Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd
[2007] FCA 794
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2007-07-01
Before
Simpson JJ, Gray J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (165 paragraphs)
The applicant 56 The applicant, the ACCC, is established by s 6A(1) of the Trade Practices Act. By s 6A(2)(a), the ACCC is a body corporate and by s 6A(2)(d) it may sue in its corporate name. The ACCC is a party given standing by s 77(1) of the Trade Practices Act to institute a proceeding for the recovery on behalf of the Commonwealth of a pecuniary penalty referred to in s 76. Section 80(1) also gives the ACCC standing to apply for an injunction.
The corporate respondents 57 Among the 18 respondents to the proceeding, the first eight are corporations. They are respectively: the first respondent, Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd ('Leahy'); the second respondent, Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd ('Apco'); the third respondent, Pegasus Retail Pty Ltd ('Pegasus'); the fourth respondent, United Geelong Pty Ltd, formerly called United Fuels Pty Ltd ('United Fuels'); the fifth respondent, Brumar (Vic) Pty Ltd ('Brumar'); the sixth respondent, United Retail Pty Ltd ('United Retail'); the seventh respondent, Liberty Petroleum Pty Ltd ('Liberty') and the eighth respondent, Andrianopoulos Motors Pty Ltd ('Andrianopoulos'). 58 On 4 February 2004, Leahy filed a defence in this proceeding, in which it admitted some allegations against it. On 11 April 2005, Leahy entered into voluntary administration. At a creditors' meeting on 6 May 2005, Leahy was placed in liquidation. The ACCC sought the leave of the Court, pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ('the Corporations Act'), to continue the proceeding against Leahy, on the basis that it wished to obtain declaratory relief against Leahy, and to have imposed on Leahy a pecuniary penalty, which would not be provable in the liquidation. The only evidence about the affairs of Leahy discloses that, at the time it went into liquidation, Leahy's liabilities exceeded its assets by in excess of $1 600 000. In the circumstances, I declined to grant leave to proceed. The trouble and expense of proceeding to impose a pecuniary penalty on Leahy, which is extremely unlikely ever to be collected, is unwarranted. Declaratory relief is a largely pointless exercise at the best of times, and has absolutely no point in a case in which the person about whose conduct the declaration is sought is never going to conduct any further activities. If the function of a declaration is to record in a formal way the past acts of a corporation, so that its past conduct may be taken into account against it if it should ever contravene the law in a relevant way again, there is no point in making a declaration when the corporation has ceased to function permanently. As will be seen, there are two natural persons who are alleged to have given rise to the contravening conduct alleged against Leahy. If those contraventions were to be established, and declaratory relief is of any symbolic value at all, any desire for such relief would be satisfied amply by making declarations about the conduct of the two natural persons. In the absence of leave to proceed, no relief can be sought or granted against Leahy in this proceeding. 59 On 15 August 2005, during the trial of the proceeding, the ACCC discontinued the proceeding against Pegasus. The ACCC also abandoned its allegations of conduct contravening the Trade Practices Act in relation to Pegasus. 60 United Fuels came into existence in order to merge the business interests of Eino Heikkila (the 14th respondent), which involved wholesale and retail distribution of Shell-branded petroleum products in Geelong, and Robert James Riordan, which involved similar activities in Colac. With encouragement and assistance from Shell, the two formed United Fuels, of which they and their respective spouses were directors. Responsibilities were divided between them, with Mr Heikkila being in charge of retailing in Geelong, including setting prices for the United Fuels outlets, and Mr Riordan being in charge of wholesaling, and of the operations to the west of Geelong, including Colac. With the passage of time, a personal rift developed between Mr Heikkila and Mr Riordan, and progressed to the point where they were barely able to communicate. As a result, with the cooperation of Shell, they negotiated a settlement, under which Mr Heikkila left the business, and the petroleum retailing industry, altogether. The wholesale distributorship was sold to an unrelated company, Triton Petroleum Pty Ltd ('Triton'), which was said to be controlled by Shell. Mr Riordan formed United Retail, which he controlled, to carry on the retail business as the operator of a number of Shell outlets. Robert Keith Hambrook was employed by United Fuels as its accountant, and became the financial controller for United Retail. Mr Riordan and Mr Hambrook gave evidence on behalf of United Fuels and United Retail at the trial. United Fuels ceased to trade on 30 September 1999, and subsequently changed its name. Accordingly, conduct in contravention of the Trade Practices Act is only alleged against United Fuels up to that date. From 1 October 1999, United Retail effectively became the successor to United Fuels in the conduct of the relevant business. Accordingly, conduct in contravention of the Trade Practices Act is alleged against United Retail only after that date. 61 On 17 December 2004, Merkel J delivered judgment in the Ballarat case, to which I have referred in [23], in a proceeding in which the ACCC alleged the existence of an arrangement or understanding to fix the prices of petrol in the City of Ballarat and its surrounding area. Among those found to be parties to the Ballarat arrangement or understanding was Brumar. Merkel J also found that Brumar had given effect to that arrangement or understanding on some 53 occasions. See the Ballarat case at [382]. On 17 March 2005, his Honour imposed a pecuniary penalty of $4 000 000 on Brumar in respect of those contraventions. See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 254 at [42]. By that date, Brumar was already in liquidation, consequent upon a creditors' meeting on 17 February 2005. Earlier, Brumar had sold its business assets for a sum exceeding $26 000 000. Settlement of the sale occurred on 26 July 2003. After satisfaction of secured and other creditors out of the proceeds of sale, Brumar was left with $994 400. By the time of the liquidation, Brumar was said to have had total assets of $50 000 and creditors totalling $400. After investigation by the liquidator, on 18 May 2005, the liquidator expressed the view that a distribution to creditors of close to 100c in the dollar would be likely, subject to the resolution of a dispute as to whether any debt in respect of the costs awarded against Brumar by Merkel J on 17 March 2005 was provable in the liquidation. The liquidator contended that such a debt could not be proved in the liquidation. For practical purposes, any surplus of assets over liabilities of Brumar would be more than exhausted by the payment of the penalty imposed by Merkel J and the payment of any costs ordered by his Honour. The prospect of the ACCC recovering any pecuniary penalty from Brumar appears to be non-existent. Accordingly, for reasons similar to those I have given with respect to Leahy in [58], I also refused the ACCC's application, pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act, for leave to proceed against Brumar. 62 There is no dispute that each of Apco, United Fuels, United Retail, Liberty and Andrianopoulos answers the description of 'trading corporation formed within the limits of Australia', and is therefore a 'corporation' for the purposes of the provisions of the Trade Practices Act to which I have referred. Prior to their respective liquidations, Leahy and Brumar also fell within the same provision of the definition of 'corporation' in s 4(1) of the Trade Practices Act.