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[2012] VSC 94
Supreme Court of Victoria
2012-03-20
VICKERY J
Original judgment source is linked above.
NOTE: This version has been amended pursuant to the 'Slip Rule' by Order made 1 May 2012 and reasons: James George Hodgson v Amcor (No. 8) [2012] VSC 162
COMPANIES - "Officer" of a corporation - Duties arising under ss 180, 181, 182 and 183 Corporations Act 2001 - Persons who constitute the directing mind of a corporation -Alleged sale of company assets on uncommercial terms - concept of an 'uncommercial transaction' - Whether breach of fiduciary duty for employee to participate in a sale of company assets on uncommercial terms - Noting business opportunities - Whether breach of fiduciary duty to employer - Making preparations for new business following termination of employment - Whether breach of fiduciary duty to employer - Concealing useful commercial intelligence from employer - Whether breach of fiduciary duty to employer - Failing to disclose own breaches of fiduciary duty - Whether in itself a breach of fiduciary duty to employer - Compensation under - Claims by shareholders for losses suffered by a company - Claims by shareholder for damages reflective of company losses
EMPLOYER and EMPLOYEE - Redundancy at common law - Whether employee made redundant - Contractual termination by notice - Purported summary dismissal post termination - Whether purported ground of summary dismissal made out - Burden on employer to establish serious misconduct - Whether grounds of termination may change by reason of after acquired information - Application of principle in Shepherd v Felt and Textiles of Australia [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359 - Entitlement to bonus - Quantum of bonus - Long service leave calculation - Annual leave calculation - Whether accrued entitlements survive termination - Sale of employers' businesses to employees - Fiduciary duties of employees
EQUITY - Fiduciary duties of employees - Equitable remedies - Election as to relief - Equitable compensation - Taking of accounts - Causation and equitable relief - Barnes v Addy liability - Knowledge of fiduciary breach - Equitable defence of laches in relation to fiduciary claims
EVIDENCE - Admissions made by a party in computer stored information- ss 59(1), 81(1), 87(1)(a) Evidence Act 2008 - Admissions admissible against parties other than the maker - s 87(1)(a) Evidence Act 2008 - Proof of requirements under s 87(1)(a) Evidence Act 2008
PRACTICE and PROCEDURE - Application at trial to amend defence to withdraw an admission - Principles to be applied - Anshun estoppel - Principles to be applied
1 The Court has before it two proceedings which were heard concurrently in a joint trial:
(a) James George Hodgson v Amcor Limited and Amcor Limited & Others (Supreme Court Proceeding No. 9420 of 2004) (the "Hodgson Proceeding"); and
(b) Amcor Limited & Others and Trevor Mark Barnes & Others (Supreme Court Proceeding No. 8181 of 2007) (the "Barnes Proceeding").
2 The proceedings involve a substantial multinational business based in Australia, generally known as Amcor. The Amcor group of companies comprise one of the world's largest packaging manufacturers and distributors.
3 Serious issues have arisen between Amcor Limited and a number of its former senior managers which have spawned this complex litigation. In these reasons the former senior managers are called collectively the "Defendants", with the composition of that group changing from time to time in accordance with the context.
4 All of the Amcor entities are collectively referred to as "Amcor" or the "Amcor Parties", again with the composition of those entities changing from time to time in accordance with the context.
5 In the Hodgson Proceeding, Mr James Hodgson ("Hodgson") as the Plaintiff claims amounts due to him under his contract of employment with Amcor consequent on the termination of his employment with that company which he claims to have occurred on 1 October 2004. Hodgson, at the time of his departure from Amcor occupied a senior position as Group General Manager of Amcor's corrugating division known as Amcor Fibre Packaging Australia ("Corrugating/AFPA"). The company has defended Mr Hodgson's claims, by challenging the quantum of the sum due to him, and on the basis that he is disentitled to the amounts he claims by reason of serious misconduct, as alleged in Amcor's counter-claim.
6 The trial of the quantum of Hodgson's claim in the Hodgson Proceeding was conducted in an earlier and separate trial. The balance of the issues, including Amcor's counter-claim, were heard in the principal trial which was conducted concurrently with the Barnes Proceeding. These reasons include reasons for decision in relation to both parts of the Hodgson Proceeding.
7 In the Barnes Proceeding, the Amcor Parties claim that the natural person Defendants, Messrs Trevor Barnes "(Barnes"), Craig Holihan ("Holihan"), Ian Sangster ("Sangster"), Roger Bayley ("Bayley") and Albert Mihelic ("Mihelic"), and the first defendant by counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding, Hodgson, as former senior managers of Amcor's corrugating division, Corrugating/AFPA, breached various contractual, equitable and statutory duties they owed to the company.
8 The duties alleged to have been breached were fiduciary duties and duties of fidelity and good faith, together with duties under sections 180, 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act 2001.
9 The Amcor Parties claim that the Defendants breached their duties by entering into agreements between themselves relating to their acquisition or proposed acquisition of interests in two businesses sold by the Corrugating/AFPA division of Amcor, namely:
(a) a business known as the "Service Packaging Business" sold by an agreement dated 1 February 2002 by two Amcor subsidiary companies to a Mr Ian Hottes ("Hottes") (the "First Sale Agreement"). Hottes is now deceased and could not be called to give evidence. The purchase price was $81,650. The sale included a supply agreement; and
(b) a business known as the "ACB Business" was sold by an agreement dated 2 June 2003 by two other Amcor subsidiaries to Holihan (the "Second Sale Agreement"). The base purchase price was $1 million (plus stock), payable within five years of completion. There was also an associated supply agreement.
10 It is alleged that the former managers secretly entered into arrangements to gain interests in the two businesses and maintained those interests without any disclosure to their employer at the time, Amcor Limited.
11 Amcor claims that the Defendants were heavily involved in each of the sales on behalf of Amcor, purportedly acting for Amcor, but in fact pursuing their own interests.
12 It is also alleged that the sales of the businesses were effected at an under value and on uncommercial terms, which was detrimental to the interests of the relevant Amcor selling entity in each case, as well as to the Amcor Group overall.
13 Amcor further alleges that Hodgson, in breach of his duties to Amcor, involved himself in a company unrelated to Amcor, Australian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd. It is alleged that this company secretly conducted business activities in competition with and against the interests of Amcor.
14 Amcor Limited ("Amcor Ltd"), the first plaintiff in the Barnes Proceeding, is the corporate vehicle for Amcor's worldwide operations.
15 At the time relevant to this litigation, there were seven individual businesses that made up Amcor's worldwide portfolio - Amcor Australasia, Global Tobacco, Amcor Rentsch Europe, Amcor Asia, Amcor Sunclipse, Amcor Flexibles Europe, Amcor PET and Amcor Closures.
16 Amcor Australasia itself had six discrete operating businesses - Corrugating/AFPA, Metals, Plastics, Cartons & Sacks, Paper and Glass. The head office of Amcor Australasia was in Melbourne. It operated 66 manufacturing plants, including 14 corrugated box plants, 14 metal packaging plants, 13 flexible and plastic packaging plants, 4 paper mills, 13 carton and sacks plants and a glass plant, employing in excess of 7,800 people.
17 In the financial year ending 30 June 2002 sales for Amcor Australasia were in excess of $2.36 billion. In the financial year ending 30 June 2003 sales were in excess of $2.45 billion.
18 Corrugating/AFPA, the largest division of Amcor Australasia, was Amcor's corrugated packaging business in Australia and New Zealand. It focussed on the manufacturing of cardboard corrugated products, principally cardboard boxes. It had its head office in Melbourne. It operated 14 corrugated box plants in Australia and New Zealand. In 2002, Corrugating/AFPA employed over 3,900 people.
19 In the financial year ending 30 June 2002 sales for Corrugating/AFPA were in excess of $860 million and in the financial year ending 30 June 2003 sales were in excess of $920 million.
20 The agreements relating to the First Sale Agreement for the Service Packaging Business entered into by the relevant Defendants to give effect to their interests inter se are alleged by the Amcor Parties to be comprised in the following documents:
(a) a deed between Service Packaging Pty. Ltd. ("Service Packaging"), Hottes, G5 Investments Pty Ltd (Hottes' company) ("G5"), Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley and Sangster concerning the Service Packaging Business (the "First G5 Deed"). The deed provided in essence that Hottes held the five issued shares in Service Packaging on trust for G5. It also provided that Hottes held one share in G5 beneficially and the other four shares in G5 in trust, one each for the other "shareholders" (Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley and Sangster, but not Mihelic). The former Amcor managers who were signatories admit that it was signed by them sometime in late 2001 but contend that it did not proceed, essentially due to non-fulfilment of an oral condition relating to Hottes obtaining an exclusive distributorship for 3M stretch wrapping machinery;
(b) a deed between Service Packaging, G5, Hottes, Bankson Pty Ltd (representing Hodgson) ("Bankson"), Brobel Investments Pty Ltd (representing Barnes) ("Brobel"), CBB Investments Pty Ltd (representing Bayley) ("CBB"), Merrymen Pty Ltd (representing Sangster) ("Merrymen"), Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley and Sangster ( the "Second G5 Deed"). It provided in essence that Hottes held one share in G5 beneficially and the other four shares in G5 in trust, one each for the company shareholders representing each of Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley and Sangster. In other words, the individual beneficial interests held under the First G5 Deed by those persons were substituted by the beneficial interests held by the companies nominated by those original shareholders (the companies being Bankson, Brobel, CBB and Merrymen). The former managers admitted executing the Second G5 Deed in late 2002, but again contend that it did not proceed essentially due to non-fulfilment of an oral condition relating to Hottes obtaining an exclusive distributorship for 3M stretch wrapping machinery.
21 The agreements relating to the Second Sale Agreement for the ACB Business entered into by the relevant Defendants to give effect to their interests inter se are alleged by Amcor to be comprised in the following documents:
(a) a deed dated 26 May 2003 between Barnes and Astra Corporation Pty Ltd ("Astra") (being a Barnes company ), Merrymen (representing Sangster), Bankson (representing Hodgson), Sampson Solo (representing Mihelic), CBB (representing Bayley) and Brobel (representing Barnes) (the "26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed"). It provided in essence that pursuant to a management agreement between Barnes and Holihan in relation to the ACB Business acquired by Holihan's company ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd (the holding company), the shares in the ACB Business, through a complicated company and trust structure, were held beneficially in trust ultimately for each of the company shareholders representing each of Holihan, Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic. The 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed contained a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause. The various signatories to the Deed admitted executing it, but contend that it was cancelled by them on about 28 May 2003;
(b) an agreement dated 26 May 2003 between Holihan and Barnes regarding purchase of the ACB Business (the "26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement"). Pursuant to this agreement, Holihan in effect gained a 20 per cent beneficial interest in the ACB Business, while together, Barnes, Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in effect gained an 80% beneficial interest. However, other than Barnes, the identity of the other ultimate beneficiaries, namely Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic, was not disclosed to Holihan in this agreement, who was said in the agreement to be "not aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares". The agreement also contained a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause. Holihan and Barnes admit executing the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement on about 26 May 2003;
(c) the Agreement dated 28 May 2003 between Barnes and Holihan regarding the ACB Business purchase, but in fact executed in October 2005 (the "28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement"). Pursuant to this agreement, in the circumstances described, Holihan and interests associated with him in effect gained a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the ACB Business, while Barnes and interests associated with him gained the other 50% beneficial interest. By this means, Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic dropped out of the arrangement in favour of a 50/50 split between Holihan and Barnes. Again, this agreement also contained a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause.
22 It is the case of the Amcor Parties that Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic first proposed acquiring Amcor businesses whilst employed by Amcor in late 2000, when advice was sought from their jointly engaged solicitor, Mr Mark Dillman at Deacons. It is alleged that the scheme involved using a genuine purchaser to acquire the interest from Amcor (Hottes, in the case of the Service Packaging Business, and Holihan for the ACB Business). It was proposed that the genuine purchaser would hold some equity with the balance held by the former managers.
23 Amcor further alleges that the former managers' interests would be concealed by utilising a trust structure. It was contended that the acquisition of the Service Packaging Business provided the template for the later acquisition of the ACB Business by the former managers of Amcor.
24 Amcor further contends that its management was completely unaware of the involvement of the former managers (apart from Hottes in the first instance and the Holihan in the second) in acquiring any interest in the businesses or of the existence of the agreements.
25 The Amcor Parties also advance the case that its proper processes for sales of business assets to current managers were not followed and had it known that the former managers were proposing to acquire interests in the businesses, the sales would not have proceeded, or a different procedure would have been adopted in effecting the sales.
26 The plaintiffs in the Barnes Proceeding are the same as the plaintiffs by counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding:
(a) Amcor Limited ("Amcor Ltd") (which has been earlier described) is the First Plaintiff. Amcor is a publicly listed, multinational packaging company;
(b) Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd ("APA") is the Third Plaintiff. APA is the corporate vehicle for Amcor Australasia's operations. It is, and was at all relevant times, wholly owned by Amcor. APA was at all relevant times, the parent company of both ACB and Service Containers. APA trades as Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia ("Corrugating/AFPA"). APA is described in more detail below;
(c) Specialty Packaging Group Pty Ltd. (formerly Service Containers Pty Ltd (ACN 005 319 666), is the Fourth Plaintiff, ("Service Containers") and the vendor of the assets of the Service Packaging Business on the terms of the First Sale Agreement. Service Containers is described in more detail below;
(d) ACN 002693843 Box Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd) ("ACB"), the Second Plaintiff, was the vendor of the assets of the ACB Business on the terms of the Second Sale Agreement. ACB is described in more detail below.
27 Amcor Packaging Australia Pty Ltd ("APA") is the corporate vehicle for Amcor Australasia's operations and the conduct of its various divisions. APA is, and was at all relevant times, a wholly owned subsidiary of Amcor.
28 APA was at all relevant times, the parent company of both ACB and Service Containers.
29 APA was the trading entity responsible for Amcor Australasia's corrugated packaging operations.
30 From 2000, Amcor Australasia was divided into six operational "groups": AFPA/Corrugating, metals, plastics, cartons & sacks, paper and glass.
31 Each business division had a Group General Manager, who reported to Mr Brown ("Brown") and later to Mr Sutton ("Sutton").
32 APA has at all material times owned all the issued shares in:
33 Amcor Ltd, is not a shareholder in either ACB or Service Containers. However, it holds all the issued shares in APA. Accordingly, at all relevant times, Amcor Ltd was the ultimate holding company of ACB and Service Containers.
35 The principal operation of Corrugating/AFPA was the production of corrugated cardboard products, including cardboard boxes and the like.
36 Corrugating/AFPA comprised several departments: Sales and Marketing, Operations, Commercial, New Zealand Box, Packaging Solutions, and Human Resources. The department General Managers were as follows:
(a) Sangster (based in Queensland) - Sales and Marketing;
(d) Mr McElroy ("McElroy") (based in Auckland) - New Zealand box;
(e) Mihelic, General Manager, Packaging Solutions (based in Burwood); and
(f) Mr Dwyer ("Dwyer") (based in Burwood) - Human Resources.
37 Hodgson was the Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA.
38 Hodgson reported to the managing director Amcor Australia, Brown, who in turn reported to the CEO and Managing Director of Amcor Ltd, Jones.
39 Mr Clayton ("Clayton") held the position of Group General Manager, Finance & Operations. Clayton reported to Brown. Mr Parker, General Manager of the Commercial department of Corrugating/AFPA ("Parker"), reported directly to Hodgson with an indirect line of responsibility to Clayton.
40 The structure of Corrugating/AFPA at relevant times is set out in Schedule 1 to these reasons.
Speciality Packaging Group Pty Ltd (Formerly Service Containers Pty Ltd)
41 Speciality Packaging Group Pty Ltd (formerly Service Containers Pty Ltd) ("Service Containers") is and was at all relevant times a wholly owned subsidiary of the Amcor company, APA.
42 Service Containers conducted a business known as the Service Packaging Business as part of the Corrugating/AFPA division before that business was sold to a Mr Ian Hottes ("Hottes") on 2 February 2002, in circumstances which are the subject of controversy in this proceeding.
43 The directors of Service Containers at the time of the First Sale Agreement were Clayton (from April 2001 to July 2008), Hodgson (from August 2001 to November 2004), Brown (from February 1996 to September 2003), and Lachal (from April 2001 to July 2008). Lewis was the secretary from December 2001 to present.
44 Apart from Hodgson, none of the Defendants was a director of Service Containers.
45 Prior to the sale Service Containers conducted two businesses: Amcor Displays and the Service Packaging Business. The businesses were situated in NSW.
46 Amcor Displays was a graphics and displays business.
47 The Service Packaging Business had two discrete aspects to its business operations. First, it received orders from its customers for the supply of finished corrugated products and corrugated boxes. It sourced its supply of corrugated cardboard from Amcor's corrugated packaging division. It charged a premium on the cost of supply to it by Amcor. Second, it brokered the sale to its customers of a range of plastic wraps, tapes, stock boxes and general packaging which Amcor did not manufacture and which the Service Packaging Business sourced externally.
48 The Displays Business was profitable, however the Service Packaging Business was not. The turnover of the Service Packaging Business in or about February 2002 was approximately $3.0 million. This was less than 0.5% of Corrugating's Australasian turnover of about $900 million. It had trading stock of approximately $400,000 and book assets of about $80,000 representing less than 0.1% of Corrugating's assets. It had three employees, not including Hottes. It was a non-core and underperforming business for Amcor.
49 ACN 002693843 Box Pty Ltd ("ACB") conducted the ACB Business as part of the Corrugating/AFPA division before that business was sold to the Holihan in 2003, in the controversial circumstances the subject of this proceeding.
50 ACB is and was at all relevant times a wholly owned subsidiary of APA, the directors of which were at the relevant times Clayton (from April 2001 to July 2008), Mr Crawford (from January 2003 to July 2004), Brown (from February 1996 to September 2003), Lachal - Director from September 1996 to November 1997 and September 2005 to January 2008 and Mr Reichler (from March 1999 to January 2003). Lewis was appointed Company Secretary of ACB in January 2000 to present and Director from August 2004 to present.
51 ACB conducted the ACB Business as part of the Corrugating/AFPA division of Amcor Australasia and was the owner and the vendor of the business assets sold to ACB Australia Pty Ltd by the terms of the Second Sale Agreement dated 2 June 2003.
52 Holihan was the General Manager of that business. He reported to Barnes in Barnes' capacity as General Manager Central Region, at least until November 2002. Barnes reported to Hodgson in Hodgson's role as Group General Manager, AFPZA/Corrugating.
54 Amcor reorganised its global operations in 2000. This reorganisation saw the birth of Amcor Australasia and the implementation of the broad structure that was in place at the time of the sales of each of the two businesses the subject of this litigation.
55 All of Amcor's Australasian businesses became one division called "Amcor Australasia". Brown became the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia. He continued to report to Jones.
56 It was during this restructure in 2000 that Hodgson became Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA.
Changes to Key Personnel Following Re-organisation
57 As a consequence of the reorganisation, in about February 2000 Hodgson's position and title was changed to Group General Manager, Corrugating/AFPA, Northern Region, however his responsibilities remained unchanged.
58 Mr Morriss ("Morriss") was Hodgson's then equivalent in the Southern Region, but at about this time Morriss left Amcor in February 2000 and an Mr Smith replaced him. At or about the same time, AFPA's New South Wales Corrugating operations became part of Hodgson's responsibility in the Northern Region.
59 After Morriss left in February 2000 Hodgson was asked by Brown to run the Australian and New Zealand box business. Hodgson took up this role in early June 2000.
60 On 1 July 2000, Hodgson was appointed as the Group General Manager, Corrugating/AFPA with responsibility for Amcor's box business throughout Australia and New Zealand.
61 In this position Hodgson reported to Brown. Hodgson still retained direct responsibility for the Queensland operations until about June 2001 at which time Sangster replaced Hodgson in that role upon his appointment as General Manager, Corrugating/AFPA, Northern Region.
62 At or about this time, in June 2001, a Central Region was also created which encompassed New South Wales operations for which Barnes was responsible. Sangster (Northern Region), Barnes (Central Region) and Mr Smith (Southern Region) reported to Hodgson.
63 Hodgson undertook his new role while based in Camberwell in Melbourne but he commuted from Brisbane until early 2001 when his family moved to Melbourne.
64 Both prior to and after the 2000 restructure Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic reported up to Hodgson, who in turn reported to Brown, who in turn reported to Jones.
65 Since joining Amcor in 1966, Hodgson enjoyed a long career with the company group.
66 Hodgson is the plaintiff in the Hodgson Proceeding. He was employed by Amcor Limited ("Amcor") (or by companies acquired by Amcor) from 13 January 1966, when he joined Amcor. During the period of his employment with Amcor he held various managerial positions and was ultimately Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA from 1 July 2000. He left his position on 1 October 2004 in the circumstances later described.
67 Between about 1966 and about 1979, he was employed by Queensland Fibre Packages at its fibreboard packaging plant located at West End, Queensland. Hodgson commenced working in Accounts Payable and then Customer Service before becoming a Sales Representative in about 1969.
68 In about 1979, Fibre Containers took over the business of Queensland Fibre Packages. Hodgson continued as its Sales Representative until he was appointed as Sales Manager in 1980. In that same year Hodgson completed a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of Queensland majoring in financial accounting. In July 1986 Hodgson was appointed as General Manager of Fibre Containers.
69 Between about 1992 and 1996, Hodgson continued as General Manager of Fibre Containers which Amcor operated as a separate and independent brand to its fibre packaging interests in Queensland.
70 In about May 1996, Hodgson was appointed the State General Manager, Queensland of Corrugating/AFPA, with responsibility for Amcor's Fibre Packaging Business (boxes) throughout Queensland and New Zealand. At that time Hodgson was based in Brisbane and reported to Brown who was Managing Director of Corrugating/AFPA. Brown reported to Jones who was Managing Director of AFP.
71 In about 1997, Amcor organised the business into the following divisions:
(a) Amcor Containers Packaging;
(b) Amcor Fibre Packaging ("AFP");
(c) Amcor Printing Papers Group; and
(d) Amcor Europe.
72 The Australian sub-division of AFP was Corrugating/AFPA.
73 In January 1998 Jones became Managing Director of Amcor Limited. Hodgson continued to report to Brown at that time, who continued as Managing Director of Corrugating/AFPA.
74 In January 2000, Amcor reorganised its worldwide business regionally, and all of Amcor's Australasian businesses became one division called "Amcor Australasia". Brown became the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia and continued to report to Jones.
75 The sub-divisions of Amcor Australasia relating to "Fibre Packaging" included:
(a) Mills - which made recycled paper;
(b) Corrugating - which made boxes; and
(c) Cartons - which made cartons and paper for cartons at a mill in Queensland.
76 In about February 2000, Hodgson's title changed to Group General Manager, Corrugating/AFPA, Northern Region. From about March 2000, that role incorporated responsibility for Amcor's fibre packaging business in New South Wales.
77 On 1 July 2000, Hodgson was formally appointed as the Group General Manager of the Amcor businesses trading under the names Corrugating/AFPA, Fibre Containers Queensland and Kiwi Packaging, with responsibility for corrugating products n Australia and New Zealand. Hodgson continued to report to Brown.
78 Hodgson retained direct responsibility for the Queensland operations until about June 2001 at which time Ian Sangster took over the role of General Manager, Corrugating/AFPA, Northern Region. At this time, Mr Trevor Barnes was responsible for the Central Region (which encompassed New South Wales operations), and Mr Tony Smith was responsible for the Southern Region.
79 Hodgson was senior to each of the other Defendants, who were his subordinates.
80 Hodgson remained in the role of Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA until his departure from Amcor on 1 October 2004.
81 As such, Hodgson was responsible for the largest division of Amcor Australasia, with the most staff, resources and revenue. In 2004 it had an annual turnover of approximately $970 million, an annual profit of approximately $70-$80 million and employed about 2,600 people.
82 Hodgson is not a party to the Barnes Proceeding, although in essence the same allegations that are pressed by Amcor in that proceeding, are alleged against Hodgson by counter-claim in the Hodgson Proceeding.
83 Bankson Pty Ltd ("Bankson") is the Second Defendant to the Counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding.
84 Bankson Pty Ltd was incorporated on 25 June 1996 with Hodgson and his wife Natasha Hodgson as its sole directors and shareholders.
85 It was through Bankson that Hodgson, at least initially, acquired an interest in the Service Packaging Business. Pursuant to the terms of the Second G5 Deed, Hottes held one of the five issued shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd on trust for Bankson, and by this means, Bankson acquired a one fifth interest in the Service Packaging Business.
86 It was also through Bankson that Hodgson in 2003 first acquired a 16% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
87 Hodgson's contract of employment relevant to these proceedings commenced 1 July 2000 ("Hodgson's Employment Contract"). It was extended for three years from 1 July 2003 under the same terms and conditions.
88 Hodgson's Employment Contract, insofar as it relates to his remuneration, will be dealt with below in the context of a consideration of the entitlements he claims on cessation of his employment with Amcor on 1 October 2004.
89 From 1 July 2000, when Hodgson was appointed as the Group General Manager ("GGM") of Corrugating/AFPA, Hodgson was on the third tier of management within the Amcor hierarchy. He reported to the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia (Brown from 2000 until 2003, then to Sutton from 2003 until 2004), who in turn reported to Jones, Managing Director of Amcor Limited, who in turn reported to the Amcor Board, which was chaired by Mr Roberts.
90 As earlier referred to, an organisational chart of Corrugating/AFPA at relevant times is set out as Schedule 1 to these reasons. This depicts Hodgson's key managerial position within the Amcor hierarchy.
91 In the 2002/2003 financial year Hodgson had authority to approve budgeted capital expenditure up to $250,000 with prior approval from the Amcor Board.
92 In the 2003/2004 financial year, in his capacity as Group General Manager of Fibre Packaging I accept that Hodgson was relatively senior in the organisation of Amcor Limited. He had seven General Managers reporting to him.
93 As to his scope and level of authority within Amcor, Hodgson gave the following evidence, which I accept:
I did not have power as one of the Group General Managers of Amcor Australasia to make substantial decisions affecting Amcor or indeed Corrugating. As Group General Manager, I had limited authority, in the 2002/03 financial year, to approve budgeted (namely, transactions pre-approved by the Amcor Board) capital expenditure only up to $250,000. I do not recall having any authority to sell Amcor assets and I do not recall ever doing so. I had no financial authority in respect of unbudgeted transactions. Amcor had a policy ("Acquisition of Capital Assets" in relation to capital expenditure and a review committee referred to as the Capital Expenditure Review Group (CERG) was established by that policy. In the late 1990s when I was working at Rocklea in Queensland, I was a member of CERG with Mr Morris, Mr Brown and, I believe, Mr Reichler. CERG was responsible for acquisitions (capital expenditure). The policy did not apply to the sale of assets. No one at Amcor told me that the sales of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business the subject of these proceedings had to be approved or reviewed by CERG. The first time I ever saw a suggestion that these two sales should have been referred to or reviewed by CERG was in February 2011 when I read the witness statements filed on behalf of the Amcor Parties in this proceeding.
The power to make decisions in relation to Amcor Australasia was vested in Mr Brown and later Mr Sutton in their role as Managing Director, Amcor Australasia. In the 2002/03 financial year, Mr Brown had financial authority to approve budgeted capital expenditure up to $2 million and unbudgeted capital expenditure up to $1 million.
I could make recommendations, submissions and presentations to Mr Brown and Mr Sutton relevant to Corrugating and I did so (less often in the case of Mr Sutton).
Some decisions affecting Amcor Australasia could not be made by Mr Brown or Mr Sutton. These types of decisions (for example, the recommendations set out in the BluePrint for Further Improvement for the closure of Amcor's Townsville, Box Hill and Wetherill Park operations to which I refer below) required approval by Mr Jones and the Amcor Board.
I did make, when asked to do so by Mr Brown or Mr Sutton (less so by Mr Sutton) or Mr Jones, formal submissions to the Amcor Board on matters relevant to the interests of Corrugating. Again, by way of example, I presented the BluePrint for Further Improvement to the Board of Amcor Limited in conjunction with Mr Brown.
Mr Brown and Mr Sutton in relation to Amcor Australasia and, at the higher level, Mr Jones and the Amcor Board made all the significant decisions that were considered to affect Amcor's interests and the interests of Corrugating. My role as Group General Manager, Corrugating was to make recommendations or submissions for approval by Brown (later Sutton) and the Amcor Board but otherwise to implement the directions or the strategic vision given to me by my superiors.
94 I also accept that Hodgson, although he had authority to approve budgeted capital expenditure of up to $250,000 with prior approval from the Amcor Board, he had no authority to approve unbudgeted capital expenditure.
95 I do not accept that Hodgson had any authority to sell Amcor assets, and he did not have authority to sell either of the subject businesses. Lewis conceded that Hodgson had no authority to sell the ACB Business and that only Brown had authority to sell the Service Packaging Business even though in relation to the Service Packaging Business, Hodgson was one of its several directors. The evidence of Lewis was that these decisions were made by the person within Amcor who had the financial authority to make those decisions. Further, Brown gave evidence that he, not Hodgson, in fact approved the sales of the ACB Business and the Service Packaging Business. Brown said in the course of his evidence:
But otherwise if the proposal looked feasible and it wasn't vetoed by some strategic consideration, then it was your practice to approve?---Yes.
That's what happened with respect to both of the sales which are the subject of this proceeding wasn't it?---Yes.
Proposals were put to you and you approved them?---As did the expenditure review committee as I recall.
96 Further, I am not satisfied on the evidence that Hodgson was an officer of ACB. Although the decision to sell the ACB Business was a decision which affected the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of ACB, there is no evidence that Hodgson exercised any decision making authority in relation to the ACB Business that did not reflect a direction given, or approval first sought and obtained, from Brown.
97 Hodgson was from August 2001 to October 2004 a director of Service Containers. It was not disputed by Hodgson that he owed statutory and fiduciary duties to Service Containers for the period of time that he held that office.
Amcor's Principal Allegations Against Hodgson
98 The principal case put by the Amcor parties against Hodgson is that he gained and maintained an interest in the ACB Business and the Service Containers business at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently, and thereby was in breach of his duties to Amcor.
99 It is also put that the sale agreements in respect of the two businesses were uncommercial.
100 Amcor further alleges against Hodgson (and Hodgson alone) that he breached his duties to Amcor in the course of his employment, by his secret participation in the business of a company known as Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd ("AMCG") which provided consultancy services to an Amcor competitor Carter Holt Harvey ("CHH"). AMCG was incorporated on 22 September 2004.
101 Barnes, the First Defendant in the Barnes Proceeding, was appointed to the position of Regional General Manager of Amcor Fibre Packaging in New South Wales commencing 1 January 2000. This was done pursuant to the terms of a letter of appointment dated 19 February 2000. He was employed by Amcor from January 1998 until he resigned on 28 September 2004, with effect on 28 October 2004.
102 During his employment with Amcor Barnes held the following management roles:
(a) from January 1998 until early 1999 he was employed as a Site Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging (New South Wales) for the Smithfield site;
(b) from early 1999 until 1 January 2000 he was employed as General Manager Operations Amcor Fibre Packaging (New South Wales), reporting to David Ley;
(c) from 1 January 2000 until June 2000, he was employed as Regional General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging (New South Wales), reporting to John Morriss and, from February 2000, to Hodgson;
(d) from June 2000 until November 2002, he was General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging, Central Region, reporting to Hodgson;
(e) from July 2002 until his resignation in September 2004, he was employed as General Manager Australian Operations (a position held concurrently with his management of the Central Region until November 2002), also reporting to Hodgson; and
(f) in January 2003 he was additionally appointed to the role of project director supervising a large team of implementation consultants.
103 Thus from February 2000 until his resignation in September 2004, Barnes reported to Hodgson.
104 The Amcor Parties allege that he was an officer of each of Amcor, APA, Service Containers and ACB. Barnes denies this allegation.
105 Barnes' position as Regional General Manager for AFPA in NSW from 1 January 2000 was subject to a written contract of employment dated 10 January 2000 and signed on 19 February 2000 ("Barnes' Employment Contract"). While in this position, Barnes received a salary of $175,000 per annum.
106 In accordance with Barnes' Employment Contract, Barnes' employment was subject to the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 5 Barnes had a duty to comply with directions and keep Amcor informed by:
(i) reporting to Mr Morriss, Regional General Manager, Northern Region AFPA;
(ii) informing Amcor of any developments in relation to his role;
(iii) abiding by all ethical standards, policies and procedures that related to the operation of the business;
(iv) devoting his full time and attention to Amcor's business during working hours; and
(v) honestly and diligently carrying out his duties and responsibilities.
Under clause 7 Barnes was entitled to further remuneration including:
(i) a fully maintained motor vehicle inclusive of $4,000 worth of options;
(ii) health insurance cover under the Amcor Health Care Plan; and
(iii) eligibility to participate in the Amcor Employee Incentive Share Plan.
Under clause 15 Barnes had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by:
(i) refraining from any involvement with, or financial interest in, any business or enterprise that competed with, was a customer of, or supplied goods or services to, any business or enterprise within the Amcor Group including the Amcor Limited Group and its related bodies corporate whilst employed by Amcor; and
(ii) arranging his affairs to ensure there was no conflict between his personal interests and those of the Amcor Group;
Under clause 16 Barnes had a duty of confidentiality which required him to refrain from:
(i) disclosing or using, other than for the purposes of Amcor, any information to which he was exposed during his employment that was not in the public domain relating to the financial affairs; suppliers; customers and clients (including lists of names and addresses); future plans, research and development; business methods, systems and strategies; technical operations and pricing policies and costings of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group; and
(ii) disclosing, for his own purposes or those of any person associated with him, any knowledge of financial results of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group prior to their release to the public, in particular, any information concerning Amcor which, if publically disclosed, could affect the market price of Amcor shares.
Under clause 23 Barnes was restrained from:
(i) employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any employee of Amcor either on his own account or for any other person, form or company during his employment and for a period of three months following the effective date of the termination of his employment (namely, 28 January 2005);
(ii) disclosing confidential information about Amcor or belonging to Amcor obtained during employment;
(iii) engaging in any business, employment, consultancy or otherwise, engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably be expected to put him at an unfair advantage during his employment and at all times after the termination of his employment; and
(iv) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by Amcor from persons who have been clients or customers of Amcor during his employment and for a period of three months in Australia following the termination of his employment (namely 28 January 2005).
107 Barnes' employment as General Manager Operations Australia of AFPA (which he held from July 2002 until his resignation in September 2004) was "regularised" by a letter from Hodgson dated 19 August 2003 "embodying" the terms of his current employment. This letter was in very similar terms to the 19 February 2000 letter described above, except that:
(b) under clause 5 Barnes now reported to the Group General Manager AFPA (Hodgson).
108 Barnes contended that between 1 November 2002 and 19 August 2003, the terms of his employment were not in writing. However, I accept the submissions made by Amcor that:
(a) given the broad similarities between the written letters of offer which applied before and after this period of time it is clear that the policies and procedures set out in both letters applied to Barnes during this intervening period; and
(b) the "regularising" letter operated retrospectively and set out in writing what had fact occurred in Barnes' employment. Accordingly, the terms and conditions of Barnes' employment between 1 November 2002 and 19 August 2003 were effectively set out in the letter of 19 August 2003.
109 Prior to his resignation on 28 September 2004, for the financial year ending 30 June 2004, Barnes received a salary package of $374,988 which comprised a salary component of $284,200 together with a Management Incentive Program payment of $90,788.
110 Barnes simultaneously held two key positions within AFPA.
111 First, as General Manager Amcor Fibre Packaging - Central Region from June 2000 until November 2002, Barnes:
(a) had direct responsibility for Corrugating's New South Wales operations;
(b) had Mr Alvarez, Hottes and Holihan reporting to him as their immediate superior; and
(i) the ACB Business from 19 February 2000 until he left this role in November 2002; and
(ii) the Service Packaging Business from 19 February 2000 until it was sold on 1 February 2002.
112 Second, as General Manager Australian Operations from July 2002 until the cessation of his employment on 28 October 2004 following his resignation on 28 September 2004, he held a senior executive position within Amcor. In this capacity, the following Amcor managers reported directly to him:
(a) five separate Regional Operations Managers in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia and New Zealand;
113 Further, Barnes had approximately 1,800 staff under his authority; he stated that the "funds employed" in his role amounted to $450,000,000, with a capital expenditure of $35,000,000 and revenue of $675,000,000; and Amcor expected him to achieve a "major contribution" to an annual cost reduction target of $20,000,000, add "demonstrable value across the Operations area", and maintain key relationships with AFPA's suppliers and customers.
114 From June 2000 until November 2002, when he was General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging, Central Region, and from July 2002 until his resignation in September 2004, when he was employed as General Manager Australian Operations, Barnes was on the fourth tier of management within the Amcor hierarchy. He reported to who reported to the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia (Brown from 2000 until 2003, then to Sutton from 2003 until 2004), who in turn reported to Jones, Managing Director of Amcor Limited, who in turn reported to the Amcor Board, which was chaired by Mr Roberts.
115 Barnes resigned from Amcor by letter to Hodgson dated 29 September 2004. The letter was in similar terms to letters of resignation sent to Amcor on 28 September 2004 by Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic. As in the case of these other Defendants, Barnes' resignation took effect on 28 October 2004.
116 However, I accept that Barnes had been considering leaving Amcor on earlier occasions.
117 The settlement orders of 17 December 2004 made in the Federal Court Proceeding included an undertaking given by Barnes for the period 17 December 2004 to 28 January 2005 to refrain from:
in Australia (whether alone, in association, or as an employee, director or consultant) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by the Amcor Group from persons who have been clients or customers of the Amcor Group; and, employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from the Amcor Group any employee of the Amcor Group.
118 Barnes owned and controlled the following companies which are of relevance to the present proceeding: Brobel Investments Pty Ltd ("Brobel"), and Astra Corporation Pty Ltd ("Astra").
119 Brobel was incorporated on 24 May 2002. Barnes was the sole director, secretary and shareholder.
120 It was through Brobel that Barnes, at least initially, acquired an interest in the Service Packaging Business. Pursuant to the terms of the Second G5 Deed, Hottes held one of the five issued shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd on trust for Brobel. As a result of this shareholding, Brobel acquired a one fifth interest in the Service Packaging Business.
121 Barnes stated that he incorporated Brobel when Sangster approached him and informed him Hottes wanted investors in the Service Packaging Business.
122 The ASIC records show that Astra was registered on 20 May 2003 with 10 ordinary shares all of which were issued to Brobel. Barnes was the sole director and secretary of Astra.
123 It was also through Brobel and Astra that Barnes in 2003 first acquired a 16% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
124 Amcor claims that Barnes breached the duties he owed to it.
125 The principal case put by the Amcor parties is that Barnes gained and maintained an interest in the ACB Business and the Service Containers Business at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently.
126 It is also put that the sale agreements in respect of the two businesses were uncommercial.
127 Holihan, the Second Defendant in the Barnes Proceeding, was employed by Amcor from December 1988 until his resignation on 30 July 2003. His employment ceased on 31 July 2003. At the time he held the position of General Manager of the ACB Business.
128 Holihan is also the sole director of ACB Australia Pty Ltd and the sole director of Australian Corrugated Box Co. Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd).
129 During his employment with Amcor Holihan undertook the following management roles:
(a) from 4 December 1998 until 13 October 2000, he was employed as Southern Region Specialty Packaging Manager, reporting to Mr Morriss; and
(b) from 13 October 2000 until the sale of the Australian Corrugated Box business and the corresponding cessation of Holihan's employment, he was employed as General Manager - Small Businesses, NSW, reporting to Barnes.
130 Holihan's employment as General Manager, Specialty Businesses, NSW, which he held from 4 December 2000 to 31 July 2003, was set out in a letter of offer from Barnes dated 13 October 2000 and signed 31 October 2000 ("Holihan's Employment Contract"). In this role Holihan received a salary of $121,800 per annum.
131 Holihan's Employment Contract was subject to the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 5 Holihan had a duty to comply with directions and keep Amcor informed by:
(i) reporting to Barnes, General Manager AFPA, NSW;
(ii) informing Amcor of any developments in relation to his role;
(iii) abiding by all ethical standards, policies and procedures that related to the operation of the business;
(iv) devoting his full time and attention to Amcor's business during working hours; and
(v) honestly and diligently carrying out his duties and responsibilities.
Under clause 7 Holihan was entitled to further remuneration including:
(i) a fully maintained motor vehicle;
(ii) health insurance cover under the Amcor Health Care Plan;
(iii) eligibility to participate in the Amcor Employee Incentive Share Plan; and
(iv) eligibility to participate in the Management Incentive Plan.
Under clause 15 Holihan had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by:
(i) refraining from any involvement with, or financial interest in, any business or enterprise that competed with, was a customer of, or supplied goods or services to, any business or enterprise within the Amcor Group including the Amcor Limited Group and its related bodies corporate whilst employed by Amcor; and
(ii) arranging his affairs to ensure there was no conflict between his personal interests and those of the Amcor Group.
Under clause 16 Holihan had a duty of confidentiality which required him to refrain from:
(i) disclosing or using, other than for the purposes of Amcor, any information to which he was exposed during his employment that was not in the public domain relating to the financial affairs; suppliers; customers and clients (including lists of names and addresses); future plans, research and development; business methods, systems and strategies; technical operations and pricing policies and costings of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group; and
(ii) disclosing, for his own purposes or those of any person associated with him, any knowledge of financial results of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor group prior to their release to the public, in particular, any information concerning Amcor which, if publicly disclosed, could affect the market price of Amcor shares.
Under clause 23 Holihan was restrained from:
(i) employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any employee of Amcor either on his own account or for any other person, form or company during his employment and for a period of three months following the effective date of the termination of his employment (namely 31 October 2003);
(ii) disclosing confidential information about Amcor or belonging to Amcor obtained during employment;
(iii) engaging in any business, employment, consultancy or otherwise engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably be expected to put him at an unfair advantage during his employment and at all times after the termination of his employment; and
(iv) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by Amcor from persons who have been clients or customers of Amcor during his employment and for a period of three months in Australia following the termination of his employment (namely 31 October 2003).
132 I accept that Holihan exercised significant autonomy and authority over the Specialty Businesses, initially in Victoria, and later in NSW. However, his level of authority did not in any practical sense, extend beyond these businesses.
133 In August 2001, Amcor prepared a position description and job specification for Holihan's role. Holihan agreed with this description, save for a reference to him engaging with the local community. The position description stated that Holihan supervised a total of 56 staff. The document also provided that Holihan's "Principal Accountabilities" included:
(d) liaising with employer bodies and negotiating with union officials.
134 In his role as Southern Region Specialty Packaging Manager, which he held from 14 December 1998 until 13 October 2000, Holihan treated a number of small businesses "as if [he] owned them," with authority for hiring and firing decisions, raising cheques and paying creditors.
135 I also accept that as General Manager - Small Businesses NSW from 13 October 2000 until the sale of the ACB Business, Holihan:
(a) controlled the daily operations of the ACB and Central Coast Cartons businesses as both General Manager and, for the ACB Business, as Site Manager;
(b) was responsible for thirty-five factory staff and a number of administrative staff;
(c) upon taking on this role, immediately reorganised the operations of the ACB Business and its reporting structure; and
(d) managed relationships with key customers, liaised with AFPA, set prices and generally controlled the business' operations.
136 Holihan reported to Barnes from 4 December 2000 until September 2002. Thereafter, he said, he "didn't really report to anyone".
137 I am satisfied that Holihan occupied a fifth tier management role within the Amcor hierarchy. From 4 December 2000 until September 2002 he reported to Barnes who reported to Hodgson.
Holihan s' Cessation of Employment with Amcor
138 Holihan's employment with Amcor and its subsidiaries ended when his trading company Achilla began to trade with Amcor on 31 July 2003 in accordance with the terms of the Second sale Agreement executed on 2 June 2003.
139 ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd ("ACB Australia") was registered on 23 April 2003.
140 ACB Australia was registered by Holihan for the purpose of holding the assets of the ACB Business purchased from Amcor pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement.
141 Upon registration, and at all material times thereafter, Holihan was the sole director and secretary of ACB Australia.
142 One ordinary share was issued in that company and held by Holihan on registration. On 5 September 2003 a further 999 shares were issued to LeoRose Pty Limited ("LeoRose"). Also on that date, the share held by Holihan was transferred to LeoRose Pty Limited such that LeoRose held all 1000 shares issued by ACB Australia.
Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd)
143 Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) ("Achilla") is the Fourth Defendant in the Barnes proceeding. It was registered by Holihan on 23 April 2003.
144 Achilla was Holihan's trading company in respect of the ACB Business. From 1 August 2003, Achilla made use of the assets held by ACB Australia to conduct the Australian Corrugated Box business.
145 Upon registration, and at all material times thereafter, Holihan was the sole director and secretary of Achilla.
146 One ordinary share was issued in that company and held by Holihan on registration. This was corrected on 5 September 2003 so that that share was held by ACB Australia.
147 Achilla's name was changed to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd on 2 September 2003.
148 Holihan Investments Pty Ltd ("Holihan Investments") was a company controlled by Holihan.
149 It was also through Holihan Investments that Holihan in 2003 first acquired a 20% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
150 Amcor claims that Holihan breached the duties he owed to it.
151 The principal case put by the Amcor parties is that Holihan knowingly assisted the Amcor employees, Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic to gain and maintain an interest in the ACB Business at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently.
152 It is also put that the sale agreement in respect of the ACB Business was uncommercial.
153 Sangster, the Fifth Defendant in the Barnes Proceeding, was employed by Amcor from January 1996 until 28 October 2004, following his resignation on 28 September 2004. Prior to August 2003 he was General Manager, Sales and Marketing, of AFPA/Corrugating.
154 During his employment with Amcor, Sangster held the following management positions:
(a) from January 1996 to August 1998 he was employed as Sales and Marketing Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging (New South Wales);
(b) from August 1998 to July 2001 he was employed as General Manager, Amcor Kiwi Packaging (New Zealand);
(c) from July 2001 to August 2002 he was employed as General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging Northern Region;
(d) from August 2002 to September 2003 he was employed as General Manager, Fresh Food Packaging, AFPA /Corrugating;
(e) from September 2003 to 28 October 2004 he was employed as General Manager Sales and Marketing, AFPA /Corrugating.
155 Sangster's employment with Amcor was subject to a written contract of employment dated 19 August 2003 ("Sangster's Employment Contract"). This confirmed his continued employment with Amcor under the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 5 Sangster had a duty to comply with directions and keep Amcor informed by:
(i) reporting to Hodgson, Group General Manager AFPA;
(ii) informing Amcor of any developments in relation to his role;
(iii) abiding by all ethical standards, policies and procedures that related to the operation of the business;
(iv) devoting his full time and attention to Amcor's business during working hours; and
(v) honestly and diligently carrying out his duties and responsibilities;
Under clause 7 Sangster was entitled to further remuneration including:
(i) a fully maintained motor vehicle inclusive of $10,000 worth of options;
(ii) health insurance cover under the Amcor Health Care Plan; and
(iii) eligibility to participate in the Amcor Employee Incentive Share Plan;
Under clause 15 Sangster had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by:
(i) refraining from any involvement with, or financial interest in, any business or enterprise that competed with, was a customer of, or supplied goods or services to, any business or enterprise within the Amcor Group including the Amcor Limited Group and its related bodies corporate whilst employed by Amcor; and
(ii) arranging his affairs to ensure there was no conflict between his personal interests and those of the Amcor Group;
Under clause 16 Sangster had a duty of confidentiality which required him to refrain from:
(i) disclosing or using, other than for the purposes of Amcor, any information to which he was exposed during his employment that was not in the public domain relating to the financial affairs; suppliers; customers and clients (including lists of names and addresses); future plans, research and development; business methods, systems and strategies; technical operations and pricing policies and costings of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group; and
(ii) disclosing, for his own purposes or those of any person associated with him, any knowledge of financial results of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor group prior to their release to the public, in particular, any information concerning Amcor which, if publically disclosed, could affect the market price of Amcor shares;
Under clause 23 Sangster was restrained from:
(i) employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any employee of Amcor either on his own account or for any other person, form or company during his employment and for a period of three months following the termination of his employment (namely, 28 January 2005);
(ii) disclosing confidential information about Amcor or belonging to Amcor obtained during his employment;
(iii) in the course of any business, employment, consultancy or otherwise, engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably be expected to put him at an unfair advantage during his employment and at all times after the termination of his employment (which occurred on 28 October 2004); and
(iv) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by Amcor from persons who have been clients or customers of Amcor during his employment and for a period of three months in Australia following the termination of his employment (namely 28 January 2005).
156 For the financial year ending 30 June 2004, Sangster received a salary package of $374,064 which comprised a salary component of $283,500 together with a Management Incentive Program payment of $90,564.
157 I accept that as Sales and Marketing Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia, from January 1996 to August 1998, Sangster was responsible for:
(a) Amcor's sales activities in New South Wales; and
(b) 20 sales representatives who directly reported to him.
158 As General Manager Amcor Kiwi Packaging from August 1998 to July 2001, Sangster:
(a) was responsible for setting and adhering to annual budgets governing sales revenue, manufacturing costs and capital expenditure recommendations; and
(b) had authority for capital expenditure to NZ $25,000.
159 In his capacity as General Manager Amcor Fibre Packaging, Northern Region, from July 2001 to August 2002, Sangster was responsible for:
(a) the profit of Amcor's Queensland corrugated business;
(b) sales and marketing related issues requiring guidance in New Zealand;
(c) Bayley who reported directly to him; and
(d) otherwise held a similar level of authority to that held in his previous position.
160 Between August 2002 to September 2003 when he was employed as General Manager, Fresh Food Packaging, AFPA/Corrugating, and between September 2003 to September 2004 when he was employed as General Manager Sales and Marketing, AFPA/Corrugating, Sangster was on the fourth tier of management within the Amcor hierarchy. He reported to
161 Amcor placed reliance on the following conduct on the part of Sangster to support the contention that "Sangster held a substantial degree of autonomy and responsibility": Pursuant to the First Sale Agreement, Service Packaging purchased the property and assets owned or used by Service Containers in its business for the purchase price of $81,650. By an Addendum to the First Sale Agreement dated 4 May 2004, Sangster on behalf of Amcor Fibre Packaging, and apparently of his own accord, extended the supply period from five to nine years under clauses 13.1 and 13.2 of the First Sale Agreement. This conduct was relied upon by Amcor as a "striking example of the breadth of Sangster's authority". Amcor submitted further that at the time of the extension, Sangster reported to Hodgson, and that Hodgson gave evidence that it was "part of Sangster's duties to negotiate with customers in relation to supply agreements of this kind", and that he did not seek, and did not need to seek, approval from Hodgson or anyone else to extend the arrangements with Hottes.
162 However, even when this example is taken into account, I am not satisfied that Sangster enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy and responsibility within Amcor, as was alleged.
Sangster's Cessation of Employment with Amcor
163 Sangster resigned from Amcor on 28 September 2004, effective 28 October 2004. His resignation was effected by way of letter to Hodgson dated 28 September 2004 which detailed his intention to commence a private consultancy business with his colleagues. Sangster's resignation letter followed a similar form to the letters of resignation of Barnes, Bayley and Mihelic.
164 Sangster gave evidence at trial, which I accept, that following his resignation he was asked by Amcor to leave and he did so on either 28 September 2004 or the day after.
Sangster's Federal Court Proceeding Settlement
165 The settlement orders of 17 December 2004 made in the Federal Court Proceeding included an undertaking given by Sangster for the period 17 December 2004 to 28 January 2005 to refrain from:
in Australia (whether alone, in association or as an employee, director or consultant) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by the Amcor Group from persons who have been clients or customers of the Amcor Group; and
employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from the Amcor Group any employee of the Amcor Group.
166 Merrymen Pty Ltd ("Merrymen") was incorporated on 21 May 2002 with Sangster as its sole director, secretary and shareholder. Merrymen was incorporated as a family investment vehicle to participate in the Second G5 Deed.
167 It was through Merrymen that Sangster acquired an interest in the Service Packaging business under the Second G5 Deed. Pursuant to the terms of the Second G5 Deed, Hottes held one of the five issued shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd on trust for Merrymen. As a result of this shareholding, Merrymen acquired a one fifth interest in the Service Packaging Business.
168 It was also through Merrymen that Sangster in 2003 first acquired a 16% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
169 Amcor claims that Sangster breached the duties he owed to it.
170 The principal case put by the Amcor parties is that Sangster gained and maintained an interest in the ACB Business and the Service Containers business at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently.
171 It is also put that the sale agreements in respect of the two businesses were uncommercial.
172 Bayley, the Sixth Defendant in the Barnes Proceeding, was employed by Amcor from 1988 until 28 October 2004, following his resignation on 28 September 2004. He is now 67 years of age and retired.
173 From 1966 until 1973 Bayley was in the air force where he attained a trade certificate as an airframe fitter. In his employment with Amcor, he worked in a number of positions, starting on the factory floor. From 1 March 2001 until about May 2003 he was employed as General Manager, Amcor Kiwi Packaging. In that period, he lived and worked in Auckland, New Zealand. He reported to Sangster.
174 Bayley returned to Australia in about May 2003. From about May 2003 until February 2004 he held the position of Operations Manager, Central Region, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia. In that position, he reported to Barnes.
175 From about 1 March 2004 to 28 October 2004 he was employed as General Manager, Specialty Group, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia.
176 The Amcor Parties allege that he was an officer of Amcor Ltd. There is no allegation that he was an officer of Service Containers, APA or ACB.
177 Bayley was also a director of an Amcor subsidiary which is fully owned by the fourth plaintiff, namely Central Coast Cartons Pty Ltd, from 1 May 2003 to 18 November 2004.
178 Whilst employed as General Manager Amcor Kiwi Packaging, from 1 March 2001 to May 2003, Bayley was subject to an Employment (Incorporating Expatriate Service) Agreement dated 15 February 2001 ("Bayley's Kiwi Packaging Employment Contract").
179 Under Bayley's Kiwi Packaging Employment Contract, he was subject to the following relevant terms and conditions:
Under clause 4 Bayley had a duty to promptly notify Amcor of any matter coming to his attention which could have a material effect on the business or affairs of Amcor;
Under clause 5 Bayley had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by refraining from being engaged, interested or concerned either directly or indirectly in any other business which was a customer, competitor or supplier of goods and services to Amcor or any of its related corporations;
Under clause 7 Bayley was entitled to remuneration including:
a salary of AUS $180,000 per annum;
a fully maintained motor vehicle;
eligibility to participate in Amcor Management Incentive Program;
a mobile telephone;
the reasonable costs associated with utilities; and
appropriate accommodation;
Under clause 14 Bayley received health insurance cover for himself and his dependent family;
Under clause 23 Bayley was restrained, during his employment and for 12 months thereafter, from:
employing, engaging, soliciting, interfering with or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any employees of Amcor; and
engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably and objectively be expected to put him or other person(s) at an unfair advantage or put the relevant Amcor company at an unfair disadvantage, whether that use may be inadvertent or deliberate, without Amcor's prior written authorisation in the course of any profession, business, employment, consultancy or otherwise;
Under clause 24 Bayley had a duty of confidentiality, during his employment and for 12 months thereafter, to:
keep entirely secret and confidential and not indirectly use, divulge or communicate to any person any of the trade secrets or otherwise confidential information of, or in relation to, the business of Amcor which he may have received, obtained or have access to while in the service of Amcor;
report any approach, except as permitted by this clause, to provide such information;
refrain from using for his own purposes or for purposes other than those of Amcor, any information so acquired; and
refrain from disclosing to any competitor the names and addresses of any clients of Amcor, any information relating to methods of operation, marketing, finance, fees and costs, business systems or techniques, or any other confidential information not generally available to competitors.
180 Bayley's employment as Operations Manager, Central Region from May 2003 to 28 February 2004, was not subject to a written contract of employment.
181 For the financial year ended 30 June 2004 Bayley received financial remuneration in the sum of $271,807 which comprised a salary of $206,000 and a Management Incentive Program payment of $65,807.
182 Bayley's employment as General Manager Specialty Group, Amcor Fibre Packaging from 1 March 2004 to 28 October 2004, was subject to a written contract of employment dated 2 March 2004 ("Bayley's Specialty Group Employment Contract"). This confirmed his continued employment and subjected him to the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 5 Bayley had a duty to comply with directions and keep Amcor informed by:
(i) reporting to Hodgson, Group General Manager AFPA;
(ii) informing Amcor of any developments in relation to his role;
(iii) abiding by all ethical standards, policies and procedures that related to the operation of the business;
(iv) devoting his full time and attention to Amcor's business during working hours; and
(v) honestly and diligently carrying out his duties and responsibilities.
Under clause 7 Bayley received further remuneration including:
(i) a fully maintained motor vehicle inclusive of $10,000 worth of options;
(ii) continued participation in the Amcor Health Care Plan; and
(iii) eligibility to participate in Amcor Employee Incentive Share Plan;
Under clause 15 Bayley had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by:
(i) refraining from any involvement with, or financial interest in, any business or enterprise that competed with, was a customer of, or supplied goods or services to, any business or enterprise within the Amcor Group including the Amcor Limited Group and its related bodies corporate whilst employed by Amcor; and
(ii) arranging his affairs to ensure there was no conflict between his personal interests and those of the Amcor Group;
Under clause 16 Bayley had a duty of confidentiality which required him to refrain from:
(i) disclosing or using, other than for the purposes of Amcor, any information to which he was exposed during his employment that was not in the public domain relating to the financial affairs; suppliers; customers and clients (including lists of names and addresses); future plans, research and development; business methods, systems and strategies; technical operations and pricing policies and costings of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group; and
(ii) disclosing, for his own purposes or those of any person associated with him, any knowledge of financial results of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group prior to their release to the public, in particular, any information concerning Amcor which, if publically disclosed, could affect the market price of Amcor shares;
Under clause 23 Bayley was restrained from:
(i) employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any employee of Amcor either on his own account or for any other person, form or company during his employment and for a period of three months following the termination of his employment (namely, 28 January 2005);
(ii) disclosing confidential information about Amcor or belonging to Amcor obtained during employment;
(iii) in the course of any business, employment, consultancy or otherwise, engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably be expected to put him at an unfair advantage during his employment and at all times after the termination of his employment; and
(iv) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by Amcor from persons who have been clients or customers of Amcor during his employment and for a period of three months in Australia following the termination of his employment (namely, 28 January 2005).
183 I accept that Bayley, as General Manager Amcor Kiwi Packaging, from February 2001 to May 2003:
(b) held primary responsibility for improving the productivity and profitability of the New Zealand business;
(c) had authority to hire and fire staff, but no to reduce staff numbers;
(d) needed authority "up the line" to enter into an industrial agreement with factory employees; and
(e) had authority for capital expenditure with a ceiling of NZ$25,000.
184 Bayley reported to Sangster who in turn reported to Hodgson.
185 As such, Bayley was on the fifth tier of Amcor's management hierarchy.
186 Bayley never attended any Board meeting of Amcor directors, nor saw Board minutes. There is no evidence that he had authority to dispose of any Amcor asset.
187 Bayley resigned from Amcor on 28 September 2004, effective 28 October 2004. His resignation was effected by way of letter to Hodgson dated 28 September 2004 which detailed his intention to commence a private consultancy business with his colleagues. Bayley's resignation letter followed a similar form to the letters of resignation of Barnes, Sangster and Mihelic.
188 Bayley was the Third Respondent in a the Federal Court Proceeding in which it was principally alleged that Bayley had misused confidential information of the Amcor parties.
189 The Federal Court Proceeding was resolved by consent orders of Merkel J made on 17 December 2004. The consent orders of 17 December 2004 included an undertaking of Bayley for the period 17 December 2004 to 28 January 2005 to refrain, inter alia, from:
in Australia (whether alone, in association, or as an employee, director or consultant) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by the Amcor Group from persons who have been clients or customers of the Amcor Group; and
employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from the Amcor Group any employee of the Amcor Group.
190 CBB Investments Pty Ltd was incorporated by Bayley on 20 May 1996. Bayley and his former wife, Mrs Betty Bayley are the directors and shareholders of CBB Investments Pty Ltd ("CBB Investments"). Bayley's evidence was that "the only activity of CBB Investments was to manage my family's investments."
191 It was through CBB Investments that Bayley acquired an interest in the Service Packaging Business. Pursuant to the terms of the Second G5 Deed, Hottes held one of the five issued shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd on trust for CBB Investments. As a result of this shareholding, CBB Investments acquired a one fifth interest in the Service Packaging Business.
192 It was also through CBB Investments that Bayley in 2003 first acquired a 16% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
193 Amcor claims that Sangster breached the duties he owed to it.
194 The principal case put by the Amcor parties is that Bayley gained and maintained an interest in the ACB Business and the Service Containers business at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently.
195 It is also put that the sale agreements in respect of the two businesses were uncommercial.
196 Mihelic, the Seventh Defendant in the Barnes Proceeding, was an employee of Amcor from 1992 until 28 October 2004, following his resignation on 28 September 2004. From July 2002 he held the position of General Manager, Packaging Solutions. He is now 58 years old. Since about 1 April 2006 he has been an employee of Carter Holt Harvey ("CHH").
197 During his employment, Mihelic held the following management roles:
(a) from 1998 until July 2002 he was employed as Engineering Services Manager, West End site, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia; and
(b) from July 2002 until his resignation effective 28 October 2004 he was employed as General Manager Packaging Solutions, AFPA.
198 The Amcor Parties allege that he was an officer of Amcor Ltd. There is no allegation that he was an officer of either APA or ACB.
199 Mihelic attained a degree of Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics which he completed in 1976 at Oregon State University, USA. He started employment in May 1978 with ACI Fibre Packages in West End, Brisbane. In about 1992, the Amcor group acquired that part of the business in which he worked.
200 From July 2002 Mihelic's job as General Manager Packaging Solutions, AFPA was to manage product design, development and packaging systems. This was a technical support role, his expertise being that of a technical nature. He had responsibility for product innovation and responsibility for a computer software program Ispek, a web-based system which enabled Amcor customers to create their own specifications. It was a national job, and employees who were in charge of various design activities reported to him. Approximately 130 employees located predominantly in 15 Amcor box plants across Australia reported to Mihelic.
201 From the time of his appointment as General Manager, Packaging Solutions Mihelic was a member of Hodgson's "lead team": that is, those employees who reported directly to Hodgson. Its members were departmental General Managers as follows:
(a) Sangster (based in Queensland) - Sales and Marketing;
(b) Barnes (based in New South Wales)- Operations;
(c) Parker (based in Burwood)- Commercial;
(d) Mr McElroy (based in Auckland) - New Zealand box;
(e) Mihelic (based in Burwood); and
(f) Mr Dwyer (based in Burwood) - Human Resources.
202 Mihelic's employment with Amcor was subject to a written contract of employment dated 30 August 2002 ("Mihelic's Employment Contract") which confirmed his continued employment with Amcor and subjected him to the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 5 Mihelic had a duty to comply with directions and keep Amcor informed by:
(i) reporting to Hodgson, Group General Manager Corrugating;
(ii) informing Amcor of any developments in relation to his role;
(iii) abiding by all ethical standards, policies and procedures that related to the operation of the business;
(iv) devoting his full time and attention to Amcor's business during working hours; and
(v) honestly and diligently carrying out his duties and responsibilities;
Under clause 7, Mihelic was entitled to further remuneration including:
(i) a fully maintained motor vehicle, or alternatively, a car allowance in lieu thereof in the sum of $20,244;
(ii) eligibility to become a member of the Amcor Health Care Plan;
(iii) eligibility to participate in the Amcor Employee Incentive Share Plan; and
(iv) a mobile telephone;
Under clause 16 Mihelic had a duty to avoid conflicts of interest by:
(i) refraining from any involvement with, or financial interest in, any business or enterprise that competed with, was a customer of, or supplied goods or services to, any business or enterprise within the Amcor Group including the Amcor Limited Group and its related bodies corporate whilst employed by Amcor; and
(ii) arranging his affairs to ensure there was no conflict between his personal interests and those of the Amcor Group;
Under clause 17 Mihelic had a duty of confidentiality which required him to refrain from disclosing or using, other than for the purposes of Amcor, any information to which he was exposed during his employment that was not in the public domain relating to the financial affairs; suppliers; customers and clients (including lists of names and addresses); future plans, research and development; business methods, systems and strategies; technical operations and pricing policies and costings of businesses and enterprises within the Amcor Group;
Under clause 25 Mihelic was restrained from:
(i) employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from Amcor any current employees of Amcor;
(ii) disclosing confidential information obtained during his employment;
(iii) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by Amcor from persons who had been clients or customers of Amcor during his employment and for a period of 12 months in Victoria after the termination of his employment (namely, 28 October 2005); and
(iv) engaging in any specific project or research in relation to which the use of Amcor's confidential information may reasonably be expected to put him (or any other person, firm or company) at an unfair advantage.
203 Initially, pursuant to his contract following his commencement in the role of General Manager Packaging Solutions, AFPA, Mihelic was paid an annual salary of $170,000. For the financial year ended 30 June 2004 Mihelic received a salary package of $262,768 which comprised a salary component of $199,150 and a Management Incentive Program payment of $63,618.
204 As General Manager Packaging Solutions, AFPA, from July 2002 until his resignation effective 28 October 2004, Mihelic was responsible for:
(a) increasing the profitability of Amcor's products and services within the Packaging Solutions;
(b) managing the demand for products and services; and
(c) increasing scope and scale of products and service.
205 As to his scope and level of authority he gave unchallenged evidence as follows:
I was not a director at any time of any company within the Amcor Group. I did not attend Board meetings of Amcor or receive copies of minutes of Amcor Board meetings. I was never a signatory to any Amcor bank account. I had no discretionary authority as to capital expenditure. I had no delegated responsibility to sign any document on behalf of Amcor. I never had any role in selling any Amcor business. As to my place in the executive hierarchy, I was on the fourth tier of management - in ascending order, Hodgson, Mr Brown (later Mr Sutton) and Mr Jones occupied managerial rungs on the ladder above me.
206 I accept that Mihelic was on the fourth tier of management within the Amcor hierarchy as he described it, the same level of authority as Barnes.
207 There is no evidence that Mihelic had authority at any time to dispose of any Amcor asset.
208 Mihelic resigned from Amcor on 28 September 2004, effective 28 October 2004. His resignation was effected by way of letter to Hodgson dated 28 September 2004 which detailed his intention to commence a private consultancy business with his colleagues. Mihelic's resignation letter followed a similar form to the letters of resignation of Barnes, Sangster and Bayley.
Mihelic's Federal Court Proceeding Settlement
209 Mihelic was the First Respondent the Federal Court Proceeding in which it was alleged that Mihelic had misused confidential information of the Amcor parties.
210 The Federal Court Proceeding was resolved by consent orders of Merkel J made on 17 December 2004. The consent orders of 17 December 2004 included an undertaking of Mihelic for the period 17 December 2004 to 28 January 2005 to refrain, inter alia, from:
(a) in Victoria (whether alone, in association, or as an employee, director or consultant) canvassing or soliciting business the same as or similar to that provided by the Amcor Group from persons who have been clients or customers of the Amcor Group within the period 29 October 2003 to 28 October 2004; and
(b) (either on Mihelic's own account or for any other person, firm or company), employing, engaging or endeavouring to entice away from the Amcor Group of Companies any employee of the Amcor Group.
211 Sampson Solo Pty Ltd ("Sampson Solo") was incorporated on 20 May 2003 with Mihelic and his wife Mrs Meredith Mihelic as sole directors and shareholders. Sampson Solo was deregistered on 17 December 2008.
212 It was through Sampson Solo that Mihelic in 2003 first acquired a 16% interest in the ACB Business, pursuant to the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed as later described.
213 Amcor claims that Mihelic breached the duties he owed to it.
214 The principal case put by the Amcor parties is that Mihelic gained and maintained an interest in the ACB Business (but not the Service Packaging Business) at the time of his employment with Amcor and subsequently.
215 It is also put that the sale agreement in respect of the ACB Business was uncommercial.
Summary of Relevant Organisational Relationships within Amcor
216 By way of summary, at the relevant times Jones was the Manager Director of Amcor Ltd, Brown was the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, and Hodgson was the Group General Manager of Corrugating/AFPA.
217 Hodgson reported to Brown and then (after Sutton replaced Brown) to Sutton. Barnes, Sangster and Mihelic reported to Hodgson. Holihan reported to Barnes. Bayley reported to Sangster, from May 2003 to Barnes and from 1 March 2004 to Hodgson.
218 Mr Ian Hottes ("Hottes") controlled the corporate vehicle Service Packaging Pty Ltd, which was the named purchaser of the assets Service Packaging Business by the terms of the First Sale Agreement.
219 In April 2001 Hottes was diagnosed with cancer and had major surgery in May 2001. He recovered sufficiently to return to work in late 2001. However, the cancer returned in mid 2003 and he became very sick and was hospitalized for 55 days and on life support. From mid 2003 until his death Hottes rarely attended work. Even when he improved after his return home in December 2003, he only attended work on rare occasions. Throughout this period Ms Dettmar, who had been the business manager of the Service Packaging Business since 1996, continued to manage the business.
220 In 2003, Hottes' wife, Mrs Marlene Hottes was made a director of Service Packaging Pty Ltd. This was because at the time her husband was thought to be dying. Mrs Hottes was also made a director and secretary of G5 Investments Pty Ltd on 1 October 2003.
222 Prior to the sale of the Service Packaging Business on 1 February 2002, from 1 July 1996 until 2 February 2002, Hottes was engaged as an independent contractor by Amcor through his company MI Displays Pty Ltd to operate two of its businesses, the Service Packaging Business and the Displays Business.
223 Hottes managed the Service Packaging and Displays Businesses at premises situated in Revesby, New South Wales. In this capacity he reported initially to Mr David Ley, and, from 10 January 2000, to Barnes.
224 Hottes' consultancy with Amcor changed with the sale of the Service Packaging Business to Hottes pursuant to the First Sale Agreement dated 1 February 2002.
225 Hottes consultancy with Amcor, and later Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia (which his company MI Displays Pty Ltd held from 1 July 1996 until 1 February 2002) was set out in a contract dated 18 July 1996. This contract was extended until 30 June 2003 by letters dated 2 November 1997 and 17 August 1998. These letters also substituted AFPA for Amcor.
226 In return for its services managing the Service Packaging and Display Businesses, MI Displays Pty Ltd received a fixed fee which, in 1999, was $111,800. In 2001, Hottes received a fee of $122,000. In addition to this sum, Hottes was eligible, in each year of his employment, for a bonus of up to 15 per cent of the remuneration received by his company under the contract with Amcor.
227 In accordance with MI Displays' contract with Amcor, Hottes' conduct was subject to the following relevant conditions:
Under clause 6, Hottes was restrained, throughout the consultancy from:
disclosing trade secrets, manufacturing processes or information about Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd, its finances, dealings, transactions or internal affairs; and
being concerned or interested, directly or indirectly with any competing business or any other business which could affect MI Displays' duties to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd.
Under clause 8, Hottes was restrained for three years from:
carrying on a packaging business or any other business carried on by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd within 15 kilometres of Revesby;
advertising or soliciting orders from Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd's customers within 15 kilometres of Revesby;
disclosing or using any information about the Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd affairs or customers; or
using Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd's' name.
228 Clause 7 of the consultancy agreement empowered Hottes to have "general control and management" of the two Amcor Businesses and over "all persons employed in or about the same". The same clause also limited Hottes' power to dismiss employees, increase wage bills or order goods.
229 I accept that Hottes therefore had autonomy, control and direction over two independent business units of Amcor, with broad discretion in their operation.
230 Carter Holt Harvey ("CHH") is a publicly listed company on the New Zealand stock exchange with operations in Australia and New Zealand. It is one of the largest public companies in New Zealand. It is a forest products company with significant interests in wood products, pulp, paper and packaging. It is an owner of paper mills and manufacturer of a range of packaging products, with paper and pulp mills operating in both Australia and New Zealand, which produce packaging products.
231 In 2003-2004 CHH's major competitors in Australia were Amcor and Visy.
232 In 2004, CHH recognised that the Australian corrugated box industry was effectively a duopoly with Amcor and Visy having strong holdings. It noted that CHH's share of the market at that time was only 4 per cent. CHH planned to increase its share of the Australian market to 18 per cent, initially by growing its market share in Queensland to 25 per cent. In Queensland, CHH already had a foothold in the market and was third after Amcor and Visy.
233 In April 2004, as part of its plan to expand its presence in the Australian market, CHH commenced a commercial venture which it called "Project Flipper". As part of this operation it planned to recruit experienced top level staff from a key competitor.
234 CHH executives held discussions with Hodgson, Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster and Bayley. Later in the first half of 2004, all five Defendants attended the Bledisloe Cup in New Zealand with CHH staff.
235 Amcor alleges that a "handshake" deal was stuck between the Defendants and Mr Rhys Jones, the Chief Operating Officer of CHH ("Rhys Jones"), in July 2004 at Hodgson's home to implement Project Flipper.
236 Amcor further alleges that prior to the company AMCG being incorporated and prior to the Defendants tendering their resignations to Amcor, the Defendants and CHH set about establishing a paper trail to hide the true nature of their arrangements. A letter dated 10 August 2004 and signed on behalf of Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic was sent to Rhys Jones of CHH. It purported to be a letter of introduction. However, Amcor says that by this time a handshake deal had already been done. Amcor also says that the response by CHH of 3 September 2004 which commenced "We refer to your letter to Rhys Jones dated 10 August 2004 enquiring about the possibility of undertaking consulting work with Carter Holt Harvey" is also artificial given that the arrangements had already been entered into pursuant to the alleged earlier "handshake" deal.
237 By late September 2004 the scope of work between CHH and the Defendants been agreed and the payments had been agreed.
238 Australian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd ("AMCG") was incorporated on 22 September 2004.
239 At a meeting on 24 September 2004 between CHH representatives and four of the Defendants it was agreed that CHH would pay the salary and benefits of Sangster, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Hodgson. The payment amounts were to be the same as each of the Defendants were receiving at Amcor. Once the financial arrangements had been put in place between the Defendants and CHH, Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster and Bayley tendered their resignations to Amcor on 28 September 2004, four days after a terms sheet had been signed between CHH and the Defendants, which set out the key terms between them as to scope of work and payments.
240 Following its incorporation on 22 September 2004, AMCG rented business premises in Malvern. It acquired computers, office furniture and other equipment for use by Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, Mihelic and Hodgson.
241 Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster became directors of AMCG. Barnes was also appointed as the Secretary. Each of Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster held 100 shares in AMCG of the 400 issues by the company. Hodgson was never a director or shareholder in AMCG.
242 Nevertheless, the Amcor parties also contend that Hodgson was heavily involved in the operations of AMCG. They rely on Hodgson's conduct, including travelling to New Zealand on behalf of AMCG to meet with Rhys Jones of CHH is clearly consistent with the actions of an officer of AMCG. Amcor also relies upon having received a financial benefit from AMCG in the amount of approximately $520 and "gifts" from the AMCG directors of $240,000 after tax. It was submitted that Hodgson was an integral part of the AMCG establishment, and financial arrangements of AMCG and played a central role in establishing the relationship with CHH.
243 Amcor alleges that the purpose of AMCG was simple. It was to grow the CHH business in Australia at such a rate that within three to five years the Defendants would have grown their management consultancy business (which was a personal services business) to a stage that they would be entitled to a payment from CHH of between $15M-$20M.
244 Amcor also says that by that time, each of the Defendants would have been in a position to decide their employment direction within CHH. Hodgson and Bayley had indicated they would retire and Sangster, Mihelic and Barnes had indicated they would accept "equivalent positions" guaranteed by CHH within its organisation.
245 The business of AMCG was to manage CHH's proposed expansion of corrugated operations into Australia as part of Project Flipper. The was a project which had as its central goal "... to increase share of profitable Australian corrugated box market and improve share of board sales". In so doing it would aim to take market share from Amcor and Visy.
