showed that there had been a change of control. Mr Raleigh then contacted Mr Konstandellos and asked him what was going on. Mr Konstandellos said that he had no idea and was unable to give Mr Raleigh any explanation.[27]
54 On 19 December 2014, Mr Pinzone's lawyer, Mr George Bouhalis of George James Lawyers, wrote to Hera's solicitor and said that he had been instructed to inform them that 'any instructions regarding the affairs and business of Hera Project Pty Ltd and any other matters relating to this company are to be taken solely from Mr Pinzone.'
55 On 22 December 2014, Mr Konstandellos's daughter, Ms Angellique Konstandellos, filed an eComplaint with ASIC, complaining that her husband, Mr Kaziakouras, had been removed as a director and she had been removed as a shareholder of Hera by Mr Pinzone without any authority or consent and the address of the company had also been changed without their knowledge.
56 On 23 December 2014, Taylors sent to Mr Limoli an Activity Centre Concept sketch which they had prepared as a 'first attempt' of the plan they had worked up for 1 and 2 Adrian Street, noting that it 'is subject to review by the planners, Council and yourself.' In their covering email, Taylors pointed out that they have 'extended the sketch to cover Gino's land' but added that 'he has not had any input to this either and he will be required to provide input before we take the plan to Council.' Further they noted that the 'inclusion of a full line supermarket has required additional car parking and Council will require this to be co-located on Gino's land' and accordingly, 'the residential on Gino's land has been reduced to accommodate this'. On the sketch, the supermarket was positioned in the middle of the 1 Adrian Street land.
57 On 5 January 2015 the vendors' solicitors sent the Contract of Sale and section 32 statement to Hera's solicitor in duplicate and said they 'await receipt of signed copy by way of exchange.'
58 On 13 January 2015, a meeting was held at the City of Casey premises between Council officers, Sam and Mario Limoli, Mr and Mrs Bisognin and their solicitor, and representatives of Taylors. No representative of Hera was present. The handwritten notes of the meeting prepared by Taylors record that there was discussion at the meeting about a 'full line supermarket' and a need to 'update the plan to correspond.' A further meeting was held between representatives of Taylors, Sam, Rosa and Mario Limoli, and Mr and Mrs Bisognin on 21 January 2015. Mrs Bisognin said the purpose of the meeting was that Sam Limoli wanted Taylors to do the framework because Stephen Parsons had engaged Taylors to do it in 2012/2013 but Mr Parsons did not proceed and so 'Sam Limoli said, I'm going to do it.'[28] According to the handwritten notes of the meeting prepared by Taylors, reference was made to the possibility of 'carparking on roof' in the context of considering '2 options for PSP on Gino land'.
59 On 27 January 2015, the vendors' solicitors wrote to Hera's solicitor, referring to their earlier correspondence and noting that they await receipt of the signed contract of sale and section 32 statement in duplicate by way of exchange and also the $330.00 for the room hire costs. A further letter to similar effect was sent on 9 February 2015, and requesting a response as soon as possible. In their letter the vendors' solicitors also stated:
We are advised by Mr Sam Limoli the adjoining landowner that he has prepared a Plan in accordance with the Urban Design Framework and we understand has submitted same to Council. Limoli advises us that he has not heard from your client. He also advises that Taylors have not heard from your client.
Please provide us with an update.
60 In mid-February 2015, Taylors sought to schedule a further meeting with the Council. Mr Asok Rao, the Council officer, indicated that he was hoping to invite representatives of the Urban Design and Traffic teams as well and requested that the draft UDF be provided in advance of the meeting. On 17 February 2015, Taylors circulated the draft concept plan to the Limolis and the Bisognins, noting that it had been sent to the Council and VicRoads for comment also. This iteration of the draft concept plan showed the supermarket located in the middle of 1 Adrian Street land and with rooftop parking.
61 On 19 February 2015, Hargrave J made orders in proceeding S CI 2014 6875, which is the related proceeding concerning the dispute about the management of Hera. Relevantly for present purposes, his Honour ordered:
(a) Removing Christopher Pizone as a director of the Hera Project Pty Ltd (ACN 163 685 041) (the Company) as from 11 December 2014 and reinstating John Kaziakouras as a director of the Company as from 11 November 2014;
(b) Removing Christopher Pizone as secretary of the Company as from 11 December 2014 and reinstating John Kaziakouras as secretary of the Company as from 11 November 2014;
(c) Removing Christopher Pizone as a shareholder of 120 fully paid shares in the Company from 12 December 2014 and replacing AEM Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 106 170 165) as the registered holder of 120 Class A fully paid shares in the Company from 12 December 2014.
(a) Forthwith cause the Company to execute the 'New Contract' described in the terms of settlement exhibit NK-5 to the affidavit of Nikolaos Konstandellos sworn 23 December 2014; and
(b) Until the hearing and determination of the proceeding or further order, take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Company is able to complete the New Contract.
62 Hera's solicitor first notified the vendors' solicitors of the orders made by Hargrave J by letter dated 4 March 2015. They requested 'by way of completeness' that the vendors' solicitors forward the final version of the contract of sale denoting John Kaziakouras as the guarantor. In their letter they also stated:
Our client and our client's town planner have reviewed the UDF report prepared by Taylors however this report is not satisfactory as it does not take into consideration a full line supermarket. Please ensure that you advise Taylors that they are not to lodge the said UDF Report unless it is first approved by our client or its town planning consultant.
Please ensure that Taylors provide our office a complete set of all plans prepared for the UDF report, such as the master plan. Our client's town planner shall shortly be in communication with Taylors regarding these matters Please advise Taylors of this. We remind you of your client's obligation to cooperate in respect of the UDF report and plans which to date have not been provided. Please ensure that your clients or their consultants attend to this matter by the end of this week to avoid our client deeming this a breach of the Terms of Settlement.
Our client has also requested that the sunset clause set out in the Terms of Settlement be extended for a period of at least sixty (60) days. This request follows the lengthy delay in providing us with a copy of the final version of the contract of sale. You will note that this matter was settled on 25 November 2014 however it was not until 14 January 2015, after we re-opened our office following the Christmas break that we received the contract of sale. Our client in that regard should not be compromised. Please confirm that this is acceptable so that there may be a proper exchange of letters in verification of the extended sunset date.
We await hearing from you.
63 The meeting with the Council was scheduled to take place on 3 March 2015. The draft concept plan was forwarded to the Council on 20 February 2015. On 24 February 2015, following a meeting with Mr Konstandellos, Hera's solicitor re-sent the UDF that Taylors had prepared to Mr Perry for his attention.
64 At the meeting on 3 March 2015, various Council officers and representatives of Taylors were in attendance along with Mr and Mrs Bisognin and Mario and Paul Limoli. Neither Mr Waters nor any representative of Hera was in attendance. Taylors prepared typed minutes of the meeting, recording that it was attended by the landowners (represented by Mario and Paul Limoli, and Mr and Mrs Bisognin), Taylors (represented by Stephen Lake and Amy Davidson), and the Council (Lauren Richardson, Asok Rau and others). The minutes noted that Council had suggested that the supermarket be pushed further to the south and that the car parking be consolidated to its north. Council was also 'comfortable' with roof-top parking and agreed that it would assist in future proofing the structure. Under the headings 'Landowner feedback' and 'Further Actions' the minutes relevantly recorded:
65 The Council Officer, Ms Lauren Richardson, also made a handwritten note of the meeting. Her note records as follows:
Subject: Adrian Street NAC UDF Date: 3/3/15
PSP [Precinct Structure Plan] shows smaller supermarket but Activity Centre Strategy supports full provision
Non retail commercial to Ballarto
Rooftop car parking for supermarket
Blank walls an issue - Access arrangements
66 As noted earlier, Mr Waters was not present at the meeting on 3 March 2015. Mr Waters said he was not aware that Hera did not want rooftop car parking. He was of the view that rooftop parking was a good suggestion and said it would have assisted Hera and alleviated some of its problems because the Council had suggested there was not enough land available for car parking.[29] He said that at this point in time, Hera was not providing them with any input, and the vendors did not know who to deal with at Woolworths, so they did not know whether Woolworths were happy with it or not.[30]
67 Mr Perry was formally engaged by Hera in, or by, early March 2015.[31] Mr Perry said that his diary records him as having a meeting with Mr Konstandellos at his office on 23 February 2015 but he cannot recall what was discussed.[32] On 6 March 2015, Mr Perry emailed Taylors to confirm that he was acting for Hera and that the southern lot is to be the site of a proposed full line supermarket. He noted that he understood the Council officers had requested changes which 'indicate a southward shift in the location of the supermarket on lot 1' and added that whilst his client had not been involved in those discussions, Hera 'has negotiated a proposed layout with the prospective supermarket operator who has very specific requirements' and thus 'it is essential that our client has the opportunity to review the proposed Urban Design Framework Plan prior to it being submitted to the Council.' He requested that Taylors provide his firm with 'a copy of the plan which shows the layout of Lot 1 prior to lodgement with the Council' so that the UDF 'can be agreed in the shortest possible time.'
68 On 10 March 2015, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor to 'require as a matter of urgency the amended Contract of Sale for execution and return to complete exchange.' He informed the vendors' solicitor that Mr Perry had 'conferred with both Council and your clients' town planner who advised that they had meetings and discussions with both your clients and the Council.' Hera's solicitor complained that Taylors had not been informed by the vendors of Hera's interest or involvement. Further, he said Taylors had 'advised that [the vendors] were at the meeting with Council and making representations in respect to where the supermarket should be located' which is 'contrary to the spirit of the terms of settlement pertaining to the UDF.' He also said that the vendors and their solicitors had failed to supply them with master plans of the subject area and that they had that day received a version of the master plan which Hera's town planner says 'makes no sense and [was] not in accordance with the plan approved by Woolworths.' The letter continued, asserting that:
Your clients have acted against our client's interests contrary to special condition 9 and 10 of the Contract of Sale. [Hera's] town planner is now conferring with Taylors with a view to finalising this matter as soon as possible. [Hera] shall also be taking steps to lodge the Plan of Subdivision once the UDF has been in principle accepted.
Please obtain your clients' instructions for the date set out in special condition 8 to be extended as per our letter dated 4 March 2015. Your client in providing their consent to the extension of time should also take into account the non-compliance of special conditions 9 and 10 of the Contract.
We await your early response.
69 On 10 March 2015, Taylors forwarded to the Limoli's two alternative sketches for 1 and 2 Adrian Street reflecting the discussion that took place at the meeting with the Council. Taylors noted that:
... As required by Council, the supermarket has been moved to the south of Gino's land and a secondary anchor added to [the Limoli's] land. Access to Gino's land has been further investigated and VicRoads will require a deceleration lane. ...
Two versions of the concept plan, marked Nos. 6 and 7 respectively, were enclosed, each of which relevantly showed the supermarket on 1 Adrian Street located at the southern end towards Ballarto Road. Taylors asked them to review the plans and to provide a copy to the Bisognins.
70 On 11 March 2015, Mr Perry forwarded by email to Hera's solicitor and Mr Konstandellos a plan that he 'was able to get from Gino's lawyer'. He said the plan 'does not seem to make any sense and is not in accordance with the plan that was signed off by Woolworths.' The plan appears to be an earlier iteration of what was proposed, and was probably the 16 February 2015 plan, showing the supermarket as being located towards the middle of the 1 Adrian Street land. As noted earlier, however, by this point Mr Perry had already been in contact with Taylors and had requested that they provide 'a copy of the plan which shows the layout of Lot 1 prior to lodgement with the Council'. Mr Perry followed the matter up with Taylors, first by email on 10 March 2015 (referring to the vendors' obligation under the terms of settlement to use their best endeavours to cooperate with the finalisation of the UDF), and then by phone on 11 March 2015, seeking a copy of the UDF. Mr Lake of Taylors told him that he would only provide a copy of the UDF if instructed by the Limoli's to do so.
71 On 11 March 2015, following a telephone conversation with Hera's solicitor, the vendors' solicitor wrote to them and confirmed the vendors' position as follows:
(a) Your client has had three (3) years to prepare plans for Council approval.
(b) We have written to you on several occasions requesting that your client lodge plans.
(c) Your client engaged Taylors originally to prepare plans but it appears that nothing was done.
(d) Limoli and Taylors are still waiting to hear from your client and/or yourselves and we note that at Mediation on the 25 November 2014 we gave you the telephone contacts for Taylor and Limoli yet no contact has been made.
(e) At Mediation your client told our client that he would get cracking on having plans done.
(f) Prior to Christmas your client contacted our client that he had engaged Town Planners who would contact Limoli as he did not want to use Taylors.
72 Under cross-examination, Mr Konstandellos said he could not recall having told Mr Bisognin that he had engaged town planners who would contact Mr Limoli. Rather, Mr Konstandellos maintained that he told Mr Bisognin he had obtained quotes from town planners and that he did not want to use Taylors.[33]
73 On 12 March 2015, the vendors' solicitor emailed the contract of sale and associated documents to Hera's solicitor. At about this time, representatives of Hera, namely Mr Perry, Mr Konstandellos, Mr Pozzebon and Mr Axford met with Council officers, Mr Rao and Mr Jayden Mizzi, regarding Adrian Street. Afterwards, Mr Perry prepared a note summarising what took place at the meeting, as follows:
Yesterday Nick, Luciano, Steve Axford and I met with Asok and Jayden to explain the position in regard to Hera and its purchase of the southern section of lot 1 Adrian Street. It was apparent that despite the fact that the week before the two officers had met with Sam Limoli and Gino it was not clear to them that Hera was an essential stakeholder with regard to the site. We advised the Council officers that the supermarket needed to be located and serviced in accordance with a lease agreement that had been worked out with Woolworths and they were given a plan that formed the basis of the agreement. We also indicated that we would design the layout of the site in order to activate the Adrian Street frontage with some activity on the Ballarto Road frontage at the junction with Adrian Street.
We also indicated that we had no objection to the Urban Design Framework being prepared by Taylors provided that the document provided for the location of the supermarket on the site contracted to Hera and we would be prepared to meet with the Council officers and Taylors to workshop the details of the framework that affects the Hera Land. Asok indicated that he would find that a suitable outcome. We will respond to the Council with a design that reflects the discussion and which can be integrated into the framework plan being prepared by Taylors.
I indicated to Asok that there should be no impediment to the changes proposed because we do not seek any changes to lot 2 which is the Limoli land and Gino is committed to everything he can to achieve finalisation of the UDF and to facilitate the subdivision of the land.
The Council is now well aware of Hera's interest in the UDF and the supermarket site and will proceed with our involvement.
74 This email demonstrates that there was no impediment to Hera being directly involved in the UDF process.
75 On 16 March 2015, in an email to the Limoli's, Taylors reported that the vendors' solicitor had phoned and advised that Perry Town Planning are looking to lodge a UDF over 1 and 2 Adrian Street, and that he believed they would lodge their design for the 1 Adrian Street land and overlay the Taylors' design for the 2 Adrian Street land. Taylors also included a copy of the concept plan sketch that the vendors' solicitor had sent them 'illustrating how a supermarket could be configured for 1 Adrian Street'. This concept plan was the plan that Mr Parsons of Joslin had earlier provided. Taylors added that they understood that the concept plan was the plan that was earlier sent to Council and which Council had advised was not acceptable from a layout and design perspective.
76 On 16 March 2015, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor expressing dismay that they had 'misplaced the Contracts we sent to you on 5 January 2015.' They also noted that they have not yet received a plan in accordance with the UDF from either the solicitors or Hera's Town Planner and enquired as to when this would be done. On 17 March 2015, Taylors provided to the Council a draft UDF incorporating the changes requested by Council at the meeting on 3 April 2015, including shifting the shopping centre on 1 Adrian Street to the south and providing for a secondary anchor on 2 Adrian Street.[34] The schematic for the 'Adrian Street proposed Activity Centre', which appears as Figure 7, shows the full line supermarket located towards the Ballarto Road frontage and with roof-top car parking.
77 On 19 March 2015, Taylors emailed the Limoli's and their solicitor, Mr John Cicero of Best Hooper, to let them know that the Council would be inviting Woolworths, in addition to Mr Perry, to attend a meeting scheduled to take place on 27 March 2015.
78 On 20 March 2015, Hera's solicitor responded to the vendors' solicitors' letter of 11 March 2015, complaining about their (alleged) failure to inform Council of their client's interest and of the existence of the Woolworths supermarket on the southern lot, and the generally negative conduct on the part of the vendors. They also sought confirmation that the vendors will cooperate and support Hera's recommendations and proposals with respect to the master plan and 'consent to the extension of the sunset date from 25 August 2015 to 25 October 2015'. The vendors' solicitor responded by letter dated 23 March 2015 addressing the various matters raised. Relevantly, they expressly denied the suggestion that Council was unaware of the existence of a purchaser of the southern lot and the role of Woolworths in the purchaser's plans and set out the number of occasions when that matter had been drawn to the attention of the Council. They also noted that they only became aware of the involvement of Perry Town Planning on 4 March 2015 and whilst Mr Perry had stated that a UDF had been prepared by his firm, no copy had been provided to the Bisognins as yet. They requested that Hera's solicitors provide a copy of the UDF and also the signed contract of sale.
79 On 23 March 2015, Mr Perry sent an email addressed to Mr Konstandellos, Hera's team of consultants and its solicitor, enclosing an extract from the UDF that Taylors had lodged with the Council. He had obtained the UDF plan from Mr John Cicero, the solicitor acting for the Limoli's. Mr Perry noted that the 'plan shows parking on the roof of the supermarket and solid development along the frontage to Ballarto Road with very little surface parking' and said 'it is not an acceptable plan'. He added that he has been in contact with the vendors' solicitors 'who profess to know nothing of the lodgement of the UDF.' Mr Perry followed the matter up with Mr Cicero, sending him a copy of the plan that was signed off by Woolworths and suggesting that 'with some tinkering the plan for our site can be adjusted and integrated into the UDF.'
80 Over the ensuing week a further volley of correspondence took place between Hera's solicitor and the vendors' solicitor, with each bemoaning the other party's shortcomings. On 25 March 2015, Hera's solicitor finally returned the executed contract of sale to complete the exchange. In a letter dated 26 March 2015, the vendors' solicitor informed Hera's solicitor that they understood Perry Town Planning, in consultation Taylors, has arranged a meeting with the Council on Friday, 27 March 2015 and advised that Mr Waters would now be attending on behalf of the Bisognins. The meeting with the Council took place and was attended by representatives of the respective landowners, the Council officers, Mr Perry and Mr Axford (an urban designer) on behalf of Hera and Mr Brad Karge, a representative of Woolworths. It appears that much of the focus of the meeting was on Woolworths and the Council's aspirations rather than the Limoli's plans for 2 Adrian Street. During the meeting Woolworths made it clear that it was not keen on roof-top parking.
81 After the meeting, Mr Axford reported 'some quick feedback' to Mr Konstandellos, copied to Mr Perry, noting that while the Council wants them to come back with a revised plan they nevertheless made progress. Under cross-examination, Mr Konstandellos acknowledged that once the Council came up with their own design vis-à-vis the proposed supermarket development, with an active frontage to Ballarto Road and the main access to the car park from Adrian Street, they had to 'accept what the Council want'.[35] Taylors also reported back to the Limoli's by email. On 30 March 2015, Messrs Perry and Axford prepared a more formal document headed 'Recollection of a statement made by Noel Waters' at the meeting on 27 March 2015. Relevantly, the document stated:
Noel Waters then commented more than once that if the subdivision did not proceed there would be ample space for car parking, as lot one would revert back in its entirety to the ownership of his client [Mr and Mrs Bisognin]. The clear implication was that there would be no significant constraint on the layout of the site if the subdivision did not proceed.
82 Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor by letter dated 14 April 2015 referring to what transpired at the meeting with Council and asserting that the vendors' solicitor did not support Hera's proposed plans. However, 'in the spirit of the terms of settlement' they attached a copy of their revised plan as sent to Council, which took into account the Council's requirements, and requested that the vendors support that plan to move matters forward. The vendors' solicitor responded by letter that same day refuting their suggestion of a lack of support, and reiterating the expressions of support that were given by Mr Waters during the course of the meeting.
