The course of authority since the Agreed Penalties Case (HC)
113 Against this background, it is necessary to say something of a number of Full Court decisions at the centre of the arguments on the appeal, including those raised by the notice of contention.
114 After the High Court decided the Agreed Penalties Case (HC) in December 2015, the matter was remitted to the Full Court for the imposition of penalty. The matter was heard in May 2016, and judgment delivered in August 2017: Queensland Infrastructure Case (2017) 254 FCR 68. The matter had been before a Full Court in the original jurisdiction of the Court in the Agreed Penalties Case (FC) pursuant to a direction under s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) given the important question of the applicability, or not, of the principle in Barbaro. That question having been resolved by the High Court, which in doing so settled the question as to the statutory object or purpose of the imposition of a civil penalty, in accordance with the line of authority reflected by CSR and NW Frozen Foods, the matter came back to the Full Court (Dowsett, Greenwood and Wigney JJ) for imposition of penalties. Their Honours set out what they perceived to be relevant general principles. The discussion should be read and understood in the context that there was "effectively no dispute" about them: see [97]. They were expressed to be a "brief discussion" drawn from Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] FCA 1516; 118 ACSR 124, but importantly they were expressed in the light of the High Court's recent expression of view. At 254 FCR 88-90 [98]-[107], their Honours said the following:
98 Whereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty is primarily, if not wholly, protective in promoting the public interest in compliance: Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076 at 52,152; Commonwealth v Director, FWBII at [55] (per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ). The principal object of a pecuniary penalty is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene; both specific and general deterrence are important: Chemeq at [90]; Ponzio at [93]. A pecuniary penalty for a contravention of the law must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not to be regarded by the offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640 (TPG Internet) at [66]; Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249 at [62]-[63]. In relation to general deterrence, it is important to send a message that contraventions of the sort under consideration are serious and not acceptable: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 406 at [32].
99 The question whether a pecuniary penalty involves an element of punishment remains somewhat controversial: see the discussion in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 242 FCR 389 at [76]; ACCC v ANZ at [78]-[83]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2016) 247 FCR 339 at [8], referring to NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 (NW Frozen Foods) at 296-297; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 238 at 241; Trade Practices Commission v Stihl Chain Saws (Aust) Pty Ltd [1978] ATPR 40-091 (Stihl Chain Saws) at 17,896; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Ithaca Ice Works Pty Ltd [2002] ATPR 41-851 at [50]. To a certain extent, that debate appears to be more semantic or philosophical than real. It is sufficient to say that, accepting that the primary purpose of imposing a pecuniary penalty is to protect and deter, that purpose is achieved by imposing a punishment in the form of a pecuniary penalty: ACCC v ANZ at [83].
100 The fixing of a pecuniary penalty involves the identification and balancing of all the factors relevant to the contravention and the circumstances of the defendant, and making a value judgment as to what is the appropriate penalty in light of the protective and deterrent purpose of a pecuniary penalty. While there may be differences between the criminal sentencing process and the process of fixing a pecuniary penalty (cf Commonwealth v Director, FWBII at [56]-[57]), the fixing of a pecuniary penalty may to an extent be likened to the "instinctive synthesis" involved in criminal sentencing: TPG Internet Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 210 FCR 277 at 294. Instinctive synthesis is the "method of sentencing by which the judge identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case": Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 (Markarian) at [51] (per McHugh J). Or, as the plurality put it in Markarian (at [37], per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) "the sentencer is called on to reach a single sentence which … balances many different and conflicting features". Like the exercise of imposing a sentence for an offence, the process of fixing an appropriate pecuniary penalty should not be approached as a mathematical exercise involving increments to or decrements from a predetermined range of sentences: Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [74]-[76].
101 In fixing the amount of a civil penalty, reference is frequently made to the lists of factors or considerations identified by Santow J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 at [126] and French J in Chemeq at [99]. Those lists of relevant considerations, which have been approved and elaborated on by many subsequent decisions of this Court, were not, and plainly were not intended to be, exhaustive. Nor was it suggested that each of the factors referred to in the respective lists was necessarily relevant or important in every case. These lists of factors should not be treated as a rigid catalogue or checklist of matters to be applied in each case; the overriding principle is that the Court should weigh all relevant circumstances: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v GE Capital Finance Australia [2015] ASC 155-203 at [72].
102 In general terms, the factors that may be relevant when fixing a pecuniary penalty may conveniently be categorised according to whether they relate to the objective nature and seriousness of the offending conduct, or concern the particular circumstances of the defendant in question.
103 The factors relating to the objective seriousness of the contravention include: the extent to which the contravention was the result of deliberate, covert or reckless conduct, as opposed to negligence or carelessness; whether the contravention comprised isolated conduct, or was systematic or occurred over a period of time; if the defendant is a corporation, the seniority of the officers responsible for the contravention; the existence, within the corporation, of compliance systems and whether there was a culture of compliance at the corporation; the impact or consequences of the contravention on the market or innocent third parties; and the extent of any profit or benefit derived as a result of the contravention.
104 The factors that concern the particular circumstances of the defendant, particularly where the defendant is a corporation, generally include: the size and financial position of the contravening company; whether the company has been found to have engaged in similar conduct in the past; whether the company has improved or modified its compliance systems since the contravention; whether the company (through its senior officers) has demonstrated contrition and remorse; whether the company had disgorged any profit or benefit received as a result of the contravention, or made reparation; whether the company has cooperated with and assisted the relevant regulatory authority in the investigation and prosecution of the contravention; and whether the company has suffered any extra-curial punishment or detriment arising from the finding that it had contravened the law.
105 Where the defendant is a body corporate, the size of the body does not of itself justify a higher penalty than might otherwise be imposed: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 327 ALR 540 (Coles Supermarkets) at [89]-[92]. The size of the corporation may, however, be particularly relevant in determining the size of the pecuniary penalty that would operate as an effective deterrent. The sum required to achieve that object will generally be larger where the company has vast resources: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 at [39]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apple Pty Ltd [2012] ATPR 42-404 at [38].
106 Careful attention must also be given to the maximum penalty for the contravention. That is so for at least three reasons: first, because the legislature has legislated for the maximum penalty and it is therefore an expression of the legislature's policy concerning the seriousness of the prescribed conduct; second, because it permits comparison between the worst possible case and the case that the Court is being asked to address; and third, because the maximum penalty provides a "yardstick" which should be taken and balanced with all the other relevant factors: Markarian at [31] (per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
107 Even where the maximum penalty for the contravention is high, and the amount necessary to provide effective deterrence is large, the amount of the penalty should be proportionate to the contravention and should not be so high as to be oppressive: Stihl Chain Saws at 17,896; NW Frozen Foods at 293.
115 The following comments can be made about these paragraphs. First, the comments at [99] reflect what we have said at [38]-[39] above. The Court clearly expressed itself as needing to eschew retributive elements in the object of the imposition of the penalties. Secondly, the utilisation of the notion of the "instinctive synthesis" in [100] can be seen as a (correct) emphasis on the evaluative resolution or conclusion from sometimes conflicting considerations and the (correct) rejection of a mechanical or a mathematical approach in some (impossible) search for precision. Thirdly, whilst a degree of taxonomy can be seen in dealing with available factors at [100]-[104], there was no rigidity of approach that could be seen as limiting or restricting the statutory task of fixing the appropriate penalty for the relevant contravention for the object of deterrence by reference to all considerations relevant to deterrence. Fourthly, by way of comment, there could be added to [104] or [105], depending upon how the factors arose, a consideration of whether the contravention involved or reflected, or other material including past contraventions evidenced, a degree or strength of unwillingness in the contravenor to obey the law. Such would be highly relevant to deterrence. We do not see anything in these paragraphs of the Full Court excluding such a consideration which could be seen to derive from Veen (No 2) at 477-478. Fifthly, we agree with the expression of the matters concerning the role of the maximum penalty in [106]-[107]. We do not see anything in [106] as contrary to viewing the maximum penalty as available for circumstances where the most severe penalty is warranted given the object is to deter contraventions of the kind before the court.