246 Prior to 9 November 2004, the Defendants conducted negotiations with CHH about a "side letter". This was to be an adjunct to the written Management Consulting Agreement between AMCG and CHH. Amcor submitted that the side letter was the real agreement while the Management Consultancy Agreement was to exist in the event that CHH needed to "reveal it in a process of discovery". The side letter specified that it took precedence and cancelled any other agreement between CHH and AMCG. It included clauses, inter alia, providing that:
AMCG would be given a contract to manage CHH's corrugated operations and this would be extended within 2 years to include folding cartons businesses;
In 2-3 years when the contract concluded, CHH would purchase AMCG for $15-20 million;
In the event of an industry settlement at a paper level or other outcome satisfying CHH's Australasian objectives, CHH would pay $20 million to AMCG. Mihelic, Barnes and Sangster would be offered positions with CHH;
All legal fees in respect of the litigation with Amcor incurred by directors of CHH or Hodgson would be paid by CHH; and
Hodgson would be "made whole" with respect to his separation package from Amcor should Amcor not provide it.
247 ACB, when owned by Amcor, was an "in-house" manufacturing enterprise operation that produced customised or unusual boxes. The business catered mainly to smaller customers, or large customers who also had specialised box requirements. The business supplied corrugated products where the quantity of product was deemed to be too small, or would result in bottlenecks in a higher-speed, lower-cost production plant - such as the plants run by Amcor at Smithfield and Revesby in NSW.
248 The ACB Business generally obtained its income in two main areas.
249 First, ACB had its own customers who purchased packaging products directly from ACB. In this respect, ACB essentially operated as a re-seller. Products (such as cardboard) were purchased from Amcor and ACB on-sold them to customers.
250 The second aspect of the ACB Business involved "toll processing" or "toll manufacturing" work for Amcor customers. This part of the business involved Amcor transferring cardboard to ACB for further processing on its specialised machines operated by a specialised labour force.
251 ACB's operations continued in this way both when the business operated within the Amcor stable and after the business was sold to Holihan in 2003.
252 ACN Box owned large factory premises at Wetherill Park in Western Sydney ("Wetherill Park") and the ACB Business, which operated from those premises. The Wetherill Park site had a written down value of $7,455,780 and occupied a site of about 20,241 square metres and a building area of around 12,200 square metres.
253 ACN Box usually obtained its supplies of corrugated sheet from the AFPA plants at Revesby or Smithfield in New South Wales. It also owned its own corrugator machine (the "ACB Corrugator"). The ACB Corrugator was a very large and expensive machine. It had a written down value of $4,409,738. It occupied floor space of around 2,945 square metres.
254 Holihan commenced with Amcor as the General Manager, Small Business, NSW in October 2000. In that role, Holihan was responsible for overseeing two businesses - one of which was the ACB Business. Shortly after Holihan took over the General Manager role, he also took over the role as site manager of the ACB Business. Holihan maintained both positions until he purchased the ACB Business in 2003.
255 At all times since Holihan commenced management of the ACB Business, Holihan reported to Barnes who in turn reported to Hodgson.
Amcor's Proposals to Deal with the ACB business (late 1990's until sale to Holihan)
256 At all relevant times, Amcor employed a management tool which required that each of its businesses achieve a 'threshold' 15% return on funds employed ("ROFE" or the "ROFE Benchmark"). ROFE was normally calculated by taking Profit Before Interest and Tax ("PBIT"), dividing it by the amount of funds employed (normally working capital, property, plant and equipment and other items such as employee entitlements and goodwill) and multiplying by 100 to arrive at a percentage.
257 The Amcor parties did not dispute that the aim to achieve a return on funds employed of 15 per cent was a well-known target within Amcor at the time that both the Service Packaging and the ACB Businesses were disposed of.
258 Although the ROFE Benchmark was not a carte blanche instruction to sell non-core and non-performing businesses at any cost regardless of their strategic value, it was an important criterion against which a decision would be made as to the future of the business within Amcor.
259 Lachal, Amcor's executive general manager at the relevant time (and later managing director of Amcor Australasia) stated that any business not of strategic significance that did not achieve the ROFE Benchmark would be subject to a 'mantra' requiring it to be fixed, closed or sold.
260 Brown, the managing director of Amcor Australasia at the relevant time, described the ROFE Benchmark as "a very critical part of the assessment of the business".
261 Clayton, former Group General Manager Finance & Operations, gave evidence that "fix, close or sell" was a "mindset".
262 Historically the ACB Business did not meet the ROFE Benchmark. A series of proposals to restructure, sell or close the business were made in the five years leading up to the negotiations of the Second Sale Agreement.
263 Commencing with a board memorandum dated 28 January 1997, Amcor's managing director Jones noted that AFPA's ROFE was 9.3%, and that its position against Visy (its major competitor) had deteriorated.
264 In a memorandum to the board of 2 September 1997, Brown described AFPA's corrugating sites (including "Wetherill Park", which was the site of the ACB Business, and was used in Amcor documents to describe the ACB Business) as:
... old disparate factories with few common features ... the result of acquisitions of low-tech companies, taken to improve market share. They are a constant drain on funds for replacement assets and O H & S requirements.
265 Brown proposed the closure of Wetherill Park, writing
[t]he proposed structure will result in the closure of Revesby and Wetherill Park plants. These properties could realise $16 million ... [Emphasis added]
266 A business summary from some time in 1998 suggested that the closure of four plants was part of a broader strategy designed to increase AFPA's ROFE to 16.4%.
267 The Amcor Board appears to have approved the proposal to close Wetherill Park. In a memorandum to the Board dated 4 December 1998, Brown wrote
In December 1997 the Board approved $101.6 million to improve the cost competitiveness of the NSW corrugated business. The approval included the construction of a Greenfield plant in the western suburbs of Sydney and reinvestment in the Smithfield plant, resulting in the closure of the Revesby and Wetherill Park sites. A short run box plant was also foreshadowed. The project was to deliver a PBIT/FE return of 15.7% with an IRR of 12.8%. [Emphasis added]
268 On 3 April 1998, Jones presented the Board with his three year strategic plan. He forecasted that AFPA would improve its ROFE from 10.9% to 15.1%. In his closing comments, Jones wrote:
The fundamental objective of Amcor Packaging is the achievement of a minimum 15% PBIT to Funds Employed ratio. This will be achieved by:
- Disposal of non-core and non-performing businesses.
- Focus on cost reduction in Australasia ....
- Improved control of Working Capital and tight management of Capital Expenditure. [Emphasis added]
269 Plans for Wetherill Park appear to have changed for a short period. In a Board memorandum dated 4 December 1998 it was stated:
... new management team has now re-looked at the plan to address the deficiencies in the manufacturing facilities. It has concluded that these can be substantially addressed by reinvesting in the current plants.
The proposal is to invest in the Smithfield, Revesby and Wetherill Park plants by upgrading the corrugators and installing new, or where appropriate, modernise existing converting equipment to current technological standards. A new plant specialising in short-run box production, displays and packaging sales will also be established. [Emphasis added]
270 However, the proposal to revitalise Wetherill Park was short lived. On 31 May 1999, the Wetherill Park site manager, Mr Michael Brown, announced that increased capacity at the Revesby plant would lead to Wetherill Park being "scaled down". Seventy five jobs were shed. In cross-examination, Brown agreed that by May 1999, the prospects were that Wetherill Park was to be closed.
271 By June 1999, AFPA's commercial staff were planning to wind up the ACB Business and transfer its staff to Amcor and its business to APA. Wetherill Park's output was in the process of being reduced and its production capacity moved to the Revesby site. In August, Brown expressed his "main interest" regarding Wetherill Park was in "quitting the site". In his view, it had "value as a superb industrial site" but "was not doing much at all".
272 In February 2000, Mr John Morriss floated the idea of Amcor running two separate businesses from the Wetherill Park site: a sheet feeding business and a short run box business that would manufacture boxes for supply to brokers. However, it appears that Brown was not in favour of the concept. He had formed the view that the Wetherill Park site should be closed. He believed the site was "very valuable" but "was hardly being utilised at all". In Brown's view, from the year 2000, the need to close the Wetherill Park site was "pressing". Brown saw "no possibility" of ACN Box continuing at the Wetherill Park site. Because the corrugators at other sites had been upgraded, in his view there was no possibility of upgrading the ACB Business to better utilise the site. His assessment was that the business was going to have to be "moved to another site, closed or sold".
273 By the time Holihan accepted the appointment as its general manager in December 2000, the performance of the ACB Business was far below the ROFE Benchmark. In October 2000, Mr Alvarez (then AFPA's financial controller - specialty business) ("Alvarez") showed Holihan the figures of the ACB Business. The first set forecast a PBIT loss of $1,345,762 for the 2000/2001 financial year. A revised set of figures showed a projected PBIT of $265,212 for the same period, but with the business's net assets of $16,221,953, even that modest profit would have resulted in a ROFE of less than 2%.
274 By August 2001, the entire AFPA business was forecast to deliver PBIT of $21 million against a budget of $32.8 million. This was some 35% under budget. On 13 August 2001, Brown notified businesses with major shortfalls against budget that they would be approached to develop "profit improvement plans". On 27 August 2001, he sent a memorandum to Hodgson attaching a "strong request" from Jones to develop such a plan.
275 In September 2001 Amcor established the "major operational cost savings" team ("MOCS"). Its objective was to identify cost savings across the AFPA businesses for the purpose of increasing ROFE. In particular its task was to identify non-core or non-performing businesses and assets for closure or sale. The target set was $10 million in cost savings in 2001-2002, with a further $25 million in 2002-2003. These targets were in addition to existing budget commitments. Hodgson gave unchallenged evidence that "one of the fastest ways to achieve the [ROFE Benchmark] was to close non-core and/or underperforming business assets and sell the assets, particularly the real estate".
276 Brown instructed Hodgson to commence the MOCS process. Hodgson appointed Kevin McCluskey as the leader of the scheme.
277 Both the Wetherill Park site and the ACB Business were targets of the MOCS programme.
278 At the monthly AFPA management meeting in September 2001, the sale of the Wetherill Park land and buildings was discussed. A marketing submission was obtained from Colliers Jardine. It reported a likely price of $9,750,000 to $10 million if sold on a five year leaseback and $10,250,000 to $10,500,000 if sold on a ten year leaseback.
279 On 2 November 2001, Barnes sent the Colliers Jardine proposal to Hodgson and recommended seeking expressions of interest. He noted that a sale at the forecast $10 million point would generate a profit of about $2.5 million.
280 Barnes' memo was provided to Mr Ken Parker, who was then AFPA's general manager - finance. On 12 November 2001, Parker responded to the Barnes proposal. His view was that a sale of the site was probably inevitable, but that it should take place following a review of the ACB Business and a determination of whether that business was core to AFPA's long term plan (in which case a lease back could be obtained) or not (in which case the business could be sold and the property sold with vacant possession). It appears that he did not consider selling the business and entering a tenancy with the prospective purchaser, which would have resulted in both a sale of the business and a sale of the property on the more profitable lease back basis.
281 In November 2001, Barnes directed Holihan to meet with Colliers Jardine to discuss the marketing submission. Holihan was told that a sale subject to a lease would attract a higher price.
282 The question of whether to keep, sell or close the ACB Business was raised at a MOCS meeting in Sydney in November 2001, and again at a meeting held on 6 December 2001.
283 In January 2002, Alvarez sent Holihan two spreadsheets which showed the number of employees at Wetherill Park reducing from 43 to 12 and to 0, respectively. Someone other than Holihan had asked Alvarez to consider those reductions as part of a proposal to shut the site and move its work to the other two main plants.
284 A presentation to Amcor's board dated February 2002 was headed on its first slide: "AFPA Challenge: Achieve a sustainable 15% ROFE in the shortest possible time." The presentation canvassed an upgrade of corrugators and other equipment at Smithfield and Revesby and a review of possible plant closures in New South Wales to achieve a permanent cost reduction of $20 million p.a. A board memorandum co-authored by Hodgson and Brown stated that "we are developing a proposal to rationalise capacity in ... New South Wales ... Preliminary indications are that PBIT will be increased by over $20m per annum when the process is expected to be complete in mid 2004".
285 A memorandum from Parker to Lachal, Clayton, Brown and Hodgson dated 6 May 2002 referred to the closure of three smaller plants (including Wetherill Park) which (if the closures proceeded) would occur in about February 2003.
286 Some time after 29 July 2002, Holihan contacted Lewis and asked if he knew of any Amcor business that might take a lease over the Wetherill Park site. Lewis told him that Amcor Aerosols, another business operated by Amcor, would be looking for a new site. Site visits by staff from Amcor Aerosols, and further conversations with Lewis about the proposal followed.
287 It appears that Amcor was considering the sale of the ACB Corrugator machine (the "Corrugator") in July and August 2002. This was a valuable, very large (about 80 metres in length) and heavy industrial machine which manufactured corrugated cardboard for use in cardboard boxes. The machine was situated within the Wetherill Park site.
288 In a joint memorandum to the board dated 15 October 2002, Hodgson and Brown wrote:
Our Wetherill Park site in New South Wales is currently focused on ·short run orders and fitment work, which inhibits the overall capacity of our major plants. It is located on a site which is much larger than required and we are considering relocation and/or selling the business and envisage entering a long-term supply arrangement with the purchaser should we sell.
289 By that time, Holihan was of the belief that the interest of Amcor Aerosols in the Wetherill Park site was wavering. He sought information about Amcor's use of rented storage at non-Amcor premises, believing that the Wetherill Park site might be used as a substitute for those sites.
290 In evidence in chief, Brown said that by 15 October 2002 "I had already formed the view at this stage that Amcor should not remain in businesses specialising in filling orders for small quantities of boxes (Short Run Box Businesses)". This was the kind of business conducted by the ACB Business.
291 A memorandum of 15 October 2002 entitled "Blueprint for Further Improvement", was prepared by Brown and Hodgson and put to and approved by Amcor's Board on 23 October 2002. The Board minute in relation to the memorandum reads:
AFPA Future Improvement
The Board received and discussed BO/1092.
Hodgson reminded the Board of the strategy for this business. The first phase generated significant improvement in both PBIT and ROI in the 2001/02 year. 2002/03 will see further improvement.
To further increase profit, ROI and cash generation, a step change reduction in the cost base and a securing of increased profitable growth by achieving much greater levels of customer intimacy with major customers is required. A comprehensive restructure of the business from a regionally based model to a customer and market centric model will be fully implemented by January 2003. The new organization structure, supports the customer-centricity ambitions and facilitates the standardisation of best practices on a national basis. Significant cost reductions are expected from capacity rationalisation and process improvements, driven by the deployment of proprietary Amcor technologies and an integrated IT platform primarily at the transaction layer to replace existing 20 year old legacy systems.
Following discussion the Board resolved to endorse the restructuring strategy.
292 The strategy endorsed by the Board was set out in the AFPA "Blue Print for Further Improvement" slide presentation. Slide 12 related exclusively to Wetherill Park. It reported that the site was to be sold and the business closed or sold by June 2003. Key assets would be retained. The following was included in the presentation: "Sell remaining business (outsource)." This action was said in the presentation to result in a manning reduction of 48 and overhead savings, with PBIT impact of +$0.5 million. Hodgson, Clayton and Parker were involved in preparing the presentation.
293 Shortly after the Board endorsed the plan reflected in the presentation, Barnes informed Holihan that the Board had given 'in principle' approval to his acquisition of the ACB Business.
Conclusion as to the Position of ACB within Amcor
294 I accept that before Holihan became its general manager, since the late 1990's the possible disposal of the ACB Business by AFPA was under consideration by Amcor. The business was underperforming against the ROFE Benchmark. Following the significant investments made in the nearby Revesby and Smithfield plants in about 1999-2000, the ACB Business did not remain as a core AFPA business. Further, the MOCS programme set in place a chain of events which ultimately led to the sale of the business to Holihan.
295 It was Holihan's case that his proposal to purchase the ACB Assets and enter a supply agreement was endorsed by Amcor's board in October 2002, and that this coincided with AFPA's long-term plan to sell the site and cease operating the business.
296 On the other hand, it was Amcor's case that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against Holihan and the Defendant parties from the fact that there was no proposal suggested for any person or entity other than Holihan and his associated companies to purchase the ACB Business. No offering to the public was undertaken or contemplated, which Amcor alleged was part of Hodgson's responsibility to at least consider. The fact that there were no other proposals to deal with the business after Holihan first expressed his interest in it is, on the Amcor case, said to be significant.
297 The present litigation arises out of and is set against the back-drop of orchestrated illegal cartel conduct in which Amcor participated for almost 5 years between 2000-2004.
298 For the purposes of this litigation Amcor admitted it participated in the relevant cartel conduct as found by Heerey J in ACCC v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd and Ors (No 3).[1]
299 Broadly, the cartel conduct, which was known within Amcor by the euphemism "orderly marketing strategy", involved the following key elements:
300 Heerey J in ACCC v Visy Industries made the following observations about illegal cartel conduct:[15]
Cartel behaviour of the kind with which this case is concerned is extremely destructive of the competition on which the prosperity of a free market economy depends. Often the profits can be immense, and the risk of detection slight. Of its nature, cartel behaviour is likely to occur in secret and between parties who seek mutual benefit. In the present case, detection occurred purely by chance when Amcor's solicitors, in the course of quite unrelated litigation, stumbled across incriminating material. Even then the present resolution may not have been reached were it not for two additional factors. First, the commission's immunity policy and, second, the fact that there were not only witnesses prepared to give evidence, but also tape recordings of damning conversations. [Emphasis added]
The progressive increase in the maximum penalties mentioned above shows how gravely the legislature regards this kind of conduct. Price fixing and market sharing are not offences committed by accident, or in a fit of passion. The law, and the way it is enforced, should convey to those disposed to engage in cartel behaviour that the consequences of discovery are likely to outweigh the benefits, and by a large margin.
... this case is a giant artificial construct actuated by spite to punish a whistle blower. Amcor's got a hundred million reasons to hate Hodgson and that is the explanation for the way in which this case has been expanded and has grown and has been persisted with and why it's been dragged and delayed, as it has been, for the last several years by the Amcor Parties.
302 In brief compass, this observation was grounded in the following factual matrix.
303 Hodgson made tape recordings of conversations between himself and Brown, Sutton and Harry Debney which concerned the cartel conduct during its period of operation in circumstances where the other party to the conversation was unaware that they were being recorded. These tape recordings were referred to in the observations of Heerey J in ACCC v Visy Industries in the passage earlier cited.
The recordings were made by me to secure evidence of the collusive arrangements between Amcor and Visy. I made these recordings so that there would be some evidence of the arrangements between Amcor and Visy and the fact that they had been approved at, and were known to, the highest levels within each company.
My concern at the time was that, without such evidence, Amcor would later seek to contend that I had instigated or been responsible for these arrangements, particularly if I had by then left the employment of Amcor at the time that Amcor's arrangements with Visy came to light.
305 On 10 November 2004 Amcor Limited and other Amcor entities (the "Applicants") initiated proceedings in the Federal Court (VID 1383 of 2004) (the "Federal Court Proceedings") against Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley, Barnes and AMCG (the "Respondents"). The basis of the proceeding was the allegation made by Amcor that the individuals had misappropriated Amcor's confidential information for the purpose of setting up a competing business through AMCG.
306 At the time of issuing the Federal Court Proceedings, the Amcor Applicants sought and obtained an Anton Piller order made by Finkelstein J. The Anton Piller order was executed on 11 November 2004 at the following premises:
307 Pursuant to the Anton Piller order, Amcor's solicitors, Allens, obtained a number of boxes of hard copy documents, together with forensic images of several computer hard drives. Approximately 60,000 documents were obtained in the Anton Piller raid.
308 Hodgson was not initially a respondent to the Federal Court Proceedings, and the Anton Piller order was not executed at his premises.
309 On 15 November 2004 the Amcor Applicants applied ex parte for leave to join Hodgson to the Federal Court Proceedings. On 17 November 2004 pursuant to the orders made by Ryan J, Hodgson was joined as the Sixth Respondent to the Federal Court Proceedings.
310 Pursuant to the 17 November 2004 orders, an interlocutory injunction was also made against all natural person Respondents restraining them, inter alia, from being engaged, concerned or interested in any business competing with the Applicants and from enticing any of the Applicants' employees to work for any business which competed with the Applicants, including AMCG. The Respondents were also directed to deliver up a variety of documents described in the categories provided in the order.
311 On 19 November 2004, pursuant to the order of Justice Ryan of 17 November 2004 requiring Mihelic (among other Respondents) to deliver up all materials containing "Applicants' Documents" (as defined in the Anton Piller order), AJ Macken & Co ("Mackens"), solicitors for the Respondents in the Federal Court Proceedings, delivered to Allens documents which included two CDs containing the taped discussions recorded by Hodgson. This was undertaken under cover of Mackens' letter of 19 November 2004.
312 The tapes delivered by Mackens to Allens on 19 November 2004 included the transcripts of conversations between Hodgson and others held on 20 September 2002, 21 October 2002 and 20 October 2003.
313 Amcor subsequently voluntarily provided Hodgson's tapes to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the "ACCC"). Amcor simultaneously applied to the ACCC and was granted immunity from prosecution. The ACCC subsequently commenced its action against Visy for engaging in the cartel conduct. This ultimately resulted in the penalties referred to in the judgment of Heerey J in ACCC v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd and Ors (No 3), to which reference has already been made.
314 The transcripts recorded in Hodgson's tapes confirmed the operation of the cartel between Amcor and Visy and to some extent, Hodgson's participation in that conduct.
315 However, as later analysed in some detail, I am satisfied on the evidence that, to the extent that Hodgson was himself involved in the cartel conduct, he did so with the full knowledge and indeed the encouragement of Amcor principally through Hodgson's immediate superior, Brown.
316 Nevertheless, although there may have been a degree of animosity towards Hodgson on the part of some individuals within Amcor, I reject the contention as advanced by Senior Counsel for Hodgson, to the effect that these proceedings are purely motivated by spite on the part of Amcor directed against Hodgson for his part in making the damning tape recordings, and consequently have no substance.
317 Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic simultaneously tendered their resignation with Amcor by letters to Hodgson dated 28 September 2004. Each of the four letters were in substantially the same form and detailed their respective intentions to commence a private consultancy business. Hodgson left Amcor on 1 October 2004.
318 On 3 December 2004, Hodgson instituted the present Hodgson Proceeding in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
319 On 16 December 2004 a mediation of the Federal Court Proceedings was conducted. The mediation was successful and the Anton Piller proceeding was settled by a consent order of Merkel J made on 17 December 2004.
320 The terms of settlement did not require Amcor to return any of the materials it had obtained under the Anton Piller order. However, the material was subject to strict confidentiality orders and the solicitors for Amcor were prohibited from disclosing the documents or their contents to Amcor.
321 The terms of settlement and the orders made thereon of 17 December 2004 included an undertaking of Hodgson for the period 17 December 2004 to 30 September 2005 to refrain inter alia from:
(a) directly or indirectly using, divulging or communicating to any person any of the trade secrets or other confidential information of, or in relation to the business of, the Applicants which Hodgson may have received, obtained or had access to while in the employment of the Applicants;
(b) (whether on his own account or for any other person, firm, company or other entity) employing, engaging, soliciting, interfering with or endeavouring to entice away from the Amcor Group any employees of the Amcor Group who are employed in the senior management position as at 1 October 2004 who had worked or who had worked with or knew Hodgson personally at any time from 1 April 2004 to 1 October 2004;
(c) in Australia (whether alone, in association, or as an employee, director and consultant) soliciting the custom of any person who at any time between 2 October 2003 and 1 October 2004 had been a customer or supplier of the Amcor Group;
(d) being engaged, concerned or interested in (as a financier, guarantor, shareholder, unit holder, contractor, agent or consultant, partner, director or assistant) either directly or indirectly in any business which is or is about to engage in the distribution, sale or other dealing in restricted product in competition with Amcor Limited trading as Amcor Australasia within Australia.
322 In July and December 2005, the Federal Court imposed a confidentiality regime in respect of documents obtained by Amcor pursuant to the Anton Piller order which permitted Amcor to use certain of the documents obtained pursuant to the Anton Piller order in the Hodgson Proceeding.
323 It was not until the orders of Harper J in April 2006 that Amcor's General Counsel, Ms Julie McPherson, was allowed access to the Anton Piller material.
324 The writ in the Barnes proceeding was filed by the Amcor parties on 3 September 2007.
325 I shall first deal with the monetary claims made by Hodgson in the "Hodgson Proceeding" arising from the termination of his employment with Amcor.
326 These issues were substantially canvassed in the "Hodgson Quantum Trial" (as it was called) conducted between 30-31 March 2011.
327 To re-cap: Hodgson commenced working for Amcor, or its predecessor, in Queensland from 13 January 1966. He rose through the ranks. In July 2000 he was appointed to the senior position of Group General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia (Corrugating/AFPA). He was aged 61 at the time he left the company in 2004. These facts were not in dispute.
328 Hodgson seeks monies (including long service leave, holiday pay and other entitlements) totalling $1,563,803 due upon the termination of his employment with Amcor, which he claims occurred on 1 October 2004.
329 The sums claimed by Hodgson as at 1 October 2004 are as follows:
(iii) Annual Leave (31.4 days x $752,000/260 days) $90,818
(iv) Long Service Leave (168.49 days x $752,000/260) $487,325
(Paid to 31/12/04 - 3 months x $536,000/12) $134,000
330 It was common ground that the payments made to Hodgson in the period 1 October-31 December 2004 amounting to $467,374 ($134,000+$333,374) were paid by Amcor.
331 These calculations exclude interest. Hodgson also claims to be entitled to interest on the sum claimed to be due to him under the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 from 1 October 2004.
332 As stated above, Hodgson's relevant Employment Contract commenced 1 July 2000. It was extended for three years from 1 July 2003 under the same terms and conditions, and applied at the time when he left Amcor in October 2004.
333 Hodgson's Employment Contract included the following terms relating to his remuneration:
(a) base salary of $536,000 per annum (from 1 October 2003);
(b) superannuation contributions as required by the Amcor Superannuation Defined Benefit Fund with a 17.5per cent per annum accrual rate, with salary for superannuation purposes being base salary plus bonus less $70,000;
(c) upon achievement of budget and performance measures agreed by Amcor and Hodgson for each financial year, eligibility for an annual bonus starting from $140,000;
(f) a Lexus 300 vehicle and all running costs and upon expiry of the lease on the Lexus 300, a motor vehicle one level higher on Hodgson's scale; and
(g) travel allowance consisting of four economy class return airfares from Melbourne to Brisbane per family member each year of the contract.
334 In August 2004, Hodgson's employment package ("total fixed remuneration", or "TFR") totalled $751,915, comprising base salary ($536,000), superannuation ($96,960, 17.5% of base salary plus bonus less $70,000), motor vehicle allowance ($31,577) and housing allowance ($87,378). These figures are summarized in the table below:
335 The total figure of $751,915, and its constituent elements, was the gross remuneration package for Hodgson. It was rounded up to $752,000 by the managing director Sutton in August 2004. These matters were not in dispute.
336 An issue arose as to the basis of Hodgson's cessation of employment with Amcor and whether this was on the ground of redundancy.
337 Hodgson claims a redundancy payment of $536,000 in addition to any payment in respect of notice.
338 Hodgson's Employment Contract did not expressly provide a period of notice in the event of redundancy. However, Amcor had a redundancy policy dated 1 October 2004 ("Redundancy Policy"), which applied to "all staff members (including senior management)".
339 The evidence of Hodgson, which I accept, was that "the existence of the [Redundancy Policy] was well known to me", that "[i]nvariably, the redundancy policy was applied in circumstances of redundant employees and the calculations were as set out in the policy", and that "[t]he existence of the redundancy policy and its application to me in the event that I was made redundant was an important factor in my decision to accept the proposed renewal of my contract in March 2003".
340 It was common ground that the Redundancy Policy formed part of Hodgson's contract of employment with Amcor, and I find on the evidence that in any event this was the case.
341 Hodgson submitted that Amcor's Redundancy Policy provided that, if made redundant, employees were entitled to be paid three weeks Notional Base Salary for each completed year of continuous service (with pro-rata payment for a part year) capped at a maximum of fifty two weeks. Hodgson's length of service (some 38¾ years by October 2004) which entitled him to the maximum of 52 weeks. Hodgson's annual base salary as at 1 October 2004 was $536,000, which comprised his claim under this head.
342 However, Amcor submitted that the Redundancy Policy set out in clause 3 were limited to the entitlements of a staff member "whose position is redundant and who is retrenched". Assuming this applied to Hodgson, clause 3.1 relevantly provided for 5 weeks' notice in writing or payment in lieu. Accordingly, Amcor contended that, even on his case, Hodgson was prima facie entitled to a 5 week notice period, or payment in lieu of the 5 weeks' notice.
343 Hodgson put his case on the basis that he was given notice "on 5 August 2004, and confirmed on 11, 13 and 18 August 2004".
344 Amcor therefore contended that if any such notice was a notice of redundancy, it was given on 5 August 2004 with the redundancy to take effect on 1 October 2004. Hodgson was therefore entitled to no payment in lieu of notice of redundancy. The period between 5 August 2004 and 1 October 2004 was some 8 weeks; considerably longer than the 5 week notice period to which Hodgson was entitled, so it was put.
345 Hodgson continued to attend his place of work and carry out duties until 30 September 2004. Between 18 August and 27 September 2004, neither Sutton nor any other person on behalf of Amcor told Hodgson that his employment would not be terminated effective from 1 October or that he would not be paid $912,000 on that date. From 1 October 2004, Hodgson had no position with Amcor, he had no title or job designation, and no duties to perform.
346 I accept the evidence relied upon by Hodgson. His employment with Amcor was terminated on 1 October 2004.
347 Hodgson contended that his employment was terminated on 1 October 2004 by reason of redundancy as a result of the decision made by Amcor to reduce the number of its group general managers from six to five and later four.
348 Hodgson claimed that the reduction in the number of GGM positions from six to four, following the completion of the restructure and, in particular, the merging of the Australian and New Zealand cartons businesses (from Cartons and Sacks) into the Fibre Packaging Division, resulted in the position of GGM of each of these divisions no longer being required and the creation of one new GGM position. This restructure was confirmed in an Amcor memorandum dated 17 August 2004, in which Sutton announced that the current number of division would be reduced from six to five and then to four.
349 Hodgson also relied upon a memorandum addressed to all Amcor staff dated 1 September 2004, in which Sutton announced that Hodgson would be leaving Amcor on 1 October 2004. This was repeated by Messrs Laidlaw and Brookes of Amcor in a memorandum to staff dated 1 September 2004. On 30 September 2004 Sutton said that Hodgson was "redundant" effective "from tomorrow".
350 Hodgson initially contended in his pleadings that he was given notice of redundancy on 18 August 2004. However, in his opening submissions in the Quantum Trial, Hodgson alleged that he was given notice on 5 August 2004, which was confirmed on 11, 13 and 18 August 2004.
351 On the other hand, Amcor contended that Hodgson could not claim a prima facie entitlement to a retrenchment package under the Redundancy Policy unless he could show, among other things, that:
(a) his position (Group General Manager of Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia) was made redundant; and
(b) Amcor terminated his employment on that basis.
(a) Hodgson's position was never made redundant; and
(b) although it initially sought to terminate Hodgson's employment on notice by letter dated 29 September 2004, this was never on redundancy grounds.
353 Clause 3 of Amcor's Redundancy Policy provides that a retrenchment package will be available, subject to clause 2.2 of the Redundancy Policy,[16] to "an Eligible Staff Member whose position is redundant and who is retrenched".
354 The Redundancy Policy did not define the term "redundant".
355 In assessing any prima facie entitlement to a retrenchment package under the Redundancy Policy incorporated into Hodgson's contract of employment, construction of the term "redundancy" is called for.
356 The Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed, 1997) now relevantly defines "redundant" as meaning:
... denoting or relating to an employee who is or becomes superfluous to the needs of the employer ...
357 In the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 2000) 'redundancy' is defined relevantly as:
Of a person: no longer needed at work; unemployed because of a reorganisation, mechanization, change in demand etc.
... the concept of redundancy in the context we are discussing seems to be simply this, that a job becomes redundant when the employer no longer desires to have it performed by anyone. A dismissal for redundancy seems to be a dismissal, not on account of any personal act or default of the employee dismissed or any consideration peculiar to him but because the employer no longer wishes the job the employee has been doing to be done by anyone.
359 Bright J in the same case expressed a similar view:[19]
A consideration of the cases leads me to think that the question of the redundancy of an employee is linked to the question of the continued utility of the job which he is performing. In other words it does not relate to the personal competence of the employee in the job which he is performing. If I am right in this, then in its widest form the concept of redundancy connotes that an employee becomes redundant whenever (and for whatever reason) his employer no longer desires to have performed the job which that employee was doing.
360 Hodgson submitted that the authorities, including Whittaker v Unisys Australia Pty Ltd,[20] support his contention that he was made redundant. However Amcor did not accept this position.
361 In Whittaker, the employee's position had also been subject of a restructure. However, in contrast to the present fact scenario, the employee had been offered an alternative and continuing role by the employer.
362 Ross J ultimately determined that the circumstances constituted a repudiation by the employer of the employee's contract with consequential loss and damage. The employee however also contended that his position had become redundant.
363 His Honour analysed the concept of common law redundancy as it applied to the facts of the case before him in the following paragraphs:[21]
The plaintiff contends that the changes communicated in the email broadcast of 12 February 2009 constituted a restructuring of the defendant's business and as a consequence, Mr Whittaker was made redundant.
The defendant says that there was no redundancy. Ms Carter continued in the VP and GM position formerly occupied by Mr Whittaker. It is also submitted that there is no termination pleaded as a result of restructuring, rather the plaintiff's claim is that the termination of his employment arose from redundancy. But in any event, the defendant says that there was no restructuring in this case as the relevant clause is concerned with terminations resulting from Unysis' 'restructuring ... its business with any other organisation or entity'. The defendant contends that the clause is not concerned with the internal restructuring of some positions, but rather with the restructuring of the business with another organisation or entity. It is also submitted that, in this case, the employer did not wish to terminate Mr Whittaker's employment, rather it wished that his employment would continue, albeit in a different role, and hence the clause does not apply.
It is convenient to deal first with the proposition that Mr Whittaker's employment was terminated as a result of redundancy.
The defendant contends that an essential feature of redundancy is that the particular position occupied by the employee ceases to exist for reasons such as economic downturn or restructuring. It is said that the focus is on the position not the person, and that in this case the plaintiff's position, as VP and GM, did not cease to exist. Ms Carter took the plaintiff's VP and GM role and Mr Whittaker was offered the mega deal role. In these circumstances, it is said that there was no redundancy. A number of authorities are relied on in support of this proposition.
In R v Industrial Commission of South Australia; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Cooperative Ltd, Bray CJ defined redundancy in these terms: [22]
... the concept of redundancy in the context we are discussing seems to be simply this, that a job becomes redundant when the employer no longer desires to have it performed by anyone.
As the defendant observes, this description of redundancy was referred to with apparent approval by the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the Termination Change and Redundancy Case (the TCR case)[23] and by Beach J in Lindeman v Bentley.[24] But these cases do not assist the defendant; they are not concerned with the definition of redundancy at common law. The TCR case was about the creation of a standard redundancy provision for inclusion in federal awards. In Lindeman v Bentley, Beach J was construing a Victorian Public Sector Agreement titled 'Redeployment and Retraining in the Victorian Public Service'. Clause 3 of that agreement defined redundancy in terms of positions, not persons.
The same observation may be made of the judgments in Foster's Group Limited v Wing.[25] In that matter, the Victorian Court of Appeal was concerned with the application of Foster's redundancy policy which defined redundancy in these terms:
A redundancy arises when an employee's role no longer exists or the duties of the role have changed that for all practical purposes the original role no longer exists.
I am not persuaded that the concept of redundancy at common law is as narrow as the defendant contends. It is not simply concerned with the abolition of a position, but may arise upon the redistribution of job functions. As Beazley J observed in Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding:[26]
A redundancy will arise where an employer has labour in excess of the requirements of the business; where the employer no longer wishes to have a particular job performed; or where the employer wishes to amalgamate jobs. It is not necessary for the work to have disappeared altogether. As was said in Bunnett's case:
'Organisational restructuring may result in a position being abolished and the functions or some of them being given to another or split amongst others'. (citations omitted)
Hence a redundancy may arise where the duties performed by an employee are redistributed among other employees. The employer still requires the duties to be performed, but the reorganisation gives rise to a redundancy. The plaintiff says that that is what happened here:
Mr Whittaker's former position, that is the bundle of duties that comprised his position were redistributed among the two persons (Mr Whittaker and Ms Carter).
I accept that the duties that made up Mr Whittaker's former GM and VP role were redistributed between Ms Carter and Mr Whittaker. But I do not accept that Mr Whittaker was made redundant as a result. As Ryan J observed in Jones v Department of Energy and Minerals:
... it is within the employer's prerogative to rearrange the organisational structure by breaking up the collection of functions, duties and responsibilities attached to a single position and distributing them among the holders of other positions, including newly created positions. ... One illustration of it occurs when the duties of a single, full time, employee are redistributed to several part time employees. What is critical for the purpose of identifying a redundancy is whether the holder of the former position has, after the reorganisation, any duties left to discharge. [Emphasis added]
In Jones, some of the tasks previously assigned to the applicant still had to be carried out, but as a consequence of the employer's rearrangement of its operational structure, these tasks were combined with other functions and performed by the holder of a newly created position. Mr Jones was rendered redundant when he could not be redeployed and was found to be surplus to the respondent's personal needs.
The situation in the present case is quite different. Unysis rearranged its operational structure by splitting the functions of Mr Whittaker's former GM and VP role between Mr Whittaker and Ms Carter. But, importantly, after the reorganisation Mr Whittaker still had duties to perform. Contrary to the plaintiff's submission, I am not persuaded that the mega deal position did not exist - the weight of the evidence supports the existence of such a role. A position description in respect of the proposed role was drawn up and forwarded to Mr Whittaker and the position is referred to in the organisational chart on p 6 of Exhibit R7. Further, in his letter to Mr Barkla of 10 April 2008, Mr Whittaker describes the proposed position as 'essentially a sales role' which he saw as a severe downgrading of his previous role. But Mr Whittaker does not say that the proposed role was a sham or did not exist. While the mega deal position has not yet been filled, that is explicable on the basis that a person with the requisite skills has not yet been identified.
In such circumstances, and consistent with what Ryan J said in Jones, Mr Whittaker was not redundant.
364 In Jones, cited by Ross J in Whittaker, the organisational restructure in question involved two positions (one of which was held by Jones) which were subsumed into an entirely new position, attached to which were also a number of other, newly created, functions. The employer in this case dismissed Jones on the ground of redundancy, the validity of which was upheld by the Court.
365 The circumstances in Jones are distinguishable from those in the present proceedings. In Jones it was accepted by the court that the employee's former position had been "abolished" and that a new position had been created (for which, evidence was led, Jones lacked the "full range of skills and experience").[27] However, there is no evidence in the present case, that a like situation occurred in relation to Hodgson as a result of the Project NEXT restructure undertaken by Amcor.
366 The Victorian Court of Appeal case of Fosters Group Limited v David Kou Tien Wing ("Fosters") is also instructive.[28] The facts in Fosters were that Kou, who was employed by Fosters Group Ltd as Deputy General Manager, Finance in its China branch, was dismissed due to serious dishonesty allegations made against him. However, for various reasons, it was decided internally at Fosters that the termination would be packaged as a cost cutting measure. Following Kou's dismissal and subsequent difficulties in finding a replacement for him, Fosters restructured elements of the business and Kou's former position (with some minor changes) was filled by a different employee under a new title.
367 In Fosters, the Victorian Court of Appeal cited with approval the observations of Beazley J in Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding[29] where his Honour said:
There was no dispute that the 'operational requirements' of a business may include redundancy. A redundancy will arise where an employer has labour in excess of the requirements of the business; where the employer no longer wishes to have a particular job performed.; or where the employer wishes to amalgamate jobs. ... As was said in Bunnetts' case (Bunnett v Henderson's Federal Spring Works Pty Ltd) [1989] AILR 354:
Organisational restructuring may result in a position being abolished and the functions or some of them being given to another or split amongst others.
368 Having regard to the decided case law, Habersberger AJA (with Maxwell P and Nettle JA concurring) formulated a question for determining redundancy in the following terms:[30]
The critical question is whether, through no fault of the employee his or her role no longer exists or the duties have so changed that for all practical purposes the original role no longer exists.
369 His Honour Habersberger AJA proceeded to find in Fosters:[31]
... it seems to me the objective facts point inescapably to the conclusion that Kou's position was not made redundant. First, whatever changes were made to the role performed by Kou, after his departure, there still existed a position of General Manager, SSBL.
370 Habersberger AJA in Fosters also noted that a redundancy will not arise where the termination is brought about for any consideration peculiar to the dismissed employee. In this regard, his Honour focussed on the facts before the Court, in observing that that: [32]
... there could be no redundancy if the termination was brought about by fault of Kou ... the evidence showed convincingly that there had been fault on the part of Kou which ruled out any entitlement to redundancy benefits, whatever subsequently happened to his position.
371 I respectfully adopt the analysis of the Court of Appeal in Fosters. The decision of Ross J in Whittaker can be reconciled with these principles. In essence, subject to any qualification or re-statement found in the relevant contract of employment or any applicable statute, the common law concept of "redundancy" comes down to the following propositions:
(a) A job becomes redundant when the job of the employee ceases to exist because the employer, for whatever reason, whether by reason of reorganisation, mechanization, change in demand or other reason, no longer desires to have it performed by anyone;[33]
(b) This can occur either when the role no longer exists or the duties have so changed that for all practical purposes the original role no longer exists;[34]
(c) However, redundancy is not limited to the circumstance where the employer, no longer desires to have the work previously performed by the terminated employee done by anyone;
(d) A redundancy may also arise upon the redistribution of job functions, where the duties performed by an employee are redistributed among other employees.[35] In this case the employer still requires the duties to be performed, but the reorganisation may give rise to a redundancy. In this event, although the duties remain to be performed, 'for all practical purposes the original role no longer exists' because the duties are divided and assigned amongst others. In such a case the question is whether any function or duty remains to be performed by the employee. A redundancy will occur if, after the reorganisation, the employee in question is left with no duties to discharge;[36] and
(e) Redundancy will not arise where the termination of employment is carried out solely because of any personal act or default of the employee terminated or for any consideration peculiar to that employee.[37]
372 The employee in Whittaker was not found to be redundant on the facts of that case because the employer had offered the employee a role and duties to perform after the restructuring. It was found that the employer rearranged its operational structure by splitting the functions of Mr Whittaker's role between himself and another, importantly with the result that after the reorganisation Mr Whittaker still had duties to perform.
Whether Amcor's Re-organisation Was Capable of Giving Rise to a Redundancy of Hodgson
373 Hodgson's case was that his former position (Group General Manager of Amcor Fibre Packaging Australasia) was made redundant as a result of Amcor's corporate restructure known as "Project NEXT".
374 Prior to the restructure, Amcor comprised six business divisions, namely: Corrugating (AFP); Paper; Beverage Packaging; Food Can/PET/Closures; Cartons/Sacks; and Glass. Each division was headed by a Group General Manager (GGM). Hodgson headed the Corrugating (AFP) division as the GGM of Fibre Packaging.
375 In the first phase of the Project NEXT restructure, effective 1 October 2004, the Cartons & Sacks Division ceased to exist as a separate division. Its constituent business areas were moved to other divisions as follows:
(a) the Petrie Mill became part of the new Paper Division, renamed the Paper & Board Division;
(b) the Sacks business became part of the Plastics Division, renamed the Flexible Packaging Division; and
(c) the Australian and New Zealand Cartons businesses became part of Fibre Packaging.
376 Following this initial restructure, all GGM positions remained, except for that of the defunct Cartons & Sacks Division. The GGM position for Cartons & Sacks held by a Mr David Armstrong ("Armstrong") was made redundant. However, Armstrong was offered alternative employment as GGM of the Rigid Packaging Division. This meant that five GGM positions remained across Amcor's Australasian operations, heading the following business divisions:
(a) Fibre Packaging including the Australian and New Zealand corrugated box businesses (AFPA), the Australian and New Zealand Cartons businesses and the Specialty Box businesses with Mr Darryl Roberts ("Roberts") as GGM (previously GGM of Metals);
(b) Rigid Packaging bringing together the Beverage Cans, Food Cans, Aerosol Cans, PET, and Closures businesses (with Glass to follow later) with David Armstrong as GGM (previously GGM of Cartons & Sacks);
(c) Flexible Packaging (Plastics) with Flexibles, Sacks and Functional Coatings to provide products and services to the flexible packaging market businesses with Graeme Moncrieff as GGM (previously GGM of Plastics);
(d) Glass as a separate Division initially with John Winckel to remain as GGM prior to its merger into the Rigid Packaging Division when his role would become redundant; and
(e) Paper and Board including the recycled paper mills and the Petrie Board Mill with Malcolm Shield as GGM (previously GGM of Paper).
377 The second phase of Project NEXT, effective January 2006, concerned the integration of the Glass Division into the Rigid Packaging Division. This reorganisation is not relevant for present purposes.
378 Immediately prior to the first phase of the Project NEXT restructure Hodgson held the position of GGM of Fibre Packaging. His successor following the restructure was Mr Darryl Roberts, formerly Amcor's GGM of Metals. However, although Roberts was to assume additional responsibility for staff relocated from the Cartons & Sacks Business to the Fibre Division and for five small sites (two in New Zealand and three in Australia), the role of the GGM Fibre Packaging was effectively the same before and after the restructure. The additional businesses and employees which became part of the Fibre Packaging Division were not material in terms of job classification for the GGM role.
379 On this basis Amcor submitted that Hodgson's position was not made redundant from 1 October 2004 and that he was not entitled to a retrenchment package under the Redundancy Policy.
380 Ms Allibon, GGM of Human Resources and Operating Risk at Amcor during the relevant time, gave evidence that that Hodgson was not made redundant, rather he became "surplus to requirements" arising from "other issues with Sutton", his superior, which gave rise to his termination. She said in cross-examination:
I'd say no, he wasn't redundant. He was surplus to requirements... Technically roles become redundant, not - not people and his role wasn't redundant.
Hodgson was to be terminated because of other issues with Sutton, not about the role being available or not being available.
381 Mr Peter Wilson ("Wilson"), who was Executive General Manager of Human Resources and Operating Risk at the relevant time, also confirmed in his witness statement:
At that time Jim Hodgson was GGM of the Corrugated or Fibre Division (AFPA). That role would continue to exist after the proposed restructure. The core functions, key customers and duties and responsibilities of the role were not to change with the restructure ...
382 Wilson further confirmed during his cross-examination:
We were discussing the termination of his contract. I don't believe the term redundancy was applicable to our discussion ... Redundancy to me meant we were taking his job away. The job continued.
and later during the continuation of his cross-examination:
My recollection he was entitled to a payment with respect to us executing the termination provisions of his contract and there were some engrossments of that made in the negotiations on offer, but redundancy to me as a business person is a technical term where the job that somebody is doing ends and therefore they're without a job and they're treated because the job has gone. His job didn't go.
383 This evidence points to the role of GGM Fibre Packaging being modified, but not in such a way as to alter the fundamental nature of the position.
384 Nor was there any redistribution of job functions in relation to the GGM Fibre Packaging position with the result that Hodgson was left with no duties to perform as a consequence. True it is that after 1 October 2004 Hodgson was "surplus to requirements" in the sense that he had no role or duties to perform for Amcor after that time. However, this was not brought about by any redistribution of Hodgson's job functions by splitting and assigning the relevant duties to others.
385 In my opinion, the reorganisation within Amcor did not result in Hodgson's employment being capable of being terminated by reason of redundancy.
386 Further, I am satisfied that Amcor did not terminate Hodgson's employment on the ground of imminent redundancy. Rather, it elected to terminate Hodgson's employment on the basis of differences in management style and clashes between Hodgson on the one hand and his superior, Sutton on the other. It determined to appoint Roberts in his place.
387 It appears that Sutton made this decision to terminate Hodgson's employment in April 2004.
388 Discussions and negotiations took place between Amcor and Hodgson in August 2004 concerning the terms on which Hodgson's employment would end.
389 Hodgson contends that notice of termination of his employment was given to him on 5 August 2004, and confirmed on 11, 13 and 18 August 2004.
390 On the other hand, Amcor's position is that, although the parties discussed Hodgson's departure from Amcor in August, those discussions did not amount to Amcor giving Hodgson notice that his employment would terminate as of 1 October 2004. Rather, it was put that the parties were engaged throughout that time in a process of negotiation concerning Hodgson's departure from Amcor. Such matters as the date of his departure, the amount he would be paid, whether he would be retained (and paid) in a consultancy capacity, whether he would accept a longer restraint period and the like Amcor said were the subject of discussions, principally between Hodgson and Sutton.
391 The negotiations did not result in any agreement.
392 It is implied by law into a contract of employment, absent an express term to the contrary or which defines the period of notice, that either party may bring the contract of employment to an end by giving a reasonable period of notice to terminate.[38]
393 In the present case, clause 13.1 of Hodgson's Employment Contract provided for termination in the following provision:
The Company [Amcor] may terminate this contract at any time:
...
(b) for any reason whatsoever by providing 12 months' notice to the Employee [Hodgson]. The Company:
(i) may, at its option, elect to make payment in lieu of any such notice to the Employee; and
(ii) shall not be under any obligation to provide the Employee with any work, or work of a particular kind, during the period of notice.
394 Hodgson's Employment Contract also provided for notices to be served under the contract. This could be achieved, inter alia, by the delivery by hand to the intended recipient of a notice in writing signed by an appropriately authorised person. Clause 14 relevantly provided:
Any notice, demand, consent or other communication (a Notice) given or made under this contract:
(a) shall be given in writing and signed by a person duly authorised by the sender;
(b) shall either be delivered to the intended recipient by prepaid post (where posted to an address in another country, by registered airmail) or by hand or fax to the address or fax number below or the address or fax number last notified by the intended recipient to the sender:
...
Events Commencing 5 August 2004 Leading up to Hodgson's Dismissal with Effect 1 October 2004
395 On 5 August 2004 Hodgson first met with Sutton in relation to the termination of his employment. The meeting took place in Sutton's office in Camberwell. At that meeting, Sutton told Hodgson that, pursuant to the "Project Next" restructure of Amcor Australasia, it had been decided to reduce the six divisions of Amcor Australasia for which Sutton was then responsible down to four divisions. The "Project Next" restructure was an initiative of the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Amcor Ltd, Jones. The project had been initiated in about April 2004. The object of "Project Next" was to achieve sustainable reductions in costs across Amcor's global businesses, including Amcor Australasia and its business divisions. Sutton told Hodgson that as a consequence of the "Project Next" review, it had been decided that he would only require four Group General Managers, not six. Sutton told Hodgson that he had decided that his employment would be terminated together with John Winckel, Group General Manager - Glass, although Mr Winckel would be terminated at a later time in the year. Mr Winckel's employment was terminated later in 2004.
396 On 11 August 2004 Hodgson met again with Sutton. Sutton handed to Hodgson a letter signed by him dated 11 August 2004. The letter said, omitting formal parts:
Separation arrangements
I refer to our recent discussions, regarding the conclusion of your employment relationship with Amcor Australasia (Amcor).
Attached is a Separation Agreement, which reflects the terms upon which we propose to bring our employment relationship to an end. As discussed, while one aspect of our working relationship is drawn to a close, the Separation Agreement also provided for Amcor to continue its relationship with you in an alternative form, with you providing management services to the company as a specialist consultant.
As discussed, I encourage you to obtain your own independent legal and financial advice regarding this Agreement, prior to responding to or signing it.
If you have any questions regarding the attached Agreement, or if I can be of assistance in any other way, please do not hesitate to contact me on 9811 7160. Alternatively, Melanie Huson will be available to discuss with you. Melanie can be reached on 9811 7152.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the invaluable contribution you have made to Amcor over your 38 years with the company. I look forward to continuing to work with you as a consultant in the coming years and wish you all the very best for your future endeavours.
397 At the meeting, Hodgson was also presented with the "Separation Agreement" mentioned in the letter, which was entitled "Deed of Release". Amongst other things, the document provided for a 36 month restraint proposed to be imposed on Hodgson. The clause provided:
C. NON-COMPETITION
As separate and distinct agreements and undertakings -
The Executive [Hodgson] shall not for a period of 36 months after execution hereof either on his own account or as a partner, officer, agent or employee of any other person, firm or corporation be engaged in Australia or New Zealand in the business of designing, developing, manufacturing, distributing, marketing or selling any fibre packaging or other like products or any component of these products (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Products).
The Executive shall not for a period of 36 months after execution hereof supply or offer to supply any person, firm or corporation within Australia or New Zealand any advice, service or product in any way connected with the design, development, manufacture, distribution, marketing or sale of any of the Products or with the supply of any services sold or supplied by the Companies.
The Executive shall not for a period of 36 months after execution hereof either on his own account or as a partner, officer, agent or employee of any other person, firm or corporation, solicit or interfere with or endeavour to entice away from the Companies any person, firm or corporation who at any time during his employment with the Company was a customer of or otherwise in the habit of purchasing from the Companies any of the products or services designed, manufactured, supplied, distributed, marketed or sold by the Companies.
The Executive shall not for a period of 36 months after execution hereof either on his own account or as a partner, officer agent or employee of any other person, firm or corporation, solicit or interfere with or endeavour to entice away from the Companies any person, firm or corporation who at any time during his employment with the Company was a supplier of or otherwise in the habit of providing goods or services to the Companies that were used in connection with the design, manufacture, supply distribution, marketing or sale of any products or services by the Companies.
The Executive shall not for a period of 36 months after execution hereof solicit any employee of the Companies to terminate his or her employment with the Companies or otherwise knowingly interfere with the Companies' relations with any of their employees.
The Executive acknowledges that each of the prohibitions and restrictions contained in Part C of this Deed:
b) is reasonable as to period, territory and subject matter; and
398 The letter was accompanied by two other documents which were also handed to Hodgson at the meeting. They contained the following information:
399 The letter of 11 August 2004 and its accompanying documents were unequivocal. The letter made the following references: the "conclusion of your employment relationship with Amcor Australasia (Amcor)"; "one aspect of our working relationship is drawn to a close" (with the offer of Hodgson continuing to provide management services to the company as a specialist consultant); and the parting gesture of thanks contained in the concluding words: "I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the invaluable contribution you have made to Amcor over your 38 years with the company" ..."and wish you all the very best for your future endeavours". The draft Deed of Release made reference in its recitals to the fact that Hodgson had "been employed by the Company [Amcor Ltd] since 13 January 1966"; and that the Company has resolved to terminate the Executive's [Hodgson's] employment pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Release with effect from 1 October 2004.
400 It was abundantly clear from the meeting between Sutton and Hodgson of 11 August 2004 and the provision of the documents to Hodgson at that meeting that Hodgson was being told that his employment with Amcor pursuant to the Employment Contract was over.
401 In my opinion the letter dated 11 August 2011 signed by Sutton, together with its attachment, the proposed "Deed of Release", the accompanying document entitled "Termination Package for JH", and the document entitled "Total Fixed Remuneration - JH", together constituted a written notice of termination of Hodgson's employment with Amcor pursuant to his contract of employment effective from 1 October 2004.
402 The fact that the documents also purported to offer components of a separation package beyond that specified in Hodgson's Employment Contract, did not alter the fundamental nature of the notice. Nor was the notice given under the contract affected by the failure of Hodgson to accept the additional terms offered to him. The notice of termination, as reflected in the letter, was not made contingent upon further agreement being achieved between Amcor and Hodgson as to the terms on which he would depart from Amcor. If no agreement was achieved, the legal position was that the terms of Hodgson's departure from Amcor would be governed by his Employment Contract as it stood, unvaried by an further arrangement.
403 Pursuant to clause 13.1(b) of the Employment Contract, Amcor was entitled to unilaterally terminate Hodgson's contract at any time, and for any reason whatsoever, provided it gave 12 months' notice to him. This it did by the letter dated 11 August 2011 and the accompanying documents.
404 However, pursuant to clause 13.1(b)(i) Amcor could at its option elect to make payment in lieu of any such notice. This is what it elected to do by providing to Hodgson on 11 August 2004 the document "Termination Package for JH". This document included the following phrase: "Lump sum payment, including 12 months pay in lieu of notice (based on TFR) and 03/04 MIP, all treated as ETP - $912,000.00". The 12 months pay in lieu of notice (based on TFR or "Total Fixed Remuneration") amounted to $752,000 and the "03/04 MIP" ("Management Incentive Program" bonus) amounted to $160,000, which together totalled $912,000.
405 Further, pursuant to clause 13.1(b)(ii) Amcor was not under any obligation to provide Hodgson with any work, or work of a particular kind, during the period of notice. Amcor elected not avail itself of this right during the period 11 August to 1 October 2004, and Hodgson continued with his usual duties during this period.
406 Following the meeting of 11 August 2011, in subsequent meetings between Sutton and Hodgson, further terms of departure were discussed, including Hodgson's claim that he had been made redundant. However, no agreement was struck. Nevertheless, one theme remained constant. It was agreed between the two that Hodgson's employment with Amcor was to cease, effective from 1 October 2011. This was confirmed in conversations at meetings on 13 August and 18 August 2004.
407 Following the meeting of 18 August 2004, I accept Hodgson's evidence that he acted thereafter on the basis that his employment with Amcor was going to end on 1 October 2004. He was well entitled to do so. Sutton issued a General Memorandum dated 1 September 2004 with an attached Organisation Chart to all Amcor employees which, amongst other things, confirmed that Hodgson would be leaving Amcor on 1 October 2004. On the same day (1 September 2004), Mr Ted Laidlaw (then Group General Manager, Marketing & Technology) and Mr David Brookes (General Manager, Public Affairs & Environment) issued a Memorandum to which was attached a document entitled "Briefing Note For Communication With Amcor Australasia Customers". This Briefing Note also confirmed that Hodgson would be leaving the business on 1 October 2004. The termination of Hodgson's employment with Amcor with effect on and from 1 October 2004 was also the subject of media comment.
408 On 27 September 2004 Hodgson met with Mr Jones at the latter's request at Mr Jones' office at Abbotsford. During the interview Jones encouraged Hodgson to sign the restraint document contained in the Deed of Release which Sutton had given him on 11 August 2004, which provided for a 36 month restraint. Hodgson declined to sign the document or accept its terms.
409 On 28 September 2004, Hodgson received letters of resignation dated 28 September 2004 from each of Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic. He forwarded them to Amcor's administrative staff.
410 Amcor posted a prepaid letter to Hodgson addressed to his home address dated 29 September 2004 (the "29 September Letter"). Hodgson's evidence, which I accept, was that he received the letter at his home on 30 September 2004 after returning from Queensland. The letter was signed by Sutton, Hodgson's superior, in his capacity as "Managing Director Amcor Australasia".
Dear Jim,
I refer to our recent discussions regarding your separation from Amcor Australasia. I must advise that if we have not received a signed copy of the deed of release by 5pm on Friday 1st October 2004, we have no alternative but to give you notice of our intent to terminate your employment, effective 1st October 2005.
I attach a further copy of our separation offer, including the deed of release and termination payment calculations, which you may accept until 5pm on 1st October 2004. After 5pm on 1st October 2004, this offer is withdrawn.
Should we not receive the signed deed of release by 5pm on Friday 1st October 2004, regrettably the following will apply:-
Jim, it is still our strong preference for you to accept the original separation offer and we ask that you give this serious consideration.
If you need any clarification, please do not hesitate to contact either myself, Melanie Huson or Peter Wilson.
412 The letter also noted that during that during the 12 month period commencing 1 October 2004, Hodgson would not be required to work but would be expected to exhaust his leave entitlements. The attached draft calculation of termination payments included the following amounts which were offered:
leave entitlements: $412,081.24;
lump sum payment ETP: $752,000.00;
additional bonus ETP: $160,000.00.
413 Amcor's letter also informed Hodgson that in the event that he was to be directed to serve a period of 12 months notice at home, he would not be eligible to participate in the 2004/2005 MIP. The letter further informed him that, at the conclusion of any notice period that he would be directed to serve, he would be required to comply on and from 1 October 2005 with the 12 months' post termination restraint provided for in his original Employment Contract.
414 Hodgson did not accept Amcor's further "separation offer" referred to in the second paragraph of the 29 September Letter by 1 October 2004, or at all. According to its terms, this offer therefore lapsed after 5 pm 1 October 2004. Further, in these circumstances, the letter could be said to have constituted notice, according to its terms "of Amcor Australasia's decision to terminate your employment on 1 October 2005". [Emphasis added]
415 Amcor submitted that, by the 29 September letter, it elected to terminate Hodgson's employment by giving him a 12 month notice under clause 13.1 of Hodgson's Employment Contract. It did not elect to make any payment to him in lieu of the notice, but elected to continue to pay him during the 12 month period. However, during the period of the notice, Amcor elected not to provide him with any work. In this way, it was put that Hodgson continued to be employed by Amcor, although he was put on "gardening leave". Under this regime, Hodgson continued to receive his usual remuneration on each of 15 October, 15 November and 15 December 2004. It was said that Hodgson's termination was not effective until 1 October 2005.
416 Hodgson, on the other hand, contended that his employment was terminated with effect from 1 October 2004. Consequently the 29 September letter was of no effect other than to evidence the making of a further offer by Amcor, which Hodgson did not accept.
Conclusion as to the Effect of the 29 September Letter
417 Undoubtedly, one of the intentions behind the purported notice given by the letter of 29 September 2004 was an attempt to keep Hodgson technically employed by Amcor for the 12 month period from 2 October 2004 to 1 October 2005. This in turn would operate to keep Hodgson under the restraint clause in his original Employment Contract for the duration of that contract and 12 months beyond, to 1 October 2006. By this means, if Hodgson was not prepared to sign the amended Deed of Release, which provided for a 36 month restraint, Amcor attempted to secure a fall back position for itself, namely a 24 month restraint by means of the "gardening leave" mechanism.
418 Hodgson read the letter on his return home in Melbourne on 30 September 2004. He did not accept the offer made or consent to what was being proposed.
419 On 1 October 2004, Hodgson resigned as a director of various Amcor subsidiary companies. On the same day, he gave back his company cars, his corporate credit card and all other Amcor property in his possession.
420 Hodgson did not return to work at Amcor after 1 October 2004.
421 Hodgson pleads that as at 1 October 2004 Amcor did not have the right to terminate his employment on the provision of 12 months' notice in circumstances where Amcor had already given notice to Hodgson of the termination of his employment with effect on and from 1 October 2004.
422 I take Hodgson's plea to first invoke the common law doctrine that, subject to a limited class of exceptions which are of no present application such as a notice of termination or resignation effected in the "heat of the moment" which is renounced soon after, a valid notice of termination or resignation cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the party to whom it was given, even where the period specified in the notice has not expired.
423 There is long standing authority in support of this proposition.
424 In Riordan v War Office,[39] Diplock J said:
The giving of a notice terminating a contractual employment, whether by employee or employer, is the exercise of the right under the contract of employment to bring the contract to an end, either immediately or in the future. It is a unilateral act, requiring no acceptance by the other party, and, like a notice to quit a tenancy, once given it cannot in my view be withdrawn save by mutual consent.
425 In State of New South Wales v Paige,[40] Spigelman CJ, with whom Mason P and Giles JA agreed, adopted with approval the observations of Gray J in his judgment in Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission,[41] which have been often referred to on the issue. In Birrell Gray J stated the common law rule and its rationale in the following passage:[42]
... The purpose of providing in a contract for a period of notice of termination is to enable the party receiving the notice to make other arrangements. An employee given notice by his or her employer has a period of time in which to seek another job; an employer who receives notice has time to arrange for a substitute employee. It would be harsh if arrangements so made during the running of the notice could be disrupted, and parties could be held to their contracts by unilateral withdrawal of the notice at the last minute. Such withdrawal, if possible, could lead to an employee being bound by contracts of employment with two employers, or an employer being bound by contracts of employment with two employees, each being required to give notice to one or the other in order to be extricated from this position, or possibly to suffer the requirement to forfeit or pay wages for a period of time. In my view, I should lean against the adoption of any principle which could lead to such unfortunate consequences, and I should follow the authorities which tend to establish that withdrawal of a notice of termination of a contract of employment can only be effected by consent of both parties.
426 Adopting a similar approach, Spigelman CJ in Paige said:[43]
Subject to any contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, the act of resignation from employment, or from membership of an organisation, is a unilateral act that takes effect in accordance with its terms and does not depend upon acceptance by the person or body to whom the resignation is directed. This common law principle is a reflection of the significance the common law has always attached to personal autonomy. Where this principle applies, unilateral withdrawal of a resignation or notice of termination is not possible.
427 The above authorities were also cited with approval and applied by White J in Frederick v State of South Australia.[44]
428 Once given his notice unilaterally by Amcor through Sutton on 11 August 2004, it being a perfectly valid notice within the terms of his Employment Contract, it was not legally possible for Amcor to then undertake a later unilateral withdrawal of the notice of termination by substituting another notice of termination on different terms, which it purported to do by its letter of 29 September 2004. Hodgson did not consent to the first notice being withdrawn. Nor did he accept the terms of the second notice. For these reasons, I find that Amcor's letter of 29 September 2004 had no legal effect.
429 Alternatively by his plea, I take Hodgson's contention to be that, the doctrine of election (sometimes treated synonymously as "waiver"), applies in the circumstances of this case. In other words, in making its determination on 11 August 2004 and acting upon it in giving notice to Hodgson that his employment would be terminated on and from 1 October 2004 and offering him payment in lieu of notice, Amcor elected between two inconsistent rights open to it under clause 13.1 of Hodgson's Employment Contract, namely:
(a) in the exercise of its power to terminate Hodgson's contact "at any time" it elected to make payment to him in lieu of the 12 month notice that it was otherwise required to give, with the termination being effective on and from 1 October 2004; or
(b) it elected to give Hodgson 12 month's notice, to continue to employ and pay him during the 12 month period and hold him to his Employment Contract during that time, while not providing him with any work, with the termination of employment being effective at the end of the 12 month period.
430 As I have found, Amcor elected to put into effect the first of these options available to it under Hodgson's Contract of Employment.
431 In Craine v. Colonial Mutual, the High Court (Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke JJ) said:[45]
"Waiver" is a doctrine of some arbitrariness introduced by the law to prevent a man in certain circumstances from taking up two inconsistent positions (see per James L.J. in Pilcher v. Rawlins). It is a conclusion of law when the necessary facts are established. It looks, however, chiefly to the conduct and position of the person who is said to have waived, in order to see whether he has "approbated" so as to prevent him from "reprobating" - in English terms, whether he has elected to get some advantage to which he would not otherwise have been entitled, so as to deny to him a later election to the contrary (see per Lord Shaw in Pitman v. Crum Ewing). His knowledge is necessary, or he cannot be said to have approbated or elected. [Footnotes omitted]
432 Mason CJ in Commonwealth v Verwayen[46] stated that the broad principles of election are not in doubt. His Honour the Chief Justice observed in this regard:
They were formulated by this Court, under the title of waiver, in Craine v Colonial Mutual, at p 326; see also O'Connor v S.P Bray Ltd (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248 at pp 257-264. In Sargent v A.S.L. Developments Ltd [1974] HCA 40; (1974) 131 CLR 634 Stephen J. explained (at p 641):
"The doctrine only applies if the rights are inconsistent the one with the other and it is this concurrent existence of inconsistent sets of rights which explains the doctrine; because they are inconsistent neither one may be enjoyed without the extinction of the other and that extinction confers upon the elector the benefit of enjoying the other, a benefit denied to him so long as both remained in existence."
433 For the doctrine of election to operate, the authorities reveal that three elements must be present:
(a) the elector must possess the requisite degree of knowledge as to the existence of the rights as between which an election must be made. There is some variance in the case law as to the degree of necessary knowledge, however, it has been held to be sufficient if the circumstances give rise to the elector having knowledge of the facts which bring the inconsistent legal rights into operation;[47]
(b) the rights in question must be inconsistent; and
(c) there must be words of conduct sufficient to amount to the making of an election between the inconsistent rights which the elector possesses so as to effectively forfeit the right not availed of.
434 I find, in addition in this case, that Amcor, by the conduct of Sutton at his meeting with Hodgson on 11 August 2004, elected to pursue the course it did, with the consequence that it forfeited its right to later go back on its position, which it sought to do by the delivery of its letter dated 29 September 2004. Amcor well knew of the rights which it had pursuant to clause 13.1 of Hodgson's Employment Contract; the rights which it had open to it to exercise pursuant to the clause were inconsistent with each other, compelling it to make an election between those rights; and by the conduct of its manager Sutton on 11 August 2004, it made its election as to which of the rights which it had available should be exercised.
435 For these further reasons, I find that the Amcor letter dated 29 September 2004 had no legal effect.
Events leading up to the 13 December 2004 Purported Summary Dismissal of Hodgson
436 On or about 10 November 2004, Amcor and a number of its subsidiary companies made an ex parte application in the Federal Court of Australia (No. VID1383/2004) (the "Federal Court Proceeding") for various orders against Mihelic, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd, a company which they had incorporated and in respect of which they were directors and shareholders.
437 Hodgson was joined to the Federal Court Proceeding as the Sixth Respondent by order of the Court made on 15 November 2004. No Anton Piller order was ever executed upon Hodgson nor was he subject to any order made by the Court for the delivery up of documents to Amcor falling within the category of documents sought upon the execution of the original Anton Piller orders.
438 On 3 December 2004 Hodgson issued his writ in the Hodgson proceeding claiming his alleged entitlements from Amcor on the basis of the termination of his employment with effect on and from 1 October 2004. The writ was served on Amcor shortly thereafter. Hodgson's statement of claim annexed to his writ pleaded, inter alia:
14. As a consequence of the Defendant's conduct in paragraph 12 hereof:
The Defendant has exposed the Plaintiff to the possibility of being made party to proceedings being brought against him and/or the Defendant and its directors, officers and employees by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the imposition of a pecuniary penalty in consequence thereof; and the Plaintiff's future employment prospects and his professional reputation and standing have been materially prejudiced, and he has thereby suffered further loss and damage.
439 By letter dated 13 December 2004, the solicitors for Amcor wrote a letter to Hodgson's solicitors stating that Amcor had resolved to terminate his employment with immediate effect on and from that date. The letter in its material parts said:
As you know, we act for Amcor Limited (the Company) in relation to the alleged termination of Hodgson's employment and the wrongful dismissal proceeding commenced by his recently served writ.
Our client has consistently asserted that Hodgson's employment contract is still on foot, he having been given 12 months' notice of termination in accordance with an express term of the contract. Hodgson maintains that his employment ended on 1 October 2004.
In the statement of claim which was served on us on 3 December 2004, Hodgson admits that he has been a party to systematic and organised collusive conduct in breach of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). That admitted conduct was in breach of Hodgson's obligations under his employment contract dated 13 September 2000. It also constitutes serious misconduct which warrants summary termination of that contract.
The Board of our client has resolved to terminate Hodgson's employment with immediate effect. This letter serves as notice of termination. We have already requested return of all the Company's documents, information and property in Mr Hodgson's possession and reiterate that request. Any payments due to Hodgson in consequence of the termination will be made to him once they have been calculated.
440 The Federal Court Proceeding was resolved by consent orders of Merkel J made on 17 December 2004. By the consent orders, among other matters, Hodgson made undertakings that he not during the period 17 December 2004 to 30 September 2005 Amcor Group or canvass or solicit business similar to that provided by the Amcor Group, from persons who were clients or customers of the Amcor Group. In addition, he undertook not to use or disclose confidential information belonging to the Amcor applicants.
441 By the letter dated 13 December 2004 from its solicitors to Hodgson's solicitors, Amcor purported to summarily dismiss Hodgson from his employment.
442 This step was undertaken, it appears, on the assumption that by its earlier letter to Hodgson dated 29 September 2004, Amcor had validly exercised its rights under clause 13.1 of Hodgson's Employment Contract to direct that Hodgson, as from 2 October 2004, serve a period of 12 months notice and that during that period Hodgson would not be required to work but would be expected to exhaust his leave entitlements. In other words, Hodgson was still technically employed by Amcor during the 12 month period of the notice, but would serve out his time on "gardening leave". The effect of this, if valid, was that as at 13 December 2004, Hodgson was still employed by Amcor and was exposed to the possibility of summary dismissal if such grounds existed.
The Validity of the Purported Dismissal of Hodgson of 13 December 2004
443 It was not open to Amcor to later dismiss Hodgson, which it purported to do by summarily dismissing him by its letter dated 13 December 2004.
444 By this time, Hodgson's Employment Contract with Amcor and his employment with the company, save for any continuing obligations arising from his 12 month restraint clause and the like under his original Contract of Employment, had ended.
445 The Amcor letter dated 13 December 2004 as a notice of summary dismissal had no legal effect because by that time Hodgson's employment with Amcor had already been terminated.
Amcor's Case on Hodgson's Involvement in the Cartel as a Ground for Summary Dismissal
446 As I have found that Hodgson's employment was terminated by notice given to him by Amcor on 11 August 2004 with effect on 1 October 2004, and that thereafter it was not open for Amcor to dismiss him on any other ground relied upon by Amcor, it is unnecessary for me to determine the question whether Hodgson's involvement in the cartel conduct was such as to justify his later purported summary dismissal on that ground or whether Amcor condoned the conduct, thereby depriving it of its right to summarily terminate the Employment Contract on that basis. However, I propose to briefly consider and determine the question.
448 His Honour, after analysing the authorities in Rankin, observed further:[50]
An employer who has full knowledge of the misconduct of an employee, and who makes a decision to continue to employ the employee, cannot at a later date, unless of course other facts come to his knowledge, dismiss him summarily on the basis of the employee's known misconduct. It is said that the employer has waived his right to dismiss the employee summarily, and thereby condones the misconduct.
449 Amcor in its submissions placed reliance upon the High Court authority in Concut Pty Limited v Worrell[51] for the proposition that the character of a termination (for example on redundancy grounds as in Concut) can change (to summary dismissal on grounds of misconduct) because of the after acquired information.
450 The relevant facts in Concut relied upon by Amcor were:
451 The majority in Concut (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) noted:[52]
In this Court, no attempt was made, and none would have succeeded, to deny the proposition of law expressed in Shepherd. The proposition that the dismissal of an employee may be justified upon grounds on which the employer did not act and of which the employer was unaware when the employee was discharged is but an application of what, in Shepherd, Dixon J identified as a rule of general application with respect to the discharge of contract by breach.
452 In Shepherd v Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd[53] Dixon J made the following observations of general application which were referred to in Concut in the cited passage:
It is well established, however, that a servant's dismissal may be justified upon grounds on which his master did not act and of which he was unaware when he discharged him (Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Ansell; Spotswood v Barrow; Willets v Green; Mercer v Whall; Ridgway v Hungerford Market Co). It is true that the agreement between the appellant and the respondent does not amount to a contract of service. But the rule is of general application in the discharge of contract by breach, and enables a party to any simple contract who fails or refuses further to observe its stipulations to rely upon a breach of conditions, committed before he so failed or so refused, by the opposite party to the contract as operating to absolve him from the contract as from the time of such breach of condition whether he was aware of it or not when he himself failed or refused to perform the stipulations of the contract. "It is a long established rule of law that a contracting party, who, after he has become entitled to refuse performance of his contractual obligations, gives a wrong reason for his refusal, does not thereby deprive himself of a justification which in fact existed, whether he was aware of it or not" (per Greer J, Taylor v Oakes Roncoroni & Co; see, too, per Lord Sumner in British and Beningtons Ltd v North Western Cachar Tea Co and per Starke J in Henry Dean & Sons (Sydney) Ltd v P. O'Day Pty Ltd).
453 The central question of fact then becomes, was Hodgson's involvement in cartel conduct known to Amcor at the time when it terminated his employment on 11 August 2004?
454 A subsidiary question arises as to which person or persons within Amcor constituted its directing mind for the purposes of attributing their knowledge to that of the company?