83 On 27 March 2015, the Council's Planning Department acknowledged that Taylors had lodged the Limoli's UDF documentation and advised that Ms Richardson would be handling the matter. On 30 April 2015, Mr Lake of Taylors wrote to Ms Richardson by email requesting that because of the difference of opinion between Woolworths and the Council in respect of 1 Adrian Street, the Council give consideration to supporting a staged UDF so that the Limoli's 'not be held hostage to matters over which they have no control.' Taylors proposed that such an approach would allow the Limoli's to proceed with a two lot subdivision for their land and allow the owner/future owner of 1 Adrian Street to work with Council and then seek an amendment to the UDF. Ms Richardson responded a few days later, by email dated 2 April 2015. She explained that Council are not in a position to support a staged UDF or a UDF done in two parts. She added that the Limoli's had been advised of this position earlier in 2014. Ms Richardson stated that Council:
are committed to resolving the UDF in a timely manner and will liaise directly with Frank Parry and Woolworths regarding the western side of the UDF and once we get to an agreed position, we can inform you to make the relevant changes to the layout plan prior to approval.
84 On 8 April 2015, Mr Perry sent an email to the Council, copied to Hera's UDF team, attaching a copy of the re-vamped section of the UDF as it affects the supermarket site. He pointed out that 'the layout has been switched to achieve an active frontage to Ballarto Road with the main access to the car park from Adrian Street' commenting that the change to the layout 'is in response to the comments we received from council officers at the recent meeting' and adding that it 'has received a positive response from Woolworths and subject to VicRoads acquiescence and general approval, the plan could be plugged into the draft UDF prepared by Taylors.' On the re-vamped plan, the car parking arrangements for the supermarket abutted (or effectively merged with) the car parking to be provided for the development on the land retained by the Bisognins.
85 Taylors forwarded a copy of Mr Perry's re-vamped design to the Limoli's on 14 April 2015 and Ms Davidson (of Taylors) said she had spoken with the Council, who had advised that 'they are much happier with this plan.' She added that Ms Richardson indicated that 'if all the parties are in agreement with this plan (VicRoads, Limoli's, Council and Woolworths) they will look to sign off on the UDF.
86 On 28 April 2015, Taylors reported back to the Limoli's following their meeting with the Council earlier that afternoon. Ms Davidson said that Council had discussed internally the plan prepared by Mr Perry and his team and advised that 'they were generally happy and comfortable with this layout'. Council also mentioned that they had found money in their budget to commission an independent retail analysis over the design and shortly would appoint one of two named consultants for that task. Further, she said that Council had discussed the Perry plan with VicRoads at their April meeting and the initial feedback is that VicRoads 'are open to a left in, left out arrangement on 1 Adrian Street' but they had some concerns for the land to the west of this and how access into that subdivision would work. Ms Richardson also apologised for the length of time it was taking Council to respond but she said that 'this is not a standard UDF and there are a lot of complicated factors at play.'
87 Meanwhile, Charter Keck Kramer, on behalf of Hera, had prepared an application for subdivision and associated plans. These documents were forwarded by Hera's solicitor to the vendors' solicitor under cover of a letter dated 1 May 2015, requesting that they be executed as soon as possible so that they may be collected and lodged at the Titles Office forthwith. By letter dated 6 May 2015, the vendors' solicitor informed Hera's solicitor that 'your client has collected the Application for certification directly from our office.' He also asked that they request that 'your client not contact our client by way of telephone.'
88 On 12 May 2015, Ms Richardson of the Council sent the marked-up text of the UDF to Taylors together with the Council's final review of the UDF for review by Taylors. Ms Richardson stated that:
We're largely satisfied with this layout, and if this is something that your client is happy with, and is happy to make the changes then we would be in a position to approve the urban design framework when it is resubmitted.
89 The proposed Figure 7, setting out the Adrian Street Proposed Activity Centre, showed the supermarket located at the southern end of the 1 Adrian Street site near Ballarto Road and with the supermarket car parking to the north, adjacent to the car parking spaces to be provided for the associated development on the northern lot retained by the Bisognins. In other words, the Council's proposal for the southern lot effectively reflected the re-vamped plan submitted by Perry Town Planning on 8 April 2015. Ms Richardson also sent the Council's mark-up of the UDF to Perry Town Planning and the vendors' solicitor for review and feedback.
90 On 15 May 2015, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor enclosing a copy of the email from Ms Richardson dated 12 May 2015 and requesting that Mr and Mrs Bisognin consent to the plan so that the matter may be progressed. By 18 May 2015, Ms Richardson emailed the Council officers to inform them of developments with the finalisation of the UDF stating:
SUCCESS! All parties have agreed to our amended Adrian Street plan and the amended UDF is coming through tomorrow - we will have an approved UDF by the end of the week!
91 On 26 May 2015, based on a 'Delegated Satisfaction Matter' report prepared by Ms Richardson, the Council by its delegate determined that the '1 & 2 Adrian Street Activity Centre Urban Design Framework (May 2015) prepared by Taylors Development Strategists is satisfactory and can be approved under Clause 3.1 of the Urban Growth Zone Schedule 2.'
92 Meanwhile, on 7 May 2015, Perry Town Planning lodged with the Council Hera's application for subdivision of the 1 Adrian Street property and associated plans. The Council formally acknowledged receipt of the application on 20 May 2015 and indicated that Ms Richardson would be the relevant officer for handling any queries.
93 On 21 May 2015, Charter Keck Kramer applied 'via SPEAR' for certification of the plan of subdivision under s 6 of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic). On 26 May 2015, the Council required the provision of further information including confirmation that the owner has been notified of the application.
94 In the Council's 'Delegated Satisfaction Matter' report dated 26 May 2015, Ms Richardson summarised at some length the background to the Limoli's application for the Urban Design Framework. The summary reflects her understanding of the relevant events and both Mr and Mrs Bisognin took issue with the accuracy of much of what is stated.
Discussions around the Adrian Street NAC [Neighbourhood Activity Centre] have been occurring for some time, dating back to 2012. There is a somewhat complex history with the two owners of the site and the contractual arrangements outside of the planning process. This can be summarised as follows:
All parties to this matter, including the Limoli's at No. 2 Adrian Street, the Bisognin's at No. 1 Adrian Street, Taylors Development Strategists, Noel Waters (legal representative of the Bisognin's), Frank Perry and Woolworths have seen the Urban Design Framework to be approved and are generally in support of the concept.
Due to the above legal proceedings described being undertaken by the Bisognin's in relation to the developer options on the site, they have advised that they do not want the Urban Design Framework to be approved until the end of August 2015 to allow them to be released from their contractual arrangements.
However, this Urban Design Framework has been lodged (and funded by) Mr Limoli at No. 2 Adrian Street and Council has entered into design negotiations in good faith. Council officers did not support the staging of the Urban Design Framework over the two sites as this is a small Activity Centre compared to other centres, and the entire point of preparing an Urban Framework would be missed if this outcome was supported. Council Officers cannot get involved or consider any legal proceedings of this nature occurring outside of the planning process and cannot delay the approval of a document for non-planning reasons, particularly for a number of months as requested. As such, the Bisognin's have advised that they are seeking legal advice as to whether they wish to pursue the matter of the timing of Council's decision on this application, however they are satisfied with the overall layout of the Urban Design Framework as laid out.[36]
95 Under the heading 'Assessment/Consideration' Ms Richardson also noted that:
The Bisognin's have voiced their concerns at length over the amount of space that Woolworths has been contracted to buy and that there is not enough room on the site for a full Woolworths to be built. This is not a consideration for the Urban Design Framework, rather it is for the permit application to determine in terms of the amount of car parking to be provided etc. If Council is not happy with the amount of car parking provided on the Woolworths site then the supermarket will have to be reduced in size to fit. The Bisognin's are under no obligation to sell Woolworths their remaining parcel of land to the north of 1 Adrian Street. If Woolworths doesn't 'fit' into the site, then this is a matter for Woolworths to deal with as part of their application, and Council will not be making any concessions whatsoever if Woolworths come to realisation that they have not purchased enough land. However, Council officers are confident that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved without any major concessions.
96 Ms Richardson emailed the approvals of the Urban Design Framework to Taylors and to Perry Town Planning and the vendors' solicitors on 26 May 2015. In her email to Mr Perry, she referred to the future Woolworths application for the site and hoped that 'that one will be a lot more straight forward!' She also asked Mr Perry to call her the next day regarding the subdivision application as she required some further information to be provided.
97 Ms Richardson gave evidence and was cross-examined about the content of her 'Delegated Satisfaction Matter' report. She said that the information contained in the reference (italicised above) to the Bisognin's having taken legal action against the developer was relayed to her during the course of a long telephone conversation she had with Mrs Bisognin in early April 2015 concerning the draft UDF.[37] Ms Richardson said that the conversation had started with Mrs Bisognin and she then passed her on to her husband and then Mrs Bisognin came back on to finish the conversation. The telephone conversation occupied just over 55 minutes[38] and Ms Richardson agreed that it did become a little heated.[39] Ms Richardson said that it became heated in part because she was unaware at that point of all the previous conversations that the Bisognins had had with the Council going back to 2012, and the letter which had been sent earlier regarding the full size supermarket being acceptable on the site.[40] Further, she said:
There was also some frustration around having to repeat the same points on a number of occasions about detailed design matters that would have been dealt with under the planning permit application. Um, another source of frustration was the timing of the document, um, that Mrs Bisognin wanted the timing to be delayed until such time, something in relation to the contract, but she asked if it could be delayed until 25 August of that year. She was discussing contractual arrangements between Woolworths and other developers and I kept repeating that it's not for counsel [sic] any external contractual obligations with any of the parties. And what we were only concerned with at that time was the matters under the Planning and Environment Act and statutory timeframes under that legislation.[41]
98 Mr Bisognin said that he only came onto the line at the tail end of the phone call, and did so because the women were arguing and yelling. He had come in from training the greyhounds and was not privy to what had taken place during the conversation, but he said that he came into the call and apologised to Ms Richardson and said that his wife was 'very emotionally upset'.[42] Mr Bisognin said that he did not know what his wife had said to Ms Richardson.[43] But he denied ever having said to Ms Richardson words to the effect that once 25 August 2015 was reached, the contract would expire and they would be free to make their own deal with Woolworths for the purchase of the site.[44] He also denied ever having advised the Council officers to the effect that they only ever agreed to the mediation outcome because it was their understanding that Woolworths could not fit a large format supermarket on the land and that the contract with the original developer would fall through.[45] He said that he had been trying to get the thing through but the Council had advised them that 'there wouldn't be enough land to fit all the elements.'[46] He said he had issues with the UDF, where he does not feel that it meets the requirements of the Precinct Structure Plan in maintaining a full-line supermarket, but that was the only issue he had raised with the Council.[47] Mr Bisognin maintained that they did not have any issue with the UDF at that time because 'I wanted to settle, I wanted my money'.[48] He denied that he had ever mentioned to the Council that they were seeking legal advice as to whether they could pursue the timing of the Council's decision concerning the draft UDF. But he added that he did not know what his wife had said during the phone call with Ms Richardson.[49]
99 Ms Richardson gave evidence frankly and to the best of her recollection. Under cross-examination, it was put to her that some of the matters she had recorded in the 'Delegated Satisfaction Matter' report were simply not correct. Ms Richardson responded by saying that as she understood it from the phone conversation, 'the developer who had purchased options on the site had the contract with Woolworths, and the Bisognins wanted to deal directly with Woolworths so that they could wrap it up from there'.[50] Ms Richardson did accept that if she had got some parts of this account wrong, she may have misunderstood other parts of the conversation.[51]
100 Mrs Bisognin also gave evidence about the 'Delegated Satisfaction Matter' report. Her view was that the contract with Hera would expire on 25 August 2015. She referred several times to what she said had taken place in the earlier proceedings in the County Court, reiterating that the judge had said to the developer words to the effect that they should not enter into a contract with Woolworths because they have not acquired all of the land. Her demeanour and tone in giving evidence at the trial was somewhat combative and argumentative, due in large part no doubt because she was so obviously frustrated by the lack of progress that had been made with the sale of the southern lot since 2012. She disagreed with Ms Richardson's statement about the Bisognin's not wanting the UDF to be approved until the end of August 2015 so as to allow them to be released from their contractual arrangements. Under cross-examination Mrs Bisognin said:
That's incorrect, we've always wanted the framework to be approved. We wanted - to the subdivision to be approved so I can go, I can leave the land. We get our money and then we can go and move on with our lives. We have - we couldn't move forward, we couldn't move backwards. As I mentioned it's - it'll nearly be four years in February that this has been going on. So I can't go forward, I can't go back, I'm in a stable situation and it's unfair for anyone to hold a contract for four years.
MR CLARKE: Yes, which is why you want to get out of the contract now?
----No. That's what you're saying, no. As I mentioned that this has been goin' on for four years, in February it'll be four years. Do you wait for something for four years?[52]
101 Each of Mr and Mrs Bisognin was cross-examined about what they would do in the event that the contract was terminated. Mrs Bisognin said that it is not her intention to sell the whole property. She said they were 'in greyhounds now' and 'we need a lot of land to do the greyhounds, because we need a track for them to go around in' and to break them in.[53] Further, she said:
There has been three generation that Bisognin has been on this property. It's been Gino's mother, Gino and myself and my children. So I've got no intention selling this. I don't know in six months or 12 months' time. I haven't got a crystal ball.[54]
102 Mr Bisognin also indicated that he was not looking to sell the property to a third party after 25 August 2015, despite having received a number of unsolicited phone calls and enquiries. Under cross-examination about what was in his mind as being in prospect he responded:
I'm not sure, ah, of the future. If I had a crystal ball I could tell you. Um, I am genuinely thinking, well at the moment I'm in the position where I'm rearing greyhounds, I do need land space, so that is a professional hobby of mine. So I'm genuinely thinking of keeping it at the moment.[55]
103 Mr Bisognin went on to clarify that at the present moment his intention 'is to do nothing with the land' but added that '[i]n the New Year I don't know. What happens if someone comes and offers me $20 million? Would I say no?'[56]
104 By letter dated 11 June 2015, the Council notified Hera that its application for the planning permit for the two lot subdivision had been approved. The planning permit contained a number of conditions. Relevantly, for present purposes, it required that:
(a) a telecommunications network or service provider for the provision of telecommunications services to each lot shown on the endorsed plan in accordance with the provider's requirements and relevant legislation at the time; and
(b) a suitably qualified person for the provision of fibre ready telecommunications facilities to each lot shown on the endorsed plan in accordance with any industry specifications or any standards set by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, unless the applicant can demonstrate that the land is in an area where the National Broadband Network will not be provided by optical fibre.
(a) a telecommunications network or service provider that all lots are connected to or are ready for connection to telecommunications services in accordance with the provider's requirements and relevant legislation at the time; and
(b) a suitably qualified person that fibre ready telecommunications facilities have been provided in accordance with any industry specifications or any standards set by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, unless the applicant can demonstrate that the land is in an area where the National Broadband Network will not be provided by optical fibre.
Servicing Requirements
(a) The land shown on the endorsed plans is drained to the satisfaction of the Responsible Authority with outfall drainage constructed to provide a legal point of discharge to each allotment.
(emphasis added by underlining)
105 On 16 June 2015, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor enclosing copies of the application for subdivision, the plan of subdivision and the planning permit. The letter pointed out that a planning permit has been issued for the subdivision and said Hera is 'in the process of obtaining the statement of compliance.' Hera's solicitor informed the vendors' solicitor that Hera envisages it will 'be in a position to lodge the plan of subdivision at the Titles Office on or about mid-July 2015 once the statement of compliance has been completed' and requested that immediate steps be taken to ensure that the vendors' financier makes the title available at the Titles Office for the registration of the plan of subdivision.
106 Meanwhile, on 5 June 2015, South East Water notified Hera that it consents to the plan being certified, but it added that the Council 'should not issue a statement of compliance at this stage.' Reference was made to South East Water's requirement that the owner of the land must enter into agreements with it concerning potable water and also for the provision of sewerage, but South East Water indicated it may withdraw the latter requirement in circumstances where it is satisfied that in the long term all domestic sewerage can be adequately treated and retained within the boundaries of each lot without danger to public health or the environment and where 'the owner, the Council and South East Water enter into a "section 173 Agreement" under s 173 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic)'. On 16 June 2015, Mr Pozzebon was in contact with the Council about the requirement for a s 173 Agreement. The Council responded to Mr Pozzebon by email explaining that 'the requirement for a section 173 Agreement has come from South East Water through the certification process, not the planning permit' and as such 'the agreement needs to be between the Owners, Council AND South East Water.' The Council also attached a copy of a specific template that South East Water requires be used. This correspondence from the Council and the letter from South East Water dated 5 June 2015 were not copied to the vendors' solicitor nor brought to their attention, at least at this point in time.
107 On 17 June 2015, South East Water issued a further letter in relation to the application for certification. The conditions set out in this letter were framed in different terms to those set out in the 5 June 2015 letter. The 17 June 2015 letter stated:
POTABLE WATER
The owner of the subject land must enter into an agreement with South East Water for the provision of potable water supply and fulfil all requirements to its satisfaction.
RECYCLED WATER
The owner of the subject land must enter into an agreement with South East Water for the provision of potable water supply and fulfil all requirements to its satisfaction.
SEWER
The owner of the subject land must enter into an agreement with South East Water for the provision of sewerage and fulfil all requirements to its satisfaction.
108 In contrast to the earlier letter from South East Water, in this letter there was no mention of any requirement to enter into a s 173 Agreement. Rather, the letter set out three options available for reaching agreement with South East Water, namely:
109 On 19 June 2015, Melbourne Water notified the Council that it consents to the certification of the plan of subdivision but added that Council 'may not issue a statement of compliance at this time as not all of Melbourne Water's requirements have been met.'
110 On 26 June 2015, AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd notified the Council that it consents to the certification of the plan of subdivision but added that before the issue of a statement of compliance the following conditions must be satisfied:
Arrangements for the supply will be subject to obtaining the agreement of other Authorities and any landowners affected by routes of the electric power lines required to supply the lots and for any tree clearing.
Prospective purchasers of lots on this plan should contact this office to determine the availability of a supply of electricity. Financial contributions may be required.
111 On 16 July 2015, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor requesting confirmation by return mail that the title for 1 Adrian Street has been made available at the Titles Office for lodgement of the plan of subdivision. The vendors' solicitor responded, advising that the Bank wished to sight the certified plan before it would produce the title. On 3 August 2015 the Council certified the plan and Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor on 6 August 2015 enclosing a copy of the certification. Initially the vendors' solicitor disputed that certification had taken place but the matter was soon clarified and he agreed.
112 At this point Hera was busily ascertaining the availability of construction funding with Balmain NB Commercial Mortgages Limited. A company search of Hera conducted on 23 July 2015, however, showed that strike-off action was in progress by ASIC due to non-payment of fees. The vendors relied on this fact, together with the unsatisfied requests made of Hera for payment of the sum of $330.00 for its share of the cost of hiring the mediation room, to suggest that Hera was experiencing financial difficulties and was not ready, willing and able to settle on the purchase.
113 At some point in late June or early July 2015 Mr Konstandellos was telephoning Mr Bisognin directly. Mr Bisognin said that once he saw Mr Konstandellos's mobile number appear on his phone's screen he did not answer the call. Nor did he answer the ensuing calls that were made from other numbers he did not recognise, because Mr Bisognin believed the unidentified caller was likely to be Mr Konstandellos. As a result of these calls, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor on 21 July 2015 and requested that 'as previously advised would you please instruct your client that if he wishes to raise any matters those matters should be raised through your office.' Mr Konstandellos said that letter was sent approximately three weeks after his initial telephone call to Mr Bisognin. Mr Konstandellos maintained that during that initial phone call he had actually spoken with Mr Bisognin and had discussed with him the need for the vendors to enter into agreements with the various utilities and authorities. Mr Bisognin disputes that any such conversation took place.
