"Professor Finn accepts that some fiduciary obligations have an effect enduring beyond the termination of the fiduciary relationship.[65] In the first of the cases cited by Finn, Laskin, J., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, said, at 607: `An examination of the case law in this Court and in the Courts of other like jurisdictions on the fiduciary duties of directors and senior officers shows the pervasiveness of a strict ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic disqualifies a director or senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting even after his resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired'. The second case cited by Finn was one of competition after resignation by a person held to have been a fiduciary. With the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada may be compared that of Roskill, J. in Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v Cooley, another case of a director who disengaged himself from the company being held liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and that of the: Full Court in Green & Anor v. Bestobell Industries Pty. Ltd., yet another case of a fiduciary's being held accountable despite the termination of the fiduciary relationship. The proposition that fiduciary duties can survive the termination of the fiduciary relationship is supported by decisions dealing with whether a trustee may avoid disqualification as a purchaser of trust property by retiring from his fiduciary office. Lord Eldon thought that a fiduciary could not do this `unless he shakes off the character altogether; putting himself altogether out of the trust; and not then without a little more than merely parting with the character.' A trustee who retires after making arrangements for the impugned transaction cannot escape. Jacobs, J. has given this explanation of equity's approach: `It is my view that the basis of the rule that a trustee cannot retire for the purpose of effecting a transaction between himself and the trust is twofold. First, in the ordinary case, the fact that he retires in order to effect that purpose means that the decision to effect that purpose has been taken during the period of his trusteeship when he was actually performing the duties of a trustee; in other words the decision to deal with the trust is his own. Secondly, the trustee who has been actively managing the trust has all the advantage of the information and knowledge which comes to him as trustee and which he should use in no way for his own benefit, but purely for the benefit of the beneficiaries.' The first of these two bases is independent of the second. At least in a case like the present, where the fiduciary terminates the relationship with a view to acting against the client in the same matter, may it not be said by analogy that, leaving aside altogether the use of any special `information and knowledge' that had come to the fiduciary as such, a fiduciary, who cannot retire in order to escape from the conflict of duty and interest rule, cannot quit his or her position in order to escape the conflict of duty and duty rule? I call to mind again what Lord Eldon said in Cholmondeley v. Clinton and Beer v. Ward. Three other decisions bearing on the survival of the fiduciary duty of loyalty may be mentioned, two from the United States and one from Canada. The first of these is a relatively early decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where this was said: `[P]laintiff s claim for attorneys' fees is void and unenforceable, since it is in conflict with the well-established rule of public policy that where an attorney has acted for a client he cannot thereafter assume a position hostile to the client concerning the same matter, or use against the client knowledge or information obtained from him while the relation existed.' (My emphasis.) The second is a decision of the United States District Court holding that the receipt of confidential information was not a prerequisite to disqualification: `[T]he basis for the rule against representing conflicting interests is broader than the basis for the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose confidences both arise from the need to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to their attorneys, and both protect only the confidential information disclosed. The duty not to represent conflicting interests, on the other hand, is an outgrowth of the attorney-client relationship itself, which is confidential, or fiduciary, in a broader sense. Not only do clients at times disclose confidential information to their attorneys; they also repose confidence in them. The privilege is bottomed only on the first of these attributes, the conflicting-interests rule, on both.' The Canadian case, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, was one in which confidential information had undoubtedly been imparted. But the words used by the Court suggest that the fiduciary duty held to survive termination of the retainer was not confined to a duty not to misuse confidential information: `If she lied to him, it in no way relieved him of his fiduciary duty towards her, nor did the fiduciary duty of Mr Lockyer or of Mr Pinkofsky cease when the services had been terminated. ... It was fundamental to her rights that her solicitor respect her confidences and that he exhibit loyalty to her. A client has every right to be confident that the solicitor retained will not subsequently take an adversarial position against the client with respect to the same subject-matter that he was retained on. That fiduciary duty, as I have noted, is not terminated when the services rendered have been completed'."