455 As observed in Ford's Principles of Corporations Law,[54] "In ascertaining those persons [who constituted the directing mind and will of the company] the search is for those people who, although some of them are employees or agents for many purposes, are charged with such a high degree of responsibility for the management of the company that they can be said to be acting as the corporation rather than for the corporation."
456 A managing director, for example, may occupy such a position that his or her knowledge is treated as the knowledge of the company. In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass Lord Reid made the following observations of relevance:[55]
It must be a question of law whether, once the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to be regarded as the company or merely as the company's servant or agent...Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other superior officers of a company carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the company. Their subordinates do not. They carry out orders from above and it can make no difference that they are given some measure of discretion. But the board of directors may delegate some part of their functions of management giving to their delegate full discretion to act independently of instructions from them. I see no difficulty in holding that they have thereby put such a delegate in their place so that within the scope of the delegation he can act as the company.
457 Until 7 December 2004, Jones was the managing director and chief executive officer of Amcor Ltd, the holding company of the Amcor Group. Brown reported to Jones. Brown was the managing director of Amcor Australasia, a division of Amcor Ltd which conducted the business of manufacturing and supplying corrugated fibreboard packaging products in Australia. Sutton was from 1 July to 30 September 2003 deputy managing director of Amcor Australasia and from 1 October 2003 to 6 December 2004 the managing director of that division.
458 Hodgson reported to Brown and worked closely with him from 1996 to June 2003 when he left his position as Managing Director, Amcor Australasia. Brown had regular monthly meetings with Hodgson and other senior staff. He was an astute manager and assiduous in his attention to detail. Sutton took over the role of Managing Director from Brown on 1 October 2003, after which time Hodgson reported directly to him. Mr Laidlaw was the general manager sales/group marketing executive of Amcor Australasia. In early 2003 he was appointed Group General Manager, Marketing and Technology, Australasia. He reported directly to Brown in that role.
459 Brown admitted in cross-examination that his position with Amcor was terminated on 7 December 2004. He said further that, on the same day, the employment of Jones and Sutton was also terminated. The terminations occurred because of the involvement of all three in the cartel conduct.
460 Amcor participated in the illegal cartel arrangements with Visy for almost 5 years between 2000-2004.
461 Hodgson's counsel put to Brown in cross-examination that he told Hodgson that the cartel had the "imprimatur" of the whole Amcor organisation, to which Brown responded that "it had the imprimatur of Jones".
462 Hodgson gave detailed evidence on Amcor's involvement with the cartel conduct which was unchallenged. He catalogued Brown's involvement in arriving at an "understanding" with Mr Debney, the chief executive officer of Visy, commencing in 2000. This arrangement was communicated by Brown to Hodgson, who said that he had several conversations with Brown in the period April 2000 to May 2000 about an understanding Brown had reached with Debney. Hodgson could not recall the precise words but Brown described the understanding to Hodgson in words to the following effect: "I have met with Mr Debney and we have agreed that Amcor and Visy will implement some sensible pricing in the corrugated box market that reflects the costs of production."
463 It was during early 2000 that Corrugating's strategy was directed by Jones, with the support of the Amcor Board, to change from obtaining market share (namely volume) based principally on the "breadth strategy" to a new "orderly marketing" strategy of increasing prices and holding margins in a stable market environment.
464 The "orderly marketing strategy" was how the arrangements between Amcor and Visy were spoken about within Amcor. Brown confirmed this in his interview with the ACCC on 15 December 2004. When asked what the "orderly marketing strategy" was, Brown answered "Well, that is the euphemism for colluding on price basically" and "Well, it is more the commitment of both parties not to change volumes in the marketplace. That is really what it is"
465 Brown involved Hodgson in implementing the arrangement arrived at with Debney of Visy. Brown had a conversation with Hodgson in or about October 2000 and said words to the following effect: "I have told Mr Debney that I want you to meet with him to work out how this can be implemented." Hodgson followed this up and first met up with Debney on 27 October 2000 at Rockman's Regency Hotel. The meeting was arranged by Brown. Debney proposed a mechanism for both Amcor and Visy to charge prices for their products. Following the meeting, Hodgson reported the outcome to Brown. Hodgson told Brown what Debney had suggested and that he (Hodgson) had agreed with his analysis and recommendations. Brown told Hodgson that he also agreed. Brown directed Hodgson to implement Debney's recommendations across his division.
466 Thereafter the cartel conduct flourished between Amcor and Visy. It was developed and implemented through further meetings held between Brown, Hodgson, Laidlaw and Debney, or various combinations of this group from time to time.
467 In mid 2002, Brown told Hodgson that he had been instructed by Jones to initiate the arrangements with Visy which he ultimately established with Debney, as part of a direction which Brown had been given by the Amcor Board. Hodgson said, and I accept, that Jones and the Amcor Board were regularly updated by both Brown (later by Sutton) and Hodgson on the successful implementation of price increases.
468 In the second half of 2002 Hodgson started to secretly record conversations he had with Brown, Debney and later Sutton.
469 Sutton was appointed to the position of Managing Director Amcor Australasia in about September 2003. He worked with and directed Hodgson in maintaining the cartel arrangements with Debney of Visy, including ensuring that Visy was abiding by the terms of the arrangement where it was suspected the company had acted inconsistently with the price fixing arrangements in place. For example, Hodgson met with Sutton in his office at Camberwell on 8 December 2003. He recorded the conversation between them. Hodgson confirms that the following extracts of the conversation, amongst others, are accurate:
PS [Sutton]: well that'd be helpful. I probably should try and see Debney shortly. What would be helpful is if you could give me a list of the things that you think they've done that is inconsistent with because there have been a few of them as I understand all their way, you know the Markeys one that I'm aware of Ernest Adams is another that's just happened.
...
PS[Sutton]: Yeah you do that and we might either have a meeting with Debney or not have a meeting, depending on which we think is the best way to go, but I agree either we get, we see the whites of Debney's eyes again and get absolute commitment from him that they will behave themselves given that there has been some recent examples where they haven't ....
JH [Hodgson]: mm
PS [Sutton]: ... or we get off and punch them back a bit and give them the message that we're not going to cop this.
470 Amcor submitted that there is no evidence that Hodgson was directed to engage in anti-competitive conduct on behalf of Amcor. I do not accept this to be the case.
471 In any event, I am satisfied that, well prior to 11 August 2004, each of Hodgson's superiors Brown, Sutton and Jones, well knew of Hodgson's involvement and participation in the illegal cartel conduct being undertaken between Amcor and Visy. They were very senior Amcor executives. Each was charged with such a high degree of responsibility for the management of Amcor at the relevant time such that they can each be said to have been acting as the corporation in relation to the cartel and Hodgson's involvement in it. They were persons within Amcor who constituted its directing mind for the purpose of attributing their knowledge of the facts in issue to that of the company.
472 The facts of Concut are therefore distinguishable from the present in this important respect: In Concut it was only after Wells had been dismissed that the employer gained knowledge of his improper conduct which justified his summary dismissal. This was a case of true after acquired knowledge. However, in the present case, as I have found, Amcor through its senior executives, had the relevant knowledge of Hodgson's involvement in the cartel conduct at the time when it terminated his employment by giving notice to him on 11 August 2004. Indeed, the very person who signed Hodgson's letter of termination by his letter of that date, Sutton, knew full well of his involvement.
473 For this reason, the principle expressed by Dixon J in Shepherd, as cited with approval by the High Court in Concut, has no application.
474 Further, applying the legal principle explained by Gillard J in Rankin, had it been necessary to so find, I am satisfied that Amcor waived any entitlement it may have had to summarily dismiss Hodgson from his employment by reason of his involvement in the anti-competitive conduct.
475 For these further reasons, the purported summary dismissal of Hodgson by Amcor's letter dated 13 December 2004 was also ineffective at law.
476 Hodgson claims an entitlement to $752,000 being one year of his total fixed remuneration, as a payment in lieu of notice.
477 In my opinion, Hodgson, having been given notice on 11 August 2004 with effect on and from 1 October 2004, a period of 51 days, is entitled to $646,926.23, being his total fixed yearly remuneration ($752,000), less 51 days worth of that income (51 days x $2060.27 per day = $105.073.77).
478 This results in the sum of $646,926.23 which is due to Hodgson for payment in lieu of notice.
479 Hodgson claimed in his pleadings that he was entitled to $160,000 as a bonus. However, in the course of submissions senior counsel for Hodgson claimed that the evidence demonstrated that the correct figure was $165,034 and that I should proceed on that basis.
480 During the 2003/2004 financial year Amcor had in place a bonus scheme called the Management Incentive Program (the "MIP scheme"). The rules of the MIP scheme applicable for 2003/2004 provided, amongst other things, that:
(a) Participation in MIP is by Company invitation and is on an annual basis. Participation in any one year does not give rise to an ongoing right to participate in any future year.
(b) No MIP payment will be made in the absence of a signed acknowledgement of the MIP targets and rules of participation.
(c) After sign off on the MIP components and targets there can be no discretionary alteration of targets or re-weighting of components.
481 On 10 September 2003 Hodgson was invited to participate in the 2003/2004 MIP scheme.
482 Hodgson had earned a bonus in each of the 1999/2000, 2000/2001, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 financial years. The bonus payments were usually paid on or before 30 September of the same year.
483 The 2003/2004 MIP framework applicable to Hodgson identified various objectives with a potential to earn a bonus of between 30% ($160,000) to 50% ($268,000) of base salary.
484 Sutton was the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia in 2003-2004, and Hodgson's immediate superior. Hodgson had discussions with Sutton about two matters with respect to the 2003/2004 MIP bonus, namely headcount reduction and PBIT target.
485 I am satisfied that Hodgson reached agreement with Sutton on both of these matters.
486 In relation to the head count reduction target on or about 29 June 2004, Hodgson and Sutton agreed that the reduction target of "Permanent employee numbers" would be 146 persons, not 200 as stated in the MIP Framework.
487 In relation to the PBIT target relevant to Hodgson, initially there was disagreement between Hodgson and Sutton as to whether his division had achieved the target. Hodgson assessed the relevant PBIT at $77.3 million. Sutton subsequently assessed it at $75.9 million, a figure with which Hodgson disagreed. However, in August 2004 Sutton agreed that the PBIT target had been met for the purpose of Hodgson's bonus calculation. This, it was confirmed by:
(a) a salary summary spreadsheet prepared on behalf of Amcor in about January 2005 which disclosed a total bonus payable to Hodgson for the 2003/2004 year of $165,034;
(b) a document "2003/2004 MIP Results for year for corrugating - GGM Result 13 August" signed by Sutton and dated 16 August 2004" by which the exercise of "MD discretion" gave Hodgson 7% required to make up a $165,088 (30.8%) bonus (equivalent to 7% required for achievement of PBIT target);
(c) a document "Termination Package for Jim Hodgson" given by Sutton to Hodgson on 11 August 2004. The amount in respect of "lump sum payment" of $912,000 includes an amount of $160,000 in respect of the bonus;
(d) a document "Draft calculation of Termination payment" given by Sutton to Hodgson on 11 August 2004 which identifies "additional bonus - ETP $160,000";
(e) a document "Draft calculation of termination payment" sent to Hodgson by Amcor under cover of letter dated 29 September 2004. This identifies "additional bonus - ETP $160,000"; and
(f) a document entitled "Calculation of Termination Payment" attached to an Amcor memorandum dated 22 September 2004.
488 Having found on the evidence that ultimately Hodgson reached agreement with Sutton on both of the matters which comprised his entitlement under the Amcor MIP scheme, it is unnecessary to go further.
489 However, the finding is also confirmed in Amcor's pleading. Amcor, made application to amend the relevant pleading in the final minutes of the Quantum Trial. In this context, I propose to briefly with Amcor's amendment application.
490 Amcor's pleading on the issue was reflected in its defence to paragraph 8 of Hodgson's statement of claim where he pleads:
Amcor's defence to the allegation then pleads in paragraphs 4(g) and 8:
4.(g) For the financial year 2003/2004, the Defendant and Plaintiff agreed on budget and performance measures to be met by the Plaintiff, upon achievement of which the Plaintiff would be entitled to a bonus and such measures included, inter alia, compliance with all laws including without limitation the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) (MIP Framework 2003/04);
491 Thus, on the pleadings as they stood during the course of the evidence called in the Quantum Trial, there was no issue that Hodgson and Amcor had agreed on budget and performance measures to be met by him, upon achievement of which he would be entitled to a bonus pursuant to the MIP Scheme.
492 However, in the course of the reply delivered on behalf of Amcor in the closing minutes of the Quantum Trial senior counsel for Amcor sought leave to withdraw the admissions it made in paragraphs 4(g) and 8 of its defence. Amcor relied upon McKenzie v Commonwealth of Australia[56] and Jeanes v Commonwealth of Australia.[57]
493 In McKenzie Gillard J discussed the principles concerning an application to amend a defence to withdraw an admission made, which were summarized as follows:
(a) The general rule is that all amendments should be permitted and that includes an amendment to a defence, unless the amendment will cause prejudice to the other party which cannot be overcome in some way.
(b) No amendment would be allowed if it raised a false issue or did not raise an arguable defence.
(c) The issue is one of justice between the parties ensuring that the real matters in controversy are decided.
(d) The trial is the proper place to determine all claims and defences and it is not appropriate, except in a clear case on a summary application to amend, to exhaustively investigate the facts and the law.
(e) The burden of proof or persuasion may be crucial on an application where there are disputed facts.
(f) It is not the law that a defendant is not permitted to resile from an admission unless it was shown the admission was made inadvertently or through error; justice is the determinant.
(g) It is unnecessary to show that there was some error or mistake which led to the form of the pleading and that there is a reasonable explanation for having made the admission, before a party may seek to withdraw the admission. A court usually requires some explanation for the change in approach, but in the absence of the same, or whether it was an adequate or inadequate explanation, can hardly determine the outcome of the application in the face of compelling reasons of justice.
494 In accordance with these well established principles governing amendment, as they stood at the time McKenzie was decided, Gillard J granted to the Commonwealth the opportunity to argue the issue it wished to raise at trial, saying that prima facie it was entitled to amend its pleading, and "Whether it be permitted depends upon whether the plaintiff will suffer a prejudice which cannot be overcome".
495 It is to be noted that in McKenzie, the Commonwealth sought leave to amend its defence in excess of two years after the date it delivered its defence, however, the proceeding had not been fixed for trial.
496 The principles referred to by Gillard J in McKenzie were said by his Honour to be supported by a number of decisions, including Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd[58] where the High Court said:
Justice is the paramount consideration in determining an application such as the one in question. Save in so far as costs may be awarded against the party seeking the amendment, such an application is not the occasion for the punishment of a party for its mistake or for its delay in making the application. Case management, involving as it does the efficiency of the procedures of the court, was in this case a relevant consideration. But it should not have been allowed to prevail over the injustice of shutting the applicants out from raising an arguable defence, thus precluding the determination of an issue between the parties. In taking an opposite view, the primary judge was, in our view, in error in the exercise of her discretion.
497 The principles as to withdrawal of an admission and amendment referred to in McKenzie were re-stated by Gillard J in Jeanes.
498 However, since McKenzie and Jeanes, the High Court handed down its decision in Aon Risk Services Australia v Australian National University,[59] which it did on 5 August 2009. This decision affirmed the importance, not only to the parties, but to the Court and other litigants, of a "just but timely and cost-effective resolution of a dispute between the parties to a proceeding".[60] French CJ noted there is "an irreparable element of unfair prejudice in unnecessarily delaying proceedings".[61] In particular, the Chief Justice drew attention to "the waste of public resources", the "strain and uncertainty imposed on litigants" and "the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system" arising from adjournment of trials without adequate justification [62] Similarly, in Aon, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ referred to the "ill-effects of delay" upon employees and officers of corporations, as well as upon defendant corporations whose ability to plan financially may be affected by a contingent liability.[63]
499 In Aon, the High Court accepted the principles of case management by the courts, saying:[64]
Such management is now an accepted aspect of the system of civil justice administered by courts in Australia. It was recognised some time ago, by courts here and elsewhere in the common law world, that a different approach was required to tackle the problems of delay and cost in the litigation process.
500 In so doing, the High Court expressly overruled statements in its previous decision of Queensland v JL Holdings to the effect that case management concerns are only relevant in exceptional circumstances. In its place it was ruled that courts must always consider the public interest in the efficient use of court resources when determining whether to grant indulgences such as amendment of pleadings and adjournments.
501 In the present case, Amcor's application to amend was made when the trial was all but over, with all of the evidence concluded, and the principal submissions in final address delivered. It was only in an otherwise short reply that Amcor made its application.
502 Amcor did not contend, or put on evidence, to suggest that the pleading in question was the product of mistake or inadvertence. Nor could it have properly been contended that this was the case, in my view, because of the positive nature of the plea advanced in paragraph 4(g) of Amcor's defence. No other reason or excuse was put forward for the state of its original pleading.
503 Nevertheless, Amcor submitted that Hodgson, in spite of the admissions made in its pleading, went into evidence on the matter in his witness statement and accordingly, the parties went to trial seeking a determination of the issue on the facts. Further, senior counsel for Amcor, in the face of objection, challenged Hodgson on one component of his MIP bonus calculation relating to the relevant head count and put to him that there was no agreement about that, to which Hodgson replied that he disagreed.
504 I am not satisfied that Amcor has made out its case for the amendment which it sought. Hodgson was entitled to proceed to trial on the basis of the admissions made in Amcor's pleading. Although he called evidence on the point, he may well have put on or referred to additional evidence on the issue, had the relevant pleas not been in place. A tight timetable was put in place for the hearing of the Quantum Trial. Had the amendment been granted, an application to reopen the trial with the calling of further witnesses was foreshadowed. This may well have resulted in the trial being adjourned to enable this to occur, following a period during which the parties would have to consider their position in the light of the amendment. This would have defeated the timetable set for the hearing of this part of the proceeding and been inimical to the case management regime which had been put in place to govern the trial. It may well have delayed the conclusion of the Quantum Trial and compounded the delays already suffered in this litigation.
505 For these reasons, I reject Amcor's application to amend its pleadings made in the course of the Quantum Trial, as I have described.
506 Although the figure calculated by Amcor in respect of Hodgson's bonus under the Amcor MIP scheme for the 2003/2004 year varied in different documents prepared by Amcor between $160,000 and $165,088, the preponderance of evidence settled on $160,000. This figure also accorded with the sum claimed by Hodgson in his pleadings.
507 I find that Hodgson is entitled to a bonus of $160,000 under the Amcor MIP scheme for the 2003/2004 year.
508 Sutton provided Hodgson with a document entitled "Draft calculation of termination payment" on 11 August 2004. That document states Hodgson's accrued entitlements as follows:
(a) Annual Leave 31.4 days.
(b) LSL (Long Service Leave) pre 16 August 1978 - 54.55 days.
509 These amounts (annual leave 31.4 days and long service leave 168.49 days) were repeated in the "Draft Calculation of Termination Payment" provided to Hodgson with a letter dated 29 September 2004. Together they were a product of Amcor's Annual Leave Policy and its Long Service Leave Policy.
510 It was not in dispute that the Amcor Annual Leave Policy and its Long Service Leave policy formed part of Hodgson's contract of employment with Amcor.
511 I find that Hodgson is entitled to payment in respect of these accrued entitlements.
512 Hodgson claims an entitlement to a long service leave payment amounting to $487,325 (168.49 days x $752,000/260).
513 As at 1 October 2004, the Plaintiff's entitlement to the accrual and payment on termination of long service leave, was determined by sections 56, 64 and 72 of the Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic).
514 As at 1 October 2004, section 56 of the Long Service Leave Act 1992 (Vic) ("LSL Act") provided that:
(a) 13 weeks of long service on ordinary pay on completing 15 years of continuous employment with one employer; and
(b) 4 1/3 weeks of long service leave on ordinary pay on completing each period of 5 years of continuous employment with that employer after the first 15 years of continuous employment with that employer.
515 As at 1 October 2004, section 64 of the LSL Act provided that:
Meaning of Ordinary Pay
64(1) For the purposes of this Division, "ordinary pay" means the pay an employee is entitled to receive at the time he or she takes long service leave for working his or her normal weekly hours at his or her ordinary time rate of pay."
64(2) Ordinary pay includes the cash value of any board or lodging that the employee receives from his or her employer.
516 As at 1 October 2004, section 72 of the LSL Act provided that:
What is to happen if employment ends before leave taken
72(1) If the employment of an employee ends before he or she has taken all the long service leave to which he or she is entitled, the employee is to be regarded as having started to take his or her leave on the day the employment ended.
72(2) On that day, the employee's employer must pay the employee the full amount of the employee's long service leave entitlement as at that day.
517 On termination, an employee's entitlement to payment of accrued long service leave becomes a debt due and payable immediately.[65]
518 "Ordinary pay" is a reference to an employee's total remuneration or salary "package", because upon termination the entitlements to long service leave fall due to be paid. After termination, the employee is no longer able to enjoy the benefit of the total remuneration "package". Employee entitlements, accrued during employment, cannot be calculated by reference to a different yardstick after termination of employment.
519 In Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd[66] Gillard J accepted that the statutory provisions of the Long Service Leave Act 1992 could be applied to govern the entitlements of a terminated employee. Reference was made to the concept of "ordinary pay" as defined in s 56 of that Act for the purposes of calculating the employee's entitlement to payment in lieu of accrued long service leave. This was held to be "based on his total pay" at the time when he would have taken his long service leave. In Rankin, the figure was calculated on the basis of the former employee's pay-roll amount together with the amount of a salary sacrifice.
520 In Jongewaard v Dall & Ors[67] Parsons IM reasoned as follows in relation to the meaning of "ordinary weekly rate of pay" in similar legislation which applied in South Australia:
The meaning of the phrase ordinary 'ordinary weekly rate of pay' has to be determined from its context in the Act. In that context the word 'ordinary' as it is used in the phrase 'ordinary weekly rate of pay' does not simply mean ordinary in the sense of commonplace, normal or not exceptional. The word 'ordinary' when used in the context of a weekly rate of pay, has acquired a slightly different meaning. It refers to the rate of pay related to the hours of work which form the basis or core of the particular contract of employment between the parties.
The exclusion of overtime, shift premiums and penalty rates and the specific saving of the benefits applying to commission, casual workers and workers' accommodation, are all consistent with an intention to confine the calculation of an entitlement to long service leave to that part of the worker's remuneration which is essential to the contract between the parties. The whole amount (i.e. the total remuneration) was solely at his disposition. The allowances so called, were not in the nature of additional remuneration paid by the respondent, attributable to or contingent upon the performance of work by the applicant in particular circumstances, rather the allowances were part of the ordinary earnings of the applicant which, for the convenience of the parties, were calculated on an annual basis and were notionally divided into the various components set out in Exhibit "A1". Whether the applicant received some taxation advantage by notionally dividing the annual sum in this way is not to the point. Because the sum of $80,833 represents the essential basis of the applicant's remuneration, that amount constitutes the applicant's ordinary rate of pay and his ordinary weekly rate of pay is to be calculated by diving that amount by 52 weeks.
522 The above passage in Jongewaard was cited with approval in Lyon v IOOF Victorian Friendly Society.[68] There the Victorian County Court considered the meaning of "ordinary pay" in calculating annual leave and long service leave upon termination. The entitlement arose pursuant to the Industrial Relations (Annual Holidays) Order 1992 made pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1979 and pursuant to the Employee Relations Act 1992. The Court concluded that "ordinary pay" was a reference to the total remuneration under a salary package. Lyon was later referred to with approval and followed by Judge Dyett in Zielinksi v National Force Ltd.[69]
523 I will approach the calculation of Hodgson's entitlement to long service leave by assessing it on the basis of that part of the remuneration which is essential to the contract between the parties. This will be a calculation built on his base salary, but will also include the allowances and benefits to which he would usually be entitled under his Employment Contract. These allowances, were not in the nature of additional remuneration paid by Amcor, attributable to or contingent upon the performance of work undertaken by Hodgson, or any other factor. They were calculated on an annual basis and were notionally divided into the various components set out in the table which follows. Together they comprised the remuneration package to which the former employee was entitled under his Employment Contract. The package amounted to a rounded figure of $752,000 per annum:
Base Salary $536,000
Superannuation $ 96,960
Motor Vehicle $ 31,577
Housing Allowance $ 85,378
TOTAL $751,915
524 The calculation does not include payments which are contingent or extra-ordinary, such as an ex-gratia payment, a one-off payment in special circumstances or a bonus which was dependent upon achieving agreed targets (for example Hodgson's $160,000 bonus for the 2003/2004 year in this case).
525 The approach I have taken is analogous to the position when an employee is terminated, and payment in lieu of notice is calculated. In such a case, the value of superannuation, motor vehicle and other regularly provided benefits are included, unless the contract of employment otherwise provides.[70]
526 For these reasons, Hodgson is entitled to a long service leave payment amounting to $487,325 (168.49 days x $752,000/260).
527 Hodgson claims an entitlement to an annual leave payment amounting to $90,818 (31.4 days x $752,000/260).
528 As at 1 October 2004, Hodgson's entitlement to payment on termination of annual leave, was regulated by Part 1A of Schedule 1A of the (Cth) Workplace Relations Act 1996.
529 Part 1A relevantly provides:
Calculation of annual leave
(1) An employee is entitled to annual leave, for each year worked, of the number of hours calculated by multiplying by 4 the usual number of ordinary hours worked by the employee per week during the year.
...
Rules about annual leave
(2) Annual leave:
...
(d) is to be paid at the rate that, immediately before the leave is taken, is the employee's ordinary hourly rate of pay; and
(e) is to be paid when the employee takes annual leave or leaves his ... employment, as the case may be.
530 On termination, an employee's entitlement to payment of accrued annual leave becomes a sum certain or debt due and payable in full immediately. The assessment of "ordinary pay" is to be determined in the same manner as for long service leave.
531 Hodgson contends that for the purpose of termination, the calculation of annual leave is also by reference to the value of the total remuneration or "package", not by reference to his base salary.
532 If an employee is paid annual leave (or long service leave) during continuing employment, it is calculated by reference to base salary. This is because other benefits of the "package" are still received by the employee during the period of the leave.
533 However, the position is quite different when payment for annual leave is in circumstances of a termination. In that event, it should be calculated by reference to the total package. This is because the benefits of the "package" compensation will not be enjoyed by the employee after termination. It would be unfair to deprive the employee of annual leave (or long service leave) based upon the total remuneration package to which the employee is entitled under the contract of employment in such circumstances.
534 In Reilly v Praxa Ltd,[71] Gray J considered that the calculation of an annual leave entitlement, amongst other payments due on termination, should be based upon the total annual remuneration of the former employee.
535 Further, the position in relation to annual leave on termination should be founded on the same rationale as that which applies to long service leave on termination and should be calculated on no different basis.
536 For these reasons I find that Hodgson is entitled to an annual leave payment amounting to $90,818 (31.4 days x $752,000/260).
Accrued Annual Leave and Long Service Leave Survive Termination
537 Accrued entitlements to annual leave and long service leave are accrued amounts which, provided the statutory or contractual conditions have been satisfied, are debts owing to the employee on termination. This is well settled. Termination of employment, whether summarily or not, does not disentitle the employee to those amounts.
538 A contract terminated is not a contract rescinded ab initio such that certain rights that have accrued under the contract will survive termination. As Dixon J said in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd:
When a party of a simple contract, upon breach by the other contracting party of a condition of the contract, elects to treat the contract as no longer binding upon him, the contract is not terminated as from the beginning. Both parties are discharged from the further performance of the contract, but rights are not divested or discharged which have already been unconditionally acquired. Rights and obligations which arise from the partial execution of the contract and causes of action which have accrued from its breach alike continue unaffected.[72]
539 It was common ground, and I so find, that the payments made by Amcor to Hodgson to date, consequent on his termination were:
(Paid to 31/12/04 - 3 months x $536,000/12) $134,000
Summary of Hodgson's Entitlements on Termination
540 For these reasons, Hodgson is not entitled to any payment for redundancy, which has been found not to have occurred.
541 Consistently with my findings, Hodgson's entitlements are as follows:
(iii) Annual Leave (31.4 days x $752,000/260 days) $ 90,818
(iv) Long Service Leave (168.49 days x $752,000/260) $ 487,325
(Paid to 31/12/04 - 3 months x $536,000/12) $ 134,000
Payments in lieu of accrued leave 13/1/05 $ 333,374
NOTE: Paragraphs 542 - 546 have been deleted pursuant to the 'Slip Rule' by Order made 1 May 2012 and reasons: James George Hodgson v Amcor (No. 8) [2012] VSC 162
547 In its counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding and in its claims in the Barnes Proceeding Amcor raises makes allegations of some gravity against the Defendants.
548 In determining the factual issues alleged by Amcor on these issues I apply the principles referred to in Dixon J's discussion of the quality of persuasion in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[73] (Briginshaw). In that case, the High Court held that, on a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery, the standard of proof was not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
549 However this position is qualified. Dixon J said that when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. In civil matters, the affirmative of an allegation is to be made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. His Honour proceeded in the oft quoted passage:
The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no third standard of persuasion was definitely developed. Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done involving grave moral delinquency.
550 To similar effect is the statement of the majority of the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd.[74]
551 These are not civil penalty proceedings carrying a pecuniary penalty. However, the allegations made against the Defendants are serious and the consequences which may flow from the matters alleged, if made out, may be grave.
552 The seriousness of the allegation comprising the cause of action and the gravity of the matters alleged must be taken into account in deciding whether facts have been proved on the balance of probabilities. In a practical sense, this means that ordinarily, the more serious the consequences, the more a court will have regard to the strength and weakness of evidence in coming to a conclusion. Further, if inferences are to be drawn, the party bearing the onus of proof may be required to establish that the evidence gives rise to a reasonable and definite inference and not merely to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability.[75]
553 I will take these principles into account in determining whether the facts in issue have been proved on the balance of probabilities.
First Sale Agreement - Sale of the Service Packaging Business
554 The Service Containers Business in the hands of Amcor had two discrete aspects to its business operations. First, it received orders from its customers for the supply of finished corrugated products and corrugated boxes. It sourced its supply from Amcor's corrugated packaging division upon which it charged a premium on the cost of the supply. This was known as the "Service Packaging Business". Second, it sold to its customers of a range of plastic wraps, tapes, stock boxes and general packaging which Amcor did not manufacture and which the Service Packaging Business sourced externally. This was known as the "Displays Business".
555 The Displays Business was profitable, however the Service Packaging Business was not. The turnover of the Service Packaging Business in or about February 2002 was approximately $3.0 million. This was less than 0.5% of Corrugating's Australasian turnover of about $900 million. It had trading stock of approximately $400,000 and book assets of about $80,000 representing less than 0.1% of Corrugating's assets. It had three employees, not including Hottes. It was a non-core and underperforming business for Amcor.
Amcor's Management of the Service Packaging Business
556 Hottes was an independent contractor retained through his company M&I Displays Pty Ltd by Amcor to manage both the Service Packaging Business and the Displays Business. These two businesses constituted the entire operations of Service Containers at that time.
557 Hottes had managed both the Service Packaging and Displays Businesses for approximately five years before he purchased the Service Packaging Business from Amcor in February 2002.
558 The Displays Business was retained by Amcor after the Service Packaging Business was sold to him. Barnes authorised the continued employment of Hottes to manage the Displays Business at a monthly fee of $8,800 (annual of $105,600 including GST).
559 In January 2000 Barnes was appointed General Manager, Amcor Fibre Packaging, NSW. From that time, Hottes reported directly to Barnes, who had primary responsibility for Amcor's New South Wales corrugating operations which included the Service Packaging Business.
560 In March 2000, the New South Wales operations (which included the Service Packaging Business) became part of Hodgson's responsibilities - from March to June 2000 in Hodgson's role as Group General Manager of Corrugating's Northern Region, and from July 2000 in Hodgson's role as Group General Manager of the entire Corrugating division. Barnes reported directly to Hodgson in these roles.
561 As such, from early 2000, Hottes reported directly to Barnes who in turn reported directly to Hodgson in respect of the operations of the Service Packaging Business.
Amcor's proposals to deal with the business (late 1990's until sale to Hottes)
562 The sale of the Service Packaging Business had its genesis in Jones' memorandum to the Amcor Board on 3 April 1998. The paper relevantly stated:
The fundamental objective of Amcor Packaging is the achievement of a minimum 15per cent PBIT to Funds Employed ratio. This will be achieved by:
563 In 2000 Amcor made a decision to either close or sell the business. Brown's assessment of the business at the time was that it "wasn't making much money" and that "the assessment we made" during 2000 was that the Service Packaging Business was appropriate to be disposed of.
564 The sale of the Service Packaging Business was not undertaken on the open market.
565 It is common ground that on 1 February 2002 Amcor sold the Service Packaging Business to a company owned by Hottes and entered into a five year supply agreement with a company associated with him (the "First Sale Agreement").
Key Terms and Effect of the First Sale Agreement
566 The First Sale Agreement was the instrument which effected the sale of the Service Packaging Business. I accept that this effected the sale of the business in its entirety, not merely the assets of the business, although the sale agreement was entitled "Asset Sale Agreement".
567 The key terms of the First Sale Agreement executed on 1 February 2002 were:
(a) The transfer to Hottes (by a company associated with him) included all property and assets owned or used by Amcor in the business as at completion including:
(iii) all of the interest held by Amcor under or arising out of contracts,
(b) The assignment of Amcor's interest under all contracts and agreements was broad. It involved not only written contracts in relation to the business to which Amcor was a party but also any other form of agreement pursuant to which Amcor may otherwise be bound (including oral contracts where no written contract could be located);
(c) The First Sale Agreement also covered the transfer of employees including the employee, Ms Dettmar. Hottes and his company assumed responsibility for the continuity of service and entitlements plus superannuation obligations for such transferred employees;
(d) In consideration of the assignment of the business the purchase price to be paid to Amcor was a total of $81,650 subject to any adjustments. The terms provided for this purchase price to be paid over a period of time. Nothing was paid on execution or at the completion date of the sale. The sum of $50,000 of the sale price was required to be paid in two equal instalments - at six months and 12 months respectively from the date of completion. The further and final sum, being the balance, was not payable until 18 months after completion;
(e) Pursuant to the First Sale Agreement Amcor was obliged for a period of five years to supply fibreboard materials to the Hottes company at prices based on yearly increases to direct and distribution costs as set out in the First Sale Agreement. The supply payment terms were 59 days from the date of statement but was otherwise subject to the standard terms and conditions which Amcor charged for such supplies;
(f) Also under the First Sale Agreement Amcor was obliged to purchase packaging materials manufactured by the Service Packaging Business for the same five-year period. The price for the supply was to be a cost of materials, labour, freight and transportation plus a mark-up of 12per cent;
(g) Pursuant to the First Sale Agreement a lease of the premises at Milperra Road, Revesby for a five-year period at a rent of $70,000 per annum was included; and
(h) Hottes gave personal guarantees in respect of the obligations of the purchaser.
568 In addition to the sale of the Service Packaging Business to Hottes a further agreement was reached between Barnes and Hottes whereby Hottes continued his contracting arrangement with Amcor and managed the operations of the Displays Business. This was done for an annual salary of $96,000.
569 In about mid 2000 Barnes was notified by Hodgson of Brown's decision to close the Service Packaging Business. Barnes advised Hottes of this development.
570 In mid to late 2000 Hottes made a verbal offer to Barnes to purchase the Service Packaging Business, together with stock, for the sum of $50,000. He also offered to continue to manage the Displays Business. Barnes told Hottes that he would put his proposal to Amcor management.
571 Hodgson was informed of the Hottes offer by a telephone call from Barnes. Hodgson advised Barnes that the Displays Business was not for sale but that a proposal for the sale of the Service Packaging Business could be considered as an alternative to closing it.
Involvement of Hodgson and the Other Defendants
572 I accept Hodgson's evidence was that in late 2000 Barnes, on behalf of Mr Hottes, approached him for support in taking an interest in the Service Packaging Business. Hodgson's evidence was that he discussed the proposition with each of Barnes, Sangster and Bayley.
The Deacons 19 December 2000 - the "Dillman Advice"
573 Mr Mark Dillman ("Dillman") of the firm Deacons had been Hodgson's personal lawyer for a number of years.
574 On 4 December 2000 Dillman conferred at Hodgson's home with Hodgson, Bayley, Barnes, Sangster and Hottes.
575 The issue raised at the meeting was a proposal for Hodgson and the other three Amcor executives, Bayley, Barnes, Sangster, to participate in the acquisition of the Service Packaging business by Hottes. Advice was sought from Dillman on that matter. Hodgson stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider Hottes' request that they "either give him a loan or have equity or a loan that could be converted into equity". Barnes said that he, Hodgson, Bayley and Sangster advised Dillman that they were interested in the proposal and sought advice about forming a partnership with Hottes to acquire the Service Packaging Business.
576 In his internal memorandum dated 12 December 2000 to Elizabeth Jameson, another partner at Deacons, Dillman set out the background to his instructions from Hodgson and the other three Amcor executives. Dillman noted that:
(a) he had acted for Hodgson (the General Manager of Amcor) and some of his executives in a personal capacity for a number of years. For some time Hodgson and the others had been looking at investment vehicles for their retirement;
(b) Hodgson and the 3 other executives had a personal business opportunity, and ACB Packaging (Amcor's Service Containers business) was the target;
(c) Amcor had offered the business to the person currently employed to run it, and whilst he was interested in the acquisition, he wanted an injection of capital and to spread the risk, and so he had approached Hodgson and his team in confidence;
(d) Hodgson and the other executives were looking at forming a partnership with this person with a view to building it up and perhaps acquiring another business down the track; and
(e) Dillman's view was that the proposal was "fraught with potential conflicts, but Jim and his team, despite those conflicts are still keen."
577 Dillman also wrote in his internal memorandum that Hodgson and the executives had come to him because they wanted their involvement to be kept secret from Amcor. He said in the memorandum:
The trick is that Jim and his team do not want Amcor to know of their involvement and have asked me to:
(a) advise on the best vehicle to achieve this (l suspect a unit trust); and
(b) provide them with a copy of a document showing how the vehicle works (l want to provide a copy of a standard trust deed that we can amend down the track to suit their needs if this proceeds.
Another issue is how to organise the trustee of the trust so that Jim and his team's involvement cannot be traced, but they have control.
578 Dillman's detailed advice to Hodgson was set out in a memorandum dated 19 December 2000, which was faxed to Hodgson on the same date (the "Dillman Advice").
579 The Dillman Advice was discovered in the non-party discovery of Norton Rose (incorporating the predecessor law firms Deacons and Dunhill Madden and Butler) on 17 May 2011, along with other documents on five files of the firms' former partner, Dillman.
580 Neither the 19 December 2000 advice nor any of other documents from the Norton Rose files had been discovered by Hodgson or any other defendant in the proceeding. None of this material or dealings had been referred to in any statement filed by the Defendants.
581 When the documents were produced by Norton Rose in the first week of trial, Hodgson (and subsequently Barnes), made claims of legal professional privilege over the 19 December 2000 advice and other material on the Deacons files.
582 The privilege claims were the subject of two separate hearings; in the first instance before Associate Justice Randall on 27 May to 3 June and then on appeal before Justice Kyrou on 20 June 2011. Following orders of Justice Kyrou, on the 21st day of the trial (20 June 2011) the 19 December 2000 advice was tendered in the proceeding.
583 The 19 December 2000 advice stated amongst other things:
584 The Dillman Advice also outlined to Hodgson a means of achieving his objective of anonymity through the use of unit trusts, using spouses or others as nominee shareholders and family trusts.
585 Hodgson said that in January 2001 he and Barnes, Sangster and Bayley were having discussions at that time regarding their possible involvement in the Service Packaging Business. The proposal, however, he said was short lived. Hodgson said that:
by this time [January 2001] we'd advised Mr Hottes that we, on the advice we were given, we weren't going to go ahead and support him. He'd have to look for support elsewhere.
586 Hodgson also said that the proposal did not proceed because the legal advice from Dillman "... suggested I shouldn't go there so we didn't ...".
587 Barnes said he was shown the advice by Hodgson. Barnes said that he discussed the advice with the others and decided not to proceed. Barnes said as to the Dillman Advice:
Well, Mr Hottes was a careful man, and that's all I can say. I don't think he was risk adverse. He was looking for investors, initially, and the meeting that we had in December 2000, it was very early December 2000, it was probably in the first week of the month or so, and Mr Dillman was present at that meeting. Mr Hottes put forward his scenario in terms of the business, and we spoke about structures, et cetera, et cetera. Mr Dillman came back with his advice, Your Honour, and on the back of that, to my recollection, it was over. Before the end of December, it was over.
588 Although Dillman was Barnes' solicitor, Barnes said that "He was basically giving advice to all of us at the time". Barnes said further that Dillman was acting at the time for all of the participants in proposed business arrangement except for Hottes.
589 In February 2001, Sangster contacted Dillman and informed him that the proposal would not proceed.
590 Bayley gave evidence that he never saw or read the 19 December 2000 advice, although I infer that it is likely that he became aware of the thrust and tenor of the document. The Dillman Advice bore directly on the transaction which Bayley was seriously entertaining at the time.
591 Dillman was not called to give evidence by the Amcor Parties or any of the Defendants.
592 The final letter on Dillman's general matter file in respect of Hodgson is a letter dated 22 February 2001 in which he encloses a final account and refers to advice received from Sangster that the group had decided not to proceed with the acquisition of the business.
593 I accept the evidence that from early in December 2000 Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster and Bayley were all interested in forming a partnership with Hottes to acquire the Service Packaging Business. They consulted with Dillman in respect of this enterprise, even though the initial proposal appears to have been shortlived. The proposed transaction involving Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley did not proceed at this time.
594 However, the 19 December 2000 Dillman Advice provided an outline framework for the possible future involvement for those parties in the Service Packaging Business or some other business. A structure diagram was included in Dillman's file. It is remarkably similar to structure that was later adopted in relation to the Service Packaging Business. The Dillman structure identifies:
595 Barnes followed up his earlier telephone conversation with Hodgson about the verbal offer from Hottes by writing a memorandum addressed to Hodgson dated 9 January 2001 which contained the terms of Hottes' offer from Amcor, which was then on the table. The 9 January 2001 memorandum from Barnes to Hodgson relevantly stated:
I have spoken to Ian Hottes regarding closing the business or alternatively selling the business ... Ian has placed a verbal offer to me of around the (sic) $50,000 for the packaging business based on the following understanding:
7. The name ACB packaging will be would with the business.
596 By a memorandum of 17 February 2001 Hodgson instructed Barnes to proceed with the drafting of a contract of sale for the sale. The memorandum relevantly stated:
Further to your letter dd 9th January 2001, I confirm that I have had discussions with Peter Brown and have flagged in a recent business presentation to Russell Jones that we intend to dispose of non core business including your Sydney packaging business as part of a range of initiatives aimed at restoring profitability back into the NSW operations. Provided you could get Ian Hottees [sic]to commit to an extended supply agreement, rental of the Revesby site at commercial rates and offer employment to the employees currently in the business, we would be happy to proceed with the sale of the business.
Please could you draft a contract of sale document which would address these and other critical issues. Given the unsatisfactory performance of the N.S.W operations and the attention this has generated in Amcor I would request that this matter be concluded along with the other initiatives we have discusses as a matter of urgency.
597 Hodgson gave evidence that by this memorandum he passed on Brown's directions to him in relation to the offer from Hottes, which I accept. Hodgson also referred to the observation in the memorandum as to having spoken with Jones in relation to the closure of the Service Packaging Business. However, he said that he now had no recollection of having done so. Hodgson said further that he later telephoned Barnes about the matter and asked him to proceed with the negotiations in conjunction with his division's Commercial Contracts team, which I also accept.
598 Amcor submitted that the Barnes memorandum of 9 January 2001 and the later memorandum of 17 February 2001 by which Hodgson instructed Barnes to proceed with the drafting of a contract of sale document, were artificial creations intended to create a paper trail for the purpose of Amcor's file. I do not accept that the evidence, when taken as a whole, justifies such a finding.
599 There were a number of subsequent conversations with Brown which led to approval of the sale to Hottes.
600 The first of these conversations between Hodgson and Brown took place in January/February 2001.
601 Hodgson's evidence is that he rang Brown and spoke to him about Hottes' proposal to buy the business and explained the proposal "in some detail".
602 However, Brown's evidence was that, although he recalled a conversation about the matter, he merely recalled "Jim saying something about Hottes wanting to buy the business because he was running the business at the time".
603 Hottes incorporated the company Service Packaging Pty Ltd in April 2001 in order to undertake the acquisition of the Service Packaging Business. I infer from this conduct that the sale was a seriously entertained proposal by Amcor at the time.
604 Hodgson and Barnes both gave evidence of a meeting they had with Brown in mid-2001, during which they said Brown was briefed on the detailed terms of the sale. Brown is said to have been "pleased with the outcomes" but asked if Hodgson could "get a bit more out of Hottes". Hodgson's evidence was that the sale "required formal approval by Brown" at this time.
605 Brown's evidence when questioned about this meeting was that, although he didn't deny that the meeting took place, he said "I can't recall the meeting and I can't recall the details". Brown said further that "normally I wouldn't get involved with that business to that level of detail, I'd expect Jim Hodgson and his people to if they wanted to sell the business to manage the process and that would include setting the price of (sic) anything else that was required to be covered".
606 Brown was party to another conversation, on Hodgson's evidence, a week after the mid-2001 meeting with Hodgson and Barnes. In that conversation Brown is said to have been informed that Hottes had increased the price to pay an additional $31,000, at which point Brown issued his directive to Hodgson to "go ahead with the deal".
607 Brown, however, could not recall that any such conversation took place.
608 Brown did not deny that any of these conversations took place. Indeed, he admitted to the conversation in January/February 2001, at least to the extent that he was informed by Hodgson that Hottes wanted to buy the business. Brown could not recall the conversation with Hodgson and Barnes in mid-2001, nor the conversation with Hodgson a week later.
609 Although there was considerable divergence in the recollection of Brown on the one hand and Hodgson and Barnes on the other, and indeed differences between Barnes and Hodgson, on balance on this issue I prefer and accept the evidence of Hodgson and Barnes to this extent:
• In January/February 2001 Brown was informed by Hodgson that Hottes wanted to buy the business. By this means, Brown knew that Hottes was the intended purchaser and approved the sale of the business to its then manager;
• Brown did not require the sale to be first undertaken on the open market;
• The principal terms of the First Sale Agreement were agreed in principle with Hottes early in 2001;
• Both Hodgson and Barnes met with Brown in mid-2001, when they briefed Brown on the terms of the proposed sale. Brown at this meeting asked if Hodgson could get an increased price from Hottes;
• At a further meeting, a week after the mid-2001 meeting with Hodgson and Barnes, Brown was informed that Hottes was prepared to pay an additional $31,000, at which point Brown told Hodgson to go ahead with the transaction.
610 Although Brown was a senior Amcor executive, given the relatively small scale of the Service Packaging Business, it did not warrant him absorbing the details of the proposed transaction, particularly given that the business was a non-core and underperforming business for Amcor.
611 Nevertheless, Brown was also, along with Hodgson, a director of Service Containers at the time. He was also Hodgson's immediate superior. I accept that he was an astute general manager with an eye to detail. In the words of Hodgson "he never missed anything". In these circumstances, it is likely that Hodgson proceeded to consult with Brown on the sale of the Service Business and seek his approval to proceed, at least on the broad parameters of the proposed transaction and at the price discussed. However, it is also likely, given his level within Amcor, that Brown left the management of the details of the sale to be supervised by Hodgson. This conclusion corresponds with the evidence as to the progress of the transaction in the second half of 2001 to the conclusion of the sale on 1 February 2002.
612 Once Brown had given his approval to the broad terms which had been proposed, preparation of a sale agreement commenced.
613 Within Amcor's Corrugating/AFPA division there was a group called the "Commercial Contract team". Members included, Mr Bryan Lawless ("Lawless"), then Mr Joe Alvarez ("Alvarez") (who replaced Lawless in his position) and Mr Ken Parker ("Parker"). In May 2001, Alvarez took over from Lawless as a member of the Commercial Contract team. He was appointed Commercial Manager, Central Region (New South Wales). In this capacity he reported to Parker and was subordinate to Barnes.
614 The Commercial Contract team participated in reviewing the contract terms for the proposed First Sale Agreement. Between January 2001 to May 2001 Barnes together with Lawless met with Hottes to discuss the offer and proposed terms and conditions of the sale. Lawless created a file for the matter (the "Lawless file"). Parker had no direct role in terms of the day to day negotiations.
615 Alvarez, upon taking over responsibility for the transaction within Amcor following his promotion in May 2001, recalled being asked by Hodgson shortly thereafter "Where are you up to with this? I want it sold. I need this speeded up". It was after that conversation that Alvarez was handed the Lawless file. Alvarez set about creating a list the terms which had been agreed to that point in the preceding negotiations between Barnes, Hottes and Lawless. Alvarez did not reopen negotiations on what had been earlier agreed.
616 Alvarez dealt directly with Amcor's external lawyers (Mr MacPhail of Baker and McKenzie), with Hottes' lawyer (Mr Walmsley) and at times with Hottes himself in respect of the draft agreements that were circulated between 15 June 2001 and 21 September 2001. These attendances focused on the details of the transaction. They did not change any of the fundamental or principal features of the transaction which had already negotiated and agreed upon.
I was engaged directly by Jim Hodgson and Barnes in concluding the Sale agreement. I reported on the steps taken in concluding the Sale Agreement to Trevor Barnes and took my instructions from Barnes, not from Ken Parker or anyone else in the Commercial Department.
618 A draft First Sale Agreement was prepared by Amcor's lawyers Baker & McKenzie and was forwarded to Hodgson by Barnes in late September 2001 or early October 2001.
619 In about late September 2001 or early October 2001 Hodgson told Barnes to provide the draft sale agreement to Parker for review.
620 Although I accept that Parker did not directly negotiate any of the terms of sale of the Service Containers Business, he was appraised of its terms. Parker first saw the draft of the proposed First Sale Agreement on or around 22 October 2001 when it was sent to him by an email from Alvarez. He said that he looked for inconsistencies or errors in drafting but he said he did not "query the substance of the agreement as to sale price, subject matter sold or other main terms since I had been told the deal was done".
621 The terms of the proposed First Sale Agreement were drafted and amended through Baker and McKenzie, on behalf of Amcor, and Walmsley, on behalf of Hottes. Drafts were exchanged and both parties expressed some frustration as to the length of time the exercise was consuming. Walmsley's evidence was that he had found dealing with Amcor's lawyers Baker & McKenzie difficult.
622 Throughout the second half of 2001, Barnes remained the officer within Amcor who was primarily responsible for the sale and approval of any substantial changes to the documentation.
623 On 1 February 2002 the finalised First Sale Agreement was executed. The parties to the agreement were Service Containers Pty Ltd (the vendor and Amcor subsidiary), Service Packaging Pty Ltd (the purchaser) and Ian Hottes (the director and owner of the purchasing company).
624 The negotiation of the lease of the Milperra Road premises was conducted separately. Mr Lewis and Mr Clayton of Amcor executed the lease on behalf of the lessor, APA, on 27 May 2002.
625 The principal terms of the lease formed part of the First Sale Agreement (namely, term (5 years plus an option to renew) and rental ($70,000 plus GST)).
First Sale Agreement Extension - the Addendum to the Supply Agreement
626 By an Addendum to the First Sale Agreement dated 4 May 2004, Sangster on behalf of "Amcor Fibre Packaging" extended the supply period from five to nine years. This was done pursuant to clauses 13.1 and 13.2 of the First Sale Agreement. At this time, Sangster was acting Sales and Marketing Manager for Amcor's Fibre Packaging group and he reported to Hodgson. It was Hodgson's evidence that it was "part of Sangster's duties to negotiate with customers in relation to supply agreements of this kind. He did not seek, but neither did he need to seek, approval from me or anyone else to extend the arrangements with Mr Hottes".
627 In November or December 2001 each of Service Packaging Pty Ltd ("Service Packaging"), G5 Investments Pty Limited, Hottes, Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley and Sangster executed an undated 4 page deed (the "First G5 Deed"). This was undertaken in contemplation of the future purchase of the Service Packaging Business by Service Packaging.
628 Sangster was close to Hottes. He initiated an early discussion with him on the Service Packaging Business. He said in his evidence:
Leading up to the time that I signed the first G5 deed, Hottes and I had several conversations about developing an entity to advance the idea of building sales within a specialist machinery sales firm. Hottes was enthusiastic to pursue this concept and had started negotiations with the 3M Company for a distributorship of their machinery particularly a new form of stretch wrapping. Hottes had contacted manufacturers of top and bottom tapers and sealing machines.
Amcor was not in the business of selling or distributing this type of machinery and I saw no conflict.
I suggested to Hottes that to give this concept a chance of succeeding quickly that I should approach Hodgson, Barnes and Bayle to gauge their interest. Each had certain capabilities that could be beneficial to quick roll out and ultimate success.
Hottes had his solicitor draft the G5 deed and the group signed it on the understanding that Hottes secured the exclusive distributorship with the 3M Company. Hottes subsequently informed me that he could not guarantee the distributorship so I informed Hottes after discussion with Hodgson, Bayley and Barnes that I and the co signatories would not proceed. This was in late 2001.
629 G5 Investments Pty Ltd ("G5 Investments"), a company which was to become central within the G5 structure, was incorporated on 3 April 2001.
630 Hottes was the director of both Service Packaging and G5 Investments. He was also the legal owner of the five shares issued in both companies.
631 Pursuant to the First G5 Deed, Hottes held the five issued shares in Service Packaging in trust for G5 Investments. Hottes also held one share in G5 Investments for his own benefit and he held another 4 shares on trust. The four beneficial shareholders in G5 Investments Pty Ltd were named and set out in the First G5 Deed, as Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley.
B. IH holds the five issues shares in SP in trust for G5.
633 I accept that whilst a number of persons within Amcor were aware that the Service Packaging Business was being sold to Hottes, and knew of, vetted and approved the terms of the First Sale Agreement with Hottes, no person within Amcor, beyond Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley, was aware that Hottes had these four shareholders involved with him in the acquisition through the vehicle of the First G5 Deed or had planned to enter into any such an arrangement. None of these persons informed Amcor of their entry into the First G5 Deed.
634 Further, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley, during the currency of their employment with Amcor, and in Hodgson's case also during the currency of his directorship of the Amcor vendor Service Containers, entered into the First G5 Deed in spite of the advice from Dillman of 19 December 2000, which they said had prompted them to withdraw from the proposed partnership early in 2001.
635 Under the terms of the First Sale Agreement, Hottes was required personally to guarantee the performance of his company under both the contract and the lease. He provided the required guarantee by way of signed letter addressed to Barnes. It was for this reason that the First G5 Deed required the other shareholders, namely Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley, to provide guarantees and indemnities to Hottes for any liability arising from the purchase of the business and the entry into the lease. The deed also specified that the shareholders would provide financial contributions as required and contemplated that meetings between shareholders would be held from time to time.
636 It was the case of the Defendants, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley that the transaction reflected in the First G5 Deed did not proceed in the circumstances later described.
637 In late 2002 the parties executed a second G5 deed (the "Second G5 Deed").
638 Sangster described the genesis of the Second G5 Deed in these terms:
In or about August or September 2002. Hottes again approached me about pushing the business in the original direction that we had spoken about, that being, an Australian wide machinery distributorship. Hottes was of the view that if Hottes got financial guaranteed provided by partners he would be able to more successfully negotiate a position to secure machinery. To that end I agreed to approach Hodgson, Barnes and Bayley again to gauge their interest. It was my view that such an entity would succeed because it was difficult to find a single provided of all types of machinery in Australia.
Hottes had the second G5 deed drafted to reflect the addition of company names and to capture the fact that guarantees would be provided by the potential partners.
639 Hodgson described the circumstances as follows:
Sometime after the execution of the First Sale Agreement, probably in or about May 2002, Sangster again contacted me on behalf of Mr Hottes. Sangster told me that Mr Hottes was once again pursuing his proposal for an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M and was again inviting interest from myself and the others to renew the offer to take up an interest in the Service Packaging Business which would indemnity Mr Hottes against some of the commercial risk he would otherwise be personally exposed to. I told Sangster that I was again interested in taking up an interest in the Service Packaging Business if Mr Hottes could obtain an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M.
As with the first G5 agreement, I told Sangster that the second G5 agreement was contingent upon Mr Hottes securing an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M. Sangster agreed to tell Mr Hottes. I also spoke with Barnes and Bayley and said the same thing and they agreed.
640 The Second G5 Deed was in substantially the same terms as the First G5 Deed. The major difference was the addition of the Hodgson's, Sangster's, Bayley's and Barnes' companies as parties so that the interests of the individuals vested into their corporate vehicles, the individuals now being described as guarantors. There were also consequential amendments to the recitals and obligations reflecting the fact that this document was signed after the execution of the First Sale Agreement under which Hottes had acquired the Service Packaging Business. The Second G5 Deed included changes to the date of the First Sale Agreement and lease details.
641 Hottes' solicitor Mr Walmsley drafted the Second G5 Deed following Hottes' instructions by email on 3 September 2002 asking Walmsley to "please draw up a new deed to replace the current one with the following company names instead of individual names". In the email, Hottes asked Walmsley to telephone him to discuss the mater. Walmsley gave evidence that in the subsequent conversation, Hottes said to him "I want to amend the deed you've prepared to include the companies which I believe are owned by the parties", and mentioned that the parties had received advice that the deed should be in their company names, not their personal names.
642 Both G5 Deeds were subject to terms of confidentiality.
643 Clause 6 of the First G5 Deed and clause 7 of the Second G5 Deed were in substantially identical terms, namely that the signatories would "provide a secure email address to the others for confidential communications between them".
644 Moreover, both G5 Deeds utilised a trust structure with the five issued shares in Service Packaging (the purchaser of the Service Packaging Business under the First Sale Agreement) being held in trust by Hottes for G5 Investments, with Hottes holding one share in G5 beneficially and the other four shares in G5 being held by him in trust one each for the other shareholders (recitals A-C of the Deeds).
645 Sangster agreed in cross-examination that both G5 Deeds were confidential and were not to be disclosed to third parties as far as he and the other partners were concerned.
646 I infer that the trust structure selected was designed to conceal the identity of the beneficial shareholders and to protect this information from being disclosed to Amcor. The structure was consistent with the proposed scheme outlined in the earlier Dillman Advice and was devised to avoid the consequences alluded to in that advice.
647 The Defendants gave evidence that each of the First G5 Deed and Second G5 Deed was conditional upon Hottes obtaining two things: first, a licence or distributorship from 3M for certain of its products; and second, Hottes securing exclusive distribution rights for stretch tape wrapping machinery which utilised the products.
648 As this did not occur, in each case, the Defendants maintained that the First G5 Deed and Second G5 Deed and the transactions reflected in those documents were brought to an end.
649 3M is an American company that manufactures tape and stretch wrap products and wrapping machinery.
650 The Service Packaging business used 3M products when it was owned by Amcor. The First Sale Agreement purported to transfer a "sale or supply contract" with 3M to the purchaser, Service Packaging. However, this arrangement was verbal and related to products which were required by the Service Packaging Business at that time.
651 Mr Vickery ("Vickery") was Hottes' accountant. He gave evidence that in about February 2002 he was instructed to apply for a Queensland business name registration for the Service Packaging Business in that State. He said that Hottes told him it was necessary if he was to obtain a 3M distributorship in Queensland. However, no licence to distribute 3M products in Queensland followed from this step.
652 Further, there is no evidence that Hottes was ever successful in securing exclusive rights to distribute 3M stretch tape wrapping machinery.
653 Mr Wakefield was called by Hodgson. He gave evidence that he conducted a business known as "Safetech" which designed and manufactured materials handling and industrial equipment. He said that Hottes contacted him in mid-2002 to discuss becoming a distributor of a Safetech stretch tape wrapping machine. The machine used a 3M stretch wrap product. Hottes wished to use the machine to wrap fruit products, including bananas, for transport from North Queensland. Hottes and Wakefield travelled to Queensland on 9 October 2002 to demonstrate the machine to customers. Hottes wished to become an exclusive distributor of the Safetech machine in North Queensland, however Mr Wakefield declined to appoint him.
654 These matters were relied upon by the Defendants to support Hottes' failure to meet the conditions of the First G5 Deed and Second G5 Deed contended for.
Evidence of the First G5 Deed being subject to Oral Conditions
655 The First G5 Deed and later the Second G5 Deed were said by the Defendants who participated in the scheme relating to the Service Packaging business to be subject to Hottes securing a 3M distribution agreement as earlier described. The condition was said to be oral, however the precise terms were ill-defined.
656 Hodgson's evidence as to the First G5 Deed was: "the agreement that I had with Sangster ... was that the arrangement would not proceed unless and until Mr Hottes secured an exclusive distributorship agreement with 3M".
657 Barnes said that he signed the G5 Deed "on the basis that the new deal with 3M was secured". He said in cross-examination that:
Both agreements, the first agreement and the second agreement were both predicated on Mr Hottes achieving a - firstly the distributorship formally for the 3M products, and secondly, to obtain a distributorship, sole distributorship for the stretch wrap machinery that applied to the 3M products.
658 However, in his witness statement, Barnes said:
Hottes had planned to acquire the business service packaging business from Service containers by way of an asset sale deed and take the business in a new direction utilizing the distributorship for 3M's new stretch wrap products and to diversify the business further into packaging and packaging machinery. The business as such would not be a material competitor to Amcor.
Hottes had established the G5 acquisition vehicle in anticipation of attracting suitable investors to achieve this purpose. On the basis I signed a Shareholder's Agreement (first G5 Deed) along with other potential investors in or about late 2001 on the basis that the new deal with 3M was secured.
On this basis I was advised by Sangster in or about late 2001 early 2002, but before the Sale Agreement was executed between Service Containers Pty Ltd and Service Packaging Pty Ltd, that the proposed deed which was always contingent on Hottes new business direction would not proceed, and that he had advised Hottes accordingly.
659 Sangster's evidence was "the group signed it [the First G5 Deed] on the understanding that Mr Hottes secured the exclusive distributorship with the 3M Company".
660 Bayley's evidence was that either Sangster or Hodgson told him that Hottes had been unsuccessful in obtaining a distributorship agreement with 3M. On that basis, they were not going to be involved and he also was not going to be involved.
661 Each of Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley reiterated in their oral evidence that proceeding with the First G5 Deed was contingent upon the 3M proposal.
662 Hodgson's evidence and the Defendants' evidence was that Sangster, who was a close personal friend of Hottes, acted as a go-between between the defendant group and Hottes.
663 Sangster told Hottes that the group would not proceed with the First G5 Deed prior to 1 February 2002; that is, before the date of the signing of the First Sale Agreement. Sangster said that: "Hottes subsequently informed me that he could not guarantee the distributorship with the 3M Company so I informed Hottes after discussion with Hodgson, Bayley and Barnes that I and the co-signatories would not proceed. This was in late 2001".
664 Sangster further said that he had the following conversation with Mr Hottes:
When it was determined that the First G5 Agreement would not be proceeded with, as you said, you've said in your evidence-in chief, that you had a conversation with Mr Hottes. What conversation, as best you can recall, did you have with Mr Hottes about that? ---Mr Hottes was concerned about the fact that he could not find documents or contracts with suppliers, particularly with 3M. He came to me to tell me that fact. When he told me that fact, I said to him, "Well, on the basis of that, till such time as you do have solid ground to stand on, there's no point proceeding with this deed". He agreed, we shook hands, and parted company.
665 The First G5 Deed is silent as to any distributorship agreement. It contains no express term as to what the Defendant parties to it said they regarded as a central condition of their involvement in the transaction. This is notable, particularly in the light of the obligations of indemnity to Hottes which each Defendant assumed under the deed and in the light of the obligations of Hottes to guarantee the performance of the First Sale Agreement and the accompanying lease. The First G5 Deed provided by clause 9:
The other shareholders for themselves both jointly and severally indemnify and shall hold indemnified IH [Hottes] from and against a four fifths share of any liability arising from any or all of those guarantees and indemnities or any other matter or thing arising from them whereby a personal liability shall apply or attach, or shall be claimed to apply or attach, to IH.
666 Nevertheless, it was submitted by the Defendants that the existence of a distributorship agreement was a critical aspect of the arrangements between them. They said there existed a level of trust between them which meant that they were prepared to deal with one another on the matter of the distributorship on an informal basis without those arrangements being formalised in writing and included in the First G5 Deed.
Evidence of the Second G5 Deed being subject to Oral Conditions
667 Hodgson's evidence was that probably in about May 2002 Sangster again contacted him on behalf of Mr Hottes. Sangster told him that Hottes was again pursuing his proposal for an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M and again inviting interest from him and the others to renew the offer to take up an interest in the Service Packaging Business.
668 Again the term which imported the alleged condition into the Second G5 Deed was oral and ill-defined.
669 None of the Defendants provided any detail as to the negotiation of the alleged 3M conditions with Hottes.
Notwithstanding the fact that there was a written agreement, the agreement that I had with Sangster (I never spoke with Hottes at any time in relation to this proposal) was that the arrangement would not proceed unless and until Mr Hottes secured an exclusive distributorship with 3M. I also spoke to Barnes and Bayley and they also agreed.
671 Neither Barnes nor Bayley spoke with Hottes about the condition.
672 The evidence is vague as to what comprised the alleged discussion or discussions said to give rise to the alleged agreement. The absence of any detailed evidence on such an allegedly important term is even more striking when the fact that the 3M conditions are said to apply not only to the first G5 Deed, but also to the second, is taken into account.
673 Hodgson said that he executed the Second G5 agreement "contingent upon Mr Hottes securing an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M".
In late 2002 Hottes prepared a new shareholders agreement (Second G5 Deed) which included my new company Brobel Investments as a signatory. The execution of this deed (Second G5 deed) was at all times contingent on Hottes achieving the machinery distributorships
This was once again not achieved and Hodgson advised me in late 2002 to the best of my recollection by telephone that he had instructed Sangster to cancel the Second G5 deed. I supported this.
Shortly after Ian Sangster informed me I believe by telephone that he had written to Ian Hottes to advise him that the deed we had signed with Hottes could not proceed.
Sometime in August or September ... we signed the second G5 deed in order to give Hottes a point of leverage in any negotiation he would have with machinery producers or suppliers.
It was my and everybody's understanding that Hottes needed to be successful with his negotiations or again we would not proceed ... after about four (4) to six (6) weeks after signing the second G5 Deed, I rang Hottes to find out how successful he had in with his negotiations. Hottes informed me that he had been unsuccessful.
I informed Hodgson and Barnes. It is my recollection that Hodgson in particular said he was withdrawing ... and that I should inform Hottes of his position.
...
It was my view and I believe everybody's view that the deed be rescinded and I took it upon myself to write to Hottes and inform him of our position.
Hottes was disappointed in the outcome and agreed to let his solicitor know that the deed would not have effect.
I drafted the letter to Hottes to formally end the deed in late 2002 although I am unsure of the exact date.
Hottes was disappointed in the outcome and agreed to let his solicitor know that the deed would not have effect.
677 Bayley's evidence as to the Second G5 Deed was as follows:
Either Hodgson or Mr Sangster told me that, because Mr Hottes had not obtained 3M contract, they were not prepared to proceed with the Second G5 Deed. My position had not changed since the First G5 Deed. I told Hodgson that if they were not proceeding with the Deed I would not proceed with it.
678 Barnes's evidence as to the second G5 Deed was as follows:
In or about May 2002, after the execution of the first sale agreement, Sangster approached me again and stated that Hottes had reinvigorated his quest for new investors on the same basis. Hottes at this stage had acquired the Service Packaging Business and was now confident he could establish the required distributorships to take the business in a new direction ... In Late 2002, Hottes prepared a new shareholders agreement (second G5 deed) which included my new company Brobel Investments as a signatory. The execution of this deed (second G5 deed) was at all times contingent on Hottes achieving the machinery distributorships ... This was once again not achieved and Hodgson advised me in late 2002 to the best of my recollection by telephone that he had instructed Sangster to cancel the second G5 Deed. I supported this. Shortly after Ian Sangster informed me I believe by telephone that he had written to Ian Hottes to advise him that the Deed we had signed with Hottes could not proceed.
679 On this basis the Defendants submitted that the Second G5 Agreement was also never proceeded with because Hottes did not proceed with his plan to secure an exclusive distribution agreement with 3M.
Whether the First and Second G5 Deeds Subject to Oral Conditions
680 It was Amcor's submission that the Defendants' contention that there was a 3M condition and that the G5 Deeds did not proceed due to non-fulfilment of that condition ought be rejected.
681 Amcor relied principally on contemporaneous evidence which was inconsistent with the position taken by the Defendants.
682 An email dated 3 September 2003 was sent from Hottes to his solicitor Mr Adrian Walmsley in which Hottes gave instructions for the preparation of the Second G5 Deed. The relevant text of the email read:
Adrian,
Can you please draw up a new deed to replace the current one with the following company names instead of individual names.
The are as follows;
R. Bayley
CBB Investments Pty Ltd
ACN 074 044 358
T. Barnes
Brobel Investments Pty Ltd
ACN 100 674 655
I. Sangster
Merrymen Pty Ltd
ACN 100 630 180
J. Hodgson
Bankson Pty Ltd
ABN 19074543794.
683 I find that this was inconsistent with the position that the First G5 Deed had earlier been cancelled and that the transaction had now been revived, particularly with the instruction given for "a new deed to replace the current one". [Emphasis added]
684 A letter was written by [Ian] Sangster to [Ian] Hottes at some time after entry into the Second G5 Deed (this is known as the "Ian to Ian" letter). It is undated. The letter purported to give the reason for not proceeding with the Second G5 Deed. The letter said:
Dear Ian,
Just a note to formally advise that the deed that we have agreed with you cannot proceed.
In line with our undertaking that we both seek legal opinions to establish the do ability of us joining you as partners our opinion has suggest that there is enough grey area to warrant his withdrawal from the deed. I act on all signatories behalf.
I appreciate and thank-you for considering us as partners to your business. Unfortunately any capital that we might inject in to gain business to help you instigate cash flow that you open the business would or could put us at odds with our employer.
Mate best of luck with the venture and I'm sure that you will be successful and that your fears of not having sufficient cash flow will not materialise.
Will you advise your solicitor that the deed will not be actioned.
Regards,
Ian.
685 The letter did not refer to the failure of Hottes to secure a 3M distributorship pursuant to the alleged condition.
686 Further, Barnes' post-it note, attached to the "Ian to Ian letter" forwarded to Hottes' solicitor Walmsley, said that the letter outlined the reasons for not proceeding with the agreement. The note read:
Hi Adrian,
As per our discussion, please find a copy of the letter sent to Ian Hotte[e]s shortly after the deed was signed outlining the reasons why we could not go ahead with the partnership.
Regards,
Trevor.
687 Again, no mention was made in the Barnes note as to the reason for the transaction not proceeding being the failure of Hottes to obtain a 3M distributorship.
688 Walmsley, Hottes' solicitor of the time, gave evidence that he did not recall Hottes ever telling him that the two G5 deeds had not been proceeded with, let alone on the basis of him failing to achieve any arrangement with 3M, and he was not told by Hottes that he no longer needed investors in the business.
689 The "Ian to Ian" letter was also inconsistent with the following particulars provided by Sangster in answer to the following request in relation to his defence:
[Request]
Under paragraph 18A(c)(iii):
(d) Identify each and every person who authorised or directed the Firth Defendant to write to Hottes advising the other signatories of the deeds would not be taking an interest in the Service Packaging Business.
[Particulars]
(d) Mr James Hodgson orally told the Fifth Defendant that he did not intend to proceed with the Deeds. Mr Hodgson also orally told the Fifth Defendant that he believed the other signatories to the Deeds should not proceed. The reason Mr Hodgson gave for not proceeding was a concern about a possible conflict between Amcor and the Service Containers Purchaser. The Fifth Defendant said to Mr Hodgson that if he (Mr Hodgson) did not intend to proceed he (the Fifth Defendant) also did not intend to proceed. The conversation occurred in Mr Hodgson's office. The Fifth Defendant believes the conversation occurred on or about 1 February 2002 but cannot be more precise as to the date of the conversation. The Fifth Defendant notes that in his letter to Mr Hottes he says that he acts on "all signatories behalf." He infers therefore he spoke also with Mr Bayley (the Sixth Defendant) and with Mr Barnes (the First Defendant) before sending the note. He cannot now remember those conversations or provide any further particulars of those conversations. {Emphasis added]
690 These particulars provided by Sangster in April 2009 are at odds with the evidence he presented at trial to the effect that the reason for the Defendants withdrawing from the transaction reflected in the deeds was the failure of Hottes to secure the 3M distributorship. On the other hand, his version of events as pleaded is consistent with the Ian to Ian letter, which he conceded to be false as to the reason for the group withdrawing from the arrangements.
692 Walmsley's evidence was that he did not receive the Ian to Ian letter from Barnes until June 2006. Walmsley then sent a copy of the letter on 7 June 2006 to senior counsel, Mr Kunc. Walmsley had not seen the Ian to Ian letter before that time.
693 Sangster was inconsistent in his evidence as when it was that he allegedly prepared and delivered the Ian to Ian letter to Hottes.
694 Sangster said in evidence that he sent or delivered the letter to Hottes in late 2002 after entry into the Second G5 Deed. However, he conceded that what appeared in his pleading,[76] to the effect that he wrote to Hottes on or around 1 February 2002, the date of the First Sale Agreement, and delivered the note to Hottes in person "at or about the same time" was "clearly a mistake". The mistake was also repeated in the same document in a later paragraph.
695 I find the explanations given by both Hodgson and Sangster for the content of the "Ian to Ian" letter unconvincing.
This is the letter you got Mr Sangster to write in respect of the second deed, is that right?---Yes.
You know don't you that you or Mr Sangster or Mr Bayley or Mr Barnes didn't seek any legal opinion at this time - - - ?---No.
...
So it was false wasn't it what Mr Sangster wrote there about the legal opinion and the doability of joining you as partners?---That wasn't the - yeah we pulled out - - -
That was false was it?---Yes.
...
Yes, all right, well, do you agree with me that nowhere in this letter is there any mention of the second G5 deed not proceeding because Mr Hottes had been unable to secure this exclusive distributorship?---No, it doesn't mention it there.
Right, and don't you think that this would have been the appropriate time or place for Mr Sangster, acting on your instructions, to have made that plain to Mr Hottes?---No. The reason being that he was desperately looking for help and support, and he would have continually said, "Look, I'll get this distributorship", or, "I've got a bit here and a bit there", and we would have continually been under pressure to support him. We wanted a clear cut, "No, we can't, for certain reasons". That's why it was written in that vein.
...
But in any event, you considered it was appropriate, was it, to tell a falsehood in this letter to Mr Hottes about the reasons for you not proceeding with the second G5 deed?---I believe, unless I cut him off at the pass, I'd be continually getting requests for support, and this seemed a good way to cut it off at that point.
By using a false reason, right?---Yes.
I see. What would have been the problem in telling Mr Hottes the truth, if that really was the truth at that time?
---Because he would be continually knocking on the door, looking for support.
You say nothing in this letter at all about the 3M exclusive distributorship and him failing to obtain that, nothing, yes?---Correct.
Your close friend?---Yes.
The critical matter that or entry into the G5 deeds and you say nothing about it?---Not in this letter no - I had had a conversation with Mr Hottes about that.
Isn't this meant to be the formal ending of the second G5?---It is. It's not meant to be it is.
So the only reason you set out is a false one - that legal opinion stopped you from going ahead with it?---Yes.
And do you have any explanation for His Honour on your oath as to why you have said nothing about the 3M exclusive distributorship which you say is critical?---I didn't feel the need to. I'd had the discussion with Hottes.
698 Sangster was a close friend of Hottes. He delivered the eulogy at Hottes funeral in 2004. He had no reason to tell him a lie. Further, Sangster's evidence as he stated it in the witness box was that he told Hottes about the failure to obtain the exclusive 3M distributorship as being the reason for not proceeding in a separate conversation he had with Hottes. If this was the reason conveyed to Hottes in a separate conversation, why was it necessary to hide this fact in the letter written on the very subject to Hottes?