116 In fixing the relevant penalties, the Full Court dealt with the record of contravention of the union. It is appropriate to set out that consideration at some length given the arguments which will be dealt with later. The Court said at 254 FCR 101-103 [158]-[165] the following:
158 As for the position of the CFMEU itself, the Commissioner tendered schedules of prior cases involving the CFMEU that on any view reveal a lamentable, if not disgraceful, record of deliberately flouting industrial laws. At the time of the hearing, the CFMEU and its officials had been involved in 37 separate cases involving breaches of s 38 of the BCII Act, as well as countless other cases involving contraventions of other industrial laws. It is unnecessary and probably undesirable to discuss the specifics of those cases, including the penalties imposed in them, in any detail. The conduct involved in the cases covers a broad range of unlawful industrial action. In most of the cases the contraventions were admitted and the penalties were agreed between the parties. In all the circumstances, it is not possible to discern any meaningful pattern or range in the penalties that have been imposed that would assist in fixing the penalties in this case.
159 The most significant point to emerge from the schedules of past cases is that the CFMEU is a recidivist when it comes to contravening industrial laws. No penalties that have been imposed in the past have appeared to reduce its willingness to breach the law. It continues to thumb its nose at the industrial laws, including the BCII Act. The Court should nevertheless not shy away from imposing stern sentences with a view to attempting to deter the CFMEU from engaging in, or encouraging others to engage in, further unlawful industrial action. Considerations of deterrence, both specific and general, undoubtedly loom large in fixing the appropriate penalties.
160 Equally, the CFMEU's record of past transgressions means that there is no reason to afford it any particular leniency based on its past behaviour. That is not to say that it should be penalised again for its past contraventions. The CFMEU's conduct in the past should be given significant weight in determining the appropriate penalties, but it should not lead to penalties that are disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the relevant contraventions.
161 It should also perhaps be noted that the schedules reveal that the CFMEU officials involved in the contraventions in this matter have been involved in many of the past contraventions by the CFMEU. Nevertheless, for reasons that remain largely unexplained, the Commissioner did not commence proceedings and seek penalties against the officials in this matter. The relief sought was limited to the union itself.
162 It is uncontroversial, and in any event is a matter of common knowledge not reasonably open to question, that the CFMEU is a significant organisation with real power and influence in the building industry. There is, however, no evidence or agreed fact about its financial capacity.
163 About the only thing that could be said in favour of the CFMEU, other than that the conduct was related to genuine concerns about sham contracting, is that it cooperated with the Commissioner in relation to these proceedings by admitting the contraventions and reaching agreement in relation to the facts. Importantly, the admissions and agreed facts were also not withdrawn after the initial agreement in relation to the penalty amounts was withdrawn by the Commissioner. There is no doubt that the CFMEU should receive credit for this cooperation. From a public policy perspective, it is important to encourage such cooperation by reflecting it in the penalties imposed. It also shows willingness on the part of the CFMEU to accept responsibility for its actions and to facilitate the course of justice. The fact that the proceedings were not defended saved the community the expense of a potentially lengthy contested hearing.
164 It is, however, doubtful in all the circumstances that the CFMEU's cooperation with the regulator could really be said to demonstrate contrition or remorse. In some respects the cooperation reflects nothing more than an acceptance of the inevitable. The CFMEU did not adduce any evidence of contrition or remorse. Indeed, there was not even an expression of contrition or remorse in its submissions. There was no evidence from which it could be inferred that the CFMEU intended to change its ways. There was certainly no suggestion, let alone evidence, to the effect that the CFMEU intended to set up any systems, processes, procedures or education to ensure that its officers did not encourage unlawful industrial action in the future.
165 The principles in relation to taking admissions and cooperation into account are well-known and do not need to be repeated. It is sufficient to note that the authorities make it clear that it is not necessary for the Court to specify a specific discount or percentage discount in respect of cooperation.
(Emphasis added.)
117 With respect, we see no error in any aspect of the principles there expressed in the course of their practical application. We see no intrusion of inappropriate considerations of retribution. The matters expressed in [160] are all consistent with the notion of reasonable proportionality inhering in s 546 for the reasons that we have earlier given.
118 In February 2018, the High Court handed down judgment in the Non-Indemnification Case (HC) (2018) 262 CLR 157. The majority of the Court determined that s 546 contained an implied power to make an order against the person upon whom the penalty was imposed not to seek indemnification or payment from any other person (including the union). The reasons were not concerned with an examination of sentencing principles, apart from reiterating the objective of the imposition of civil penalties being deterrence: 262 CLR at 173 [42] and 195 [116]. The matter was remitted to the Full Court for the setting of fresh penalties.
119 The remitted penalty hearing in this Court was heard on 25 May 2018, with judgment being delivered on 25 June 2018. There was no doubt that past conduct and past contraventions by the union and the union official concerned were at the centre of the consideration of the Court. That is clear both from the primary judge's reasons in that matter (Mortimer J), and the reasons of the Full Court: Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2018] FCAFC 97; 264 FCR 155 at 165-166 [12]-[13] (2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC)). In that context, the Full Court shortly expressed the relevant principles at 264 FCR 167-168 [19]-[22] and 168-169 [25]-[27] as follows:
19 It is unnecessary to engage in any extended discussion of principle. Of particular significance is the recognition that deterrence (general and specific) is the principal and indeed only object of the imposition of a penalty - to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravener and others who might be tempted to contravene the Act: French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1990] FCA 762; [1991] ATPR 41-076 at 52,152, cited by the plurality in Commonwealth v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (Civil Penalties Case) [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 at [55]. Retribution, denunciation and rehabilitation have no part to play.
20 Relevant factors in the overall assessment of penalty were helpfully listed by French J in CSR. They have been adopted in many cases. For present purposes, they can be restated as follows: the nature, character and seriousness of the conduct; the loss and damage caused; the circumstances in which the conduct took place; the size of the contravener and its degree of power; the deliberateness of the conduct and the time over which it occurred; the degree of involvement of senior officials or management; the culture of the organisation as to compliance or contravention; and, any co-operation with the regulator and contrition.
21 The seriousness of the contravention and other features of the conduct which may be seen as relevant to it (here, the seriousness of interruption of a concrete pour, the seriousness of the threats of repetition, the deliberateness of the contravening of the Act, and the exhibited apparent sense of impunity in undertaking contravening conduct) find their place in understanding the degree of deterrence that is necessary to be reflected in the size of the penalty: Flight Centre Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 53; (2018) 260 FCR 68 at [71].
22 The overwhelming importance of deterrence as the protective purpose of the penalty does not exclude the need to determine a penalty which is proportionate to the contravening conduct. The history of contravention is to be taken into account in fixing the proper level of penalty for the proportionate response to the contravention in question. Proportionality has within it the need to characterise the seriousness of the contravention. Proportionality of penal response to a contravention assessed by reference to its seriousness and gravity is an essential characteristic of the application of the statute. The penal response is for that contravention, not earlier contraventions: Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-478. Prior contraventions may reveal an apparent disregard for the Act and the need for deterrence by a penalty at a level appropriate to achieve that objective. It is to be borne in mind, however, that it is for the conduct in question that the penalty is imposed, not for prior conduct.
…
25 The maximum penalty under the Act for each contravention is $51,000 for the Union and $10,200 for Mr Myles: see Item 11 of the table in s 539(2) and s 348 of the Act, and s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), by reference to the date of the contravening conduct.
26 It is necessary to have regard to the maximum penalty. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; (2016) 340 ALR 25 at [154]-[156], the Full Court said:
[See these paragraphs set out at [101] above].
27 These considerations, especially those in [156], will be affected by the level of deterrence recognised as necessary, in part from any history of contravening conduct.
120 The Court also, in dealing with the notion of course of conduct, emphasised the role of that principle in the prevention of penalising a party more than once for the same conduct. In that respect, regard was had, at 264 FCR 170 [31], to a series of Full Court cases rejecting double punishment, that is, rejecting the proposition that a party could have imposed on him, her or it a penalty for the same contravention more than once: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39; 194 IR 461 at [41]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hillside (Australia New Media) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 698 at [24]-[25] approved by the Full Court in Reckitt Benckiser at [141] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 159; 258 FCR 312 at 448 [425]-[426]; and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation [2018] FCAFC 73; 262 FCR 243 at 295 [231]-[232].
121 On 14 August 2018, the Full Court delivered judgment in Broadway on Ann 265 FCR 208. This decision was at the centre of the primary judge's reasoning. The primary judge saw in the reasoning of the majority (Tracey J and Logan J) a correct understanding of the proper principles concerning the imposition of penalties, in contradistinction to what he considered the flawed expression of principle by the dissenting member of the bench, Bromwich J, in particular in what the primary judge perceived to be a failure by Bromwich J to apply Veen (No 2) correctly.