114 By letter dated 11 August 2015, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor enclosing a copy of a notice of default served on Hera that day. The default was particularised as being Hera's 'failure to pay the balance of deposit of $990,000.00 in accordance with Special Condition 1 of the Contract.' Hera's solicitor responded by letter to the vendors' solicitor that day contending that the notice was 'premature and as such defective and invalid' and 'should be immediately withdrawn'. Further they advised that the Council 'is in a position to issue a statement of compliance for the purpose of the Plan of Subdivision once the relevant referral authorities provide their consent.' Hera's solicitor then set out their instructions regarding the consent from the relevant referral authorities, as follows:
Please see letter dated 3 August 2015 together with schedule
Condition 7(a) of Planning Permit requires outfall drainage to be constructed to legal point of discharge (rubble pit)
You will note from the attached correspondence from the relevant authorities that in order for consent to be granted for the purposes of the statement of compliance fees/bond monies in the sum of approximately $920,000 will need to be paid/provided. This is a vendor obligation as it is usual practice that the vendor assumes the responsibility for payment of these fees in their entirety. Accordingly we request as a matter of urgency that you confirm with us once payment of the fees and bond monies have been made so that the requisite consent from the referral authorities may be obtained for the statement of compliance to be issued.
Please note that our client has used its best endeavours at its own cost and expense to prepare the Plan of Subdivision in readiness for it to be lodged at the Land Titles Office. Your clients cooperation is therefore required for the requisite consents to be granted for the Plan of Subdivision to be lodged and registered.
We also seek your advices regarding the status of the GAIC payment that will become due and payable for the purpose of registration of the Plan of Subdivision. Has your client contacted the relevant authorities and made the relevant application?
In the circumstances our client considers it appropriate that the sunset date referred to in special condition 8 of the Contract to either be extended or to no longer apply in order for our respective clients to properly fulfil their obligations under the Contract of Sale taking into account your clients conduct in delaying and frustrating the process for the Plan of Subdivision to be registered.
Furthermore we are instructed that our client is ready, willing and able to settle this Contract as it has secured funds to immediately effect settlement once the Plan of Subdivision is registered in accordance with the Contract.
We are instructed that if we do not receive your confirmation that the fees/bond monies will be paid by the vendor immediately or if the default notice is not withdrawn or extension in time as set out above is not granted by 5.00 pm Wednesday, 12 August 2015 our client will be referring this matter to Court where our client will seek appropriate orders and relief. This letter and our other letters shall be produced in Court on the issue of costs.
(emphasis added)
116 The documents enclosed with the letter from Hera's solicitor were:
• South East Water - Application to enter into a Development Agreement - Works
This application form showed the details of 'developer (owner)' as 'Hera Projects' and was signed by Mr Pezzano of Charter Keck Kramer and dated 20 July 2015. The fee stated was $949.32. The letter of 3 August 2015, which accompanied the form, included an Offer Letter (Schedule 7) setting out the description of the development, details of the financial and servicing requirements for the development. The Schedule 7 document set out the relevant financial conditions as follows:
Potable Water
2 Commercial Lots @ $1,046.88 each
- Credit 1 Lot @ $1,046.88 each
Recycled Water
New Customer Contributions - applicable upon connection
Securing Construction Costs (To Facilitate the Early Release - Refer to Section 7.2.7)
Bank/Cash Guarantee
Water and Sewer Assets
Dependent Sewer Works
Warranty Bond
In accordance with Section 6 of the Development Agreement, the Developer is required to lodge a Warranty Bond with South East Water.
The Works Warranty Bond is to be in the form of a bank/cash guarantee which is required to be lodged prior to the issuing of an Acceptance of Works Certificate.
This letter, which was addressed to Mr Sam Pezzano of Charter Keck Kramer, estimated the contribution required for the supply of electricity to 1 Adrian Street to be 'within the range of $16,940.00 to $20,570.00 (GST inclusive). To obtain a firm offer, the applicant was required to complete the Firm Offer Request Form and pay a project fee of $550.00 (GST inclusive).
The letter dated 17 July 2015 was addressed to Mr Pezzano of Charter Keck Kramer. Therein Melbourne Water stated that 'before the Council can issue a Statement of Compliance, it is necessary for you to enter into an agreement with Melbourne Water.' The relevant Developer Contributions were stated as being:
117 On 11 August 2015, the vendors' solicitor wrote to the vendors' mortgagee, the ANZ Bank, by urgent facsimile transmission and asked that the bank prepare the necessary discharge of mortgage in anticipation of settlement, due to take place on the registration of the plan of subdivision. The next day, the vendors' solicitor wrote to Hera's solicitor and confirmed that the ANZ Bank would need to sight a copy of the Council signed approved plan of subdivision and requested if it could be made available as a matter of urgency. In relation to the recent request made by Hera's solicitor that the vendors should pay the costs associated with the subdivision, the vendors' solicitor stated:
In relation to the Vendor paying the costs associated with the subdivision, this is not the case, see Special Condition 2(a) which makes it plain that the purchaser must do all things reasonably required to procure registration of the Plan of Subdivision. The only obligation of the Vendor is pursuant to Special Condition 2(c) which relates to the purchaser having access to the property for the purpose indicated. Statement of Compliance will be required to be issued by the Council to enable registration of the Plan of Subdivision.
Accordingly, once we receive a copy of the signed, approved and certified Plan of Subdivision and the payment of the deposit we will request the Bank to make the Certificate of Title available and no doubt the ANZ Bank will require fees to be paid in relation to their consent.
It seems to us that the delays in this matter lie with your client.
118 On 13 August 2015, Hera's new solicitor, Russell Kennedy Lawyers, wrote to the vendors' solicitor to inform them that they now act for Hera in relation to the contract of sale. They stated that Hera is 'ready, willing and able to fulfil its obligations under the Contract' and 'has the finance in place to pay the balance of the Contract sum as soon as the vendors are able to give clear title to Lot 1.' They maintained that as the vendors had, in the past, caused delay and continue to do so, Hera will hold them 'responsible for any loss and damage caused by their delays, including any inability to complete if its financiers pull out of the project by reason of the vendors' delays.' They contended, relying upon special condition 10, that the vendors are required to meet the conditions set out in the planning permit, and noted that special condition 8 'requires a mutual decision to terminate.' Further they stated:
In any event, due to the delays caused by your clients, the prevention principle means that the time for the purchaser to complete is at large. Please confirm that the vendors will not seek to unilaterally terminate the Contract pursuant to SC8 on 25 August 2015 or any time thereafter.
119 Hera's solicitors then put forward the following offer on a 'without prejudice' basis and as a means of achieving a practical resolution of the dispute:
The 'offer' was open to be accepted by the vendors until noon the next day, failing which Hera would commence proceedings.
120 The vendors' solicitor wrote to Russell Kennedy Lawyers rejecting the offer of settlement. In essence, the vendors contended that Hera was obliged to use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the plan of subdivision, including 'preparing all the documents and paying any costs involved in complying with the Planning Permit'. Further, they maintained that 'if the Plan of Subdivision is not registered by 25 August either party may terminate the contract.'
121 As noted in the introduction, on 17 August 2015, the vendors commenced this proceeding against Hera by way of Originating Motion, seeking answers to questions about the Contract of Sale pursuant to s 49(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic).[57] Following the determination of Question 1 by Cameron J, the substantive proceeding was set down for hearing. As there were likely to be disputed evidentiary matters, as well as the disputed claim for rectification, orders were made on 20 November 2015 for pleadings to be filed and served articulating all of the matters sought to be raised at the trial including in respect of the vendors' claim for rectification.
122 In the prayer for relief set out in their Statement of Claim, the vendors claimed declaratory relief as to the proper construction of special condition 8, alternatively that the contract be rectified so as to read 'If the said plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 either party may, by notice in writing to the other, end this contract.' Further, they sought a declaration that, on its true construction, apart from any Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution Payment, special condition 10 does not require the plaintiffs [vendors] to make any payment to a third party that is necessary to be made to secure the registration of the plan of subdivision.
123 Hera filed a defence and counterclaim[58] denying the factual basis for the rectification claim and contending that upon execution of the new contract the vendors and Hera became bound by the new contract in accordance with its terms and each believed and intended that they were bound by the terms of the new contract as executed. In particular, Hera contended that on its proper construction, special condition 10 of the new contract required the vendors 'to comply with the conditions imposed by any responsible authority upon the plaintiffs as a condition of a statement of compliance being issued in respect of the proposed subdivision of 1 Adrian Street, Cranbourne' and to comply with the conditions of the planning permit as issued permitting the subdivision of 1 Adrian Street, Cranbourne. Further or alternatively, Hera pleads that in order to give business efficacy to the new contract and or by operation of law, there were implied terms of the new contract to similar effect. Hera also contends that there was delay on the part of the vendors both in respect of the application for an Urban Design Framework and in respect of the registration of the plan of subdivision such that the vendors are disentitled by their own conduct from seeking equitable relief in respect of the new contract. A host of declaratory relief is sought, including relief extending the time for registration of the plan of subdivision.
124 The trial commenced on 7 December 2015 and occupied five hearing days.
Background to the construction questions that arise under the new contract
The Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic)
125 The Sale of Land (Allotments) Act 1985 (Vic) was introduced to make amendments to the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic) so as to facilitate the sale of land prior to the approval of a plan of subdivision or strata subdivision and simplify the procedures involved in the resealing of plans of subdivisions.
126 In the early 1980's, the subdivision of land process in Victoria had been under review following the report of the Subdivision of Land Task Force. One recommendation of the Task Force that the Government was apparently willing to move on without awaiting the preparation of a complete subdivision package was 'that legislation should be enacted to permit the sale of allotments before the plan of subdivision is approved by the Registrar of Titles.'[59] A working party was established to consider the feasibility and need for the pre-selling of land. In its report, the working party 'recommended that pre-selling of allotments should take place, provided that the legislation contained certain safeguards for the purchaser.'[60]
127 At that time, under the existing law, pre-selling could occur where land was to be divided into not more than two allotments. The second reading speech for the Bill which introduced the Act records that concern had been expressed that the inclusion of two lot subdivisions under the proposed new law could cause problems and so it was 'agreed that the existing law relating to two-lot plans will be unaffected, and the new proposed legislation will apply where the land is to be subdivided into three or more allotments.'[61] Otherwise, the conditions that would apply to the sale of lots on un-registered plans of subdivision were relevantly as follows:
128 In the Second Reading speech, the Minister for Local Government, in commending the Bill to the Legislative Assembly said:
The inbuilt safety mechanisms in the Bill will ensure that a purchaser is protected, so far as possible, until the plan of subdivision is approved and the sale is settled. The flexibility provided will also aid the developer of the land.[62]
The operation of the Sale of Land Act in its current form
129 In its current form, the general provisions contained in the Sale of Land Act concerning the sale and subdivision of land apply to all subdivisions not merely those of three lots or more. It is evident from a perusal of those provisions that the scheme of the Act continues to be one of providing significant protection for purchasers of lots on unregistered plans of subdivision.
130 Under s 9AA(1), a vendor cannot sell a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision unless the contract provides that the deposit moneys payable by the purchaser are to be paid to a legal practice and held in trust for the purchaser until registration of the plan of subdivision, and the 'deposit moneys'[63] payable under the contract do not exceed 10 per cent of the purchase price of the lot. Section 9AE sets out provisions concerning the rescission of a 'prescribed contract', being relevantly a contract of the kind referred to in s 9AA(1) for the sale of a lot prior to the registration of the plan of subdivision. Relevantly for present purposes, s 9AE(2) provides that if the plan of subdivision is not registered within 18 months after the date of the prescribed contract, or if the contract specifies another period, then before the end of that specified period, 'the purchaser may, at any time before the expiration of that period but before the plan is so registered, rescind the contract.'
131 Section 9AF(1) deals with the repayment of deposit moneys in the event of rescission of a prescribed contract by the vendor (as a result of default by the purchaser) or by the purchaser (as a result of default by the vendor or pursuant to ss 9AC[64] or 9AE[65]). However, s 9AF(2) expressly provides that nothing in s 9AF(1) 'shall limit or affect the power of the court' to order the repayment of the deposit moneys or to relieve a purchaser against the forfeiture of the deposit.
132 Section 14 renders void any agreement under which a person purports to waive any rights they may have under the Act.
133 The 2012 contract concerned the sale of a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision. Hence, s 9AA of the Sale of Land Act applied, and the contract was a 'prescribed contract' for the purposes of s 9AE of the Act.
134 The 2012 contract provided that settlement was due to take place on 31 December 2012 'unless the land is a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision, in which case settlement is due on the above date or 14 days after the vendor gives notice to the purchaser of registration of the plan, whichever is later.' Accordingly, it was necessary for a plan of subdivision to be prepared and registered before settlement could take place. As at 25 November 2014, when the mediation of the County Court proceeding took place, the plan of subdivision had not been registered and it remained the position that only the initial instalment of the deposit, namely the sum of $10,000.00 that was payable on signing, had been paid.
135 Mr Bisognin gave evidence to the effect that he was concerned about the lack of progress that had been made by Joslin and Hera under the 2012 contract. He said that by the time the mediation took place, 'the whole thing had been lingering on for over two years' and the most important thing for the vendors at the mediation was to ensure that any settlement they reached contained an 'end date'.[66]
136 As noted earlier, the mediation was successful and Terms of Settlement were entered into recording the agreement reached between the parties. Relevantly, the parties agreed that a new special condition was to be added to the provisions set out in the 2012 contract, as follows:
If the said plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 either party may, by notice in writing to the other, end this contract.[67]
137 Under the 2012 contract, Hera was already subject to special condition 3(a), requiring it to 'use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure registration of the said Plan [of subdivision]'. But under the Terms of Settlement another new special condition was to be added, requiring the vendors also to use their 'best endeavours', as follows:
[The vendors] will use their best endeavours to co-operate with [Hera], sign all documents and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval and registration of the plan of subdivision and to give effect to the UDF including making the duplicate title available for the purposes of registration, and will make any GAIC payment promptly if required by the relevant authority.[68]
138 Under the Terms of Settlement the parties also agreed that the 2012 contract would remain in full force and effect, and with the variations as agreed in the Terms of Settlement 'incorporated into the old contract, until execution of the new contract'[69] by the vendors and Hera.
139 When the provision enabling either party to end the contract if the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015 is read together with the parties having subjected themselves to use their respective 'best endeavours', it is clear that the Terms of Settlement (and the new contract that was to follow) were directed to procuring registration of the plan of subdivision in a timely way but if that were not achieved by 25 August 2015 then either party could bring the contract to an end. In the absence of such a provision providing a mechanism for termination of the contract, the vendor generally could not do anything with the land and the purchaser would remain bound by the contract and could not recover its deposit.
140 When the new contract was engrossed, however, the terms in which special condition 8 was expressed did not conform with the wording that had been agreed in the Terms of Settlement. Special condition 8 provided as follows:
If the said Plan of Subdivision is not registered by 25th August 2015, then the parties may by notice in writing to each other end this Contract of Sale.
141 If the words of special condition 8 are construed literally, termination of the new contract could take place only if both parties agreed. Under cross-examination, the vendors' solicitor, Mr Waters, agreed that as written in the new contract the wording of special condition 8 would require both parties to agree before the contract could be terminated.[70] He added that such an outcome 'is really nonsensical once you look at ... when you look at the terms of settlement.'[71]
142 Save for the evidence given by Mr Waters, there is no direct evidence about how the change in wording occurred. What is clear, however, is that having entered into the Terms of Settlement, the parties did not thereafter discuss any change to the wording of that special condition.
Approach to the construction of the new contract
143 In their recent decisions in Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd[72] and in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited,[73] the High Court reaffirmed that an 'objective approach' is to be adopted in determining the rights and liabilities of parties to a contract and that the approach to construction enunciated in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales[74] by Mason J, with whom Stephen and Wilson JJ agreed, is to be followed. In Codelfa, Mason J stated the 'true rule' of construction as being:
[T]hat evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties...[75]
144 In Mount Bruce Mining, French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained the approach to be adopted as follows:[76]
[46] The rights and liabilities of parties under a provision of a contract are determined objectively[77], by reference to its text, context (the entire text of the contract as well as any contract, document or statutory provision referred to in the text of the contract) and purpose[78].
[47] In determining the meaning of the terms of a commercial contract, it is necessary to ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean[79]. That enquiry will require consideration of the language used by the parties in the contract, the circumstances addressed by the contract and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract[80].
[48] Ordinarily, this process of construction is possible by reference to the contract alone. Indeed, if an expression in a contract is unambiguous or susceptible of only one meaning, evidence of surrounding circumstances (events, circumstances and things external to the contract) cannot be adduced to contradict its plain meaning[81].
[49] However, sometimes, recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contract is necessary. It may be necessary in identifying the commercial purpose or objects of the contract where that task is facilitated by an understanding "of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating"[82]. It may be necessary in determining the proper construction where there is a constructional choice. The question whether events, circumstances and things external to the contract may be resorted to, in order to identify the existence of a constructional choice, does not arise in these appeals.
[50] Each of the events, circumstances and things external to the contract to which recourse may be had is objective. What may be referred to are events, circumstances and things external to the contract which are known to the parties or which assist in identifying the purpose or object of the transaction, which may include its history, background and context and the market in which the parties were operating. What is inadmissible is evidence of the parties' statements and actions reflecting their actual intentions and expectations.[83]
[51] Other principles are relevant in the construction of commercial contracts. Unless a contrary intention is indicated in the contract, a court is entitled to approach the task of giving a commercial contract an interpretation on the assumption "that the parties ... intended to produce a commercial result".[84] Put another way, a commercial contract should be construed so as to avoid it "making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience".[85]
145 In adopting an 'objective approach', the court, when construing the terms of a commercial contract, will look to what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the contract to mean. In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd,[86] the High Court said '[w]hat matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe'[87] and that normally requires 'consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.'[88] A few years later, in Electricity Generation, a differently constituted High Court also reiterated and endorsed the view expressed by Mason J in Codelfa that the ascertainment or understanding of the commercial purpose or objects of the contract 'is facilitated by an understanding "of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context [and] the market in which the parties are operating"'.[89] In their joint judgment, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ explained that a commercial contract should be construed by considering 'the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract'[90] so as to avoid arriving at a result that could not have been intended. Further, their Honours endorsed the observations of Arden LJ in Re Golden Key Ltd (in rec)[91] to the effect that a court is entitled to approach the task of interpreting a commercial contract 'on the assumption "that the parties ... intended to produce a commercial result"' and stated that a court is to construe a commercial contract 'so as to avoid it "making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience."'[92]
146 In seeking to give a commercial contract an interpretation that would promote and give effect to the notion that the parties intended to produce a commercial result, however, a court must also ensure that by having regard to the context and surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, it does not impermissibly depart from the meaning of the words used by the parties merely because it regards the result as inconvenient or unjust.[93]
147 Against this background, in their joint judgment in Mount Bruce Mining, Kiefel and Keane JJ referred to the notion that 'ambiguity' is the criterion or gateway that permits a Court to go beyond the text of the document and have regard to 'surrounding circumstances' in the process of arriving at the proper construction of a provision of a contract and observed that:
148 The relevant concept of 'ambiguity' in the context of contractual construction has received surprisingly little detailed attention by the courts.[96] It will be recalled that in Mount Bruce Mining, the question of whether it was necessary to resort to events, circumstances and things external to the contract 'in order to identify the existence of a constructional choice' did not arise.[97] But in the earlier case of Royal Botanic Gardens Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council,[98] some consideration of the concept of ambiguity was required. There, cl 4(b)(iv) of the lease for the Domain underground car parking station provided that 'the Trustees may have regard to additional costs and expenses which they may incur in regard to the surface of the Domain above or in the vicinity of the parking station and the footway and which arise out of the construction operation and maintenance of the parking station by the lessee'. Before the High Court, the question was whether the phrase 'the Trustees may have regard to additional costs and expenses' meant that the Trustees, in making a determination could not have regard to matters other than those additional costs and expenses. Alternatively, if the Trustees could have regard to other matters, what were they? In dealing with the task of construing such a phrase the plurality stated:
[9] In a context such as cl 4(b), to specify a particular matter to which a party may have regard without expressly stating either that it is the only such matter or, to the contrary, that the specification does not limit the generality of the matters to which regard may be had is likely to result in ambiguity. It does so in the present case. The resolution of the ambiguity requires the application of settled principles of construction.[99]
149 That statement appears against a background where, in the court below, Spigelman CJ had expressed the view that in the context outlined by Mason J in Codelfa:
the word "ambiguity" - ironically a word not without its own difficulties - does not refer only to a situation in which the words used have more than one meaning. A broader concept of ambiguity is involved: reference to surrounding circumstances is permissible whenever the intention of the parties is, for whatever reason, doubtful. (C/f with reference to a similar issue in the context of statutory interpretation: Bowtell v Goldsborough Mort & Co Ltd [1905] HCA 60; (1905) 3 CLR 444 at 456-477; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273, at 287-288; Cross on Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed 1995) pp 83-84; and my Sir Ninian Stephen Lecture "Statutory Interpretation: Identifying the Linguistic Register" to be published in the Newcastle Law Review, accessible at www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/sc.).[\[100\]](#fn100)
150 Spigelman CJ reiterated this view in Gardiner v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd[101] in 2007.[102] In 2011, when writing extra-judicially, his Honour drew attention to the fact that there is 'no authoritative decision on the distinction in Codelfa between the word "ambiguous" and the subsequent phrase "or susceptible of more than one meaning"'[103] and said:
I have expressed the view that the latter should be distinguished from the former, so that reference to extrinsic materials is permissible not only on the basis of a lexical or verbal ambiguity and/or grammatical or syntactical ambiguity, but extends to any situation in which the interpretation is for any reason doubtful. What his Honour had in mind, in my opinion, was something along the lines of the traditional distinction between patent and latent ambiguity...[104]
151 More recently, in the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Ritter v Keatley Real Estate Pty Ltd trading as Mt Gambier First National,[105] Stanley J considered the concept of ambiguity and expressed a somewhat narrower view, as follows:
The concept of ambiguity referred to by Mason J in Codelfa is not without its difficulties. The disjunctive reference to language which is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning suggests that the concept of ambiguity is broader than the concept of a word or phrase susceptible of more than one meaning. This may reflect an intention to include concepts of patent, latent and inherent ambiguity. The dictionary definition of "ambiguous" includes the following meanings: "open to various interpretations", "equivocal", "doubtful", "uncertain", "having a double meaning", "obscure", "indistinct", and "lacking clarity". In Gardiner v Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd Spigelman CJ said that ambiguity "... extend[s] to any situation in which the scope and applicability of the formulation [is], for whatever reason, doubtful." In my view, the Mason J formulation in Codelfa is directed to circumstances in which an exclusively textual analysis of the language of a contract produces uncertainty as to the meaning of the contractual provision.[106]
152 In Technomin Australia Pty Ltd v Xstrata Nickel Australasia Operations Pty Ltd,[107] McLure P (with whom Newnes JA agreed) discussed the 'gateway requirement' and supported a broader view of the concept of ambiguity:
The gateway requirement
[73] For the purpose of the gateway requirement, 'ambiguity' means any situation in which the scope or applicability of a contract is, for whatever reason, doubtful: Bowtell v Goldsbrough, Mort & Co Ltd [1905] HCA 60; (1905) 3 CLR 444, 456-457. It is not confined to lexical, grammatical or syntactical ambiguity: Hancock Prospecting[108].