699 The alleged 3M condition was not pleaded until relatively recently:
(a) by Hodgson, not until his Further and Better Particulars of Amended Reply and Defence dated 25 October 2010, [at pars 8(a)(iv)-(v); (c)-(d) and (f)];
(b) by Barnes, his Further and Better Particulars dated 16 June 2009 refers to Barnes considering "taking an interest in the business in the second half of 2001 at which time Hottes proposed incorporating new stretch wrap machinery", [at par. 4];
(c) by Sangster, there is no mention of the 3M condition in his Defence dated 29 July 2010, [at par. 18A(c)], nor in his Further and Better Particulars of Defence dated 24 April 2009, [at par. 6(a)-(d)], where he says at (d) that "the reason Hodgson gave for not proceeding was a concern about a possible conflict between Amcor and the Service Containers Purchaser";
(d) by Bayley, there is no mention of the 3M condition in his Defence dated 1 September 2010, [at par. 18O(c)].
700 In his amended defence filed on 29 July 2010 by his solicitors of the time, Sangster pleaded the following in relation to the Ian to Ian letter:
(iv) on a date shortly after he signed the deeds he wrote to Mr. Hottes advising that he and the other signatories to the deeds would not take an interest in the Service Packaging Business;
PARTICULARS
As to (c) the Fifth Defendant cannot recall the precise date of his signing of the deeds. The only copies of the deeds in the Fifth Defendant's possession are those provided by the solicitors for the Plaintiffs pursuant to request. Further, notwithstanding the terms of those deeds, he told Mr. Hottes that he would not take an interest in the Service Packaging Business by an undated handwritten note sent to Mr. Hottes shortly thereafter. He cannot be more precise about the date of the handwritten note. A copy of the note may be inspected on appointment.
701 The inconsistency between Sangster's pleading on the matter, and his position as indicated in the transcript of his oral evidence, is palpable. In his pleading he relies upon the handwritten note as the vehicle which brought to an end his interest and that of the other Defendants in the Service Packaging Business. He invites Amcor to inspect the document. Yet he fails to qualify its content by indicating that it sets out an incorrect basis on which the Defendants had decided not to proceed. Further, and significantly, he is silent as to the basis for ending the arrangement which he contended for in his evidence, namely the failure of Hottes to secure the necessary 3M distributorship.
702 Ms Dettmar (formerly Wearne) gave evidence that she ran the business "for nearly 20 years" since 1996 continued to manage the business after its sale to Hottes. Dettmar had primary responsibility for management from mid-2003 until the time of Hottes' death.
703 I am also satisfied from her evidence that Hottes did not say anything to Dettmar about any 3M exclusive distributorship proposal. Dettmar referred to the fact that the Service Packaging Business and its predecessor had been distributing 3M products for the 20 years or so while she had worked in the business, although it was one of a number of companies that distributed such products, there being some 15 to 20 such distributors estimated to be in the Sydney Metropolitan area between 2001 and 2007. She also said that the Service Packaging Business did not sell shrink wrap machines and that such machines could be purchased through 3M or other distributors.
705 Her evidence was that, prior to his death, her husband named Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley in about February-April 2004 as his "secret partners" in the Service Packaging Business.
706 This statement, if accepted, would work directly against the proposition that the G5 Deeds had been cancelled as maintained by the Defendants.
707 She also gave evidence to the effect that Barnes and Sangster visited her husband shortly before he died with a proposal that Holihan take over the Service Packaging Business.
708 This conduct, if accepted, would confirm the continuing interest of the Defendants in the Service Packaging Business, and would also work to contradict the position taken by the Defendants that their interest in the business ceased in 2002.
709 Mrs Hottes gave evidence that her husband told her in 2004 that he had "secret partners" in the Service Packaging Business and that those partners were Sangster, Barnes, Hodgson and Bayley. Initially she thought the conversation occurred in the months February through April 2004. Later in her evidence she recalled that it was in July 2004, about three weeks before Hottes died.
711 I accept that this conversation, by reason of its content and the visit of Sangster and Barnes at Hottes bed-side, was more likely to have occurred in July 2004, while Hottes was suffering with cancer shortly before he died.
712 Mrs Hottes recalled persistent phone calls which Hottes received on his mobile phone in the two month period from May to July 2004. She gave evidence that she had a conversation with her husband in relation to the calls and that he told her in about July 2004 that the person calling was Barnes. This led to the conversation regarding the secret partners.
713 She asked her husband why Barnes was ringing him constantly. Hottes said "well he's involved in it". Until that time, as far as Mrs Hottes knew, only her husband was involved in the Service Packaging Business. Hottes then revealed the names of the secret partners. Hottes said "I know Mar I've done the wrong thing", to which she replied "I can't believe Ian that you could be dishonest".
714 Walmsley also recalled that Mrs Hottes had in fact mentioned something to him about Hottes having had secret partners in the business, but it was a fleeting comment. This observation was made during a meeting at Walmsley's office attended by Mrs Hottes and her brother in about April or May 2005. Mrs Hottes' words were to the effect of, "Ian did something wrong with - involving these people and he should never have done it". Walmsley also confirmed that Mrs Hottes identified the people she was referring to.
Meeting of Sangster and Barnes with the Hottes in July 2004
715 Mrs Hottes also recalled Sangster and Barnes coming to visit her husband at their home about three weeks before Hottes died. Barnes confirmed that he attended, but suggested it was 5 days before Hottes died.
716 Mrs Hottes recalled Sangster and Barnes being in the bedroom with her husband when he called out to her while she was in the kitchen, saying "Mar you better come in here and listen to this". In response to a question from Barnes in which he sought to challenge Mrs Hottes evidence that she had said to him during that meeting "you're a silent shareholder of Ian's", Mrs Hottes said: "Trevor Barnes you said to me - you said to my husband that you wanted to bring I think it was Holihan in to run that business because Ian was not well and he could just continue on and get better and you wanted to introduce Holihan to take over running the business. That is what you said and you wanted Ian to agree to it".
717 On re-examination Mrs Hottes confirmed she thought it was about three weeks before Ian died when Mr Sangster and Barnes came to visit because she was very upset "to think that they came out to discuss about Holihan taking - having his share or running the business or whatever because Ian was so sick and it seemed to me that they weren't that concerned about my husband who looked like he was dying". According to Mrs Hottes, they wanted Ian's permission or agreement, to have Holihan take over and run the business whilst Ian was still ill.
718 Barnes testified that Hottes had asked Sangster about helping with the business and that he (Barnes) suggested to Sangster on the way to visit Hottes in late July 2004 "well why don't you ask him if he'd consider Holihan to run the business". According to Barnes, this conversation gave rise to Sangster (not Barnes) suggesting to Hottes engaging Holihan to run the business. Barnes tried to explain Hottes' adverse reaction to their proposal to involve Holihan by saying that Hottes didn't like Holihan much and this is why he became upset after that suggestion, and not because of any suggestion that Holihan take over Hottes' share.
719 At this time Dettmar was running the Service Packaging Business as she had been for many years, with assistance from Vickery, the accountant for the business. Hottes spent very little time at the business since becoming sick. There was no particular need for Holihan to manage the business. Neither Barnes nor Sangster in their witness statements made any mention of this visit.
Assessment of Mrs Hottes' Evidence as to the "Secret Partners Confession"
720 The Defendants submitted that the evidence of Mrs Hottes should be dismissed. They contended that the Court should not speculate whether Hottes in fact made the "secret partners confession" which has been attributed to him. They submitted that the evidence she gave was simply the result of delusion, could be given no weight by the Court and was unsafe and should be rejected.
721 Mrs Hottes at times became passionate in giving her evidence, and on these occasions became visibly upset about what she regarded as her husband's dishonesty, which she described as her "guilt". There was evidence that she became delusional after her husband's death, was hospitalised several times, treated by a psychiatrist and prescribed both anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications. She was advised by her medical practitioners that she should put her "guilt" behind her. The delusions were florid - she told her solicitor Walmsley that "Amcor were tapping her phones and following her in the street" and that "Amcor were breaking into her house and replacing valuable ceramic dog sculptures with cheap imitations".
722 The Defendants also submitted that there was no objective evidence upon which the Court could properly act to support the evidence that she gave. No evidence was led that any of the men named were in fact partners of Hottes while he was alive, and all of the objective evidence was to the contrary. It was submitted that none of the operative parts of either of the G5 deeds was ever given effect to, and none of the four suggested "secret partners" took any partnership role, made any contribution or derived any financial benefit from the business. Further, it was not suggested to any of the Defendants that they did. Further the evidence of the accountant for the Service Packaging Business, Vickery, was that all of the monies derived from the business was accounted for, with nothing going to any person other than Hottes.
723 One of the reasons advanced by the Defendants for rejecting the evidence of Mrs Hottes was that it was unsupported by any contemporaneous note or statement. However, this is incorrect. As earlier stated, Walmsley recalled Mrs Hottes had mentioned to him that Hottes had secret partners in the business.
724 Mr Hottes' evidence of her late husband's confession was hearsay. I also take into account the passage of time. These factors inevitably work against accurate recall of past events in all of their detail and the precise content of those conversations. Accordingly, I approach the evidence with caution.
725 However, and taking into account these factors, I nevertheless accept the substance of her evidence as an accurate statement of the relevant events, the "secret partners confession" of her late husband and the bed-side conversation between Barnes, Sangster and Hottes in late July 2004 shortly before the latter's death. Mrs Hottes presented as an alert, honest and open witness and gave her evidence in a manner which I accept was untainted by any of the disabilities which she has suffered in the past.
726 There was no evidence that any of the Defendants conducting any assessment of the viability or profitability Service Packaging Business in the absence of either of the 3M commercial opportunities being achieved, either at the time of the negotiation of the alleged condition of the G5 agreements or at the time of their alleged withdrawal from the arrangements.
727 The failure to undertake any such an assessment points away from the alleged 3M conditions being a product of considered thought at the time of entry into the G5 deeds and similarly points away from the alleged conditions providing a ground for ending the involvement of the Defendants in the business upon the failure of Hottes to achieve the required objectives.
728 These circumstances provide further evidence of the unlikelihood of the arrangements reflected in the G5 deeds ever becoming subject to the alleged 3M conditions.
729 Amcor further submitted that certain information derived from a computer found at Barnes premises during the execution of the Anton Piller order in late 2004 (the "Barnes Computer Information") makes clear that the Second G5 Deed was still in force and operative as late as October 2004, and that Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley all then had 1/5th interests in the Service Packaging Business.
730 The Barnes Computer Information is also relied upon by Amcor in support of its allegations in relation to the ACB Business to the effect that as late as October 2004, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was still operative and had not been earlier cancelled by the participating Defendants.
731 The Barnes Computer Information included the draft of a letter known in the proceedings as the "Barnes Finance Letter".
Source and Form of the Barnes Computer Information
732 Mr Reid (Amcor's solicitor at the time with Allens Arthur Robinson) ("Reid") and Mr Conn (a computer expert with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) ("Conn") gave evidence about the origin and content of the Barnes Computer Information.
733 On 10 November 2004 Amcor executed an Anton Piller order which it had obtained from the Federal Court. In addition to other premises, it was executed at the home of Barnes, in Rhodes, New South Wales. Amongst other items seized from Barnes' home was a laptop computer owned by Ms Selever, Barnes' wife and partner at the time. Information was discovered on Ms Selever's laptop in the 'slack space' of a file at the end of the text of a live file. This was imaged by Conn's colleague, Mr Lee, who made a hard drive image derived from Ms Selever's computer on 11 November 2004.
734 Conn gave evidence explaining 'slack space' data. He described slack space data as residual information in the disk space at the end of a live file which can exist when a smaller file overwrites the same physical space previously occupied by a larger data file.
735 Reid gave evidence explaining that the original evidence, comprising the hard drive image derived from Ms Selever's computer on 11 November 2004, had been inadvertently destroyed. However, prior to its destruction Reid created a secondary record of the Barnes Computer Information which he called "File note of electronic letter located on laptop at Barnes' premises on 11 November 2004". I accept that Reid's file note of the electronic record is accurate. It is this file note which comprises what is referred to in these reasons as the "Barnes Computer Information".
736 Reid dated the Barnes Computer Information by reference to the date of the live file (Dc.doc58) which had a file creation date listed as 29 October 2004. This is consistent with the surrounding facts described in the information and I accept it as the date of creation.
737 For example, in relation to the Service Packaging Business, Hottes' shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd were transferred to Marlene Hottes on 6 October 2004. The Barnes Computer Information refers to the offer from a party called the "Borgs" to purchase the business. There is evidence that Joseph Borg, Managing Director of Ubeeco Packaging Solutions, sent a facsimile to John Vickery on 19 October 2004 to inform Vickery that he and his brothers were interested in holding discussions with the principals of ACB Packaging (the Service Packaging Business) with a view to possibly negotiating the sale of ACB Packaging to his company. Given that the Barnes Computer Information refers to Marlene's shares and to the offer from the Borgs, I infer that the Barnes Computer Information was created between 19 October and 29 October 2004.
738 Further, the Barnes Finance Letter, which is later discussed and comprised part of the Barnes Computer Information, was sent to Barnes' accountant towards the end of October 2004, as conceded by Barnes himself. This coincided with the time that Barnes was in the process of making application to a financier to finance the purchase of a new motor vehicle.
739 Further, as the hard drive image of Ms Selever's laptop was made on 11 November 2004 during execution of the Anton Piller orders, it could have been created no later than that date.
740 Barnes advanced no evidence to credibly challenge the position that the Barnes Computer Information was created between 19 October and 29 October 2004.
741 However, Barnes said that the information recorded on Ms Selever's laptop was written by her and that much of the Barnes Computer Information was inaccurate.
742 I found Barnes' explanations to be unsatisfactory and I reject them. Although Ms Selever may well have typed the Barnes Computer Information into her computer, I find that she acted on information accurately provided by Barnes. I accept the following answers of Barnes in cross-examination in this regard:
Well who wrote that bit "Current structure of G5"?---I believe that was my partner that wrote that.
And was she acting on information that was being provided by you wasn't she?---That's correct yes.
743 Barnes said that Ms Selever was available to give evidence. This was raised in the cross-examination of Barnes. However, and without explanation, Ms Selever was not called to give evidence in support of Barnes' version of events. I draw an inference pursuant to the rule in Jones v Dunkel that the evidence of Ms Selever, if she had been called, would not have been of assistance to Barnes' case.
744 As to the purpose of the entries in the Barnes Computer Information relating to the Service Packaging Business, as is made clear from the information following the words: "Please advise the following", I infer that this was advice that Barnes was seeking from his accountant Vickery at the time. In this respect, I do not accept the following evidence given by Barnes in cross-examination on the point, which follows:
And this advice you were wishing to obtain from Vickery at about this time?---That's incorrect.
745 When further questioned on the matter, Barnes was unresponsive and evasive. He nevertheless conceded that "there was definitely a proposal for us to go and buy the Service Packaging Business". This coincides with the tenor of the Barnes Computer Information and lends weight to its veracity.
746 The Barnes Computer Information was admitted into evidence as against Barnes by reason of the admissions contained therein pursuant to the exception in s 81(1) of the Evidence Act to the hearsay rule in s 59(1).
747 A question arose as to whether these documents were also admissible against the other Defendants.
748 The representations for consideration (the "Representations") are those contained in documents described as:
(b) the Barnes Finance Letter (which was also contained in the Barnes Computer Information) when read together with an ancillary third party document called the "Toyota Printout".
749 The issue may be framed in terms of the following example: where A gives evidence of a conversation between A and B, and A's evidence is that, in the course of the conversation, B said something probative of the existence of an illegal arrangement or understanding between B and C, although the evidence is admissible against B as an admission, the question is whether the evidence is also admissible against C.
750 Amcor submitted the disputed documents were admissible against all Defendants because:
(i) they contain (direct) admissions respectively by and against Hodgson, Holihan and Barnes, pursuant to s 81 of the Evidence Act 2008 (the "Evidence Act"); or
(ii) they contain (indirect) admissions, which pursuant to s 87 of the Evidence Act, are admissible against each of the Defendants.
751 Part 3.4 of the Evidence Act 2008 deals with admissions.
752 Section 81(1) provides that the hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission (defined in the Dictionary in Part 1 as a "previous representation that is made by a person who is or becomes the party to a proceeding ... and [is] adverse to the person's interest in the outcome of the proceeding").
753 Section 82 provides that s 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless (a) it is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the admission being made; or (b) the admission is made in a document.
754 I do not accept Amcor's submission that the documents in question contain (direct) admissions by and against Hodgson and Holihan or any of the Defendants other than Barnes, pursuant to s 81(1) Evidence Act. The evidence does not permit a finding to be made that the Representations were made by any of the Defendants other than Barnes.
755 Two further provisions of the Evidence Act are relevant to the question of the admissibility of the Representations as evidence against the other Defendants, namely s 57(2) and s 87(1)(c).
756 Section 57 provides:
(1) If the determination of the question whether evidence adduced by a party is relevant depends on the court making another finding (including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant-
(a) if it is reasonably open to make that finding; or
(b) subject to further evidence being admitted at a later stage of the proceeding that will make it reasonably open to make that finding.
(2) Without limiting sub-section (1), if the relevance of evidence of an act done by a person depends on the court making a finding that the person and one or more other persons had, or were acting in furtherance of, a common purpose (whether to effect an unlawful conspiracy or otherwise), the court may use the evidence itself in determining whether the common purpose existed.
[Emphasis added]
757 Section 57(2) of the Evidence Act however does not of itself answer the evidentiary question in issue. According to its terms it deals only with the relevance of evidence. If the statement made by B in the conversation with A points to the existence of an arrangement or understanding between B and C, then, consistently with section 57(2), the court may use the content of that statement, whether by itself or in combination with other circumstances, to determine whether it evidences that the requisite common purpose existed. The evidence admitted under s 57(2) is evidence which is relevant to that question.
758 Section 87 provides:
87. Admissions made with authority
(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that-
(a) when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made; or
(b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the person's employment or authority; or
(c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the hearsay rule does not apply to a previous representation made by a person that tends to prove-
(a) that the person had authority to make statements on behalf of another person in relation to a matter; or
(b) that the person was an employee of another person or had authority otherwise to act for another person; or
(c) the scope of the person's employment or authority.
[Emphasis added]
759 However, even if the evidence passes through the gateway of s 57(2) and a relevant common purpose, its participants and scope can be determined, as is demonstrated by the analysis of the case law which follows, the evidence is still not admissible against C unless the additional element defined in s 87(1)(c) is proven to the requisite degree, namely that it is reasonably open to the court to find that the statement was made in furtherance of a common purpose that B and C had. In this regard, s 87(1)(c) can only operate if it is reasonably open from evidence other than the representation itself that the statement was made in furtherance of the common purpose. That is not to say that the representation in question is not to be examined. The sub-section calls for this to be done. However, the prevailing current case law directs that, in dtermining whether it is reasonably open to find that the representation was made 'in furtherance of a common purpose', the representation itself is to be excluded from the body of relevaqnt evidence.
760 Thus two fundamental questions arise in relation to the potential application of s 87(1)(c). First, did a relevant common purpose (whether lawful or not) exist, what were its participants, and what was its scope; and second, was the representation made by the person in furtherance of the common purpose. Two quite different evidentiary regimes apply to the consideration of each element.
761 Section 87(1)(c) has been considered in a number of cases: ACCC v Leahy Petroleum (17 December 2004) (Merkel J);[77] ACCC v Leahy Petroleum (29 May 2007) (Gray J)[78]; Landini v State of New South Wales and Ors (Hall J);[79] and R v Baladjam (No. 19) (Whealy J).[80]
762 In ACCC v Leahy Petroleum (17 December 2004), Merkel J was concerned with price fixing in the retail petrol market. His Honour approached s 87(1)(c) as substantially reflecting the common law as stated in Ahern v R[81] where the High Court observed in relation to conspiracy:[82]
In conspiracy cases a clear distinction is to be made between the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of each of the alleged conspirators in it. Conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means and it is the fact of the agreement, or combination, to engage in a common enterprise which is the nub of the offence. This fact can seldom be proved by direct evidence of the making of an agreement and must in almost all cases be proved as a matter of inference from other facts, that is to say, by circumstantial evidence. For this purpose, evidence may be led which includes the acts or declarations of one alleged conspirator made outside the presence of the others provided such evidence is not led to prove against the others the truth of any assertion or implied assertion made by the actor or the maker of the statement. It may take the form of evidence of separate acts or utterances from which the fact of combination might be inferred. Led in that way, it is not hearsay and is not dependent upon some circumstance to take it outside the hearsay rule, such as an implied authority making the acts and words of one the acts and words of the other.
763 In ACCC v Leahy Petroleum (29 May 2007) Gray J was also concerned with price fixing in the retail petrol market.
764 As to the process to be undertaken pursuant to s 87 Evidence Act, Gray J said:[83]
On two occasions, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has said that section 87(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) reproduces the pre-existing common law (see R v MacRaild and R v Watt). The pre-existing common law is found in Tripodi v The Queen and Ahern v The Queen. In both of these cases, the High Court of Australia made it clear that the statement by B could only be admissible against C if there were "reasonable evidence" establishing the existence of the common purpose, apart from the statement itself. I do not necessarily accept, as a New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal appears to have done, that the 'reasonable evidence' test is identical to the formulation 'reasonably open to find' referred by the legislature. For present purposes, however, MacRaild and Watt stand as authority for the proposition that, so far as they are consistent with the terms of section 87(1)(c) of the Evidence Act, Tripodi and Ahern are to be taken as providing authority on the proper construction of that provision. It follows that section 87(1)(c) must be applied on the basis that the admissibility of B's statement as against C can only be determined by reference to evidence other than the statement itself.
[Emphasis added]
765 Gray J in Leahy Petroleum, in the paragraph which followed, further developed the proposition that s 87(1)(c) could only operate if it was reasonably open from evidence other than the statement itself that the statement was made in furtherance of a common purpose. His Honour continued:[84]
It is clear that s 87(1)(c) can only operate if it is reasonably open from evidence other than the statement itself that the statement is made in furtherance of a common purpose. This follows from the terms of s 87 itself. The three paragraphs of subs (1) deal with three different situations in which a representation by one person is taken to be an admission by another person. Sub-section (2) makes provision for the prerequisites to admissibility under s 87(1)(a) and (b) to be proved by a representation by the same person who made the representation that is tendered as an admission. The prerequisite representation may, and often will, be contained in the same statement that is sought to be tendered as an admission against the party who made it. Section 87(2) says nothing at all about the manner in which the prerequisite to admissibility under s 87(1)(c) is to be established. If the existence of the required common purpose could be established by the representation itself, then a statement by B that indicated that B had a common purpose with C would always be admissible against C. The statement by B would be permitted to pull itself up by its own bootstraps. This would be an undesirable, and unintended, result of the application of s 87(1)(c).
[Emphasis added]
766 However, Whealy J in R v Baladjam (No. 19)[85] qualified the approach of Gray J in ACCC v Leahy Petroleum. Baladjam concerned an alleged criminal conspiracy involving associates of the Melbourne Muslim cleric Abdul Benbrika. The proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court involved a number of accused charged with conspiring to commit acts in preparation for a terrorist act or acts. The offence carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In general terms the Crown argued that a body of evidence known as the "Melbourne evidence" was admissible against all the accused to prove the existence, scope and nature of the alleged conspiracy. Further, it contended that some aspects of the evidence were admissible to prove the participation of the accused in the conspiracy. The Crown alleged that Benbrika was an Islamist who had publicly declared his support for militant or violent jihad and that he communicated with certain of the accused. The Crown wished to lead evidence of conversations intercepted on Benbrika's telephone service and recorded from listening devices in which extremist notions were discussed in inflammatory language.
767 An application was brought on behalf of the accused which sought to exclude "the Melbourne evidence" from the trial. His Honour admitted this material into evidence.
768 In the course of his reasoning, Whealy J considered the provisions of the Evidence Act relating to admissions.[86] His Honour observed:
It seems to me that, consistently with decided authority, the evidence of the statement made by B referred to above may be examined alongside other evidence in the proceedings, including a body of circumstantial evidence, to determine whether the common purpose existed, its participants, and its scope. In that sense, the statement is admissible against C, although it cannot be used to prove the participation of C in the agreement unless the process in s 87(1)(c) is followed and satisfied.
Again, I would demur from Gray J's analysis in one respect. It seems clear to me from the authorities to which I have made reference that B's statement may be admissible against C in proof of the existence and scope of the conspiracy in the manner I have suggested it may be used.
770 With the greatest of respect to Gray J, I agree with the analysis of Whealy J in Baladjam as to the appraoch to be taken to s 87(1)(c) Evidence Act.
771 It follows that, in determining the first question (as to whether a common purpose existed, what were its participants, and what was its scope) the relevant representation may be examined alongside other evidence, including circumstantial evidence, to determine the issue.
772 The approach to the second question however, namely whether the representation was made by the person in furtherance of the common purpose, in the sense of advancing, aiding or assisting the common purpose is entirely different. The alleged participation of C in the manner described can only be determined for the purposes of s 87(1)(c) by evidence other than the representation itself.
773 This proposition is confirmed in Landini v State of New South Wales and Ors[89] where Hall J was called upon to consider a statement allegedly made by one police officer to another as to what was allegedly said to the latter by a third officer. His Honour ruled that the statement made by the first officer was not a representation in furtherance of a common purpose within s 87(1)(c) of the Evidence Act. In the course of his reasoning, Hall J adopted the approach of the common law as stated in Ahern and said further as to the pre-conditions of s 87(1)(c):
(a) In Regina v MacRaild (18 December 1987, BC 9707215), Dunford J (with whom Sully and Simpson JJ. agreed) stated that s.87 reproduces the common law relating to representations made by co-conspirators: Ahern v The Queen [1988] HCA 39; (1998) 165 CLR 87; or in furtherance of a common purpose: Tripodi v The Queen [1961] HCA 22; (1961) 104 CLR 1.
(b) Under the common law, an admission by A is admissible against B if the court decides that there is "reasonable evidence" of common purpose and the admission was made in furtherance of that common purpose: see Ahern (supra).
(c) The pre-conditions specified in s.87(1)(c) depend, inter alia, upon whether "... it is reasonably open to find that ..." the representation made by Mr Dent to Mr X was in furtherance of a common purpose that Mr Dent had with a party or one or more persons including a party. The expression "common purpose" is a familiar one particularly in the field of criminal conspiracy. See, for example, Tripodi (supra) at 6 to 8. It, generally speaking, involves the concept of a combination or some form of preconcert formed between two or more persons to do an act or acts of a particular kind. When used in s.87(1)(c), it applies to a common purpose whether that common purpose be a lawful one or not. I have concluded that it is not possible on the evidence to make a finding that Mr Dent was a party to a common purpose within s.87(1)(c) at the time the representation was allegedly made. I will explain the basis for this conclusion below.
(d) The phrase "in furtherance of" carries with it the ordinary English dictionary meaning encapsulated in the word "furtherance", namely, the fact of being helped forward; the action of helping forward; advancement, aid, assistance: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, fifth ed., Vol. 1, p.1053. In the context of s.87(1)(c), it denotes an act done to advance, aid or help a common purpose whether that purpose is a lawful one or not.
774 Hall J added a qualification to the application of s 87(1)(c) of the Act. His Honour held that for the evidence to be admissible against the third party pursuant to the sub-section, the relevant common purpose must be derived from evidence beyond the statement in question. In this regard, his Honour observed:[90]
For that [s.87(1)(c)] to apply, it must be reasonably open to the court to find that the statement was made in furtherance of a common purpose that B and C had. It is clear that section 87(1)(c) can only operate if it is reasonably open from evidence other than the statement itself that the statement is made in furtherance of a common purpose.
775 Hall J in Landini proceeded to find that, as there was no evidence of a common purpose within s 87(1)(c), the alleged representation could not be found to have been made in furtherance of such a combination or purpose. His Honour reasoned:[91]
A representation will usually need to be more than a narrative statement of account of some past event in order for it to be a representation described in s.87(1)(c): Tripodi (supra) at 7. Representations within that provision will often be in the nature of directions, instructions, arrangements or statements accompanying acts, as has been observed, is usually the position concerning the admissibility at common law of statements against parties to an unlawful conspiracy or combination: see Tripodi (supra) at 7. It is, of course, possible to envisage a statement concerning a past activity that may carry with it an implication that the activity is to form the basis for a future arrangement and thereby relate to a combination or common purpose that existed at the time the statement was made. However, I do not consider that applies to the statement said to have been made by Mr Dent.
The statement in question said to have been made by him to Mr X is not in the nature of a direction, instruction or arrangement. Nor could it be said that there is evidence from which a finding could be made that the statement in question was one which was capable of advancing, aiding or helping a common purpose such as that relied upon by the plaintiff in the present proceedings.
Application of s. 87(1)(c) to the Documents in Question
776 I will now turn to consider the application of the legal principles to the Barnes Computer Information and the Barnes Finance Letter (in the context of the Toyota Printout).
777 Although I am satisfied that it is reasonably open to find that some of the documents in contention contained representations by one or more of the Defendants or other persons in furtherance of the common purpose as found, I am not satisfied that this is the case with regard to representations contained in other documents.
778 The evidence surrounding the production of each of the documents will be considered in turn.
779 The Barnes Computer Information will be considered in two parts: the representations which related to the Service Packaging Business and the representations which related to the ACB Business.
Barnes Computer Information - Service Packaging Business
780 The sale of the Service Packaging Business was effected by the First Sale Agreement dated 1 February 2002. The Court has before it the following agreements which each of the Defendants admits executing concerning the Service Packaging Business: namely, the First G5 Deed; and the Second G5 Deed.
781 It is reasonably open to find on the evidence that the same combination of persons who entered into the First G5 Deed and the Second G5 Deed, together with Holihan, in October 2004, at the time of the creation of the Barnes Computer Information, proposed an arrangement to acquire the entire interest in the Service Packaging Business. This is corroborated by the statements themselves.
782 The relevant part of the Barnes Computer Information containing the Representations relating to the Service Packaging Business reads:
ACB Packaging
Some discussion points on the business. I wish to talk to you about the offer from the Borg's.
In so far as Holihan placing an offer for Marlene's share this we can do quite quickly and this appears to be the chosen path pending our discussion on the other offer. We will need Marlene's brother to sign confidentiality agreements as well as Marlene in settling this sale. Ian Sangster will be our spokesman with Marlene and Brian.
This is how we see the structure. I would appreciate your advice on implications please.
SHARE\* MERGEFORMAT
ACB Packaging Proposed
Holihan buys Marlene's shares in G5. There are 10 shares issued in G5. We issue another 90 shares. Craig holds 16.67 shares on trust for his company Holihan Investments and 83.33 shares on trust for Leo Rose. LeoRose holds 16.67% ea for RB CBB Investments, Trevor Barnes, Brobel, Ian Sangster, Merry Men, Jim Hodgson Bankson and Albert Mihelic of Sampson Solo Pty Ltd. This represents a dilution of existing shareholders shares in favour of A. Mihelic and the purchase of shares by C. Holihan. The new structure would be: SHARE\*MERGEFORMAT
Please note that LeoRose is already established and holds Australian Corrugated Box shares for each of these companies. We are therefore using existing vehicles to do this.
Please advise the following. Firstly, does the structure make sense. Secondly what are the implications of Trevor, Roger, Jim and Ian reducing there (sic) shareholdings from 20 to 16 per cent. Thirdly what are the implications for Craig paying 200k for Marlene's 20 per cent and then reducing this to 16per cent. Fourthly the beneficiary of the share reductions is Albert who picks up 16per cent at no cost.
Please give me a ring on this at your convenience before Monday, many thanks Trevor.
Also in the file is the following note relevant to ownership of the Service Packaging business under the heading "Current structure of G5":
G5 MH sole dire Holds 2 shares and 8 on trust
RB CBB Investments 2 shares
JH Bankson 2 shares
IS Merrymen 2 shares
TB Brobel 2 shares
ACB Pack MH Sole Dire
783 The Representations in issue, as is clear on their face, comprised draft instructions to Vickery, Barnes' accountant, to enable him to advise on a proposed restructure for the enterprise involving the participants in the Service Packaging Business, namely Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley. The proposed re-structure involved Holihan being introduced to the business by buying out the interest of Mrs Hottes, coupled with a proposal for Mihelic to also take up a share.
784 The Representations comprised statements concerning a past activity that carry with them an implication that the activity is to form the basis for a future arrangement and relate to a combination or common purpose that existed at the time they were made.
785 It is reasonably open to find that a common purpose therefore existed within the meaning of s 87(1)(c) Evidence Act.
786 Further, in relation to the Representations contained in the Barnes Computer Information relating to the proposed acquisition of the Service Packaging Business, it is reasonably open to find on the evidence, other than that contained in the relevant statements in issue, that the parties to the G5 deeds, together with Holihan, were seeking to advance the common purpose at the time the Representations were made. The statements were created in furtherance of the common purpose on the part of the Defendants Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Holihan to purchase the interest of Mrs Hottes in the Service Packaging Business. This is evident from what follows.
787 The Barnes Computer Information was in part produced pursuant to a plan to buy the entire interest in the Service Packaging Business. In cross-examination Barnes said:
Well I'm not suggesting they hadn't proceeded well but I'm suggesting that these were your plans for the future so far as the Service Packaging business was concerned.
I think as Mr Sangster said we did consider buying the Service Packaging business yes.
...
So what was planned at this time was that Craig Holihan through agency of the spokesman Ian Sangster would make an offer for Marlene's shares in the Service Packaging business first of all, is that right?
Yes.
788 The evidence of Sangster given in cross-examination was consistent with the evidence given by Barnes, when he said:
Now, I put it to you that there was a proposal in or about October 2004 that Mr Holihan would buy the one-fifth share formerly of Mr Hottes, now of Marlene, his wife, in G5?
I can't say any more than I have, and that is that I have [had] discussions, numerous discussions, with Trevor Barnes about how we would build a vehicle to buy Marlene [Hottes] out completely.
789 I find that the Representations contained in Barnes Computer Information insofar as they relate to the Service Packaging Business are admissible pursuant to s 87(1)(a) Evidence Act against Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley, and evidence that, as at October 2004, each through their respective companies had an interest in the Service Packaging Business to the extent of 20%.
790 The Barnes Computer Information supports the Amcor parties' contention that each of Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley had taken an interest in the Service Packaging Business through G5 Investments Pty Ltd, and had maintained that interest at least into late 2004.
791 Reference is made in particular to the following, upon which Barnes was seeking advice: "Secondly what are the implications of Trevor; Roger Jim and Ian [who together with Hottes were the original shareholders in the Service Packaging Business] reducing their shareholdings from 20 to 16.67%". This is consistent with Barnes, Bayley, Hodgson and Sangster as at October 2004 continuing to each own a 20 per cent interest in the Service Packaging Business.
792 In cross-examination Barnes denied that through the G5 arrangement Mrs Hottes then owned in her own right a 20 per cent interest, and that she then held on trust for Barnes through his company Brobel, Hodgson through his company Bankson, Sangster through his company Merrymen, and Bayley through his company CBB Investments the remaining 80 per cent interest, saying that this structure, as it was put to him, was "incorrect". Barnes also said that at the time the other parties, meaning Hodgson, Sangster, and Bayley, were not shareholders in G5 Investments Pty Ltd Pty Ltd. This may have been technically the case, but when it was put to Barnes that "if they insisted upon shareholdings of 20 per cent each in G5 Pty Ltd [G5 Investments] at this time" they would have been so entitled to be issued shares on this basis, Barnes said "I don't believe so, at this time all the shares in G5 were owned by Mrs Hottes so I don't know how that would work". I found this response of Barnes to be unconvincing, and to be quite at odds with the proposal set out in the Barnes Computer Information in relation to the Service Packaging Business to which I have referred.
793 Part of the Barnes Computer Information contained statements which related to the ACB Business.
794 The ACB Business was sold by Amcor pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement by a document entitled "Asset Sale Deed" dated 2 June 2003. The relevant agreements between the Defendants, which each of them admits executing concerning the ACB Business, are:
(ii) the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement between Holihan and Barnes (reflecting the 80/20% split);
(iii) the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement between Holihan and Barnes (reflecting the 50/50% split).
795 It is reasonably open to find on the evidence that the same combination of persons who entered into these arrangements in relation to the ACB Business as documented in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, continued with these arrangements between them into October 2004 and that these arrangements were in place at the time of the creation of the Barnes Computer Information. This is corroborated by the statements themselves in their context.
796 Part of the Barnes Computer Information was in the form of draft instructions given by Barnes to Vickery, Barnes' accountant. This confirms that the structure outlined in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed proceeded, with Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic together with Holihan, holding interests in the ACB Business through their corporate vehicles (Holihan 20 per cent and the others 80 per cent, comprising 16 per cent each). The Barnes Computer Information relevantly stated in this regard:
Overview
Australian Corrugated box:
There is a trading company and a holding company. The holding company owns 100per cent of the trading company. Holihan investments owns 20 per cent of the holding company. LeoRose owns 80 per cent of the holding company. Craig is the sole dir of LeoRose and holds 80 per cent of the shares on trust for Astra. Astra holds all these shares on trust for Brobel which holds 16.66 per cent beneficially and the rest equally on trust for Merrymen; Bankson; CHH investments and Sampson Solo. (We are about to tidy this up and have LeoRose holding 80 per cent of the shares equally on trust for each of Brobel; Sampson Solo; Merry men; CHH Investments and Bankson. This will mean that we will close Astra).
797 The Barnes Computer Information confirms the arrangement between the parties that as at October 2004, being that Brobel held 10 shares in Astra of which 8 were held on trust for the corporate vehicles of Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster.
798 I find that the Barnes Computer Information, insofar as it related to the ACB Business was provided to Ms Selever by Barnes in October 2004. The purpose of the information was to provide information to Vickery, Barnes' accountant, to enable him to advise on a proposed restructure for the enterprise involving the participants in the ACB Business, namely Holihan, Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic.
799 The Representations were statements concerning a past activity that carry with them an implication that the activity is to form the basis for a future arrangement. The Representations relate to a combination or common purpose that existed at the time the statements were made.
800 Further, in relation to statements contained in the Barnes Computer Information relating to the ACB Business, it is reasonably open to find on the evidence, other than that contained in the relevant statements in issue, that the parties to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, were seeking to advance the common purpose reflected those documents at the time the statements were made.
801 Barnes was cross-examined about this section of the Barnes Computer Information. He confirmed that the section headed "Overview Australian Corrugated box" related to the ACB Business, and that the structure involved both a trading company and a holding company.
802 When asked whether this was information that "you were providing to Ms Selever in October 04". Barnes replied "I don't recall". The cross-examination of Barnes continued:
You're not suggesting Ms Selever had independent knowledge of this are you?---No not at all, I'm not suggesting that but I can't recall that.
So the information here in all likelihood came from you didn't it Mr Barnes?---It might have at some point in time.
803 I found Barnes' responses in relation to these matters put to him in the quoted passages above were disingenuous. Barnes gave instructions to Ms Selever in October 2004 which resulted in the entries in the Barnes Computer Information relating to the ACB Business.
804 On the other hand, Barnes' evidence given in cross-examination in which he confirmed that the section headed "Overview Australian Corrugated box" related to the ACB Business and that the structure involved both a trading company and a holding company, is accepted as confirming that in 2004 the structure was in place to effect the common purpose and that the relevant common purpose amongst the Defendant participants was current. From this evidence it is inferred that the relevant Representations were made in furtherance of the common purpose.
805 The Dividend Evidence, which is later dealt with, is another example of the furtherance of the common purpose described.
806 It is reasonably open to find that the Representations in relation to the ACB Business were created in furtherance of the common purpose on the part of the Defendants Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, Mihelic and Holihan to administer the arrangements which existed at the time between themselves in relation to the ACB Business.
807 The Representations contained in Barnes Computer Information insofar as they relate to the ACB Business are therefore admissible pursuant to s 87(1)(a) Evidence Act against Holihan, Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic, and evidence that, as at October 2004, each through their respective companies had an interest in the ACB Business to the extent of 16.66%.
The Barnes Finance Letter and the Toyota Printout
808 In about October 2004 Barnes was seeking finance from Toyota Financial Services (the "financier") to purchase or lease a new motor vehicle. Barnes was about to leave Australia for a period and he wanted finance to be arranged in his absence so he could take possession of the new vehicle on his return. He sent an undated letter to his accountant, Vickery, about the matter (the "Barnes Finance Letter"). In this letter Barnes provided Vickery with financial information in the event that a representative from the financier requested such information in the course of assessing his application.
809 A computer printout (the "Toyota Printout") produced by the financier notes that Mr Denis Bainbridge was the business manager within the financier who had responsibility for assessing Barnes' application for finance. The Toyota Printout also notes: "FOR TAX RETURNS/CASH FLOWS/BUDGETS CONTACT THE ACCOUNTANT MR JOHN VICKERY". I infer that Barnes had nominated Vickery to provide financial information to the financier in support of his application.
810 Barnes gave evidence about the Barnes Computer Information. Included in that information was a draft of the Barnes Finance Letter.
811 In the Barnes Finance Letter, Barnes listed as one of his assets a 20% interest in the Service Packaging Business, in addition to a 16% interest in the other business in contention in this proceeding, the ACB Business. The letter reads in relevant parts:
Dear John,
Please find enclosed my tax file as discussed. You will find the data for the 2004 return in the orange folder.
On Monday or Tuesday the Denis Bainbridge will contact you. I have applied under AMCG to purchase a vehicle via Lexus Financial Services as the interest rate is very favourable at 6.9%.
He will probably request details around my financials from you to approve the finance. I don't really want to give details around ACB packaging or Australian corrugated box. Ill need to discuss with you.
In terms of assets and liabilities
Assets
812 The letter then proceeds to list various other assets of Barnes.
813 Barnes gave evidence that Vickery was aware of the Service Packaging Business because Barnes, together with others, was looking at buying the business in October 2004. However, this does not explain why the business was listed as a current asset when writing to secure finance.
814 I accept what Barnes said about the origin of the Barnes Finance Letter. He wrote a handwritten note from which his wife Ms Selever drafted the letter on her laptop. He said that Ms Selever was acting on his behalf in seeking finance for the acquisition of a new motor vehicle in October 2004. I accept what Barnes said in the following passage of his cross-examination:
Did she [Ms Selever] prepare[d] them [the notes] from information that you provided her?---Information - we had discussions about the information, about certain information, yes.
Were you the author yourself of some of these notes in this document?---Um, I believe I was the author of some of the notes by way of a handwritten note which I asked her to draft a letter on my behalf.
815 He also conceded that the draft letter was prepared by Ms Selever on his behalf. It was a letter to be sent to Barnes' accountant, Vickery, asking him to convey the financial information to his prospective financier for the purposes of obtaining finance for a new motor vehicle. Ms Selever was at the time carrying on business as a financial planner. Part of her business involved brokering finance on behalf of clients. She had appropriate management and financial services qualifications to undertake this business.
816 Barnes also said in cross-examination as to these matters:
I think you agreed with me that you were making an application for finance for the purchase of a new vehicle in October 04?
That's correct.
You sent a letter to your accountant asking him to convey financial information to the prospective financier?
My partner sent the letter.
Is that you present wife Ms Selever?
Yes.
...
Ms Selever prepared a letter on your behalf that you sent to Mr Vickery the accountant?
She sent that to Mr Vickery, yes.
That was about October, towards the end of October 2004?
It would have been around that time yes.
...
You know don't you that Mr Vickery in due course provided that information to the prospective financier?
I believe he did.
817 In cross-examination by Barnes, Vickery explained that Barnes had told him that he was leaving Australia and wanted to collect a vehicle immediately on his return and wanted finance arranged in his absence. Vickery said, "He told me that a finance broker would forward me information which had to be forwarded onto the finance company. This is the information that was forwarded to me, and in turn, I forwarded information contained in this letter onto the finance company. On his return, I queried some of the information in it". In particular, Vickery said he queried the ACB Packaging shares. In response Barnes said it was an error and that he would rectify it with the finance company. However, there was no evidence showing that Barnes did in fact rectify the alleged error with the finance company and no evidence was called to this effect.
818 Barnes also said that the letter drafted by Ms Selever contained errors. However, she was not called to explain how she could have made such errors with respect to Barnes' finance application in a draft letter written on his behalf and into which he had direct input. At one point Barnes sought to explain the alleged errors by suggesting he believed that Ms Selever "was working from documents, unsigned shareholders agreements". However, Ms Selever was not called to give evidence, and again I draw a Jones v Dunkel inference that any evidence she may have given would not have assisted Barnes' case.
819 The Barnes Finance Letter further confirms as at 29 October 2004 that Barnes' company Astra owned 80 per cent of the ACB Business on behalf of 5 shareholders, including Barnes, who beneficially owned 16per cent each of that business. It also described the structure of the ACB Business as it was in October 2004 with Barnes holding one of the five shareholdings in the ACB Business amounting to a 16 per cent interest in the total enterprise.
820 I find the following in relation to the Barnes Computer Information insofar as it relates to the Service Packaging Business as reflected in the Barnes Finance Letter:
(a) The relevant Barnes Finance Letter material is an accurate record written by Amcor's solicitor of the time, Reid, of the content of the portions of the information which remained stored in the slack space on the hard-drive of a laptop obtained from Barnes' premises during the execution of the Anton Piller order on 11 November 2004;
(b) Subsequently, the original evidence was inadvertently destroyed;
(c) The laptop was used by Barnes' wife, Ms Selever, to create the relevant material stored therein;
(d) The material recorded by Ms Selever was prepared from information supplied to her by Barnes;
(e) The relevant material was entered into Ms Selever's laptop in October 2004;
(f) The relevant information comprised notes for the draft of a letter which was subsequently proposed to be sent to Barnes' accountant Vickery to assist in Barnes' application for finance for a new motor vehicle;
(g) The relevant Barnes Finance Letter described the structure of the Service Packaging Business as it was in October 2004 with Barnes holding a 20 per cent interest in the total enterprise and the other relevant Defendants each holding a 20 per cent interest.
821 I find that the information contained in the Barnes Finance Letter when read in conjunction with the Toyota Printout, as those documents were explained in the evidence of Vickery, constitute admissions against Barnes that, as at October 2004, he had an interest in the Service Packaging Business to the extent of 20%. However these documents do not constitute evidence against any of the other Defendants.
822 However, there is no evidence upon which the Court can be satisfied that the documents comprising the Barnes Finance Letter and the Toyota Printout were created in furtherance of any common purpose between any of the Defendants. Indeed the material on its face was created on the instructions of Barnes to further his own private purpose, namely the obtaining of finance to purchase a new motor vehicle for his private use.
823 I find that the Barnes Finance Letter, being the draft of this letter found in the Barnes Computer Information, and the Toyota Printout are admissable against Barnes as an admission against his interest pursuant to s 81(1), however these documents are not admissable against any of the other Defendants pursuant to s 87(1)(c) of the Evidence Act. They were not produced in aid of advancing any common purpose between them.
Evidence Supporting the Defendants' Position Relating to the Service Packaging Business
824 Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley gave sworn evidence in which each denied that he maintained an interest in the Service Packaging Business after the purported cancellation of the Second G5 Deed.
825 There is no evidence that Hodgson or any of the Defendants received any money out of the Service Packaging Business after its sale to Hottes. Post-sale the business was profitable. Profits were sufficient to enable dividend distributions. The business made payments to Hottes. The experts found no evidence of any payment to any of Hodgson or the Defendants. The Joint Report of Messrs Stone and Meredith states: "Mr Stone accepts that there were no dividends paid from the business, whilst it was not part of the Amcor Group".
826 Further, in mid-2006, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, solicitors for the Amcor Parties retained accountants McGrath Nicol & Partners to conduct a review of the Service Packaging Business. No witness was called from McGrath Nicol & Partners. Consequent on the review, the solicitors noted in a letter to Mr Walmsley dated 19 September 2006 "During the period of the business, the profits have been retained in the business...". Hodgson and Bayley gave evidence that they received no payments from the Service Containers Business. They were not challenged on this evidence.
827 The operational provisions of the First G5 Deed and the Second G5 Deed provided for the occurrence of various events: the shareholders were obliged from time to time to contribute funds for the operation of the business (clause 4); shareholder meetings were to be held (clause 7); and quarterly management and financial reports to shareholders were to be provided (clause 11). There is no evidence that any of these operational provisions were ever carried into effect or that any of the alleged partners ever played any part in the management of the Hottes business.
828 Those most closely involved with the Service Packaging Business, its accountant notably Vickery and its manager Ms Wearne, saw no evidence that Hottes had secret partners.
829 Vickery was Mr Hottes' accountant. He was also the accountant to Barnes. He gave advice to Mr Hottes prior to the sale. He prepared the financial records of the business after sale. He had full access to the company's books and records. After Hottes' death in August 2004, the business depended on him. He was familiar with the books and records of the company. In his early meetings with Hottes in 2001 Hottes told him that he intended to have investors. However, shortly before the settlement of the sale Hottes told him he did not need investors, because he had done a deal to pay for the stock over time. Hottes never told Mr Vickery that he had investors and, to the best of Vickery's knowledge, Hottes never had any investors in the business.
830 Further, Dettmar observed no involvement of any kind of Hodgson or the Defendants in the business. She had no knowledge of any secret partners in the business. Her evidence was: "Mr Hottes never said to you that he had any secret partners in the business? ---No."
831 Finally, when the business was returned to the Amcor Parties following the death of Hottes, it was transferred without consultation with Hodgson or the other Defendants. In the "Deed of Transfer of a Business" (between Service Packaging Pty Ltd and Amcor Packaging (Australia Pty Ltd), that is APA, signed by Mrs Hottes for and on behalf of Service Packaging Pty Ltd, the Deed notes: "the Transferor reports that it is the legal and beneficial owner of the business and the assets and uses the assets to conduct the business".
Conclusion as to Ownership of the Service Packaging Business
832 There is no contemporaneous documentary evidence which gives any support to the contentions of the Defendants that the First and Second G5 Deeds were both subject to an oral "3M" condition to the effect alleged, and that the transactions reflected in the deeds did not proceed by reason of the failure on the part of Hottes to fulfil those conditions.
833 Indeed, contemporaneous documentary evidence which does exist, is directly contrary to the Defendants' position, as reflected in the Barnes Computer Information, by way of example.
834 Further, the alleged 3M condition which is said to have governed the First and Second G5 Deeds, was ill-defined and the evidence is vague as to what comprised the alleged discussion or discussions said to give rise to this important term of the agreements.
835 I take into account each of the matters relied upon by the Defendants. However, having observed their evidence given in the witness box and having considered the evidence as a whole, I do not believe their version of events.
836 I am positively satisfied on the balance of probabilities to the requisite degree, that the transactions reflected in the two G5 Deeds were not brought to an end at the times and in the manner stated by the Defendants. The First G5 Deed was brought to an end when it was replaced by the Second G5 Deed. This had the principal effect of substituting company parties for the individual parties. Thereafter, the Second G5 Deed remained in place until at least October 2004.
837 I am satisfied that the secrecy surrounding the involvement of the Defendants in the Service Packaging Business, which had its origin in the Dillman Advice of December 2000, and was reflected in the elaborate structures which the Defendants put in place for that very purpose, was well guarded. It was revealed by Hottes to his wife shortly before his death in 2004. It was also revealed in the Barnes Computer Information and the Barnes Letter Information.
838 The Defendants' contention that the G5 Deeds were subject to the alleged 3M condition and that the G5 Deeds did not proceed due to non-fulfilment of that condition is rejected.
839 I do not arrive at this conclusion lightly and do so only after applying the accepted test for the necessary level of satisfaction required to establish such matters.[92]
(a) the First G5 Deed operated and was effective according to its terms from about November 2001 until about September 2002, with Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley each acquiring 20 per cent interests in the Service Packaging Business (together with Hottes); and
(b) the Second G5 Deed was substituted for the First G5 Deed in about September 2002. It operated and was effective according to its terms from then until at least October 2004. Throughout this period, the companies Bankson (for Hodgson), Brobel (for Barnes), Merrymen (for Sangster) and CBB Investments (for Bayley) obtained and maintained beneficial interests of 20 per cent each in the Service Packaging Business, with their principals respectively Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley acting as guarantors under the Second G5 Deed and ultimately enjoying beneficial ownership of the company's interests in the Service Packaging Business.
Acquisition of the Service Packaging Business by Mrs Hottes and Reacquisition by Amcor
841 Following Hottes' death on 5 August 2004, his solicitor Walmsley, and his accountant, Vickery, made arrangements to transfer Hottes' interests in the Service Packaging Business to Mrs Hottes. Vickery prepared the standard transfer of the five shares in G5 Investments Pty Ltd from the estate of Hottes to Mrs Hottes and sent them to Walmsley once they had been stamped. The ASIC search of G5 Investments Pty Ltd confirms that following transfer from Hottes on 6 October 2004, Mrs Hottes held one share beneficially and four shares on trust.
842 After Hottes' death there were a number of enquiries made by interested parties as to whether Mrs Hottes wished to sell the Service Packaging Business.
843 Vickery was acting as the accountant for Mrs Hottes at this time. He received several letters around October 2004 from people wanting to buy the business, including a letter from Joseph Borg, Managing Director of Ubeeco Packaging Solutions dated 19 October 2004. Mr Borg sent a follow up letter on 12 November 2004. Vickery had already received a letter dated 23 August 2004 from Dettmar, referring to earlier discussions and formally advising of her interest in acquiring the business. Vickery received a further letter from Ubeeco's solicitors dated 7 April 2005 and a letter from Pro-pack Packaging dated 11 May 2005 expressing interest in acquiring the Hottes business. Dettmar also wrote to Mrs Hottes on 28 July 2005, 7 November 2005 and 9 January 2006, again expressing her interest in purchasing the business. These letters were found on the files of AJ Macken & Co and discovered in Mr Macken's affidavit of documents.
844 Sangster gave evidence that he was aware from about October 2004 onwards of offers being made by third parties to purchase the Service Packaging Business.
845 The Amcor Parties contended that during October 2004 through August 2005 Sangster sought to purchase the single beneficial share Mrs Hottes held in G5 Investments Pty Ltd for Holihan; the plan was for Mihelic to also become a shareholder such that each of Barnes, Sangster, Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Holihan would each have 16.6 per cent of the Service Packaging Business.
846 Sangster's case was that he had a number of conversations with Walmsley: "... with respect to her predicament (Mrs Hottes) and what needed to happen with the business and then after I'd left Amcor it morphed into the fact that I wanted to buy the business and present myself as one of the purchasers", and that he and Barnes from October 2004 were interested in the purchase the whole of the Service Packaging Business rather than to secure the remaining one fifth interest held by Mrs Hottes. Each of Sangster and Barnes voluntarily resigned from Amcor on 28 September 2004.
847 However, I am not satisfied on the available evidence that the Amcor parties' contentions relating to Sangster's alleged proposals from October 2004 through August 2005 can be accepted. Nor am I satisfied on the evidence that any of the Defendants or any company associated with any of them, held any interest, whether beneficial or otherwise in the Service Packaging Business after October 2004.
848 The Service Packaging Business was reacquired by Amcor from Mrs Hottes on 30 March 2007. This was the year that Amcor commenced the Barnes Proceeding. Amcor paid $125,000 to Mrs Hottes for the business. She did not share this with any of the Defendants. There was no evidence about the settlement or as to any steps taken to resolve any issue of beneficial shareholders in the business, if they continued to hold beneficial interests at this time. The inference is that at that time there were no other parties who had, or claimed to have, any such continuing interest in the business.
849 In the hands of Hottes, and until Amcor reacquired the business on 30 March 2007, the Service Packaging Business was profitable.
(a) the business returned operating profits of $323,168 as at 30 June 2004;
(b) as at the 30th of June 2004 (5 weeks before Mr Hottes death), the net profit of the business for that year had been $226,218 and shareholders equity in the business at that time was $597,986;
(c) in addition, the following payments were made to made to Hottes company M & I Displays, totalling $645,150 from the Service Packaging Business throughout the period it was held by G5:
(i) March 2002 to December 2003 - $4,950 per month; and
(ii) 1 January 2004 - March 2007 - $13,750 per month;
(d) at the time the Amcor parties obtained possession of the Service Packaging Business in 2007, there were funds in the bank in excess of $750,000. In fact the reconciliation report amount and investment account balance total $725,734.56, and the balance sheet as of 30 March 2007, the settlement date, shows total equity of $951,137.92. These funds in the bank were returned to Amcor along with the business.
851 No documents showing the disbursement of funds from M & I Displays were produced or admitted into evidence.
852 In spite of the profitable financial position of the Service Packaging Business, Hottes elected not to distribute any dividends and instead retained the profits in the business (other than the monthly payments to his company M & I Displays Pty Ltd).
853 By letter dated 23 July 2004, Vickery, Hottes' accountant, wrote to Hottes about dividends. In the letter Vickery noted that a dividend of $200,000 could be paid in September 2004 and a further dividend of $200,000 in April 2005. Subsequently Vickery had a telephone conversation with Hottes in relation to the payment of dividends and hand wrote Hottes' response on the letter to the effect that he "doesn't want to pay any dividend. Prefers to retain liquidity and get back to paying accounts sooner".
854 Amcor paid $125,000 to Mrs Hottes for the business on its re-transfer to Amcor on 30 March 2007.
855 There was no evidence of any dividend or payment of any of any profits derived from the Service Packaging Business ever finding their way into the hands of any of the Defendants, either prior to October 2004, or at any time thereafter.
The Second Sale Agreement - Sale of the ACB Business
856 The business the subject of the Second Sale Agreement (the "ACB Business") was the business conducted by ACN 002693843 Box Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd) ("ACB"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Amcor. The business involved the sale and supply of corrugated packaging. The ACB Business was conducted at Wetherill Park, in Sydney, NSW.
857 The ACB Business was in the short run, and specialty market. Its market niche was customers with small run needs. It manufactured the more complex or labour-intensive cardboard box products.
858 As at June 2003, the directors of ACB were Brown, Clayton and Crawford. Lewis was Company Secretary.
859 Neither Hodgson, nor any of the Defendants was a director of ACB.
860 Holihan was the manager of the ACB Business at the time. He reported to Barnes, who in turn reported to Hodgson.
861 In September 2002, the ACB Business had been identified by Amcor in its "Major Operational Costs Saving" ("MOCS") review as a non-core or non-performing business asset which was to be closed. The Amcor Board approved the recommendation to close the ACB Business and sell its assets on 23 October 2002.
862 The events leading up to this decision were as follows.
863 In the 2001/2002 financial year and after the sale of the Service Packaging Business Brown instructed Hodgson to commence the "MOCS" review, as it was called.[93]
864 The purpose of the MOCS review was to identify for the purposes of closure or sale, non-core and/or non performing fibreboard packaging business assets of Amcor or its subsidiaries.
865 Amcor settled upon a strategy of closing non-core and/or underperforming business assets and sell the assets, particularly the real estate. This had been identified as one of the means by which a directive of Jones and the Amcor Board to increase overall profitability was to be achieved. Hodgson placed Mr Kevin McCluskey ("McCluskey") in charge of the MOCS initiative.
866 Part of Mr McCluskey's role was to identify relevant business assets for closure and sale. The MOCS Report produced by McCluskey recommended the closure of the Townsville, Wetherill Park [the ACB Business] and Box Hill operations.
867 A strategy document incorporating McCluskey's MOCS Report was prepared and presented by Hodgson and Parker to Brown, Jones, Lachal and Clayton at Abbottsford on 20 September 2002. Brown and Jones suggested some changes but otherwise approved the presentation and told Hodgson to prepare the amended document for presentation to the Amcor Board.
868 Parker and Hodgson amended the document and made the changes recommended by Brown and Jones. They called the final version of this strategy document "Blueprint for Further Improvement". This was considered by the Amcor Board on two occasions, the first being a presentation made to the Amcor Board by Hodgson on 16 October 2002. Brown was also present at this meeting. Hodgson spoke to the "Blueprint Print for Further Improvement" document on this occasion. This exercise was repeated on 23 October 2002, when it was approved by the Amcor board.
869 The "Blueprint for Further Improvement" document made provision for 265 redundancies across Australia including all 48 employees at Wetherill Park and the closure of the ACB Business.
870 By this means, the Amcor Board approved the sale of the land and certain assets of the ACB Business at Wetherill Park, but for commercial reasons, exempted the large corrugator machine situated on the site.
871 The Amcor Board was advised that the sale of the Wetherill Park assets (excluding the corrugator) was expected to raise approximately $1.2 million. The calculations of the value of the assets of the ACB Business were prepared by Parker. He wrote all of the financial parts of the "Blueprint for Further Improvement" document and Hodgson wrote the implementation strategies.
872 In the financial year ended 2003, the ACB Business had a turnover of approximately $4,285 million but made a loss of approximately $359,000. Accordingly, it was not only a business which was not profitable, it was a loss making enterprise, a situation which did not escape the attention of Amcor.
Holihan's Proposal to Purchase the ACB Business
873 Sometime prior to the Amcor Board's approval on 23 October 2002 of the "Blueprint for Further Improvement" recommendations, Barnes told Hodgson that Holihan, the ACB Business manager at the time, had expressed interest in acquiring some of the assets of the ACB Business if that business was to be closed down. His initial plan was to buy some of the assets of the ACB Business excluding the corrugator and relocate its operations to a smaller plant employing an entirely new workforce that would not be covered by Amcor industrial agreements.
874 In about mid-2002, Hodgson spoke to Brown about Holihan's interest. Brown said "Let him put in a proposal and we'll look at it".
875 Hodgson told Barnes that Holihan should submit a proposal for consideration by Brown. Holihan subsequently prepared a document entitled "Management Buy Out (MBO) of Australian Corrugated Box Co (ACB)".
Amcor's Approval of the Second Sale Agreement
876 In or about November or December 2002, Hodgson directed Parker to take responsibility for finalising negotiations in relation to the Second Sale Agreement proposed with Holihan.
877 Parker in turn directed Mr Tony Joyce to review the sale and the proposed terms in early January 2003. Joyce completed the review and prepared a document entitled "Notes on Proposed ACB Contract" for Parker dated 7 January 2003. The document commented on the terms of the proposed Second Sale Agreement including the price. There was no conclusion arrived at to the effect that the proposed Second Sale Agreement was uncommercial, and the transaction proceeded on its way.
878 Ms Alyssa Caplan, an in-house lawyer seconded from Allens Arthur Robinson to Amcor reported to Lewis. She was asked to review the terms of the Second Sale Agreement. She did so without identifying that the terms were uncommercial.
879 Legal advice was also sought by Amcor from Baker & McKenzie and from Allens Arthur Robinson.
880 The vendor company was ACB, an Amcor subsidiary.
881 Ultimately, Clayton signed the Second Sale Agreement. He was a Director of ACB. Lewis also signed the document in his capacity as the secretary of the vendor company. Clayton said that prior to signing the agreement, he asked Parker to come to his office and take him though the relevant clauses of the Second Sale Agreement. He was familiar with sale of business agreements and was aware prior to signing the that the sale price was $1 million which was payable over five years.
882 Clayton also gave evidence in cross-examination about a number of other clauses in the Second Sale Agreement. For example, Parker told Clayton that there was a five year contract for the supply of corrugated board by Amcor. Clayton also gave evidence that Parker explained the rationale for the sale to Holihan, namely that Amcor could not run the business profitably and it did not fit strategically with Amcor's future objectives. He also noted in his evidence that the transaction had the advantage of realising the underlying value of the real estate where the business was situated.
883 Clayton agreed in cross-examination that Hodgson had no authority to approve the sale and that he spoke to Brown who confirmed that he (Brown) had approved it. In this regard, Clayton said in his evidence:
Prior to signing the Asset Sale Deed I had a meeting with Ken Parker. Ken Parker told me that the sale had the approval of Jim Hodgson and Peter Brown. I do not recall how the $1 million dollar sale price was arrived at, how the sale price was justified or whether I was every briefed on such matters. I was told by Ken Parker that the rationale for selling the businesses was that Amcor could not run it profitably and it did not fit strategically and that Craig Holihan had the specific knowledge and skill set to obtain growth from the business as a stand alone entity.
I had a conversation with Peter Brown where he confirmed that he had approved the sale of the ACB business to Holihan.
884 As Clayton said, and I accept, Parker was a very experienced accountant and financial controller. He also had management experience. He said that if Parker had considered there was anything wrong with the transaction that he (Parker) would have told him. He expected Mr Parker would have been thorough and that he (Parker) did not tell him any reason not to execute the document, nor did he (Clayton) consider he should not sign it. Clayton considered that "it was his job" not to sign the agreement if he didn't get satisfactory answers to any question he put to Parker about it. He said that Lewis did not tell him that there was anything uncommercial about the sale of land or the proposed lease. He said there was nothing that caused him any concern about the transaction.
885 I am satisfied that Brown, Clayton and Lewis on behalf of Amcor authorised and approved both the sale and lease arrangements comprised in the Second Sale Agreement and thereby Amcor itself approved of the sale and its terms.
886 An issue arose as to the operation of Amcor's policy in relation to the "Acquisition of Capital Assets". A capital expenditure and a review committee called the Capital Expenditure Review Group (CERG) was established by that policy. Lachal in his evidence in chief gave evidence that the Acquisition of Capital Assets Policy applied equally to the disposal of assets. However, in cross-examination, Lachal could not identify any part of the policy that said anything about its application to the sale of assets, nor could he identify any other document in support of the position which he maintained on this issue.
887 I am not satisfied that the AMCOR Capital Expenditure Review Group policy applied to both the acquisition of assets by Amcor as well as to the divestment of assets.
888 Lachal outlined what he said was the role of the Capital Expenditure Review Group (CERG) based on his experience as chairman of CERG for Amcor from 2000-2003 and his knowledge of the proper processes to be followed when selling a business. He referred to the policies and procedures for capital expenditures and for the acquisition of assets as set out in a formal document approved by the Board entitled "Acquisition of Capital Assets". His evidence was that the same procedures, including authority levels and review processes, applied with respect to the divestment of assets and that all businesses within Amcor Australasia were expected to follow those procedures.
889 Lachal was challenged about the applicability of the policy to divestments in addition to acquisitions. He agreed that the policy did not say anything in relation to sale of assets. He said, however "The policy applied equally to sales and acquiring of assets. The management of all of Amcor's assets was a primary responsibility of all of the senior people within Amcor. You could not, in any conscience, have a policy that said you could sell any assets you like without any approvals you like".
890 Lachal also gave evidence about the normal process for the sale of a business. Such a sale would be included in the annual budget for the division. Before that happened, the relevant manager or managers of the business were required to discuss the proposal to sell the business with the corporate team. This discussion would include an assessment of the value of the business based on a range of parameters including its strategic value to Amcor. Lachal's evidence, which was uncontroverted, was that the same process (apart from inclusion in the budget and different authority levels) was to occur for an unbudgeted sale.
891 Lachal said further that as the sale was for a proposed selling price of over $500,000, Hodgson should have prepared a paper and had the proposed sale reviewed by the CERG. Lachal also gave evidence that it would be usual to then prepare an information memorandum (IM).
892 His evidence was that after approval in the budget and divisional business plan, the sale process would commence, involving external advisors and preparation of a paper to be presented at the relevant level of Amcor for authorisation to proceed to explore the sale. The paper was intended to cover as a minimum: the strategic rationale for the sale; details as to whether assets or the company itself were being sold; key financial details including tax impacts, evaluation criteria such as similar transactions; and likely buyers.
893 Lewis, another long-serving employee of Amcor, also gave evidence that the CERG policy applied equally to transactions, purchases and leases as well as divestments.
894 Hodgson gave evidence to the contrary, saying that the policy did not apply to sales and that he was unaware that the ACB Business sale had to be approved or reviewed by the CERG.
895 I am satisfied that the sale of the ACB Business to Holihan pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement was in the Amcor category of an "unbudgeted sale of up to $1 million". The sale at $1 million did not require Amcor board approval.
896 As such, the approval level for the sale rested with the managing director of Amcor Australasia, who in this instance was Brown.
897 I am also satisfied that in this case, the sale of the ACB Business was not referred to CERG for review and no IM was prepared.
898 However, in approaching the sale in this way, although I accept that the procedure in referring this kind of matter to the CERG for review and preparing an IM may have been employed by Amcor, I am not satisfied that adherence to those procedures was an invariable procedural requirement which called for strict compliance.
899 I find that no breach of duty to Amcor arose by reason of non-compliance with these protocols even if they applied to the sale of assets at the time.
900 Both Lachal and Pyne gave evidence about further procedures to be adopted when the sale was a management buy-out ("MBO Procedure"), noting that the internal controls were critical where there was a sale proposed to Amcor employees to ensure independence of valuation and proper process.
901 The MBO Procedure was explained by reference to another MBO prepared for the Kiwiplan business. This highlighted the requirement for full disclosure to the Amcor board of the identity of the employee purchasers.
902 Lachal also gave evidence about the procedures which ought to have been followed to ensure no conflict of interest arose and that Amcor's interests were properly protected, particularly had he known of the proposed involvement of the Amcor senior employees Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in the acquisition of the ACB Business.
903 Again, although I accept that the application of an MBO Procedure may have been employed by Amcor, I am not satisfied that adherence to this procedure required strict compliance, failing which a breach of duty to the company would occur.
Sale of the ACB Business by Amcor (the Second Sale Agreement)
904 The ACB Business was eventually sold by Amcor to companies associated with Holihan pursuant to a document entitled "Asset Sale Deed" dated 2 June 2003 (the "Second Sale Agreement"). The Second Sale Agreement was executed on 3 June 2003 by Lewis and Clayton on behalf of ACB, the Amcor vendor.
905 The Second Sale Agreement was completed on 30 July 2003.
906 The parties to the executed deed were Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (the vendor), ACB Australia Pty Limited (the Purchaser), Achilla Pty Limited (the Purchaser Trading Company) and Holihan (the director and owner of the purchaser and trading companies) (collectively called the "Purchasers").
907 The key terms of the Second Sale Agreement involved the transfer to the Purchasers included all property and assets owned or used by ACB in the ACB Business as at completion, including:
(3) All of the interest of ACB under or arising out of existing contracts, including contracts and agreements for supply to customers;
908 The purchase price for the ACB Business was $1 million, payable in the five annual instalments and commencing 12 months after completion of the sale. There was no provision for any payment at the time of sale and most of the purchase price was payable by the fourth and fifth instalments (clause 3).
909 The price for the stock was payable 12 months from completion, at a price determined by a stock take conducted by ACB prior to completion, with the costs borne exclusively by ACB (clause 6).
910 The parties were required to enter a separate agreement for the sublease of the premises at Wetherill Park from which the ACB Business operated. The sub-lease was annexed to the Second Sale Agreement (clause 5.4) and provided for a rental at a lower rate than under the head lease.
911 It was agreed that ACB would effect the termination of employment of its employees and was obliged to pay their entitlements and the Purchasers were entitled to offer employment to the employees on any terms (clause 7).
912 The Purchasers were entitled to all accounts receivable accruing but not paid by the date of the sale and to accounts receivable after the sale (clause 8).
913 ACB assigned to the Purchasers, or was obliged to obtain novation of, its interests under all contracts, including a licence known as the NXT General Licence between New Transducers Limited and ACB of July 2002 (clause 9). The NXT licence was included in the assets after the sale price had been settled.
914 Further, a supply agreement was incorporated into the Second Sale Agreement (clause 12). For a period of five years from completion, the Amcor company ACB was obliged to supply raw materials in the nature of corrugated board and cartons to the Purchaser Trading Company Achilla and the Purchaser at prices based on a direct costs and distribution costs ("D&D") basis. Second, for a period of five years from completion, Achilla was required under the Second Sale Agreement to undertake work for AFP on "base products" supplied by it (for example, boxes or corrugated sheets). Achilla was obliged to perform work on this material (for example, affixing a label or performing some other special work) and then return the modified product to AFP and charge AFP for the work done and any additional material used.
915 There is divergence as to how the parties arrived at the purchase price of $1 million for the ACB Business.
916 On Barnes' evidence, he provided a template agreement to Holihan on 26 August 2002. That template agreement contained a price of $500,000.
917 However, Holihan's evidence was that the first price he offered was $700,000.
918 Hodgson said Barnes told him in August 2002 that Holihan was willing to pay $500,000 plus stock. Barnes did not explain why he told Hodgson that Holihan had offered only $500,000. Hodgson's evidence was that he then relayed the $500,000 offer to Brown and Brown said "can we get more?". Hodgson gave evidence that he then phoned Barnes in NSW to say Brown wanted more money.
919 Between about mid-2002 to late August 2002 Hodgson told Brown by telephone that Holihan was offering to pay $500,000 plus stock. Brown said "Can we get more?". Hodgson said to Brown that he would find out and get back to him. Hodgson then telephoned Barnes (who was in New South Wales) and told him that Brown wanted more money.
920 Hodgson gave evidence that, at about this same time in August 2002, in a meeting between Parker, Hodgson and Brown, Parker said he had calculated that the ACB Business was likely to earn approximately $200,000 to $225,000 operating profit per annum after its sale to Holihan. Parker said that, using a multiplier of 4.5 times estimated profit, a sale of $1 million was not unreasonable. Brown said words to the effect that he accepted Parker's assessment. Hodgson said that he also thought this was a reasonable price.
921 Brown said that he wanted Holihan to agree to a long term supply contract. This was seen to be to the commercial advantage of Amcor.
922 However, Parker gave evidence that he did not carry out any such calculations, and did not have discussions with Brown about what the asking price for the ACB Business should be by reference to a PBIT multiple or otherwise.
923 I prefer the evidence of Parker on this issue and accept that Parker had no input into the sale price of the business. Parker did not know what assets were being proposed to be sold to Holihan. The asset list was finalised only in discussions between Barnes, Holihan and Parker in May 2003.
924 However, a purchase price at $1 million was broadly within range of the value of the ACB Business assets as reported to the Amcor Board in the "Blueprint for Further Improvement", which was $1.2 million.
925 Further, it seems in about August 2002, Hodgson rang Barnes and told him that Holihan would have to pay $1 million plus stock and would have to agree to a long term supply contract.
926 Following these events, on or about 15 October 2002 Holihan attended an awards presentation at the NSW Parliament House organised by the Sustainable Energy Development Authority. When he arrived, he saw and approached Brown, who he knew at the time was the Managing Director of Amcor Australasia. Holihan also knew that Brown reported directly to Jones, the Managing Director of Amcor. Brown and Holihan had a conversation about the sale process relating to the ACB business. Brown asked Holihan whether he was aware of the risks involved in purchasing a business. Holihan asserted that he was experienced enough to be successful in turning the business around in the long term. Brown indicated stated that the ACB business had not been successful for Amcor, and asked whether Holihan "had access to $1 million". The discussion continued about the possible provision of vendor finance to Holihan and the security which Amcor may require for this purpose. However, the proposed sale price appeared not to be in doubt, as far as Brown was concerned.
927 The substance of the conversation was put to Brown in cross-examination. Brown accepted that he attended the NSW Parliament House on the occasion in question and that he had met and spoken with Holihan. He did not deny the essence of what Holihan related about the conversation, however said that he could not remember the details, saying for example:
You said, "Do you have a million dollars or access to that sort of money, do you have a million dollars equity in your house"?---I can't recall that.
You're not saying it didn't happen,, you just can't recall it?---Well I can't recall it, I recall seeing him there but I can't recall the details of the conversation.
928 As at September 2002, I accept that Brown was aware that Holihan was comfortable with the idea of purchasing the assets of the ACB business and moving to another site. He was also aware of the likelihood of significant advantages to Amcor of a transaction involving a supply agreement and a sale and lease back to Amcor of the site on which the ACB business was conducted. He said in cross-examination:
Your view was, was that there were significant advantages on the sale of Wetherill Park if there was a lease back to Amcor?---Ah, that was one possibility.
Which would enhance the amount that would be recovered on the sale of Wetherill Park?---Yes, I could find somebody to take it up and - - -Yes?---And use the facility.
929 Brown also said in his evidence that he was aware that the proposed sale price for the ACB business was to be $1 million as he had been advised of this by Hodgson.