122 The leading judgment in Broadway on Ann was delivered by Logan J. It is helpful, however, to frame the analysis of the reasons of Logan J by referring first to the "observations" of Tracey J. Before doing so, it is instructive to understand the facts of the case and how the primary judge had dealt with them. The case involved the right of entry to a construction site and the improper behaviour of a very senior union official of the CFMEU, contrary to s 500 of the Fair Work Act. The reasons of Logan J at 265 FCR 217-218 [33]-[37] reveal, in narrative form, the relevant facts in the human context of what occurred on the day in question, with clarity and restrained expressive illumination. The principal actor, Mr Hanna, was a very senior union official, known to be such by the representatives of the employer and by the workers on the site.
33 Shortly after Mr Hanna entered the premises, his presence was noted by Mr John Liddington, Hindmarsh's project manager and by Mr Garry Gough, who was its site manager for the building project. They told him that he was on site illegally and that he must return to the site office immediately. Mr Hanna ignored this. He remained on the premises. He descended down some stairs to the basement level of the project. There he encountered Mr David Liebke, who was Hindmarsh's site supervisor. Mr Liebke asked Mr Hanna what he was doing on site. Mr Hanna replied: "I'm having a meeting with my workers." Mr Liebke asked Mr Hanna if he had a right of entry permit. At this point Mr Hanna raised his hand to Mr Liebke with his middle finger extended and said that he did not need an entry permit. Mr Liebke then asked Mr Hanna to leave the premises. Notwithstanding this, Mr Hanna remained on the premises at the basement level. He walked away from Mr Liebke and called some of the employees present from the four different subcontractors mentioned towards him. He told them that they were going to have a meeting.
34 Shortly thereafter and while Mr Hanna was still on the basement level, Mr Gough approached him. Mr Gough said to him: "You are trespassing. Why don't we go upstairs and talk about it?" Mr Hanna replied to the effect that he had come to meet with his members. Mr Gough then said: "What are you doing here? You are here illegally. Why don't you go through the right channels?" Mr Hanna replied: "I can do what I like." Mr Thomas Neylon, who was Hindmarsh's contracts manager for the project, then approached Mr Hanna with Mr Liddington. Mr Liddington again said to Mr Hanna that he was to leave the site as he did not have permission to be there and that no entry permit had been sent to Hindmarsh. Mr Hanna's response was to the effect that he did not need to get permission to enter a building site to talk to the men with whom he had an enterprise bargaining agreement.
35 During this discussion between Mr Liddington and Mr Hanna, Mr Neylon activated the video recorder function on his mobile phone. Mr Hanna, seeing this, then moved towards Mr Neylon. Mr Hanna, who had in his hand a plastic water bottle, squirted water from the plastic water bottle at Mr Neylon. This hit Mr Neylon in the face, wet his shirt and went over his mobile phone. Mr Hanna then moved to Mr Neylon and said: "Take that phone away or I'll fucking bury it down your throat. You ask me if you want to take a picture of me. You ask me."
36 Mr Hanna then spoke to some of the employees who were there in the basement level of the project. This conversation was not heard by any of the persons in authority for Hindmarsh. At about 12 noon, Mr Hanna and a number of the employees left the basement level of the project and made their way out of the premises. Mr Hanna used the swipe card of one of those employees to swipe out a number of the employees through the turnstiles at the exit of the premises. That had the effect of a number of employees leaving under the one swipe card. This meant that Hindmarsh did not have a record of which employees had left the premises and which employees had not. The employees were all similarly dressed. There is no evidence that any employee in a position of authority for Hindmarsh was in any way then able to check who it was had left the site and where they were. Of this the learned primary judge, permissibly and understandably, observed at [17] "The safety aspects of such an action should be quite obvious."
37 The employees who left in this manner with Mr Hanna were away for about 30 minutes. The employees then returned to the premises and recommenced work.
123 From this the evident seriousness of the episode of conduct can be appreciated.
124 Out of this episode, six contraventions of s 500 of the Fair Work Act of exercising or seeking to exercise a right of entry in an improper manner were extracted and found by the primary judge (for each of which the union had imposed on it the maximum penalty by the primary judge). They were described by Logan J at [41] as follows:
(a) entering the Project without having given a notice of entry under s 487 of the FWA;
(b) remaining on the premises despite requests to leave;
(c) when asked if he had a right of entry permit, responded by raising his hand with his middle finger extended and saying that he did not need one;
(d) squirted water at a person validly engaged to work on the Project, which struck the person's face, shirt and mobile phone;
(e) stating "Take that phone away or I'll fucking bury it down your throat, you ask me if you want to take a picture of me, you ask me"; and
(f) using an employee's swipe card to swipe out a number of employees engaged on the Project, the effect of which was that the occupier of the premises did not have a record of which employees had left the premises and which had not.
125 This disaggregation of the conduct into somewhat more abstracted and less humanly expressive terms, tended, at least in language, to drain the whole conduct of some of its seriousness. This is so because the disaggregation (necessary for the precise identification of the contraventions) tended to separate the events from their interconnected whole human context.
126 Section 500 is not included in what can be called the statutory course of conduct provision of s 557. From this, the primary judge (wrongly) concluded that he was bound to deal with each contravention without regard to considerations of a single course of conduct as part of ordinary sentencing principles. Thus, the Full Court, on any view, was required to engage in the process of resentencing.
127 The appeal, as argued, raised four grounds, which were set out by Logan J at [44]:
(a) an alleged error in concluding that course of conduct considerations were not applicable to the imposition of penalty in the circumstances;
(b) an alleged error in the description of Mr Hanna as the public face of the CFMEU;
(c) an alleged error in the characterising of the contraventions as in the worst possible category; and
(d) whether the penalty imposed was, both individually and in total, was [sic] manifestly excessive.
128 In the result, and for the reasons to which we will come, even having regard to the considerations of the course of conduct of the events, Logan J concluded (with which conclusion Tracey J agreed) at 265 FCR 230 [87]:
… So recalcitrant is the contravening conduct charged having regard to the past history in the tabulation and such is the importance of deterrence and compelling conformity with the requirements of the FWA my view is that only the most condign penalisation of a cumulative maximum punishment is warranted in the circumstances of this case. I would impose that so as to bring home emphatically to the CFMEU that, in its internal governance, it must force systemic behavioural change upon its Construction Division. …
129 Tracey J, after referring to the history of the uncertainty of the character of the penalty under earlier legislation, the settling of that controversy in Gapes v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd [1979] FCA 62; 38 FLR 431, the development of the civil remedy provisions in replacement of criminal provisions in more modern legislation, and the settled guidance, nevertheless, in many cases in the Court of sentencing principles from crime adapted to the imposition of civil penalties (in particular proportionality, consistency, avoidance of double punishment, deterrence and totality), referred to the "modifications and differences in emphasis in the way in which the principles are framed" following the Agreed Penalties Case (HC): see 265 FCR at 212 [9]. In that context, and immediately after referring to the Agreed Penalties Case (HC) 258 CLR at 506 [55] and 523-524 [110], Tracey J set out at [13], without disapproval, what had been recently said by the Full Court in the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC) 264 FCR at 167-168 [20]-[22] (as to which see [115] above). At [14], Tracey J referred to the distinction between:
… the need to ensure that a contravenor is not doubly penalised for past and present misconduct and the consideration of historic misconduct for the purpose of assessing the need for specific deterrence of a recidivist organisation. …
The distinction to which his Honour was referring was supported by Veen (No 2) at 477-478, subject to the recognition of the importance of the place of the maximum penalty referred to in Veen (No 2) at 478.
130 After referring to decisions of the Court emphasising the need for industrial laws to be obeyed: Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 1462 at [8] (Jessup J), Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCAFC 53; 249 FCR 458 at [100]-[101] (Dowsett and Rares JJ) and the Queensland Infrastructure Case 254 FCR at 88 [98], Tracey J said at [16]:
These principles are to be observed in the fixing of any civil penalties under the FW Act. All relevant considerations must be taken into account with a view to determining an appropriate penalty.
131 It is clear that in this statement of principle, to this point, his Honour was guided by Veen (No 2), that his Honour recognised that the imposition of a penalty for the past was impermissible as a form of double punishment, and that the imposition of the penalty was for the instant contravention before the court.
132 From [17]-[22] of his reasons, Tracey J gave pointed and powerful expression to deep concerns about the conduct of the CFMEU over "recent years", saying:
17 Over recent years I have become increasingly concerned about the ongoing misconduct of the CFMEU and its officials and the implications of this conduct when penalties are being determined. These misgivings have been expressed in a series of judgments.