[74] The fact that adversaries can formulate and advance materially different constructions of the language of a contract does not itself satisfy the gateway requirement. Having regard to the language of the contract as a whole and what can be gleaned from that source as to the contractual purpose, competing constructions must be reasonably arguable.[109]
153 In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd,[110] the broader view of the concept of ambiguity expressed by McLure P in Technomin Australia is consistent with the views expressed in a number of earlier Western Australian cases: see McCourt v Cranston,[111] Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd,[112] Red Hill Iron Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd,[113] Vincent Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission,[114] Acorn Consolidated Pty Ltd v Hawkslade Investments Pty Ltd.[115]
154 In Acorn Consolidated, the court was concerned with the construction of a clause setting out the purchase price of a parcel of land under a standard form contract. On the settlement date the parties disagreed as to the correct interpretation, and settlement did not take place. Each party then sought declarations as to the true construction of the contract, and in the alternative, rectification. One of the difficulties raised before the court was the extent to which the absurdity or injustice of a particular construction could govern the interpretation of the contract. Owen J outlined the issue, and after referring to the relevant principles, including those enunciated by Gibbs J in Australian Performing Rights Association[116] said:
It is quite consistent with the dicta in Australian Performing Rights Association that where there is an ambiguity, or where two possible meanings are open, the contract will be construed in the way that will best avoid an absurd or unjust result. See Watson v Phipps (1985) 60 ALJR 1 at 3. But what is the nature of the ambiguity which must be found before resort can be had to the possible "result"?[117]
155 His Honour referred to Mason J's 'true rule of construction' enunciated in Codelfa, noting that Mason J pointed out that 'interpretation of a contract proceeds on the presumed, rather than actual, intention of the parties'.[118] His Honour then observed that 'the real difficulty lies in identifying the intellectual process by which the court decides, in the first instance, whether there is an ambiguity.'[119] Owen J canvassed the English authorities to which he had been referred, principally Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan,[120] Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd[121] and Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,[122] noting that 'cases such as Prenn v Simmonds,[123] Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd v L Schuler AG[124] and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen[125] on which so much of the reasoning of Lords Steyn [in Mannai Investment Co] and Hoffman [in Investors Compensation Scheme] depends, were referred to with apparent approval by Mason J in Codelfa.'[126] His Honour then referred to some Australian authority - Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd v Withers,[127] B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Brian Cheeseman & Associates Pty Ltd[128] and Trawl Industries of Australia Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd[129] - in which he said 'a more relaxed approach' had been taken, and proceeded to describe what, in his view, is the proper approach, as follows:
I think the proper approach is to look first at the instrument itself to see whether there is some reasonable basis for apprehension that the wording of the contract might not necessarily reflect the presumed intention of the parties.
The English language being what it is, such a reasonable apprehension will generally be apparent "in many if not most cases": see Trawl Industries (at 358), per Clarke JA. It may come from a patent and obvious confusion in the words themselves. But it may also come from a reading of the instrument as a whole. The law has long recognised that ambiguity can be latent, as well as patent: see, e.g., Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd (In liq) v Joseph Nathan & Co Ltd [1919] HCA 18; (1919) 26 CLR 410 at 451-452. Once the door is open so to speak, extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist in identifying and resolving the ambiguity by introducing material that puts the court in the position of reasonable persons, circumscribed as the parties were, so as to appreciate what they would have had in mind.[130]
156 Decisions such as Royal Botanic Gardens demonstrate that the relevant concept of ambiguity is broader than the concept of a word or phrase that is susceptible of more than one meaning. In my view, the relevant concept of ambiguity extends at least to the situation where a textual analysis of the language used in the contract reveals or gives rise to uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision, or apprehension that the wording of the contract might not reflect the presumed intention of the parties. In Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,[131] Gibbs J observed that 'language read in its context, very often proves to be ambiguous'.[132] And of course, the perception of what is ambiguous may well 'differ from one judicial eye to the other'.[133]
157 In my view, the relevant concept of ambiguity expressed by McLure P in Technomin Australia and the approach to the identification of ambiguity outlined by Owen J in Acorn Consolidated, taken together, represent a sensible, coherent and pragmatic approach, especially given that courts nowadays are required to conduct civil proceedings in a manner that will facilitate the fair and just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of 'the real issues in dispute'.[134]
The rival contentions advanced by the respective parties
158 Hera says that the words of special condition 8 of the new contract are clear and their meaning is plain. It contends that no ambiguity arises which would permit the Court to have regard to the context and surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction.
159 The vendors, on the other hand, maintain that the introduction of the 'best endeavours' clauses and the short time frame in which to register the plan of subdivision raise an ambiguity in special condition 8 in that the literal meaning of special condition 8 is inconsistent with the parties' intention to obtain prompt registration of the plan of subdivision. They contend that this ambiguity permits the Court to examine the Terms of Settlement and in particular the terms of cl 2(f) thereof (which added what became special condition 8 of the new contract) and the requirement that this special condition be included in the new contract. The vendors also referred to the decision of the High Court in Upper Hunter District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd,[135] where Barwick CJ said that in searching for the parties' intentions 'no narrow or pedantic approach is warranted, particularly in the case of commercial arrangements'.[136] The vendors submitted that if, contrary to the view expressed by Barwick CJ, 'a narrow or pedantic approach' were taken to the construction of special condition 8 of the new contract, such that termination could only take place if both parties agreed, then:
(a) a party that for economic necessity or any other reason wanted to end the contract could be seriously inconvenienced for a long period of time after 25 August 2015 until the Contract of Sale could be terminated on the basis of common law principles;
(b) SC8 would be otiose because the parties could always agree to terminate the Contract of Sale.[137]
160 In other words, the vendors argue that if the Court were to adopt a literal or 'narrow or pedantic approach' of the kind contended for by Hera, it would result in a construction that makes no commercial sense or works commercial inconvenience and produce a result that could not have been intended by the parties.
161 Further, the vendors contend that their construction of special condition 8 of the new contract does not conflict with the position that applies under the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic). They accept that by selling the southern lot on the proposed (unregistered) plan of subdivision under a contract where the stated deposit (of $1,000,000.00) exceeded 10 per cent of the total purchase price ($3,600,000.00) they breached s 9AA(1)(b) of the Act. The vendors acknowledge that such a breach entitles Hera to 'rescind' the contract under s 9AE of the Act at any time before registration of the plan of subdivision, in which event Hera would be entitled to the immediate return of the deposit moneys paid,[138] but they maintain that until rescission takes place, the contract remains enforceable by the vendors.[139]
162 Further, the vendors submit that if by way of reliance on special condition 8 they were successful in bringing the new contract to an end, then the ending of the contract would be in futuro and not ab initio, with the consequence that there remained contractual rights and obligations subsisting prior to termination and that the operation of s 9AE cannot be defeated by such termination.[140] This would entail the consequence that even after the vendors ended the new contract, Hera would not be precluded from exercising the statutory right to 'rescind' under s 9AE and could nevertheless proceed under s 9AF(1)(b) to recover the deposit of $10,000.00 that it has paid. The vendors also accept that they could not rely upon special condition 7 of the new contract[141] as a basis for retaining the deposit of $10,000.00.
Conclusion on the proper construction of special condition 8 of the new contract
163 In my view, (and adopting the language of Owen J), there is a reasonable basis for apprehension that the wording of special condition 8 of the new contract might not necessarily reflect the presumed intention of the parties. Viewed objectively, the plain words of special condition 8 show that the parties intended to include in their new contract a clause which would provide a mechanism for bringing the contract to an end. Yet the words of the clause, as drafted, do no more than present an opportunity on and from 25 August 2015 for the parties to mutually agree to bring the contract to an end, which was a course that was always open to them. In the terms in which special condition 8 appears in the new contract, the clause is patently an ineffective mechanism for ending the contract and would work commercial inconvenience - that is, because (as the vendors contend) a party who wished to bring the contract to an end could be seriously inconvenienced for a long period of time after 25 August 2015 until the contract could be terminated on the basis of common law principles. Accordingly, if construed literally, special condition 8 is anomalous and makes no commercial sense and produces a result that could not reasonably have been intended by the parties. Further, the Sale of Land Act itself recognises the need for the contract to be able to brought to an end in circumstances where the plan of subdivision is not registered in a timely way. Section 9AE(2) provides a mechanism whereby a purchaser may rescind a contract of sale of a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision if the plan of subdivision is not registered within 18 months after the date of the prescribed contract. But there is no similar provision enabling a vendor to bring the contract to an end.
164 In the present case, the new contract came into existence as a direct result of the parties having entered into Terms of Settlement directed to clarifying aspects of the 2012 contract and their respective obligations and imposing a 'sunset clause' or end date. Viewed objectively, it is clear from the Terms of Settlement that the parties regarded the ability to bring the contract to an end as a commercial imperative, and each side was to use their best endeavours and take steps directed to achieving the registration of the plan of subdivision promptly within the ensuing nine months failing which the contract could be brought to an end by either party.
165 If the words of special condition 8 of the new contract are construed literally, and without regard to the genesis of the transaction and the commercial purpose for which the new contract was entered into, termination of the new contract could take place only if the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015 and both parties agreed to end it. But such a construction is patently at odds with the parties' objective intentions as manifested in the Terms of Settlement.
166 Furthermore, the parties expressly agreed that until such time as the new contract was executed, the 2012 contract 'remains in full force and effect and the variations described in paragraphs 2(c) to 2(h) are incorporated in the [2012 contract] until execution of the New Contract'. Thus, if the new contract were to be construed literally, the vendors would move, seemingly inexplicably, from a position where (after the Terms of Settlement were entered into but prior to execution of the new contract) it was possible for them to end the contract unilaterally after 25 August 2015 to one where (following execution of the new contract) they could do so only by agreement with Hera. And if Hera did not agree, there was no contractual mechanism readily available to the vendors that would permit them to bring the contract to an end even though the plan of subdivision had not been registered. Such an outcome is unworkable and uncommercial and is unlikely to be one that was intended by the parties.
167 The task of the Court is to produce a commercial result and to construe the parties' commercial contract 'so as to avoid it "making commercial nonsense or working commercial inconvenience."'[142] In the present case, that objective is to be achieved by construing special condition 8 in the context in which the new contract was made and to reflect the presumed intention of the parties, namely as enabling the contract to be brought to an end in the event that the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015, by either party giving notice in writing to the other.
In the alternative, the vendors seek rectification of special condition 8 or rescission of the new contract
168 The vendors submit that if, contrary to their primary submission, the Court were to find that, on its proper construction, special condition 8 of the new contract operated such that the contract could only be brought to an end under that clause if both parties agreed, then they seek rectification of special condition 8 on the basis of mutual mistake; alternatively rectification or rescission on the basis of unilateral mistake.
169 Given the views I have formed on the construction issue, it is not strictly necessary to decide the rectification issue, but I do so for completeness lest the matter go further.
Relevant legal principles concerning rectification
170 In my recent reasons for decision in Fitzgerald & Humphris v CBL Insurance Ltd[143] I set out the relevant legal principles concerning rectification. Rather than restating them again in full here, I will rely on what I said in those reasons and simply summarise the essential principles below.
171 Where, by mistake, a written instrument does not accord with the intention of the parties who executed it, a court of equity has power to order that the instrument be rectified so as to make it accord with the true intention of the party, or the shared intention of the parties, at the time it was executed.[144] Rectification is not a mechanism for the reformulation of an agreement expressed in a document; rather it is a remedy which 'cures erroneous expression of the parties' true intention in a contract which is already binding'.[145] Rectification is a discretionary remedy and ordinarily it will not be decreed where the desired result could be achieved by some other means, such as proper construction.
172 In Club Cape Schanck Resort Co Ltd v Cape Country Club Pty Ltd,[146] the Court of Appeal explained the traditional view of rectification that courts in Victoria have adhered to. Phillips JA said:
... I venture to suggest that the principle upon which rectification depends always remains the same; it depends in every case upon a want of correspondence between the form of the document (that is, in the words actually used) and the common intention of the parties at the time when the document is executed. Where the disconformity is the product of a common mistake, that mistake may be as to what words have been employed in the document or the meaning or effect of such words as appear. But whatever the common mistake, the lack of correspondence must be between the form of the document and the common intention, if rectification is to be available. ... The result in any given case will depend upon whether in the particular circumstances of that case there is (as a matter of fact) the requisite disconformity between the document as executed and the common intention of the parties. It is not enough that the parties have made a mistake about their document (whether the mistake be about the words used, their meaning or their effect); that mistake may serve to explain such disconformity (if any) as is seen to exist, but it cannot be a substitute for it.[147]
173 Tadgell JA reached the same conclusion but elaborated on the legal basis for doing so. His Honour reinforced the notion that rectification will be ordered only to give effect to the common intention of the parties as shown. He said:
... since the equitable doctrine of rectification exists for the purpose, in effect, of ordering actually or notionally the textual amendment of a document, it will not be available to achieve the amendment of a particular document just because the document is shown not to conform with a common intention of the parties to it. It must be shown further that words or expressions or other text inserted into or deleted from the document would give effect to the common intention.[148]
174 Chernov JA likewise agreed that the appeal should be allowed, essentially for the reasons advanced by Phillips JA. His Honour pointed out that unlike the situation that applied in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Carlenka Pty Ltd,[149] the document in question in Club Cape Schanck Resort, upon its true construction, did not wrongly misstate the parties' intention. Thus, there was no basis on which the court could properly rectify the terms of settlement.[150] Further, he said, the rectification ordered could not stand because it does not reflect what the parties agreed to do.[151]
The mutual mistake contended for by the vendors
175 The vendors contend that the present case is a clear instance of mutual mistake, requiring the Court's intervention to rectify special condition 8 of the new contract so as to reflect the agreement that the parties made when they entered into the Terms of Settlement on 25 November 2014. They submit that when both parties executed the new contract they did so in the mistaken belief that it correctly recorded or reflected the agreement they had reached at the mediation on 25 November 2014, and in particular that special condition 8 of the new contract was consistent with the terms of the proposed special condition 9 as set out in the Terms of Settlement.
176 The mediation was attended by Mr and Mrs Bisognin and their solicitor, Mr Waters, and also by Mr Nikolaos Konstandellos, who is the appointed representative of Hera[152] and the father in law of Mr John Kaziakouras, the director of Hera, together with Hera's solicitors, Mr Laki Tasiopoulos and Mr Nick Lambros. The Terms of Settlement were prepared at the end of the mediation by Mr David Lloyd, the vendors' barrister, and were signed by each of Mr and Mrs Bisognin and by Mr Konstandellos.
177 The vendors' solicitor, Mr Waters, gave evidence that following the mediation he prepared a handwritten draft of the special conditions applicable to the new contract which correctly reflected what the parties had agreed in the Terms of Settlement. Mr Waters delegated the task of engrossing the new contract to his conveyancing clerk, Mr Ross Foenander, and did not himself check the new contract before it was sent to Mr Tasiopoulos, Hera's solicitor. Mr Tasiopoulos received the draft of the new contract on or about 19 December 2014.[153] He says that shortly after 19 February 2015 he re-read the draft of the new contract and noticed that the wording used in the special conditions was slightly different from the wording proposed in the Terms of Settlement. He requested some minor changes to the draft of the new contract but says he did not inform the vendors' solicitor of the difference because the change in wording 'did not disadvantage the Defendant'.[154] When the new contract was executed on 13 March 2015 it remained the case that special condition 8 did not reproduce the terms of special condition 9 of the Terms of Settlement.
178 As to signing of the new contract, Mr Bisognin said that while he was in Mr Waters' office, Mr Waters gave him the new contract to sign and so he signed it.[155] Mrs Bisognin said Mr Waters also gave the new contract to her to sign while she was in his office and she signed it after being told by him that 'it was the terms of settlement done at mediation litigation um referred to in the sunset clause'[156] and he said 'this is the contract for the terms of settlement.'[157]
179 The evidence adduced on behalf of Hera concerning signing was as follows. In his affidavit of 23 November 2015, Mr Tasiopoulos says:
......I re-read the proposed contract of sale. I noticed that the wording in the Special Conditions to the proposed contract of sale were slightly different from the wording proposed in the terms of settlement of 25 November 2014, but the changes did not disadvantage the Defendant.[158]
180 Mr Konstandellos, in his affidavit of 23 November 2015, said:
I relied upon Laki Tasiopoulos to inform me that it was in order to have the contract of sale in relation to the subject land executed by the Defendant. Laki Tasiopoulos forwarded the contract of sale to me for execution by the Defendant on or about 13 March 2015. I read the Special Conditions to the contract. I was happy with the contract. I asked John Kaziakouras to execute the contract of sale on or about 13 March 2015. He did so and returned it to me.[159]
181 Mr Kaziakouras signed the new contract on behalf of Hera. In his affidavit sworn on 3 December 2015, Mr Kaziakouras says:
I was not involved in the negotiations with the vendors on 25 November 2014. I signed the contract of sale of land dated 13 March 2015 when asked to do so by my father in law, as he told me the lawyers were happy with the documents.[160]
182 The vendors pointed out that there is no evidence before the Court to the effect that Mr Tasiopoulos told Mr Konstandellos (or Mr Kaziakouras) that the new contract departed from what had been agreed between the parties at the mediation and recorded in the Terms of Settlement.[161] They submitted that in those circumstances it is open to the Court to find that Mr and Mrs Bisognin on the one hand, and Mr Kaziakouras on the other, signed the new contract in the mistaken belief that it correctly recorded what had been agreed in the Terms of Settlement.