930 I accept that the conversation on or about 15 October 2002 at the NSW Parliament House took place as described by Holihan.
931 As to precisely how the purchase price of $1 million was settled upon on Amcor's part remains uncertain on the evidence, however, there is no doubt that this was the base purchase price which both Amcor and Holihan agreed to.
Whether Sale of the Assets or Sale of the Business
932 The Defendants contended that a distinction needs to be drawn between an agreement pursuant to which it is intended that the purchaser takes an interest in an entity which purchased assets of the ACB Business and an agreement where it is intended that the purchaser takes an interest in the business. Amcor, on the other hand, contended that the subject matter of the Second Sale Agreement was, as defined in its pleading, the ACB Business which included the sale and supply of corrugated packaging conducted by the NSW Division of AFP.
933 I am satisfied that the Second Sale Agreement, although it was contained in a document described as "Asset Sale Deed", was in substance the sale of the entire business of ACB (excluding certain defined assets such as the corrugator). Although the Second Sale Agreement did provide for the transfer of certain assets to the Purchasers, clause 3.1 makes clear that the $1 million purchase price was the "the purchase price for purchase of the Business", a term defined in the agreement as "the business carried on by the vendor of the sale and supply of corrugated packaging".
No Approval the Sale of the ACB Business to Defendants other than Holihan
934 I am satisfied that at no time prior to the sale of the ACB Business was Amcor informed that Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic had taken or intended to take an interest in the business. There was therefore no consent by Amcor for those individuals or their associated companies to take an interest in the business.
935 I accept that Amcor provided authorisation or approval for the sale of the ACB Business to the party that it understood it was dealing with - Holihan and his associated companies, ACB Australia Pty Ltd and Achilla Pty Ltd. What was approved was a sale to Holihan and his company, not to Holihan, his companies and other parties.
936 Lachal gave evidence that it was not until May 2006 when he met with Holihan in his role as Managing Director of Amcor Australasia, that Holihan told him that Barnes was his partner in the ACB Business. Until, then he had no knowledge that Barnes had acquired an interest in the business.
937 Brown's evidence was that he was not asked to give permission for Barnes to take an interest in the ACB Business together with Holihan. He did not know that Barnes was also to take an equity interest in the ACB Business.
938 Still less did Amcor give permission for Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic to take an interest in the ACB Business together with Holihan and Barnes.
939 Barnes relied on the letter to Hodgson dated 29 May 2003 (but which he says he drafted in March 2003) as documentary evidence of Amcor's authorisation and approval of his participation in the acquisition of the ACB Business. However, Barnes knew Brown was the only person within Amcor with the authority to grant the permission he was seeking.
940 I reject the Barnes letter to Hodgson dated 29 May 2003 as constituting an appropriately directed request for permission from Amcor for him to participate in the acquisition of the ACB Business. Not did Hodgson have any authority to grant the request. Further, I am satisfied that the request from Barnes was not passed on by Hodgson to Brown.
941 Each of Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and Hodgson, whilst admitting they did not seek approval for their participation or inform Amcor that they intended to take an interest in the ACB Business, contended that there was no need to do so because they did not in fact take an interest.
942 Brown approved in principle the sale of the ACB Business to its then manager, Holihan, including approval of the price. However, he did not approve the involvement of any other party in the purchase, still less the involvement of Amcor executives.
Involvement of Defendants in the Second Sale Agreement (Amcor's Sale of the ACB Business)
943 Barnes was Holihan's superior until November 2002 when the restructure within Amcor was undertaken.
944 Barnes said that the key terms of the sale of the business were agreed by November 2002, which I accept.
945 I also accept that Barnes was involved in the negotiation of the terms of sale of the ACB Business in the period before November 2002. Barnes said that he instructed John MacPhail of Baker & McKenzie as Amcor's lawyers for the transaction with an overall brief and asked them to work directly with Holihan to develop a draft agreement. Throughout the negotiations during this period it was Barnes who was given draft documents for review and comment. Subsequently, his role was assumed by Parker, although Barnes was kept appraised of the negotiated terms of the Second Sale Agreement as they progressed to the final draft.
946 Hodgson had no involvement in the operation of the ACB Business while it was in the hands of Amcor.
947 Further, he had little involvement in the early preparation of the documents relevant to the Second Sale Agreement. He did not speak with the solicitors who were retained to prepare the sale documentation and there is no evidence that he spoke with Holihan about the matter.
948 However, at some later point during the negotiations, Hodgson became appraised of the terms of the Second Sale Agreement. He was asked to look at a draft of the proposed Second Sale Agreement for review and comment, which he did.
949 I am satisfied that Hodgson had no authority to fix a sale price. Only Brown had the authority within Amcor to approve the sale and to settle the sale price.
950 There was evidence that Hodgson's involvement in the arrangements which were entered into for him and the other shareholders to acquire an interest in the ACB Business first occurred in mid to late May 2003, a short period of time prior to the execution of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and at a time after the essential terms of the Second Sale Agreement had been negotiated and approved by Brown. Barnes gave evidence that prior to a discussion between himself and Hodgson in or about mid May 2003, Hodgson was himself unaware that Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic were at that time intending to join with Barnes in taking up an interest in the ACB Business with Holihan.
951 I am satisfied that Hodgson had no direct involvement in the negotiations of the terms for the Second Sale Agreement.
952 Sangster said as to his involvement in the negotiation of the Second Sale Agreement:
During that period [from around September 2002 until 2 June 2003 when negotiations for the sale of the ACB Business took place] I was managing the Queensland business and or the sales for Amcor Fibre Packaging, Fresh Food Packaging.
In those roles I played no part in the decision to seel the ACB business. I had no part in the negotiations nor was I aware of the terms or conditions of sale. I played no part in the Supply Agreement.
I was aware that Parker, Chief Financial Officer Amcor Fibre Packaging Australia and Tony Joyce (Joyce), Assistant Financial Officer were tasked with negotiating and reviewing the sale in accordance with Browns' strategic intent to close the Wetherill Park site. Parker and Joyce gave updated [reports] with respect to the sale of ACB business at management meetings that I attended and my recollection is that they were keeping Brown informed through Clayton whom they had close financial links to.
I had no knowledge that [Mc]MacPhail, Lawyers for Amcor were involved nor did I know that Mr Roe, lawyers for Craig Hol[l]ihan, Manager, ACB Packaging were involved.
I had no role as a negotiator in The Second Sale Agreement and had no knowledge of the terms of the document.
953 I accept this evidence of Sangster. There was no satisfactory evidence to contradict it.
954 Bayley's evidence was that from March 2001 - May 2003 when he worked in New Zealand he "had no involvement with the ACB Business". Further, he did not participate in the decision to sell the ACB business and did not know the course of the negotiations as to its sale. He had no role as a negotiator of the Second Sale Agreement and did not know its terms. Having regard to his responsibilities within Amcor at the time, namely, as General Manager of the Amcor Kiwi Packaging business resident and working in New Zealand, the sale of the ACB business was outside the scope of his responsibilities.
956 Each of the relevant Amcor witnesses accepted that Bayley had no role in the transaction: Lachal's evidence was that it was no part of Bayley's role to devise a process for the sale of the ACB Business. Lewis, who had responsibilities in relation to property matters, had no dealings with Bayley in relation to the sale and lease back the Wetherill Park. Clayton's evidence was that as far as he was aware Bayley had no role in the sale process for the ACB Business. Parker's evidence was that he had no dealings with Mr Bayley in relation to the transaction. Brown's evidence was that Amcor did not rely upon Bayley in relation to the transaction.
957 Mihelic's evidence was to similar effect. His evidence was that "I did not work within the ACB Business. I had no involvement in all dealings with the ACB Business".
958 He said he had no part in the decision to sell the ACB Business. He did not participate in the decision to sell the ACB business and did not know the course of the negotiations. He said he had no role as a negotiator of the Second Sale Agreement and did not know its terms. The sale of the ACB business was outside the scope of his responsibilities as General Manager Packaging Solutions.
960 Again, each of the relevant Amcor witnesses accepted that Mihelic had no relevant part to play in the sale of the ACB Business. Lachal's evidence was that it was no part of Mihelic's role to devise a process for the sale of the ACB Business. Lewis who had primary responsibilities in relation to property matters had no dealings with Mihelic as to the sale and lease back the Wetherill Park and no dealings with him as to property matters at all. Clayton's evidence was that Mihelic had no role in the sale process for the ACB Business. Parker's evidence was that he had did not keep Mihelic appraised as to the detailed negotiations as to the transaction. Brown's evidence was that Amcor did not rely upon Mihelic in relation to the transaction.
Interest of the Defendants in the Acquisition of the ACB Business
961 The Amcor parties contended that each of Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic, together with Holihan, gained interests in the acquisition of the ACB Business and that each continued to hold such an interest.
962 However it was the case of Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic that, while they intended to acquire an interest in the ACB Business, they determined not to do so at an early point, and they did not persist with the plan.
963 On the other hand, Barnes took the position that, although he took an interest in the business during the course of his employment and continues to hold such an interest, he had the permission of Amcor to do so.
964 The history of the involvement of the various Defendants in the ACB Business is catalogued in the findings which follow.
Genesis of the Involvement of Barnes in the ACB Business
965 By 25 October 2002, with the essential terms of the Second Sale Agreement agreed, Holihan was content to sign the agreement in the form as it was at that time. He communicated this to Barnes by email. Shortly after this time Barnes advised Holihan that the proposed sale of the ACB business to him had been approved in principle. Barnes and Holihan also discussed the prospect of doing business together after they left employment with Amcor. This conversation was of a general nature and did not relate specifically to the ACB business.
966 A short time later Barnes approached Holihan and said that he wanted to be part of the ACB business which was in the process of being sold to Holihan. When Holihan raised the question of the involvement of Barnes in the sale of the ACB Business to that point, suggesting the obvious conflict of interest, Barnes said that he would see if another employee of Amcor, Mr Ken Parker ("Parker") who was a Group General Manager of the Commercial team, could take over management of the sale to Holihan. Barnes also told Holihan that in any event the sale would require the approval of Brown and possibly the Amcor board.
967 In early November 2002 Barnes put a proposition to Holihan to the effect that if he got permission from Amcor to join Holihan in the ACB Business, Holihan should reduce his shareholding in the ACB business to 20%. This was proposed by Barnes to Holihan on the basis that this would entitle Holihan to a shareholding in a larger group of businesses being planned by Barnes at the time and would therefore be worth considerably more. Barnes proposed that he also would take a 20% shareholding, leaving 60% to be taken up by another shareholder or shareholders who would provide investment funds, however the other investors could not be named at this point. Holihan left the matter on the basis that he would obtain some advice. Holihan subsequently raised the matter with his solicitor, Roe.
968 Holihan's recollection of the conversation with Barnes was to the following effect:
Barnes said: Over the last week I've been thinking through our joint venture discussions and I'd like to float another idea past you. If I get permission to join you in the business venture, would you consider reducing your shareholding to 20% on the condition that that 20% is a shareholding in an even larger group of companies and worth much more?
Holihan said: What do you mean?
Barnes said: Well the 50% of one business that you and I develop will take time and money. If you're interested in making this a part of a national business and possibly becoming a third player in the box market there's a way that we could do it. There's been a lot of work done by Amcor to reduce costs and to get out of certain markets and that work has to go somewhere. I've been told by a friend of mine that Visy is working on exactly the same modelling as Amcor. Both Visy and Amcor will continue to cut costs and that will lead to opportunities in this end of the market. Amcor might even exit the box business altogether.
Holihan said: Who would this other shareholder be?
Barnes said: I am not in a position to tell you yet. It's just an idea at this stage. There are some issues to sort through but I see this as a potential opportunity and I want to know whether you will consider it.
Holihan said: What would your shareholding be in this new venture?
Barnes said: The same as yours. You and I would each have 20% and the other shareholding would be 60%. Even though you are relinquishing some of your interest in our partnership, I see the new business venture as ultimately becoming a larger business, therefore you'll get a smaller piece of a much larger pie.
Holihan said: I'd need to think about it and I'd need to get some advice.
969 Barnes said that his early discussion with Holihan about involving other shareholders in the ACB Business was to the following effect:
Craig I am going to have to sell this concept and I believe we will need additional skills and equity to move this opportunity forward. I have some people interested and I suggest we make provision for that in the business structure. Holihan asked me who they were and I said I was unable to tell him at that stage. I suggested we put aside 60% of the business for new equity partners and he agreed with certain provisos.
Holihan was very clear in expressing that in the event that [agreement to] such an arrangement was not obtained then the original 50:50 agreement between Holihan & Barnes would automatically apply. I agreed. I explained to Holihan that AFPA was considering a new strategy for the short run end of its business which I believed could form part of this arrangement.
970 To the extent that the versions between Holihan and Barnes differ as to this conversation in early November 2002, I prefer the version of Holihan to that of Barnes. In particular, I do not accept the agreement struck at this time between Holihan and Barnes provided that in the event that agreement to the proposed arrangement was not obtained then the original 50:50 agreement between Holihan & Barnes would automatically apply. Rather, an agreement to this effect was arrived at in or around early February 2003, as described below.
971 By the end of November, Holihan asked Roe for advice on how a transaction could be structured so that unknown investors could be nominated at a later time.
972 Negotiations in relation to the sale continued. In or about December 2002 Barnes confirmed with Holihan that Parker would take over responsibility for the sale on behalf of Amcor and review the proposed contract as it had been drafted to that point. However, Barnes remained an intermediary receiving amendments and notes on the proposed contract from Holihan and passing them on to Parker.
973 Discussions in relation to the proposed Second Sale Agreement between Amcor and Holihan in the meantime continued.
974 In about early February 2003 Barnes said that he had a further conversation with Holihan in which an agreement was arrived at to the effect that if the transaction involving the 60% shareholding of the unnamed party or parties did not proceed, then they both would revert to a shareholding of the ACB Business on a 50/50 basis, and if Barnes did not obtain the permission of Amcor to participate, then Holihan would proceed on his own in any event. Holihan related his version of the conversation in the following way:
Holihan said: Any agreement we enter will show that you don't have any direct involvement with either the trading company or the asset holding company. Although you are to have some rights as part of your shareholdings, the ultimate control of the business should be with me and I can't be voted out. Any new business that we start will be via the holding company. If you don't get permission from Amcor, I will move forward with the purchase without you.
Barnes said: That's fair enough. At this stage it's important to keep my involvement in-confidence until I am given permission. I've asked Hodgson who's checking with Brown. I'm concerned that if the final sale agreement is not approved then my ongoing career with Amcor could be brought into question. I just don't know what Brown will say. I want to leave Amcor but I want to leave on my own terms.
Holihan said: If this other larger business model falls through but you get permission, then my shareholding should remain at 50% and not at 20%. I am not going to reduce my shareholding with nothing in return.
Barnes said: Absolutely, that's what we've said and agreed.
Holihan said: With the shareholding I'm giving up, I want to make sure that you aren't simply taking a bigger share in the business for yourself.
Barnes said: I can tell you that I have the exact same shareholding as you, that is, 20%.
975 Holihan then gave instructions to Roe to draw up an agreement to reflect the discussions between himself and Barnes to that point.
False Advice from Barnes to Holihan that Barnes Involvement Approved by Amcor
976 In about March 2003, Barnes advised Holihan that Hodgson had obtained approval from Brown for him (Barnes) to take a shareholding in the ACB Business. However, this was on condition that Barnes would stay employed by Amcor for 12 months to assist in the restructuring of Amcor's AFP business.
977 Holihan accepted this assurance from his superior Barnes.
978 However, I am positively satisfied that this advice given by Barnes to Holihan was false. It was calculated to provide comfort to Holihan to encourage him to proceed with the transaction as it had been discussed between Barnes and Holihan to that point. The alleged approval from Amcor was neve r obtained from Amcor and was disavowed by Hodgson.
979 Although the evidence is in conflict on the point, I am satisfied that it was Barnes was the principal instigator of the plan to introduce Hodson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic to become involved as shareholders in the ACB Business.
980 Mihelic gave evidence that Bayley initially contacted him to discuss taking an interest in the ACB Business some time between January and March 2003. Mihelic said that at this time he was aware that each of Barnes, Sangster and Bayley intended to take an interest in the ACB Business and that he only became aware of Hodgson's intention to take an interest later in April or May 2003.
981 On 21 March 2003 Roe, who was Barnes' solicitor, provided a draft of what was to become the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement to Holihan. This was the subject of some comments from Barnes when it was provided to him. Amendments were then introduced into the draft.
982 Barnes encouraged Holihan to proceed with some significant growth figures, telling Holihan that the businesses he contemplated for the enterprise would grow rapidly and within 2 years could turn over $15 million and within 7 years $100 million at which point a float on the stock exchange could be contemplated. Holihan, relying on the skill and experience of his superior Barnes, believed that this was possible, provided additional funds could be provided by the Barnes' 60% secret investor or investors.
983 In April 2003 Barnes informed Holihan that the contract of sale of the ACB business drafted to that point was to be "independently" reviewed and that he (Barnes) was seeking legal advice.
984 On 23 April 2003 the third and fourth defendants (the ACB Purchaser and Achilla, respectively) were registered as companies. Holihan intended ACB Purchaser to be the company that owned the ACB Business assets and Achilla to be the trading company.
985 Barnes gave evidence that in April 2003 Sangster and Bayley "asked me if I would consider them as partners in my proposed channel strategy vision rather than continue their employment with Amcor". However, Bayley's evidence was that it was "by May 2003" that Barnes spoke to him about taking an interest in the ACB purchaser after its sale. Sangster gave evidence that Barnes initially approached him to discuss taking an interest in the ACB Business approximately six weeks before the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was signed. I prefer the evidence of Bayley and Sangster on the matter of who first approach who.
986 In late April or early May 2003, Brown had a conversation with Holihan in which he urged Holihan to get on with the transaction to enable the sale to take place before 30 June of that year. Holihan responded that it was in the hands of Parker. Thereafter, Parker adopted the position that the transaction ought to be brought to an early conclusion.
987 Barnes received further drafts from his solicitor Roe of what was to become the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement on or about 24 April, 21 May and 22 May 2003.
988 In or around early May 2003 Barnes told Holihan that there were three other shareholders that he represented and who would hold 60% of the new venture, and that he would have power of attorney on behalf of those other three. Barnes refused to disclose to Holihan the identities of the other shareholders or any details as to who they might be.
989 Hodgson said that "in early May 2003 Barnes came to see me in my office in Burwood" and put forward a proposal that "... I and others take up some interest in Holihan's company. According to Hodgson, Barnes informed him that "he had already spoken to Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley and that they were all interested". He informed Barnes "that it sounded like a good idea and I was interested". I accept the evidence of Hodgson on the matter.
990 The necessary documentation was prepared in early May to facilitate the inclusion of Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and, later in May 2003, Hodgson. Barnes provided instructions to his solicitor, Roe (who he then shared in common with Holihan), for the drafting of the documentation.
Incorporation of Holihan Investments and LeoRose
991 On 26 May 2003, Holihan Investments and LeoRose were incorporated. LeoRose was formed because the name "ACB Holdings" was not available. LeoRose was formed for the purpose of holding all the shares in ACB Purchaser, on trust for Holihan and his wife Katherine (through Holihan Investments) and Barnes.
992 An agreement dated 26 May 2003 between Holihan and Barnes relating to the purchase of the ACB Business (the "26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement") was executed by Holihan and Barnes on or about 26 May 2003. This is the management agreement referred to in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed signed on the same day, which is later described.
993 On 26 May 2003 Holihan attended the office of his solicitor Roe with Barnes and executed the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. The parties to the agreement were Barnes and Holihan.
994 After certain corrections were made to the shareholdings of the participating entities, the structure of the arrangement between Holihan and Barnes giving rise to the 80/20 ownership split was:
(c) Holihan held 10 shares in LeoRose which were divided as follows:
(i) 2 of the shares were held beneficially by Holihan; and
(ii) the remaining 8 shares I held non-beneficially for Astra, which had 10 ordinary issued shares, all of which were owned by Brobel. Brobel had one ordinary issued share, which was owned beneficially by Barnes.
995 The Recitals pursuant to the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement were to the following effect:
(a) ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd (the purchaser of the ACB Business) was referred to as the Holding Company, Achilla Pty Ltd was referred to as the Trading Company and LeoRose Pty Ltd was referred to as the Shareholding Company;
(b) Holihan was to be sole director of each of the Holding Company, Trading Company and Shareholding Company;
(c) the Holding Company was to own all of the shares in the Trading Company;
(d) the Shareholding Company owned 80% of the shares in the Holding Company;
(e) Holihan Investments Pty Ltd was to own 20% of the shares in the Holding Company and LeoRose was to own the remaining 80% of the shares as trustee;
(f) Holihan Investments Pty Ltd was to own all of the shares in the Shareholding Company as trustee for Astra Corporation Pty Ltd (Barnes' company);
(g) all shares in Astra Corporation Pty Ltd are to be held by another company, in which there were to be 10 issued shares, of which Barnes was said to hold 2 shares beneficially and the other 8 shares on trust;
(h) Holihan was not to be aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares;
(i) the Holding Company proposed to acquire the goodwill, plant and equipment of the Corrugating Packaging Supply Business known as Australia Corrugated Box Co trading at 159 Newton Road in Wetherill Park;
(j) the Trading Company proposed to change its name to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd.
The 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed (marked "Cancelled")
996 Also on 26 May 2003 a number of the Defendant parties executed a deed called the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed (the "26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed").
997 A version of this Deed tendered in evidence was marked "CANCELLED" in handwriting and initialled, but not dated, by the Defendant party signatories.
998 The parties to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were:
Companies described in the deed as "shareholder companies", namely:
(d) CBB investments Pty Ltd (Bayley's company); and
999 The 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed described the transaction in its recitals in the following terms:
(A) Each of ACB (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 670) ('the holding company') Achilla Pty Limited (ACN 104 489 581) ("the trading company") and LeoRose Pty Limited (ACN 104 857 247) ("the shareholding company") is a company registered under the Corporations Act.
(B) Holihan ("the director") is the sole director of each of the holding company, the trading company and the shareholding company
(C) The holding company owns all of the shares in the trading company.
(D) The shareholding company owns eighty per cent (80%) of the shares in the holding company.
(E) Holihan Investments Pty Limited (ACN 104 851 247) ("Holihan's company") owns twenty (20%) per cent of the shares in the holding company and LeoRose Pty Limited (ACN 104 857 247) (the shareholding company) holds the remaining eight[y] (80%) of the shares (the trust shares) as trustee.
(F) Holihan's company holds all of the shares in the shareholding company as trustee for Astra Corporation Pty Limited (ACN 104 784 438) (Barnes' company)
(G) Barnes is the sole director and shareholder of Barnes' company.
(H) All shares in Barnes company are held by another company, in which there are ten (10) shares issues, of which Barnes holds two (2) share beneficially and the other eight (8) (the trust shares) on trust.
(I) Holihan is not aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares.
(J) The holding company proposes to acquire the goodwill, plant and equipment of the corrugated packaging supply business known as Australian Corrugated Box Co at 159 to 163 Newton Road Wetherill Park ("the business") and to cause the trading company to conduct that business.
(K) The trading company proposes to change its name to Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Limited.
(L) The trading company will conduct the substantial portion of its business with the Amcor Group of Companies.
(M) This agreement will govern the affairs of each of the trading company, the holding company and the shareholding company (the companies).
1000 The practical effect of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, read together with the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement, was that there would be five shareholders in the ACB purchaser, ACB Australia Pty Ltd, and hence the ACB Business: Holihan having a 20% stake (the "Holihan Interest"); and five others sharing an 80% stake - Barnes (16%); Hodgson (16%); Sangster (16%); Bayley (16%) and Mihelic (16%) (the "Barnes Interests").
1001 The ACB Business structure, as reflected in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreements set out in schematic form in Appendix A to these reasons.
1002 The 80/20 split structure for the ACB Business was achieved under the terms of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement in the following way.
1003 ACB Australia Pty Ltd (the holding company) owned all of the shares in Achilla Pty Ltd (the trading company). LeoRose Pty Ltd (the shareholding company) held 80 per cent of the shares in ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd. Holihan Investments Pty Ltd owned the remaining 20 per cent of the shares in ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd. Further, Holihan Investments Pty Ltd held all of the shares in Lerose LeoRose Pty Ltd on trust for Astra Corporation Pty Ltd.
1004 Pursuant to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, Barnes' corporate vehicle (Brobel) held the 10 shares in Astra Corporation so that 2 shares would be owned beneficially by Barnes and the remaining 8 shares were held on trust by him for the corporate vehicles of Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster such that together they effectively owned 80 per cent of Astra, and together with Barnes they all owned 100 per cent of Astra.
1005 Pursuant to Schedule 3 of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, Barnes' corporate vehicle Brobel (Brobel Investments Pty Ltd) held all of the 10 shares in Astra (Barnes' company, Astra Corporation Pty Ltd). Two of those shares, representiing 20 per cent, were held beneficially for Barnes and eight of those shares, representing 80 per cent, were held on trust for Bankson Pty Ltd (Hodgson's company), Merrymen Pty Ltd (Sangster's company), Sampson Solo Pty Ltd (Mihelic's company), and CBB Investments Pty Ltd ( Bayley's company).
1006 Barnes sought to say that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed contemplated that 10 shares would be issued in Brobel and that such shares would be held on behalf of the corporate entities. By this means, Barnes sought to suggest that the fact that 10 shares were not issued in Brobel was evidence that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed did not proceed. However, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed contemplated, not that 10 shares would be issued in Brobel but that 10 shares in Astra would be issued to Brobel. This is what occurred. Brobel still owns 10 shares in Astra.
Confidentiality as to the ACB Business Structure
1007 Following entry into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreements ownership of the ACB Business was concealed by two mechanisms.
1008 The first mechanism was the complicated corporate structure and trust structure for the acquisition of the ACB Business which has been earlier described. This was designed to eliminate the facility to trace the true ownership of the business by searches conducted on the public record.
1009 The second mechanism involved the inclusion of elaborate confidentiality provisions in the ACB Business documentation. These provisions notably included a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause which exposed the signatories to liquidated damages of $200,000 for disclosing the existence of the Deed, the fact that any other party was a party to the Deed or the identity of any of the shareholder representatives. These confidentiality provisions arose from instructions set out in a facsimile from Holihan to the solicitor acting in the transaction Mr David Roe ("Roe") dated 1 April 2003. Holihan explained this document set out instructions from both himself and Barnes in respect of the shareholders agreement.
1010 The 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement contained a confidentiality clause which was in the following terms:
Confidentiality
21.1 (a) Neither Holihan nor Barnes can disclose to any other person, body or corporation: -
(i) the existence of this agreement,
(ii) the fact that any person referred to clause 20 hereof is a party to this agreement, or
(iii) the identity of the persons referred to in clause 20 hereof represents.
(b) No party to this agreement can disclose to any other person, body or corporation any information relating to:-
(i) the affairs of any of the trading, holding or shareholding companies,
(ii) the interests of any person in any of the companies,
(iii) this agreement
(c) Barnes makes this agreement on his own behalf and on behalf of each of the directors and representatives of each beneficial owner. He must ensure that each of them complies with the provisions of this clause.
(d) This clause cannot prevent a party from making any disclosure required by law, or of information which can be shown by use of written records to have already been in the public domain prior to any such disclosure.
21.2 If at any time before notification is given pursuant to clause 20 hereof any party breaches the provisions of sub-clause 21.1, he must pay to the other parties jointly liquidated damages of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00), which the parties agree is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss which those parties would suffer as a result of that breach, but this provision shall not limit the other parties or any of them from claiming for losses suffered in addition to that amount.
1011 Clause 20 of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement also provided that Barnes represented himself and the unidentified beneficial owners, and that he had lodged written notification of the identity of at least two of the beneficial owners and their nominated representatives to be a party to the Agreement with David Roe, solicitor. The agreement also provided that instructions were to be given to Roe "to disclose those identities to Holihan at such time within one (1) year from the date of this agreement as Barnes shall specify".
1012 The 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed also provided for confidentiality, in terms similar to those contained in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement. Clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of the Deed achieved this, although these clauses appear to have mistakenly included part of the confidentiality regime derived from an earlier draft of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement by reference to "clause 20(b) of the agreement" (which is non-existent in the Deed). Clauses 4.1 and 4.2 provided:
4.1 (a) No party can disclose to any other person, body or corporation: -
(i) the existence of this deed
(ii) the fact that any other party is a party to this deed, or
(iii) the identity of any of the shareholder representatives
(b) No part to this deed can disclose to any other person, body or corporation any information relating to: -
(i) the affairs of any of the companies specified in the agreement
(ii) the interests of any person in any of those companies,
(iii) this deed
(c) This clause cannot prevent a party from making any disclosure required by law, or information which can be showed by use of written records have already been in the public domain prior to any such disclosure.
4.2 If at any time before notification is given pursuant to clause 20(b) of the agreement any party breaches the provisions of the clause, he must pay to the other parties jointly liquidated damages of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), which the parties agree is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss which those parties would suffer as a result of that breach, but this provisions shall not limit the other parties or any of them from claiming for losses suffered in addition to that amount.
Findings as to the Confidentiality Regime Relating to the ACB Business Structure
1013 The confidentiality clauses and the corporate and trust structures were designed to achieve confidentiality in relation to the three agreements in question, namely: the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed.
1014 In evidence given during cross-examination Bayley said that the group was not seeking to keep these agreements secret from Amcor but "just our peers".
1015 The evidence of Sangster was to similar effect when he suggested that it was standard and normal procedure as "in the context of putting something like this together you wouldn't want to have things floating around".
1016 Mihelic stated that the confidentiality clause was designed to "keep it secret from some people in Amcor".
1017 In evidence given in cross-examination, Hodgson said:
Yes, and that was because you wanted to keep this deed secret from the rest of the world, wasn't it, Hodgson?---From peer level scrutiny, yes.
Peer level scrutiny, and indeed, scrutiny by anyone above you at Amcor, is that right?---No. This whole concept would only work if Amcor approved it and supported it.
1018 However, I am satisfied that, whatever ancillary purposes were to be served by the confidentiality reagime, the principal purpose sought to be achieved by the confidentiality provisions of the various agreements and the corporate structure adopted was to conceal the interests of Amcor's managers from their employer. The approach was consistent with the Dillman Advice which had been given by letter of 19 December 2000.
1019 The reason advanced by some of the Defendants that the confidentiality regime was to prevent "peer level scrutiny" and "peer level interference" may have been a factor in its inclusion in the agreements, however, I do not accept this as a full and candid explanation.
1020 I am satisfied that the elaborate confidentiality structure was designed to conceal the ownership of the shares in the ACB Business, which as to 80 per cent of the ownership was divided equally between Hodgson, his wife and his company (Bankson); Barnes (Astra and Brobel); Sangster (Merrymen); Mihelic, his wife and his company (Sampson Solo); and Bayley, his wife and his company (CBB Investments).
1021 Amcor executed the Second Sale Agreement in respect of the ACB Business in favour of the Holihan interests on 2 June 2003. The purchase price was $1 million plus stock. The sale was settled on 30 July 2003.
1022 Following the sale of the ACB business after its settlement on 30 July 2003, for the first 12 months Barnes had no direct involvement in its day to day operation. The ACB business was managed by Holihan.
1023 I am satisfied that the identity of the other ultimate beneficiaries, other than Barnes, was not disclosed to Holihan on or prior to 26 May 2003. The Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement recorded that Holihan was "not aware of the identity of the beneficial owners of the trust shares". The agreement also contained a detailed and punitive confidentiality clause which is later described.
1024 Further, there is no evidence that Holihan became aware of the identity of the shareholders in the ACB Business, other than Barnes, for at least a year following entry into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreements.
Disclosure to Holihan of Identity of Other Shareholders
1025 As earlier observed, clause 20(b) of the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement provided a mechanism for the identities of the other parties to be disclosed to Holihan "at such time within one (1) year from the date of this agereement as Barnes shall specify".
1026 In or about May or June 2004, the precise date being uncertain, some 12 months after entry into the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, Holihan said that he raised the question with Barnes as to the identity of the other shareholders. This was information he said he felt he was entitled to.
1027 The conversation was said by Holihan to have proceeded as follows:
1028 Holihan said that in May or June 2004, "12 months after the First Shareholders Agreement had been signed" he felt "entitled to know who the other shareholders were". He said that Barnes informed him in a conversation at this time who the others "were supposed to be", namely Hodgson, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster, "but they decided not to proceed".
1029 This version of events accords broadly with the evidence of Barnes who said that it was not until May 2004 (cf. Holihan's evidence that this took place in May or June 2004) that he informed Holihan that each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic had decided, some 12 months earlier in May 2003, not to proceed with their acquisition of an interest in the ACB Business. As they still worked for Amcor, Barnes advised Holihan that they didn't want their intentions or their participation in the ACB business known and for this reason the confidentiality clause was included in the First Shareholders Agreement, however they were now prepared to divulge their identities to Holihan. Barnes also said as to this: "[It]...probably took about a year to resolve before I spoke to Holihan."
1030 Barnes proposed that they return to the 50/50 split between them as had been originally agreed. Barnes was still employed by Amcor at this time.
1032 Holihan said that he was annoyed that Barnes had not told him that these persons never took an interest in the ACB business and that his shareholding was effectively 50% and not 20%. He said further as to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, that he was nevertheless "pleased as it meant that [he] still had a 50 per cent shareholding in the Achilla Business which was performing well at the time as opposed to owning 20 per cent of an entity that to date had not evolved".
28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement Executed October 2005
1033 Sometime in mid to late 2005, a further Agreement was drafted in relation to the ACB business (the "28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement").
1034 The 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was a further management agreement between Barnes and Holihan. However, despite the date it bears, it was not executed until in about October 2005.
1035 Holihan executed the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, but it was back dated to 28 May 2003 he said to reflect the 50/50 shareholding originally agreed to as a default position between Barnes and Holihan and to reflect the fact that any agreement between Barnes and Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic never proceeded.
1036 Pursuant to the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, on its face Holihan in effect held a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the ACB Business and Barnes held the other 50 per cent.
1037 Barnes claimed the agreement "regularised the shareholding structure' between himself and Holihan" and gave effect to the true ownership of the ACB Business, namely, 50 per cent as to the Holihan interests and 50 per cent as to the Barnes' interests.
1038 As to this, Barnes claimed that the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement was subject to a verbal undertaking between himself and Holihan "to go 50 per cent [each] if the other agreement fell over". Earlier in his cross-examination, Barnes described the arrangement in the following terms: "... there was always an understanding that Mr Holihan and myself would revert to 50/50 if the other didn't proceed". Barnes said that he and Holihan "had a verbal agreement, at 50/50, the fact that there was an agreement which said it was 80/20 as far as I'm concerned wasn't relevant".
1039 Holihan's evidence was that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was not drafted by Roe until mid to late 2005. Holihan claimed that while the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was not executed until 2005, it was dated 28 May 2003 so as to reflect the fact that he had always held a 50 per cent shareholding in Achilla Pty Ltd.
1040 Holihan admitted that he did not sign the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 until about October 2005 and that such signing occurred at Barnes' house in Rhodes, Sydney, in the presence of Barnes and Tanya Selever. Barnes admitted that the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement was signed by himself and Holihan, some two and a half years later than the date it bears, in late 2005 at Barnes' home at Rhodes in Sydney in the presence of Barnes' wife, Tanya Selever, as witness.
1041 Pursuant to the terms of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, ACB Australia Pty Ltd (the holding company which acquired the ACB Business) owned all of the shares in Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (the trading company) and LeoRose Pty Ltd (the shareholding company) held all of the shares in ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd as trustee. The Agreement further provided that "Holihan and/or Holihan's company" and "Barnes and/or Astra" must each beneficially own not less than 50 per cent of the shares in LeoRose Pty Ltd.
1042 The structure of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement is shown schematically in Appendix "B".
Confidentiality of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement
1043 The 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement mirrored the provisions in relation to confidentiality as found in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.
1044 I find that these provisions were introduced into the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement for the same reason as that found in relation to confidentiality clause found in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.
Defendants Cases in relation to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed
1045 The Defendants all contended that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was cancelled by them shortly after it was made, on or before 28 May 2003, and with that the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement also was not proceeded with.
1046 A copy of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed which was marked in handwriting "CANCELLED" and initialled by the paties to it, with the handwritten part undated, was tendered in evidence.
1047 The cases of each of the Defendants on this issue will be dealt with in turn.
1048 Hodgson's evidence was that it was in early May 2003 that Barnes first approached him with a view to him taking an interest in the ACB Business, which was in the process of being sold by Amcor to companies associated with Holihan.
1049 Hodgson gave evidence at trial he advised each of Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic that: "we really needed to get approval for the Channel Partner Strategy before we signed this business agreement and that it should be cancelled and that I'd go and see Brown and start the process of selling it internally". Hodgson claimed further that "almost immediately" after the execution of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, he advised each of Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic that "he considered its execution premature ... before obtaining aproval from Brown and Jones of our Channel Partner network proposal and the proposal to acquire an interest in the company owned by Holihan which was acquiring the ACB Business assets".
1050 However, there was no evidence that Hodgson had ever discussed the so called Channel Partner Strategy with Brown or had ever sought his approval for any of the Defendants to be involved with an interest in the ACB Business.
1051 In his pleadings Hodgson claimed that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on 28 May 2003 as a consequence of the striking through of its terms and each party initialling the cancellation.
1052 At trial, Hodgson gave evidence that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled "almost immediately ... within a day" of its execution.
1053 Despite admitting that he had executed the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed before obtaining approval from Amcor, Hodgson acknowledged that he knew that it would "take a lot of internal discussion to get this approved".
1054 Hodgson also gave evidence that the agreement to cancel the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed occurred on or about 28 May 2003 and that sometime thereafter he "received the original Shareholders Agreement by post which had already been struck through and initialled by some of the parties". He claimed that he and his wife initialled the cancellation and that he probably forwarded the deed to Barnes without having kept a copy. Hodgson further claimed that "it took some time to obtain everybody's endorsement of the cancellation". Hodgson recalled "thereafter I think it [the deed] was circulated, I remember either sending it or receiving it by post".
1055 Hodgson also claimed to have no recollection as to whether he gave effect to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed in the presence of any other party.
1056 While the Defendant parties are at one in claiming that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on or about 28 May 2003, their recollections of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation were vague and varied considerably.
1057 Barnes claimed that the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed arose as a consequence of advice he received from Hodgson in late May 2003. Barnes said that in late May, Hodgson advised him, he believed by telephone, that the shareholders agreement involving Bayley, Sangster, Mihelic and himself was premature and should be cancelled pending the approval and involvement of Amcor.
1058 On Barnes' case, by the time the Second Sale Agreement was executed on 2 June 2003, Hodgson and their three other colleagues, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster, having pulled out of the proposal to obtain equity in the ACB Business, which occurred within about two to three days of 26 May 2003, the 50/50 split arrangement between Barnes and Holihan sprang into life.
1059 Barnes said further that initially, documents were meant to be prepared on the basis that Holihan Investments Pty Ltd would own 20% of the shares in ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd, with LeoRose Pty Ltd holding the other 80% on trust for Astra Pty Ltd. In a separate agreement Astra Corporation Pty Ltd was to hold all shares on trust for Brobel Investments. He, Barnes, was to issue 10 shares in Brobel, 2 to be held beneficially by himself and 2 each were to be held on trust for Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and Hodgson. The documentation then went on to provide for the disclosure of those other beneficial owners to Holihan in certain circumstances within 12 months but at the discretion of Barnes. He said that on 26 May 2003, agreements to this effect were executed (being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed), the Agreement having been signed by Barnes and Holihan and witnessed by their solicitor Roe, and the Shareholders' Deed having been signed by Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic.
1060 Barnes said further that on 28 May 2003 the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was cancelled, by endorsing the word "cancelled" and ruling a line through every page, and having such endorsement initialled by all of the parties. He said that he had not made the necessary changes to the ASIC documentation at this point in relation to the Astra shareholding structure and these never materialised as a result of the cancellation.
1061 He said that he held off informing Holihan that the arrangement had reverted to a 50/50 arrangement until May 2004 (or June according the Holihan) when Holihan enquired as to who the other parties were under the agreement. Barnes explained to Holihan that the others had not proceeded. Given that Holihan held the shares in LeoRose he requested Holihan to consider redoing the 80/20 agreement to reflect the 50/50 shareholding as has been originally intended. Barnes said that Holihan agreed to this proposal.
1062 Barnes also said that he personally held the only share in his company Brobel and that this never changed. No other party took an interest in his company.
1063 However, there were significant discrepancies in the Barnes case as to when it was that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was actually cancelled.
1064 In his pleadings Barnes claimed that he could not remember where the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed occured.
1065 However, Barnes' evidence in his witness statement was that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on 28 May 2003, having been endorsed by him with the word "cancelled" and the endorsement having been initialled by all of the parties to the deed.
1066 Then again, in the course of giving evidence at trial Barnes claimed that he could not remember when the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled save to say that it occured before the execution of the Second Sale Agreement on 2 June 2003.
1067 As to the circumstances of the cancellation, Barnes claimed that he may have initialled the word "cancelled" in the presence of others, but that he could not recall any of Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley or Mihelic initialling the word "cancelled" on the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed in his presence.
1068 Sangster claimed that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on or about 28 May 2003. He later gave evidence that it was cancelled within two days or so of signing.
1069 Sangster could not recall where he gave effect to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed by initialling or who was present, or the identity of the person who marked the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed with the word "cancelled".
1070 In his pleadings Sangster admitted that he became aware that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed had been cancelled following a phone call from Hodgson to that effect. At trial Sangster gave evidence that he had been advised by Hodgson that the Deed was premature as Hodgson had failed to successfully sell the Channel Partner Strategy to Brown.
1071 However, again there was no evidence that Hodgson had ever discussed with Brown the so called Channel Partner Strategy.
1072 Mihelic's evidence was that the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed arose as "Hodgson told me that we all had to cancel the Deed - that it did not have any support".
1073 At trial he clarified his position stating that it was his understanding that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled as it "didn't have any support from Peter Brown".
1074 However, again there was no evidence that Hodgson had ever discussed with Brown the possibility that any of the Defendants could be involved in taking an interest in the ACB Business or had ever sought his approval for any of the Defendants to be involved with the business in this way or at all.
1075 Mihelic varied his position as to the timing of his part in the alleged cancellation of the deed. In his witness statement Mihelic gave evidence that he initialled his agreement to the cancellation on 28 May 2003. He later claimed that the cancellation took place no later than 28 May 2003. At trial he then said that, save to say that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was marked with the word 'cancelled' before he initialled it, he could not remember when it was cancelled, and said that he "can't be sure it was executed on that date [28 May 2003]".
1076 As to the circumstances of the alleged cancellation by Mihlic, his evidence was that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed to effect its cancellation at his home. He said in his pleadings that Barnes and his wife Meredith Mihelic were present when he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed to effect its cancellation. However, Barnes did not corroborate this, and Meredith Mihelic was not called to give evidence.
1077 In his pleading Bayley claimed that he initialled the word "cancelled" on the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed at his home in Raby Bay, Queensland in the presence of his wife Betty Bayley but that he was not present when any of Hodgson, Sangster, Barnes or Mihelic recorded their initials recording the cancellation.
1078 Bayley's evidence was that he initialled his agreement to the cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed on or about 28 May 2003.
1079 At trial he gave evidence that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed "about 28 May ... or a few days after the 26th or whatever". He also said that he could not recall where he gave effect to the cancellation and that he did not do so at the same time as his wife Betty Bayley who witnessed his initials to the document. He said that he initialled the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed and then provided it to his wife who subsequently initialled it, "most probably in Queensland".
(a) Holihan and his wife Katherine (through Holihan Investments) always held a 50% share in the ACB business and Barnes, or an interest associated with him, held the remaining 50% share;
(b) as far as he was aware, from the outset Barnes had permission from Amcor to take a share in the ACB business;
(c) in May or June 2004 Barnes advised Holihan of the identity of the other shareholders, namely Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic, and of their decision not to proceed. It was agreed between Holihan and Barnes that they would revert to a 50/50 ownership of the ACB Business as between them;
(d) the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed never took effect;
(e) Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic never took an interest in the ACB business, neither financially nor beneficially; and
(f) the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement accurately reflected the beneficial ownership in the ACB business, and it may be inferred, does so to this day.
Amcor's Case in relation to the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed
1082 Amcor submitted that the evidence before the Court does not support the claim that the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed was cancelled on or about 28 May 2003.
1083 It relied, amongst other things, on a further copy of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, executed by all parties but not struck through or marked "cancelled", produced by Roe during the trial. This document had not been discovered by any party. However, I place no weight on this evidence. There are a number of possible explanations for a copy of the document in its unmarked state being located on Roe's file.
Findings as to the Alleged Cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed
1084 I do not accept the cases maintained by the Defendants as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed.
1085 I also do not accept what Holihan and Barnes said to the effect that the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, which provided for a 50/50 split between them, although in fact executed in or about in about October 2005, reflected an earlier oral agreement made by those parties on or about 28 May 2003.
1086 I find that the two Agreements of 26 May 2003, being the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed were entered into and carried into effect by Holihan, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and interests associated with them, and continued to be given effect to, until at or around October 2005.
1087 The version of events as stated by Holihan and Barnes to the effect that it was in May or June 2004 that Barnes informed Holihan as to the identity of the other shareholders Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley is accepted to a point. Given the uncertainty of the evidence as to the precise date of this conversation between Holihan and Barnes, I find that it was by 30 June 2004 that Holihan was advised as to the identity of the other shareholders.
1088 However, I do not accept that part of the conversation between Holihan and Barnes which is said to have occurred in May or June 2004 wherein Holihan was allegedly advised by Barnes first that the other shareholders had earlier decided not to proceed with the transaction and as between them and Barnes the transaction had been cancelled, and second that the ownership of the ACB Business would revert to a 50/50 split between Holihan and Barnes.
1089 I set out below the evidence and reasoning in support of my findings as to the alleged cancellation of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed.
1090 In the first place, in the two days between the execution of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed on 26 May 2003 and 28 May 2003, there is no evidence of any relevant external event occurring, such advice from Amcor or a third party or any other matter, which would have spurred Hodgson and the other shareholders to have rapidly changed heart and cancelled their deed at that time, so soon after having the documents prepared and entering into the arrangement.
1091 For example, there is no evidence that Brown was consulted during this period or gave his view as to the so called "Channel Partner Strategy" or as to the proposal for any of the Defendants to acquire an interest in the ACB Business which may have justified their precipitous withdrawal.
1092 Prior to entry into the transaction, Hodgson had a few weeks to think about the proposal, and seek the approval of Jones and Brown on behalf of Amcor, before arranging for himself to be included in the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed and executing it. His haste in cancelling the deed and advising the other participants to take a similar course is unexplained. There was no evidence of any matter or event which triggered his conduct at this time.
I never approached Mr Jones or Mr Brown in relation to using Mr Holihan's company in the way that had been proposed. I had originally planned to approach Mr Brown with the view to securing his support before I approached Mr Jones. However Mr Brown announced his retirement about this time and I considered it would take some time for Mr Sutton to appreciate the strategic significance of my proposal as he had had little to no exposure to the issues facing Corrugating at that time.
1094 However, Brown remained as Managing Director of Amcor Australasia until he retired from Amcor on 30 September 2003. I do not accept the explanation proffered by Hodgson for failing to seek the approval of Brown, either before entering into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed or after its execution and prior to its alleged cancellation.
1095 Further, none of the Defendants pointed to any event which occurred between the execution of the deed on 26 May 2003 and its alleged cancellation a few days later which would warrant cancellation. No approach had been made to either Jones or Brown to seek Amcor's approval to the transaction or to even flesh out their attitude to a transaction of this kind, either before or after its execution. Indeed, there was no evidence that anything had materially changed in the few days between execution and alleged cancellation. All parties were protected by a stringent confidentiality regime, and on the face of it they had no reason to proceed with the relatively drastic step of cancellation of their elaborate arrangements.
1096 In the second place, what I will call the "Dividend Evidence", as described below, is wholly inconsistent with the 80/20 structure having been cancelled as at 28 May 2003.
1097 The ACB Business was transferred to the Holihan companies on 30 July 2003, being the date of completion of the Second Sale Agreement.
1098 As at 30 June 2004, the ACB Business enjoyed a net profit of $1,067,000 after tax. A sizeable proportion of these profits found its way to LeoRose. It will be recalled that Holihan Investments held all of the shares in LeoRose, as to 20% beneficially for itself and as to 80% on trust for Astra. Holihan was in effective control of LeoRose.
1099 In October 2004 a dividend of $749,000 was declared by LeoRose to the shareholders in the ACB Business. The dividend was declared as to 20 per cent in favour of Holihan Investments and 80 per cent in favour of Barnes' company, Astra. The 20 per cent split equated to $149,900 payable to Holihan Investments and the 80 per cent split equated to $600,000 payable to Astra.
1100 The paperwork recording these dividend declarations was prepared by Holihan's accountants Wheeler Grenfell. Although the precise date of their preparation cannot be determined, it appears that this occurred in or about October 2004. The dividend statements are dated 30 October 2004.
1101 Wheeler Grenfell was first retained by Holihan in June 2004. By letter dated 2 July 2004 the firm confirmed their instructions from Holihan that the Holihan interests held 20 per cent of ACB and the remaining 80 per cent was held by Astra Pty Ltd, being the holdings equivalent to those set out in the 26 May 80/20 Holihan/Barnes Agreement.
1102 In cross-examination, Barnes admitted that a dividend was declared and actually paid by LeoRose to Astra at that time in the sum of approximately $600,000, being 80 per cent of a total dividend of $749,000 declared by LeoRose to the shareholders in the ACB Business. Barnes said:
Well I put that to you that the total dividend was $750,000, you've agreed with that haven't you?
That's correct.
Of which about $149,000-odd went to Mr Holihan's vehicle, is that right?
At that point yes.
Which represents 20 per cent of the $750,000 correct.
That's correct.
And the remaining 80 per cent of the total dividend of $750,000 equalling about $600,000 went to Astra, correct?
It ended up in my hands and Mr Holihan's hands, that's correct.
It ended up in your company's bank account didn't it?
Well it would've gone through the company's bank account yes.
1103 The $600,000 dividend by LeoRose to Astra was also recorded in the Barnes Finance Letter (which is later described and is admitted as evidence against Barnes only). The letter relevantly stated:
A fully franked dividend of $600,000 was declared to Astra for last financial year of which my share is $120000 less 18per cent tax=$100k.
1104 In cross-examination, Holihan said that it was anticipated that the above dividends would be declared by LeoRose in October 2004. However, he denied that the dividends were ever formally declared. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that, of the $749,000 proposed dividend, Holihan Investment's share was $149,800, which was exactly 20 per cent of $749,000.
1105 The dividend paid to Holihan Investments of $149,800 is consistent with the instructions that Holihan had given to his accountants Wheeler Grenfell in July 2004 to the effect that Holihan Investments owned 20 per cent of LeoRose at that time. Holihan stated that he gave his accountants those instructions because he believed that ASIC's records at that time recorded that Holihan Investments owned 20 per cent of LeoRose Pty Ltd.
1106 Nevertheless, a copy of an ASIC Company Search of LeoRose shows that, at that time, Holihan Investments held all 10 shares in LeoRose. Accordingly, Holihan's instructions to his accountant that Holihan Investments owned 20 per cent of LeoRose Pty Ltd could only have been a reference to that company's beneficial ownership of 20 per cent of Leo Rose, leaving the balance of 80% of the shareholding in LeoRose being held by Holihan Investments on trust for Astra, which I accept as the correct position.
1107 In cross-examination Holihan admitted that the declaration of a dividend from Leo Rose was effected on 30 October 2004, and that there was an actual payment to Holihan Investments of $149,000. He also conceded that this payment represented 20 per cent of the $749,000 (rounded to $750,000). However, he said that this did not represent his equity position with Leo Rose.
1108 I find this explanation from Holihan to be implausible and I do not accept it.
1109 In cross-examination Holihan also conceded that a decision to declare a fully franked dividend of $300,000 was made in the following year in about September or October 2005. The minute of LeoRose declaring this dividend was conceded by Holihan to have been signed by him in October 2005, however the minute of the resolution of LeoRose signed by Holihan was back dated to read on its front page "30 October 04".
1110 The purported effect of this transaction on its face was to substitute a fully franked dividend of $749,000 payable by LeoRose to its shareholders in October 2004, with a fully franked dividend of $300,000.
1111 As Holihan explained it, this did not come about because he had asked his new accountants Wheeler Grenfell to redo the dividend statements and minutes for the previous year, but in order to reflect a fifty, fifty split in the equity positions between himself and Barnes through their respective companies, Holihan Investments and Astra Pty Ltd which was controlled by Barnes.
1112 In cross-examination, Holihan said further that his accountants, Wheeler Grenfell, initially proposed a dividend reflecting an 80/20 arrangement. However, he said that he had a meeting with Gair of Wheeler Grenfell on or about 3 October 2004 in which Holihan stated that the ownership of LeoRose was in fact 50/50 between Holihan Investments and Astra.
1113 Counsel for Holihan directed the Court to two dividend statements which appear to declare that a total dividend of $749,000 by LeoRose would be paid to Holihan in two tranches of $374,500. Holihan asserted that these dividend statements were incorrect to the extent that one should have stated that $374,500 would be paid to Holihan as trustee for Holihan Investments and the other should have stated that a further $374,500 would be paid to Holihan as trustee for Astra.
1114 However, the dividend statements in question do not refer to either Holihan Investments or Astra. If Holihan had indeed advised Gair of Wheeler Grenfell in October 2004 that LeoRose was owned 50/50 between Holihan Investments and Astra, then Mr Gair would most likely have drawn the dividend statements referring to Holihan Investments and Astra.
1115 Furthermore, if Mr Gair had received those instructions in October 2004, then Wheeler Grenfell would, in all likelihood, have prepared a balance sheet for Holihan Investments to reflect ownership of 50 per cent of LeoRose.
1116 However, the balance sheet for Holihan Investments, which was finalised on or about 17 December 2004, did not achieve this. This was in spite of an email from Mr Edwards of Wheeler Grenfell in October 2008 in which he raised concerns that the balance sheet of Holihan Investments did not state that Holihan Investments owned 50 per cent of LeoRose.
1117 Holihan's assertion that he instructed Wheeler Grenfell in October 2004 that LeoRose was owned 50/50 between Holihan Investments and Astra is also inconsistent with the fact that, in October 2005, Holihan instructed Wheeler Grenfell Accountants to create a new minute of a resolution of LeoRose, which was backdated to 30 October 2004, to declare a total dividend of $300,000, such that $150,000 was declared to Holihan Investments and $150,000 was declared to Astra reflecting 50/50 ownership.
1118 The preparation of this backdated minute occurred around the time of the execution by Barnes and Holihan in October 2005 of the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement which provided that the Australian Corrugated Box business was owned 50/50 by Astra and Holihan Investments. This was also backdated from October 2005, in this case to 28 May 2003.
1119 I find that the backdating of dividend statements in October 2005 did not reflect the true ownership structure of the ACB Business as at October 2004. It created a wrong impression that, on 30 October 2004, LeoRose declared a total dividend of $300,000 to Holihan Investments and Astra reflecting 50/50 ownership. In fact, as at 30 October 2004, the dividends that were declared and paid out reflected the true 80/20 ownership which existed at that time.
1120 It was not until September 2006, that Wheeler Grenfell produced further backdated documents for Holihan, to reflect the position that LeoRose had been owned 50/50 between Astra Corporation and Holihan Investments since September 2003. These documents consisted of share certificates relating to shares issued in LeoRose to Holihan on 26 May 2003 and 5 September 2003 and documents recording declarations by Holihan that the shares he held in LeoRose were held on trust for Holihan Investments and Astra, again reflecting a 50/50 ownership structure. Holihan subsequently executed those backdated documents.
1121 I do not believe Holihan when he asserted that, as at late October 2004, through his company Holihan Investments, he held a 50 per cent share in the ACB Business together with Barnes who held the other 50 per cent through his company Astra.
1122 The Dividend Evidence, which concerned the period from July 2004 to October 2004, is inconsistent with the Defendants' account that the 80/20 arrangement was cancelled on 28 May 2003 and replaced with a 50/50 arrangement, and that Holihan was informed of this fact in May or June 2004.
1123 I find that as at late October 2004 Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Mihelic and Sangster continued to hold between them an 80% share in LeoRose and by this means ultimately each held a 16% interest the ACB Business.
1124 Thirdly, the Barnes Computer Information also corroborates the position that as at about October 2004 the ACB Business was then owned beneficially by Holihan (Holihan Investments) as to 20 per cent, and Hodgson (Bankson), Barnes (Astra/Brobel), Sangster (Merrymen), Bayley (CBB Investments) and Mihelic (Sampson Solo) equally as to the remaining 80 per cent.
1125 Finally, the context provided by the events leading to October 2005, points strongly to the restructure of the arrangements between the Defendants as to their ownership of the ACB Business occurring not in late May 2003, but in October 2005.
1126 Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic were employees of Amcor in September 2004. Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic did not resign until 28 September 2004, effective 28 October 2004. Hodgson's employment terminated on 1 October 2004.
1127 None of the Defendants during their employment (other than Holihan) disclosed to Amcor the fact that they were proposing to acquire and did acquire or had any interest in the ACB Business.
1128 After Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic had left Amcor, they were the subject of Anton Piller raids on 11 November 2004. Hodgson became a party to those Federal Court Proceedings on the 15 November 2004.
1129 In July 2005, after an extensive contested interlocutory application before the Federal Court of Australia in which Amcor requested leave to use Anton Piller documents in the Hodgson Proceeding, Merkel J made orders requiring the categorisation of the 60,000 odd documents, including listing the documents that Amcor sought to use in the Hodgson Proceeding. By such orders, I infer that the possibility was made clear to all of the parties to the Federal Court Proceedings that many of the documents obtained in the Anton Piller raid could be available to the Amcor Parties for use in the Hodgson Proceedings.
1130 I am satisfied that immediately after the order of Merkel J, during the period August to October 2005, there was extensive consideration and rearrangement of the business interests of Barnes, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley.
1131 Holihan was part of the deliberations in relation to the rearranging of such business interests.
1132 I am satisfied that as part of the rearrangement of the business interests, Holihan and Barnes executed the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement at or around October 2005 pursuant to which the 80/20 split of the ACB Business, which to that time had been in place, became the 50/50 arrangement. As part of this arrangement, the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement was back dated to 28 May 2003, and more than likely, the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was marked "cancelled".
1133 Further, in October 2005, Barnes and Holihan, through their companies, rearranged the 80/20 dividend payments to 50/50. In so doing they "topped up" the amount that had been received by Holihan in 2004 from $149,800 to a total of $374,500. At the same time, $374,500 was paid to Astra. The payments effected in October 2005 are "recorded" in documents created by Wheeler Grenfell that are backdated. The evidence shows they were not created until October 2005 although they are dated October 2004.
1134 There is no evidence to show what, if any, sums were onpaid to any party out of these payments.
Whether Defendants (other than Holihan and Barnes) Continue to Hold an Interest in the ACB Business
1135 Both Holihan Investments and Astra Corporation had the capacity, as provided for in the governing documentation, to potentially pay sums of money to the other Defendants to allow distributions of 80/20 to be put into affect. The Holihan Investments constituent documents allowed that company to pay out funds to Astra.
1136 Further, the relevant Trust Deed of the Holihan Family Trust included a very unusual class of beneficiaries. Holihan Investments was the trustee of the Holihan Family Trust. The structure of the arrangements with Brobel and Astra, when read alongside the Family Trust Deed of the Holihan Family Trust, together have the following effect:
(a) Barnes, via Brobel, and Astra, is able to declare dividends and make payments to the companies of Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic; and
(b) Holihan, through Holihan Investments, is able to make payments to any company where at least one share was owned by either Holihan or his wife Katherine Holihan. Both Holihan and his wife owned shares in companies with Barnes.
1137 On this basis, Amcor submitted that the Defendants retain their interests in the ACB Business to this day.
1138 In cross-examination of Holihan, a trust deed relating to the Holihan Family Trust prepared by his solicitor Roe, and reviewed by Wheeler Grenfell in September and October 2004, was tendered. The deed was carried into effect in November 2004 to receive distributions from Holihan Investments Pty Ltd.
1139 The Trust Deed contained a category of discretionary tertiary beneficiaries which included:
Any company incorporated in any country at least one share in which is owned by any one or more of the primary or secondary beneficiaries or at least one share which is owned upon trust under which any one or more of the primary or secondary beneficiaries has any interest, whether absolute or contingent.
... the trustee (in its capacity as such trustee) of any trust under which any of the primary or secondary beneficiaries has an interest, whether absolute or contingent, provided that any such interest shall vest within the perpetuity period applicable thereto.
1141 The primary and secondary beneficiaries are described as Craig and Katherine Holihan, their children who have obtained majority, their remaining children, their grandchildren, the spouses of their children and the spouses of their grandchildren.
1142 The broad scope of the unusual class of discretionary tertiary beneficiaries would have allowed distribution to be made out of the Holihan Family Trust to any company or trust in which just one share or interest was held by a primary beneficiary.
1143 This in turn could have, at least in theory, facilitated payments of dividends to any company owned by Barnes in which, for example, either Holihan or his wife Katherine Holihan owned a share or enjoyed a beneficial interest. In turn, this could have facilitated distributions of dividends to parties associated with Hodgson, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic.
1144 The most that can be said about this evidence is that at least by in November 2004, the mechanism was in place to distribute dividends from the holding company, ACB (Aust) Pty Ltd, via Holihan Investments Pty Ltd, to the Defendants, had this route been availed of.
1145 However, there is no evidence of any such dividends having been actually paid to the Defendants by this or any other means.
1146 I am unable to accept Amcor's submission. The evidence does not go so far. Mere suspicion is not proof to the requisite degree.
1147 I am satisfied that the former managers (the Defendants) acquired their interests in the ACB Business from about 26 May 2003 crystallizing upon the sale of the ACB Business on 2 June 2003 and settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 June 2003. Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest until about October 2005 when the 28 May 50/50 Holihan/Barnes Agreement was entered into and backdated to 28 May 2003 and the original 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed was endorsed "cancelled". By this means, in October 2005, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley renounced any interest in the ACB Business and renounced any entitlement for them or companies associated with them to any share in the profits of the ACB Business.
1148 The observations in DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd are apposite, where the High Court said:[94]
Neither party intended that the contract should be further performed. In these circumstances the parties must be regarded as having so conducted themselves as to abandon or abrogate the contract. The position is similar to that with which Isaacs J. dealt in Summers v The Commonwealth [1918] HCA 33; (1918) 25 CLR 144. The plaintiff did not succeed in his action for damages for breach of contract, but on the other hand the defendant had not rescinded. Time passed during which neither party took any steps to perform the contract. It was held that the parties had so conducted themselves as mutually to abandon or abrogate the contract.
1149 In the present case, Hodgson, Sangster, Mihelic and Bayley maintained their interest in the ACB Business until about October 2005 when by their conduct, and with the knowledge of Holihan, mutually abandoned or abrogated the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, and with that, renounced any rights or entitlements under it.
1150 After October 2005 the ACB Business has continued to be owned by Holihan and Barnes in equal shares, through companies associated with each. This was the position when the Barnes proceeding commenced by the issue of the writ on 3 September 2007.
1151 The Hodgson proceeding was issued on 3 December 2004. A first defence was filed on 27 January 2005. The first defence raised no allegation in relation to the ACB Business. An amended defence and counterclaim filed 21 April 2006 similarly raised no allegation in relation to the ACB Business. It was not until the further amended defence and counterclaim was filed on 3 June 2010 pursuant to the orders of Emerton J made 19 May 2010 that allegations were first made by Amcor in the Hodgson proceeding concerning the ACB Business. At this time the business was owned by Holihan and Barnes in equal shares, through companies associated with each.
1152 Part of the claim by the Amcor parties is that the Service Packaging Business and ACB Business sale transactions were "uncommercial transactions", or that the transactions were entered into on "uncommercial terms" or alternatively, uncommercial and substantially for the benefit of the relevant Defendants.
1153 Amcor contends that, by reason of their participation in those sales, the Defendants, or one or other of them breached the fiduciary duties they owed to their employer. Further, Amcor claims that the Defendants breached their obligation to warn Amcor that the acquisition of the businesses was about to be undertaken on uncommercial terms.
1154 There is no precise definition at common law of what is an "uncommercial transaction".
1155 There is a statutory concept of an "uncommercial transaction" in relation to insolvency under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), being s 588FB, in Division 2 of Part 5.7B entitled "Voidable Transactions". The definition is as follows:
588FB Uncommercial transactions
(1) A transaction of a company is an uncommercial transaction of the company if, and only if, it may be expected that a reasonable person in the company's circumstances would not have entered into the transaction, having regard to:
(a) the benefits (if any) to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(b) the detriment to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(c) the respective benefits to other parties to the transaction of entering into it; and
(d) any other relevant matter.
1156 In determining whether a transaction is an uncommercial transaction under s 588FB, a court is required to look at the transaction as whole, rather than identifying particular parts and considering each component in isolation. Section 588FB of the Corporations Act was considered by Ormiston JA in VR Dye & Co v Peninsula Hotels Pty Ltd (in liq).[95] His Honour observed:
In each case the Court is obliged to look at the transactions between the parties in a manner which accords with the commercial realities. It is not a matter of isolating particular individual steps in the course of a business relationship so as to give one element a different characteristic from that which the totality of that relationship would evidence.
I would see the logical consequence of these authorities as requiring that, for the purpose of characterising any impugned transaction and its effect for the purposes of the preference provisions, in each case the Court should look at the "ultimate effect" of the "entire transaction" (Airservices at 505, and 509) before determining whether it has worked an unfair preference within the meaning of s.588FA.
1157 More recently, in Cussen v Sultan[96] Nicholas J said:
The court is obliged to look at the transactions between the parties in a manner which accords with commercial reality. It is not a matter of isolating particular individual steps in the course of a business relationship so as to give one element a different characteristic from that which the totality of that relationship would evidence, but of looking at the transaction as a whole.
1158 The Court is therefore required to look at the whole of each of the two impugned transactions, to determine whether one or other or both were uncommercial transactions.
1159 If, after looking at each transaction as a whole an uncommercial transaction is established, further elements would need to be proven before any of the Defendants may incur liability in respect of it. First, whether any of the Defendants participated in the transaction in question in such a manner or to such a degree that the conduct comprising the participation amounted to a breach of that person's duty owed to Amcor; and second, if so, whether Amcor is entitled to any and what relief as a consequence.
Uncommercial Transaction - First Sale Agreement (Service Packaging Business)
1160 Amcor contended that there are a number of terms in the First Sale Agreement which were uncommercial having regard to the detriment imposed by those terms when viewed in the context of the contract as a whole. These terms included:
(a) the Purchase price;
(b) the provision of vendor finance;
(c) payment of stock in instalments;
(d) 59 day payment terms;
(e) price increases under the supply agreement;
(f) lease of premises at what are alleged to be below market rent.
1161 Amcor submitted that taken together as a whole the First Sale Agreement contained a sufficient number of terms detrimental to the vendor such that any reasonable person in weighing up the decision whether to proceed with the transaction or not would find on balance that the detriments outweighed the benefits of the contract and the transaction would not have been entered into in that form.
1162 The assessment as to whether the terms of the First Sale Agreement were, as a whole uncommercial, falls to be considered, in part, in the context of the profitability of the business in the hands of Amcor. The context includes the following findings that have been made:
(a) The Service Packaging Business was not profitable;
(b) The turnover of the Service Packaging Business in or about February 2002 was approximately $3.0 million. This was less than 0.5% of Corrugating's Australasian turnover of about $900 million;
(c) The Service Packaging Business was a non-core and underperforming business for Amcor.
1163 I find that by the time the Service Packaging Business came to be sold to Hottes, it was underperforming in profit generation and was of lttle value to Amcor in the context of its businesses overall.
1164 The purchase price paid by Hottes for the Service Packaging Business under clause 3.1 of the First Sale Agreement was $81,650.00 (not including stock) paid on the following terms:
(a) $50,000.00 in 2 equal instalments of $25,000.00 payable 6 months and 12 months respectively from the date of Completion (namely 1 February 2002); and
(b) a sum payable 18 months after Completion, calculated as follows:
1165 Further, pursuant to clause 3.2, the sum of $400,745.00 was paid for opening stock. This was to be paid over a period of 21 months from completion of the sale.
1166 The total purchase price for the Service Packaging Business was therefore $482,395.00.
1167 The Amcor parties contend that the Service Packaging Business, as sold pursuant to the First Sale Agreement, was not sold at a "fair market value".
1168 Amcor relied on the expert evidence of Mr Owain Stone to support this contention. Mr Stone in a Joint Expert Report considered that the market value on a Future Maintainable Earnings basis was either $1,176,000 (Scenario 1) or $922,250 (Scenario 2). The first scenario assumed the gross margin being adjusted to 30% to reflect the actual gross margin achieved post sale. The second scenario assumed a March 2002 price increase of 3.75% being adjusted on the basis it would have been known or reasonably foreseen by an arm's length purchaser.
1169 On the other hand, Mr Meredith, the expert called by the Defendants gave evidence that the market value was $490,000 (slightly more than the purchase price of $482,395).
1170 There were differences in the approach of each expert. Mr Stone included the actual rent paid, whereas Mr Meredith took into account what the Amcor Parties contended to be the market rent. Mr Stone assumed a 30% margin for the business after sale, which he assumed would be foreseeable. Mr Meredith did not make such an assumption. Mr Stone assumed, in Scenario 2, that an industry wide price increase of 3.75% should be taken into account. Mr Meredith did not apply any such increase.
1171 The experts agreed on the other aspects of the calculation, namely exclusion of other income of a one off character, and the multiple to be applied (namely 3.5 times EBIT).
1172 On balance, I prefer the methodology of Mr Meredith. In particular, in conducting a valuation to determine market value, at the date of the sale, it was not appropriate for Mr Stone to have taken into account information that was available after the sale. For example, in arriving at the figure of $1,176,000 in Scenario 1 Mr Stone adjusted gross margin by 30per cent because of the significant (and unexplained) increases in gross margin post sale. In his opinion, this was an appropriate adjustment to make in circumstances where the pre-sale figures varied vastly from the post-sale financial reporting and no Information Memorandum had been prepared, as would usually be the case for a sale of a business on the open market. Mr Stone therefore assumed a 30% margin for the business after sale which was based upon actual margins enjoyed after the sale. Mr Meredith did not make such an assumption.
1173 Further, Mr Stone assumed, in Scenario 2, that an industry wide price increase of 3.75% should be taken into account. The rationale of his assumption was that it would be known or foreseeable by a purchaser. There has been no evidence that a price increase was known or foreseeable. For that reason, Mr Meredith did not apply such an increase.
1174 I find therefore that the value of the Service Packaging Business at the time of its sale was $490,000.
1175 The sale price was $482,395. I do not consider the difference of $7,605 to be material in the valuation of a business of this type. Accordingly, I find that the business was not sold for anything less than a fair market value and it was not an uncommercial selling price.
Provision of Vendor Finance - First Sale Agreement
1176 Amcor submitted that a further example of a contract term that was favourable to the purchaser and detrimental to Amcor, in addition to the sale price, was the vendor financing provided to the purchaser. Amcor pointed to the fact that the First Sale Agreement provided Hottes with vendor finance with no apparent corresponding benefit to Amcor. This was said to be "a hallmark of uncommerciality and a non arm's length transaction".
1177 Payment of the purchase price was spread over 18 months after completion.
Payment of Stock in Instalments - First Sale Agreement
1178 Amcor also pointed to the fact that the purchase price for stock was only payable in quarterly instalments at 12, 15, 18 and 21 months after completion.
1179 Similarly the 59 day payment terms were not in accordance with Amcor's standard commercial terms. Mr Crouch gave evidence about this issue on behalf of Amcor, noting that Amcor's usual payment terms were 30 days. Further both Mr Stone and Mr Meredith agreed that the cost of the 59 day terms amounted to a $19,291 detriment to Amcor.
Price Increases under the Supply Agreement - First Sale Agreement
1180 A further example of an uncommercial term relied upon by Amcor was the fact that pricing increases under the supply agreement were fixed at CPI and not at market value.
Lease of Premises at Below Market Rent - First Sale Agreement
1181 Amcor submitted that transactions which result in one party receiving the benefit of bargains that cannot be explained by normal commercial practice point to terms which are uncommercial; rental at below market rates is one such example.
1182 Mr Lewis, who was an experienced commercial property manager, gave evidence that it was normal commercial practice in respect of shared premises to allocate responsibility for rent and outgoings by reference to square metreage occupation by each party on the premises. Based on square metreage occupation of the shared premises at the Revesby site Hottes and his company paid rental at a rate of $37.49 per square meter under the sub-lease for the area where the Service Packaging Business operated while Amcor (APA) paid rental at a rate of $67.83 under the head lease. If Hottes had been required to pay rent at the commercial rates APA was subject to under the head lease, it would have paid $126,000 per annum in rent rather than the $70,000 provided for in the sub-lease.
1183 Amcor submitted that the premises were not dilapidated and were located in an area of high demand and lettable to other tenants. In the circumstances there was no basis for an unequal sharing of rental, which was detrimental to Amcor. On this basis it was submitted to be an uncommercial term.
1184 In his calculation of loss and damage allegedly suffered by Amcor, Mr Stone made an allowance for "loss of use of funds at 5% to assumed date of awards (30 June 2011)". Under Mr Stone's "Scenario 1 the amount claimed under this head is $252,822 and under "Scenario 2" $100.632.
1185 Amcor contended that loss of use of funds was another real and definable detriment to Amcor and provided "a further example of an uncommercial term".
1186 The Defendants, on the other hand assert that a Hungerfords claim was not open to the Amcor parties because it was not expressly pleaded.
1187 This issue can be shortly dealt with. Any entitlement of Amcor to damages under a Hungerfords claim, assuming this is open to it on the pleadings, has nothing to do with an assessment as to whether the First Sale Agreement was an uncommercial transaction. Assuming that Amcor may have sold the Service packaging Business at an undervalue, if that could be established, this could theoretically have given rise to a claim the it lost the use of funds comprising the difference between the true market value and the price the business was sold for. However, even if such a loss was proven and open on the pleadings, a finding to this effect could not also found a finding that the transaction was uncommercial or be even relevant to that issue.
1188 In any event, I am not satisfied that any Hungerfords claim was expressly pleaded, and for this reason also, Amcor's claim on the issue must fail in relation to the First Sale Agreement.
1189 As at May 2004, the terms of the supply arrangements as provided for in the First Sale Agreement of February 2001 were not due to expire for almost another two years.
1190 Hottes had been sick with cancer from around mid 2003 and was in hospital for the period August 2003 to Christmas Eve 2003. Sometime in May 2004, on one of the rare occasions that Hottes attended the business premises during his extended period of illness, Dettmar recalls that he met with Sangster. Dettmar recalled that Sangster and Hottes spent approximately two hours in Hottes' office. "I specifically recall this because Ian Hottes had not been to the office for a long time. On that day Ian Hottes looked very ill".
1191 It was after this meeting that Dettmar found the agreement extending the supply contract for four years in Hottes' filing tray. The extension agreement had been executed by Sangster on behalf of Amcor. Sangster's evidence was that the extension was executed in Amcor's best interests and that the first time he saw the First Sale Agreement was after Hottes had died in 2004. He said further that it was in Amcor's interests to have the "D&D base moved annually to reflect costs increases and to which an ever increasing mark up was to be added. This annual adjustment to D&D enabled Amcor to recover all cost increases that Amcor had incurred".
1192 However, Amcor submitted that the real effect of the Addendum was to extend the favourable terms of the supply which Hottes and his group enjoyed by a further four years.
1193 Although some suspicion attaches to the conduct of Sangster relating to the extension of the supply arrangements under the First Sale Agreement, I am unable to positively conclude to the necessary standard of satisfaction that this resulted in any uncommercial transaction or that Sangster was involved in any such conduct.