18 In Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) (2015) 234 FCR 451, I made the following comments:
106 The circumstances of these cases were not identical to those in the present case. They, nonetheless, bespeak a deplorable attitude, on the part of the CFMEU, to its legal obligations and the statutory processes which govern relations between unions and employers in this country. This ongoing willingness to engage in contravening conduct must weigh heavily when the need for both specific and general deterrence is brought to account.
107 The CFMEU is not to be punished again for its earlier misconduct. It is, however, to be punished more severely than it would have been had it had no adverse record or been responsible for only a few isolated incidents over a period of many years. Its continued willingness to engage in contravening conduct supports the view that earlier penalties, some of them severe, have not had a deterrent effect: cf Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-8.
19 In Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at [63] I said that:
The longer such recidivism continues the more likely it is that this consideration will carry greater weight than the principle that the maximum available penalty must be reserved for the worst possible offending.
20 More recently, in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Werribee Shopping Centre Case) [2017] FCA 1235 at [32], I observed that:
Having regard to the history of offending by the CFMEU to which I have referred, it may be doubted that any penalty falling within the available range for contraventions of the kind presently under consideration would be "sufficiently high to deter repetition". Any penalty will be paid and treated as a necessary cost of enforcing the CFMEU's demand that all workers on certain classes of construction sites be union members.
21 Again, in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (The Footscray Station Case) (2017) 274 IR 460 at [53], I said:
In Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at [63] I observed that the longer that the CFMEU's recidivism continued, the greater the weight which would be accorded to specific deterrence when fixing appropriate penalties.
22 Such comments (and many others to like effect by other members of the Court and the Federal Circuit Court) over recent years have appeared in published judgments and must be taken to be well known to the officials who constitute the governing councils of the CFMEU. In many of these cases penalties have been imposed because of the failure of CFMEU officials who hold entry permits under the Act to comply with the requirements of Pt 3-4 of the FW Act. They have also involved contraventions of s 500 of the FW Act in the course of these site entries.
133 Drawing this together Tracey J said the following at [23]:
The contravening conduct has continued unabated to a point where there is an irresistible inference that the CFMEU has determined that its officials will not comply with the requirements of the FW Act with which it disagrees. If this results in civil penalties being imposed they will be paid and treated as a cost of the union pursuing its industrial ends. The union simply regards itself as free to disobey the law.
134 Whilst [17]-[22] may perhaps express no more (in different, and perhaps stronger language) than was said by the Full Court in the Queensland Infrastructure Case at 254 FCR 101-103 [158]-[165] (see [112] above), the expression of the matter in [23] as an inference, expressed apparently in respect of any and all of the union's officials, in any and all of its branches, to any and all relevant provisions of relevant legislation, has the capacity to appear to express a binding feature of the circumstances of any particular future case. The danger is that the strength of the language and the characterisation of the past becomes seen and applied as almost irrefutable factual conclusions, conclusively drawn, by a judge on appeal, applicable to any and all future factual circumstances. This risks distorting the proper judicial task of fixing an appropriate penalty for the contravention in question taking account of all relevant circumstances attending the contravention, including material that reflects any attitude to disobedience to the provision, and the maximum penalty, all in aid of the objective of deterrence of a contravention of the kind before the court. The practical consequences of this danger to judges imposing civil penalties can be seen in Auimatagi v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2018] FCAFC 191; 267 FCR 268, which is discussed below.
135 At [25], Tracey J expressed why he thought that the maximum penalty should be imposed:
The features of the present case and the context in which they arise, which, in my view, warrant the imposition of the maximum available penalties on the CFMEU, are:
• The many decisions of the Court over the past 15 years in which the CFMEU has been found liable and penalised for failures to comply with entry requirements on building sites and for the misconduct of its officials whilst exercising rights of entry on those sites.
• The failure of the CFMEU to respond to these repeated findings by acknowledging error and implementing remedial measures.
• The absence of any contrition for the earlier offending.
• The absence of any contrition for the present offending.
• The ongoing willingness of the CFMEU to pay the pecuniary penalties imposed by the Court by drawing on its considerable financial resources.
• The fact that it was a State Divisional President of the CFMEU who was found to have engaged in multiple contraventions on the site.
• The blatant and public assertion by such a senior official that he would not comply with the notice requirements imposed by the FW Act.
136 The consideration of the appropriate penalty by Logan J commenced with consideration of the place of the maximum penalty by reference to Elias 248 CLR at 494-495 [27]. His Honour recognised that some of the considerations there referred to do not translate into the imposition of civil penalties. Importantly, however, and with respect, correctly, Logan J said the following at 265 FCR 224 [57]:
… That the maximum penalty for each contravention is $51,000 with a total maximum of $306,000 being open is relevant. Individually and collectively they provide a sentencing "yardstick". It would though be quite wrong to base any individual or total penalty order on a view that the yardstick itself is inadequate and so come to fix penalties unwarranted by the circumstances of a particular case measured against that yardstick. The prescription of maximum penalties is a matter for Parliament, not the courts. If, by reason of the change in the value of money over time or, relevantly for example, changing patterns of industrial behaviour, maximum penalties once considered adequate are judicially believed to have a diminished deterrent quality, it is not for a court to impose a maximum penalty in circumstances which do not warrant the same because of that belief.
(Emphasis added.)
137 We would only add to this clear statement, especially in the last emphasised passage, the following: To do so would be a usurpation of Parliamentary power based on personal perspective and belief.
138 At [62], Logan J referred to the approval in TPG Internet 250 CLR at 659 [66] of what the Full Court had said in Singtel Optus 287 ALR at 265 [62]-[63] that a civil penalty:
must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not such as to be regarded by [the] offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business.
139 Accepting fully what was said in Singtel Optus, it cannot be a reason for imposing the maximum penalty in circumstances which are otherwise unwarranted by reference to the nature and gravity of the instant contravention (including by reference to any apparent unwillingness to obey the law), because of a perceived inadequacy of the level of penalties to deter. Justice Logan did not say as much; indeed his Honour said to the contrary in [57] referred to above. The setting of the level of penalties is a matter for Parliament, not the courts. The courts apply established principle by reference to the considerations set by Parliament, including the maximum penalty.
140 Justice Logan then turned to the material revealing past contraventions by the union. In dealing with the submissions of the union which stressed the passage from Veen (No 2) at 164 CLR 477 immediately prior to the reference to Ottewell (see [56] and [57] above), his Honour stressed the balance of the paragraph at 164 CLR 477-478 (also set out at [55] above).
141 In so referring to the whole of the relevant parts of Veen (No 2) at 164 CLR 477-478, his Honour was undoubtedly correct as a matter of principle.
142 Thereafter, Logan J sought to apply this principle to the case before him. At [70]-[72], his Honour described the conduct again, this time, by reference to its characterisation of seriousness:
70 All of the features of unrepentant, outlaw behaviour are present in Mr Hanna's conduct on 10 February 2015. The statement which he made to Mr Gough: "I can do what I like." is pregnant with these features, as is each other of his studied refusals to leave the site when requested. These refusals were reinforced by a contemptuous gesture (the "single finger salute") and by what the learned primary judge rightly concluded was conduct which might equally have been charged under the criminal law as an assault (the squirting of water).
71 Further, Mr Hanna's swiping out of workers from the premises under the one card was not just contemptuous of Hindmarsh's responsibility, as occupier, for entry to and egress from the premises. It was also subversive of the responsibilities under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) of Hindmarsh as the person in control of the premises and employer of some of the workers there and of the subcontractors who had employees there. Necessarily, the method of exit which he employed rendered it impossible, without stopping for a roll call, to identify who remained on the premises and what tasks could or could not still safely be undertaken by remaining staff. There is no evidence as to whether this measure was taken. It rather looks as if the pragmatic alternative of stopping work altogether was determined upon by Hindmarsh and its subcontractors. But the point for present purposes is that the conduct was subversive of workplace health and safety responsibilities, responsibilities of the very kind with which, historically and legitimately, trade unions have been deeply concerned in the interests of workers.
72 There is a course of conduct evident in Mr Hanna's conduct on 10 February 2015. It is relevant to recognise this but it does not necessarily follow that this is a mitigating factor. Section 500 of the FWA contains no qualification that the need for advance notice to be given is inapplicable to an industrial association where that association has members on a site or is a party to an industrial instrument governing workers on a site. Inferentially from his statements and behaviours, it is more likely than not that Mr Hanna was aware of this but did not accept that this law should bind the CFMEU or him in this way. Were there any doubt about this, the belief of Hindmarsh as to the illegal nature of his presence was drawn to his attention on several occasions. He did not just decline an offer extended to him on behalf of Hindmarsh to discuss that subject. He treated that offer with contempt and then with what, in law, was "improper conduct" the relevant particulars of which constituted an assault.