183 Hera contended that there was no evidence of any relevant 'mistake' made by Mr Waters. Hera was critical of the vendors for not having called Mr Foenander, the conveyancing clerk to whom Mr Waters delegated the task of transposing his handwritten version of the special conditions into a typewritten version, to give evidence. Hera submitted that the Court should infer that Mr Foenander's evidence would not assist the vendors and that the Court 'ought not to proceed on the basis that the changes were a mistake by the Plaintiffs' Solicitors, rather than deliberately and carefully chosen changes.'[162]
184 Further, Hera contended that the vendors' solicitor, by their conduct in forwarding the new contract to Hera's solicitor for execution was conduct which bound the vendors and was in the nature of an offer or variation which Hera accepted. To that end, during the opening of its case, Hera amended its defence to plead that the act of the vendors' solicitor in forwarding the new contract to Hera for execution '(a) constituted an offer by the plaintiffs to be bound to the defendant in accordance with the terms of the Contract, upon execution thereof; alternatively, (b) constituted an offer by the plaintiffs to vary the terms of the Contract'[163] and that 'upon execution of the Contract, the plaintiffs and the defendant became bound by the Contract in accordance with its terms; and the plaintiffs and the defendant believed that they were bound by the terms of the Contract.'[164] They also maintained that because rectification is an equitable remedy, the Court should refuse to grant the relief sought because the vendors 'do not come to the Court with clean hands'.[165]
Conclusion regarding rectification for mutual mistake
185 In my view, essentially for the reasons advanced by the vendors, it is clear that due to a mistake on the part of the vendors' solicitor the new contract failed to conform with, and reflect, the common intention of the parties. That is, I am satisfied that when both parties executed the new contract they did so in the mistaken belief that it correctly recorded or reflected the agreement they had reached at the mediation on 25 November 2014, and in particular that special condition 8 of the new contract was consistent with the terms of the proposed special condition 9 as set out in the Terms of Settlement. Further, it is clear that if special condition 8 were altered to read as follows it would give effect to their common intention:
If the said plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 either party may, by notice in writing to the other, end this contract.
186 In his evidence, Mr Waters explained that the handwritten draft he prepared correctly recorded the terms of proposed special condition 9 as special condition 8 but when the document was engrossed by, or under the supervision of, his conveyancing clerk an error was made and the draft of the new contract was dispatched to Hera's solicitor without the mistake being corrected. The discrepancy in the language used in special condition 8 of the draft new contract was not raised in correspondence or otherwise adverted to by Hera's solicitor and so Mr Waters remained unaware of the error at the time when the final form of the new contract was executed by the parties.
187 Further, insofar as the defendant appears to suggest that Mr Waters was not truthful or that his conveyancing clerk took instructions from Mr and Mrs Bisognin that were not consistent with the instructions given to Mr Waters, I reject that suggestion as fanciful and without any proper foundation. Mr Waters was the vendors' solicitor and there is no evidence that he gave any instructions to his conveyancing clerk to depart from the handwritten note he had prepared or to make any substantive changes to the terms of special condition 8. Having attended the mediation, Mr Waters was well aware that the vendors wanted the contract to either be performed or brought to an end as soon as may reasonably be achieved, and to that end the date of 25 August 2015 was agreed upon by the parties at the mediation as the effective 'end date'. Indeed, as the vendors point out, special condition 8 would have been unnecessary if it meant only that the parties could by mutual agreement terminate the contract. In those circumstances, it is inherently unlikely that either Mr and Mrs Bisognin or Mr Waters would have given instructions to the conveyancing clerk that would have been inimical to achieving that outcome.
188 For similar reasons, I regard Hera's contention that the changes made to special condition 8 would 'advantage the Plaintiffs by denying the Defendant the right to unilaterally terminate the agreement'[166] as untenable. If it were the case that the change in wording was advantageous to the vendors, and thus at least possibly disadvantageous to Hera, it is surprising that Mr Tasiopoulos 'took the view that the changes would be acceptable to his client.'[167] There is no evidence to suggest that he ever raised the issue with either Mr Konstandellos or Mr Kaziakouras.
189 Further, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis for Hera's contention that the act of the vendors' solicitor in forwarding the draft of the new contract containing the erroneous language in special condition 8 constituted an offer by the vendors to be bound to Hera in accordance with those erroneous terms upon execution thereof or an offer by the vendors to vary the terms of the contract, which Hera accepted. Hera accepts that 'there is no evidence that Mr and Mrs Bisognin and Mr Konstandellos (on behalf of Hera) re-negotiated the terms of Settlement after 25 November 2014'[168] but contends this is a situation where the vendors' solicitor ought reasonably be taken to have had instructions to put the draft contract forward. I do not agree. This was not a situation where the solicitors were negotiating the terms of an agreement. Rather, following the successful mediation, the task of the respective solicitors was to document the agreement that had been reached between the parties (as recorded in the Terms of Settlement) in the form of a new contract between the vendors and Hera.
190 Hera also sought to rely on special condition 6 of the new contract as a basis for denying rectification because third party rights, namely those of Media Movers, an entity apparently associated with Mr Parsons, might be affected. Special condition 6 of the new contract provides:
The terms of special condition 6 reflected correctly the terms of special condition 7 of the 2012 Contract. As the vendors submitted, had special condition 8 of the new contract reflected the terms of special condition 9 of the Terms of Settlement (as it should have done), either party could have terminated the new contract after 25 August 2015, so Media Movers does not lose or gain anything by reason of the rectification.
191 Finally, I reject Hera's contention that the Court should refuse to grant the relief sought because the vendors 'do not come to the Court with clean hands'. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that there is any conduct on the part of the vendors that would disentitle them being granted the rectification relief sought.
Alternatively, the vendors seek rectification of special condition 8 or rescission of the new contract on the basis of unilateral mistake
192 As I have found, in the alternative to construction, that the contract should be rectified because there was mutual mistake it is not necessary for me to determine the vendors' alternative case based on unilateral mistake. However, it is convenient to record in a summary way the arguments advanced and the views I have reached.
193 The vendors contend that if the Court were to find that the mistake was made by the vendors but not by the Hera, then the vendors are entitled to have the new contract set aside or rectified on the basis that it would be unconscionable or unconscientious for Hera to avail itself of the advantage thereby obtained.
Relevant principles concerning rectification for unilateral mistake
194 In Leibler v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 2)[169] Kenny JA (with whom Winneke P and Phillips JA agreed) conveniently summarized the principles which govern an application for rectification of a contract on the ground of unilateral mistake as follows:
If (1) one party, A, makes an agreement under a misapprehension that the agreement contains a particular provision which the agreement does not in fact contain; and (2) the other party, B, knows of the omission and that it is due to a mistake on A's part; and (3) lets A remain under the misapprehension and concludes the agreement on the mistaken basis in circumstances where equity would require B to take some step or steps, depending on those circumstances, to bring the mistake to A's attention; then (4) B will be precluded from relying upon A's execution of the agreement to resist A's claim for rectification to give effect to A's intention ....[170]
195 Kenny JA added that in summarising the elements that must be proved she had not overlooked that some of the authorities have described the elements in different terms, and where relevant, these differences were discussed later in her reasons.[171]
196 Further, her Honour noted, '[b]efore an order for rectification can be made on the ground of mistake, it must be shown, by convincing proof, that the respondents not only made a mistake but that the mistake was precisely the one identified by them for the purposes of their claim for rectification.' [172]
197 In Leibler, the relevant facts were that following negotiations, a draft agreement for the sale of half of the issued shares in a company was prepared containing a clause (cl 10.9) conferring on the purchasers a right of pre-emption in respect of the vendors' shareholding should the first appellant die or become incapacitated. In October 1985 it was agreed that the right of pre-emption would not arise should the first appellant's family succeed to his interests upon death and that cl 10.9 would be amended accordingly. However, the purchasers' solicitors mistakenly notified the vendors' solicitors to delete cl 10.9, which they did, knowing that a mistake had been made. The sale agreement was executed in December 1985. In early 1995, the purchasers made application for rectification of the sale agreement, contending that when the agreement was executed, the vendors knew that the purchasers were labouring under a misapprehension that cl 10.9 had been amended as agreed. The trial judge made orders for rectification of the sale agreement by reinstating cl 10.9 in a form reflecting the agreement reached in 1985.
198 On appeal by the vendors, the respondents' (purchasers') case was that they had executed the agreement in the mistaken belief that it contained a clause substantially in the form of cl 10.9 as it stood on 28 October 1985, but modified to take account of the agreement reached between the first appellant, Mr Isi Leibler, and Mr Geary on behalf of the respondents on that date.[173] The trial judge found that the respondents had executed the agreement under a misapprehension of this kind. The appellants submitted that this finding was erroneous and that his Honour should have found that, at the time of executing the agreement, the respondents knew that cl 10.9 had been deleted from the agreement and that they intended to execute the agreement as it stood on 12 December 1985.
199 One of the issues arising for determination on the appeal was whether the appellants 'knew' as at the date of execution of the agreement that the deletion of cl 10.9 was due to a mistake on the respondents' part. The respondents argued that the knowledge criterion would be satisfied if the evidence had shown no more than 'that Isi Leibler knew that there had probably been a mistake; or even that he strongly suspected that there had been a mistake; or even that he ought to have known that there had been a mistake.'[174] Whereas the case for the appellants 'rested on the proposition that actual knowledge of the mistake was necessary.'[175]
In Taylor v Johnson the majority, discussing the availability of rescission for unilateral mistake, referred to the sufficiency of awareness by the non-mistaken party "that circumstances exist which indicate that [the mistaken party] is entering into the contract under some serious mistake or misapprehension." See also Misiaris v Saydels Pty Ltd and Commonwealth v VL Investment Pty Ltd.[179]
But Kenny JA found it was not necessary for her to resolve that matter because 'the trial judge's finding was as to the appellants' actual knowledge' and in her view, 'that finding cannot be set aside, having regard to the fact that it depended very much on his Honour's estimation of the relevant witnesses'.[180] The Court of Appeal went on to affirm the decision of the trial judge, concluding that he had made all the findings necessary to sustain an order for rectification and there was no basis for challenging those findings on appeal.
201 In Misiaris v Saydels Pty Ltd, Young J said that 'it is enough that the defendant strongly suspects that the plaintiff has made a mistake of a fundamental nature about the contract for the court to provide the remedy of rectification.'[181] In Commonwealth v VL Investment Pty Ltd, Marks J held that a solicitor who, in an amended draft, drew attention to most of the alterations from the previous draft but not the one in question was guilty of sharp practice.
202 In the present case, the vendors also relied on the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tutt v Doyle.[182] The case involved the sale of a parcel of land where before completion, the vendor, to the knowledge of the purchasers, made a mistake as to the size of the lot to be transferred, with the result that the transfer registered by the purchaser gave him a larger lot than he had contracted for. The issue was whether the appellants (the purchasers) could retain the whole of the land conveyed to them. The trial judge held that they could not, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vendor was entitled to relief for unilateral mistake as it would be unconscionable for the purchasers to avail themselves of the advantage obtained. Further, the Court of Appeal held that as rescission was impracticable (because the appellants had built a house on the newly acquired strip of land), the Court could order re-transfer of an area of land equivalent to the excess.
203 In Tutt v Doyle there was no mistake in relation to the terms or effect of the contract of sale; rather the mistake related to the effect of the transfer delivered on settlement as a result of their earlier mistake in signing the plan of subdivision which enlarged lot 3063 to 2.76 hectares (from 2.2 hectares). Handley JA, with whom Meagher JA and Brownlie AJA agreed, referred to the principle in Taylor v Johnson (referred to by Kenny JA in Leibler (above)) concerning the availability of an order for rescission in cases where 'the other party is aware that circumstances exist which indicate that the first party is entering the contract under some serious mistake ... about either the content or subject matter of that term and deliberately sets out to ensure that the first party does not become aware of the existence of his mistake ....' Handley JA continued, to observe:
However the majority also endorsed wider principles which entitle a court of equity to grant relief for unilateral mistake in cases not covered by this principle. They approved (at 431) the statement by James LJ in Torrance v Bolton (1872) LR 8 Ch App 118 at 124, that the power to set aside a contract for unilateral mistake was based on the ordinary jurisdiction of equity "to deal with" any instrument or other transaction "in which the court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he has obtained". They also approved the decisions in Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul [1975] Ch 133 at 145 and Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd [1980] EWCA Civ 3; [1981] 1 WLR 505 at 514-516; [1980] EWCA Civ 3; [1981] 1 All ER 1077 at 1085-1086, where rectification, and not rescission, was granted on this ground. They noted (at 432) that in the United States and Canada:
"... the rule that relief from contractual obligations on the ground of unilateral mistake will be granted where enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable is well established."
In those jurisdictions relief is available where one party "knows that the other party ... might well be mistaken" or "had reason to know of" the other's mistake (at 432).[183]
204 Meagher JA also was of the view that because rescission was impossible, an order for re-conveyance of part of the land should be made.
205 In support of their claim for rectification or rescission of the new contract on the ground of unilateral mistake, the vendors rely upon the following evidence.
We refer to our letter of the 5 January 2015 and await receipt of the signed Contract of Sale and Section 32 in duplicate by way of exchange...
....please forward to us the final version Contract of Sale denoting John Kaziakouras as the guarantor.
....we require as a matter of urgency the amended Contract of Sale for execution and return to complete exchange. By way of clarification and to avoid confusion the "Payment of Balance" in the particulars of the contract should be amended to read "Payment of Residue.
....we request as a matter of urgency the amended Contract of Sale to complete exchange.
206 The vendors contend that Mr Tasiopoulos knew that special condition 8 as set out in in the signed new contract did not reproduce or correctly reflect the terms of special condition 9 as set out in the signed Terms of Settlement, which the parties had expressly agreed would be included in the new contract. The change in wording, if read literally, meant that the vendors could not bring the contract to an end if the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015. The vendors submit that Mr Tasiopoulos's statement that the changes 'did not disadvantage his client' is disingenuous because given the lack of progress by Joslin (between February 2012 and 26 July 2013) and Hera (between 26 July 2013 and 25 November 2014) in registering the plan of subdivision, the change in wording in special condition 8 could only advantage his client who had to use 'best endeavours and all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the said Plan...'. Furthermore, having attended the mediation as Hera's legal representative, Mr Tasiopoulos would have been in no doubt about the significant advantage that this change in wording conferred upon his client. And he knew that there had not been any discussions subsequent to the mediation about varying the language used in special condition 8 from that which had been agreed and recorded in the Terms of Settlement.
207 There was no evidence that Mr Tasiopoulos informed either Mr Konstandellos or Mr Kaziakouras of the change in the wording of special condition 8. He did not mention or raise it with the vendors' solicitors but did proceed to request that other minor changes be made. It appears that the vendors' solicitor first became aware of the discrepancy in the wording after they had commenced the present proceedings. No claim for rectification was raised in the Originating Motion and it appears that it was not until after the proceeding was commenced that the vendors became aware that they had been operating under a misapprehension as to what the terms of special condition 8 were, whereupon they issued their summons seeking rectification.
208 The vendors contend that Hera, through its solicitor Mr Tasiopoulos, was aware of the vendors' mistake, but did not correct the mistake, and permitted the new contract to be executed containing the mistake. The discrepancy in the wording of special condition 8, of which the vendors were unaware, would (unless rectified) operate to the vendors' disadvantage because it rendered it impossible for them to bring the contract to an end if the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015. In these circumstances, the vendors submitted that the Court should find that Hera has taken unconscientious advantage of their mistake, and order that they are entitled to have the new contract set aside.[184]
209 Hera advanced essentially the same arguments by way of response to both limbs of the vendors' alternate claims for rectification, save that in the case of the claim for unilateral mistake Hera's counsel contended that the vendors should have cross-examined Mr Tasiopoulos. That submission was effectively put forward on the basis of fairness, with Hera contending that the allegation made against Mr Tasiopoulos was a serious one, and tantamount to a suggestion that he had engaged in 'sharp practice', and thus was a matter that should have been put directly to Mr Tasiopoulos so that he could respond to it.
210 The vendors contended that there was no reason why they should have been required to cross-examine Mr Tasiopoulos. They submitted:
(a) Mr Tasiopoulos represented Hera at the mediation on 25 November 2014 at which the Terms of Settlement were signed;
(b) the Terms of Settlement required the parties to enter into a new contract which included terms prescribed in the Terms of Settlement;
(c) this was not a situation where the solicitors for the respective parties were negotiating an agreement: the terms of the new contract were fixed - no negotiation was required;
(d) on 19 December 2014 Mr Waters provided the draft of the new contract to Mr Tasiopoulos 'for comment';
(e) all that Mr Tasiopoulos had to do was ensure that the Terms of Settlement were accurately recorded in the draft of the new contract;
(f) despite recognising that special condition 8 of the new contract did not accord with the proposed special condition 9 set out in the Terms of Settlement, Mr Tasiopoulos said nothing and in March 2015 requested his own amendment.
Conclusion on the vendors' alternate claims for rectification and rescission for unilateral mistake
211 As noted earlier, given the views I have formed about the vendors' claim for rectification on the basis of mutual mistake it is not necessary for me to determine this issue. Suffice it to say, on the evidence before me I find it somewhat surprising that Mr Tasiopoulos did not raise or draw to the attention of the vendors' solicitor the discrepancy in the language used in special condition 8 at or about the time he first noticed it, which he says was shortly after 19 February 2015.[185] Nevertheless, I would not lightly make a finding of 'unconscientious conduct', particularly in circumstances where Mr Tasiopoulos has not been given a proper opportunity to address the allegation.
212 In this regard, the position is that his affidavits filed on behalf of Hera were sworn on 4 November and 23 November 2015. When the latter affidavit addressing the drafting of the contract was filed, the vendors had not alleged rectification or rescission for unilateral mistake, that claim having been made for the first time in their reply and defence to counterclaim filed on 3 December 2015. Mr Tasiopoulos (and his firm) ceased acting as Hera's solicitor just prior to 13 August 2015, when Russell Kennedy Lawyers were engaged. As Mr Tasiopoulos's affidavits were tendered by Hera at the trial without the vendors requiring him to attend for cross-examination, he personally was denied the opportunity to say anything further in response to the vendors' claim that he had engaged in 'unconscientious conduct'. In my view, if the vendors wished to pursue those allegations, notions of fairness required that they be put directly to him.
213 It would also appear to be the case that Mr Tasiopoulos did not inform either Mr Konstandellos or Mr Kaziakouras of the change in the wording of special condition 8. It seems that, at least until recently, they too remained unaware that the new contract did not reflect correctly the Terms of Settlement and purported to require a mutual decision to terminate. However, once they were apprised of the wording of special condition 8 of the new contract, it appears that they have embraced the arguments advanced on Hera's behalf in these proceedings rather than acknowledging that there was any mutual mistake capable of providing a foundation for the vendors' claim for rectification.
Was it open to the vendor to terminate the new contract on 25 August 2015 if the plan of subdivision was not registered by that date?
214 Hera contends that in the event the Court finds, contrary to its submission, that special condition 8 did enable either party to bring the contract to an end, the vendors cannot in the circumstances avail themselves of that right. It says the vendors have breached their obligations under special conditions 9 and 10 of the new contract to use their best endeavours to co-operate with Hera, to sign all documents and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision and to the UDF, including making the duplicate certificate of title available at the Land Titles Office. Their failure to do so, Hera submits, prevents the vendors from unilaterally ending the contract because of non-registration of the plan of subdivision by 25 August 2015 as that would be to permit the vendors to take advantage of their own wrong.[186] In that regard, Hera also relies on the fundamental principle according to which equity acts, namely 'that a party having a legal right shall not be permitted to exercise it in such a way that the exercise amounts to unconscionable conduct'.[187]
215 Further, Hera submits that in circumstances where there is no clause in the new contract which automatically extends the sunset date by reason of delays on the part of the vendors, the 'prevention principle' prevents the vendors relying upon their wrong to terminate the contract, and the time for completion by the purchaser becomes 'at large'.[188]
216 In their closing written submissions filed shortly after the hearing,[189] Hera also raised a new matter, addressing the approach the Court might take in the event that the Court were to find that both parties had engaged in conduct in relation to the UDF that caused or contributed to delay. Hera submitted that if there were concurrent causes of delay, the decided cases suggest two possible ways that the Court might approach and deal with the situation:
(a) The English approach that the Purchaser is nonetheless entitled to the full extension of time for any period of concurrent delay;
(b) The Scottish approach that the delay is equally apportioned between the parties.[190]
However, Hera submitted where, as here, there was no clause in the contract which permitted the extension of the 25 August 2015 date, then the consequence of any delays caused or contributed to by the vendors would set time at large[191] no matter which approach the Court adopted.