Fundamental Difference in Approach between Experts
1194 There was a fundamental difference between the experts as to how to approach the valuation exercises in this case.
1195 The difference is well expressed in the Joint Experts' Report prepared by Mr Stone and Mr Meredith:
The difference between the approaches being suggested by Mr Meredith and Mr Stone in respect to this issue is whether one tries to start from the historical management accounts and "add" adjustments for what would have been capable of being estimated at that stage (Mr Meredith's approach) or one tries to start from the subsequent trading results and "remove" adjustments for things that would not have been capable of being estimated prior to the sale (Mr Stone's approach).
Whether Other Terms in the First Sale Agreement Uncommercial
1196 Both experts expressed a view as to the value of terms which may be uncommercial. Mr Stone and Mr Meredith both agreed that the cost of 59 day terms was a detriment of $19,291 to Amcor.
1197 However, Mr Stone agreed in cross-examination, that if one is assessing the commerciality of a contract it would be incorrect to look at individual clauses. Nevertheless, he had not been asked prior to giving his evidence to assess the contract as a whole.
1198 Mr Meredith expressed the same view and said one "should look at the package of terms together and form a view as to whether they're uncommercial as a package". The reason for this approach, as explained by Mr Meredith, is that in a business negotiation in order to get to a negotiated position between vendor and purchaser, there may be terms which on their own may seem uncommercial. However, because of the particular circumstances of either party, and in the context of the whole transaction, they may well be commercial. Mr Meredith said such an approach is standard valuation methodology, unless the valuer is required to assess the impact of a particular term.
1199 There was also a body of "non-expert" evidence also called on the issue.
1200 Mr Alvarez gave evidence that he took over from Mr Lawless and reviewed the details of the Service Packaging Business transaction. He had some issues with certain items. These were raised with Hottes in a meeting on 24 May 2004. Alvarez was an experienced Commercial Manager. He was responsible for the transaction within Amcor. He did not consider that any elements of the transaction were detrimental to Amcor's interests. He was cross-examined regarding his views on the executed version of the First Sale Agreement. He agreed that none of the aspects of the transaction alleged by Amcor to be uncommercial were of concern to him.
1201 Mr Parker was an experienced accountant, and who had management experience at Amcor. He was a more senior commercial manager than Alvarez. He gave evidence that he reviewed the First Sale Agreement. He did not raise anything as being not in the interests of Amcor.
1202 Mr Walmsley was Hottes' solicitor and who acted on his behalf in the transaction. He gave evidence that the process of dealing with Amcor's solicitor in the transaction, Mr McPhail was "tedious", and that Baker & McKenzie ("McPhail's firm") were "impossible to deal with"; and their requirements in the documentation were "difficult and pointless".
1203 The context in which the First Sale Agreement was entered into by Amcor is of importance in the assessment of this issue. At the time, the Service packaging Business was making a loss and this was the case shortly prior to the sale. On this basis alone, any amount received for the business was a benefit to either Service Containers or Amcor.
1204 Hodgson gave evidence, which was not contested, that the terms of the sale were beneficial to Service Containers and Amcor. The benefits identified by Hodgson were as follows:
(a) the price of $81,650 equated to the full book value of certain racking and other assets sold with the business;
(b) Amcor intended to close the business due to underperformance;
(c) the transaction resulted in a reduction in Amcor employee numbers and reduced existing rental obligations by more than $600,000;
(d) the business had no assets, a significant annual churn in its customer list, no capacity to restrain the contractor who managed the business (Hottes) and it was making a loss;
(e) Amcor also secured by the sale transaction a long term supply contract for its products, which was beneficial to it.
1205 Hodgson's evidence on these issues was not challenged in cross-examination and I accept it.
1206 I find that, when the First Sale Agreement is considered overall and in its context, it has not been established that it was an uncommercial transaction, and I reject Amcor's contentions on the issue.
1207 Nor am I satisfied that the First Sale Agreement was substantially for the benefit of Hodgson, the Service Containers Purchaser, Hottes, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley. By the transaction, Amcor secured real benefits for itself, as outlined by Hodgson's evidence to which I have referred.
No Relevant Conduct of the Defendants giving rise to any Uncommercial Terms
1208 Further, I am not satisfied that Amcor has proved its case that any of the Defendants engaged in conduct or participated in the transaction in question in such a manner or to such a degree, in relation to any of the uncommercial terms alleged by Amcor, that was capable of giving rise to a breach of any duty owed to Amcor.
1209 Specifically in relation to the case as pleaded by Amcor, I am not able to be satisfied that any of the Defendants procured the sale on uncommercial terms or was involved in the conduct of others to effect a sale on uncommercial terms.
1210 Further, in the light of my finding that the transaction overall was not uncommercial, it follows that there could be no breach of any obligation to warn Amcor of such an acquisition, if any such duty arose.
1211 For these reasons Amcor is not entitled to any relief as a consequence of it entering the First Sale Agreement on the basis of any alleged uncommercial terms, and none of the Defendants are liable for any breach of duty arising from the terms of the First Sale Agreement.
1212 Mr Meredith considered that even if the terms of the First Sale Agreement, or some of them, were not commercial, in the unusual circumstances of this case, in the events that have happened, Amcor suffered no loss as a result of selling the Service Packaging Business on the terms that it did.
While the methodology applied in the Stone Report appears reasonable from a technical perspective, in my view, a more practical approach may be appropriate under the circumstances in this matter. Considering the position the Amcor Parties would have been in if they had never sold the Service Packaging Business, the Amcor Parties are actually better off because:
Even if the terms of the First Sale Agreement were uncommercial, the Service Packaging Business and all its associated profits were subsequently returned to the Amcor Parties (i.e. there is no difference to if the business had not been sold); and
The Amcor Parties had access to $485,394 (being the proceeds received for the business) to invest as they chose and to which they would not have had access had the Service Packaging Business not been sold. Even without calculating the benefit of the use of these funds, after deducting the $125,000 paid to Mr Hottes, I calculate that the Amcor Parties are at least $357,394 better off for having entered into the First Sale Agreement.
1214 I accept Mr Meredith's evidence in this regard. I am not satisfied that Amcor has proved its case in respect of its claimed loss and damage arising from entry into the First Sale Agreement for the sale of the Service Packaging Business.
1215 It is alleged by the Amcor Parties that the terms of the Second Sale agreement were uncommercial and detrimental to the interests of Amcor and ACB, further or alternatively, uncommercial and substantially for the benefit of Hodgson, the ACB Co Purchaser, Achilla, Holihan, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and/or Mihelic by reason of any, or alternatively any combination or all, of the following:
(a) pursuant to clause 3.1, the ACB Co Purchaser agreed to pay the sum of $1M to ACB for the purchase of the ACB Business (excluding opening stock). The sum of $114,364 was paid for stock, resulting in a total purchase price of $1,114,364 (inclusive of stock);
(b) further to sub-paragraph (a) above, the sum of $1M payable over a period of 60 months was substantially less than an arm's length price for the ACB Business. As to the appropriate arm's length price for the ACB Business, Amcor and ACB rely, amongst other things, upon the fact that the ACB Business was a going concern and an established business, together with the following:
(i) for the financial year ended 30 June 2003 (which is the financial year in which the Second Sale Agreement was executed), total sales by the ACB Business to third party purchasers were approximately $4,378,000.96;
(ii) total sales by the ACB Business to third party purchasers in other relevant financial years were as follows:
(iii) as at 2 June 2003, the total written down value of the plant and equipment identified in Annexure 3 to the Second Sale Agreement as being "sold to the Purchaser [the ACB Co Purchaser]" as part of the sale of the ACB Business was $1,405,576 after depreciation of approximately $4.2M had been applied;
(iv) an estimate of the appropriate arm's length price for the ACB Business is in the range of between $8M to $9M. Further particulars will be provided upon the completion of interlocutory steps;
(c) pursuant to clause 2.1, ACB provided to the ACB Co Purchaser a list of all of the customers of the ACB Business together with all relevant information about the customers as part of the sale of the ACB Business;
(d) pursuant to clause 3.1, the sum paid for the ACB Business was not paid upon Completion but rather was to be paid over the period of 5 years from Completion, with the first payment not having to be paid until 12 months after Completion, and without obligation to pay interest;
(e) pursuant to clause 3.2, the sum paid for opening stock was not paid upon Completion, but rather was to be paid 12 months from Completion, without any obligation to pay interest;
(f) pursuant to clause 5.4 and annexure 6, APA and Achilla entered into a sub-lease which did not provide for Achilla to pay a bond or give any other type of security of APA, and which provided for Achilla to pay rent in the amount stipulated in annexure 6, which was below the current market rent for the Premises and substantially below the rent that was being paid under the head lease;
(g) further to sub-paragraph (f) above, APA committed to pay and in fact paid under the head lease for year 1 approximately $919,800 which has consistently increased each year to rent of $1,305.243 for the period 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2008, whereas the rent paid by Achilla under the sub-lease for years 1 and 2 was approximately $560 000 per annum and for years 3 4 and 5 the rent paid by Achilla was approximately $600 000 per annum;
(h) pursuant to clause 5.5 ACB provided financial assistance to the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla by agreeing to pay for all purchases of products from the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla within 7 days of an invoice being issued, rather than in accordance with Amcor's usual terms. The usual terms at the relevant time were that credit purchases were paid on or before the end of the month that followed the month in which the Invoices were raised;
(i) pursuant to clause 6.1(b), ACB agreed to pay and paid the total costs of the Stock take that was undertaken for the purposes of determining the amount to be paid for opening stock by the ACB Co Purchaser;
(j) pursuant to clause 9.1(a). ACB assigned its rights under the NXT General Licence to the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla at no cost in circumstances where ACB and Amcor had only recently namely September 2002, paid substantial fees under the NXT General Licence, which fees were paid at the direction of Holihan, as follows:
(i) New Transducers Ltd issued an invoice dated 15 August 2002 to ACB in the sum of US$60,800.00 representing the Initial costs and fees of the NXT General Licence. A copy may be inspected;
(ii) on 13 September 2002 Holihan sent a facsimile to Amcor's accounts department seeking "prompt payment" of the invoice. A copy may be inspected;
(iii) On 17 September 2002 Amcor paid US$60,800 (AUS$111,427) by international funds transfer to New Transducers Ltd in payment of the invoice referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above;
(k) pursuant to clause 9.1(d), for the 12 months following the Completion ACB for no benefit to itself, would be ordering supplies for the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla and they were to either reimburse ACB or pay the supplier directly;
(l) pursuant to clause 9.3(a), ACB left its computer ordering system on the premises of the ACB Business at no cost to the ACB Co Purchaser or Achilla, and agreed to provide a replacement system at no cost;
(m) pursuant to clause 9.3(b) ACB provided an order processing and tracking computer system known as PICK to the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla at no cost which:
(i) enabled the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla to purchase products from ACB by placing an order directly into the computer system;
(ii) enabled through the placement of orders directly into the computer system, the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla to have ACB deliver products directly to customers of the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla together with an invoice created on the letterhead of the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla that was generated by ACB;
(iii) enabled the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla to access confidential information about ACE's business, including information about quotations provided to third party customers, invoicing to third party customers, delivery information and stock information;
(n) pursuant to clause 15.1, ACB agreed to pay and paid all costs in respect of the sale documentation. The sale documentation included the drafting and negotiation of the Second Sale Agreement, including the Fixed and Floating Charge between ACB, the ACB Co Purchaser and APA dated in or about 2003, the proposed agreement to sub-lease 159-163 Newton Road, Wetherill Park and the sub-lease dated August 2003, Copies may be inspected. The drafting and negotiation of these documents was undertaken by Baker & McKenzie on behalf of Amcor. Baker & McKenzie invoiced the Defendant in respect of the services over the period from September 2002 to June 2003 and those invoices were paid by Amcor.
(o) pursuant to clause 12.1, the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla received the benefit of a supply arrangement whereby up until 20 March 2005 ACB, and from 21 March 2005 APA supplied Products to the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla based on D&D costs as calculated In accordance with clause 12.1 and Annexure 5 of the Second Sale _Ag_reement, the total sales being as follows:
(i) approximately $2,550,000 for the financial year ended 30 June 2004;
(ii) approximately $3,052,000 for the financial year ended 30 June 2005;
(i) approximately $2,951,000 for the financial year ended 30 June 2006;
(ii) approximately $2,749,259 for the financial year ended 30 June 2008;
(p) further to sub-paragraph (o) above, the percentage mark up on D&D costs in clause 12.1 was substantially lower than the percentage mark-up applied at the relevant time by ACB and APA for the supply of the same types of products to third party customers. The percentage mark-up ordinarily applied at the relevant time by ACB and APA is commercially sensitive.
(q) pursuant to clause 12.2, Achilla received the benefit of an exclusive supply arrangement whereby up until 20 March 2005 ACB, and from 21 March 2005 APA purchased all of their external OME (outside manufactured supplies) requirements from Achilla, and the total purchases were as follows:
(i) approximately $3,783,000 in the financial year ended 30 June 2004;
(ii) approximately $3,868,000 in the financial year ended 30 June 2005;
(iii) approximately $3M in the financial year ended 30 June 2006;
(iv) approximately $2M in the financial year ended 30 June 2007;
(v) approximately $1,325,954 in the financial year ended 30 June 2008;
(r) further to sub-paragraph (q) above, pursuant to clause 122, the price at which Achilla supplied all of ACB's external OME requirements up to 20 March 2005 and the price at which Achilla supplied all of APA's external OME requirements from 21 March 2005 was to be based on D&D costs which included amounts for:
(i) the rent payable under the sub-lease referred to in sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) above;
(iii) repairs and maintenance labour and materials;
(s) further to sub-paragraph (r) above, the price at which ACB and APA purchased OME from third party suppliers prior to the Second Sale Agreement did not include the type of costs let out in sub-paragraph (r) above, further or alternatively such costs are not part of standard industry pricing, and therefore up until 20 March 2005 ACB and from 21 March 2005 APA, paid a higher price for all of its external OME supplies that were required to be purchased from Achilla during the term of the Second Sale Agreement.
(t) pursuant to clause 7.1, ACB terminated all employees and paid all entitlements owing to the employees amounting to approximately $850,000 and the ACB Co Purchaser and/or Achilla re-employed some of the employees with no accrued liabilities.
1216 By notice dated 11 July 2011, the Amcor Parties stated that they would not press allegations regarding the dealings by Achilla Pty Ltd with Sei Pak. There had been no evidence led by the Amcor Parties to support this allegation. I make no findings in relation to it.
1217 The assessment as to whether the terms of the Second Sale Agreement were, as a whole, uncommercial falls to be considered, in part, in the context of the profitability of the business in the hands of Amcor. The context is shaped by the following factual findings:
(a) Historically the ACB Business did not meet Amcor's ROFE Benchmark. A series of proposals to restructure, sell or close the business were made in the five years leading up to the negotiations of the Second Sale Agreement;
(b) Commencing 31 May 1999 A decision was made by Amcor for the Wetherill Park site, where the ACB Business was housed, to be "scaled down";
(c) By the time Holihan accepted the appointment as its general manager in December 2000, the performance of the ACB Business was far below Amcor's ROFE Benchmark;
(d) The question of whether to keep, sell or close the ACB Business was raised at an Amcor (MOCS) meeting in Sydney in November 2001, and again at a meeting held on 6 December 2001;
(e) A memorandum from Parker to Lachal, Clayton, Brown and Hodgson dated 6 May 2002 referred to the closure of three smaller plants (including Wetherill Park) which (if the closures proceeded) would occur in about February 2003;
(f) In evidence in chief, Brown said that by 15 October 2002 "I had already formed the view at this stage that Amcor should not remain in businesses specialising in filling orders for small quantities of boxes (Short Run Box Businesses)";
(g) Amcor's Board met on 23 October 2002. The strategy endorsed by the Board was set out in the AFPA "Blue Print for Further Improvement" slide presentation. Slide 12 related exclusively to Wetherill Park. It reported that the site was to be sold and the business closed or sold by June 2003;
(h) the ACB Business underutilised the valuable Wetherill Park site;
(i) The ACB Business could not be sold to a competitor without potential harm being caused to Amcor, which in that event would be denied the opportunity to sell its raw material corrugated product to the business;
(j) a sale would allow Amcor to realise the value of the land and reduce labour costs.
1218 I find that by the time the ACB Business came to be sold to Holihan, it was underperforming in profit generation and had been considered by Amcor for closure since at least November 2001.
Sale at Undervalue Allegation - ACB Business Sale
1219 Amcor submitted that the ACB Business was not sold at a "fair market value" to the Holihan interests, and for this reason alone, the Second Sale Agreement was uncommercial.
1220 As earlier noted, the purchase price for the ACB Business was $1 million, payable in the five annual instalments and commencing 12 months after completion of the sale. There was no provision for payment at the time of sale and most of the purchase price was payable by the fourth and fifth instalments (clause 3).
1221 Amcor complained that the formal valuations of the experts were hindered due to inadequate documentation being provided by Holihan and Barnes. Nevertheless, the trial proceeded on the basis of the information which had been supplied.
1222 As earlier noted, the Second Sale Agreement was executed on 3 June 2003 by Lewis and Clayton on behalf of the Amcor vendor. For convenience, the independent experts, Mr Meredith and Mr Stone, were requested to determine the fair market value of the ACB Business as at 30 July 2003. They approached the assessment of "fair market value" on a similar basis (by reference to Future Maintainable Earnings (FME) and the use of an agreed multiplier, but differed as to the appropriate FME and the approach to its calculation.
1223 As to the approach to the calculation of FME, the experts noted their differences in an agreed joint report as follows:
When looking at the FME, the experts agree that it may be appropriate to consider, as a reasonableness check, what happened subsequently to the ACB Business [sale].
Whilst this is not normally the case, in the situation where no budgets or forecasts are available, and there are a number of differences between the historical business (i.e. within the Amcor Group) and the business that was sold (i.e. outside the Amcor Group but with the supply and purchase agreements) the impact of which the experts do not have complete information to be able to estimate what the impact of these might have been considered to have been at that point in time.
The experts agree that an element of the post-sale EBIT was a function of the growth in sales that was actually achieved in FY2004. The experts do not know the extent, if any, that the business would (prior to the sale) have been forecasting such an increase in sales. Even if it had been forecast, it is not necessarily the case that all of that increase would have been considered to be sufficiently certain to allow it to be properly included in the FME.
Removing the direct impact of the growth in sales reduces the FY04 trading results by $1,107,642 (this is calculated by applying the FY04 gross margin of 34% to the increase in sales $2,461,427 from FY03 management accounts).
The difference between the approaches being suggested by Mr Meredith and Mr Stone in respect to this issue is whether one tries to start from the historical management accounts and "add" adjustments for what would have been capable of being estimated at that stage [at the date of the sale] (Mr Meredith's approach) or one tries to start from subsequent trading results and "remove" adjustments for things that would not have been capable of being estimated prior to the sale (Mr Stone's approach).
1224 The Amcor parties contended that the ACB Business, as sold pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement, was not sold at a "fair market price". The Amcor parties rely principally on the expert evidence of Mr Stone to support this contention. Mr Stone's opinion was that the fair market value of the business as at 30 July 2003, was $4.6 million (rounded up from $4,590,000).
1225 Amcor also relied in part on the following post sale financial information: in the first 11 months of trading post sale the ACB Business made in excess of $1.7million PBIT. At this stage the purchaser had not been required to make any payments to the Amcor vendor of the business. Further, within 12 months of purchasing the business the purchaser was giving instructions to its accountant that the business was worth $10million. Within 14 months of buying the business Barnes was instructing his accountant that the business was worth $6.8-$7million.
1226 On the other hand, Mr Meredith valued the business as at 30 July 2003 at a low of nil and a high of $720,000, but settled upon $640,000 as being a fair market value (inclusive of stock).
1227 The experts agreed that the assessment should be based on the "CFME Method", which requires the Future Maintainable Earnings ("FME") to be multiplied by the appropriate multiplier. The experts agreed that the appropriate multiplier was "4". Accordingly, the difference in the valuations by the experts is solely attributable to the different assessments of the appropriate FME.
1228 Mr Stone's calculation of loss, in his report dated 14 February 2011 ("Stone's First Report") is based on an adjusted FME of $4,411,595.
1229 Mr Stone conceded that there were errors in this calculation as follows:
(a) the EBIT in the FY 2003 Audit Pack was unsuitable for calculating the business' FME;
(b) the direct materials adjustment was falsely premised;
(c) the paper price differential was an inappropriate adjustment.
1230 Mr Stone ultimately gave evidence as to market value based on his "Scenario 3A" as follows: based on a price paid for the business of $814,364, a market value of $4,590,000, rounded up to $4.6 million.
1231 Mr Meredith's First Report valued the business at a low of nil and a high of $720,000. These valuations are based on an assessment of the FME at a low of -$280,000 and a high of $160,000. The high valuation was based on the following:
2003 EBIT based on management accounts (Document C117)
plus labour savings from workforce restructure (if foreseeable and achievable)
1232 There are a number of differences in approach between the experts:
(x) Mr Stone's Scenario 2A and 3A were both based upon a price paid for the business of $814,364. The Second Sale Agreement price was $1,114,364. The last instalment payment of the purchase price ($300,000) was tendered by Mr Holihan and the tender was refused by the Amcor Parties;
(i) Mr Stone assumed EBIT of -$401,380 based on the FY 2003 Audit Pack and Mr Meredith assumed a 2003 EBIT of -$359,000 based on the 2003 Management Accounts;
(ii) in the Joint Report, Mr Stone accepted that the 2003 audit pack may not be "an appropriate representation of likely sales of the ACB business as a separate business with the various supply and purchasing agreements". Further in oral evidence Mr Stone said that the 2003 audit pack was unsuitable as the basis for calculating future maintainable earnings;
(i) as noted above, Mr Stone increased the future maintainable earnings by $3,741,054 by reason of the direct materials adjustment;
(ii) Mr Meredith stated that a direct material adjustment is inappropriate because of the unsuitability of the 2003 audit pack figures and for other reasons;
(iii) Mr Stone did not accept Mr Meredith's opinion in his Second Report, but did not press this adjustment in the Joint Report;
(aa) paper price differential: Mr Stone accepted the paper price differential adjustment should not be made in his Second Report;
(i) Mr Meredith increased the FME by $443,933 (in the high valuation) on the basis that the labour cost savings achieved by Holihan were foreseeable;
(ii) the adjustment of $443,933 was calculated by the actual reduction in labour costs of $700,752 reduced by the consequent reduction in sales price of $256,819. The reduction in sales prices would have been the result of the fact that the price of products sold by ACB to Amcor was fixed by reference to D&D costs incurred by ACB. Accordingly, a foreseeable reduction in labour costs would have resulted in a foreseeable reduction in the D&D cost (and therefore gross value of sales) to Amcor.
(cc) they treated the lease of the ACB premises quite differently.
1233 The Defendants submitted that I should not accept Mr Stone's approach because:
(a) as to the instalment payment tendered by Holihan, it is incorrect to exclude an instalment payment in such a contract when calculating the price paid, especially when its tender has been refused by the vendor. This should not have been be included as a factor in Mr Stone's valuation. The full contract price should be taken into account;
(b) the 2003 management accounts provide the best information available to assess the FME. That was how Mr Meredith approached the calculation and this method is to be preferred;
(c) Mr Stone's scenarios 3A and 3B were based on a belief informed by hindsight that the business would have achieved an increase in sales equivalent to 50% of that achieved by Holihan in the 2004 financial year. Mr Stone was unable to point to any matter that existed prior to 2004, which would have supported a prospective purchaser in forming a belief that such an increase in sales was achievable. It is therefore not appropriate in the present circumstances to take into account the post-sale performance of the business in order to calculate FME. Mr Meredith's evidence (and approach) was to this effect.
(d) Mr Meredith said the valuation of a business at a point in time should be performed using the information which would have been available to a purchaser up to the point of sale. He said that an expert would only use or should only use hindsight to the extent that he does not have perfect information up to that point in time and that hindsight information should only be used to the extent that it illuminates a condition that was already existing at the time or that was already observable at the time;
(e) Mr Stone also took into account a sub-lease amount of $2.246M, based on the difference between the head lease (100% of the property) and the amount of the floor space (about 65% of the property) occupied by the ACB Business. Mr Meredith was instructed to assume that the large corrugator machine in place which was to remain occupied about 35% of the floor space and could have been removed, however was not removed for commercial reasons. Accordingly Mr Meredith took into account only that portion of floor space occupied by ACB and the actual rent paid.
1234 It is as well to consider the question of the market value of the ACB Business in the context of the principles which apply to determining the market value of land in the context of a land sale. It is only the facts considered on the day of sale which are relevant in undertaking the assessment of value. As Isaacs J said in Spencer v Commonwealth ("Spencer"):[97]
All circumstances subsequently arising are to be ignored. Whether the land becomes more valuable or less valuable afterwards is immaterial. Its value is fixed by Statute as on that day. Prosperity unexpected, or depression which no man would ever have anticipated, if happening after the date named, must be alike disregarded. The facts existing on 1st January 1905 are the only relevant facts, and the all important fact on that day is the opinion regarding the fair price of the land, which a hypothetical prudent purchaser would entertain, if he desired to purchase it for the most advantageous purpose for which it was adapted. The plaintiff is to be compensated; therefore he is to receive the money equivalent to the loss he has sustained by deprivation of his land, and that loss, apart from special damage not here claimed, cannot exceed what such a prudent purchaser would be prepared to give him. To arrive at the value of the land at that date, we have, as I conceive, to suppose it sold then, not by means of a forced sale, but by voluntary bargaining between the plaintiff and a purchaser, willing to trade, but neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business consideration.
1235 A similar approach was taken by Dixon CJ in a land acquisition case, Turner v Minister of Public Instruction, where his Honour observed:[98]
[market value is] necessarily affected by all the advantages which the land possessed and these might be a matter of future or even contingent enjoyment. Future advantages or potentialities must not be excluded. At the same time the value of these things must be assessed according to the condition of the land as it stood at the time of resumption: "it is the present value of such advantages that falls to be determined". [Emphasis added]
1236 A similar approach is to be preferred in relation to the valuation of the ACB Business in this case.
1237 I accept each of the contentions of the Defendants as to the approach of Mr Stone compared with the approach of Mr Meredith, and for these reasons I prefer the opinion of Mr Meredith to that of Mr Stone.
1238 I find that savings in employee costs were both achievable and foreseeable by an arm's-length purchaser. Accordingly, I accept Mr Meredith's assessment of the market value as $640,000 of the ACB Business (inclusive of stock). When the price paid ($1,114,364 inclusive of stock) is taken into account, the net value of the transaction was in fact a benefit to the Amcor Parties of $474,364 as reflected in the following table:
1239 It follows that the purchase price was not only "commercial", but was positively to the advantage of Amcor.
1240 Amcor submitted that the provision for vendor finance was totally in the purchaser's favour. The purchase price was payable over five years. Most of the purchase price was payable in the last three years. No interest was payable on the purchase price. There was no basis or rationale for it being provided, so it was said.
1241 The price for the stock was payable 12 months from completion, at a price determined by a stock take conducted by ACB prior to completion, with the costs borne exclusively by ACB.
1242 Amcor submitted that this term was, in effect, another form of vendor finance and not justified on any basis.
1243 Reciprocal supply agreements were in place (the "Supply Agreement"). The Supply Agreement had two elements.
1244 First, for a period of five years from completion, ACB would supply raw materials in the nature of corrugated board and cartons to Achilla and the Purchaser at prices based on a direct costs and distribution costs ("D&D") basis. This part of the agreement also provided for Achilla and the Purchaser to obtain these supples solely from ACB, thereby guaranteeing ACB with a secure market for these products. Achilla purchased products from APA in order to supply corrugated packaging to Achilla's non-Amcor customers.
1245 Clause 12.1 of the Second Sale Agreement was in the following terms relating to supply of raw materials to Achilla and the Purchaser:
12.1 Supply by Vendor of raw materials
The Vendor will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply corrugated board and corrugated cartons ("Products") to the Purchaser and Achilla at prices based on D&D costs to the Vendor. Achilla (and if appropriate the Purchaser) will for that period obtain all supplies of Products from the Vendor, save for those products that Achilla manufactures for itself (or the Purchaser), and will not during that period purchase or produce or procure the supply of Products from any other party other than due to the Vendor's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. After this period Achilla may (but only if all the parties agree in writing) purchase Products from the Vendor on terms expected to be D&D + 20%. For the periods referred to below prices to Achilla will be as follows:
up to 12 months after Completion D & D + 12%
12-24 months after Completion D & D + 14%
24-36 months after Completion D & D + 16%
36-48 months after Completion D & D + 18%
48-60 months after Completion D & D + 20%
In all other respects supplies by the Vendor and acquisitions by Achilla will so far as not inconsistent with this clause 12 be made on Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Limited's standard terms and conditions applying for substantially similar supplies from time to time.
1246 Second, for a period of five years from completion, Achilla was required under the Second Sale Agreement to undertake work for AFP on "base products" supplied by it (for example, boxes or corrugated sheets). Achilla was obliged to perform work on this material (for example, affixing a label or performing some other special work) and then return the modified product to AFP and charge AFP for the work done and any additional material used.
1247 Clause 12.2 of the Second Sale Agreement reflected this arrangement in the following terms:
12.2 Supply by Purchaser
Achilla will for a period of 5 years from Completion supply Products to the Vendor at prices based on D&D costs to Achilla. The Vendor will for that period obtain all its OME supplies of Products from any other party other than due to Achilla's inability to supply consistently and on a basis which is commercial and reasonably acceptable in terms of price, quality and availability. For the period referred to below prices to the Vendor will be as follows:
up to 12 months after Completion D & D + 12%
12-24 months after Completion D & D + 14%
24-36 months after Completion D & D + 16%
36-48 months after Completion D & D + 18%
48-60 months after Completion D & D + 20%
1248 Amcor submitted that the price increases under the supply agreements were on uncommercial terms.
1249 D&D was defined in the Second Sale Agreement as the applicable cost base for products for the purposes of calculating costs in relation to the Supply Agreement.
1250 The Supply Agreement was of potential benefit Amcor and its related entities. This was so because Achilla was a conduit through which Amcor sold raw materials. This arose because of the terms of the Supply Agreement pursuant to which Achilla was compelled to purchase materials from Amcor for the duration of the Second Sale Agreement.
1251 If Achilla was charged a significantly higher margin on top of D&D for materials purchased by Achilla in the course of its business, it would have added a significant cost to Achilla. For example, if a margin of 44% over D&D was charged, it would have added an additional minimum cost to Achilla of approximately $720,000 for the eleven months of trading in the financial year ending 2004.
1252 As matters stood under the executed Second Sale Agreement, Amcor secured for itself a guaranteed market for the sale of some of its raw materials for the duration of the agreement.
1253 Pursuant to clause 5.5 of the Second Sale Agreement, for the first six months of the supply agreement, the vendor agreed to provide financial assistance to the purchasers by requiring payment to be made for any purchases from ACB on the following terms:
5.5 Financial Assistance
The Vendor will for a period of up to 6 months following Completion pay for all purchases which it obtains from the Purchaser (or Achilla) weekly in arrears upon production of an invoice from the Purchaser (or Achilla).
1254 However, I accept the evidence of Holihan, founded on a chain of emails, that for the first six months of trading, APA in fact paid for its purchases from Achilla up to 10 days from the date of invoice.
1255 In the period following the first six months after completion, all invoices rendered by ACB Purchaser and APA were paid 30 days from end of month.
1256 Amcor's expert Mr Stone considered that the purchase of goods on same day terms resulted in a detriment to the Amcor parties at a value of $41,025.
1257 However, I am not satisfied that, by arrangement between the parties, same day terms for payment to Achilla was in fact regularly applied, if at all.
1258 Both of the independent experts agreed that the cost of sale documentation borne by Amcor was valued at $19,877 (clause 15.1).
1259 However, I accept Holihan's evidence that despite clause 15.1 of the Second Sale Agreement requiring Amcor to pay all costs in respect of the deed, in fact Holihan paid all of his own solicitor's fees (the fees of Mr Roe), which totalled $10,219.
1260 The parties entered into a separate agreement for the sublease of the premises at Wetherill Park from which the ACB Business operated. The sub-lease was annexed to the Second Sale Agreement (clause 5.4).
1261 Negotiations as to the lettable floor space under the lease commenced on 11 July 2003.
1262 The sublease was for the Wetherill Park premises. However, the Amcor vendor, APA, was to keep its large corrugator machine on the premises and was required to pay for "the space consumed by this machine and associated raw materials". The corrugator machine was a substantial piece of equipment (although it was quite narrow, it was very long). APA was also permitted at any time, under certain conditions as to making good the premises and the like, to remove the corrugator machine from the premises.
1263 By 15 July 2003 Holihan agreed with Lewis on the floor space split.
1264 The ACB Corrugator remained at the Wetherill Park site until about September 2008.
1265 There were benefits to Amcor in keeping the ACB Corrugator at the Wetherill Park site, which I accept. These included the following:
(a) it delayed the cost that would have been incurred in disassembling and moving the ACB Corrugator;
(b) any potential buyers of the ACB Corrugator could see the machine operating if and when they wished to inspect it; and
(c) ACB could take its time in selling the corrugator, and not be forced into selling the machine to a competitor.
1266 The sublease term was for 5 years with a 5 year option. Rental was $560,000 per annum in years 1 and 2, and $600,000 per annum in years 3,4 and 5. In total, Achilla paid $2,920,000 in rent to APA, and 65% of the total outgoings of the Wetherill Park site.
1267 Amcor proposed to sell the land comprising the Wetherill Park site to an entity called Stockland. In order to maximise the sale price of the land, the plan was for Amcor to a take head lease of the premises so that the land sold would be subject to a lease to a reliable tenant of high standing.
1268 Amcor contended that the sub-lease was not on commercial terms. It pointed to the fact that the sublease rate of rental on an occupancy basis was significantly lower than that which Amcor (APA) was required to pay to Stockland under the head lease and was not governed by the same escalation clauses. It said that this resulted in Amcor subsidizing the Achilla's (the lessee company) rent by $2,246,000 over the five year term.
1269 Amcor's expert, Mr Stone, took the alleged "sacrifice" of $2.246 million into account in his assessment.
1270 Amcor contended further that the terms of the sub-lease provided that if the corrugator was removed then Holihan was required to pay 100 per cent of the outgoings however, his rent did not increase. Further, there was nothing in the Second Sale Agreement which gave Amcor the right to sublease the area occupied by the corrugator, if it was to be removed.
1271 However, I accept that the sub-lease to Holihan and his associated companies for a rental less than that contained in the head lease between Amcor and the head lessor Stockland was the price to be paid for achieving a higher sale price on the divestment of the Wetherill Park site to Stockland. Counsel for Holihan put to Lewis that a leaseback to a blue chip company such as Amcor, rather than to a $2 company such as Achilla, or a sale with no leaseback, resulted in a higher property sale price. Lewis agreed that a sale with a leaseback is generally more valuable than if the site is sold with vacant possession; and he agreed with the proposition that a differential of approximately $1.5m would be achieved on a sale of the land for about $10 million if it was the subject of a lease to a tenant of the quality of Amcor.
1272 The Wetherill Park site was sold by Amcor in October 2003 for a price of $10,452,000.
1273 No property leasing expert, with qualifications and experience in commercial or industrial property leasing was called. In the end the Court is left with little reliable evidence upon which it can determine the submissions made by Amcor as to the alleged uncommercial terms of the sublease. For this reason alone, the contentions of Amcor on the alleged uncommercial terms of the sublease must fail.
1274 However, I am also satisfied that by selling the Wetherill Park site subject to a lease to a "blue chip" company such as an Amcor subsidiary company, served to maximise the saleability and purchase price of the Wetherill Park site. The sub-lease of part of the Wetherill Park site to the Holihan company must be viewed in this overall commercial context.
1275 Amcor contended that loss of use of funds was another real and definable detriment to Amcor and provided "a further example of an uncommercial term".
1276 The Defendants, on the other hand assert that a Hungerfords claim was not open to the Amcor parties because it was not expressly pleaded.
1277 This issue can be shortly dealt with, on the same basis as the sister claim made in respect of the Service Packaging Business. Any entitlement of Amcor to damages under a Hungerfords claim, assuming this is open to it on the pleadings, has nothing to do with an assessment as to whether the Second Sale Agreement was an uncommercial transaction. Assuming that Amcor may have sold the ACB Business at an undervalue, if that could be established, this could theoretically have given rise to a claim for lost the use of funds comprising the difference between the true market value and the price the business was sold. However, even if such a loss was proven and open on the pleadings, a finding to this effect could not also ground a finding that the transaction was uncommercial or be even relevant to that issue.
1278 In any event, I am not satisfied that any Hungerfords claim was expressly pleaded, and for this reason also, Amcor's claim on the issue must fail in relation to the Second Sale Agreement.
Conclusion as to Uncommercial Transaction - Second Sale Agreement
1279 When the Second Sale Agreement is considered as a whole and in its context, it has not been established that it was an uncommercial transaction, and I reject Amcor's contentions on the issue.
1280 Nor am I satisfied that the Second Sale Agreement was substantially for the benefit of Hodgson, the Service Containers Purchaser, Hottes, Barnes, Sangster and Bayley.
1281 By the transaction, Amcor secured real benefits for itself, particularly, as I have found, the increase in sale price achieved by the sale and lease-back arrangement, which, to the tune of $2,920,000 over the 5 year term was subsidised in significant part by the rent payable under the sublease, and when the early payment of the sale price upon the sale of the Wetherill Park site is taken into account.
No Relevant Conduct of the Defendants giving rise to any Uncommercial Terms
1282 Specifically in relation to the case as pleaded by Amcor, I am not able to be satisfied that any of the Defendants procured the sale on uncommercial terms or were involved in the conduct of others to effect a sale on uncommercial terms.
1283 Indeed, with one exception, I am not satisfied that any of the Defendants were materially involved in the formulation of any of the terms of the Second Sale Agreement alleged by Amcor to be uncommercial.
1284 A number of Amcor personnel had been engaged in settling the term of the Second Sale Agreement.
1285 Clayton, who executed the Second Sale Agreement on behalf of Amcor, was briefed by Parker and Lewis, who were both senior employees, beforehand. Parker and Lewis were involved in the settling of the terms of the transaction. Prior to signing the agreement Clayton did not consider the terms to be uncommercial or detrimental to Amcor. Further, he gave no evidence that he considered the terms to be uncommercial after he executed the Second Sale Agreement.
1286 Mr McPhail, the external lawyer, drafted the agreement. He raised no issues as to the terms. Amcor accepted the terms as drafted by Mr McPhail.
1287 Further, a number of other Amcor employees were involved at various points in the transaction. These included Ms Caplan, Ms Cleaver, Ms Flannigan and Mr Timos. None of those persons raised any concern that the terms of the proposed transaction were uncommercial or not in Amcor's interests. None of these were called by the Amcor Parties to give evidence.
1288 The exception referred to earlier relates to the inclusion of what was known as the NXT licence in the Second Sale Agreement for no additional price.
1289 Under the Second Sale Agreement, ACB assigned to the Purchasers, or was obliged to obtain novation of, its interests under all contracts, including a contract called the NXT General Licence between New Transducers Limited and ACB of July 2002 (clause 9). The NXT licence was included in the assets sold under the Second Sale Agreement after the sale price had been settled. Although Barnes maintained he had no authority in respect of the sale, he admitted that he authorised the inclusion of the NXT licence in the sale agreement for no additional price. At the same time he knew that Amcor had recently paid a large sum of money for the licence. Further, when Barnes authorised its inclusion in the Second Sale Agreement, he knew there was every chance he would get the benefit of that licence as an interest holder in the ACB Business.
1290 However, I am not satisfied that the NXT General Licence was of any tangible value at the time it was included in the Second Sale Agreement. Even though Holihan continued to pay the licence fee and invest money to get the project up and going, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out not to be a worthwhile business line and produced no income. In this respect, Barnes said in his evidence:
In regards to the NXT licence this was a failed project and even after the sale the ACB purchaser was not able to turn this into a commercial proposition.
1291 I accept the evidence of Barnes in this respect.
1292 In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the inclusion of the NXT General Licence as one of the assets sold in the Second Sale Agreement, was either in itself an uncommercial term at the time of entry into the agreement, or was such as to render the agreement as a whole uncommercial.
1293 Further, I am not satisfied that Amcor suffered any loss by reason of having parted with the NXT General Licence. Indeed, in all likelihood, it was saved paying for the ongoing licence fees for no financial gain.
1294 Further, in the light of my finding that the transaction overall was not uncommercial, it follows that there could be no breach of any obligation to warn Amcor of such an acquisition, if any such duty arose.
1295 For these reasons Amcor is not entitled to any relief as a consequence of it entering the Second Sale Agreement on the basis of any alleged uncommercial terms, and none of the Defendants are liable for any breach of duty arising from the terms of the Second Sale Agreement.
Liability of Defendants under Corporations Act
1297 Section 180 of the Corporations Act imposes civil liability upon directors and defined officers of a corporation to exercise care and diligence in exercising their powers and discharging their duties. The section provides:
Care and diligence--directors and other officers
(1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation's circumstances; and
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, the director or officer.
Business judgment rule
(2) A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment is taken to meet the requirements of sub-section (1), and their equivalent duties at common law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they:
(a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; and
(b) do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and
(d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.
The director's or officer's belief that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold.
(3) In this section:
"business judgment" means any decision to take or not take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation.
1298 Section 181 of the Corporations Act imposes a civil obligation upon directors and defined officers of a corporation to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith and for a proper purpose. The section provides:
(1) A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties:
(a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and
1299 Section 182 of the Corporations Act imposes a civil obligation upon directors and defined officers of a corporation not to make improper use of their position to gain an advantage or cause detriment to the corporation. The section provides:
Use of position - directors, other officers and employees
(1) A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use their position to:
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or
1300 Section 183 of the Corporations Act imposes a civil obligation upon directors, defined officers and employees of a corporation not to make improper use of information obtained in their position to gain an advantage or cause detriment to the corporation. The section provides:
Use of information - directors, other officers and employees
(1) A person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use the information to:
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or
1301 The duty arising under s 183 applies to employees in addition to directors and defined officers and continues after the person stops being an officer or employee of the corporation.
1302 The duties imposed by ss 180, 181, 182 and 183 are owed only to the corporation in respect of which the person is a relevant director, officer or employee, as the case may be. The relevant duty is not owed to other related corporations. In Walker v Winborne,[100] Mason J (as he then was) pointed out that because each company in a group is a "separate and independent legal entity" the officer of a company owes his duties to that company alone.[101]
1303 Pursuant to s 182 all of the Defendants in their capacity as employees of Amcor were under a duty not to improperly use their positions to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or cause detriment to the corporation.
1304 Further, pursuant to s 183 all of the Defendants in their capacity as employees, and later upon their departure from Amcor as former employees of Amcor, had a duty not to make improper use of information obtained in their position at Amcor to gain an advantage or cause detriment to the corporation.
1305 However, their obligations and duties for the purposes of ss 180 and 181 hinge on whether all or some were "officers" of Amcor at the relevant time for the purposes of the Corporations Act. "Officer" is defined in the statutory dictionary in s 9. The dictionary relevantly provides:
"officer" of a corporation means:
(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or
(b) a person:
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; or
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation); or
(c) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or
(d) an administrator of the corporation; or
(e) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or
(f) a liquidator of the corporation; or
(g) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the corporation and someone else.
1306 Sub-paragraph (b) of the s 9 dictionary definition contains three categories of persons who are "officers", any of which may apply to the Defendants in this case.
1307 The last category of persons who fall within the definition in paragraph (iii) are those who may be described as "de facto" or "shadow" directors,[102] or "shadow officers".[103] These persons are individuals who hide behind the cloak of the directors yet whose wishes or instructions the directors are accustomed to follow. Paragraph (iii) of the s 9(b)(iii) dictionary definition does not apply to this case, and it was not contended that it should.
1308 Paragraphs (i) and (ii) call for closer analysis in this case. The question whether any of the Defendants was an officer of Amcor therefore turns on whether any of them was a person: − "who made, or participated in making, decisions that affected the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of Amcor; or − who had the capacity to affect significantly the financial standing of Amcor".
1309 As observed by Jacobson J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4),[104] both of those categories are concerned with identifying persons who are involved in management of the corporation. This is borne out by an examination of the legislative history[105] and the case law in which these two limbs of the definition have been applied.
1310 Ormiston J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht[106] gave a wide ambit to the meaning of both management and participation. This was in the context of considering the proper construction of s 227 of the Companies (Victoria) Code which prohibited a person who was bankrupt from taking part in the management of a corporation.
1311 His Honour considered that the concept of "management" comprehended:[107]
activities which involve policy and decision-making, related to the business affairs of a corporation, and affecting the corporation as a whole or a substantial part of that corporation, to the extent that the consequences of the formation of those policies or the making of those decisions may have some significant bearing on the financial standing of the corporation or the conduct of its affairs.
1312 Further, his Honour found that:[108]
... although the decisions of a branch manager, subject to predetermined restrictions, may not be comprehended, there are those involved in large, discrete parts of a corporation's business who, although not participating in the central administration of that corporation, nevertheless are involved in its management to the extent that their policies and decisions have a significant bearing on its business and its overall financial health.
1313 As is noted in Ford's Principles of Corporations Law,[109] the origin of the extended definition of "officer" is to be found in Parliament codifying, at least in part, the principles stated by Ormiston J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht.[110] Thus the language of sub-paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii) of the definition of "officer" corresponds, in large measure, with Ormiston J's description of the concept of management.
1314 In Forkserve Pty Ltd v Jack & 1 Ors[111] Santow J found that a "service manager", involved in the management of staff, pricing and general "management" of a forklift repair business[112] met the former definition of 'executive officer'.[113] This was so in spite of the manager not having the authority to enter into financial arrangements on behalf of the company and in spite of the fact that he was required to account to other managers on a monthly basis. His Honour found that he was sufficiently involved in the "management" of the company, primarily through his policy and decision making functions in relation to the employees under his direction and the day to day running of the business of the company, to be regarded as an executive officer.
1315 In Re HIH Insurance Limited (in prov liq); ASIC v Adler[114] a question arose before Santow J as to whether Mr Adler, who was a director of the parent company but not of the subsidiary, was an "officer" of the subsidiary company. Santow J held that he was an officer of the subsidiary under sub-paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii) of the definition. His Honour reasoned that Mr Adler was an officer because, as a director of the holding company and a member of its investment committee, he participated in decision making as to how the funds of the HIH group were invested. His Honour held it was for this reason that Mr Adler was a person whose decisions clearly affected the whole or a substantial part of the business of the subsidiary as well as someone with the capacity to affect significantly the subsidiary's financial standing.[115]
1316 In Re Dwyer v Lippiatt; Dwyer v Backpackers R US.Com Pty Ltd,[116] White J found that a person who was not a director and who described himself as a consultant, was an "officer" within sub-paragraph (b)(i) of the definition because he was intimately involved in all the important decisions affecting the corporation. Her Honour said[117] there could be no doubt about the person's central role to the "drive and direction" of the company and that it was likely he also fell within the other limbs of the definition.
1317 The more recent authority of ASIC v Citigroup (No 4)[118] tends to support Ormiston J's approach in adopting the concept of managerial responsibility.
1318 In Citigroup (No 4), Jacobson J considered the position of a Mr Manchee, who was one of five proprietary traders employed by Citigroup. He was not a director or secretary of Citigroup. He had no one who reported to him and no responsibilities apart from that of proprietary trading. The proprietary trading desk was one of four trading desks in the Equity Derivatives Division which was itself a subdivision of Equities, one of six divisions in a Citigroup business called CIB. The CIB was one of Citigroup's three businesses. Mr Manchee's trading was subject to daily limits and to the direction of his risk manager. Whilst, he did have a large daily trading limit of $10 million, which could amount to considerable financial exposure over a number of days, on the analysis of Jacobson J this did not of itself suffice to make him a person who had the capacity to affect Citigroup's financial standing within paragraph 9(b)(ii). It was noted by way of example that a loans officer at a large branch could in general terms have the capacity to affect the bank's standing if he lent recklessly, however, this potential does not of itself elevate the loans officer beyond the level of an employee to that of an officer of the corporation.[119] Jacobson J held that Mr Manchee did not fall within paragraph (b)(i) or the paragraph (b)(ii) definition of "officer". It was found that ASIC had not established that Mr Manchee had any involvement in policy making or decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business of Citigroup.
1319 The case of ASIC v Macdonald and Others (No 11)[120] involved a company secretary, Mr Shafron of JHIL.[121] He acted in the role of general counsel. Mr Shafron's functions included providing legal memoranda to the board on disclosure requirements, issues surrounding the proposed restructure and delivering board presentations. Gzell J noted that whilst the responsibilities of a company secretary of one company may differ significantly from another[122] when looking at the functions performed by Mr Shafron he was involved in participating in the making of decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business of JHIL. The evidence in the case provided an example of Mr Shafron playing a significant role in the board's deliberations. This involved a separation proposal considered by the board of directors of JHIL. This was a significant decision of the board, one in which Mr Shafron played a vital role.[123]
1320 The position of Hodgson will now be considered in the light of the present case law.
1321 Hodgson reported to Messrs Brown and later to Sutton. Whilst his capital expenditure authority, limited to $250,000, and his reporting requirements to upper tier management and not directly to the board, may point to employee status, other considerations are relevant. It will be recalled that Hodgson was responsible for the largest division of Amcor Australasia, with the greatest number of staff, resources and revenue. In 2004 it had an annual turnover of approximately $970 million with an annual profit of approximately $70-$80 million, employing over 2,600 people. Furthermore, he was the Group General Manager of the Amcor businesses trading under the names Corrugating/AFPA, Fibre Containers Queensland and Kiwi Packaging, with responsibility for corrugating products in both Australia and New Zealand markets.
1322 I am mindful the observation of Ormiston J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht:[124]
although the decisions of a branch manager, subject to predetermined restrictions, may not be comprehended, there are those involved in large, discrete parts of a corporation's business who, although not participating in the central administration of that corporation, nevertheless are involved in its management to the extent that their policies and decisions have a significant bearing on its business and its overall financial health.[125]
[Emphasis added]
1323 As group general manager Hodgson oversaw a significant number of high level general managers, maintained responsibility for over 2,600 employees and was responsible for the largest division of Amcor Australasia with an annual turnover in 2004 of approximately $970 million. He had responsibility for the corrugating arm of Amcor's Australian and New Zealand business.
1324 The types of decisions Hodgson made, however, were management decisions and not those made at the level of the Amcor Board. Nor did he participate in the making of board decisions, although he was subject to them.
1325 It is further accepted that the Amcor board had practical control of the company's finances and the strategic direction the company took in relation to its business. Hodgson managed only part of the company. In doing so Hodgson was required to follow the direction of the company board.
1326 Nevertheless, a company's business is not governed entirely by the decisions of its board. Senior management may fulfil a critical role in determining the business processes, commercial direction and ultimately the profit achieved by the divisions of an enterprise. So much is reflected in sub-paragraph (b) of the "officer" definition in s 9 Corporations Act. Unless senior management at this level within a corporate organisation are also regarded as relevant "officers" for the purpose of the Act, there would be little point in extending the definition beyond company directors and secretaries.
1327 Hodgson was part of the highest level of Senior Management within Amcor. He took part in decisions that affected the business of Amcor at a high level. He reported to Brown and later to Sutton and on occasions to the board. He was capable of dealing directly with board members.
1328 Further, Hodgson was the Senior Manager of the largest division within Amcor. He was actively engaged in managing his division, which provided a substantial amount of the company's annual revenue. He had direct control over his own budget to a large degree. As such, he had the capacity to affect significantly Amcor's financial standing.
1329 Hodgson's participation in the management of Amcor was real and direct, even though he was not in a role in which ultimate control within the company was exercised. His role was considerably greater than merely performing an administrative function carrying out the orders of others responsible for a company's management.
1330 On balance I find that Hodgson's management placed him within the realm of "officer" for the purpose of s 9 of the Corporations Act. His management role had a significant bearing upon Amcor's business as a whole. He was a person who made or participated in making decisions that affected a substantial part of the business of the corporation within s 9(b)(i).
1331 For these reasons, I find that Hodgson was a company officer for the purposes of ss 180,181, and 182 Corporations Act.
1332 On the other hand, I am satisfied that none of Messrs Barnes, Sangster, Mihelic, Bayley and Holihan held the requisite level of responsibility to be considered company officers. None made, or participated in making, decisions that affected the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of Amcor. None had the capacity to affect significantly Amcor's financial standing. None were in a position to, nor did they, give instructions to the directors of Amcor or have their wishes acted upon by the directors, on a regular basis or at all.
Finding as to ss 180 and 182 Corporations Act
1333 As to s 180 (obligation to use reasonable care and diligence), considering the impugned conduct of the Defendants overall, it was not conduct undertaken in the exercise of their powers and in the discharge their duties to Amcor which may invite sanction. Rather it was conduct undertaken outside the scope of their powers and beyond the discharge of their duties which attracts scrutiny.
1334 For this reason, s 180 is not applicable.
1335 In relation to s 182 (improper use of position) I am not satisfied that the evidence supports findings of breach of duty on the part of the Defendants under this section to the requisite standard.
1336 The evidence discloses that the conduct of the Defendants, while undertaken during their periods of employment with Amcor, did not involve them misusing their positions as such to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or cause detriment to the corporation. Rather it was the use of information they gained in the course of their employment which they took advantage of, as analysed further below.
Finding as to s 181(1)(a) Corporations Act
1337 However, s 181(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, which imposes a civil obligation upon directors and defined officers of a corporation to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith, is in a different position.
1338 The duty draws upon equitable principles applicable to fiduciaries. These duties are imposed by law.
1339 The content of the duty is considered below. It corresponds to the fiduciary duty owed at common law by an employee to an employer.
1340 The case law serves to inform both the content of fiduciary duty under the general law and also the content of the duty under s 181(1)(a) Corporations Law.
1341 Describing a person a fiduciary is only the beginning of the analysis. It is necessary to identify the respects in which the person is a fiduciary. The duty of good faith will arise from these elements and shape the duties which follow.
1342 Once the duties have been defined, it will be necessary to apply them to the relevant operational context in order to determine whether a breach has occurred.
1343 As Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed in Breen v Williams[126] "Australian courts have consciously refrained from attempting to provide a general test for determining when persons [...] stand in a fiduciary relationship". Jacobson J referred to this passage in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4), and stated further[127] "It may be, as their Honours said, that the term "fiduciary relationship" defies definition. This is because of the difficulty of stating a comprehensive principle suitable for application to different types of relationships that carry different obligations".[128]
1344 As Jacobson J also observed in Citigroup Global Markets,[129] apart from the established categories, perhaps the most than can be said is that a fiduciary relationship exists where a person has undertaken to act in the interests of another and not in his or her own interests but all of the facts and circumstances must be carefully examined to see whether the relationship is, in substance, fiduciary.[130] The following remarks of Professor Finn (as his Honour then was) in "The Fiduciary Principle" [131] encapsulated the position as viewed by the learned author:
What must be shown, in the writer's view, is that the actual circumstances of a relationship are such that one party is entitled to expect that the other will act in his interests in and for the purposes of the relationship. Ascendancy, influence, vulnerability, trust, confidence or dependence doubtless will be of importance in making this out, but they will be important only to the extent that they evidence a relationship suggesting that entitlement. The critical matter in the end is the role that the alleged fiduciary has, or should be taken to have, in the relationship. It must so implicate that party in the other's affairs or so align him with the protection or advancement of that other's interests that foundation exists for the 'fiduciary expectation.[132]
1345 Nevertheless, the courts have recognised certain classes of persons as falling within established categories of fiduciary relationships. Examples of these include trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, solicitor and client, director and company, partners, and on central importance to the present case, employee and employer.[133]
1346 The relationship of the Defendants with Amcor being that of employee and employer therefore fell within an established category of fiduciary relationship.
1347 The fiduciary relationship founded upon their employment with Amcor existed, in the case of Hodgson until 1 October 2004, and in the case of the other Defendants (other than Holihan) until 28 October 2004, and in the case of Holihan until 31 July 2003.
Relationship Between a Binding Contract and a Fiduciary Relationship
1348 Although a contractual relationship may co-exist with a fiduciary relationship, the latter is subject to the terms of the contract.[134] Indeed, the terms of the contract may be so precise as to exclude the operation of a fiduciary duty entirely.
1349 Subject to the probable position that a fiduciary cannot exclude liability for fraud or deliberate dereliction of duty, as observed by Jacobson J in Citigroup Global Markets:[135] "It is open to the parties to a contract to exclude or modify the operation of fiduciary duties".[136] Whether this has been achieved is to be determined by construing the contract as a whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction.[137]
1350 In the present case, having examined the relevant contracts of each of the Defendants, I am satisfied that none had the effect of excluding or modifying the general law fiduciary duties as they would apply to employees in their position.
1351 Cardozo CJ in his landmark observation in Meinhard v Salmon[138] prescribed a high standard for fiduciaries in the following terms:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behaviour.
1352 The standard is, however, necessarily tempered by practical considerations which may apply in individual cases. As Latham J said in Mills v Mills[139] in relation to directors, they are:
... not, in my opinion, required by law to live in an unreal region of detached altruism and to act in a vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious facts which must be present to the mind of any honest and intelligent man when he exercises his powers as a director.
1353 The content of the duty is an evolving concept. As Professor Robert C Clark said, in writing about the fundamentals of the duty of loyalty in the United States:[140]
The most general formulation of corporate law's attempted solution to the problem of managerial accountability is the fiduciary duty of loyalty: the corporation's directors ... owe a duty of undivided loyalty to their corporations, and they may not so use corporate assets, or deal with the corporation, as to benefit themselves at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders. The overwhelming majority of particular rules, doctrines, and cases in corporate law are simply an explication of this duty or of the procedural rules and institutional arrangements involved in implementing it. The history of corporate law is largely the history of the development of operational content for the duty of loyalty. Even many cases that appear to be about dull formalities or rules of the road in fact involve disputes arising out of alleged managerial disloyalty ... Most importantly, this general fiduciary duty of loyalty is a residual concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen and categorized. The general duty permits, and in fact has led to, a continuous evolution in corporate law.
1354 As to the rationale for the role of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, this may be seen as a necessary adjunct to the functions performed by statutory regulation and public accountability. Laskin J in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley,[141] following a review Canadian and international authority, put the position in this way:
What these decisions indicate is an updating of the equitable principle whose roots lie in the general standards that I have already mentioned, namely, loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-interest. Strict application against directors and senior management officials is simply recognition of the degree of control which their positions give them in corporate operations, a control which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special meetings. It is a necessary supplement, in the public interest, of statutory regulation and accountability which themselves are, at one and the same time, an acknowledgment of the importance of the corporation in the life of the community and of the need to compel obedience by it and by its promoters, directors and managers to norms of exemplary behaviour.
1355 The subject matter over which any fiduciary obligations will extend will be determined by the character of the venture or undertaking.[142] This is to be ascertained from the terms of the agreement and the course of dealing between the parties.[143] The scope of the fiduciary duties will vary and is to be determined according to the nature of the relationship and the facts of the case.[144]
1356 The over-riding duty of a fiduciary is the obligation of undivided loyalty.[145] This duty embodies "the twin themes" of preventing undisclosed conflict of duty and interest (or of duty and duty), and of prohibiting misuse of the fiduciary position.[146] However, these "themes" are not exhaustive. The nature of the fiduciary obligation was described in the following remarks of Millett LJ in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew:[147]
The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary. As Dr Finn pointed out in his classic work Fiduciary Obligations (1977), p. 2, he is not subject to fiduciary obligations because he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that he is a fiduciary.
1357 In Australia, the duty of loyalty is proscriptive rather than prescriptive in nature. In Breen v Williams, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:
In this country, fiduciary obligations arise because a person has come under an obligation to act in another's interests. As a result, equity imposes on the fiduciary proscriptive obligations - not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of conflict. If these obligations are breached, the fiduciary must account for any profits and make good any losses arising from the breach. But the law of this country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.
1358 In P & V Industries Pty Ltd and Ors v Porto and Ors[148] Hollingworth J described the relevant duties of a fiduciary in the following terms:
A person in a fiduciary position is not, unless otherwise expressly permitted, entitled to make a profit from his position of trust ("the no profit rule") or to put himself in a position where his duty and personal interest conflict ("the no conflict rule"). These general rules are both cast in proscriptive terms, being things which a fiduciary cannot do.
1359 The fiduciary duty, as it applies to the ordinary relationship of employer and employee at common law is one importing implied duties of loyalty, honesty, confidentiality and mutual trust.
At common law:
[c]onduct which in respect of important matters is incompatible with the fulfilment of an employee's duty, or involves an opposition, or conflict between his interest and his duty to his employer, or impedes the faithful performance of his obligations, or is destructive of the necessary confidence between employer and employee, is a ground of dismissal ... [T]he conduct of the employee must itself involve the incompatibility, conflict, or impediment, or be destructive of confidence. An actual repugnance between his acts and his relationship must be found. It is not enough that ground for uneasiness as to its future conduct arises.
1361 In Blyth Chemicals Ltd v Bushnell Starke and Evatt JJ said:[151]
The mere apprehension that an employee will act in a manner incompatible with the due and faithful performance of his duty affords no ground for dismissing him; he must be guilty of some conduct in itself incompatible with his duty and the confidential relation between himself and his employer.
1362 In Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd[152] the issue was explained in the following terms:
... it has been said on many occasions that an employee has a duty of fidelity to his employer. As a general proposition, that is indisputable. The practical difficulty in any given case is to define exactly how far that duty of fidelity extends ...
1363 The fundamental rule is that a fiduciary is not allowed to put himself or herself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. For example, Lord Herschell said in Bray v Ford[153] that a person "... is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict". In Boardman v Phipps[154] Lord Upjohn referred to "the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and interest may conflict".
1364 In his classic statement in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros[155] Lord Cranworth LC said that no one, having fiduciary duties to discharge, "shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interest of those whom he is bound to protect".
1365 However, in the later case of Boardman v Phipps[156] Lord Upjohn, speaking of the phrase "possibly may conflict" as used by Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros, said:
In my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in a conflict.
1366 Pertinently, the conflict rule may apply to indirect forms of conflicting interest. If, for example, a company is contracting with another company in which a director of the first company is a director, member or creditor, the director may have a competing interest for the purposes of the conflicts rule: Walker v Nicolay.[157]
1367 As to the standard of proof required before a breach of duty founded upon a conflict of interest may be found, in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp[158] Mason J referred to a "real or substantial possibility of a conflict" and in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9)[159] Owen J referred to a "real sensible possibility of conflict" and a "real or substantial possibility of conflict".
1368 In relation to and employee taking steps preparatory to entering to business for himself prior to the cessation of his employment, Marks J in Independent Management Resources Pty Ltd v Brown[160] cited Robb v Green for the relevant principle:
In Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 1, at p. 15 Hawkins J (who was the Judge at first instance) said: "In what I have said I do not intend to convey that while the contract of service exists a person intending to enter into business for himself may not do anything by way of preparation, provided only that he does not, when serving his master, fraudulently undermine him by breaking the confidence reposed in him. For instance, he may legitimately canvass, issue his circulars, have his place of business in readiness, hire his servants, etc. Each case must depend on its own circumstances."
... in my judgement an intention by a director of a company to set up business in competition with the company after his directorship had ceased is not to be regarded as a conflicting interest within the context of principle, having regard to the rules of public policy is to restraint of trade, nor is the taking of any preliminary steps to investigate or forward that intention so long as there is no actual competitive activity, such as, for instance, competitive tendering or actual trading, while he remains a director.
... if, as I have held, it was no breach of his fiduciary duty as a director of Balston while still director to form the intention to set up a business in competition with Balston and carry out those preparatory acts, which I have mentioned. And that without disclosing that intention or those acts to Balston, it seems to me, a fortiori, that there could have been no breach of his duty of good faith and fidelity as an employee ...
1370 The common law duties of fidelity come to an end when a person's employment is terminated. Loyalty cannot be demanded of a former employee: Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley.[164]
1371 It follows that after his termination on 1 October 2004, Hodgson owed no fiduciary duty to Amcor. Similarly, in relation to the Defendants (other than Holihan) they owed no duty to Amcor at common law beyond the date of the cessation of their employment, being 28 October 2004, and in relation to Holihan, 31 July 2003.
1372 A person occupying a fiduciary position may be absolved from liability for what would otherwise be a breach of duty by obtaining a fully informed consent.[165] Whether or not such consent has been forthcoming will be a question of fact in all the circumstances of each case,[166] and may be given expressly or implied from all the circumstances.[167]
1373 However, although there is no precise formula, a fiduciary must give full and frank disclosure of all material facts, before an exoneration will apply.[168]
1374 A time honoured method for dealing with conflicts of interest which arise from the carrying on of business by large institutions is the use of Chinese walls.[169] Chinese walls are a means of restricting the flow of information between different persons or departments of the same organisation.[170] Chinese walls have been described as a technique for "managing" conflicts of interest, correctly implying that they may not be watertight in practice and may sometimes prove to be somewhat porous.[171]
1375 In the present case, the findings I have made take the position well beyond mere uneasiness as to the relationship between Amcor and the Defendant parties (other than Holihan and his companies) engendered by their conduct. They seriously compromised the relationship of employer and employee. Instead of pursuing the interests of the company and its shareholders, the relevant Defendant employees pursued their own private interests.
1376 As employees the relevant Defendants acted in breach of their duty of fidelity and trust owed to the employer Amcor at common law.
1377 By not disclosing their involvement in the purchase of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, Amcor was precluded from establishing a Chinese wall restricting the flow of information to any of the Defendants in the negotiation of the sales. It is not to the point that I have found that none of the Defendants in fact had any material influence on the terms of the sale agreements or the manner of sale min each case, save for the exception of the transfer of the NXT licence by Barnes. By their silence in relation to their involvement in the two businesses, Amcor was denied the opportunity to secure the sale negotiations from any possible influence, whether direct or indirect, from any of the Defendants, by for example putting in place a Chinese wall option.
1378 It was also denied the opportunity to exercise alternative options, including the option of contractual termination of the relevant Defendants; subjecting the sale processes and terms to a greater level of scrutiny; or not proceeding with the sales on a private basis or at all.
1379 Amcor was entitled to be informed of the proposed involvement of its employees, the Defendants, in the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business to enable it to take such steps as it saw fit to protect its interests. By denying this information to their employer the necessary "confidence" essential to the relationship of employer and employee was destroyed.
1380 Further, as earlier found, pursuant to the First Sale Agreement Amcor was obliged for a period of five years to supply fibreboard materials to Hottes and the new owners of the business at prices based on direct and distribution costs pursuant to yearly increases as set out in the First Sale Agreement. Also under the First Sale Agreement Amcor was obliged to purchase packaging materials manufactured by the Service Packaging Business for the same five-year period. The price for the supply was to be a cost of materials, labour, freight and transportation plus a mark-up of 12 per cent.
1381 Accordingly the sale of the Service Packaging Business was not confined to a sale of it assets. An ongoing business relationship was put in place.
1382 Further, the supply extension agreement, which I find that Sangster negotiated and agreed on behalf of Amcor to extend for four years, in circumstances where Sangster knew of Hottes' poor health and his inability to work, provides a stark illustration of the continuing conflict of interest identified.
1383 A similar position arose in relation to the sale of the ACB Business. As found earlier, a supply agreement was incorporated into the Second Sale Agreement. For a period of five years from completion, the Amcor company ACB was obliged to supply raw materials in the nature of corrugated board and cartons to Achilla and the Purchaser at prices based on a direct costs and distribution costs ("D&D") basis. Second, for a period of five years from completion, Achilla was required under the Second Sale Agreement to undertake work for AFP on "base products" supplied by it (for example, boxes or corrugated sheets). Achilla was obliged to perform work on this material (for example, affixing a label or performing some other special work) and then return the modified product to AFP and charge AFP for the work done and any additional material used.
1384 Service Containers, the Fourth Plaintiff, was vendor of the assets of the Service Packaging Business on the terms of the First Sale Agreement and ACB, the Second Plaintiff, was the vendor of the assets of the ACB Business on the terms of the Second Sale Agreement. Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd (APA) is the Third Plaintiff. APA is the corporate vehicle for Amcor Australasia's operations. It is, and was at all relevant times, wholly owned by Amcor Ltd. APA was at all relevant times, the parent company of both ACB and Service Containers.
1385 The identity of the purchaser of the ACB business and the ongoing trading partners referred to in the Second Sale Agreement were matters of importance to Amcor. This position was reflected in the terms of the agreement which provided a restriction on a change in control of either of the Holihan purchaser or trading companies without the consent of the Amcor subsidiary, ACB. Clause 16.4(ii) of the Second Sale Agreement provided:
16.4 Change of Control of Purchaser
(i) ...
(ii) The Purchaser may not permit, allow or suffer a change in its control or the control of Achilla without first obtaining the written consent of the Vendor, which consent may be delayed or withheld by the Vendor in its sole and absolute discretion. If not withstanding there is a change in control of the Purchaser of Achilla without the Vendor's consent, then the Vendor may at its sole option provide the Purchaser with a cure period of 10 Business Days of written notice. If at the end of that period the Purchaser of Achilla (as the case may be) has not returned to the status quo ante, the Vendor may then after -
(a) terminate this Deed on further 10 Business Days' notice to the Purchaser and Achilla; and
(b) acquire the Purchasers' Business, for the consideration and as referred to in clause 16.3 (with any necessary changes).
1386 Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster, and Mihelic were all, at the relevant times, employed by Amcor Ltd, the First Plaintiff.
1387 Given the ongoing business relationship between Amcor's subsidiaries Service Containers and ACB on the one hand, and the purchasers of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business on the other, the failure on the part of Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster, and Mihelic during the period of their employment to disclose their relevant interests in the two businesses amounted to a clear conflict of duty, and a consequent breach of their common law duties to Amcor.
1388 The Defendants cannot be absolved from liability for what would otherwise be a breach of duty by obtaining a fully informed consent. No question of fully informed consent arises.
1389 On the contrary, they each failed to disclose to their employer during the period of their employment, their ongoing interest in the businesses with which Amcor continued to have direct dealings. They maintained this position of secrecy while Amcor's subsidiaries, through the ongoing supply agreements, continued to have a commercial dealings in relation to the businesses in question.
1390 This conduct, considered objectively, was manifestly incompatible with the employment relationship and was of a serious dimension.
1391 By not disclosing their involvement in the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, Amcor was precluded from establishing a Chinese wall restricting the flow of information to any of the Defendants which might have affected its bargaining position in the ongoing commercial relationship in relation to the administration of the supply agreements. Again Amcor was denied the opportunity to exercise a Chinese wall option, alternatively the option of contractual termination or any other appropriate steps to protect its position.
1392 This had the potential to compromise Amcor's relevant subsidiaries, and ultimately Amcor itself, in the course of the relationship with the purchaser entities in question during the period of the Defendants' employment with Amcor, that is to 1 October 2004 in relation to Hodgson and to 28 September 2004 in relation to Barnes, Bayley, Sangster, and Mihelic.
1393 I find that during the period of their employment with Amcor, each of Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster, and Mihelic breached their fiduciary duties arising under the general law from their contracts of employment, and did so during the following periods:
(a) Service Packaging Business: from the date of entry into the First G5 Deed, namely late 2001, to 1 October 2004 in relation to Hodgson and to 28 September 2004 in relation to Barnes, Bayley, and Sangster; and
(b) ACB Business: from the date of entry into the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed, namely 26 May 2003, to 1 October 2004 in relation to Hodgson and to 28 September 2004 in relation to Barnes, Bayley, and Sangster and Mihelic.
Further Breach by Hodgson of s 181(1)(a) Corporations Act
1394 Further, in his capacity as an officer of Amcor, by reason of the secrecy maintained by Hodgson as to his initial and continuing involvement with the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business in the circumstances earlier described, Hodgson acted in breach of his statutory duty owed to Amcor pursuant to s 181(1)(a) Corporations Act 2001.
1395 Being an officer of the corporation he failed to exercise his powers and discharge his duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation.
Breach by Other Defendants of s 183 Corporations Act
1396 I find further that the relevant Defendants by their conduct in entering the First and Second G5 Deeds in relation to the Service Packaging Business, and in entering the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed and the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement in relation to the ACB Business, improperly used information which they obtained because they were employees of Amcor, and in addition in relation to Hodgson, because he was also an officer of the corporation. In so doing they gained an advantage for themselves as individuals and for their partners in the enterprises.
1397 In relation to the Service Packaging Business, it was directly through their employment with Amcor that the relevant Defendants learned of the proposed sale of the business by Amcor to Hottes. They made improper use of this information by positioning themselves and entering the First and Second G5 Deeds, thereby securing for themselves an interest in the business, without the knowledge or consent of their employer.
1398 In relation to the ACB Business, again it was directly through their employment with Amcor that the relevant Defendants learned of the proposed sale of the business by Amcor to Holihan. They made improper use of this information by positioning themselves and entering the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed and the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, thereby securing for themselves an interest in the business, without the knowledge or consent of their employer.
1399 This conduct amounted breaches of s 183 Corporations Act.
1400 Although Holihan was employed by Amcor in a managerial role, he was not an officer of Amcor for the purposes of the Corporations Act. Holihan therefore was therefore not subject to the duties in s 181(1) (good faith and proper purpose) and 182(1) of the Act (improper use of position).
1401 Further, given that Amcor was well aware that it was dealing with Holihan at all material times in relation to the negotiation , sale and settlement of the ACB Business, no question of improper use of Holihan's position contrary to s 182 or improper use of any material information contrary to s 183 arises.
1402 Holihan however remained an employee of Amcor until he ceased his employment on 31 July 2003 following settlement of the Second Sale Agreement the day before on 30 July 2003. As such, he continued to owe fiduciary duties under the general law as an employee to Amcor until the cessation of his employment.
1403 Amcor's case against Holihan arising from the sale of the ACB Business differs from its case against the other Defendants.
1404 Amcor clearly did know Holihan was proposing to acquire an interest in the ACB Business.
1405 However, I accept that at the time of entering into the Second Sale Agreement, Amcor in fact believed that Holihan through his companies alone was acquiring the entire interest in the ACB Business. It was not aware of any other person acquiring any interest in the ACB Business with Holihan.
1406 I have also found that at the time of entry into the Second Sale Agreement, Holihan did not know the identity of the secret partners who were intending to acquire an interest in the ACB Business. He nevertheless knew that Barnes together with unidentified persons would be acquiring 80 per cent of the ACB Business.
1407 It was submitted by Amcor that this was material information to Amcor concerning its decision to sell the ACB Business to Holihan. The fact that Barnes was a current employee and Holihan's superior was proposing to take an interest was clearly material.
1408 It was submitted further by Amcor that the fact that unidentified persons were also proposing to take a 60 per cent interest in the ACB Business was also relevant. It was put that such persons could have been a competitor to Amcor (for example Visy or CHH), or employees of Amcor (as in fact was the case) or other parties which Amcor would not have wished to acquire the business.
1409 Holihan in his cross-examination volunteered that in mid-May 2003 he believed the 60 per cent unidentified partners could have been competitors of Amcor:
Did it occur to you that these three shareholders might not have been acceptable to Amcor who were selling the business?---Um it did, it was possible that it could have been an opposition company yes. It was quite possible they could have been other of Mr Barnes' managers in Amcor couldn't it? - - - It could have been. So it was a possibility? - - - But I didn't think that at the time.
1410 It was submitted that, in these circumstances, given his state of knowledge and belief at the time, Holihan ought to have disclosed to Amcor at least the proposal for his superior Barnes to take an interest in the ACB Business and also the possibility that the three other parties proposing to take an interest in the business may not have been acceptable to Amcor, and that this disclosure should have taken placed before the sale was completed. However, Holihan did not do so.