143 At [73], Logan J summarised what had happened by reference to the individual contraventions:
What occurred then in a compressed period was more likely than not a studied entry to the premises without the giving of notice. This was followed by a repeated persistence in presence on the premises notwithstanding opportunities to discuss the same and directions to leave, accompanied by foul gestures and language, refutation that the law applied to him, and an assault and culminating in a subversion of a workplace health and safety obligation. As noted, it is accepted that the CFMEU's conduct, via Mr Hanna, constituted six separate contraventions. But what is revealed by those contraventions is an escalating series of events, at any time during the course of which it was within the remit of Mr Hanna to acknowledge the error of his ways, seek some reasonable accommodation or leave. In short, the CFMEU, via Mr Hanna, had a choice on several occasions on 10 February 2015 at the premises to abide by s 500 of the FWA. Its deliberate choice was completely and pithily summed up in Mr Hanna's words: "I can do what I like."
144 Turning to the question of the relevance of the course of conduct, Logan J said at [75] and [77]:
75 … The features of Mr Hanna's conduct on 10 February 2015 do not, in my view, warrant the penal ameliorating consequence that can in other cases attend identification of a course of conduct. To approach penalisation otherwise would yield a penalty which in no way reflects, when the purpose of a civil penalty regime is understood, the gravity of what occurred that day and its manifestation of the prior history revealed by the tabulation of defiance by the CFMEU of industrial law norms.
…
77 Once the contraventions on the day, deplorable in themselves, are viewed in context, they are, in my view, of the worst possible kind. Common sense, to say nothing of the maintenance of the rule of law, dictates that this must be so. Each contravention well warrants the maximum penalty. Laws which may be ignored at will on the basis of a persistent, self-arrogated, alternative standard of behaviour are no laws at all, only empty aspirational statements.
145 His Honour then referred to a case in which he had heavily penalised an employer in a case that was brought by the CFMEU, stating from that context at [82]:
CFMEU v North Goonyella Coal Mine [[2013] FCA 1444] also offers a reminder that it is an over-simplification to regard the CFMEU in all of its other manifestations as a rogue, outlaw industrial association. That case emanated from the union's Mining Division. Defence of workplace rights apart, the records of the Court disclose there are many other examples of cases brought by the CFMEU for the construction of industrial instruments of one sort or another. Such litigation is not subversive of the rule of law in industrial matters but deeply deferential to, and respectful of, the rule of law. Overwhelmingly, what the present case and those set out in the tabulation reveal is that the rogue, outlaw tendency in the CFMEU is to be found in its Construction Division.
146 His Honour continued in the following paragraphs to discuss the amalgamation of trade unions since the early 1990s and in that context said at [83]-[84]:
83 … The present case and those in the tabulation provoke, strongly, the thought that there is a persistence within the CFMEU of the former Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (the BLF). That thought is hardly novel. Systemic unlawful conduct with historic precedent in the activities of the BLF is one feature of the CFMEU remarked upon in the report of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption, Volume 5, Chapter 8 (see paras 1 to 3).
84 That the contravening conduct charged was that of a senior official and but another manifestation of a lengthy history of unlawful conduct revealed by the tabulation inferentially suggests that, in its internal governance, the CFMEU has been unable or unwilling to restrain aberrant behaviour within its Construction Division.
147 After referring to further history of the Builders Labourers Federation, Logan J said the following at [85]-[86] about the CFMEU, and the matter before him:
85 … Amalgamation and the concentration of unlawful conduct in the Construction Division undoubtedly makes the subject of deregistration more complex but an organisation which manifests an inability by its internal governance to rein in aberrant behaviour cannot expect to remain registered in its existing form.
86 As it is, deregistration is not the subject of the present proceeding but a recollection of history underscores why it is that deterrence and compliance with statutory obligations are so overwhelmingly important in the fixing of penalties in the present case.
148 His Honour concluded in [87] (part of which we have already set out at [124] above) by explaining why he considered that six penalties of the maximum penalty was appropriate:
Approaching the subject of penalisation afresh and for all of the reasons given, I consider that the maximum penalty in respect of each contravention is warranted in the circumstances of this case. Being of this view, I have, in deference to the totality principle, asked myself whether, in total, such an overall penalty would be a disproportionate response in the overall circumstances of the case? So recalcitrant is the contravening conduct charged having regard to the past history in the tabulation and such is the importance of deterrence and compelling conformity with the requirements of the FWA my view is that only the most condign penalisation of a cumulative maximum punishment is warranted in the circumstances of this case. I would impose that so as to bring home emphatically to the CFMEU that, in its internal governance, it must force systemic behavioural change upon its Construction Division. That penalisation is necessary but it can be viewed as a cruel necessity. The cruel element is that there is an opportunity cost in the payment of the total penalty in terms of other activities, beneficial to members, to which the union's funds might otherwise be deployed. It is to be hoped that the realisation of that promotes change in the internal governance of the CFMEU.
149 Before turning to the dissenting judgment of Bromwich J, the following can be said to be clear from the reasons of Logan J (and thus also Tracey J) in point of expression of legal principle: The primary object of the imposition of a civil penalty is deterrence; in accordance with Veen (No 2) (which was treated as relevant and binding) the antecedent contravention history is relevant to understanding an attitude of disobedience and as such the seriousness of the contravention that is before the court and the appropriate deterrence called for in the imposition of the penalty; the penalty to be imposed is to deter a repetition of a contravention of the kind before the court; and the maximum penalty is for contravention of the kind (in its gravity and seriousness, including by reference to what antecedent contraventions show of a wilfulness to disobey the law) calling for, that is warranting, the most serious penalty by way of deterrence. With respect, such expression of principle is orthodox.
150 As to the so-called course of conduct principle, we agree that as a matter of principle the whole conduct, the whole episode, may well (as it did there) serve to highlight the seriousness of one or more individual contravention or contraventions, bearing in mind its or their place in the whole episode of multiple (there, six) contraventions. There was nothing, however, expressed by Logan J as a matter of principle, to justify the imposition of a penalty for an individual contravention greater than was appropriate in all the circumstances for that instant contravention (including what past contraventions, together with the conduct in question, showed about a willingness to disobey the law) and in the context of the conduct or episode as a whole.
151 Justice Bromwich dissented. The point of dissent was in essence in point of characterisation of the contraventions, not in point of expression of principle.
152 Early in his Honour's reasons at [93], Bromwich J set out five "points of principle", two of which are relevant to this appeal:
(1) While any prior contravention is a factor which may be taken into account in determining quantum, it cannot be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant contravention.
(2) The maximum penalty available under statute must be reserved for the worst category of cases. However, this does not mean that a lesser penalty must be imposed because it is possible to envisage a worse case.
153 At [95]-[101], Bromwich J discussed the place of criminal sentencing principles and cases to the imposition of civil penalties. At [97], his Honour reflected upon the need for a penalty that is proportionate to the contravention, as an aspect of applying the statute, citing the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC) 264 FCR at 167-168 [22], which drew on Veen (No 2) 164 CLR at 477-478. In this discussion, his Honour was clearly aware of the need for caution, after the Agreed Penalties Case (HC), in applying criminal sentencing principles and cases to the imposition of civil penalties: see [98]-[100]. Importantly, however, and, with respect, correctly, Bromwich J, after referring to the deterrent object of civil penalties drawn from the High Court's judgment in the Agreed Penalties Case (HC), said the following at [99]:
… Thus, deterrence rules supreme as the means by which the objective of compliance is to be achieved in civil penalty cases. However, as the discussion below demonstrates, it is deterrence by reference to the instant contravention that is required.
154 At [100], Bromwich J discussed principles of criminal sentencing of relevance, saying:
… These include the principles pertaining to course of conduct, totality, proportionality and the role of the maximum penalty. Provided that a weather eye is kept on the dominant consideration that is the objective of deterrence, there is no reason why these principles cannot readily be adapted and applied in a civil penalty context as a valuable means of assessing whether the penalty to be imposed is an appropriate consequence overall for the instant contravening conduct.