217 In essence, Hera's case is that from the time the Terms of Settlement were entered into, the vendors engaged in delaying conduct which hindered Hera's ability to have the UDF approved promptly (which was a precursor to having the planning permit issued and the plan of subdivision registered), to obtain the statement of compliance, and to have the plan of subdivision registered by 25 August 2015. The delay claims are set out in paragraph 19 of Hera's amended defence and counterclaim. In particular, Hera says that:
(a) the vendors delayed in delivering, or failed to deliver in a timely way, to Hera's solicitor copies of the new contract in a form that could be executed by Hera - this did not occur until on or about 13 March 2015;
(b) the vendors failed to inform the Council of Hera's interest as purchaser of the southern lot 1 of the 1 Adrian Street land, or of the agreement for lease that it had entered into with Woolworths concerning the 'full line' supermarket that Hera proposed be erected on that lot;
(c) Mr Bisognin engaged in an attempt to obtain approval by the Council of an Urban Design Framework which encompassed the vendors' land but which he knew was inconsistent with Hera's proposed use of the southern lot 1;[192]
(c) the vendors failed to meet the requirements addressed to them in Planning Permit No PlnA00338/15 - in this regard Hera says that to the extent that payment of the various bonds and other charges to the relevant authorities was a necessary pre-condition to obtaining a statement of compliance, it was the vendors' responsibility to make such payment;
(d) the vendors failed to take any steps to organise for payment of the GAIC payable in respect of the land, and
(e) the vendors failed to take any steps to deliver to the Land Titles Office a duplicate certificate of title for 1 Adrian Street, Cranbourne.
218 In paragraph 20 of Hera's amended defence and counterclaim it pleads that:
The Plaintiffs' breaches of Contract referred to in paragraph 19 hereof, further or alternatively the Plaintiff's actions and inactions referred to in the particulars thereto, caused or contributed to the Plan of Subdivision not being registered by 25th August 2015, further or alternatively, caused or contributed to delay in the approval of the UDF application, which was a necessary precursor to the registration of the Plan of Subdivision.
219 On Hera's case, the relevance of the vendors' conduct is that Hera contends that where it is demonstrated that any conduct of the vendors was a cause of, or contributed to, the delay in achieving registration of the plan of subdivision by 25 August 2015, the vendors are disentitled from ending the new contract because, were they to terminate, they would be taking advantage of their own wrong.
220 The vendors' contend that none of the delay claims made by Hera have been proven and in those circumstances, Hera's counterclaim must be dismissed.
221 Before turning to consider the rival contentions, it is convenient to discuss the proper construction of the relevant contractual obligations of the vendors and Hera respectively.
Construction of the relevant contractual obligations of the vendors and Hera respectively
222 Under clauses 2(g) and 2(h) of the Terms of Settlement the parties agreed to the incorporation of two new special conditions into the 2012 contract, and as terms of the new contract, which relevantly required:
(a) The vendors to provide all and any documents in relation to the draft Urban Design Framework by 2 December 2014; and
(b) The vendors to use their best endeavours to co-operate with Hera, sign all documents and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval and registration of the plan of subdivision and to give effect to the Urban Design Framework including making the duplicate title available for the purposes of registration, and will make any GAIC payment promptly if required by the relevant authority.
223 In the new contract, as executed, these obligations were set out as special conditions 9 and 10, as follows:
(While there are some minor changes in language between these special conditions as they appeared in the Terms of Settlement and the new contract, no issue is taken, and no rectification is sought.)
224 Hera's relevant obligations were set out in special conditions 2(a), (b) and (c) of the new contract, in substantially the same form as they were framed under the 2012 Contract, as follows:
The Purchaser shall at its own cost and expense prepare a Plan of Subdivision in respect of the land comprised in the Parcel in or to the like effect of the Plan of Subdivision annexed hereto and submit the same to the City of Casey for sealing in accordance with the provisions of Part 1 of the Act and shall use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the said Plan pursuant to the provisions of Part II of the Act;
The Plan of Subdivision referred to, is the Plan mentioned herein and a copy is attached and shall not be amended without the consent of the Vendors save for any amendments of a technical nature required by any relevant authority, to enable approval to be granted;
The Purchaser shall have the right and the Vendors will do all things necessary to assist the Purchaser or their agents having access to the property for the purpose of surveys and studies with a view to prepare a Plan of Subdivision.
225 Under the new contract, as was the position under the 2012 contract, special condition 2(a) imposed on Hera the obligation to 'use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of' the plan of subdivision. That is, when it came to responsibility for registration of the plan, the parties effectively designated Hera as the moving party, such that it was a matter for Hera, rather than the vendors, to procure the registration of the plan at the Land Titles Office. Special condition 2(a) also made clear that the plan of subdivision was to be prepared at Hera's 'own cost and expense'.
226 The vendors contend that special condition 2(a) imposes the burden and expense of obtaining registration of the plan of subdivision on Hera. They submit that the reference in special condition 2(a) to 'cost and expense' is not limited to preparing the plan of subdivision but extends to the expediting and procuring the registration of the plan. But if that is not correct, they say the further requirement in special condition 2(a) that Hera 'do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the said Plan' clearly includes the payment of any moneys required to be paid to enable registration of the plan.
227 As to the vendors' obligations under special condition 10, the vendors say they were required 'to use their best endeavours to co-operate with' Hera to achieve the registration of the plan at the Land Titles Office. That is, the vendors were required to co-operate with Hera to facilitate the process of registration by signing all documents and doing all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision. The only payment mentioned in special condition 10 that was to be undertaken by the vendors was the GAIC payment, 'if required by the relevant authorities', in which event the vendors were required to make payment 'promptly'.
228 Further, the vendors submit, special condition 10 is a provision that effectively requires the vendors to co-operate to assist Hera, if assistance is required. They accept that special condition 10 might require them to enter into agreements where the only party that could do so was the vendors, but they submit that issue does not arise here because there were no agreements that the vendors were required to enter into. That is, they submit that while cl 2 of the planning permit required the 'owner' to enter into agreements with the relevant authorities, that requirement was qualified by the later expression 'in accordance with the authority's requirements and relevant legislation at the time' and the position here was that no authority did require the vendors to enter into an agreement. They contended that when regard is had to the evidence before the Court, primarily the correspondence from the relevant authorities that was attached to the letter from Hera's solicitor to the vendors' solicitor dated 11 August 2015, it will be noted that the correspondence was directed to Hera in its capacity as developer and did not specifically require the vendors to enter into any agreements. In addition, they pointed to the letter from South East Water to Hera dated 3 August 2015, where South East Water required Hera to lodge a warranty bond.[193]
229 Counsel for Hera conceded that the warranty bond had not been paid but submitted that there was some confusion about whether about whether there was in fact any requirement to enter into a s 173 agreement. In closing submissions, Hera did not persist with its (earlier) complaint that the vendors had failed to execute a s 173 agreement and submitted that relevantly there was no requirement to do so. It maintained that the letter from South East Water dated 17 June 2015 superseded the letter dated 5 June 2015 and counsel said the fact that the letter from Hera's solicitor dated 11 August 2015 made no reference to a s 173 agreement confirmed that there was no requirement to enter into one. The letter from Hera's solicitor attached a (partially completed) form A: Application to enter into a Development Agreement with South East Water which Hera said was mentioned in the letter from South East Water of 17 June 2015 as one of the options available 'if South East Water reticulated sewer/water/recycled water (as applicable) is required to be extended to service lots within the development'. Form A required details of the 'developer (owner)' to be provided. The letter from South East Water dated 3 August 2015 further explained that '[t]he Development Agreement is the basis for the necessary contract between South East Water and the Developer to construct, or procure the construction of Water Infrastructure'. The enclosed letter of offer (Schedule 7) pertained to 1 Adrian Street and covered both lots on the plan of subdivision.
230 Counsel for Hera submitted that while there were anomalies with the various service provider agreements attached to the letter from Hera's solicitor dated 11 August 2015, it was a matter for the vendors, as owners of both lots in the proposed subdivision, to execute the various service provider agreements. In essence, Hera contended so much was made clear by the planning permit, the provisions of the statutory scheme concerning subdivisions[194] and the fact that the vendors are the owners of both lots.
231 Counsel for the vendors submitted that special condition 10 makes clear that the GAIC is the only payment that the vendors would be required to make. Special condition 10 was added to the 2012 contract at Hera's request. The vendors submitted that the parties, and in particular Hera as a developer, would have known that other payments may well have been required to be made before the plan of subdivision could be registered, and it would have been easy to refer to them expressly if the parties had intended that the vendors were to be required to meet them. On the contrary, the only payment that was identified and agreed by the parties as being the responsibility of the vendors was the GAIC.
232 The vendors accepted, however, that in the event that Hera had entered into agreements with the relevant authorities but the vendors subsequently became entitled to, and did, end the new contract under special condition 8, then the vendors would, by reason of special condition 7,[195] be required to refund to Hera any moneys so paid to the authorities.
233 Hera contends that special condition 2(a), on its proper construction, did not entail the consequence that Hera as purchaser was obliged to do all things and pay for things that under the statutory scheme of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic), as it applied to the 1 Adrian Street proposed plan of subdivision, were obligations of the vendors as owners of that property. Reference was made to the statutory scheme and the procedure for certification of the plan by the Council and the registration of the plan by the Registrar of Titles.
The statutory scheme for certification and registration of plans of subdivision
234 Section 5 of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic) establishes the procedure for certification and registration of plans. Relevantly, s 5 provides:
(1) Subject to sections 4 and 44, the subdivision or consolidation of land, or the creation, variation or removal of an easement or restriction, or the creation of common property, or any dealing with common property, must be done in accordance with this Act.
...
(3) A person who wishes to have a plan registered must -
(a) prepare a plan in accordance with this Act and the regulations; and
(b) if the land is not under the Transfer of Land Act 1958, bring the land under that Act; and
(c) submit the plan to the Council for certification together with an application in the prescribed form; and
(d) obtain a statement of compliance from the Council; and
(e) lodge the certified plan at the Office of Titles for registration together with -
(i) an application in the form approved by the Registrar; and
(ii) the statement of compliance obtained under paragraph (d); and
(iii) the prescribed information in respect of the street address and lot location of each lot on the plan; and
(f) in addition to any other fee payable under this Act, pay to the Registrar the fee, if any, prescribed under the Survey Co-ordination Act 1958 for the maintenance of the survey control network.
...
(5) Any person may, with the written consent of the owner, submit a plan to the Council for certification.
(6) An owner may act through an agent unless the regulations require a personal or sealed declaration, consent or authorisation.
...
235 In s 3(1) of the Act, the expression 'applicant' is defined for the purposes of the Act as meaning -
(a) a person who applies to the Council for certification of a plan; or
(b) a person who applies to the Registrar to have a certified plan registered.
236 Section 5 makes clear that a plan of subdivision is not required to be lodged by the owner of the land but may be submitted by any person 'who wishes to have a plan registered'. Prior to doing so, however, they must obtain the written consent of the owner before submitting the plan to the Council for certification.
237 The 'certification' of plans is dealt with in Part 2 of the Act. Section 6 sets out what the Council must do by way of certification of the Plan. Section 6(1) provides that the Council 'must certify a plan within the prescribed time if (relevantly):
(a) the plan complies with this Act, the regulations, and those requirements of the planning scheme and any permit that relate to the boundaries of roads, lots, common property and reserves and the form and content of the plan; and
...
(c) every referral authority has given consent; and
* * * *
(d) all alterations required by referral authorities have been made; and
* * * *
(f) alterations required by the Council have been made; ...'
238 A 'referral authority' is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean 'a person or body specified in the planning scheme as a referral authority to which an application for a permit or a plan must be referred, or which must be satisfied that things have been done'. Accordingly, service provider entities such as South East Water, Melbourne Water, and electricity, gas and telecommunications utilities are referral authorities for the purposes of the Act. Section 8 prescribes when the Council must refer a plan to a referral authority. Relevantly for present purposes, the Council must refer the plan to a referral authority where this is required by the planning scheme or the permit unless the plan is of a class that is exempted or the applicant gives the Council satisfactory evidence of the authority's consent dated not more than 3 months before the date on which the plan is submitted for certification. Section 8(6) provides that '[a]s soon as possible after certifying a plan that was not referred to a referral authority, the Council must give the authority a copy of the certified plan.'
239 Section 9 deals with what a referral authority must do. Section 9(1) provides that:
The referral authority must inform the Council within the prescribed time that it -
(a) consents to the plan; or
(b) requires specified alterations; or
(c) refuses consent.
240 Section 13 provides that where the Council certifies a plan, 'the certification is conclusive evidence that the provisions of this Act relating to certification including any preliminary requirements, have been complied with, unless, before the plan is registered, an order is made under section 39(3) and served on the Registrar.' In the present case, the parties are agreed that the Council certified the plan of subdivision on 3 August 2015.
241 Under s 21(1), a Council must issue a statement of compliance to the applicant in the prescribed form as soon as possible after -
(a) the applicant has given it the prescribed information; and
(b) it is satisfied that -
(i) all requirements of and under this Part and the Planning and Environment Act 1987 that relate to public works have been met; or
(ii) there is an agreement to secure compliance with those requirements.
242 Further, s 21(9) requires where the land the subject of the plan of subdivision is land for which there is a GAIC recording (within the meaning of Part 9B of the Planning and Environment Act 1987), the Council must, within 7 days after issuing a statement of compliance under s 21, give a notice to the Commissioner of State Revenue referred to in s 62 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997 that the statement has been issued and a copy of the statement unless -
(a) the issue of the statement of compliance is an excluded event (within the meaning of section 201RB of the Planning and Environment Act 1987); or
(b) any one of the circumstances described in section 201SA of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 applies to the land.
(a) it appears to the Registrar that the plan has been certified by the Council and the certification remains valid; and
(b) the applicant provides a statement of compliance or an acquiring authority, Minister government department, public authority or Council submits a statement that the plan is exempt from Part 3; and
...
(g) if there is a GAIC recording in respect of the land (within the meaning of Part 9B of the Planning and Environment Act 1987), the application to register the plan is accompanied by -
(i) a notice relating to that land issued by the Commissioner of State Revenue under section 201SZG of that Act; or
(ii) an application relating to that land made under section 201UC[196] by the Growth Areas Authority[197] or the Commissioner.
244 Under s 22A of the Subdivision Act 1988 (Vic), the Registrar may refuse to complete or proceed with the registration of the plan if the Registrar is of the opinion that any document, information, evidence or notice necessary or desirable for the purposes of registering the plan has not been supplied or given within the time allowed.
245 Section 24(1) provides that the registration of a plan 'takes effect from the time that the Registrar records that the plan has been registered.'
246 The Cranbourne East Precinct Structure Plan depicted the 1 Adrian Street land as being part of a Local Town Centre or 'Neighbourhood Activity Centre'. Accordingly, under the Casey Planning Scheme, the general position was that a permit to use or subdivide the land, or to construct a building or construct and carry out works could not be granted until an Urban Design Framework had been prepared to the satisfaction of the Council.[198]
247 Division 1 of Part 4 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 deals with permits required by planning schemes. Where a planning scheme requires a permit to be obtained for a use or development of land, the application for the permit must be made to the 'responsible authority', and provide the requisite information: s 47(1). For present purposes, the responsible authority is relevantly the Council.[199] If the applicant is not the owner of the land for which the permit is needed, the application must be signed by the owner or include a declaration by the applicant that the applicant has notified the owner: s 48(1).
248 Under s 173 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987, a responsible authority may enter into an agreement with a person in anticipation of that person becoming the owner of the land: s 173(3). However, if such an agreement is registered by the Registrar of Titles, it does not bind the vendor unless the vendor assumes the purchaser's rights and obligations under the agreement: s 173(4).
The nature of a section 173 agreement
[43] A section 173 agreement can be described as a hybrid instrument. In part such an instrument has the character of a private agreement. However it is also an instrument that forms part of the planning controls which apply to land. I will return to this issue later.
[44] A planning scheme may provide that any use or development of land is conditional on an agreement being entered into with the responsible authority or a referral authority. A planning permit for any use or development of land may include a condition that the owner of the land, or an applicant for a permit in anticipation of the applicant becoming the owner of the land, enter into an agreement with the responsible authority under section 173 of the Act. Further, a section 173 agreement may be entered into voluntarily by a responsible authority and an owner of land.
[45] An agreement may provide for various matters concerning the use or development of land or, indeed, any matter intended to achieve or advance the objectives of planning in Victoria.
[46] An agreement made pursuant to section 173 of the Act binds the owner to the covenants specified in the agreement. Further, and importantly, a responsible authority may apply to the Registrar of Titles to register an agreement relating to land (other than Crown land). The Registrar of Titles must make a recording of the agreement in the register, the effect of which is that any burden of a covenant in the agreement runs with the land affected and the responsible authority may enforce the covenant against any person deriving title from the person who entered into the covenant.
...
[52] It is common for a section 173 agreement to be entered into in respect of land, and then registered on the title to that land, and then for the land to be subdivided. In this case the agreement then attaches to each allotment created from the land. However in this situation a covenant imposed upon an owner imposes a separate obligation on the owner of each lot, enforceable by the responsible authority; and the owner of a lot subject to the agreement is not necessarily a party to an obligation of another owner in respect of another lot.[201]
251 The Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution, or GAIC, is a charge designed to contribute to the funding of essential State infrastructure in Melbourne's growth areas. In the present case, a GAIC certificate relating to the 1 Adrian Street land (Lot 7/LP51866 being the whole of the land in Certificate of Title Volume 8776 Folio 892) issued by the Commissioner on 18 December 2014 was attached to the section 32 statement.[203] In the GAIC certificate, the GAIC liability status of the land was stated as follows:
PART 3 - GAIC LIABILITY STATUS
Total GAIC that would be imposed if a GAIC event were to occur in respect of the land this financial year [i.e., 2014/15] is $187,568.34
252 The certificate also noted that the certificate 'is for information only and is not a notice of assessment under the Taxation Administration Act 1997'. Further, the certificate stated:
The liability to pay the GAIC only arises upon the first occurrence of a GAIC event, i.e., the issuing of a statement of compliance, the making of an application for a building permit in respect of substantive building works or a dutiable transaction relating to the land.
253 Part 9B of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 deals with the GAIC. Section 201RA defines what is a 'GAIC event'. Relevantly, for present purposes, a 'GAIC event means 'the issue of a statement of compliance relating to a plan of subdivision of land in the contribution area' but does not include an excluded event.[204] Section 201SE provides that in the case of a plan of subdivision of land, a GAIC event occurs 'when the statement of compliance relating to the plan of subdivision is issued'.[205] Section 201SF identifies the persons liable to pay GAIC. Section 201SF(2) provides that the person who is liable to pay the GAIC imposed in respect of the issue of a statement of compliance relating to a plan of subdivision of land in the contribution area is 'the person who owns the land immediately after the statement is issued' and for the purposes of assessing same, s 201SF(5) provides that 'joint tenants of that land are taken to hold the land as tenants in common in equal shares.'
254 Section 201SZG applies if the Commissioner issues certain specified types of certificates that relate to the liability to pay a GAIC in respect of a subdivision of land in the contribution area, for e.g., a certificate of staged payment approval. In that event, s 201SZG(2)(b) requires that save where there is a work-in-kind agreement in force, 'the Commissioner must give a notice to the person, which notifies the Registrar of Titles that ... the requirement under section 22(1)(g) of the Subdivision Act 1988 has been met.'
What did the agreement between the parties require vis-à-vis payment of fees and bonds to the referral authorities?
255 The contract itself does not deal expressly with the question of which party was obliged to make payment of any necessary fees and bonds to the referral authorities or the responsible authority in order that a statement of compliance may issue. Hera contends it was plainly a matter for the vendors to attend to. The vendors claim that it was a matter for Hera.