1411 In failing to inform Amcor that Barnes and unidentified persons intended to acquire 80 per cent of the ACB Business, it was contended by Amcor that Holihan breached the duties he owed to his employer company. It was submitted that he placed himself in a position of conflict between his duty to Amcor, which required him to disclose the information, and his interest in obtaining the ACB Business under the arrangements with Barnes and the others. He therefore breached his duty of good faith and fidelity owed to Amcor by reason of his employment with Amcor, so it was put.
1412 Amcor contended that the breach of duty to it arose in one of two ways.
1413 First, it submitted that if Holihan's evidence is accepted that he did not know who the unidentified partners were before about May-June 2004, then he still knew in the required sense that the ACB Business was being sold in breach of fiduciary and other duties owed by Barnes and was reckless as to the position of the others. These were matters to the knowledge of Holihan and his companies. Accordingly, the rights or entitlements to the business and assets the subject of the Second Sale Agreement together with any other benefit received by any of them as a result of entering into that agreement are held on constructive trust for Amcor, ACB or APA.
1414 Second, Amcor submitted that if on the other hand Holihan's evidence is not accepted that he did not know who the unidentified partners were before about May-June 2004, then it is clear he knew in the required sense that the ACB Business was being sold in breach of fiduciary and other duties owed by Hodgson, Barnes and the other former Amcor managers, or was reckless as their breaches. Again, these were matters to the knowledge of Holihan and his companies. Therefore the rights or entitlements to the business and assets the subject of the Second Sale Agreement together with any other benefit received by any of them as a result of entering into that agreement are held on constructive trust for Amcor, ACB or APA.
1415 It contended that, as a result, the Holihan companies are each liable to account to Amcor, ACB and/or APA for any benefit received by them as a result of entering into the Second Sale Agreement and that such benefits are impressed with a constructive trust in favour of Amcor, ACB or APA.
1416 It was further, submitted that Holihan himself, or Achilla knowingly assisted in the breach of duty and are therefore liable. In this regard, it is pleaded by Amcor that Holihan and his companies each gave "knowing assistance" concerning the sale of the ACB Business. It was contended that Holihan and his companies' knowledge was knowledge for the purposes of the second limb of Barnes v Addy[172] which renders a person liable if that person assists a trustee or fiduciary with knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee or fiduciary.
1417 It is trite law that a third party who participates with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of a defaulting fiduciary may himself become accountable as a constructive trustee.[173]
1418 The High Court has determined that such knowledge may be actual knowledge, or may arise where a defendant wilfully shuts his or her eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly fails to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make, or possesses knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person: Farah Constructions v Say Dee Pty Ltd.[174]
Whether Holihan in Breach of any Duty to the Amcor Parties
1419 I accept that Holihan was the controlling and/or directing mind and will of the ACB Business purchaser (ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd ACN 104 489 670), the Third Defendant. The same is the case with the ACB Business trading company Achilla (Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd, formerly Achilla Pty Ltd, ACN 104 489 581), the Fourth Defendant. Holihan at all relevant times was the sole director of Achilla.
1420 Secondly, the sale of the ACB Business pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement was effected on 30 July 2003 and Holihan remained in the employment of Amcor until this was terminated by mutual agreement on the day following the settlement, on 31 July 2003.
1421 Holihan therefore owed duties to Amcor arising out of his employment until 31 July 2003 following which those duties ceased.
1422 The question is whether Holihan breached any duty he owed to Amcor prior to the cessation of his employment.
1423 Holihan's position, and that of his companies during the negotiation, entry into and completion of the Second Sale Agreement, was unusual. In the course of these activities Holihan was not exercising his powers and discharging his duties pursuant to his contract of employment, but was acting independently outside the ambit of his employment. This position may be illustrated by two examples.
1424 First, Holihan could not be directed by Amcor to accept any particular terms it desired for the Second Sale Agreement, or to enter into the agreement at all.
1425 Second, although he remained in the employment of Amcor, Holihan was clearly on the other side of the table in negotiating the sale. With the knowledge and consent of Amcor, he was directly placed in a conflict of interest and could not be expected to have acted other than in his own interests in pursuing the most favourable position he could achieve for himself. I do not accept that Holihan "was handling the negotiations for its sale [of the ACB Business] on behalf of Amcor" as Amcor submitted.
1426 As such, Holihan's relationship with Amcor in respect of the negotiation, entry into and completion of the Second Sale Agreement was governed not by his employment contract or duties which arose by virtue of his employment, but by the general law relating to vendor and purchaser. Were the position to be otherwise, it would place the proposed transaction at risk of becoming bedevilled with fine distinctions as to the content and extent of the employment duties which may apply.
1427 Holihan's position on the other side of the bargaining table, is not dissimilar to an employee bargaining with the employee to secure improved working conditions or higher remuneration. In seeking such benefits, although the employee is not acting in the best interests of the employer, and is in fact pursuing self interest, the employee is not in breach of his duty in pursuing them. No fiduciary duty is breached in these circumstances because what is sought by the employee falls outside the ambit of the existing relationship of employer/employee.
1428 In proceeding with the transaction subsequently embodied in the Second Sale Agreement, Amcor assumed the risk that it was not treating with Holihan in his capacity as a present employee with all of the usual attendant duties requiring that the best interests of the corporation would be advanced, but rather in his capacity as a prospective purchaser with his own interests to pursue. Indeed, this position of conflict was recognised in the agreement itself, which provided for the resignation of Holihan from Amcor when his trading company Achilla Pty Ltd began to trade on 31 July 2003.
1429 I have accepted that at all material times leading up to the settlement of the Second Sale Agreement Holihan was led to believe by his superior Barnes (falsely as I have found), and in fact believed, that Barnes had secured the consent of Brown, managing director Amcor Australia, to become involved with and gain an interest in the ACB Business. Holihan acted in this belief and proceeded to enter into the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.
1430 As to the participation of the other Defendants in the ACB Business, as I have found, this was not disclosed to Holihan by Barnes until May or June 2004, well after he ceased his employment with Amcor.
1431 The fact that in the period leading up to settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 July 2003 Holihan knew that there were to be other unidentified shareholders in the ACB Business holding a proportion of 80 per cent of the business in company with Barnes, did not in all the circumstances give rise to a duty in Holihan to disclose that fact to Amcor, even though the possibility existed that this interest could have been taken by an opposition company or even by other managers in Amcor, whether present or past, or any other person which was not to the liking of Amcor. This was a risk which Amcor assumed from the outset in determining to part with the ACB Business. Following the sale, Amcor was not in a position to control the financial or equity structure of the ACB Business.
(a) proceed on the basis that Barnes had secured the consent of Brown, managing director Amcor Australia, to become involved with and gain an interest in the ACB Business;
(b) proceed on the basis that the other shareholders in the ACB Business did not include presently serving Amcor managers; and
(c) continue his negotiations with Amcor while making provision for future equity participation in the ACB Business he was about to acquire and to plan for the future possible expansion of the business without informing Amcor as to his arrangements in this respect, as reflected in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement.
1433 In the circumstances, I am not satisfied to the requisite standard or at all that Holihan breached any fiduciary duty to Amcor arising from his employment prior to 31 July 2003. He did not place himself in a position of conflict between his duty to Amcor and his interest in obtaining the ACB Business. Any such conflict as did arise, came about because of Amcor's decision to sell the ACB Business to Holihan, and Holihan's decision to purchase it from Amcor, and the ensuing negotiations.
1434 As to the involvement of Barnes, Holihan was not in breach because he was under no obligation to disclose to Amcor what he had been informed by his superior, Barnes, it already knew and consented to, namely the latter's participation in the business.
1435 As to the alleged duty to inform Amcor of the potential participation of the other Defendant shareholders in the ACB Business, given that I am satisfied that Holihan at the time of the settlement of the ACB Business sale did not know of the identity of the other shareholders, which was confidential information and deliberately kept from him, he had no material information to disclose. For this reason I am not satisfied that Holihan breached any duty owed to Amcor in respect of the other Defendant shareholders.
1436 I am also not satisfied that Holihan knew in the required sense that the ACB Business was being sold in breach of fiduciary and other duties owed by Hodgson, Barnes and the other former Amcor managers, or was reckless as their breaches.
1437 Although Holihan acknowledged at least the possibility that the other shareholders could have been other Amcor managers, I accept his answer given in cross-examination that he didn't think this was the case at the time. This is reinforced by Holihan's observation given in evidence that he was "shocked" when the identity of the other Defendants was ultimately disclosed to him by Barnes in mid 2003.
1438 Given the confidentiality regime which Barnes had imposed in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement, which was clearly adhered to and jealously guarded by Barnes and the other Defendants under the spectre of considerable penalty in respect of breach, and given the inherent unlikelihood of other managers of Amcor becoming involved in the ACB Business during the currency of their employment without the knowledge or consent of Amcor, and thus being in breach of their fiduciary duties to their employer, I am not satisfied that Holihan either knew about or was reckless as to their breaches of duty in the relevant sense.
1439 I am not satisfied that Holihan had actual knowledge of the other Defendants and their participation in the ACB Business at the relevant time. Nor am I satisfied that he wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make. Nor am I satisfied that he possessed knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person.
1440 Further, I find that Holihan did not give "knowing assistance" to the Defendants in relation to the initial sale of the ACB Business.
1441 Given that Holihan was the controlling mind of both Achilla and ACB (Australia) Pty Ltd, it follows that these companies too did not give "knowing assistance" to the Defendants in relation to the sale of the ACB Business.
1442 It follows that Amcor's claim against Holihan and his companies under Barnes v Addy must fail in relation to the circumstances surrounding the initial sale of the ACB Business.
1443 However, I have found that by at least 30 June 2004 Holihan had been advised by Barnes as to the identity of the other Defendant shareholders in the ACB Business. From this time he was therefore put on inquiry as to whether the Defendant shareholders other than Barnes were guilty of continuing breaches of duty to Amcor as employees with the company until they terminated their employment, on 28 September 2004 in the case of Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic and on 1 October 2004 in the case of Hodgson.
1444 In these circumstances I am satisfied that Holihan wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make, namely whether Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic ever had the consent and approval of Amcor to take up an interest in the ACB Business while continuing as employee managers with the company.
1445 It follows that Amcor's claim against Holihan and his companies under Barnes v Addy exposes Holihan to liability in relation to the circumstances surrounding the ongoing involvement of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in the ACB Business after 1 July 2004 until the terminations of their respective employment contracts with Amcor in late September and early October 2004.
1446 However, in the events that have happened, as later discussed, I am not satisfied that this conduct gives rise to any relief against Holihan or his companies.
1447 Similarly, during the period in question, namely 1 July 2004 to late September 2004, although there is no direct evidence that Holihan gained knowledge that Barnes continued his involvement in the ACB Business without the knowledge of consent of Amcor, I am satisfied that Holihan wilfully shut his eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make following the disclosure of the other Defendants and their involvement in the ACB Business by Barnes to Holihan by 30 June 2004 - namely whether Barnes ever had the consent and approval of Amcor to take up an interest in the ACB Business while himself continuing as an employee manager with the company.
1448 Indeed, the evidence discloses that Holihan continued to administer the ACB Business after 1 July 2004 according the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed, including overseeing and administering the declaration and payment of the dividend to Barnes and his company in October 2004.
1449 This conduct amounted to "knowing assistance" to Barnes and his companies in relation to the administration of the ACB Business during the period in question and exposes Holihan to liability in respect of it under Barnes v Addy.
1450 The availability of relief against Holihan and his companies in respect of this conduct is later discussed.
1451 It is alleged in the Further Amended Defence and Counterclaim filed 3 June 2010 that Hodgson was involved, from before July 2004, in inducing, causing, procuring, aiding, abetting or being directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or otherwise involved in the establishment of the business under the name "Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group" ("AMCG").
1452 The allegations against Hodgson include enticing senior management employees of the Amcor Parties to work in AMCG's Business, namely Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic while they were still employees of Amcor, and an allegation that in concert with Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes, Hodgson approached CHH with a view to providing consultancy services.
1453 The Amcor allegations against Hodgson also include, acting in concert with Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and/or Barnes, copying, removing and storing confidential documents belonging to the Amcor Parties, incorporating AMCG, renting business premises and acquiring computers and furniture for AMCG, canvassing the Amcor Parties' customers for AMCG, noting business opportunities for AMCG, making preparations to conduct AMCG and providing consultancy services to CHH in relation to strategies to compete with the AMCOR parties.
1454 Amcor's Further Amended Defence and Counterclaim also included the allegation that, by reason of his employment by Amcor in a senior managerial role, and/or his directorship of Service Containers, and/or his role as an officer of ACB, Hodgson owed a fiduciary duty and/or a duty of fidelity and good faith to Amcor, ACB and Service Containers which prohibited him from, during the term of his employment from concealing information useful to Amcor, ACB or Service Containers. It is then relevantly pleaded that from at least August 2004 Hodgson was involved in the establishment of AMCG, including providing consultancy services to CHH in connection with its strategies to compete with Amcor, and that by reason thereof, Hodgson breached the fiduciary duty and the duty of fidelity and good faith owed to Amcor, ACB and/or to Service Containers.
1455 After dealing with necessary background matters, I will proceed to consider each element of Amcor's pleaded case on the AMCG issue.
1456 Carter Holt Harvey ("CHH"), is a publicly listed company in New Zealand. It is one of the largest publicly listed companies in that country. In 2004 it was the largest competitor with Amcor after Visy. At the time CHH did not have a significant presence in Australia in the corrugated cardboard industry, but had a large presence in New Zealand.
1457 At least by 29 April 2004, CHH had plans to grow its business in the Australian market and recruit experienced top level staff from a key competitor for this purpose (the "CHH Strategy"). The CHH Strategy eventually became known within CHH and the participating Defendants, including Hodgson, as "Project Flipper". Mr Rhys Jones ("Rhys Jones") was a senior executive with CHH, occupying the position of Chief Operating Officer, and was responsible for the planned expansion.
1458 Hodgson conceded under cross-examination that he had discussions with Rhys Jones from about April/May 2004. These conversations centred upon the possibility of he and his colleagues assisting CHH to improve and expand its business in Australia.
1459 Hodgson met Rhys Jones in New Zealand at the Rugby Bledisloe Cup in July 2004 where they further discussed assisting CHH.
1460 Following this event, at the request of Rhys Jones, Hodgson arranged for his senior managers to be present at the meeting in late July 2004 at his home. A discussion occurred about ways in which Carter Holt Harvey could be assisted to improve its business generally and possible options open to develop and implement its expansion plans into Australia.
1461 In cross-examination of Hodgson on the July 2004 meeting, the following exchange took place:
Can I ask you this, why didn't the meeting take place in your office if it was about business?---It was on a weekend.
It was because you wanted to keep it secret from Amcor, wasn't it?---No. I could have well had it in my office and it would have still been secretive, if that's the point you're making.
All right?---But it was on a weekend, I had it at home.
All right. You did keep this meeting secret from Amcor, didn't you?---It had nothing to do with Amcor.
You were meeting with your top management team with your second biggest competitor, is that right?---Yes.
1462 I find that the meeting and the subject matter discussed at the meeting was kept secret from Amcor and was not disclosed by Hodgson to his employer. Thereafter, the plan, which culminated in the development of the AMCG consultancy business to assist CHH with its strategy, and the CHH Strategy itself, was not disclosed by Hodgson or any of the participating Defendants to Amcor.
1463 Hodgson said that the discussion at the meeting "was general and focused upon potential ways CHH might be assisted to improve its business generally and options to develop and implement expansion plans into Australia". In cross-examination Hodgson described the subject matter of the discussion in a little more detail in the following exchange:
So you invited Mr Reece [sic Rhys] Jones along to your home to have a chat with you and your senior management about Carter Holt Harvey's expansion into Australia?---Their business generally and expansion. It was a lot to do with proving their productivity.
Really? All right?---That's why I invited the other gentlemen because they were experts in that area.
I see, so Carter Holt Harvey wanted to improve its productivity is that right?---Amongst other things, yes.
What, productivity where? In its plants in Australia?---In Australia and New Zealand particularly with the use of paper.
1464 Hodgson gave some further insights into the subject matter of the discussion in the following cross-examination:
Prior to July 2004 you had had some conversations with Mr R[hys] Jones about his desire to see you and your senior management to discuss matters like improving productivity of Carter Holt Harvey's operations?---In part, yes.
What were the other parts, you tell us about it Hodgson? What else did you discuss in these conversations with Mr R[hys] Jones about leading up to this meeting at your home in July 2004?---About how they could just improve and expand their business generally.
So productivity is one topic, better productivity and then improvement and expansion of their business generally, is that right?---Yes.
In particular the building new corrugating capacity along the eastern seaboard of Australia, correct?---That didn't happen at that meeting, that evolved.
That evolved? All right. That evolved into what became Project Flipper, is that right?---Yes.
Project Flipper was a Carter Holt Harvey project which focused upon that company increasing its CFP capacity along the eastern seaboard of Australia?
---Yes.
1465 I find that discussions in which Hodgson participated with Rhys Jones of CHH leading up to and including the July 2004 meeting at Hodgson's home concerned the following subject matter:
(a) Hodgson and his Amcor senior managers discussed how they might "assist Carter Holt Harvey to improve and expand its business in Australia";
(b) the discussions included improving the productivity of CHH in Australia;
(c) The outline of what became later known as "Project Flipper" was discussed. This became CHH's strategic plan to build a new and expanded corrugating paper capacity along the eastern seaboard of Australia;
(d) Hodgson, his senior managers and Rhys Jones achieved a "handshake deal" or oral agreement at this meeting that they would leave Amcor and set up a new business to assist CHH implement its strategic plan.
1466 Following the July 2004 meeting Hodgson sent his contract of employment to CHH on 17 August 2004.
1467 After July/August 2004 there were further meetings between Hodgson and CHH. Some of the meetings were held at the Como Hotel in Melbourne. At the meetings they discussed the CHH proposal. These meetings were attended by all or some of Hodgson's other colleagues.
1468 By a letter dated 10 August 2004, Barnes wrote to Rhys Jones on behalf of himself, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic in the following terms:
Trevor Barnes
47 Llewellyn Street,
Rhodes,
Sydney,
10th August 2004.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Rhys,
We are a group of four Australian Amcor executives. Individually and jointly we have expertise and credible experience in strategic marketing, organisational restructuring, Operational excellence, research and development best practice and years of general management experience.
Over the past year we have become incrementally disillusioned with the strategic direction Amcor has taken in respect of its business in Australasia. The strategic departure from what we as an executive believe to be fundamental in determining both shareholder value and a sound basis for determining the future competitive position of the business has led us to a point whereby we can no longer associate our professional reputations with the direction being taken.
We have decided to form a consultancy to the industry in general. We believe that Carter Holt Harvey is underway with a business improvement program and that there are synergies between our offering and Carter Holt Harvey's future needs in determining its strategic direction in the Australasian market.
It is our intention to sever our relationship with Amcor in the immediate future and fulfil the appropriate terms regarding trade restraints applicable to each of us. Any future association with CHH will be unencumbered in respect of our past service with Amcor.
We therefore write to you and wish to determine your expression of interest in engaging our services on a consultancy basis for an agreed period.
Should you wish to pursue this offer please register your interest in writing to the write upon which we will be more than willing to discuss details of our offer.
Your sincerely,
Trevor Barnes, Ian Sangster, Roger Bayley, Albert Mihelic.
1469 The authenticity of the letter from Barnes not challenged. It was signed by some of the other Defendants and was responded to by CHH by letter dated 3 September 2011 addressed to Barnes in the following terms:
Dear Trevor
Consulting Services
We refer to your letter to Rhys Jones dated 10 August 2004 enquiring about the possibility of undertaking consulting work with Carter Holt Harvey.
As you are aware we are currently in the middle of a significant business improvement program. As part of this program we are engaging a range of consultants with specialist skills to assist us.
We would like to meet with you to discuss possible synergies between your offering and Carter Holt Harvey's needs. Any engagement would need to be consistent with your consulting obligation to Amcor (if any).
Please contact me on (649) 262-6193 to arrange a time to meet.
Your sincerely
Prafull Kesha.
1470 I accept the letter from Barnes dated 10 August 2011 accurately reflected at that time the position of the four parties referred to in the letter, namely Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic.
1471 In September 2004 Hodgson had further discussions with his senior managers about the consultancy he might enter into with CHH. Discussion took place about remuneration, as evidenced by the following passages of Hodgson's cross-examination:
Tell me this Hodgson, about this time, that is September 2004, you were having - were you having discussions with your senior management about the possible consultancy that you might enter into with Carter Holt Harvey?---Yes.
During this period, that is early middle September 04, you and your senior managers discussed did you not figures to be put to Carter Holt Harvey by way of a consultancy, a monthly consultancy fee?---I'd say so yes.
Can I suggest to you that the figure that you and your colleagues arrived at after these discussions was a figure of $162,000 a month plus GST?---I accept that.
That figure of $162,000 a month was based upon first of all the salary and benefits you then were presently receiving at Amcor?---Yes.
Plus the respective benefits by way of salary and others that your senior managers were also then receiving at Amcor?---Correct.
Are you aware that your colleagues, that is your senior managers put that figure to Carter Holt at some point in September 04?---Well they put it at some point, whether it was September 04, I accept that if that's what's happened, I can't say precisely.
1472 Australian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd ("AMCG") was incorporated on 22 September 2004.
1473 By 23 September 2004 in a CHH internal email and attachment, Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic, were referred to as the "Flipper Consultants". The details of a proposed payment structure was set out totalling payments amounting to $162,000 per month in respect of not only Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic, but also Hodgson, who was described in the attached table as "Jim". The email and its attached table read as follows:
From: Kesha, Prafull
Sent: Thursday, 23 September 2004 1:31 pm
To: Springford, Peter (Corporate)
CC: Jones, Rhys (CHH Corporate Manukau)
Subject: Cost if Flipper Consultants
Peter,
Rhys has asked me to forward you the estimated cost of the consultants for Flipper. In summary, we are looking at the following costs for the initial 6 month contract.
AUD 162k/month + gst (paid monthly in advance).
Plus reasonable disbursements (travel, accomm, cars, telephone, consumables etc).
Plus MIP equivalent paid quarterly based on agreed performance criteria being met (30% x (salary + super) = $125k/qtr).
Plus one-off reimbursement for initial establishment costs (based on actual costs incurred - up to 50k).
Regards Prafull.
Travel, accommodation, telephones, consumables etc to be invoiced as disbursements
Initial establishment costs to be dealt with as a one-off reimbursement based on actual costs incurred
MIP equivalent to be paid quarterly based on agreed performance criteria being met.
1474 This document was put to Hodgson in cross-examination who admitted its authenticity and effect in the following passage:
Of 23 September 04, do you see that?---Yes.
And it sets out the estimated cost of the consultants for Flipper. So the project we're talking about at this time was known as Project Flipper, is that right?---That's correct.
1475 On 28 September 2004, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic all resigned from Amcor.
1476 About the same time, in late September or early October 2004 all four executed an "agreement in principle" with CHH at the offices of Middleton' solicitors. The agreement was subject to a confidentiality clause. Key terms of the agreement were:
This Term Sheet is intended to set out the agreement in principle between Carter Holt Harvey Limited ("CHH") and Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty Ltd ("AMC") regarding a consulting arrangement (the scope of which being more fully described below).
It is intended that this Term Sheet will form the basis f a more formal consultancy agreement ("Consultancy Agreement") (governed by Victorian law) between the parties. The first draft of any Consultancy Agreement shall be prepared by CHH. Both parties acknowledge that this document is a confidential Term Sheet, not a binding contract.
KEY TERMS
Term of Engagement: The consultancy arrangement shall commence one month from the date the principals for AMC terminate employment with their current employer and shall continue for a period of six months (or such other period as mutually agreed by the parties).
Scope of Engagement: AMC shall (on a non-exclusive basis) provide CHH with assistance in respect of certain performance improvement initiatives for its packaging business ("Services"). CHH and AMC shall form time to time to agree a Project Plan in respect of each initiative identified by CHH. That Project Plan shall include a description of the deliverable for that project; a project scope and time-line; and specify any performance targets/KPIs to be met by AMC (and any associated performance related payments).
AMC represents and warrants that it can lawfully carry out the Services for CHH in accordance with the arrangements set out in this Term Sheet (and has obtained legal advice to that effect). Furthermore, and without limitation to the foregoing, in carrying out the Services, AMC shall ensure that its employees, agents, officers and sub-contractors comply at all times with any legal restrictions which may be applicable to them in respect of the provision of the Services.
Consulting Fee: In consideration for the provision of the Services CHH shall pay AMC a consulting fee of $AUD162,000 (ex GST) per calendar month. The fee shall be paid monthly in advance and shall be remitted on the 15th of each month. If for any reason AMC is unable to provide the Services, CHH's payment obligations shall be suspended on a pro-rata basis during that period. It is the parties' expectation that the consulting fee shall be reviewed at 3 monthly intervals.
The first month's consulting fee shall include an additional payment of up to $AUD50,000 (ex GST) to partially reimburse AMC in respect of certain set-up costs. Furthermore, CHH shall on a quarterly basis pay AMC a performance bonus in accordance with the terms of any applicable Project Plan agreed by the parties.
Disbursements: CHH shall meet all of the reasonable disbursements of AMC related to carrying out the Services. Such disbursements to include: travel, accommodation; the provision of a vehicle (whether a hire car or long-term lease arrangement). Individual disbursements in excess of $AUD5,000 must be approved by CHH before they are incurred.
1477 I infer from this evidence that by at least 23 September 2004 the outline of the CHH project known as "Project Flipper" had been formulated and formed the basis of discussions between Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic on the one hand, and CHH on the other, resulting amongst other things in the negotiated basis for remuneration. Soon after, the agreement in principle dated 28 September 2004, was executed by CHH and Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic. Implementation of "Project Flipper" was also the principal and immediate reason for incorporating AMCG on 22 September 2004.
1478 I also infer from this evidence that by at least 23 September 2004, CHH's strategic plan to increase its corrugated paper capacity along the Australian eastern seaboard, which comprised the CHH Strategy implemented by "Project Flipper" was known not only Barnes, Sangster, Bayley, and Mihelic, but also to Hodgson.
1479 Further, by 1 October 2004, the date of Hodgson's termination, it is clear that he had an interest in the proposed consultancy business. His interest was admitted in the following passage in his cross-examination:
It was proposed at some stage, was it not, that you would be an investor?---After my constraints were over, I had reserved the right, in discussions with my colleagues, that I could join that business subject to capital gains tax or whatever was - might be applicable at the time.
1480 After his termination, Hodgson continued to develop his interest in the enterprise.
1481 On 1 November 2004, Hodgson attended a meeting with Mr Silverwood, AMCG's accountant, along with Mihelic and Bayley concerning the AMCG business.
1482 Silverwood was instructed to prepare a structure that included Hodgson joining AMCG. The structure prepared contemplated Hodgson obtaining a one-fifth shareholding in AMCG. Hodgson admitted to one meeting with Silverwood, although the evidence showed there were more meetings in fact conducted about this time. In cross-examination Hodgson conceded that he attended a meeting at AMCG on 10 November 2004 with Silverwood, Mihelic and Bayley. Hodgson gave evidence that at this meeting it was contemplated that Hodgson would take an equal share in AMCG with Mihelic, Bayley, Sangster and Barnes in the future. However, Hodgson told Silverwood that he was restrained by Amcor for between 6-12 months from 1 October 2004.
1483 Hodgson also gave evidence of a business plan for AMCG which was to be put to the board of CHH. The plan included an arrangement to provide security for the AMCG participants. If the CHH board did not accept the business plan, it agreed to pay AMCG a sum of money and offer employment to some of the persons involved in AMCG, including Hodgson. On the other hand, if the plan was accepted it was proposed that ultimately AMCG would be bought out by CHH for between $15-20 million, provided certain performance parameters were met.
1484 In documents sent by Mihelic to solicitors Mr Macken and Mr Dillman in November 2004, Mihelic described the CHH Strategy as "Project Flipper" in a short document dated 29 October 2004. The document also set out the key elements of the management contract. In the document, in a number of places, reference was made to the management team of what had become AMCG formed on 29 October 2004. "JH" was listed as part of the "management team". I draw the obvious inference that "JH" referred to Jim Hodgson. The document included the following passages:
PROJECT FLIPPER 29 October 2004
Four executives of Amcor Fibre Packaging (Trevor Barnes, Ian Sangster, Albert Mihelic and Roger Bayley) tendered resignation that became effective on 28 October '04 with the publicised intention of forming a manufacturing consultancy together. This is that preferred approach of their major client to carry out what has been named Project Flipper.
The four executives formed Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group Pty. Ltd on October 29 ...
AMCG has begun invoicing the major client for the equivalent of previous salary and superannuation packages as remuneration ...
As a result of the directors' activity namely leaving their existing employer, and the potential significant damage they could cause that business, it is possible that the old employer may wish to negotiate a satisfactory outcome for both themselves and AMCG's client. ...
The major client desire that AMCG build a factory in Queensland targeting strategic markets for its products. Simultaneously, the client intends ceding management control of its existing Australasian operations to AMCG to ensure tight integration of the new facility. The major client wants to find a way to then buy out AMCG so as to reward the directors for a successful completion of the project. Depending on degree of success, the value of AMCG through a buyout could range from $15-20 million or more. At the time of buyout, each director of AMCG will be given the choice as to his employment situation. At this point in time, JH and RB have indicated they wish to retire. IS, AM and TB have indicated they will accept the equivalent positions guaranteed by the client within its organisation.
Management Contract Key points
JH; AM; IS; RB (The management Team) will form a management company. This will be a PTY LTD company and 10000 shares will be issued.
The management team will also consult to other companies.
The management team will be paid retainers up until business case approval.
CHH will underwrite the retainers.
CHH will underwrite superannuation benefits for each member such that each member will be no worse off by leaving Amcor's 1970 defined benefit scheme wether the management team are part of the management company or employed by CHH.
...
The management team JH; TB; IS; AM; RB will be paid according to the schedule contained in Appendix 2.
JH and RB may leave after three years. If this occurs then they will be paid pro rata as per schedule in appendix 2.
[Underlined for emphasis]
1485 In about November 2004, Hodgson was provided with a mobile phone, email address and the use of an office by AMCG. Hodgson gave evidence that around this time he was also provided with a computer by AMCG which he stated was for work in New Zealand. However, he conceded that he never worked in New Zealand.
1486 I find that Hodgson was central to the exercise in liaising with CHH and organising his colleagues to participate. Hodgson was, from the inception of the scheme involving AMCG, its leading participant and was active in driving the enterprise.
1487 In December 2004, the cartel conduct had been exposed, Federal Court Proceedings had commenced and Hodgson and his four colleagues were the subject of proceedings issued by Amcor. By letter dated 7 December 2004 CHH wrote to Hodgson in relation to the proposed consultancy arrangements offered to pay AMCG's start up and legal costs.
1488 CHH also agreed to reimburse Hodgson's legal fees in respect to proceedings with Amcor. I am satisfied that Hodgson was able to achieve this because of the business relationship which he had already built up with CHH since at least July 2004.
1489 In due course, a consultancy agreement was entered into between AMCG and CHH. A "side letter" was included to the effect that if AMCG achieved CHH's Australasian objectives in "Project Flipper", AMCG would be paid $20 million.
1490 Following the cessation of his employment on 1 October 2004, Hodgson was bound by a restraint clause with Amcor. Although Hodgson was not a director or shareholder of AMCG, I accept that in reality Hodgson was part of the AMCG management team. He participated in management discussions regarding the framework of the consultancy and the scope of the retainer with CHH.
1491 Hodgson did not receive any payments in respect of the consultancy business prior to the termination of his employment with Amcor on 1 October 2004. However, payments which may have been made subsequent to the termination of his employment, if referable to work done or services provided by him to advance the enterprise prior his termination, may be relevant to the issue as to whether Hodgson provided such work or services in the earlier period, and the nature and extent of that work.
1492 The arrangements negotiated with CHH were that AMCG was to invoice CHH an amount equal to the packages received by each of Hodgson, Bayley, Sangster Mihelic and Barnes at Amcor. Pursuant to their agreement with CHH, each of these five were to be "kept whole". In other words, they were each to receive the equivalent remuneration as they had when they were employed at Amcor. This included not only their base salary, but motor vehicle allowances and bonuses.
1493 AMCG invoiced CHH each month from 1 November 2004 for a consultancy fee that was comprised of salary in respect of Bayley, Barnes, Mihelic, Sangster and Hodgson. Hodgson's salary was calculated on the basis of the remuneration he received at Amcor and was included in the consultancy payment package. Approximately $162,000 per month was allocated by CHH for payment to AMCG for this purpose.
1494 The payments made to Hodgson were carefully and elaborately disguised so as to avoid detection and the exposure of evidence of a likely breach of his continuing contractual obligations to Amcor under his restraint clause.
1495 The arrangements undertaken to achieve payment to Hodgson from CHH were devised following professional advice.
1496 Hodgson gained an entitlement to about $1 million for 18 months involvement with AMCG. After considerable discussion and deliberation, $520,000 of that sum was paid to Hodgson, purportedly as a capital sum on 29 June 2005. This was undertaken in the following manner: the sum of $520,000 was paid to Hodgson by AMCG purportedly pursuant to a deed of restraint he executed with it. This deed provided that in consideration of the payment, Hodgson would not accept employment or provide services to anyone other than AMCG from 1 October 2005, but if AMCG failed to offer him employment by 31 October 2005 - one month later - he was entitled to work for anyone else and retain the payment of $520,000. The deed in effect gave AMCG a first right of offer of employment to Hodgson for just one month for $520,000.
1497 The timing of this arrangement was drawn to comply with Hodgson's undertaking given to the Federal Court of Australia in orders made by Merkel J on 17 December 2004 that he would not be engaged or participate in any business competing with Amcor until after 30 September 2005.
1498 The amount of $520,000 referred to in the deed was calculated by reference to and represented:
(a) Hodgson's gross wages, superannuation and car allowance entitlements with AMCG from November 2004 to June 2005, totalling $508,761.72; together with
(b) repayments of legal fees paid by Hodgson to Deacons and Macken, totalling $10,183;
(c) a figure which was then rounded up to a total of $520,000.
1499 As to the balance of the $1 million dollar sum due to be paid to Hodgson under the arrangement with CHH, after considering a number of options, the following strategy was settled upon: it was agreed by Bayley, Barnes, Sangster and Mihelic that a sum of $465,000 would be divided into four amounts, each of $116,250, which would be dispersed in equal amounts to each of them. They then would each pay the tax due on the amount paid to each them calculated at $56,381.25. The net amount of $59,868.75 would then be paid to Hodgson, giving him a total of net $239,475 after tax ($59,686.75 x4 = $239,475). The payments were made directly to AJ Macken & Co, Hodgson's solicitors. In this way Hodgson's share of the salary, superannuation and benefits paid by CHH was recorded as being paid to his solicitor, AJ Macken & Co, and held on trust as an advance for legal fees.
1500 Hodgson gave evidence at trial that he was paid approximately $240,000 by way of three or four cheques from Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in late 2006. He stated that this was not his share of earnings from AMCG but rather a "gift" from those individuals. Hodgson denied that he received payment from AMCG, although provision was made for him to receive a salary. His case was that he never joined AMCG.
1501 Although Hodgson's position was supported to some extent by Mihelic, who described his payment as "an appropriate and moral ... gift" and that he (Mihelic) had "no right" to the money, I do not believe Hodgson when he gave these explanations. The payment structure put in place to pay Hodgson was a sham devised to disguise his real involvement in AMCG and the financial benefit that he obtained as a result of that involvement. The monies paid to Hodgson, which in fact totalled $985,000 ($520,000 plus $465,000), comprised payment from CHH for his services provided to AMCG over an 18 month period of its operation.
1502 However, fees payable to the Defendants were only settled by CHH on about 23 September 2004. Further, the agreement in principle entered into in late September or early October 2004 specified that it was to commence "one month from the date the principals for AMC terminate employment with their current employer". Accordingly, the agreement was only to commence one month from 28 September 2004, the date that Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic resigned from Amcor. The obligation to make any payment under the agreement or for AMCG to undertake any work under the agreement, commenced at that time.
1503 I am not satisfied that any payment made, which was advanced by CHH in respect of Hodgson, was referable to any work undertaken by Hodgson prior to the termination of his employment.
1504 Accordingly, the monies paid to Hodgson, sourced from CHH, do not support the position that prior to the termination of his employment with Amcor on 1 October 2004, Hodgson performed any function for the consultancy enterprise beyond engaging in preparatory work for its possible future operation.
Whether Hodgson breached any duty to Amcor arising from his involvement with AMCG
1505 The question as to whether Hodgson breached any duty to Amcor arising from his involvement with AMCG must be considered in the following context: Hodgson's employment with Amcor was terminated on 1 October 2004 and the termination of the employment of the other Defendants, which was not in dispute, occurred on 28 September 2004.
1506 I am satisfied that no conduct on the part of Hodgson of any material consequence occurred with regard to AMCG prior to the meeting at his home in July 2004. The time period for any relevant conduct to be considered is therefore limited to the period commencing with the July 2004 meeting in Hodgson's home and ending on the termination of his employment on 1 October 2004, a period spanning some 3 months.
1507 I will consider each of the allegations made by Amcor by reference to the evidence as to what occurred during this limited time frame.
1508 Amcor made the general allegation that from at least August 2004, Hodgson induced, caused, procured, aided, abetted, was directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or otherwise involved in the establishment of a business under the name or style of "Australasian Manufacturing Consulting Group" (AMCG's Business).
1509 It was alleged by Amcor that Hodgson, in concert with Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes, on or about 10 August 2004 approached Carter Holt Harvey with a view to providing consultancy services.
1510 I accept that meetings and other contacts with officers of CHH did occur prior to the termination of Hodgson's employment on 1 October 2004 and there was evidence of other preparations for the proposed new enterprise being undertaken during this time.
1511 However, the conduct during the relevant period did not go beyond the bounds of preliminary preparation. There was no evidence of any competitive activity or actual trading in the nature of provision of consultancy services.
1512 Such conduct as did occur, in and of it itself, does not disclose any breach of contract or fiduciary duty owed to Amcor. On the authorities previously considered, an employee does not breach any fiduciary duty owed to his or her employer by pursuing, whilst employed, employment opportunities with other potential employers including such opportunities with competitors of the current employer.
1513 I accept that prior to 1 October 2004, Hodgson was entitled to discuss and pursue future employment opportunities with any employer, including a competitor of Amcor such as CHH or with a consultancy of the kind proposed by AMCG, even if the consultancy was proposed to offer services to a competitor of Amcor. Further, Hodgson was entitled to do this, either acting alone, or together with other employees of Amcor at the time.
1514 After 1 October 2004, Hodgson was, subject to the post termination restraints required of him by Amcor which were not in issue in the trial, entitled to commence employment for, and receive remuneration from, any other employer.
Whether Hodgson Enticed Defendants to Work for AMCG
1515 Amcor alleged that Hodgson enticed Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes to work in AMCG's Business.
1516 I am not satisfied that the evidence goes so far as to justify this conclusion. The evidence of Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes is that all of them had decided on their own account to leave Amcor. This is supported by the letter of Barnes to Rhys Jones of CHH dated 10 August 2004 and the reply of CHH to that letter.
1517 I accept the submissions of the Defendants on this issue. In the usual case, no breach of contract or fiduciary duty arises where one employee aids another employee in circumstances where the second employee has independently made a decision to leave his current employment.
1518 In AMP Services Ltd v Manning[175] the defendant employee had given notice to her employer and had facilitated contact between her prospective new employer and members of her team who had told her that they also wished to leave their employment. This conduct was held to involve no breach of her contract or of any fiduciary duty owed by her to her employer. Finkelstein J in Manning analysed the facts before him in the following way:[176]
Arrive [the former employer] also alleges that by assisting members of the group to find employment with GSJBW [another business] (for example, by putting them into contact with Mr Moir) Ms Manning acted in breach of fiduciary duty. It is true that Ms Manning provided members of her group with assistance in that regard. I do not, however, accept that this assistance amounts to a breach of duty. There is nothing wrong in helping a person find new employment in circumstances where that person has independently made the decision to leave his current employment.
1519 I find that prior to the termination of his employment on 1 October 2004, Hodgson facilitated the involvement of Mihelic, Sangster, Bayley and Barnes in the proposed new enterprise. However, I am not satisfied that in so doing, Hodgson breached his duty to his employer.
1520 Amcor alleged in its pleadings that Hodgson, in concert with others, copied, removed and secretly stored for use in AMCG's Business, 30,000 documents. This allegation may be shortly dealt with. The Amcor Parties led no evidence in support of it. It was not alleged against, or put to Barnes, Bayley, Sangster or Mihelic in their capacities as directors of AMCG. It was not put to Hodgson in cross-examination.
1522 Amcor alleged that Hodgson, in concert with others, incorporated AMCG on 22 September 2004. The date of incorporation of AMCG was not in contention.
1523 However, the incorporation of a corporate vehicle by a current employee to conduct a proposed future business, is not of itself restrained by the common law. Such conduct, without more, in the usual case amounts to no more than a permissible preparatory step.
1524 Further, there is no evidence as to the part played by Hodgson (if any) in the incorporation of AMCG. Prior to 1 October 2004 Hodgson was not a director or a shareholder of AMCG.
Renting Premises and Acquiring Office Furniture and Equipment
1526 Amcor further alleged that Hodgson participated in the renting of business premises, and acquiring office furniture and equipment which was achieved by 11 November 2004.
1527 However, by this time Hodgson had ceased his employment with Amcor.
1528 Further, apart from being provided with a computer for his own use, there is no evidence that he was involved in these activities.
1529 In any event, in the absence of any cogent evidence that the premises and equipment were actually being used during the relevant period to conduct a consultancy business to promote CHH's business in competition with that of Amcor, namely during the period of Hodgson's employment with Amcor, I am unable to find a breach of any duty.
1531 Amcor further alleged that Hodgson, in concert with others, canvassed the customers of Amcor for AMCG's Business.
1532 However, the Amcor Parties led no evidence in support of this allegation, the matter was not was not put to Hodgson in cross-examination, and no such allegation was made against Barnes, Bayley, Sangster or Mihelic in their capacities as directors of AMCG.
Noting of Business Opportunities for AMCG's Business
1534 Amcor alleged that Hodgson, in concert with others, noted business opportunities for AMCG's Business.
1535 I take it that this allegation amounted to a claim by Amcor that Hodgson breached his duty not to make use of any business opportunity obtained during the course of his employment. This species of claim may be brought against an employee in Hodgson's senior position and is reserved for those in "top management" such as directors or senior officers: AMP Services Ltd v Manning.[177]
1536 The principle, however, cannot be stated too widely. Reference is made to a leading case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on corporate director and officer liability, Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley.[178] As explained in that case, the duty not to make use of any business opportunity obtained during the course of a person's employment, in the usual case, will be confined to the factual circumstances described by Laskin J in O'Malley where his Honour observed:
a director or a senior officer ... is precluded from obtaining for himself, either secretly or without the approval of the company (which would have to be properly manifested upon full disclosure of the facts), any property or business advantage either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating; and especially is this so where the director or officer is a participant in the negotiations on behalf of the company. An examination of the case law in this Court and in the Courts of other like jurisdictions on the fiduciary duties of directors and senior officers shows the pervasiveness of a strict ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic disqualifies a director or senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting even after his resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired.
1537 In the present case, there is no question of Hodgson "usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity" which his company Amcor was actively pursuing.
1538 Further, the Amcor Parties led no evidence in support of this allegation including when it is alleged that Hodgson engaged in this conduct. It was not alleged against, or put to Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic in their capacities as directors of AMCG. It was not put to Hodgson in cross-examination.
1539 Accordingly, the duty not to make use of any business opportunity obtained during the course of a person's employment is not open on the facts.
1541 Amcor further alleged that Hodgson, in concert with others, made preparations to conduct AMCG's Business.
1543 Further, even if this did occur, as I have found it did, the mere making of preparations for another business in the course of a current employment, even if that business is proposed to be conducted in competition with the existing employer, or to provide consultancy services to another party who is in competition to an existing employer, does not, of itself, give rise to breach of any common law fiduciary duty.
1544 I find that Hodgson's conduct in the relevant period prior to 1 October 2004 in meeting either with CHH or with the directors of AMCG did not amount to any breach by Hodgson of any fiduciary duty then owed by him to Amcor.
1545 It is separately alleged by Amcor that Hodgson, in concert with others, provided consultancy services to CHH in connection with its strategies to compete with Amcor.
1546 However, there is no evidence that AMCG or anyone else on its behalf provided consultancy services to CHH at any time prior to Hodgson's termination on 1 October 2004 other than to meet with representatives of CHH in the course of which the commercial plans of CHH to expand to the eastern seaboard of Australia were revealed to Hodgson.
1548 Amcor alleges that, by reason of his employment by Amcor in a senior managerial role, and/or his directorship of Service Containers, and/or his role as an officer of ACB, Hodgson owed a fiduciary duty and/or a duty of fidelity and good faith to Amcor, ACB and Service Containers which prohibited him from, during the term of his employment from concealing information useful to Amcor, ACB or Service Containers. It is then relevantly pleaded that from at least August 2004 Hodgson was involved in the establishment of AMCG, which included providing consultancy services to CHH in connection with its strategies to compete with Amcor, and thereby breached his duties to his employer.
1549 I accept that the proposed consultancy business developed for AMCG would in effect compete with Amcor by providing services to CHH. The core business of the enterprise was proposed to be the advancement of the "Project Flipper", the CHH Strategy, which involved the expansion of its operations in the corrugated cardboard market on the eastern sea board of Australia, in direct competition with Amcor.
1550 I also accept that Hodgson not only concealed his involvement with the consultancy business from Amcor, because of the nature of that business as it was proposed to be, he also kept secret from Amcor the substance of the enterprise, and its primary purpose in advancing CHH's "Project Flipper" business strategy. The concealment therefore also necessarily extended to concealing the CHH Strategy to expand its presence in the Australian market.
1551 The negotiations with CHH, including the discussions held at the July 2004 meeting at Hodgson's home, were undertaken in secret and were not divulged to Amcor. In the course of this discussion, at least the outline of what was to become CHH's "Project Flipper" was advised to Hodgson. These plans were credible to the point where Hodgson and the Defendants indicated their preparedness to participate in implementing them, culminating in the "hand shake" deal which has been earlier described.
1552 As I have found, at least by 23 September 2004, Hodgson well knew of the outline strategic plan of CHH to expand its operations in the corrugated market on the eastern sea board of Australia, namely "Project Flipper".
1553 However, Hodgson gave no evidence that he advised his employer of this important development, and there was no other evidence to indicate otherwise. Indeed, the evidence reveals that Hodgson kept his involvement with the proposed consultancy enterprise, and the commercial activity of CHH which it was proposed to support, a secret from Amcor.
1554 The "Project Flipper" strategic plan of CHH was credible commercial intelligence. It was information which would have been likely to have been useful and indeed valuable for Amcor in making its own strategic decisions in the market place, or taking strategic steps to counter the challenge of its second largest rival. It was an important matter and had potential to cause harm to Amcor. Being the strategic plan of a commercial rival for expansion into the very market place occupied by Amcor, it could hardly have been anything else.
1555 I am satisfied that Hodgson did not advise Amcor of the relevant facts at any time, and the reason he did not do so, was because of a conflict of interest which had developed between his duty to give the advice to his employer, and his interest in developing and pursuing his personal objectives. These personal objectives were to build a consultancy business, eventually through AMCG, to assist CHH achieve its plans in the market place. In pursuit of these personal objectives, the communications from CHH as to its future plans may well have been protected as confidential information. However, if this was the case, the conflict of interest in acceding to such a confidentiality regime would have been further exacerbated.
1556 By withholding this useful information from his employer, Hodgson, as a senior manager then employed by Amcor, engaged in conduct which was, applying the words of Dixon and McTiernan JJ in Blyth Chemicals Ltd v Bushnell, incompatible with the fulfilment of his duty, or involved an opposition, or conflict between his interest and his duty to his employer, or impeded the faithful performance of his obligations, or was destructive of the necessary confidence between himself and his employer. In my opinion, Hodgson transgressed each element of this formulation on the facts before me. He broke the essential element of the confidence reposed in him by his employer.
1557 However, although Amcor pleaded that Hodgson owed a fiduciary duty or a duty of fidelity and good faith to Amcor, ACB and Service Containers which prohibited him from concealing information useful to those parties, Amcor did not advance submissions on the breach of any such a duty and Hodgson in his submissions and evidence did not deal with the issue.
1558 Further, there was no evidence that Amcor, ACB or Service Containers suffered any loss or damage arising from this particular breach of duty, and there was no evidence as to whether or not Amcor was possessed of the intelligence in any event, derived from other sources.
1559 In these circumstances, I decline to grant any relief pursuant to an allegation founded on a conflict of interest arising from a failure on the part of Hodgson to provide potentially useful commercial intelligence to his employer which he acquired in the course of his employment.
1560 Amcor also pleaded that a breach of duty arose by Hodgson concealing his own alleged breach of his contract of restraint.
1561 However, an employee, once under a contract of employment, is under no duty to disclose his or her own breaches of contract.[179]
1562 In Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd[180] Lord Atkin stated:
The servant owes a duty not to steal, but, having stolen, is there superadded a duty to confess that he has stolen? I am satisfied that to imply such a duty would be a departure from the well established usage of mankind and would be to create obligations entirely outside the normal contemplation of the parties ...
1563 Lord Thankerton and Lord Blanesburgh delivered judgements to similar effect.
1564 The cited observation of Lord Atkin in Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd accords with common sense and the practical context in which an employment contract must operate. Unattainable standards ought not be the subject of fiduciary duties which apply in the workplace.
1565 However, in Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi[181] the Court of Appeal (UK) took a different tack. The case involved a breach of duty by a senior executive of a company and whether he had a duty to disclose that breach. In Item Software the major part of the plaintiff company's business was the distribution of software products for another company (Isograph). The first defendant was the plaintiff's sales and marketing director. The plaintiff decided to negotiate more favourable terms with Isograph. At the same time the first defendant secretly approached Isograph in his personal capacity with his own proposals which involved establishing a new company to take over the contract. Meanwhile he encouraged his employer to press for improved terms. However, the negotiations failed and Isograph terminated the contract. The plaintiff then discovered the first defendant's misconduct, in his capacity as both a director and employee, in seeking to divert the contract to his own new company and he was summarily dismissed.
1566 In considering whether the duty of loyalty required of an employee calls for a fiduciary to disclose his own misconduct, Arden LJ of the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the factual situation which presented itself in the context of the duty of loyalty was novel. His Lordship nevertheless reasoned that:[182]
The only reason that I can see that it could be said that the duty of loyalty does not require a fiduciary to disclose his own misconduct is that it has never been applied to this situation before. As I have explained, that is not a good objection to the application of the fiduciary principle. 'Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transactions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and unselfish' (per Cardozo J in Meinhard v Salmon (1928) 164 NE 545 at 548 (US)).
1567 The Court of Appeal in Item Software (UK) Ltd held that, on the facts of the case before it, there was no basis on which the first defendant could reasonably have come to the conclusion that it was not in the interests of the plaintiff company to know of his breach of duty. He could not fulfil his duty of loyalty in such a case except by telling his employer about his setting up of the rival company, and his plan to acquire the Isograph contract for himself.[183]
1568 However, in spite of the position taken by the Court of Appeal (UK) in Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi, it is not beyond question that this is a correct statement of the law in Australia.
1569 In P & V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto,[184] Hollingworth J, following the High Court cases of Breen v Williams[185] and Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd,[186] was not prepared to allow the plaintiffs to plead that the defendant director owed the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty to disclose his past wrongdoing. In so doing, her Honour declined to follow Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi and distinguished Trevorrow v South Australia (No 2)[187] which considered the case.
1570 However, failure to disclose a past wrongdoing, may be distinguished from the position with regard to prospective wrongdoing, and the requirement to disclose a conflict of interest if the employee falls in to that position, in order to protect the employer from future harm.
1571 In spite of developments in employment law over the last 80 years, there remains a stronghold of authority which supports the approach taken in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd.
1572 Lord Atkin's principle was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Sybron Corporation v Rochem Ltd[188] where Stephenson LJ said:
... a contract of employment, though often described as creating a relationship of trust between master and servant, is not a contract uberrimae fidei so as to require disclosure by the servant of his own misconduct, either before he is taken into employment ... or during the course of his employment ...
[Emphasis added]
1573 Further, in BCCI SA v Ali[189] Lightman J, after citing Bell v Lever Brothers and Sybron Corporation v Rochem with approval, made the following observations as to developments in this area of law and the rationale for the principle:
I do not think that the developments support the proposition that the ruling in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1931] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161, [1931] All ER Rep 1 is no longer the law. There is indeed much to be said for relaxing the rule which exempts employers and employees alike from any duty to disclose to the other their breaches of duty, for disclosure may be essential to enable the other party to take urgent steps to cure, control or mitigate the consequences of such breach: such disclosure may be necessary to protect the other's 'physical, financial and psychological welfare'. The price of any relaxation is however a high one.
... A duty on an employee to disclose, eg, that he took a day's sickness leave when not genuinely ill or used his employer's telephone or stationery for private use may be thought intolerable. A duty to confess wrongdoing whether on the part of employer or employee may be thought to require standards extravagant and unattainable in the work place.
1574 I respectfully adopt and apply the observations of Lightman J in BCCI SA v Ali.
1575 Further, there is no general duty imposed on employees to report the misconduct of fellow employees, except in certain circumstances when this is required under a contract of employment, either expressly or impliedly. The exception may arise by implication from the position occupied by the employee in the employer's organisation. A person in a managerial position, for example, cannot in the usual case stand by and allow fellow employees to help themselves to the company's assets and do nothing about it, without breaching the duty owed to the mutual employer.
1576 In Sybron Corporation[190] Stephenson LJ was of the same opinion when he said:
... consistent with Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1931] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161 ... there is no general duty to report a fellow-servant's misconduct or breach of contract: whether there is such a duty depends on the contract and on the terms of the employment of the particular servant. He may be so placed in the hierarchy as to have a duty to report either the misconduct of superior as in Swain v West (Butchers) Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 261, or the misconduct of his inferiors, as in this case.
1577 Nevertheless, Hodgson was under no duty to disclose his own breaches of contract.
1578 Amcor submitted that Hodgson's breaches of duty - concerning AMCG and the sales of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business - are relevant to Hodgson's claims for remuneration and benefits which may be due to him.
1579 As I have found breaches of fiduciary duty arose on the pleaded case against Hodgson in relation to AMCG, and the sales of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, the question is whether Hodgson's conduct can have any bearing upon the basis on which Hodgson's employment was terminated or his entitlements to remuneration which I have found.
1580 It was submitted by Amcor that, by reason of his serious breaches of duty of fidelity and good faith to Amcor, Hodgson was guilty of misconduct and, as a result, was liable to be summarily dismissed on these grounds.
1581 It was further submitted that it was open to Amcor to rely on these grounds in December 2004 even though, at that time, Amcor was not aware of Hodgson's misconduct concerning AMCG and the sales of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business.
1582 Amcor contended further that Hodgson's claims for remuneration and benefits should be adjudged on the basis that Amcor was entitled to summarily dismiss him by letter from its solicitors of 13 December 2004, which should now be treated as incorporating the additional grounds which were not known to Amcor at the time, namely Hodgson's misconduct concerning AMCG and the sales of the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business.
1583 The letter from Amcor's solicitors dated 13 December 2004 which purported to dismiss Hodgson summarily from his employment was founded on what was said to be an admission contained in his pleading as to his involvement in Amcor's cartel conduct. The pleading relied upon by Amcor was found in Hodgson's statement of claim served with his writ in the Hodgson proceeding dated 3 December 2004. Hodgson's statement of claim sought damages from Amcor arising from the allegations made in paragraphs 12 and 13, which pleaded the following:
1584 The letter from Amcor's solicitors dated 13 December 2004 relevantly said:
As you know, we act for Amcor Limited (the Company) in relation to the alleged termination of Hodgson's employment and the wrongful dismissal proceedings commenced by his recently served writ.
Our client has consistently asserted that Hodgson's employment contract is still on foot, he having been given 12 months' notice of termination in accordance with the express term of the contract. Hodgson maintains that his employment ended on 1 October 2004.
In the statement of claim which was served on us on 3 December 2004, Hodgson admits that he has been a party to systemic and organised collusive conduct in breach of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). That admitted conduct was in breach of Hodgson's obligations under his employment contract dated 13 September 2000. It also constitutes serious misconduct which warrants summary termination of that contract.
The Board of our client has resolved to terminate Hodgson's employment with immediate effect. This letter serves as notice of termination. We have already requested return of all the Company's documents, information and property in Hodgson's possession and reiterate that request. Any payments due to Hodgson in consequence of the termination will be made to him once they have been calculated.
1585 It is only in exceptional circumstances that an ordinary employer is entitled at common law to dismiss an employee summarily.[191]
1586 I do not accept that the grounds relied upon by Amcor in its solicitor's letter of 13 December 2004 justified Hodgson's purported summary dismissal. As found earlier, to the extent that Hodgson was himself involved in the cartel conduct, he did so with the full knowledge and indeed encouragement of Amcor through Hodgson's immediate superior, Brown. It was Brown who conducted the early negotiations with Visy, through its Mr Debney in early 2000. In the period April to May 2000 Brown informed Hodgson about an understanding as to pricing that he had achieved with Debney. In October 2000 Brown arranged a meeting between Hodgson and Debney. Debney made a proposal to Hodgson about a pricing mechanism which could operate in the market between the two companies, Visy and Amcor. Hodgson advised Brown of Debney's proposal. Brown agreed with the concept and directed Hodgson to implement the plan across the corrugating division of Amcor. Jones, the managing director of Amcor at the time also had full knowledge of the cartel arrangement with Visy, which became known within Amcor as the "orderly marketing strategy". Jones also had full knowledge of the role played by Brown in the implementation of the arrangement, and through Brown, Hodgson and Laidlaw in the administration of the scheme.
1587 The cartel conduct continued well beyond 2000 and was encouraged and implemented by Brown in the corrugating division managed by Hodgson. For example, in 2002, Brown assured Hodgson that the conduct he was directed to participate in had the imprimatur of the managing director, Jones. Brown told Hodgson this because, as Brown said in his cross-examination:
I was trying to make him [Hodgson] comfortable about what he was doing because he was right in the middle of it all, he was running it if you like, and I tried to make all my executives feel comfortable with what they were doing.
1588 These particular circumstances could not support summary dismissal. The alleged cartel conduct, which occurred over almost 5 years between 2000-2004, was past conduct of long duration by mid December 2004. Further, given that the conduct insofar as it involved Hodgson was well known to Amcor senior management, including his superior Brown, at or about the time when it occurred, the potential consequences for him in terms of his continued employment with Amcor had been earlier waived by it. The involvement of Hodgson in the cartel conduct of Amcor was not raised at any point in the earlier discussions between Sutton and Hodgson resulting in his termination on 1 October 2004.
The authorities do establish that the employee's breach of contract of employment must be of a serious nature, involving a repudiation of the essential obligations under the contract or actual conduct which is repugnant to the relationship of employer-employee, before an employer may terminate the contract summarily. Isolated conduct usually would not suffice. Each case must be considered in the light of its particular circumstances, but nevertheless, the seriousness of the act of termination and the effect of summary dismissal are factors which place a heavy burden on the employer to justify dismissal without notice. The circumstances do not have to be exceptional, but nevertheless, must establish that the breach was of a serious nature.
1590 The following statement of McHugh J in Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell[194] provides further elucidation of the principles which I readily accept:
Whatever the position may be in relation to isolated acts of negligence, incompetence or unsuitability, it cannot be disputed (statute or express contractual provision aside) that acts of dishonesty or similar conduct destructive of the mutual trust between the employer and employee, once discovered, ordinarily fall within the class of conduct which, without more, authorises summary dismissal. Exceptions to this general position may exist for trivial breaches of the express or implied terms of the contract of employment. Other exceptions may arise where the breaches are ancient in time and where they may have been waived in the past, although known to the employer. Some breaches may be judged irrelevant to the duties of the particular employee and an ongoing relationship with the employer. But these exceptional cases apart, the establishment of important, relevant instances of misconduct, such as dishonesty..., will normally afford legal justification for summary dismissal. Such a case will be classified as amounting to a relevant repudiation or renunciation by the employee of the employment contract, thus warranting summary dismissal.
1591 The Blyth Chemicals case is an example of an instance where the justification for dismissal was based upon conduct said to be repugnant to the relationship.[195]
1592 In the present case, I have found that the circumstances surrounding concealment of information useful to Amcor derived from his involvement in the AMCG business and Hodgson's involvement in the Service Packaging Business and the ACB Business, and Hodgson's continued involvement in those enterprises during the course of his employment with Amcor, without informing his employer of the fact, was repugnant to the employment relationship. It gave rise to a Blyth Chemicals type conflict, and would have justified Hodgson's summary dismissal as at 13 December 2004, even though these matters were not relied upon by Amcor at the time.
1593 I further find that at this time in late 2004, Amcor was not aware of Hodgson's conduct which could have justified his dismissal. Accordingly, there is no need to decide the issue as to whether lack of awareness is a prerequisite for application of the principle, although Dixon J in Shepherd,[196] quoting from English precedent, Taylor v Oakes Roncorini & Co,[197] considered it was not.
1594 The particular elements of misconduct in question were not known to Amcor at the time of Hodgson's purported summary dismissal, which Amcor contended was by its letter dated 13 December 2004. Amcor said that by that letter it was entitled to and did summarily dismiss Hodgson from his employment.
1595 As a matter of law, an employer may rely not only upon the ground or grounds which actually motivated a summary dismissal, but also on evidence which subsequently comes to light to justify the dismissal. As McHugh J said in Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell:[198] "The question was not whether the employer was aware of grounds to justify the course which the employer adopted. It was whether such grounds and justification existed".
1596 Thus an employer may dismiss summarily for an employee's repudiatory breach whenever the employer learns of the breach, even if this is some considerable time after the breach occurred. A summary dismissal on inadequate grounds may also be justified by subsequent discovery of adequate grounds: Concut v Worrell; [199] Shepherd v Felt and Textiles of Australia.[200]
1597 The principle was stated by Dixon J in Shepherd in the following passage:
But the rule is of general application in the discharge of contract by breach, and enables a party to any simple contract who fails or refuses further to observe its stipulations to rely upon a breach of conditions committed before his failure or refusal by the opposite party to the contract as operating to absolve him from the contract as from the time of such breach of condition, whether he was aware of it or not when he himself failed or refused to perform the stipulations of the contract.
It is a long established rule of law that a contracting party, who after he has become entitled to refuse performance of his contractual obligations, gives a wrong reason for his refusal, does not thereby deprive himself of a justification which in fact existed, whether he was aware of it or not - per Greer, J, Taylor v Oakes, Roncoroni and Co.
[Footnotes omitted and emphasis added]
1598 The principle expressed by Dixon J in Shepherd was endorsed by the High Court in Concut, where the majority said:[201]
The proposition that the dismissal of an employee may be justified upon grounds on which the employer did not act and of which the employer was unaware when the employee was discharged is but an application of what, in Shepherd, Dixon J identified as a rule of general application with respect to the discharge of contract by breach.
1599 In Concut the issue centred upon whether the employer was entitled to dismiss the employee summarily. Because the employer had in fact purported to terminate the employment relationship, the only relevant legal issues at trial were whether the employer was entitled in law to do so and, if it was not, what was the measure of the employee's damages.[202] The High Court found that the trial judge was entitled to find that the misconduct in question, which only became known to the employer after the event, was nevertheless available to resist the employee's action for damages for wrongful dismissal.
1600 Further, although the principle stated in Shepherd may be applied to the discharge of a contract by breach, it is not confined to this situation. There are examples where a similar approach has been taken in relation to a termination undertaken pursuant to the express terms of the contract in question.
1601 Later statements of the principle by Dixon J demonstrate that the limited formulation used in Shepherd's case is but an illustration of a wider doctrine that has been later articulated.
1602 A broad view of the scope of the principle was ventured in William v Frayne,[203] where Dixon J said:
... as a general rule, it is enough that upon true facts a party is entitled to act as he has done, and his justification is independent of his own knowledge of the facts (cf. the cases mentioned in Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd.
1603 This approach was repeated in Commonwealth Homes & Investment Co Ltd v. MacKellar,[204] where Dixon J returned to the question in the course of discussing a decision of the House of Lords, London & Mediterranean Bank; In re Wright's Case,[205] which upheld the claim of a shareholder to be relieved of his contract of allotment. His Honour's explanation of the case was that it could be regarded as an instance of a valid compromise, alternatively as:[206]
the application of the general rule that, where a legal justification in fact exists for a course taken, it will suffice to support its validity though the parties or one of them acted for other reasons and in ignorance of its existence: cf. Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd.
1604 Reference is made to the later decision of McGarvie J in the unreported case of Matthews v Brodie.[207] There the plaintiff building owners were held to be entitled to the benefit of an express contractual provision for determination even though a notice given in purported reliance on that provision specified a ground not available to them.
1605 In Matthews v Brodie McGarvie J said: "I consider that the owners by specifying the one ground are not precluded from relying on another as entitling them to give an effective notice of determination".[208] In support of this conclusion his Honour referred to Shepherd's case and the common law principle that a party purporting to discharge a contract in reliance on a specified breach may later rely on another breach which then existed as justifying the discharge. His Honour reasoned further as follows:[209]
The owners here indicated that the notice was given on the ground that there were substantial and hopeless delays by the builder in proceeding with the work. I consider that this is a reference to ground in Cl15(b) "failing to proceed with the works with reasonable diligence " rather than the ground "failing to proceed with the works in a competent manner". In my opinion this does not prevent the plaintiffs from relying in this action on the latter ground if, as I have indicated, the latter ground is not included within the former ground. I have decided that it is not necessary for the owner to specify any ground of default in the notice. I consider that the owners by specifying the one ground are not precluded from relying on another as entitling them to give an effective notice of determination. The considerations which led the common law to adopt the principle that an innocent party who purported to discharge a contract in reliance on a specified breach by the defaulting party may later rely on another breach which then existed as justifying the discharge (Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359 at 377-378; H & V Developments Pty Ltd v Goondoo (1967) QWN 36; Cheshire and Fifoot on Contract, 9th English edition, p575) lead me to the conclusion that the owners here may rely on the builder failing to proceed with the works in a competent manner to justify their purported determination of the contract although the notice specified the other ground. I have not been referred to any case where that principle was applied to the determination of the contract under an express clause as distinct from the common law discharge of a contract upon breach. Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, 10th edition, p707-709, however, indicates a view that the conclusion which I have reached is one which is open.
1606 The decision in Matthews v Brodie is thus authority for applying the principle in Shepherd's case outside the strict limits of a common law discharge for breach.
1607 The same approach was taken in Minion v Graystone Pty Ltd[210] where the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland applied the Shepherd principle again to a construction contract. There the principal and the subcontractor entered into an agreement whereby the subcontractor agreed to undertake excavation works. The machine that the subcontractor intended to use in the works was seized by someone claiming to be entitled to it. The principal then purported to exercise its contractual right to take control of and complete the work itself. The agreement also gave it that power on the subcontractor becoming insolvent. It was held that the principal made a decision to take control of and complete the subcontractor's work itself on the ground that at the time the subcontractor was insolvent and it was irrelevant that, at the time that it did so, the principal was not aware of that state of affairs, but instead relied upon another ground that had since proved to be incapable of being sustained.
1608 The Full Court in Minion v Graystone Pty Ltd considered two issues in relation to the applicability of Shepherd. The first was whether the principle in Shepherd was available specifically in the case of action taken under an express provision of the contract itself; the second was whether it extends to action other than the discharge or termination of the contract. It decided both issues in favour of the principal (the appellant).
1609 The broader application of the Shepherd principle and its rationale were formulated in Minion v Graystone Pty Ltd in the following terms:[211]
Shortly stated, it is that the action taken must be capable of being justified at law, but that the grounds of justification, although they must have existed, need not have been known or relied upon at the time the action was taken. It is not difficult to identify the rationale underlying such a principle. Any other rule would have the practical consequence of throwing on the party taking the relevant action the burden of minutely investigating the facts and obtaining comprehensive legal advice before he could safely decide to adopt a particular course of action. Such a rule would serve only to impede commercial activity. It would ignore the reality that very often in business critical decisions, sometimes involving large sums of money, must be taken on momentary and immediate assessment relying on personal judgment, skill and experience, without opportunity for the kind of calm and cautious deliberation identified with proceedings in a court of law.
1610 However, in considering the application of the Shepherd principle in its broader form to the facts of the present case, four further considerations arise.
1611 First, I have found that Hodgson's employment was terminated under the terms of his contract of employment by notice given to him by Amcor on 11 August 2004 with effect on 1 October 2004. That was the "action" taken at that time. The validity of that action, or the grounds upon which that action was taken were not in issue. The issue was whether Amcor's conduct at the time amounted to the giving of the necessary notice of termination to Hodgson. Having determined that it did, no question arises as to whether there were any additional grounds to justify the contractual termination which were not known or relied upon by Amcor at the time the action was taken. The Shepherd principle in its broader form has no application to the action taken by Amcor at that time, as I have found it to be.
1612 Second, the Shepherd principle in its broader form, in my opinion, cannot be applied, in effect, to convert a termination undertaken on one basis, namely a contractual termination in this case, to a termination on another basis, namely a summary dismissal. This is so, even though facts have now come to light which would have justified the summary dismissal of Hodgson as at 11 August 2004. The Shepherd principle does not go so far.
1613 Amcor took the step of terminating Hodgson's employment pursuant to the terms of his contract on 1 August 2004 with effect on 1 October of that year. This gave rise to an obligation on the part of Amcor to pay Hodgson his contractual entitlements. Having taken this course, it is not open, in my opinion for Amcor to set aside the action it has taken or to treat it as never having occurred.
If he gives his cook a month's wages in lieu of notice can he, on discovering that the cook has been pilfering the tea and sugar, claim the return of the month's wages? I think not. He takes the risk; if he wishes to protect himself he can question his servant, and will then be protected by the truth or otherwise of the answers.
1615 Likewise, in the present case, in taking the action of terminating Hodgson's employment under the express terms of his contract, Amcor took the risk that if it was later discovered that he had been guilty of misconduct justifying summary dismissal at the time of the contractual termination, it could not later invoke that basis for termination. Consequently, any payments made cannot not be required to be disgorged and contractual entitlements to payment which arise and are due to the employee arising from the contractual termination cannot be rendered nugatory.
1616 Third, and in any event, Amcor made no claim seeking any right to summarily dismiss Hodgson as at the date of his contractual termination as I have found it to be, namely on 11 August 2004 with effect on 1 October 2004. Amcor confined its position to alleging that Hodgson's employment was summarily terminated by its letter dated 13 December 2004.
1617 Fourth, having taken the step of terminating Hodgson's contract of employment on 11 August 2004 with effect on 1 October 2004, it was not open to Amcor to later dismiss Hodgson, which it purported to do by its letter dated 13 December 2004. By this time, as I have found, Hodgson's employment contract with Amcor and his employment with the company, save for any continuing obligations arising from his 12 month restraint clause and the like, had ended. Accordingly, there was no contract left to terminate in December 2004, whether on summary dismissal grounds or any other ground. The relevant contract of employment did not survive beyond 1 October 2004. By 13 December 2004, Hodgson was no longer an Amcor employee.
1618 For these reasons, as I have found, the Amcor letter dated 13 December 2004, which purportedly sought to dismiss Hodgson summarily, had no legal effect.
1619 Again the Shepherd principle in its broader form has no application. The purported summary dismissal of 13 December 2004 cannot be given legal effect by importing other grounds for summary dismissal which were not known at the time. At that time there was no basis for summary dismissal on any basis, as Hodgson's contract of employment was at an end.
1620 Further, it is patently clear that the discovery and invocation of grounds for summary dismissal after Hodgson had been earlier terminated pursuant to the terms of the employment contract, does not provide a valid ground for retrospectively reviving his earlier contract to so as to be alive at December 2004. The case law which permits an employer to rely upon any other conduct of the employee discovered after the termination to support an earlier termination cannot have this effect.
1621 For these reasons, I do not accept Amcor's submission that Hodgson's claims for remuneration and benefits should be adjudged on the basis that Amcor was entitled to summarily dismiss him by its letter of 13 December 2004, either on the original ground relied upon by Amcor at that time, or on the subsequently discovered additional grounds.
1622 The pecuniary relief sought against Hodgson and Bankson is as follows:
(a) damages, alternatively equitable compensation, in relation to the conduct of those Defendants set out in paragraph 6A - 6AT and 6AW of the Hodgson Counterclaim;
(b) further or alternatively, an account of profits derived by those Defendants from the purchase of and carrying on of since such purchase of the ACB Business and the Service Packaging Business;
1623 The pecuniary relief sought against Barnes is damages, further or alternatively, equitable compensation, and interest.
1624 The pecuniary relief sought against Holihan is damages, further or alternatively equitable compensation and interest pursuant to statute.
1625 The pecuniary relief sought against ACB Australia (the Third Defendant) is damages, further or alternatively equitable compensation; further or alternatively the taking of accounts and an account of profits and interest on the profits for the period from 30 July 2003 to date.
1626 The pecuniary relief sought against Achilla (the Fourth Defendant) is damages, further or alternatively equitable compensation; further or alternatively the taking of accounts for the period from 30 July 2003 to date; further or alternatively an account of profits and interest on the profits.
1627 The pecuniary relief sought against Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic is damages, further or alternatively equitable compensation and interest pursuant to statute.
1628 Thus in Broad terms, the Amcor parties seek four types of pecuniary relief from the Defendants, namely:
(a) common law damages against Hodgson for breach of his contract of employment;
(b) statutory damages for breach of the various Corporations Act provisions;
(c) equitable compensation for breaches of fiduciary and other equitable duties;
(d) alternatively, the equitable relief of an account of profits.
1629 A defendant who breaches a fiduciary duty may be ordered to account for any profits he has made, in the alternative to pay compensation or damages.[214]
1630 A plaintiff may defer making an election as to whether he chooses damages or profits until the plaintiff has the opportunity to make an informed choice as to which remedy he will pursue.
1631 In Island Records v Tring,[215] Lightman J identified four principles in relation to the availability of damages and an account of profits as remedies. The third principle is relevant to the issue of election:
Thirdly, a party should in general not be required to elect or be found to have elected between remedies unless and until he is able to make an informed choice. A right of election, if it is to be meaningful and not a mere gamble, must embrace the right to alternative remedies. It is quite unreasonable to require the plaintiff to speculate totally in the dark as to whether or not the sum recoverable by way of damages will exceed that recoverable under an account of profits.
1632 In Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments,[216] the Privy Council held that the "basic principle governing when a plaintiff must make his choice [between alternative remedies] is simple and clear. He is required to choose when, but not before, judgment is given in his favour and the judge is asked to make orders against the defendant". Further, the Privy Council explained, if the plaintiff does not know how much money the defendant has made from a wrongful use of his property, the court may make discovery and other orders designed to give the plaintiff the information he needs and which in fairness he ought to have before making his election.
1633 By their solicitor's letter dated 17 February 2001, the Amcor parties gave notice to the Defendants that the Plaintiffs sought various equitable remedies including the taking of accounts to enable them to make an election between an account of profits and an award of equitable compensation. The letter specifically reserved until the time of such election the Amcor parties' rights in relation to which equitable remedy would be chosen. The letter noted that the expert report prepared by Stone then served did not quantify any of the Plaintiffs' equitable financial remedies, but was rather expert evidence as to the value of the businesses and certain other assets at various relevant times, being the financial elements of the Plaintiffs' damages claim.
1634 Accordingly, should the Defendants be found liable for breaches of common law or equitable duties, the plaintiffs seek appropriate orders to enable them to make an informed election between damages (or compensation) and profits.
1635 However, before any such orders are made directed to determining quantum to enable the Plaintiff to make an informed election between damages (or compensation) and profits, an entitlement to such damages or profits must first be established.