155 Such statements from [99] and [100] are conformable with the expression of principle by appellate courts, including Veen (No 2) and the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC), and by Tracey and Logan JJ in their reasons.
156 At [102]-[107], Bromwich J discussed the first relevant principle that he had earlier identified at [93]: that the penalty must not be disproportionate to the instant contravention. The discussion was by reference to the whole of the relevant passages from Veen (No 2) at 477-478. The discussion recognised that the necessity for proportionality was derived from the statute (s 546) and the word "appropriate" therein. This recognition was in accordance with NW Frozen Foods 71 FCR at 293, the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC) at 167-168 [22] and the other Full Court decisions referred to at [98] above.
157 It is important to set out what Bromwich J said at [105] and [107]:
105 As the High Court's observations in Veen (No 2) illustrate, it is legitimate to take into account the antecedent contravening history of a contravener insofar as it may indicate that a condign civil penalty is necessary to deter the contravener and other potential contraveners from committing further contraventions of a like kind in the future. However, the penalty that is imposed must still be proportionate to the gravity of the instant contraventions, as assessed in their own terms, for to do otherwise would be to impose a fresh penalty for past contraventions.
…
107 The important principle identified in the passage from Veen (No 2) above is particularly relevant where there is, as in this case, a serious and sustained prior history of contraventions, and an apparent determination to continue engaging in proscribed conduct. The role of any past contraventions is to be no more than a prism through which to view the instant contravention. This enables a court to assess whether, for example, the instant contravention is an "uncharacteristic aberration" or whether the contravener has, by the instant conduct, manifested "a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law". If the latter, as is clearly available to be concluded in this case, the heightened need for deterrence indicates that a more severe penalty is warranted for the instant contravention. Nonetheless, that penalty must still fall within the applicable range that is otherwise considered appropriate for that contravention.
(Emphasis added.)
158 The emphasised portions of those two paragraphs, read in the whole context of Veen (No 2), do not advance any two stage approach of the kind to which we referred at [106] above. We would not read [105] and [107] as departing in any way from Veen (No 2), or from the principle as put in NW Frozen Foods, the authorities referred to at [98] above, the Queensland Infrastructure Case, or the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC): that is, it is legitimate to draw from past conduct and past contraventions any proper conclusion as to a willingness to disobey the law in assessing the gravity and seriousness of the contravention before the court and the consequent need for deterrence for that kind of contravention and so in deciding upon an appropriate and proportionate penalty in all the circumstances of the instant contravention with the object of deterrence for that kind of contravention, and bearing in mind the guidance of the statutory maximum penalty.
159 At [108]-[110], Bromwich J discussed the second relevant principle that his Honour had earlier identified at [93]: that the maximum penalty is to be reserved for the worst category of cases.
160 Once again, the analysis began at [108] with what the majority had said in Veen (No 2) 164 CLR at 478, as to which see [58] above. At [109], Bromwich J said the following:
Thus, the maximum penalty is reserved for contraventions falling within the worst category of cases for which that penalty is prescribed. This does not require characterisation as the worst possible case. However, a case is not in the worst category merely by reason that the contravener has a history of prior contraventions, although that history may assist in the proper characterisation of the instant contravention. Considerable caution may be required to avoid blurring this vital distinction. This is especially so when, as in this case, past contraventions are many in number, extend over a protracted period of time and the legislature has not seen fit to provide greater penalties for second and subsequent contraventions.
(Emphasis added.)
161 There is nothing unorthodox or erroneous or lacking in clarity in the expression of the matter by Bromwich J in this paragraph. The distinction to which his Honour referred was explicit in Veen (No 2) at 477-478. The history of contravention "may assist in the proper characterisation of the instant contravention" because it may tell one something of its seriousness or gravity by showing a "continuing attitude of disobedience to the law": Veen (No 2) at 477. The caution to which Bromwich J referred inheres in a proper understanding of Veen (No 2). The caution concerns not using past conduct to impose a penalty disproportionate to the nature, gravity and seriousness of the instant contravention and thereby, effectively, re-penalising past conduct.
162 Nothing said by Bromwich J other than reflects the consistent expression of principle by this Court before and after the Agreed Penalties Case (HC), including, in point of expression of principle, what was said by Tracey and Logan JJ in Broadway on Ann to the extent it was drawn from appellate authority, that in the furtherance of the object of deterrence of the kind of contravention before the court the court's task is to set an appropriate penalty for the instant contravention that is proportionate to the nature and gravity of that contravention informed by all relevant circumstances, including what can be concluded as to any willingness to disobey or defy the law, and that the maximum penalty is for the worst kind of case that warrants the maximum level of deterrence set by Parliament.
163 The consideration by Bromwich J of the appropriate penalties was preceded by a careful discussion of what had been submitted to the primary judge, which included submissions by the Commissioner as to the grouping of the individual contraventions into phases of the conduct that reflected its character, quality and seriousness of the conduct. The three groups were: group 1, being contraventions 1 and 2: entering and remaining on the premises without permission and after a request to leave; group 2, being contraventions 3, 4 and 5: squirting water at Mr Neylon, verbally abusing him, and giving him an intended insulting hand gesture in response to a question as to whether he had an entry permit; and group 3, being contravention 6: using one swipe card to swipe out all workers who left the site.
164 These submissions of the Commissioner, if we may respectfully say so, thoughtfully sought to grapple with the difficult and subtle questions (faced on a day-to-day basis by sentencing judges) of evaluating the nature and gravity of instant contraventions. The difficult and subtle questions arise from applying the principles to which we have referred to six disaggregated, but related contraventions, in one overall episode. The episode was very serious. It could be seen, as a whole, as a body of conduct of gravity and seriousness warranting significant penalisation. If one were required to view the whole episode as one contravention we would have no doubt that it was in its nature and gravity, including its features of wilful, insulting and arrogant defiance of the law, of the worst kind, warranting the maximum penalty in aid of the object of deterrence.
165 But the episode was pleaded and found, in accordance with the statute, to involve six contraventions. The expression of the seriousness of the whole episode (if it were one contravention) does not translate into a proposition that each of the contraventions of improper conduct was of the worst kind. There is no place for abstracted logic here: it is a process of characterisation of all the events and circumstances to assess or evaluate the seriousness and gravity of the instant contraventions so that an appropriate penalty for them can be set to deter the contravenor and others from repeating contraventions of that kind.
166 At [151]-[153], Bromwich J described the characteristics of the six contraventions in these three groups:
151 The first two contraventions entailed no more than being present illegally and refusing to leave when asked. The conduct giving rise to the third to fifth contraventions was, viewed either separately or collectively, a distinct escalation of the first two contraventions.
152 The third to fifth contraventions were doubtless unpleasant, and were a manifest abuse of the permit system. However, they comprised conduct whilst there, rather than the conduct in being there, which is what made these contraventions distinct from the first two contraventions. That was the way in which those three contraventions were pleaded. Individually, each was still at the lower range of objective seriousness. Collectively, they did rise somewhat higher than the first two contraventions. However, even collectively, it is impossible to see how they could properly be characterised as being in the most serious category. That is so notwithstanding that none of the contraventions were, in the language of Veen (No 2), an "uncharacteristic aberration", but, rather, were conduct manifesting "a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law". Cast in the light of that attitude of disobedience, the third to fifth contraventions may be regarded as rising, in combination, to somewhere in the middle of the range of objective seriousness.
153 The conduct giving rise to the sixth contravention was the most serious. Not only were workers effectively smuggled off the site, but there was a potentially serious safety issue if anything happened at the site, such as might require an evacuation. The sixth contravention, although far from the worst possible to envisage, could properly be regarded as being in the worst category because of the subversion, while illegally on the site, of an inherently important purpose of having a swipe card system, being to record, in real time, who was on the site at any given point in time.
167 At [163]-[166], Bromwich J expressed his reasons for the penalties he thought appropriate:
163 The first and second contraventions, in the context of the many prior contraventions of the appellant, may be viewed as deliberate conduct in overt defiance of the law, but as not entailing the more serious elements of hindering or obstructing. Those contraventions are to be viewed as requiring a condign penalty to deter repetition. Taken on their own, each warrants a penalty of $10,000 when viewed in light of the prior contraventions and the "continuing attitude of disobedience of the law" that they manifest. There needs to be a degree of totality adjustment due to the relationship between the two contraventions and the grouping that should take place. The appropriate combined penalty is $15,000 in light of those considerations.