256 There was no evidence before the Court as to how the purchase price was arrived at between the parties to the 2012 contract. When Hera and the vendors entered into the new contract, following the agreement reached at the mediation, they simply adopted the sale price that had been agreed and was in force under the 2012 contract made between the vendors and Joslin.
257 Hera tendered an affidavit from Mr Parsons in which he stated, relevantly:
4.1 he and I physically paced out the land to be purchased by Joslin and agreed a cut-off point between Lots 1 [the southern lot] and Lots 2 [the northern lot-to be retained by the vendors];
4.2 I told Gino Bisognin that Joslin intended to build a supermarket and associated shops on Lot 1;
4.3 Gino Bisognin told me that the Bisognins intended to live on Lot 2 until the subject property was subdivided, at which time they intended to build many townhouses on Lot 2;
4.4 I provided Gino Bisognin with a number of plans about the division between Lots 1 and Lots 2 with full measurements, including where the supermarket was to be located.
258 On 9 December 2015, at the commencement of the day, the Court was informed by counsel for the vendors, Mr Hay QC, that '[m]y learned friend and I have reached a small agreement about a particular witness', namely Mr Parsons. Mr Hay said '[w]e won't be cross-examining him but they've made a couple of concessions in return for that' and then produced a document recording the 'small agreement' reached.[207] It stated that with respect to the affidavit sworn by Mr Parsons on 23 November 2015:
The parties have agreed to inform the court that:
(a) Gino Bisognin dispute [sic] paragraphs 6 and 8;
(b) with respect to paragraph 4.3, Gino Bisognin disputes the claim made that he would build townhouses when the property was subdivided - Mr Bisognin says that he was going to build townhouses when he retired.[208]
259 By the time the Court was informed of the agreement, Mr Bisognin had given his evidence and been cross-examined.
260 In light of the agreement reached, it would appear that Mr Bisognin does not dispute the evidence of Mr Parsons set out in paragraph 7 of his affidavit. Accordingly, on the evidence before the Court, the position is that no express agreement was reached between Joslin and Mr Bisognin that Joslin would pay for the establishment or provision of services to the subject property.
261 That position is consistent with the other evidence adverted to in the factual background set out above, being the email that was forwarded by Mr Parsons to Mr Konstandellos on 28 October 2014 in preparation for the County Court mediation. The email was one Mr Parsons had sent to Mr and Mrs Bisognin at some earlier point confirming the terms on which Joslin would acquire the land. Relevantly, the email stated that '[t]he purchaser agrees to attend to the two lot plan of subdivision', but it made no mention of any agreement reached between Joslin and Mr Bisognin to the effect that Joslin would pay for the establishment or provision of services to the subject property.
262 It appears that during 2014 and much of 2015, Mr Konstandellos laboured under the misapprehension that Hera, as developer, was obliged to satisfy at least some of the requirements of the referral authorities. In his affidavit sworn on 29 July 2015 and filed in the related proceeding before Hargrave J (S CI 2015 3088), Mr Konstandellos stated:
5. The position relating to the plan of subdivision is as follows:
...
(d) Meanwhile it is necessary for the conditions in the subdivision planning permit to be met. This includes payment of fees to certain authorities. I do not list the names of the authorities here as I believe if notified Mr Karas or others on his behalf will take the opportunity to contact those people with a view to ensuring that the plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015.
(e) The sum of approximately $500,000 is needed from equity partners or to be borrowed to satisfy the requirements of the authorities referred to in (d) above. This sum is available from certain persons, who, as noted later in this affidavit, are prepared to enter into a joint venture agreement with the Kaz Nominees interests. Once these authorities' requirements are satisfied the City of Casey will issue a statement of compliance. This is required to be lodged at the Titles Office. After the statement is lodged registration of the plan of subdivision ought to take place within 2-3 weeks.
(f) It is urgent that the sum referred to in (d) above is paid immediately, as it can be once the Court approves the undertakings proposed in this affidavit.
263 In his later affidavit sworn on 3 August 2015 and filed in the related proceeding, Mr Konstandellos explained how the figure of $500,000 had been arrived at. He stated:
3(d) Details have been requested as to the $500,000 that is to be paid in the immediate future. Following receipt of correspondence from South East Water today the amount has increased to $895,000. These sums will be paid as to:
(i) South East Water - approximately $720,000; ...
(ii) Melbourne Water - approximately $155,000. ...
(iii) Ausnet - approximately $20,000. ...
(iv) Other sums will be required to be paid in the near future as well in particular in order to obtain the relevant planning certificates from Council. This includes stormwater provisions. Other invoices incurred to others associated with the obtaining of town planning approval are required to be paid.
264 Under cross-examination, Mr Konstandellos was taken to this passage in his affidavit. He agreed that he was saying that the amount of $895,000.00 was a debt that Hera was liable for, similarly with the sum of approximately $720,000.00 payable to South East Water.[209] Counsel then sought to clarify the matter further with him, as follows:
MR STARK: Hera is liable for that?---The time - please continue, because yes, I accept all these numbers. The reason because I put it there because that time, when I received from my consultants these numbers, they're saying you have to pay this money, and then when I discussed that matter with my investor, so my partner say, Nick, we'll go through the payments, we'll go through everything. No, we're not responsible. They lent, owner is responsible to do that.
But you actually swore - - -?---Yes, that time - yes, I say yes.
And it wasn't because you believed that you were responsible, was it? It was because you knew you were responsible, wasn't it?---No. That time, when my consultant give me the - the all the invoice, all the agreements and everything, I thought I'm responsible. That's the advice I get from consulting, which is wrong, and he's wrong.
But the same applies then to Melbourne, approximately - - -?
---Correct.
- - - 155,000, AusNet approximately 20,000?---Correct.
Other sums will be required to pay in the near future as well to obtain planning certificates from council?---Correct.
They're all Hera's responsibility when you swore this affidavit on 3 August?---That's what I thought. That's what the consultant tell me.[210]
265 Mr Konstandellos also explained that the civil engineer had given him 'the development cost' and not the cost for the subdivision, which were two different costs.[211] He went on to say that it was only when he went through the costs to the authorities with his business partner that he became aware that it was a mistake and that it was his partner who had picked it up.[212]
266 When Mr Konstandellos was taken to the correspondence from South East Water and Ausnet Services he acknowledged that Hera was obliged to make the applications but said that there were applications for subdivision and applications for development[213] and his partner had explained to him that it was for 'the vendor to certify the permit and provide the certificate of compliance . End of story.[214]'
267 In re-examination, counsel for Hera returned to the topic. He referred Mr Konstandellos to the fees and costs that were outlined in an exhibit to his affidavit sworn on 3 August 2015 and the following exchange ensued:
MR COOK: This document was prepared at the time you swore your affidavit of 3 August. Is that right?---Yes.
You said before in evidence that you have previously thought that you had to pay those fees?---And still I believe I have to pay fees to the authorities, but when I did my affidavit this court, because it was a mistake, because this apply for the - for the subdivision and when I did the affidavit and I say yes, I have to pay this money to - to the other court, and then my partner said, no Nick, it's not our responsibility, it's the vendor's responsibility to go and get the certificate of compliance and pay the money, or same answer with the agreement, because the most of the money is going to come back.
That's why - and when did that happen, when this change of mind or your change of who had to pay happen, sometime after 3 August?---That's correct.[215]
268 During cross-examination of Mr Bisognin, he was taken to the conditions of the planning permit, and in particular the conditions directed to 'the owner' of the land. He said he did not believe he had been shown the planning permit before, but acknowledged that he possibly could have. He said he did not recall it. The gist of his evidence was that he was selling the land and these arrangements with the referral authorities were matters for the developer to attend to. He said the contract 'clearly states the purchaser [is] to fully subdivide and pay all the costs and apply for all applications and permits in regards to the subdivision'[216] and 'that's always been the understanding of mine and that was the conditions.'[217] He added that no one had ever told him that he had to sign an agreement with the service providers, and he rejected the notion that he ever had a discussion with Mr Konstandellos during which he suggested that the Bisognins were required to enter into agreements regarding the provision of services.[218]
269 The background to Mr Bisognin's latter statement is that Mr Konstandellos asserted that he had spoken with Mr Bisognin in mid-to-late June 2015 - he could not remember the exact date but believed it was 'close to 18 or 19 June'[219] - and said that he had raised with him the matter of the agreements with the referral authorities and the need to make payment of the fees and bond moneys. In examination in chief, Mr Konstandellos explained what he said took place during this conversation, as follows:
MR COOK: Well when you say you explained what had happened, I mean what did you say?---No, no, I explained to him, I explained the reason I call Gino make sure no delay stuff here. We have agreed, we have conditions, there's some conditions on the payment we have and some agreements you as a land owner have to executed.
Yes, and what did he say?---He said I'm gunna - I'm gunna speak to Noel and I come back to you, that's it.
Yes, and did you speak to him again after that?---Oh I try a couple of times, no answer, and um two weeks after or three weeks after I receive a letter through my solicitor say don't bother my client anymore, that's it.
Yes. I won't ask anything further at this stage Your Honour.[220]
270 In his evidence, Mr Bisognin said he believed that Mr Konstandellos had called him at or around that time but he denied that any conversation had taken place between them. The substance of his evidence was that over recent months he had received about 35 miscellaneous calls from 'bogus numbers' that he did not recognise and was unable to trace to a known person, so he ignored them and reported them to his solicitor.[221] Mr Bisognin said that where there was a phone call from a number that he did not recognise, he would not answer it. Under cross-examination it was put to Mr Bisognin that he knew Mr Konstandellos was calling him, and he responded by explaining his position as follows:
MR CLARKE: No, but the only reason you got Mr Waters to write the letter of 21 July, is because you knew that Nick was ringing you?---At that time, it come up, Nick, because I've got it registered in my phone as Uncle Nick.
So is it your evidence that Gino [sic] had no conversation with you - that Nick had no conversation with you, ask - in the period 16 June to 21 July of 2015, asking you to execute the agreements with the utility owners, to notify his bank that settlement was imminent and to organise production of the title to the Land Titles Office?---I have never had that conversation with Nick and that's why I use a solicitor.
Yes. So that you didn't answer Nick's calls, is that what you're saying to Her Honour?---That's correct and I advised my solicitor immediately, when he rang with his true phone number.[222]
271 In other words, Mr Bisognin recalled having received a call from a number that he suspected was Mr Konstandellos, but he did not answer the call. During cross-examination he also denied having been aware that he was required to pay the fees and bonds to the relevant referral authorities and also denied having had any telephone conversation with Mr Konstandellos about them, as follows:
MR CLARKE: But I suggest to you that your understanding from 16 June was that you had to sign agreements with service providers in respect - - -?---No one had told me, no. No one told me. No one said Gino, you've got to sign this document with agreements with services.
Yes. Do you recall any time Nick having a conversation with you, suggesting that you needed to enter into agreements regarding the provision of services?---I've never, ever, ever had that discussion with Nick. The only time I've ever spoken to Nick Constandelos [sic] is once in our office, a couple of abusive phone calls that he gave me. The other one was early - I kept on letting Noel Waters know, for him not to harass me and ring me. Noel Waters actually spoke to Lucky [Mr Laki Tasiopoulos] several times. He actually wrote letters and emails for him not to talk to me.
All right?---All talks were to be done through the solicitors.
Yes?---And the other time is at mediation, with the um - in David Lloyd [of counsel]. Outside he asked me in regards to how the renovation for my business was.[223]
272 Under cross-examination, Mr Konstandellos maintained that he had spoken with Mr Bisognin by telephone and said that call was the reason the vendors' solicitors had written to Hera's solicitors and requested that no contact take place other than through the solicitors. He added that 'I can bring you my bill, my phone bill, and I can tell you the time and everything when I call.'[224] When Mr Bisognin's version of events was put to Mr Konstandellos he disputed it and observed that he was unaware of the evidence Mr Bisognin had given because Hera's counsel had acceded to a request that he be out of Court when Mr Bisognin was called. Mr Konstandellos cited that fact as the reason why no phone records had been discovered. In my view, Mr Konstandellos, through Hera's solicitors and counsel, was on notice of this dispute on the evidence but Hera took no steps to produce his telephone records or other documents that might evidence a phone conversation having taken place as opposed to making a phone call that went unanswered.
273 Mr Konstandellos's evidence that he raised with Mr Bisognin during a phone call in mid-to-late June 2015 the matter of the agreements with the referral authorities and the need for the vendors to make payment of the fees and bond moneys does not sit comfortably with the evidence he has given in his affidavit sworn on 3 August 2015 and filed in the related proceeding. It will be recalled that his affidavit evidence was to the effect that it was a matter for Hera to make payment of (at least some of) the fees and costs payable to the referral authorities.
274 Against that background, it appears that the first time Hera's solicitor raised with the vendors' solicitor the issue of the payment of the fees and bond moneys to the referral authorities and made them aware that Hera contended it was the vendors' responsibility, in accordance with 'usual practice', to make payment of them was in their letter of 11 August 2015. I am not satisfied that there was any earlier communication to this effect by Mr Konstandellos to Mr Bisognin by telephone.
275 Hera contended that the contract ought proceed on the basis that the vendors had allowed for the cost of the provision of services to both lots of 1 Adrian Street when they reached agreement with Joslin as to the sale price for the southern lot, particularly when it was the case that a significant portion of the cost of provision of services to the land (representing bond moneys) would eventually be refundable to the vendors.
276 In my view, there is no utility in speculating about whether the vendor made allowance in the purchase price for the cost of provision of the services or not. What is relevant is that Joslin and the vendors agreed upon the purchase price for the southern lot, at a time when it was a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision. Once the vendors agreed to sell the southern lot to Joslin, it was a matter for the vendors to make good the title to that lot, and that only became possible if the plan of subdivision were registered. There was no change to the agreed purchase price when the 2012 contract was assigned to Hera, nor when the new contract was made between Hera and the vendors. In my view, it remained the case throughout that it was a matter for the vendor to make title to the southern lot available. And in the absence of any evidence to suggest that the parties agreed otherwise, the vendors as owners were required to meet the costs and fees and pay the bonds associated with establishing the provision of services to the southern lot, in order that a statement of compliance might issue.
277 In the section 32 statement issued in December 2014 on behalf of the vendor in respect of 'Southern Lot 1 being 12,850m² being part of 1 Adrian Street Cranbourne East, Victoria 3977' the status of services (other than drainage services) provided were set out as follows:
Connected indicates that the service is provided by an authority and operating on the day of sale. The purchaser should be aware that the vendor may terminate their account with the service provider before settlement and the purchaser will have to have the service reconnected.
(emphasis added)
278 The evidence given at trial was to the effect that the Bisognins' dwelling was not connected to the sewer.[225] At least in the case of the supply of electricity, gas, water and telephone services, the section 32 statement gives no indication that the purchaser would be required to meet the cost of establishing the provision of each of those services to 'Southern Lot 1'. On the contrary, the vendors effectively state that each of those services 'is provided by an authority and operating on the day of sale'.
279 Under the planning permit, the obligation to perform each of the conditions concerning agreements for the provision of services is placed on 'the owner' and is expressed in terms of entering into agreements in respect of each lot. Hera, as purchaser of the southern lot only, had no ability to do anything in respect of the northern lot retained by the Bisognins. That is, Hera was not empowered to enter into agreements with the relevant authorities for the provision of services to the northern lot. Nor was it in a position to ensure that the servicing requirements set out in conditions 7 and 8 of the planning permit were met. Even if Hera had purported to do so, it is unlikely that a statement of compliance would issue because the service agreements would not comply with the permit conditions. Furthermore, in those instances where the connection of the relevant services involved the payment of a bond, it would be surprising if the purchaser were required to pay the bond as a precondition to obtaining the statement of compliance and registration of the plan of subdivision. That is because, if the contract was brought to an end by the vendors in circumstances where the plan was not registered by 25 August 2015, the vendors would have the ongoing benefit of the service agreements which the purchasers had entered into and paid for.
280 Further, a construction of the special conditions of the contract which would require the purchaser to enter into service agreements with referral authorities in advance of registration of the plan of subdivision and pay in respect of them a total sum being considerably in excess of 10% of the purchase price, would be inconsistent with the provisions of ss 9AA and 9AE of the Sale of Land Act. Such a construction would also operate to defeat the statutory mechanisms for protection of a purchaser in respect of moneys paid before registration of the plan of subdivision that are embodied in the legislation. In this regard, the vendors accept that if (a) Hera had entered into agreements with the relevant authorities; and (b) the vendors were entitled to and did end the contract pursuant to special condition 8, then they would, by reason of special condition 7, be required to refund to Hera any moneys so paid to the referral authorities.[226]
281 In the circumstances, when the contract is viewed and interpreted in the context of the relevant statutory scheme and the planning permit, the obligation on the part of the vendors to 'use their best endeavours to co-operate with [Hera], sign all documents, do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the Plan of Subdivision and to give effect to the UDF' encompassed the obligations that were imposed on 'the owner' under the planning permit. That is, in the context of using their best endeavours to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision, it was a matter for the vendors, and not Hera, to make payment of any necessary fees and bonds to the referral authorities or the responsible authority in order that a statement of compliance may issue.
If the vendors failed to use their 'best endeavours', did that breach of special condition 10 disentitle them from terminating the contract of sale or having the contract set aside?
282 The next question that arises is whether, if it is established that the vendors breached the contract by failing to comply with the 'best endeavours' requirement in special condition 10, did that breach disentitle the vendors from terminating the contract of sale under special condition 8 or having the contract set aside?
283 Hera contended that if, contrary to its submission, special condition 8 permits the vendors to end the contract unilaterally, the vendors should nevertheless be disentitled from doing so because of their failure to use their best endeavours pursuant to special condition 10. In essence, Hera says that after the vendor received notice of the planning permit and its conditions on 16 June 2015, they did nothing to advance the entry into agreements with the relevant authorities that were a precursor to the issue of a statement of compliance. Charter Keck Kramer, on behalf of Hera, made contact with the referral authorities and ascertained what would be required and made and lodged applications in respect of the 1 Adrian Street land, but Hera submits it was the vendors as owners that were required to enter into the relevant agreements and pay the necessary bonds and fees before a statement of compliance would issue.
284 Further, it was submitted, the letter from Hera's solicitor to the vendors' solicitor dated 11 August 2015 made clear, if it was not already, that the Council was in a position to issue a statement of compliance once the referral authorities provided their consent, and Hera's solicitor requested the vendors to enter into the agreements (copies of which were attached) and to pay the requisite fees and bond moneys in order to procure that consent.
285 The letter from Hera's solicitor was immediately met by the vendors' solicitor issuing a 'default notice' dated 11 August 2015 and a denial that the vendors had any obligation to pay 'the costs associated with the subdivision.'
286 Hera's new solicitor followed up by letter to the vendors' solicitor dated 13 August 2015, requiring the vendors to comply with the conditions set out in the planning permit. Further, Hera offered to pay, on behalf of the vendors, the relevant bonds and costs involved and to deduct them from the balance of the purchase price payable to Hera. Hera's solicitors also made clear that if that course was followed, they would direct the relevant authorities to pay the refundable (bond) portion of those charges to the vendors. In that regard, the evidence before the Court was to the effect that the costs associated with the subdivision of Adrian Street were in the order of $920,000.00, of which approximately $720,000.00 would eventually be refundable by the authorities in approximately two years' time.[227] The vendors' solicitors, by letter to Hera's new solicitors dated 17 August 2015, re-stated their position contending that Hera was obliged to use its best endeavours and do all things reasonably required to expedite and procure the registration of the plan of subdivision, including 'preparing all the documents and paying any costs involved in complying with the Planning Permit.'