1636 In equity, specific restitution of the relevant property by rescission or other order, or an account of profits improperly derived, may be ordered. Alternatively, the defaulting fiduciary may be ordered to pay equitable compensation. This may be ordered to be paid on a "loss" basis so as to put the principal back to the position the person would have been in had the breach not been committed, or on a "gains" basis so as to pay any profits improperly derived from the errant conduct to the principal. See: McKenzie v McDonald[217] and Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds.[218]
Courts of Equity had jurisdiction to direct accounts to be taken, and in proper cases to order the solicitor to replace property improperly acquired from the client, or to make compensation if he had lost it by acting in breach of a duty which arose out of his confidential relationship to the man who had trusted him. This jurisdiction, which really belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, had for the client the additional advantage that, as is illustrated by the judgment of Lord Hatherley LC in Burdick v. Garrick, the Statute of Limitations would not apply when the person in a confidential relationship had got the property into his hands.
1638 In the present case, there is no claim for an order that any property improperly obtained be returned. The equitable claims are for equitable compensation, alternatively, for an account of profits.
1639 At the heart of equitable remedies which may be called upon following breach of duty by a fiduciary lies the flexibility to fashion relief to the case at hand. Equity provides flexibility in the remedy to be applied in the event of a breach of a fiduciary duty being found. Different relationships and different facts may call for the application of a wide variety of remedies.[221]
1640 In Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [222] the High Court stated the "cardinal principle of equity" to be that "the remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the particular facts". In this respect, the Court referred to the observations of Fletcher Moulton LJ in In re Coomber; Coomber v Coomber:[223]
Fiduciary relations are of many different types ... and the Courts have again and again, in cases where there has been a fiduciary relation, interfered and set aside acts which, between persons in a wholly independent position, would have been perfectly valid. Thereupon in some minds there arises the idea that if there is any fiduciary relation whatever any of these types of interference is warranted by it. They conclude that every kind of fiduciary relation justifies every kind of interference. Of course that is absurd. The nature of the fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference. There is no class of case in which one ought more carefully to bear in mind the facts of the case ... than cases which relate to fiduciary and confidential relations and the action of the Court with regard to them.
1641 At the same time, this inherent elasticity does not provide the occasion for the exercise of an unfettered discretion - an element of "practical justice" founded upon accepted principle must regulate the determination. Although the grant of an equitable remedy is discretionary, it is granted or withheld according to settled principles, and the traditional equitable defences will apply.
Where, however, the fiduciary's breach comprises non-disclosure, equity can be seen at what has been described as its "flexible pragmatic best (or worst) in dealing with fiduciaries". The general rule is that non-disclosure will vitiate the transaction affected, however fair that transaction might have been in all other respects. To achieve the multiple objectives of equity in respect of breaches of fiduciary duties, a rule of strictness is applied. Otherwise, the simple rule will be eroded that fiduciaries must make sure that the beneficiary is fully informed of the real state of things and secure a "fully informed consent" for any conduct which involves (relevantly) a private profit or a possibility of conflict of interest and duty. Ordinarily, once the breach is established, it is the duty of the defaulting fiduciary to effect, so far as possible, a restitution or restoration of the beneficiary to the position which would have obtained if the fiduciary's duties had been fulfilled. The elasticity of equitable remedies comes to the aid of a fiduciary whose default is judged to be technical rather than deliberate and fraudulent and whose failures cannot really be said to have produced all of the losses which follow, in point of time, the non-disclosure. The purpose of equity's relief is not punishment. So far as possible, it is to restore the status quo ante. For this reason, the remedies will be fashioned according to the exigencies of the particular case so as to do what is "practically just" as between the parties. The fiduciary must not be "robbed"; nor must the beneficiary be unjustly enriched. Given the ample discretion afforded to primary judges and the advantages conventionally attributed to them in conducting a trial, appellate courts will exercise restraint in disturbing such orders unless it is shown that the judge has made an error of a kind that authorises appellate intervention to correct discretionary decisions.
[Footnotes omitted]
1643 In Talacko v Talacko[226] Kyrou J summarised the general principles to be applied in assessing equitable compensation. His Honour said:
The Court, in its equitable jurisdiction, has the power to award compensation for a breach of fiduciary duty.
As an equitable remedy, the award of compensation is discretionary and it is subject to the usual equitable defences, such as laches or acquiescence, that the Court may consider before granting relief.
The objective of the remedy is to place the innocent party, as nearly as possible, in the position in which he or she would have been had there been no breach of duty.
Equitable compensation is conceptually different from common law damages in that it involves restitution for the value of the loss or damage suffered by the innocent party as a result of a breach of duty.
While at common law damages for breach of contract are generally assessed as at the date of the breach, the normal rule in equity is that equitable compensation for breach of trust or fiduciary duty is assessed not as at the date of the breach but as at the time of the trial, with the full benefit of hindsight. It can also be awarded on terms.
1644 Amcor placed particular reliance on the observation of Kyrou J in Talacko that where a defaulting fiduciary fails to keep and produce proper accounts of his or her dealings with property that is the subject of a fiduciary duty and thereby makes it difficult for the Court to assess the equitable compensation due to the plaintiff, "the Court should assess the compensation in a robust manner".
1645 In cases of breach of fiduciary duty, issues of causation of loss arising from the breach of fiduciary obligations are to be determined in a different way from breach of common law and statutory obligations. For example, there is no place for the doctrine of novus actus interveniens.
1646 As was said in O'Halloran v RT Thomas and Family Pty Limited:[227]
It has long been established that questions of causation of loss said to arise from breach of fiduciary obligation are to be determined in a different way from breach of common law obligations. Specifically, the remedy of equitable compensation differs from damages in common law. It also differs from damages under a statutory regime where the Court is concerned with, and confined by, the construction of the statute. Causation for purposes of s 212 of the Corporations Law will not involve the same analysis of causation as is required for breach of a fiduciary obligation.
1647 In Re Dawson (deceased); Union Fidelity Trustee Co Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd,[228] a case involving a breach of trust, Street J said:
The obligation of a defaulting trustee is essentially one of effecting restitution to the estate. The obligation is of a personal character and its extent is not to be limited by common law principles governing remoteness of damage. ...
[I]f a breach has been committed then the trustee is liable to place the trust estate in the same position as it would have been in if no breach had been committed. Considerations of causation, foreseeability and remoteness do not readily enter into the matter. ...
[T]he inquiry in each instance would appear to be whether the loss would have happened if there had been no breach.
1648 In Barnes v Hay,[229] Mahoney JA said:
... the determination of a causal question involves, in my opinion, a normative decision as to whether, for the purposes of the case, the precedent act for which the defendant is responsible should be seen as causal of the plaintiff's loss. And, in my opinion, that evaluation is made, not by a `test' or `guide' such as the `but for' test, but by a functional evaluation of the relationship and the purposes or policy of the relevant part of the law.
1649 Thus a different approach to causation may be taken, depending upon the nature of the relief which is sought. It was said by the High Court in Maguire v Makaronis that:[230]
Where the subject-matter of the transaction is, for example, the sale of a business, intervening changes may render more complex the decree for rescission. In some circumstances, the purchaser seeking rescission by reason of fraudulent misrepresentations by the vendor, may be entitled to an indemnity for trading losses incurred, both before the purchaser disavowed the transaction and thereafter whilst the business was maintained for the benefit of the vendor; but the indemnity will extend only to that part of the trading losses which were "directly occasioned" by the falsity of the vendor's misrepresentations. To this extent issues of "causation" may arise in cases of rescission for fraudulent misrepresentation. But that is not this case.
Different considerations arise where the plaintiff seeks one or other of the further remedies referred to by the Lord Chancellor in Nocton v Lord Ashburton, namely an account of profits, as a personal rather than proprietary remedy or, as another personal remedy, compensation for that which the plaintiff has lost "by [the fiduciary] acting", to use the Lord Chancellor's phrase, in breach of duty. Likewise where what is sought is a proprietary remedy in the nature of a constructive trust. In these instances, there directly arises a need to specify criteria for a sufficient connection (or "causation") between breach of duty and the profit derived, the loss sustained, or the asset held.
[Footnotes omitted]
1650 The High Court considered the role of causation in claims for equitable relief in Maguire v Makaronis.[231] That case involved solicitors who had lent money to their own clients on the security of a mortgage without disclosing their interest in the lender/mortgagee. In a case of this character the primary remedy is rescission, rather than equitable compensation. For this reason the High Court did not deal with compensation. However, the joint judgment of Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ stressed that every fiduciary relationship must be carefully analysed to identify the particular obligations owed and the nature of the particular breaches found[232] in order to determine the appropriate relief. As was observed: the exercise calls for "the ascertainment of the [particular obligations owed [to the other party] and consideration of what acts and omissions amounted to failure to discharge this obligations".[233]
1651 Reference is also made to the rule in Brickenden v London Loan and Savings Co[234] insofar as it applies in cases of breach of fiduciary duty:
When a party, holding a fiduciary relationship, commits a breach of duty by non-disclosure of material facts... he cannot be heard to maintain that disclosure would not have altered the decision to proceed with the transaction, because the constituent's action would be solely determined by some other factor, such as the valuation by another party of the property proposed to be mortgaged. Once the Court has determined that the non-disclosed facts are material, speculation as to what course a constituent, on disclosure, would have taken, is not relevant.
[Emphasis added]
1652 In Maguire v Makaronis[235] the High Court referred to but left open the authority of Brickenden for Australian law. However, the majority of the Court observed that "the reasoning in Brickenden has been applied by intermediate courts of appeal in Australia and by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in cases where the plaintiff has sought to recover loss caused (in most of these cases) by the plaintiff's solicitor having acted in breach of fiduciary duty". Kirby J in the same case, after noting criticism of rule in judicial and academic commentary,[236] made the following observation:[237]
Nevertheless, the author[238] acknowledges that, especially lately, the decision has been followed in Australia by federal and State courts. It has received approval from Australian judges speaking and writing extracurially. Recent dicta in this Court also suggest that the Brickenden test should be accepted. It has been applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in a recent decision. In New Zealand it has been applied repeatedly in recent decisions. Cooke P (as Lord Cooke then was) described it as a rule which is "one of strictness, and, indeed, severity". The rule has been ascribed to the policy decision that fiduciaries should be held to strict standards and not simply limited to the disgorgement of personal gain. This view of fiduciary duties, and the strict consequences of their breach, also finds an echo in opinions expressed in this Court on connected matters.
[Footnotes omitted]
1653 The rule in Brickenden represents a well accepted trend in Australian law and I propose to follow it. The rule, although strict, accords with the approach to the responsibilities of fiduciaries described by Kirby J in Maguire v Makaronis.
1654 Nevertheless, a causal link needs to be established between the errant conduct of a fiduciary and the loss sustained by the principal for which compensation is recoverable. In O'Halloran, the Court of Appeal[239] expressed the view that in cases where equitable compensation is claimed, this element must be established. The requirement has been variously expressed.
1655 In Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns,[240] Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, with reference to the trustee of a traditional trust:
If specific restitution of the trust property is not possible, then the liability of the trustee is to pay sufficient compensation to the trust estate to put it back to what it would have been had the breach not been committed ...
Even if the immediate cause of the loss is the dishonesty or failure of a third party, the trustee is liable to make good that loss to the trust estate if, but for the breach, such loss would not have occurred ... thus the common law rules of remoteness of damage and causation do not apply. However, there does have to be some causal connection between the breach of trust and the loss to the trust estate for which compensation is recoverable viz. the fact that the loss would not have occurred but for the breach.
[Emphasis added]
1656 In Bartlett v Barclays Trust Co (Nos. 1 & 2),[241] Brightman LJ said:
If specific restitution of the trust property is not possible, then the liability of the trustee is to pay sufficient compensation to the trust estate to put it back to where it would have been had the breach not been committed. ... Even if the immediate cause of the loss is the dishonesty or failure of a third party, the trustee is liable to make good that loss to the trust estate if, but for the breach, such loss would not have occurred.
[Emphasis added]
1657 Returning to O'Halloran, a sufficient connection may be found, irrespective of a separate and concurrent cause, for example "when the loss would not have occurred if there had been no breach of duty".
1658 Whichever approach is adopted, the Court must identify the criteria which supply an adequate or sufficient connection between the equitable compensation claimed and the breach of fiduciary duty.
1659 Then, in Canson Pty Limited v Boughton & Co,[242] her Ladyship Justice McLachlin, who was in the minority in that case, said:
In summary, compensation is an equitable monetary remedy which is available when the equitable remedies of restitution and account are not appropriate. By analogy with restitution, it attempts to restore to the plaintiff what has been lost as a result of the breach, ie the plaintiff's lost opportunity. The plaintiff's actual loss as a consequence of the breach is to be assessed with the full benefit of hindsight. Foreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensation, but it is essential that the losses made good are only those which on a commonsense view of causation, were caused by the breach.
[Emphasis added]
1660 As Spigelman CJ said in O'Halloran, "In my opinion this [the observation of McLachlin LJ in Canson] also represents the law in Australia".
Loss Based and Gain Based Equitable Compensation
1662 Loss and damage which is caused in the relevant sense by contravening conduct may be the subject of an award of equitable compensation.
1663 As earlier observed, equitable compensation may be awarded on a 'loss' basis or on a "gains" basis.
1664 However, applying the "cardinal principle of equity" that "the remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the particular facts",[243] while equitable compensation is often computed by reference to the loss suffered by the innocent party, this is not always the case.[244] As Tadgell J observed in Hill v Rose:[245]
The remedy, like any equitable remedy, is necessarily to be fashioned to meet the needs of the case. The method of calculation of monetary compensation will vary according to the nature of the fiduciary obligation whose breach is to be redressed. It might be appropriate to compensate the plaintiff's loss by reference to the defendant's gain ... Compensation may be awarded, however, in an appropriate case whether or not the defendant has made any direct pecuniary gain.
The present case concerns defaulting fiduciaries and more particularly, misappropriating fiduciaries. The obligation of such a party is essentially to effect restitution to the estate, and this may be achieved in a number of ways, one of which is to require the fiduciary to disgorge the equivalent of the advantage that has been taken.
1666 In Talacko v Talacko[248] Kyrou J pointed to the English Court of Appeal's decision in Re Leeds and Hanley Theatres of Varieties Ltd[249] as providing an example of an explicitly gain-based assessment. In that case, the promoter of a theatre company purchased two music halls using a trustee and sold them to the theatre company at a substantially inflated price. The promoter was held to be in a fiduciary relationship with the theatre company and to have breached its duties by concealing the fact that it was the beneficial vendor of the halls. Equitable compensation was computed as the amount of the profit that was made by the promoter from the purchase and re-sale of the music halls.
1667 His Honour in Talacko[250] further observed:
In determining the remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty, it may be inequitable to compel the defaulting fiduciary to disgorge all of the profits if some of those profits are attributable to the use of his or her own skill, efforts, property or resources. This is a matter of judgement that depends on the facts of the case. The onus falls on the defaulting fiduciary to establish that, in all of the circumstances, it would be inequitable not to apportion the profits or to make some other allowance. In general, profits will only be apportioned if there exists an antecedent arrangement for the sharing of the profits. In the absence of such an arrangement, the defaulting fiduciary will ordinarily be entitled only to an allowance for skill, expertise and expenses.
1668 Kyrou J in Talacko[251] also referred to the decision of Warren J (as her Honour then was) in Disctronics Ltd v Edmonds,[252] a judgment which was affirmed in relevant respects by the Court of Appeal.[253] As observed by his Honour, Disctronics provides a further example of a gain-based assessment of equitable compensation and highlights the flexibility of the remedy. His Honour described the facts before him in the following terms:[254]
The plaintiffs were four joint venturers that proposed to purchase a golf course, negotiate a long-term lease with a tenant, and then sell the property for profit. They retained two of the defendants, Edmonds and Cahill - respectively, a financial adviser and a real estate agent - to provide services to the project on a fee basis. Later, when negotiations were well underway with the owner of a golf course and a likely tenant, the plaintiffs agreed to include Edmonds and Cahill in the venture and to share equally all of the profits from the project between the six of them. When the venture collapsed, Edmonds and Cahill formed a new joint venture with other persons. In breach of their fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs, Edmonds and Cahill misused confidential information to assist the new venture in making a successful bid for the golf course and installing the likely tenant on a long-term lease.
1669 After referring to the plaintiffs' delay in bringing the proceedings and to the existence of other interests in the property, Warren J in Disctronics determined that the appropriate remedy was equitable compensation, rather than a constructive trust or an account of profits.[255]
1670 In the alternative to equitable compensation, the Amcor parties seek an account of profits.
1671 The obligation of a defaulting fiduciary is essentially to effect restitution to the principal. This may be achieved in a number of ways, one of which is to require the fiduciary to disgorge the equivalent of the advantage that has been taken.
1672 In such a case, a causal link between the errant conduct and the gain achieved by the fiduciary will also need to be established before relief can be granted. As observed by the High Court in Maguire v Makaronis:[256]
Where the plaintiff seeks recovery of a profit, the necessary connection has been identified in this Court by asking whether the profit was obtained "by reason of [the defendant's] fiduciary position or by reason of his taking advantage of opportunity or knowledge derived from his fiduciary position".
[Emphasis added]
1673 As further observed by the High Court in Maguire v Makaronis: "Particularly where a complex course of dealing is in issue, minds reasonably may differ as to the outcome of the application of these principles".[257]
1674 Nevertheless, as observed by the Court in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer[258] "in determining the proper basis for an account of profits, it is of first importance in this, as in other cases, to ascertain precisely what it was that was acquired in consequence of the fiduciary's breach of duty". This presupposes that something was in fact so acquired.
Compensation under the Corporations Act
1675 Section 1317H of the Corporations Act authorises a court to order a person to compensate a corporation for damage suffered as a result of a contravention of s 181(1)(a), which is a civil penalty provision.[259] The section relevantly provides by sub-sections 1 and 2:
Compensation for damage suffered
(1) A Court may order a person to compensate a corporation or registered scheme for damage suffered by the corporation or scheme if:
(a) the person has contravened a corporation/scheme civil penalty provision in relation to the corporation or scheme; and
(b) the damage resulted from the contravention.
The order must specify the amount of the compensation.
Damage includes profits
(2) In determining the damage suffered by the corporation or scheme for the purposes of making a compensation order, include profits made by any person resulting from the contravention or the offence.
1676 A causal link between the contravening conduct and the damage sustained is provided by the requirement that damage is suffered by the corporation and the damage "resulted from the contravention".
1677 Having found that Hodgson breached his duty to Amcor under s 181(1)(a) and s 183, and that the other Defendants (Holihan aside) also breached s 183 it is appropriate that an order for compensation be made against him under the Corporations Act for the loss sustained by Amcor resulting from the contravention, if any such loss was suffered.
1678 The questions are whether any loss or damage resulted from the breach found and whether the statutory claim for compensation is now time barred.
1679 Given the conduct which amounted to the breaches of duty owed by each of the Defendants to Amcor which I have found, and the breaches of statutory duty on the which I have found, the question is then whether, as a result of this conduct, compensable loss or damage was caused to Amcor which would justify an award of equitable damages, alternatively compensation under the Corporations Act, or whether profits were derived from this conduct which ought to be disgorged to Amcor through the mechanism of an account of profits.
1680 The relevant duties which are found to have been breached by the Defendants in respect of the two sale agreements occurred during their periods of employment.
1681 In respect of the First Sale Agreement the relevant Defendants became involved in attaining an interest in the Service Packaging Business at least from the time of their execution of the First G5 Deed in about December 2001. It was on 2 February 2002 that the First Sale Agreement between Amcor and Hottes was executed.
1682 As at December 2001 the relevant Defendants in relation to the Service Packaging Business occupied the following positions in Amcor:
Hodgson was employed as a Group General Manager by Amcor until his termination on 1 October 2004 (a period of about 2 years 10 months);
Barnes was employed as a Regional General Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 2 years 11 months);
Sangster was employed as a General Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 2 years 11 months); and
Bayley was employed as a Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 2 years 11 months).
1683 In respect of the Second Sale Agreement the relevant Defendants became involved in attaining an interest in the ACB Business at least from the time of their execution of the 26 May 80/20 Shareholders Deed. It was on 3 June 2003 that the Second Sale Agreement between Amcor and the Holihan interests was executed.
1684 As at 26 May 2003 the relevant Defendants in relation to the ACB Business occupied the following positions in Amcor:
Holihan was employed as a General Manager with Amcor until he resigned when his trading company Achilla Pty Ltd began to trade on 31 July 2003 in accordance with the Second Sale Agreement executed on 2 June 2003 (a period of about 2 months);
Hodgson was employed as a Group General Manager by Amcor until his termination on 1 October 2004 (a period of about 16 months);
Barnes was employed as a Regional General Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 17 months);
Sangster was employed as a General Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 17 months);
Bayley was employed as a Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 17 months); and
Mihelic was employed as a Manager by Amcor until 28 October 2004 (a period of about 17 months).
1685 It was during these employment periods (the "Relevant Employment Periods") that the Defendant parties (other than Holihan) breached their fiduciary duties of to Amcor arising from their contracts of employment and in the breaches of statutory duty under the Corporations Act 2001.
Compensable Loss or Profits Derived from the First Sale Agreement
1686 There is no evidence that any of the Defendants derived any financial benefit or derived any profit from the First Sale Agreement or the Service Packaging Business, either during the course of their employment with Amcor, or indeed at any time.
1687 Vickery was called to give evidence. He was the accountant for the Service Packaging Business both before and after the death of Hottes. He had full access to all of the company's books and records in the course of his duties.
1688 It was a business conducted on a small scale. Apart from Hottes himself, there were four other employees: a manager, Heather Dettmar; a bookkeeper; a storeman and Mrs Hottes who also worked in the business.
1689 Vickery gave the following answers in his cross-examination, which I accept:
You never, ever saw a payment to Mr Jim Hodgson?
Never.
...
To the best of your knowledge did you ever see any evidence of any investors at the time he bought the business?
Not at the time he bought the business, no.
...
Apart from the documents on your file to which you've been taken this morning, did you ever see any evidence from the books and records of Service Packaging Pty Ltd of any investors?
No.
...
If there had been any payments to anybody other than the entities that you've referred to before, Amcor, the courier, the wages, the telephone and other utilities, is that something you would remember?
Yes.
There were no such payments were there?
No there weren't.
...
To the best of your knowledge no payment of any kind was ever made to Mr Roger Bayley out of Mr Hottes businesses?
No payment was ever made to Mr Bayley.
1690 Further, as earlier found, the Service Packaging Business was reacquired by Amcor from Mrs Hottes on 30 March 2007. Pursuant to this arrangement, Mrs Hottes was permitted to retain the amount of $125,000.00 (defined as an "Excluded Asset" in the Deed of Transfer) prior to the return of the business to APA. She did not share this with any of the Defendants.
1691 All profits generated in the business were retained in the business for the period 1 February 2002 until 30 March 2007. APA paid no amount for the return of the business to it. Included in the assets transferred to APA was approximately $500,000.00 cash at hand. The experts agreed that the market value of the business on its return to APA was $952,500.00. Accordingly, as a result of the return of the business to the Amcor Parties, the Amcor Parties received a benefit of $952,500.00.
1692 Reference is also made to the earlier findings which have resulted in the dismissal of Amcor's allegations as to uncommercial terms associated with the First Sale Agreement, including as to the sale price.
1693 In these circumstances I am not satisfied that Amcor suffered any compensable loss as a result of the breaches found against the Defendants or any of them arising from the First Sale Agreement or their involvement with the Service Packaging Business.
1694 Nor is there any evidence upon which the Court can rely to found an order for the taking of accounts as to profits derived by the Defendants from the Service Packaging Business. The evidence is that no such profits were earned by any of the Defendants.
1695 Amcor's claims to equitable compensation and an account of profits arising from the First Sale Agreement and the transfer of the Service Packaging Business are dismissed.
Equitable Compensation, Constructive Trust and Account of Profits - ACB Business
1696 I am not satisfied that Amcor suffered any loss arising from the sale of the ACB business. Equitable compensation is therefore not available to Amcor.
1697 As to profit, as at 30 June 2004, the ACB Business achieved a net profit of $1,067,000 after tax. This was the subject of a dividend declared in October 2004, which has been earlier discussed.
1698 However, the amount of actual profit generated by the ACB Business during the period between 30 July 2003 (the settlement of the Second Sale Agreement) and 30 June 2004, which was available to be distributed to the owners of the business, Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) and ACB Australia Pty Ltd, and their respective shareholders, in the event that dividends were declared, is uncertain. Further, it is uncertain as to what, if any such profits were generated by the business between 1 July 2004 and 28 October 2004 (the date of Barnes' retirement from Amcor).
1699 Because the amount of profit is uncertain, and indeed there is no evidence as to what, if any, was the level of profit generated in the period 1 July 2004 and 28 October 2004, it is inappropriate to declare a constructive trust in respect of it.
Liability of the Defendants (other than Barnes and Holihan) for Profits of the ACB Business
1700 There is no evidence that any of the Defendants, Holihan and Barnes aside, ever received any pecuniary benefit derived from the ACB Business, whether by way of a share in the profits or otherwise.
1701 Further, as to any entitlement to future profits, these Defendants renounced any such entitlement, as confirmed by the execution of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement and their conduct of these proceedings.
1702 It will be recalled that in October 2005, Barnes and Holihan executed an agreement, the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement, which provided that the Australian Corrugated Box business was owned 50/50 by Astra and Holihan Investments. This was backdated from October 2005 to 28 May 2003.
1703 I am satisfied that, as from the execution of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement in October 2005, none of the Defendants, other than Holihan and Barnes, had any entitlement to any profits from the ACB Business. This was confirmed by the steps also taken in late 2005 to adjust the dividend earlier declared in October 2004 on an the basis of an 80/20 split. The adjustment resulted in the earlier dividend being re-declared on the basis of a 50/50 split.
1704 It follows that, after October 2005, the Defendants, other than Holihan and Barnes, in fact had no interest in the ACB Business.
1705 This position is confirmed by their conduct in these proceedings in maintaining that they had no such interest as from 28 May 2003. Indeed, they have renounced any interest in the business or any claim to profits or dividends derived from the business as from this date.
1706 Following October 2005 the Defendants, other than Barnes and Holihan, were not entitled to share in any profit derived from the ACB Business, and continue to not be so entitled.
1707 The consequence of these findings is that no order should be made against the Defendants, other than Barnes and Holihan, in respect of the profits of the ACB Business.
1708 It will be recalled that Barnes resigned from Amcor with effect on 28 October 2004.
1709 Following settlement of the Second Sale Agreement on 30 July 2003 the ACB Business derived profits. As at 30 June 2004, the ACB Business achieved a net profit of $1,067,000 after tax. This was the subject of a dividend declared in October 2004, which has been earlier discussed.
1710 Pursuant to his arrangements with Holihan, Barnes, or companies associated with him, were entitled to 50 per cent of the profits earned by the ACB Business.
1711 I am satisfied that the necessary causal nexus has been established between the conduct of Barnes giving rise to his breaches of fiduciary duty and the profits of the ACB Business which he has gained a prima facie entitlement to.
1712 In all likelihood, Amcor would not have sold the business to Holihan's company had it known that Barnes together with four other of its senior employees had or proposed to take up a share in the ACB business. In this respect Brown said in his evidence:
If I had discovered that Barnes, Hodgson and other persons who were then employees of the Amcor Group intended to acquire an interest in the ACB Business and remain as employees of the Amcor Group, I would not have supported the sale and would have prevented it from proceeding. I had relied on Hodgson to oversee the sale process and to ensure that the terms of the sale were in the best interest of his division and Amcor and would protect the profitability of AFP.
I did not give permission for a continuing employee of Amcor to have ownership, financial or management involvement in either the ACB Packaging business or the ACB business following the sales to Hottes and Holihan.
1713 Further, given the ongoing commercial supply agreement between the Amcor vendor and Holihan's trading company and the number of participating senior employees involved and their positions within the company, it was unlikely that Amcor would have been successful in taking steps to quarantine all of those employees from relevant information so as to eliminate any conflicts of interest while the supply agreement was on foot. The alternative was to terminate the employment of the five senior employees. This would have attracted significant costs in payouts and left large gaps in the executive structure of the company. A likely outcome would have been, as Brown said, for Amcor to have prevented the Second Sale Agreement from proceeding.
1714 Accordingly, the necessary nexus between the conduct of Barnes and him gaining an entitlement to profits has been made out.
1715 I am satisfied that Barnes must account for such of those profits which were earned during the period of his employment with Amcor, namely between 30 July 2003 and 28 October 2004.
1716 As there is no loss to Amcor which I have found, and consequently no election is open to it, I will order that an account be taken as to the following:
(a) Between 30 July 2003 and 28 October 2004 what profits were earned by the ACB Business which were available for distribution by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) and ACB Australia Pty Ltd to their shareholders had any dividends been declared to distribute those profits?
(b) What is the calculation of one half of the sum referred to in paragraph (a)?
1717 Following the taking of accounts I will make the appropriate and necessary orders as to payment directed to Barnes.
1718 Arising from my finding as to the knowing involvement of Holihan in the fiduciary breach perpetrated by Barnes in relation to the ACB Business in the period 1 July 2004 to 28 October 2004, I will order that a further account be taken. Given the findings made as to the knowing participation of Holihan during this limited period, and given that he was legitimately entitled to earn 50 per cent profits from the business by his own skill, efforts and investment, it would be inequitable to compel him to account for the whole of the profit of the ACB Business during the period.
1719 In so doing, I take into account the observation of McLelland J in United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd[260] where his Honour said that:
... a person who knowingly participates in a breach of duty by another may be ... jointly liable with the fiduciary in respect of any pecuniary liability to the beneficiary as a result of the breach.
1720 A similar approach was taken earlier by Manson J in Canada Safeway Ltd v Thompson[261] where the learned Judge observed:
The defendant must account to the plaintiff not only for the profits which they made ... but additionally, for the profits made by their co-conspirator Raley. The liability is, among them, not joint but joint and several.
1721 Although the issue is not beyond doubt and there is a substantial body of contrary authority,[262] given the underlying flexibility of the equitable remedy and in order to achieve practical justice, for example in the event that the fiduciary's assets have been dissipated after the wrong but before judgment, following the taking of accounts I will give consideration to ordering that the profits in question, namely 50 per cent of the distributable profits derived from the ACB Business during the period between 1 July 2004 to 28 October 2004 to which Barnes and his companies may have been entitled, be the subject of a joint and several liability to pay by Holihan.
1722 However, as the matter has not been the subject of argument, I will defer making any final determination on the point until the conclusion of the process of taking of accounts.
1723 Accordingly, I will make orders for the taking of accounts as to the following:
(a) Between 1 July 2004 to 28 October 2004 what profits were earned by the ACB Business which were available for distribution by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) and ACB Australia Pty Ltd to their shareholders had any dividends been declared to distribute those profits?
(b) What is the calculation of one half of the sum referred to in paragraph (a)?
1724 Following the taking of accounts I will make the appropriate and necessary orders as to payment directed to Holihan.
1725 The ACB business the subject of the Second Sale Agreement was the business conducted by ACN 002693843 Box Pty Ltd (formerly Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd) (ACB), a wholly owned subsidiary of Amcor.
1726 Barnes was employed by Amcor at the time of the sale of the ACB business on 3 June 2003, during the prior negotiation of the sale and during the period of the administration of the supply agreement between ACB and the Holihan companies Achilla and ACB Australia (the purchaser) included in the Second Sale Agreement until his resignation with effect on 28 October 2004.
1727 As such, he owed fiduciary duties to Amcor arising from his employment, which have been earlier described. He did not owe those duties to the Amcor subsidiary ACB which was the vendor of the ACB business in the sale to the Holihan interests and the contracting party in the trading arrangements provided for in the Second Sale Agreement.
1728 It was contended by the Defendants to the Barnes Proceeding and Hodgson that Amcor is not the proper plaintiff (or plaintiff by counterclaim) as Amcor was not a party to either the First Sale Agreement or Second Sale Agreement, accordingly, it has suffered no loss.
1729 This raises an issue as to which party is the correct plaintiff.
1730 It is accepted that Amcor is and was at all material times the holder of all issued shares in APA. APA is and was at all material times the holder of all shares in Service Containers and ACB. Accordingly, at all relevant times, Amcor was the ultimate holding company of Service Containers and ACB.
1731 It is also accepted that Amcor included the results of all of its subsidiaries in its consolidated accounts.
1732 The relevant board minutes of APA and Service Containers were tendered in evidence. Each of the relevant minutes for APA, ACB and Service Containers provided:
(1) Amcor Limited Deed of Cross Guarantee
The Board NOTED that the Company is a party to a Deed of Cross Guarantee with Amcor Limited pursuant to ASIC Class Order 98/1418.
A condition of the Class Order requires the Directors to reassess the advantages and disadvantages associated with remaining a party to the Deed of Cross Guarantee.
Remaining a party to the Deed provides relief from the requirement and significant costs involved in the preparation and audit of financial statements. The disadvantage of giving a guarantee is considered minimal given the strong financial status of the Company, Amcor Limited and the other Amcor subsidiaries that are parties to the Deed of Cross Guarantee.
The Board RESOLVED that the Company remains a party to the Deed of Cross Guarantee.
1733 Mr Lewis, Company Secretary and Director of APA (from 1 July 1999 and 20 August 2004 respectively) and Company Secretary and Director of ACB (from 17 January 2000 and 20 August 2004 respectively) confirmed that the effect of the cross-guarantee was that these subsidiaries were not required to produce separate accounts.
1734 I have found that Amcor suffered no loss as a result of the sale of the Service Packaging Business pursuant to the First Sale Agreement.
1735 Similarly, I have found that Amcor suffered no loss as a result of the sale of the ACB Business pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement. However, Barnes gained a profit to which he was not entitled by virtue of the breach of duty to his employer of the day, Amcor.
1736 Further, and in any event, a shareholder generally cannot recover damages which are reflective of the losses of the company in which they hold shares. As was observed in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) what a shareholder in a company cannot do:[263]
... is to recover damages merely because the company in which he is interested has suffered damage. He cannot recover a sum equal to the diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to the likely diminution in dividend, because such a 'loss' is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. His only 'loss' is through the company, in the diminution in the value of the net assets of the company, in which he has (say) a 3 per cent. shareholding. The plaintiff's shares are merely a right of participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association. The shares themselves, his right of participation, are not directly affected by the wrongdoing.
1737 This passage was referred to with approval by the High Court in Gould v Vaggelas.[264] In that case, a fraudulent misrepresentation had caused Mr and Mrs Gould to enter a contract to purchase, on behalf of a company yet to be incorporated, certain business assets. The company was then incorporated. Gibbs CJ stated the principle for assessing damages in the following terms:[265]
... Any loss suffered by Gould Holdings as a consequence of the fraud can be recovered only by the company itself. Even if the company had not commenced an action within the limitation period, its failure to enforce its own rights would not have enhanced the rights of the Goulds: see Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 at 223; [1982] 1 All ER 354 at 367. However, although the Goulds cannot recover damages merely because Gould Holdings has suffered damage, and cannot recover damages which are merely a reflection of a loss suffered by the company, they may recover damages for the loss which they personally have suffered and which is separate and distinct from the loss suffered by the company.[266]
1738 The losses that the Goulds claimed were held to be separate losses to those that the company had incurred, and thus to be recoverable by the Goulds, the High Court concluding that: "... the loss which the Goulds have in fact suffered, of $733,212.12, was a direct consequence of the fraud, and the Goulds are entitled to recover that amount by way of damages".
1739 In Christensen v Scott,[267] the New Zealand Court of Appeal considered a similar question to that in Gould v Vaggelas. The plaintiffs were shareholders in a company which grew potatoes. They caused it to take a lease of land. The land was mortgaged, but those advising both the company and the plaintiffs did not ensure that the mortgagee's consent to the lease was obtained. The plaintiffs guaranteed an advance to the company. The lessors defaulted under the mortgage, and the mortgagee went into possession, denying the company access to its potato crop. The mortgagee then went into liquidation, and the company went into receivership. The company claimed damages from various parties, including the advisers. The plaintiffs commenced their own action against the advisers. Those proceedings were struck out at first instance. On appeal Thomas J, with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed, referred to Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and continued:[268]
We do not need to enter upon a close examination of (Prudential). It has attracted not insignificant and, at times, critical comment. ... It may be accepted that the Court of Appeal was correct, however, in concluding that a member has no right to sue directly in respect of a breach of duty owed to the company or in respect of a tort committed against the company. Such claims can only be brought by the company itself or by a member in a derivative action under an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle ... But this is not necessarily to exclude a claim brought by a party, who may also be a member, to whom a separate duty is owed and who suffers a personal loss as a result of a breach of that duty. Where such a party, irrespective that he or she is a member, has personal rights and these rights are invaded, the rule in Foss v Harbottle is irrelevant. Nor would the claim necessarily have the calamitous consequences predicted by counsel in respect of the concept of corporate personality and limited liability. The loss arises not from the breach of the duty owed to the company but from a breach of duty owed to the individuals. The individual is simply suing to vindicate his own right or redress a wrong done to him or her giving rise to a personal loss.
[Emphasis added]
1740 In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm),[269] the plaintiff Mr Johnson sought to recover against the defendant firm of solicitors for losses he sustained through their negligence in performing his and his company's joint retainer of the firm to exercise an option on the company's behalf to acquire land for development purposes. Lord Bingham distilled from the authorities three propositions dealing with claims by shareholders for losses suffered by a company:[270]
These authorities [which included Christensen v Scott and Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd] support the following propositions. (1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good the diminution in the value of the shareholder's shareholding where that merely reflects the loss suffered by the company. A claim will not lie by a shareholder to make good the loss which would be made good if the company's assets were replenished through action against the party responsible for the loss, even if the company, acting through its constitutional organs, has declined or failed to make good the loss. So much is clear from Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd ... (2) Where a company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the loss is diminution in the value of the shareholding ... (3) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffers a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by a breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue to recover the loss caused to it by the breach of the duty owed to it but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to that other ...
1741 In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co Lord Millett said:[271]
Where the company suffers loss as a result of a wrong to the shareholder but has no cause of action in respect of its loss, the shareholder can sue and recover damages for his own loss, whether of a capital or income nature, measured by the diminution in the value of his shareholding. He must, of course, show that he has an independent cause of action of his own and that he has suffered personal loss caused by the defendant's actionable wrong. Since the company itself has no cause of action in respect of its loss, its assets are not depleted by the recovery of damages by the shareholder.
The position is, however, different where the company suffers loss caused by the breach of a duty owed both to the company and to the shareholder. In such a case the shareholder's loss, in so far as this is measured by the diminution in value of his shareholding or the loss of dividends, merely reflects the loss suffered by the company in respect of which the company has its own cause of action. If the shareholder is allowed to recover in respect of such loss, then either there will be double recovery at the expense of the defendant or the shareholder will recover at the expense of the company and its creditors and other shareholders. Neither course can be permitted. This is a matter of principle; there is no discretion involved.
1743 The third principle as stated by Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co has been re-framed in terms of a prohibition on a shareholder recovering damages for a loss caused by a breach of duty owed both to the company and the shareholder where the shareholder's loss reflects the diminution in the value of his shareholding. In Thomas v D'Arcy,[275] McPherson JA (with whom Williams JA and White J agreed) said:[276]
Accepting the principles adopted by Lord Bingham, Lord Goff and Lord Millett in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co, the question here is to identify the category into which the relevant allegations fall ...
According to what was said by Lord Millett in the passage quoted from Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, 62, the point of principle is that a shareholder will not be permitted to recover damages for a loss caused by a breach of duty owed both to the company and the shareholder where the shareholder's loss reflects the diminution in the value of his shareholding.
1744 McPherson JA concluded in Thomas v D'Arcy that to the extent that the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Christensen v Scott suggests that a reflective loss may be recovered by the shareholder rather than the company itself, it should not be followed.[277]
1745 The second principle as stated by Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co was applied by Ferguson J in Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd v Wouter Nolten.[278] The proceeding concerned an application to join a fourth plaintiff (GNZ) to a proceeding against Mr Nolten (the defendant) in circumstances where Mr Nolten was a director of both GNZ and GA. Her Honour said:[279]
Counsel also submitted that none of the cases deal with the situation here where there is a separate and distinct duty that Mr Nolten owes to GA, as a director, from the duty that he owes to GNZ as its sole director. It was put that if Mr Nolten was not a director of GNZ and was only a director of GA and, if in that capacity, he allowed GNZ to enter into an uncommercial lease, GA would be entitled to plead a case against him for breach of duty. In my view, this analysis does not assist GA because, in those circumstances, no issue of reflective loss would arise as GNZ would have no claim against Mr Nolten. Both Johnson v Gore Wood & Co and Thomas v D'Arcy make it clear that shareholders may sue for loss suffered by them when the company has no cause of action available to it. [Emphasis added]
1746 Amcor submitted, however, that it was not claiming a "reflective loss". It contended that the authorities do not address the circumstances in this case where, by reason of consolidated accounting within a corporate group, the ultimate parent company of wholly owned subsidiaries includes the results of all of its subsidiaries in its consolidated results. It said that, as a result of the consolidated accounting within the Amcor Companies, as a matter of fact all relevant losses flow through to and are suffered by Amcor. It was said that this is not a case where the loss of Amcor (the shareholder) is a diminution in the value of the shareholding or dividend because of the improper transfer of assets from the company. The wholly owned subsidiary companies do not suffer any relevant loss because of the consolidated nature of the accounts. That is, any loss goes directly to the profit and loss statement of Amcor, and then, at the end of the relevant trading period, directly to the balance sheet of Amcor. It followed from this submission, so it was put, that Amcor suffered a direct loss as a result of a breach of duties owed to it by each of the Defendants to the Barnes Proceeding and the Defendant by Counterclaim to the Hodgson Proceeding. Accordingly, so it was submitted, in relation to all claims Amcor is the proper plaintiff and the proper plaintiff by counterclaim to the Hodgson Proceeding.
1747 I do not accept this submission. The manner in which a loss may be recorded in the books of account of a company, does not necessarily evidence a loss, and I am not satisfied that it does so in this case. It is actual loss which is critical to the operation of the principles in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co, not a recorded loss for accounting purposes.
1748 However, applying the second principle of Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co produces a different result. In this case, in relation to Barnes, the subsidiary company has no cause of action to sue to recover any loss arising from any breach of duty. Barnes owed his fiduciary duty, not to the subsidiary, but to his employer Amcor, which, as the shareholder in the subsidiary company, may sue in respect of it. Amcor has a cause of action to do so by reason of the breach of duty which Barnes owed to it.
1749 Further, Amcor claims equitable relief by reason of breach of duties to it, including equitable compensation and the taking of accounts.
In circumstances where the Prudential principle applies to bar a viable claim on the footing of the company's cause of action which it does not assert, the application of the principle can work hardship. Moreover in this case the application of the principle might serve to leave the trustee holding a profit without being accountable for it to his beneficiary, and that may run counter to a basic equitable principle.
1751 In my opinion, the rules in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co cannot be applied in this case to bar Amcor's claim to equitable relief from Barnes by way of equitable compensation. Barnes owed a fiduciary duty to his employer Amcor, which he breached. He owed that duty, not to the subsidiary company, but to Amcor. It was Amcor which approved the Second Sale Agreement acting on behalf of its subsidiary, without which the Second Sale Agreement would not have proceeded. As a result of the breach, Barnes derived profits which, in equity, he ought to disgorge to the party to whom he owed his duty, Amcor.
1752 On or about 21 March 2005, ACB, APA, Holihan, the ACB Purchaser and Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly, Achilla) entered into a transaction known as the "Deed of Accession" (the "Deed of Accession"). The Deed of Accession in effect substituted APA for ACB in relation to "all capacities and for all purposes under or pursuant to the Second Sale Agreement". Clause 2 of the Deed of Accession provided:
2 Novation
2.1 With effect on and from the Accession Date:
(a) [APA] shall be substituted for [ACB] in all capacities and for all purposes under or pursuant to the [Second Sale Agreement]; and
(b) the [Second Sale Agreement] shall take effect as a deed on the same terms as previously except that references to [ACB] shall be read and construed as if they were references to [APA].
2.2 Assumption of benefits and obligations
With effect on and from the Accession Date, [APA] shall observe, perform, be bound and comply with the provisions of the [Second Sale Agreement] binding on [ACB] and shall enjoy all the rights and benefits of [ACB] under or pursuant to the [Second Sale Agreement].
1754 Following the discovery of the Deed of Accession, Amcor and ACB then sought leave to add APA as a plaintiff to the Barnes Proceeding and APA as a plaintiff by counterclaim to the Hodgson Proceeding. The application for leave to add APA and Service Containers as parties was heard on 15 and 16 December 2009. On 19 May 2010, Emerton J ordered that APA and Service Containers be added as plaintiffs in the Barnes Proceeding pursuant to r 9.06 and the writ be amended accordingly. The order did not specify any time for amending the writ. The date of filing of the amended writ in the Barnes Proceeding is stated, on its face, to be 3 June 2010.
1755 On these facts it was further contended, in respect of the Second Sale Agreement, that ACB had no cause of action (by reason of entry into the Deed of Accession) and APA did not suffer any loss or damage as a result of the conduct of the relevant Defendants (but instead, suffered its loss, if any, by reason of entry into the Deed of Accession in respect of the Second Sale Agreement).
1756 However, given the finding that as a result of his breach only Barnes derived profits which, in equity, he ought to disgorge to the party to whom he owed his duty, namely Amcor, and given that no loss has been found to have been suffered by either APA or ACB at the hands of the Defendants arising from the Second Sale Agreement, the submission has no practical effect.
Corporations Act Claims
1757 Part 9.4B of the Corporations Act is titled "Civil Consequences of Contravening Civil Penalty Provisions". Section 1317E(1)(a) provides that ss 180-182 are civil penalty provisions. Section 1317J(1) reserves solely to ASIC the right to apply for a declaration of contravention. A corporation may, however, apply for a compensation order: section 1317J(2).
1758 Section 1317H creates a statutory right of compensation for the contravention of a civil penalty provision. It provides as follows:
(1) A Court may order a person to compensate a corporation ... for damage suffered by the corporation...if:
(a) the person has contravened a corporation ... civil penalty provision in relation to the corporation ...; and
(b) the damage resulted from the contravention.
The order must specify the amount of the compensation.
1759 Section 1317K provides for a time limitation in the following terms:
Proceedings for a declaration of contravention, a pecuniary penalty order, or a compensation order, may be started no later than 6 years after the contravention. [Emphasis added]
1760 As no liability has been found in respect of Holihan, Bayley, Sangster, or Mihelic (or their associated companies) it is unnecessary to determine whether or not the claims against them are barred by the passage of time.
1761 It was submitted that Amcor's claim for breach of fiduciary duty found against Barnes is barred by laches.
1762 A classic statement of the equitable principle of laches is drawn from Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd:[282]
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
1763 Amcor commenced the Barnes proceeding by the issue of its writ on 3 September 2007. The Hodgson proceeding was issued on 3 December 2004. A first defence was filed on 27 January 2005. The first defence raised no allegation in relation to the ACB Business. An amended defence and counterclaim filed 21 April 2006 similarly raised no allegation in relation to the ACB Business. It was not until the further amended defence and counterclaim was filed on 3 June 2010 pursuant to the orders of Emerton J made 19 May 2010 that allegations were first made by Amcor in the Hodgson proceeding concerning the ACB Business.
1764 The length of the delay in this case in Amcor prosecuting its claims in respect of the ACB Business were considerable. Nevertheless, orders were made by Emerton J on 19 May 2010 which permitted these causes of action to be agitated by Amcor, in spite of the apparent delay to that point.
1765 Further I am not satisfied that any party has suffered in the presentation of their cases at trial by reason of the delay, and no evidence was adduced to this effect.
1766 I am not satisfied that it would be practically unjust to give a the remedy which I propose in favour of Amcor. The balance of justice calls for the grant of the remedy in the circumstances of this case.
1767 The final question is whether the Amcor Parties are estopped by the application of the Anshun principle in respect of any, and if so which, of their claims.
1768 Hodgson and the Defendants to the Barnes proceeding who were also respondents to the Federal Court proceedings have pleaded an estoppel against the Amcor Parties in respect of the claims now made against them and heard in the present trial.
1769 It was submitted by the Defendants that a reasonable inference may be drawn that the Amcor Parties had, contrary to the bare denial raised on their pleadings, sufficient knowledge of the matters now alleged which would have permitted the ventilation of the claims made in the present proceedings in the Federal Court Proceeding. The question is whether, on the authorities, the Amcor Parties who were parties to the Federal Court Proceedings ought be estopped from raising the claims they could have raised against the parties who were also parties in the Federal Court Proceeding. Hodgson, Barnes, Bayley, Sangster and Mihelic were all respondents to the Federal Court Proceedings and Amcor, APA and Service Containers were applicants.
1770 The Federal Court Proceedings were settled on 16 December 2004 and, subject to the relevant undertakings being given to the Court, consent orders giving effect to the settlement were made by the Federal Court on 17 December 2004. Neither the settlement nor the 17 December 2004 orders reserved to Amcor or any subsidiary the right to institute proceedings canvassing again the issues litigated in the Federal Court Proceedings.
1771 The Amcor Parties called no evidence from any of the directors or senior officers of Amcor who made the decision to settle the Federal Court Proceedings to the effect that they had no knowledge at that time of the matters of the subject of the claims advanced on behalf of the Amcor Parties in this Joint Trial. The Defendants, on the other hand pointed to a number of facts from which it may be inferred that the Amcor parties in fact had the relevant knowledge following the settlement of the Federal Court proceedings.
1772 On this basis it was submitted that it is not open for Amcor or its subsidiaries to seek to re-agitate the issues raised (and settled) in the Federal Court Proceedings, by way of its claims in the present trial. Such claims, it was submitted, are barred by either issue estoppel (to the extent that the pleaded issues of fact or law are the same) or by Anshun estoppel.
1773 The distinction between res judicata and issue estoppel is discussed in the judgment of Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited[283] as follows:
The distinction between res judicata (in England called "cause of action estoppel") and issue estoppel was expressed by Dixon J in Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464, at p 532 in these terms: "in the first the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has in the former proceedings passed into judgment, so that it is merged and has no longer an independent existence, while in the second, for the purpose of some other claim or cause of action, a state of fact or law is alleged or denied the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by the prior judgment, decree or order." (at p597)
The distinction was restated by Fullagar J. in his dissenting judgment in Jackson v Goldsmith [1950] HCA 22; (1950) 81 CLR 446, at p 466. His Honour expressed the rule as to res judicata by saying: "where an action has been brought and judgment has been entered in that action, no other proceedings can thereafter be maintained on the same cause of action. This rule is not, to my mind, correctly classified under the heading of estoppel at all. It is a broad rule of public policy based on the principles expressed in the maxims 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' and 'nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem cause'." His Honour went on to discuss issue estoppel, citing the comment of Dixon J in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR, at p 531: "A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies."
(at p597)
1774 As to res judicata and issue estoppel, the Federal Court proceedings were settled, as reflected in the consent orders of Merkel J made 17 December 2004. The proceedings were not determined judicially and decided by a prior judgment or order. Nor did the rights or causes of action claimed in the Federal Court Proceedings pass into judgment. Undertakings given to the Court aside, the settlement of the Federal Court Proceedings arose from a contractual document potentially giving rise to contractual remedies if breached. The settlement precluded the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact by a court or otherwise conflicting judgments.[284]
1775 The principle of Anshun estoppel is set out in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited[285] (Anshun) where Gibbs CJ, and Mason and Aickin JJ said:
The critical issue, then, is whether the case falls within the extended principle expressed by Sir James Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson. The Vice-Chancellor expressed the principle in these terms:
"where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matters which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward ..."
1776 In Anshun, Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ said further:[286]
In this situation we would prefer to say that there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding. In this respect, we need to recall that there are a variety of circumstances, some referred to in the earlier cases, why a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings e.g. expense, importance of the particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few. [Emphasis added]
The double negative is here significant because the question is not whether it would have been reasonable to take the course of relying on a particular defence or cause of action in the first proceeding, for more often than not it was then possible to rely upon the proposed defence or cause of action. The issue is whether it was unreasonable to defer reliance upon the defence or cause of action, so, if it cannot be shown to have been unreasonable not to have relied earlier on the defence or cause of action, then the principle stated by the majority in Anshun's Case will not shut out a party's later reliance on the defence or cause of action, unless some other principle of estoppel or the law can be called in aid.
1778 Whether or not it is unreasonable for a party asserting a cause of action in a later proceeding not to have done so in an earlier proceeding depends almost entirely on the particular circumstances.[290]
1779 As Kenny JA observed in Gibbs v Kinna,[291] there is at least one factor which is indicative on "unreasonableness" in not asserting a cause of action in an earlier proceeding: if any judgment or order which might have been made on the cause of action in the subsequent proceeding would conflict with a judgment or order in the earlier proceeding, then is will ordinarily be unreasonable to refrain from raising the cause of action in the first proceeding.
1780 The relevant principles in relation to Anshun estoppel were conveniently summarised by Davies J in Solak v Registrar of Titles (No. 2).[292] They include as follows (citations omitted):
(a) An Anshun estoppel will arise in circumstances where a party to a subsequent proceeding seeks to litigate a claim or defence "which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings" (underlining added).
(b) The estoppel is "analogical extension" of the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel and operates to preclude a litigant from bringing a particular claim where it was "unreasonable" for the litigant not to have brought that claim, or rely on that claim as a defence, in an earlier concluded proceeding.
(c) If the litigant was unable to raise the claim or defence in the earlier proceeding, no Anshun estoppel will arise.
(d) Equally so the fact that the litigant could have raised the claim or defence in the earlier proceeding does not mean that the estoppel will arise. The test is "based on the reasonableness of the conduct of a litigant in earlier proceedings".
(e) The mere fact that the matter could have been raised does not mean that it should have been raised for the operation of the estoppel. The "unreasonableness" criterion involves an evaluative element based upon what a litigant could reasonably have been expected to do in the earlier proceeding. In Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd, the majority Mason and Aickin JJ stated:
there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding.
(f) Although the estoppel was expressed in reference to the failure to raise a defence, the principle equally applies with respect to a claim. The question is whether the claim was "so relevant" to the earlier litigation that it was "unreasonable" not to have raised it.
(g) Whether a claim was "so relevant" to the earlier litigation that it was "unreasonable" not to have raised it falls to be considered on a case by case basis. This requires consideration of all the circumstances bearing upon unreasonableness in the particular matter, not simply identifying common facts in, or subject matter of, both proceedings. In Anshun, Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ explained that:
there are a variety of circumstances ... why a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings eg expense, importance of the particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few.
(h) Circumstances bearing on "unreasonableness" include, but are not confined to, the potential for the judgment in the later proceeding to "conflict" with the judgment in the earlier proceeding. Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ in Anshun explained:
By "conflicting" judgments we include judgments which are contradictory, though they may not be pronounced on the same cause of action. It is enough that hey appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect to the same transaction.
Thus the estoppel may apply where the subject matter of the later proceeding is so closely connected with the subject matter of the earlier proceeding that there may be an inconsistent determination of rights in respect to the same transaction, although there is not precise correspondence between the legal claims.
(i) Anshun estoppel can apply even though the subsequent action is against a party that was not a party to the earlier action as the consideration that underlies the estoppel, as with res judicata and issue estoppel, is the "general public interest in the same issue not being litigated over again". Justice Handley, writing extracurially, explained:
The extended res judicata doctrine applied in Anshun is based on the court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process by proceedings which are vexatious, that is unreasonable. It is not necessary for this purpose to establish identity of parties or privity. A good example is Hunter v Chief Constable where civil proceedings for assault brought by members of the Birmingham Six against police officers were dismissed as an abuse of process because they sought to relitigate issues decided against them in the criminal trial. Needless to say the police officers were not parties to the criminal proceedings. [References omitted]
(j) The doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel "can be regarded as serving a public policy which protects against abuse of process by supporting the finality of judicial dispositions of particular controversies". Thus in Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the proceedings were an abuse of process because the plaintiff was attempting to litigate or relitigate issues that had been determined in an earlier proceeding against persons who were not parties to that earlier proceeding. Although the Anshun principle was not relied on to support the application to have the proceeding dismissed as an abuse of process, Handley JA (with whom Mason P and Heydon JA agreed) stated that:
[I]t could fairly have been said, in the language of the joint judgment in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (at 602), that the claims against the accountants were so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it was unreasonable for the purchasers not to rely upon them in that action: compare Morris v Wentworth-Stanley (1999) QB 1004 at 1011, 1017.
(k) The guiding consideration where an action is commenced against a party that was not a party to the earlier action is whether there is such a close connection between the actions, albeit against different defendants, that it would be expected that the claims would all be dealt with in the one proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings and the possibility of conflicting or inconsistent judgments.
1781 Courts are reluctant to apply the Anshun principle in circumstances where serious injustice would arise. If there is fraud of which a party only becomes aware after the initial proceeding, there is no Anshun estoppel. As Nettle and Harper JJA said in Gangemi v Osborne[293] "... if it is true that there was fraud of which Gangemi has only now become aware, there would be no Anshun estoppel either".
1782 In my opinion, the Anshun principle does not prevent Amcor from maintaining these proceedings against each of the Defendants to the Barnes Proceeding or the plaintiff in the Hodgson Proceeding.
1783 With one exception, the same or substantially the same facts do not arise for consideration in these Proceedings as in the Federal Court Proceeding. The Federal Court Proceeding in broad terms concerned the circumstances under which Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic left their employment with Amcor, including the copying and removal of confidential information and the making of preparations to conduct AMCG's business. Those matters are not the subject of the Barnes Proceeding. The Federal Court Proceeding largely concerned different underlying facts to those alleged in the Barnes Proceeding.
1784 The exception lies in respect of causes of action in relation to the AMCG business. This was at issue in the Federal Court Proceeding. It was also raised by Amcor as an issue in the Hodgson Proceeding.
1785 The claims in these proceedings arising from the First Sale Agreement and Second Sale Agreement could not have been raised in the Federal Court Proceeding. For the reasons above, the breaches of Hodgson and the Defendants to the Barnes Proceeding in respect of their concealment from Amcor of their involvement with the businesses sold under the First Sale Agreement and Second Sale Agreement were concealed by fraud, the true extent of which Amcor only became wholly aware after the settlement of the Federal Court Proceedings.
1786 No Anshun estoppel arises in these circumstances.[294] The Anshun principles would give rise to a serious injustice if they were to apply.
1787 Further, the settlement of the Federal Court Proceeding precludes the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact or conflicting judgments in this case.[295]
1788 The Federal Court Proceeding was settled with final orders based on undertakings of Hodgson, Barnes, Sangster, Bayley and Mihelic which were not, and could never have intended to be, met. In circumstances where the Amcor parties were materially misled as to the basis upon which they chose to conclude the Federal Court Proceeding, it is not unreasonable to raise the allegations they now seek to raise in these proceedings.
1789 The preparation to conduct AMCG's business, which was an issue in the Federal Court Proceeding is the subject of the defence but not the counterclaim in the Hodgson Proceeding.[296] Although there is some overlap of underlying facts in this regard, Amcor does not raise this issue as a claim in the Proceedings, which could be "estopped".
1790 For the above reasons, the circumstances do not warrant the application of the Anshun principle.
1791 I will order that an account be taken as to the following:
(a) Between 30 July 2003 and 28 October 2004 what profits were earned by the ACB Business which were available for distribution by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) and ACB Australia Pty Ltd to their shareholders had any dividends been declared to distribute those profits?
(b) What is the calculation of one half of the sum referred to in paragraph (a)?
1792 Following the taking of accounts I will make such orders as are necessary as to payment directed to Barnes, if any are required.
1793 I will order that a further account be taken as to the following:
(a) Between 1 July 2004 to 28 October 2004 what profits were earned by the ACB Business which were available for distribution by Australian Corrugated Box Co Pty Ltd (formerly Achilla Pty Ltd) and ACB Australia Pty Ltd to their shareholders had any dividends been declared to distribute those profits?
(b) What is the calculation of one half of the sum referred to in paragraph (a)?
1794 Following the taking of accounts I will make such orders as are necessary as to payment directed to Holihan, if any are required.
1795 I will hear the parties at an appropriate time to be fixed for the setting down of any necessary directions hearing in relation to any further orders which ought to be made generally or in relation to the taking of accounts and any hearing in relation to the costs of the proceedings.
SCHEDULE 1 - AMCOR FIBRE PACKAGING AUSTRALASIA (Corrugating / AFPA)
The "80/20 split" as structured in the 26 May Holihan/Barnes 80/20 Agreement and the 26 May 80/20 Shareholder Deed
HI owns shares of LeoRose, 80% as trustee for Astra & 20% beneficially for itself
Structure of the 28 May Holihan/Barnes 50/50 Agreement
[1] [2007]FCA [2007] FCA 1617; 1617; 244 ALR 673.
[16] Clause 2.2 of the Redundancy Policy sets out a range of circumstances in which an Eligible Employee whose position is redundant, will not be entitled to a retrenchment package.
[18] (1977) 16 SASR 6 at 8.
[19] (1977) 16 SASR 6 at 26-27.
[22] (1977) 16 SASR 6 at 8.
[23] (1984) 8 IR 34 at 56.
[24] Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 8 December 1989.
[26] (1995) 60 IR 327 at 332-333.
[27] Jones v Department of Energy and Minerals (1995) 60 IR 304 per Ryan J at 305 and 308.
[28] 148 IR 224 [2005] VSCA 322.
[29] (1995) 60 IR 327 at 332-333.
[33] R v the Industrial Commission of South Australia: ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Cooperative Limited & Anor (1977) 16 SASR 6 at 8; Fosters Group Limited v David Kou Tien Wing 148 IR 224 [2005] VSCA 322, Habersberger J at [36].
[35] Whittaker ibid at [95-96]; Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding (1995) 60 IR 327 at 332-333; Fosters Group Ltd v Wing 148 IR 224 [2005] VSCA 322 at [35].
[38] Creen v Wright (1876) 1 CPD 591, per Lord Coleridge CJ at 594; Payzu v Hannaford (1918) 2 KB 348; Rankin v Marine power International [2001] VSC 150 per Gillard J at [203-207].
[39] [1959] 1 WLR 1046 at 1054 (An appeal on the decision was dismissed: Riordan v War Office [1961] 1 WLR 201).
[40] [2002] NSWCA 235; (2002) 60 NSWLR 371 at 408-409.
[45] [1920] HCA 64; (1920) 28 CLR 305 at 326.
[47] Sargent v A.S.L. Developments Ltd [1974] HCA 40; [1974] 131 CLR 634 per Stephen J at 642-646.
[49] Supra at [250], [264] and [267].
[53] [1931] HCA 21; [1931] 45 CLR 359 at 377-378.
[54] HAJ Ford, RP Austin and IM Ramsay, Butterworths (2000) Vol. 1, 16.180 "A company's state of mind".
[55] [1971] UKHL 1; [1972] AC 153 at 170-1; See too Yore Contractors Pty Ltd v Holcon Pty Ltd. (1990) 2 ACSR 663.
[58] [1997] HCA 1; (1997) 189 CLR 146 at 155.
[60] Supra at [93] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
[64] Ibid at [92] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
[66] Rankin v Marine Power International Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 150 at paragraphs 381-388.
[67] (Unreported), 20 February 1992 Industrial Court of South Australia.
[68] (1996) No. 199507342, 21 November 1996, Judge Spence.
[69] [2006] VCC 1785 at [39].
[70] Kilburn v Enzed Products (1988) AICR 215.
[71] [2004] ACTSC 41, per Gray J at [21].
[72] McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd [1933] HCA 25; (1933) 48 CLR 457, per Dixon J at 476-477.
[73] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-2 ; [1938] HCA 34; [1938] ALR 334 at 342.
[74] [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 110 ALR 449 at 449-50.
[75] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald and Ors (No 11) [2009] NSWSC 287; (2009) 256 ALR 199 at [186].
[76] Further and Better Particulars of Sangster's Defence dated 24 April 2009.
[92] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362-363 per Dixon J; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR at 449-450.
[93] Known within Amcor as the Major Operational Costs Savings, or MOCS, review.
[94] [1978] HCA 12; 138 CLR 423 at 434 per Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ.
[95] VR Dye & Co v Peninsula Hotels Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] VSCA 60; (1999) 3 VR 201 per Ormiston JA at [36]-[37].
[96] Cussen v Sultan [2009] NSWSC 1114 at [21].
[97] [1907] HCA 82; (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 440-441.
[98] [1956] HCA 7; (1956) 95 CLR 245 at 268. See also McDonald v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2009] NSWLEC 105 at [36] per Biscoe J.
[99] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
[100] [1976] HCA 7; (1976) 137 CLR 1, 6-7.
[101] See also: Industrial Equity Limited v Blackburn [1977] HCA 59; (1977) 137 CLR 567; AMP Services Ltd v Manning [2006] FCA 256 at [54].
[102] Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) v Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 109; (2011) 277 ALR 189; Australia Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd, Ample Funds Ltd, AS Securities Pty Ltd & Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663; (1995) 62 FCR 504; Bluecorp Pty Ltd v ANZ Executors & Trustee Co Ltd [1906] VicLawRp 18; (1995) 127 FLR 120.
[103] Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, (13th ed, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007) at [8.020].
[104] [2007] FCA 963 at [483].
[105] See: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 at [484-488].
[110] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 at [488].
[113] Note the previous s 232 provision of the Corporations Law, the equivalent is now s 180 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
[121] JHIL was the holding company of the James Hardie Group.
[122] See comments made by Barrett J in Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 657 at [10].
[126] [1995] HCA 63; (1996) 186 CLR 71 at 106.
[127] [2007] FCA 963 at [270].
[128] See Hospital Products at 69 per Gibbs CJ; News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited [1996] FCA 870; (1996) 64 FCR 410 at 538 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ.
[129] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [272].
[130] See Hospital Products at 71-72 per Gibbs CJ; News Limited at 541 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville J.
[131] Youdan TG (ed), Equity Fiduciaries and Trusts (Law Book Co, 1989) at p 46-47.
[132] Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ considered that these remarks contain an important question "if not the question": see News Limited at 541. La Forest J also agreed with Professor Finn's remarks in Lac Minerals Limited v International Corona Resources Limited (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 at 26.
[133] See Hospital Products at 68 per Gibbs CJ, at 96 per Mason J; and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [271].
[134] Hospital Products, Mason J at 97; Breen v Williams, Gummow J at 132-133.
[136] See Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 36; (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 196 per Deane J; News Limited at 539 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ; Noranda Australia Limited v Lachlan Resources NL (1988) 14 NSWLR 1 at 17 per Bryson J; Woolworths Limited v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189 at 225 per Mahoney JA; Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 at 213-214 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Limited [1994] UKHL 5; [1995] 2 AC 145 at 206 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
[137] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [281].
[138] 249 NY 458 (1928).
[139] [1938] HCA 4; (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 164.
[140] Corporate Law (1986) at 34 and 141.
[142] Birtchnell v The Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Company Limited [1929] HCA 24; (1929) 42 CLR 384 at 408 per Dixon J; United Dominions v Brian at 13 per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ; News Limited at 539 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [287].
[143] News Limited at 539 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ; Australian Breeders Co-operative Society Limited v Jones [1997] FCA 1405; (1997) 150 ALR 488 at 514 per Wilcox and Lindgren JJ; Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy [1999] NSWCA 408; (1999) 48 NSWLR 1 at [194] per Spigelman CJ, Sheller JA and Stein JA; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [287].
[144] See Hospital Products at 69 per Gibbs CJ, 102 per Mason J.
[145] See Gibson Motorsport Merchandise Pty Limited v Forbes [2006] FCAFC 44; (2006) 149 FCR 569 at [11] per Finn J; Beach Petroleum at [201] per Spigelman CJ, Sheller JA and Stein JA; Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per Millett LJ; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [289].
[146] See Chan v Zacharia at 198-199 per Deane J; Gibson Motorsport at [12] per Finn J; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) Ibid at [291].
[147] [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per Millett LJ.
[150] [1933] HCA 8; (1933) 49 CLR 66 at 81-82 per Dixon and McTiernan JJ.
[152] [1946] Ch 169 at 173; cited in Macken's, Law of employment, [5.405].
[153] [1896] AC 44 at 51; see also New Zealand Netherlands Society "Oranje" Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR at 1129.
[154] [1966] UKHL 2; [1967] 2 AC 46 at 123.
[158] [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 103.
[159] [2008] WASC 239 at [4506] and [4508].
[161] (1990) FSR 385. Cited with approval by Harper J in GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Ritchie And Another [2008] VSC 164; (2008) 77 IPR 306 at [125].
[165] CBA v Smith at 393 per Davies, Sheppard and Gummow JJ; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [293].
[166] Maguire v Makaronis [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 466 per Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ; see also CBA v Smith at 393 per Davies, Sheppard and Gummow JJ; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [294].
[167] Woolworths v Kelly at 212 per Samuels JA, at 234 per Mahoney JA; see also Our Lady's Mount Pty Limited (as trustee) v Magnificat Meal Movement International Inc (1999) 33 ACSR 163 at [128] per Muir J; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [295].
[168] New Zealand Netherlands Society 'Oranje' Incorporated v Kuys [1973] 2 All ER 1222 at 1225-6 per Lord Wilberforce at 1227.
[169] Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1998] UKHL 52; [1999] 2 AC 222 at 238 per Lord Millett; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832) (No. 4) [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [308].
[170] Bolkiah per Lord Millett at 238.
[172] ( 1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 at 251-2.
[174] [2007] HCA 22; (2009) 230 CLR 89, at [174], [176]-[178].
[177] [2006] FCA 256 at [59].
[178] (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, 381-382. See also Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) Macq 461, 472.
[179] See: Bell v Lever Brother Ltd [1931] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161 per Lord Atkin at 228_; Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali_ [1999] 2 All ER 1005 at 1015; Concut v Worrell [2000] HCA 64; 176 ALR 693 at [36-37] per McHugh J.
[180] [1931] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161 at 227.
[187] (2005) 94 SASR 1; 242 LSJS 199; [2005] SASC 369.
[188] [1983] 2 All ER 707 at 714.
[189] [1999] 2 All ER 1005 at 1018.
[190] Sybron Corporation v. Rochem [1983] ICR 801 at 815.
[191] See: McHugh J in Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell [2000] HCA 64; 75 ALJR 312 at [51].
[192] [2001] VSC 150 at [238-269].
[197] [1922] 127 LT 267 at 269 per Greer J.
[199] [2000] HCA 64; (2000) 176 ALR 693, at [27]-[29], [38], [42].
[200] [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359, at 373 per Starke J and 377-378 per Dixon J.
[201] Ibid at [29] per Gleeson CJ; Gaudron and Gummow JJ.
[203] [1937] HCA 16; (1937) 58 CL.R 710, at 733.
[207] Supreme Court of Victoria, 2 April 1980.
[214] See Halsbury [185-1630], [185-810].
[215] [1996] 1 WLR 1256, at 1258-9.
[216] [1986] AC 514; [1996] 1 All ER 193; [1996] 2 WLR 192, at WLR 197, 200-201.
[221] Re Coomber; Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728-9.
[222] [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544, 559.
[223] [1911] 1 Ch. 723 at 728-729.
[226] [2009] VSC 533 at [117-132].
[229] (1988) 12 NSWLR 337, 353F.
[234] (1934) 3 DLR 465 at 469.
[238] Referring to Mr JD Heydon, "Causal Relationships between a Fiduciary's Default and the Principal's Loss" LQR, vol 110 (1994) 328.
[239] Spigelman CJ, Priestley and Meagher JJA.
[243] Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544, 559.
[248] [2009] VSC 533 at [117-132].
[253] Edmonds v Donovan [2005] VSCA 27; (2005) 12 VR 513, 545 [83].
[255] Ibid Disctronics [2002] VSC 454 at [216].
[260] [1982] 2 NSWLR 766 at 817, citing Gibbs J in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd [1975] HCA 8; (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 395-8.
[261] [1951] 3 DLR 295 at 323.
[262] Cf. Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544, especially at 569-570 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ; Dart Industries Inc v Décor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 AT 111 PER Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey JJ; My Kinda Town Ltd v Soll [1983] RPC 15 at 55 per Slade J; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 50; (1968) 122 CLR 25 at 34 per Windeyer J; and Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton [1996] 1 WWR 412.
[263] Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch. 204 at 222 to 223.
[266] See also at 231-232 (Murphy J); at 245-246 (Wilson J); at 253-254 (Brennan J).
[270] At 35E to 36A. The 3 propositions were agreed to by Lord Goff (at 38G), Lord Cooke (at 43B); compare Lord Hutton: at 54-55 who preferred the reasoning in Christensen v Scott.
[273] [2002] NSWCA 412 at pars [35] to [44].
[274] [2009] NSWCA 183; (2009) 257 ALR 558 at 600-603 [207]- [217]. These matters not dealt with in the report at [2009] NSWCA 183; 76 NSWLR 69.
[275] In Thomas v D'Arcy, the respondent owed duties to both the appellant (personally) and the company: at 677-678 [25]-[26] (per Williams JA).
[282] (1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239, 240.
[283] [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 597.
[284] See: Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Wholefoods Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] VSC 405 at [51-52].
[285] [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 598, and at 602 "it would be an abuse of process to allow a new proceeding" and at 604, and see also Brennan J at 609, and also Chamberlain v. Deputy Commissioner Of Taxation [1988] HCA 21; (1988) 164 CLR 502.
[287] Rahme v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported, Court of appeal NSW, 20 December 1991) per Priestley JA; Ling v Commonwealth [1996] FCA 1646; (1996) 68 FCR 180 at 184; Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski [2010] NSWCA 33 at par [4]; Solak v Registrar of Titles (No 2) [2010] VSC 146 at [8].
[290] Gibbs v Kinna [1998] VSCA 52; [1999] 2 VR 19 at 26-27 [23].
[291] [1998] VSCA 52; [1999] 2 VR 19 at 27.
[292] [2010] VSC 146 at [8]- [12].
[293] See Gangemi v Osborne [2009] VSCA 297 at [169] (per Nettle and Harper JJA).
[294] See Gangemi v Osborne [2009] VSCA 297 at [169] (per Nettle and Harper JJA).
[295] Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Wholefoods Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] VSC 405 at [51]- [52].
[296] (Vol 2, CB P668; Vol 2, CB P697).
(1931) 45 CLR 359
(1974) 131 CLR 634
(1998) 165 CLR 87
(1961) 104 CLR 1
(1918) 25 CLR 144
(1939) 62 CLR 464
(1950) 81 CLR 446
(1977) 16 SASR 6
(2010) 26 VR 668
(1984) 8 IR 34
(2005) 148 IR 224
(1995) 60 IR 327
(1995) 60 IR 304
(2002) 60 NSWLR 371
(1984) 5 FCR 447
(1920) 28 CLR 305
(1990) 170 CLR 394
(2000) 176 ALR 693
(1997) 189 CLR 146
(1933) 48 CLR 457
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1992) 110 ALR 449
(2009) 256 ALR 199
(2004) 141 FCR 183
(2007) 160 FCR 321
(1988) 165 CLR 87
(1999) 3 VR 201
(1907) 5 CLR 418
(1956) 95 CLR 245
(1976) 137 CLR 1
(1977) 137 CLR 567
(2011) 277 ALR 189
(1995) 62 FCR 504
(1995) 127 FLR 120
(1996) 186 CLR 71
(1996) 64 FCR 410
(1984) 154 CLR 178
(1988) 14 NSWLR 1
(1991) 22 NSWLR 189
(1938) 60 CLR 150
(1929) 42 CLR 384
(1997) 150 ALR 488
(1999) 48 NSWLR 1
(2006) 149 FCR 569
(2006) 14 VR 1
(1933) 49 CLR 66
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(2008) 77 IPR 306
(1997) 188 CLR 449
(2009) 230 CLR 89
(2001) 207 CLR 165
(2005) 94 SASR 1
(1939) 63 CLR 351
(1990) 1 Qd R 157
(1995) 182 CLR 544
(1996) 188 CLR 449
(1988) 12 NSWLR 337
(2005) 12 VR 513
(1975) 132 CLR 373
(1968) 122 CLR 25
(1985) 157 CLR 215
(2009) 257 ALR 558
(1981) 147 CLR 589
(1988) 164 CLR 502
(1996) 68 FCR 180