164 As discussed above, the third to fifth contraventions in combination rise to the mid-level of objective seriousness when viewed in light of the prior contraventions and the "continuing attitude of disobedience of the law" that they manifest. So considered, each warrants a penalty of $15,000. There needs to be a degree of totality adjustment due to the relationship between the three contraventions and the course of conduct grouping that should take place. The appropriate combined penalty is accordingly $30,000.
165 For the sixth contravention, while worse contraventions can be envisaged, this can properly be characterised as being in the worst category and therefore permits and warrants the imposition of the maximum penalty of $51,000. While the contravention was not pleaded as one of intentionally hindering or obstructing the usual operation of the workplace, the protean quality of acting in an improper manner can, and in this case does, permit a view that it is no less serious than conduct that might be pleaded as intentionally hindering or obstructing. In the context of the prior contraventions, it may properly be regarded as requiring the maximum deterrence.
166 The overall penalties that should be imposed therefore add up to a total of $96,000. This is, on any view, a very substantial penalty for contraventions that took place in a half-hour period and were not shown to have caused any actual loss or damage. While the primary judge referred to a loss of productivity for 30 minutes, it is not apparent how that conclusion was reached, nor what it meant.
168 This is not an appeal from Broadway on Ann. But the stark difference between the majority and the minority, and the refusal of an application for special leave has led to the (incorrect) view that there was a difference in expressed principle by the majority from the minority and to the (incorrect) view that the majority were, in point of principle, breaking from past expressions of principle by the Court (without saying so) and setting proportionality to one side. Nevertheless, the difference between the two outcomes (of Tracey and Logan JJ on the one hand and Bromwich J on the other) is stark.
169 In our respectful view, the approach of Bromwich J accorded with the principles expressed by the Full Courts of this Court on many occasions. That is not to say that we would not have imposed higher penalties than Bromwich J if charged with his task. For our part, the history of contraventions reflecting a willingness to defy the law on right of entry and other provisions, the seniority of Mr Hanna, and Mr Hanna's evident staunch defiance of the relevant provisions in the serious manner in which he acted may have warranted higher penalties. Nevertheless, plainly, taken individually, even informed by the willingness to defy the law, some of the contraventions were less serious than others.
170 Whilst the expressed view of the majority as to principle may not have departed from previous appellate expression of principle, in point of application one can see the facts and circumstances of the instant (six different) contraventions becoming overwhelmed by past conduct in a manner that led, in relation to some of the contraventions, to the imposition of penalties disproportionate to the gravity and nature of the particular instant contravention. It perhaps does little to advance the resolution of this appeal for this Court to engage in putative resentencing of the CFMEU's conduct in Broadway on Ann. It is necessary, however, given the arguments, to say that, in our respectful view, the majority's conclusion that each of the six contraventions was in the worst possible category of contravention, was plainly not correct. That is not to deny the conclusion that the whole episode was of the worst kind (if viewed as one contravention). The approach of Bromwich J to look at the seriousness of each contravention individually by reference to the nature of what occurred and by reference to the apparent willingness to defy the law was demanded by the statute and was correct and orthodox. To the extent that it may be relevant, we might disagree with the level of total penalties imposed by Bromwich J if it were our task to do so. With respect to the majority, however, even taking the fullest regard, as we would, for the demonstrated willingness to disobey the law, we cannot accept, on a principled basis that (for instance) the first contravention of entering without an entry permit can be characterised as of the worst case warranting as the relevant instant contravention the imposition of the maximum penalty. The imposition of the maximum penalty for that contravention could only be based on a freedom from the notion of proportionality to the identified contravention, or a freedom to penalise (again) for past contraventions or for one or more of the other contraventions (in addition to their individual penalisation).
171 Our view does not rest on totality, or on the so-called course of conduct principle, rather it rests on the proposition that, for the reasons that we have sought to express, s 546 contains within it a notion of proportionality such that the appropriate penalty for the instant contravention of such gravity and seriousness as is assessed (by reference to all the circumstances of the conduct, and including any demonstrated willingness to defy the law) is that which is necessary to deter the contravenor and others from contraventions of like kind. In so doing we cannot agree that in the circumstances of Broadway on Ann, each and every one of the contraventions in that case could reasonably be characterised as of the worst kind.
172 Next came Parker 270 FCR 39. The case involved numerous issues of liability and penalties concerning the organisation and taking of industrial action at a large building site in Sydney. Those issues included the relevance of prior contraventions, the place of proportionality and the role of the maximum penalty in fixing an appropriate penalty.
173 The leading judgment was delivered by Besanko and Bromwich JJ, with which judgment Reeves J agreed. The relevant appeal grounds on the above issues were dealt with at 270 FCR 141-149 [321]-[351]. Parker involved individual participants who had many past contraventions as did the union, the CFMEU. The arguments involved emphasis by the union on a limited role for past contraventions, by reference only to the objective seriousness of the contraventions. The union's submissions were distilled by Besanko and Bromwich JJ at 270 FCR 145 [334] as follows:
(1) whether the primary judge paid insufficient attention to the objective seriousness of the contraventions, most especially as to conduct attributed to the two Unions;
(2) whether, as a result or independently, the past contraventions were misused by his Honour so as to sanction past contraventions afresh, rather than being properly confined to the instant contraventions;
(3) whether, additionally to, or independently of, the question of overt error being established, the penalties imposed were, taken holistically, manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
174 Relevantly here, the expression of relevant principle can be found in [339], [341], [342] and [348].
175 At [339] the question of the place of past contraventions was dealt with by reference to Veen (No 2) as follows:
As to the second consideration, being the use that was put by the primary judge to prior contraventions, especially in respect of the CFMEU, a court imposing a civil penalty is entitled to have regard to such prior contraventions in the exercise of the discretion, but that does not permit such a history to be given such weight as to lead to the imposition of a penalty that is disproportionate to the gravity of the contravention that is being considered: Veen (No 2) at 477. That is because a court should impose a penalty that is proportionate to the gravity of the contravention being sanctioned, and no more. This is also supported by s 546(1) of the Act, which expressly provides for what would otherwise likely be implicit, namely, for the Court to fix an "appropriate" penalty for a contravention. A civil penalty that is not proportionate cannot be regarded as appropriate, and therefore cannot meet that statutory requirement.
176 In [340] their Honours cited the 2nd Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case (FC) 264 FCR at 167-168 [22].
177 Their Honours then continued at [341] and [342] as follows:
341 Thus, the role of any past contraventions is to be no more than a prism through which to view the instant contravention. This enables a court to assess whether, for example, the instant contravention is an "uncharacteristic aberration", or whether the contravener has, by the instant conduct, manifested "a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law". If the latter, as is clearly available to be concluded in this case, the heightened need for deterrence may indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted for the instant contravention. Nonetheless, that penalty must still fall within the applicable range that is otherwise considered appropriate for that contravention. If that is not carefully observed, the contravener may suffer the fate of being sanctioned anew for past contraventions, as the above quote from Veen (No 2) makes clear is not permitted.
342 Veen (No 2) also provides valuable guidance as to the role of the maximum penalty. The High Court's observations at 478 make it clear that the maximum penalty is reserved for contraventions falling within the worst category of cases for which that penalty is prescribed. This does not require characterisation as the worst possible case. However, a case is not in the worst category merely by reason that the contravener has a history of prior contraventions, although that history may assist in the proper characterisation of the instant contravention. Considerable caution may be required to avoid blurring this distinction. This is especially so when, as in this case, past contraventions are many in number, extend over a protracted period of time and the legislature has not seen fit to provide greater penalties for second and subsequent contraventions.
(Emphasis in bold added.)
178 A reading of the above paragraphs reveals complete conformity with the approach of the Full Courts to which we have referred, including, at least in point of expression of principle, the judgments of Tracey J and Logan J in Broadway on Ann. In particular in [342] the proper characterisation of the instant contravention is recognised as assisted by what can be taken from prior contraventions as to any continuing wilful disobedience of the law. Their Honours were clearly expressing the view that the prior contraventions gave assistance in the characterisation of the instant contravention in its level of seriousness. However, they warned of the need for a considerable caution required to avoid blurring the distinction between the proper characterisation of the instant contravention, taking into account wilful disobedience to the law shown in part by a prior contravention, and changing the character of the contravention by overly emphasising past conduct so as, in effect, to overwhelm the circumstances of the instant contravention and to slide into penalisation of past conduct. Their Honours explained this by saying that a matter is not placed in the worst category merely because the contravenor has a history of prior contraventions, although that history may assist in the proper characterisation of the events and circumstances attending the contravention by reference to any displayed wilful disobedience. Once one understands the proper content of [339]-[342] the content of [348] is clear. In that paragraph their Honours said:
As the above discussion of Veen (No 2) demonstrates, while the role of past conduct informs the need for deterrence, that cannot be used to change the character of the instant contravention. Without an explanation as to how it was possible to treat attributed contraventions that were the same in the hands of the Unions differently, and attributed contraventions that were different as to their source in the same way, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that past contraventions have been inadvertently used by his Honour in a way that goes beyond a prism through which to view the instant contraventions. Thus in this way, which is hard to quantify, the principles in Veen (No 2) have been breached. That error in approach means that the exercise of the discretion by imposing uniform maximum penalties against the CFMEU has miscarried as a matter of process, rather than necessarily the result. Thus ground 11 should succeed, and upon that basis, as for totality, the penalties imposed on the two Unions should be set aside and the penalty imposition exercise for each carried out afresh.