287 The vendors contend that they were required to use their 'best endeavours' to do the things referred to in special condition 10, and they did so. But if the Court finds that, contrary to their contention, the vendors failed to use their best endeavours, they submit that Hera cannot succeed unless it establishes that the vendors have, by their conduct, 'deprived it of a substantial chance' that the plan of subdivision would have been registered by 25 August 2015. In this regard, the vendors rely upon the decision in Joseph Street Pty Ltd v Tan,[228] where the Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Nettle JA and Cavanough AJA), citing Mordue v Kroone[229] and the numerous cases there cited, said:
It is well established that a party wishing to rescind cannot take advantage of its own ineffective or inefficient measures to comply with its contractual obligations, and that where a vendor's default has deprived the purchaser of a 'substantial chance' that the condition would have been fulfilled, the vendor cannot exercise the right of rescission.[230]
The contractual obligation to use 'best endeavours'
288 Joseph Street was a case where the appellants had purchased a residential unit 'off the plan' of a proposed subdivision pursuant to a contract of sale with the respondents. Under the contract, the respondent vendors were required to use their 'best endeavours' to procure the registration of the plan in a timely way. The time for registration passed without registration of the plan having been effected, whereupon the vendors purported to rescind the contract. The purchasers then commenced proceedings for specific performance, contending that the vendors had breached their best endeavours obligation and also an implied term to the same effect by failing to have sought to enter into an agreement with the local council pursuant to s 173 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic). The trial judge dismissed the purchaser's claim. On appeal, the only real issue before the Court was whether the respondent vendors, who were also developers, had complied with their obligation to the purchaser under the contract to use their best endeavours to procure the registration of the plan in a timely way. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that on a proper analysis of the evidence, the vendors were in breach of their obligation to use best endeavours by failing to pursue a s 173 agreement with the local council.
289 In Joseph Street the Court of Appeal focussed attention on the best endeavours requirement. Their Honours confirmed that the question of whether the vendors had complied with their best endeavours obligation 'is to be determined on an objective basis.'[231] Their Honours described an obligation to use best endeavours to achieve a contractual object as one 'requir[ing] the obligor to do all he or she reasonably can do in circumstances to achieve that contractual object' and added that:
The words 'best endeavours' mean what they say - best endeavours, not second-best endeavours; and so, within reasonable limits, they require the obligor, broadly speaking, to leave no stone unturned to achieve the object in view.[232]
290 In their reasons, their Honours referred to several comparable cases concerning an obligation to use best endeavours to obtain (variously) planning permission, subdivisional approval or town planning approval in a context similar to the present case. It is instructive to note the approach taken by the respective courts in those cases as to the content of the best endeavours obligation, as summarised by their Honours in Joseph Street:[233]
[42] In IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd,[234] in the context of a covenant to use best endeavours to obtain planning permission, Buckley LJ described the obligation as requiring a vendor to do what an owner who is anxious to obtain permission would do to achieve it:
What would an owner of the property with which we are concerned in this case, who was anxious to obtain planning permission, do to achieve that end. The formula which has been suggested and which would commend itself to me is that the plaintiffs as covenantors are bound to take all those steps in their power which are capable of producing the desired results, namely, the obtaining of planning permission, being steps which a prudent, determined and reasonable owner, acting in his own interests and desiring to achieve that result, would take.[235]
On that basis, his Lordship held that the obligation would include an obligation to appeal from an initial refusal of permission so long as the circumstances were such as to indicate that there was a reasonable chance of success.
[43] Similarly, in Western Australia, in Paltara Pty Ltd v Dempster,[236] Malcolm CJ and Pigeon J held that an obligation to use best endeavours to obtain subdivisional approval in a contract for the sale of land required the obligor company to do what reasonably could be done in the circumstances, and that what could reasonably be done was whatever a reasonable and prudent board of directors acting properly in the interests of their company would do in the circumstances of the case.
[44] To the same effect, in Hawkins v Pender Bros Pty Ltd,[237] the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland approved the formulation that a covenant to use best endeavours to obtain building and town planning approvals required the obligor conscientiously to apply itself to the task of securing approval with the vigour to be expected of it if it were prudently attempting to secure its own interests, and to continue so to do until it should reasonably judge in the circumstances that further efforts would have such remote prospects of success as to be likely to be wasted.
[45] In a similar context, both IBM and Hawkins were recently referred to with approval by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Foster v Hall.[238]
[46] In Western Australia in O'Rourke v P & B Corp Ltd,[239] Martin CJ sitting at first instance concluded after a thorough and careful consideration of relevant authority that the scope of the obligation to use best endeavours to achieve a planning approval is to be assessed in accordance with what had been said in Paltara, with the result that:
if a prudent and reasonable person, acting in his or her own interests and determined to obtain approval, would have pursued an appeal, the obligation to use best endeavours would extend to an obligation to appeal. Construed in this way, there does not appear to me to be any tension between the decision in IBM United Kingdom Ltd and the decisions in Paltara and Ross in this court.[240]
291 It was against this background, that their Honours found it was 'well established' that where a default on the part of the vendor has deprived the purchaser of a 'substantial chance' that the condition would have been fulfilled, the vendor cannot exercise the right of rescission and concluded that the vendors had not used their best endeavours.
Were the vendors in breach of their obligation to use best endeavours?
292 The vendors contend that there is no evidence that they caused any relevant delay. Rather, they say, the overwhelming evidence is that Hera was responsible for any delay. Further, the vendors say that Hera did not call any expert evidence to assist the Court in understanding the time that it should have taken to register the plan of subdivision, and submitted that the Court does not know if the plan of subdivision could have been registered in the nine month period between 25 November 2014 and 25 August 2015.
293 In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the starting point is that the parties, having reached agreement allowing for a period of nine months for registration of the plan of subdivision, must be taken to have adopted that period as a reasonable period for achieving that object. Otherwise the agreement would not make commercial sense.
294 The evidence before the Court demonstrates that there were delays in commencing the process for registration of the plan of subdivision that were attributable to Hera. In his affidavit sworn and filed in the related proceeding brought against Mr Pinzone, Mr Konstandellos has effectively acknowledged that the insinuation of Mr Pinzone into Hera and his taking control of the company meant that they lost a 'period of 3-4 months' which had 'caused huge risk to the Cranbourne project not proceeding'.[241] At trial, however, he sought to resile from this position, contending that Mr Pinzone's action in taking control of Hera between December 2014 and February 2015 did not cause any delay in registration of the plan of subdivision.
295 In my view, while that event had the effect of de-railing the process somewhat, I am not satisfied that it was an effective cause of delay in achieving registration of the plan of subdivision in the present case. Likewise, I am not satisfied that Hera's delay in involving Mr Perry in the process of obtaining the UDF, and in applying for and obtaining the planning permit, were an effective cause of delay in achieving registration of the plan of subdivision. The evidence given by Ms Richardson, the Council officer, was that the UDF under consideration here was not a standard one and there were a lot of complicated factors at play. In those circumstances, in the absence of any expert evidence, I am unable to determine whether any, and if so which, conduct on the part of the vendors or Hera was a relevant cause of delay in obtaining the UDF.
296 What is clear, however, is that from the time the planning permit issued on 11 June 2015, all that remained was for the statement of compliance to be obtained, and thereafter for the GAIC amount to be assessed by the Commissioner and paid by the vendors, for the duplicate certificate of title to be produced and for the mortgagee and any caveator to consent to the registration of the plan.
297 From at least early in May 2015 Charter Keck Kramer, on behalf of Hera, had set about taking the steps required for registration of the plan of subdivision, having procured the vendors' consent to do so. On 2 May 2015, they applied to the Council for certification of the plan and this was achieved on 3 August 2015. It appears that contemporaneously with the application for certification, applications for the establishment of the relevant services were lodged with each of the relevant referral authorities in late May and early June 2015.
298 On 16 June 2015, Hera's solicitor wrote to the vendors' solicitor, enclosing for his attention copies of the planning permit, the plan of subdivision and the plan of subdivision application form (to be lodged at the Titles Office). They informed Mr Waters that Hera 'is in the process of obtaining the statement of compliance' and requested that the vendors 'take immediate steps' to ensure that their mortgagee makes the title available at the Titles Office in order for registration of the plan of subdivision. One month later, they wrote again to the vendors' solicitor requesting confirmation by return mail that the title has been made available. The response from the vendors' solicitor was to the effect that the Bank wished to sight the certified plan before it would produce the title, and would require payment of its fees.
299 The Council's certification issued on 3 August 2015, seven days elapsed, and on the next day, being 11 August 2015, the vendors served a default notice on Hera. The notice specified the default as being Hera's 'failure to pay the balance of deposit $990,000.00 in accordance with special condition 1 of the contract'. That is, the vendors' notice proceeded on the basis that the balance of the deposit was payable within 7 days of certification of the plan, whereas Cameron J has since held that it was payable within 7 days of registration of the plan. Accordingly, the position is, as Hera's solicitor contended in the letter of 11 August 2015, that the vendors' notice was 'premature and as such defective and invalid'.
300 Further, in their letter of 11 August 2015, Hera's solicitor advised the vendors' solicitor that the Council is in a position to issue a statement of compliance once the relevant authorities provide their consent. To this point in time, however, Hera's solicitor had not raised the issue of the connection fees and bond moneys with the vendors' solicitor nor had they asserted that the normal practice is such connection fees and bond moneys are payable by the vendors. Their letter of 11 August 2015 summarises their instructions regarding the consent from the relevant referral authorities and enclosed the relevant correspondence which indicates that a total sum of approximately $920,000.00 was required to be paid in order for the consents to be granted.
301 Hera's solicitor also made enquiries as to the status of the GAIC payment and whether the requisite arrangements had been made with the relevant authorities. It will be recalled that an assessment of GAIC was required to be made and issued by the Commissioner, using the rates applicable for the 2015-2016 financial year,[242] and then paid promptly by the vendors following the issue of the statement of compliance.
302 Hera contends that after receipt of the planning permit on 16 June 2015, whilst there was likely still sufficient time to obtain registration of the plan of subdivision by 25 August 2015 'the earlier delays made achieving this date "tight"' and 'it required the parties to actively co-operate, including entry by the vendors into the service agreements, the vendors organising production of title from the bank and the vendors organising the ability to pay GAIC upon lodgement of the plan of subdivision for registration.'[243] When the planning permit was issued on 11 June 2015, it included several conditions requiring 'the owner' to obtain the requisite consents from the referral authorities in respect of both lots on the plan of subdivision. If one were to enquire (to borrow Buckley LJ's formulation in IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd[244]), 'What would an owner of the property ... who was anxious to obtain planning permission [here, the statement of compliance so as to facilitate registration of the plan of subdivision], do to achieve that end' it is likely that the response would be to the effect that some consultation would take place between the solicitors to co-ordinate the respective roles of the vendors and Hera, with a view to each party using their best endeavours as required under the contract to perform all of the steps required to bring the registration of the plan of subdivision to fruition.
303 In the present case, however, it would appear that the vendors seemingly stood by and took little or no steps directed to achieving that outcome. Even if they were of the view that it was a matter for Hera to procure the requisite consents from the referral authorities, the vendors were aware that Hera had no authority to act in respect of the northern lot being retained by them. The vendors, through their solicitors even if not personally, knew from the terms of the planning permit that the referral authorities were concerned with arrangements for the provision of water supply, drainage, sewerage facilities, electricity and gas services and telecommunications to each lot. Furthermore, and notwithstanding that the vendors in their section 32 statement had represented to Hera that all but the sewerage facilities were connected to the southern lot, they must also have known that these other services were not in fact connected, in the relevant sense, to the southern lot.[245] Yet this did not provoke any correspondence from them to Hera or its solicitors following the issue of the planning permit. Rather, it would appear that the vendors adopted the stance that no action was required to be taken by them, by way of co-operation with the purchaser, directed towards satisfying those conditions of the planning permit and obtaining registration of the plan.
304 In my view, the vendors having entered into a contract with Hera for the sale of a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision, were required to use their best endeavours to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision, and in so doing take active steps to make the southern lot available to be transferred to the purchaser in a timely way. I have found that they were required to comply with the requirements of the planning permit and to enter into the relevant agreements with the referral authorities in respect of both lots, even if it was a matter for Hera to undertake all of the preliminary steps directed to establishing those agreements between the vendors and the referral authorities. Further, the vendors were required to co-operate with Hera, with a view to assisting Hera to obtain the statement of compliance and thereby procure the registration of the plan. If the vendors had taken an active interest in the matter from 16 June 2015 or thereabouts, and entered into the relevant agreements in a timely way, it may have been possible for Hera to obtain a statement of compliance in time for the plan of subdivision to be registered by 25 August 2015. But the conduct on the part of the vendors, or perhaps more correctly their failure to engage with the task of satisfying the planning permit conditions and actively co-operate with the purchaser, and their service of the notice of default, denied Hera the opportunity to demonstrate that such an outcome was possible.
305 In circumstances where no expert evidence was adduced by either party to assist the Court in forming a view about whether it was possible for Hera to obtain a statement of compliance in time for the plan of subdivision to have been registered by 25 August 2015, I am not satisfied that it was not possible for Hera to do so.
306 In these circumstances, in my view, the vendors should not be permitted to rely upon their own shortcomings to bring the contract to an end because the plan was not registered by 25 August 2015. The period between 16 June 2015 (when the planning permit was notified to the vendors' solicitor) and 25 August 2015 is a period of approximately 70 days. In my view, because of conduct on the part of the vendors, Hera effectively lost the benefit of that period of time.
307 It is clear that once a statement of compliance was issued, the vendors were required to pay promptly the GAIC so assessed. But under the statutory regime, until the statement of compliance was issued, no occasion arose for the making of an assessment. Nevertheless, in a case where the vendors were subject to a best endeavours obligation directed to achieving registration of the plan in a timely way, the prudent course was for them to have made all necessary preparations for that to occur as soon as the statement of compliance issued. Mr Waters gave evidence that the GAIC is normally paid upon settlement.[246] But reference to the statutory regime suggests that is not the position in the case of a subdivision. Mr Konstandellos maintained that the GAIC was payable in advance of any settlement, and that a certificate of release (issued by the State Revenue Office) confirming that the GAIC had been paid was required to be produced upon registration of a plan of subdivision.[247]
308 Registration of the plan of subdivision also required the production of the duplicate certificate of title at the Land Titles Office. As the 1 Adrian Street land was subject to a mortgage, the vendors were required to make arrangements with their mortgagee to produce the duplicate certificate of title.
309 Hera contends that the Court ought infer that in taking the approach he did, as set out in the correspondence that passed between the parties, Mr Waters (doubtless upon instructions) was being deliberately obstructive and that his letters and the vendors' refusal to take any steps to obtain title from the mortgagee bank or to organise themselves to be in a position to pay GAIC upon lodgement of the plan of subdivision for registration, was reflective of their desire to ensure that even if a statement of compliance issued, registration of the plan of subdivision could not take place by 25 August 2015.[248]
310 If, as seems to be the case, the vendors' solicitor was proceeding on the erroneous basis that the GAIC was payable at settlement, rather than upon the making of the application for registration of the plan of subdivision at the Land Titles Office, it is not clear that the vendors would have been in a position to promptly pay the GAIC following the issue of the statement of compliance. In that event, it is likely that the vendors would not be found to have used their best endeavours to do all things necessary to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision. Furthermore, if, as I have found, it was a matter for the vendors (rather than Hera) to enter into the various agreements with the referral authorities, that exercise would involve significant expenditure, in the order of approximately $920,000.00. If the vendors were to comply with their best endeavours obligation, they would need to have made arrangements for funds to be available to meet those fees and charges when called upon to do so. There was no evidence to suggest that any steps had been taken by the vendors in that regard.
311 If the statement of compliance were issued and the plan of subdivision were registered, the balance of the deposit, being $990,000.00 would be payable by Hera within 7 days.[249] The balance of the purchase price, or 'residue', of $2,600,000.00 was payable 'on or within 14 days of approval of the Plan of Subdivision by the Registrar of Titles'.[250] As the vendors' conduct operated to defeat any prospect of Hera achieving the first step, namely the issue of the statement of compliance, no occasion arose to test the financial ability of Hera to complete the sale. The evidence that was filed on behalf of Hera seeking to demonstrate that it had the ability to settle at or around 25 August 2015 and also at or around the time of trial was, in my view, weak, vague and unsubstantiated. Having said that, however, things may well have been different if Hera's efforts to achieve a statement of compliance and registration of the plan of subdivision had not been affected by the vendors' conduct. On any view, the agreement for lease that Hera had entered into with Woolworths was a valuable corporate opportunity, and one that was likely to be of interest to developers generally, even if not able to be pursued by Hera on its own.
312 Of the three questions raised in the Originating Motion for determination by the Court, only two remain to be answered. For the reasons set out above, I would answer those questions as follows:
Question two: On its true construction, does special condition 8 of the Contract provide that if the relevant plan of subdivision is not registered by 25 August 2015 then either party may end the Contract by notice in writing to the other party?
Answer: Yes
Question three: On its true construction, apart from any Growth Areas Infrastructure Contribution Payment, does special condition 10 of the Contract require the plaintiffs to make any payment to a third party that is necessary to be made to secure registration of the plan of subdivision?
Answer: Yes. The plaintiffs, as vendors of a lot on an unregistered plan of subdivision, undertook by special condition 10 of the Contract with Hera to use their 'best endeavours to co-operate with the Purchaser, sign all documents, and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the Plan of Subdivision and to give effect to the UDF ...'. The planning permit issued by the City of Casey dated 11 June 2015 to allow the two lot subdivision of the 1 Adrian Street land, required the vendor as 'owner of the land' to enter into agreements with the relevant authorities in respect of each of the southern lot 2 and northern lot 1 (to be retained by them) for the provision of water supply, drainage, sewerage facilities, electricity and gas services, and telecommunication services (and fibre ready telecommunication facilities) in each case in accordance with the relevant authority's requirements and relevant legislation at the time, and also to ensure that the land is drained to the satisfaction of the Responsible Authority with outfall drainage constructed to provide a legal point of discharge to each allotment. To the extent that entry into any such agreements required the payment of moneys, by way of fees and other charges, and the provision of bond moneys, those were obligations that were to be satisfied by the vendors.
313 The vendors' summons dated 1 September 2016 sought, in the alternative to the proper construction of special condition 8 contended for by them, relief by way of rectification. As I have found that the proper construction of special condition 8 is that the contract could be brought to an end in the event that the plan of subdivision was not registered by 25 August 2015, by either party giving notice in writing to the other, no rectification is necessary. However, were the proper construction otherwise, relief by way of rectification would be granted in the terms sought.
314 Hera also issued a summons seeking certain relief, including a declaration that the default notice or notice of rescission served by the vendors on Hera dated 11 August 2015 is invalid. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to make a declaration in those terms.
315 Hera also sought relief by way of declaration and injunction, declaring that the vendors are not entitled to terminate the contract pursuant to special condition 8, and an injunction restraining them from terminating or purporting to terminate the contract pursuant to special condition 8, together with an injunction restraining them from selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the land the subject of the contract. I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to grant relief of this kind. Rather, in circumstances where I have found that conduct on the part of the vendors operated to deny Hera the opportunity to demonstrate that it was possible for it to achieve registration of the plan of subdivision by 25 August 2015, I propose to order that the period of time specified in special condition 8 for registration of the plan of subdivision be extended.
316 The period between 16 June 2015 (when the planning permit was notified to the vendors' solicitor) and 25 August 2015 is a period of approximately 70 days. In my view, because of conduct on the part of the vendors, Hera effectively lost the benefit of that period of time. Fairness suggests that Hera should be provided a further period of 70 days or thereabouts[251] to enable it to seek to achieve registration of the plan of subdivision. If, despite the best endeavours of both parties, registration is not achieved during the period of extension, then either party may bring the contract to an end, by giving notice in writing to the other. Further, during the period of extension of time, it remains the position that the vendors are required to use their best endeavours to co-operate with Hera and do all acts and things necessary to give effect to the approval of the plan of subdivision and to give effect to the UDF as required by special condition 10, including satisfying the conditions of the planning permit by entering into the agreements with the relevant referral authorities, the Responsible Authority and the relevant telecommunications service provider in a timely way.
317 I will hear the parties on the form of orders to be made and on the issue of costs.
[1] The notice is given under s 201UB of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic).
[2] A 'full-line supermarket' has a minimum area of 3,200 square metres.
[3] On 29 February 2012, Mrs Joanne Faye Parsons, a director of Joslin and the wife of Mr Parsons, executed the form of Guarantee and Indemnity attached to the contract.
[4] The 'Property Address' was described as '1 Adrian Street, Cranbourne East, Lot 1 on Plan of Subdivision No: [left blank] being part of the land contained in Certificate of Title Volume 8766 Folio 892.'
Bisognin & Anor
Hera Project Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 75
(1905) 3 CLR 444
(1995) 183 CLR 273
(1985) 60 ALJR 1
(1919) 26 CLR 410