179 The primary judge referred to the word "character" in the first sentence in [348]. His Honour perceived a lack of clarity between the first sentence in [348] and the last three sentences of [342] and in particular the distinction between "characterisation of the instant contravention" and "character of the instant convention". With respect to the primary judge, the reasoning of their Honours is tolerably clear. As stated in [342] the history of prior contraventions, to the extent that it shows wilfulness, can be taken into account in characterising the seriousness of the contravention. Once that process has been undertaken and the seriousness of the instant contravention (including what can be drawn from prior contraventions as well as the circumstances otherwise of the instant contravention) is assessed, the prior contraventions do not have a further role to play in changing that character.
180 In all these cases what can be seen as clear and as taken from the content of the statute (as directed to the instant contravention for the objective of deterrence of such kind of contravention, in a statutory context of a maximum penalty for the worst type of contravening warranting the heaviest possible penalisation for the object of deterrence) is that the notion of proportionality of the penal response is central to the content of the statutory power to impose the penalty. That proportional response is not blind to wilful recidivism, to asserted impunity from obedience to the law, or to any other aspect of intentional disobedience to the will of Parliament. Such matters form a principled part of the assessment of the seriousness of the contravention and thus the evaluation of the appropriate penalty. No Full Court has said to the contrary. The jurisprudence of the Court in point of expression of principle is clear and consistent. What is not permitted in the name of deterrence is to untether the penal response from the nature and character of the instant contravention such that the penalty imposed can be seen to be undifferentiated between grades of conduct assessed and characterised on a principled basis.
181 Were the statute to permit such penalisation: that is the imposition of a penalty disproportionate to the seriousness of the contravention (having considered any willingness to disobey the law in that assessment), one would need the clearest words. Any such interpretation of the statute, that is to remove proportionality from the assessment of an appropriate penal response to a contravention or to make it a subsidiary consideration, would lead to an interpretation of a statutory power to inflict a penal consequence untethered to the nature and seriousness of the contravention. In such circumstances one is no longer penalising for an instant contravention, rather one is imposing penalties to bring about compliance generally by, in effect, saying the maximum penalty is always available against the recidivist for any contravention since the penalty will always conform with the object of deterrence. Such an approach could encourage or lead to inconsistent decision-making informed by personal perspective and opinion. A view that that is the current law would require the High Court to state as much. The view that Parliament would intend a discretion in sentencing with such capacity for variance according to personal choice and attitude is not lightly to be made. Any such interpretation would be required to confront what Gleeson CJ said in Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 at 591 [6] (albeit in the criminal law), as approved by the plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at 535 [47]:
All discretionary decision-making carries with it the probability of some degree of inconsistency. But there are limits beyond which such inconsistency itself constitutes a form of injustice. The outcome of discretionary decision-making can never be uniform, but it ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge who happens to hear the case. Like cases should be treated in like manner. The administration of criminal justice works as a system; not merely as a multiplicity as unconnected single instances. It should be systematically fair, and that involves, amongst other things, reasonable consistency.
182 So much may be also said as to the imposition of civil penalties.
183 The case of Auimatagi (2018) 363 ALR 246 should be mentioned. It was decided before Parker, but after Broadway on Ann. The case concerned conduct on a building site in Brisbane during one of the hottest parts of the year and focused upon whether or not workers would comply with a policy of the head contractor prohibiting short pants and short sleeves. The CFMEU and Mr Auimatagi, who was a union official, were said to have contravened s 340 (adverse action) and s 343 (coercion) of the Fair Work Act. In the events that occurred the findings of liability were set aside by the Full Court. The reasons for this need not be addressed. Comments were made, however, on penalty by way of obiter in short reasons in summary form adequate to deal with the instant case, at 363 ALR 279-280 at [172]-[177], as follows:
172 Although it is unnecessary in the circumstances to say anything of the penalties, in case we are wrong in our views as to liability, and in particular for the benefit of Mr Auimatagi, we consider it appropriate to express some brief views as to penalty which would have been more fully elaborated had we not upheld the appeal on liability.
173 Given our views as to the lack of the requisite quality of unconscionability or illegitimacy to lead to a conclusion of coercion, our comments need to be qualified by that recognition.
174 This was Mr Auimatagi's first contravention. He was, as we have said, representing the views of the men on the site. It can be accepted that he was also pushing his views as to what the Union wanted. He put those views with apparent firmness and clarity, but without the kind of arrogance or entitled impunity that can mark exchanges of this kind. To characterise this as worthy of a penalty so close to the maximum ($7,500 from a maximum of $10,200) was manifestly excessive. Taking into account all the facts and the need for deterrence, if there had been a contravention of s 340 or, if contrary to our views the conduct can be characterised as coercive, we would not have imposed a penalty outside a range of $1,750-$2,000.
175 As to the Union, the imposition of the maximum penalty of $51,000 was manifestly excessive. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the "recidivism" to which the primary judge referred was not merely a factor in giving a penalty at the high end of an appropriate response to the contravention, but in substance there was punishment for past conduct.
176 The quality or objective seriousness of the contravention (on this hypothesis) fell far short of being worthy of the maximum penalty. It is a fundamental principle, at the core of the judicial power to impose a penalty, that the imposition is for the contravention in question. Prior contraventions, even so many and often so serious as the Union may have engaged in in the past, is a factor which may be taken into account in determining the appropriate quantum for the contravention; it cannot be taken to lead to a penalty that is disproportionate to the gravity of the instant contravention. The maximum is for the worst category of cases. See the points of principle set out in the reasons of Bromwich J (dissenting in the result, but not in point of principle) in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (Broadway on Ann Case) [2018] FCAFC 129 at [93] and [102]-[110], and see Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (The Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case) [2018] FCAFC 97 at [22].
177 Considering all the circumstances here and the fact that the contravention by the Union was wholly based on Mr Auimatagi's conduct, we would not impose a penalty outside a range of $10,000 to $12,000.
184 The reason it was said to be for the benefit of Mr Auimatagi is that the surrounding facts showed that Mr Auimatagi was not a high ranking union official, did not display any declared intransigent disobedience to the law and was acting in what he thought to be representing the interests of the workers who had almost unanimously voted not to comply with the policy. There was no suggestion that the union or Mr Auimatagi had bullied or coerced the workers into this course of action. Mr Auimatagi was representing the members of the workforce to the head contractor in question. If there had been a breach of the Fair Work Act a penalty would have followed. But the learned primary judge had imposed a penalty on Mr Auimatagi of $7,500 against the maximum of $10,200 and the maximum of $51,000 on the union. In all the circumstances, notwithstanding the expression of the correct principle by the primary judge in her Honour's penalty judgment, such a characterisation of Mr Auimatagi's behaviour could only have been thought to be so serious if such weight had been given to the union's (not his) past contraventions. Likewise the imposition on the union was such as to betray such an emphasis on past conduct as to be effectively penalisation for past conduct. This was made all the more plain when one appreciated the facts that Mr Auimatagi was effectively representing the views of the workers on the job, not imposing some union position in defiance of the law, and that the workers were off the job for about a day, the matter being placed before the Fair Work Commission immediately and the union being instrumental in the amicable resolution of the dispute on the day that it went before the Fair Work Commission. In the circumstances of how the issue had arisen and been dealt with, if there had been a contravention, to characterise it as the primary judge did as so serious as to warrant a $7,500 penalty upon Mr Auimatagi and the maximum penalty upon the union betrayed a complete mischaracterisation of the contravention and betrayed the influence and utilisation of past contravening conduct when such had no proper connection with such contravention as might have been found.