The proposed penalty
48 The parties have agreed that a civil penalty of $1 million is appropriate for SWF2's contravention.
49 As already noted, NER 4.4.3 is a civil penalty provision. By s 2 of the NEL, the maximum penalty applicable throughout the whole of the relevant period was an amount not exceeding $100,000 in addition to an amount not exceeding $10,000 for each day that the contravention continued. The parties agreed that this meant that the maximum penalty which could be imposed for the continuing contravention of NER 4.4.3 in the period from 10 September 2013 to 10 October 2016 was $11,360,000 (being $100,000 plus $10,000 for each of the 1,126 days during which the contravention continued).
50 It is established that the Court may act on the parties' agreement in determining an appropriate civil penalty: Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 (Cth v FWBII). In that case, the plurality said, at [58]:
… Subject to the court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties' agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty which the parties propose is an appropriate remedy in the circumstances thus revealed, it is consistent with principle and … highly desirable in practice for the court to accept the parties' proposal and therefore impose the proposed penalty. To do so is no different in principle or practice from approving an infant's compromise, a custody or property compromise, a group proceeding settlement or a scheme of arrangement.
(Emphasis in the original and citation omitted)
51 A number of matters of principle bearing upon the fixation of an appropriate civil penalty are settled. The principal (and perhaps only) object of the imposition of a civil penalty is to achieve deterrence, both general and specific: Cth v FWBII at [55]. Thus it has been said that a civil penalty should put a price on contraventions which is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who may be tempted to contravene the Act in a similar way: Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1990] FCA 762; [1991] ATPR 41-076 at 52,152 in a passage approved in Cth v FWBII at [55]. A civil penalty should not be so high as to be oppressive, but should be such as to deter participants in the relevant industry "from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contraventions": Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commissioner [2012] FCAFC 20: (2012) 287 ALR 249 at [63].
52 Section 64 of the NEL requires the Court when fixing a civil penalty to have regard to all the relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the breach; and
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the breach; and
(c) the circumstances in which the breach took place; and
(d) whether the person has engaged in any similar conduct and be found be in breach of a provision of [the NEL], the Rules or the Regulations in respect of that conduct; and
(e) whether the service provider had in place a compliance program approved by the AER or required under the Rules, and if so, whether the service provider has been complying with that program.
53 As is apparent, the listed matters are not an exhaustive statement of the matters which may be relevant. Matters which may, depending on the circumstances of the given case, be relevant include those discussed by French J in CSR at 52,152-3. In addition to those to which s 64 directs attention, these include the size and resources of the contravenor; the degree of power of the contravenor; the deliberateness of the conduct; the length of time over which the conduct occurred; the degree of involvement of senior management; the culture of the organisation as to compliance or contravention; any cooperation; and any evidence of contrition - see Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (The Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case) [2018] FCAFC 97; (2018) 264 FCR 155 at [20].
54 It is also established that the Court is to determine an appropriate penalty by a process of instinctive synthesis after taking into account all relevant factors, similar to the manner discussed in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [37], [39] - see Pattinson v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 177; (2020) 299 IR 404 at [90], [112].
55 The nature and circumstances of SWF2's contravention have been set out above and need not be repeated.
56 It was common ground that the Snowtown 2 Wind Farm had been designed, supplied and installed by Siemens Ltd, an internationally recognised wind turbine supplier, and that it had fixed the LVRT settings. SWF2 did not become aware that the settings made by Siemens had not been approved by ElectraNet or AEMO until after 28 September 2016.
57 The circumstance that the contravention was not intentional or reckless is an important matter bearing upon the fixation of penalty.
58 Further, very shortly after the blackout which occurred on 28 September 2016, SWF2 engaged Siemens to make an assessment. The Repeat LVRT Protection Systems were then modified (by 10 October 2016) so that they would be activated only if the LVRT capability was utilised more than 20 times within a 120 minute period. That is to say, SWF2's contravention was not only not deliberate, it took prompt action to rectify the situation.
59 It remains, however, a significant matter that SWF2's contravention continued for a long time, namely, a little over three years. During that period, SWF2 had not made any assessment of the Repeat LVRT Protection System installed on its wind turbines to ensure that the settings satisfied the negotiated performance standard.
60 The contravention in this case must be regarded as serious. As noted earlier in these reasons, AEMO's ability to achieve security in the power system depends, amongst other things, on Generators such as SWF2 providing, both at the time of the connection and subsequently, accurate and complete information concerning their ability to operate in accordance with the agreed performance standards. SWF2's use of non-approved settings in the present case comprised AEMO's ability to discharge its responsibility. As the events of 28 September 2016 indicate, a compromise of the security of the power system can have extensive and serious consequences.
61 There are matters which mitigate the seriousness of the contravention or which at least are not of an aggravating kind. Apart from the fact that SWF2's contravention was not deliberate, it has not previously been found by a court to be in breach of a provision in the NEL or in the NER; it had during the relevant period sought to ensure that it complied with its obligations under the NEL by putting in place its own compliance program, as required by NER 4.15(b); and it did not obtain any financial benefit by reason of its contravention. Further, AER does not allege that the involvement of SWF2's senior management made the contravention more serious and it accepts that SWF2 has shown a "high level of cooperation" with it in the proceedings. In this respect, it is pertinent that AER's proceeding against SWF2 has been jointly cased managed in the Court with three other proceedings in which allegations of contraventions of the NER are made, but which remain unresolved. SWF2 reached an in principle agreement with the AER for the resolution of the proceedings before the AER had filed any of its evidence, and, as indicated, did so while the respondents in the other proceedings continue to defend them. That cooperation makes it appropriate, by itself, for there to be a reduction in the penalty which would otherwise be imposed.
62 As to the size and financial position of SWF2, it is an agreed fact that SWF2 was, during the relevant period, a wholly owned subsidiary of Trustpower Limited (Trustpower), a publically listed company in New Zealand. It is also an agreed fact that, in the period between 31 March 2013 and 31 March 2017 (a timeframe which extends beyond the relevant period by approximately 5-6 months on each side), Trustpower reported approximately NZD 4.45 billion in total revenue and NZD 545 million in profit after tax. SWF2 should accordingly be dealt with on the basis that it has substantial resources available to it.
63 The parties referred to some other principles concerning the fixation of civil penalties. These included the totality, course of conduct and parity principles. For the reasons which follow, I consider that none of these principles is applicable in the present context.
64 The totality principle applies when a court is imposing two or more penalties for multiple contraventions. That is not this case. Likewise, the course of conduct principle may be applicable when a court is imposing penalties for two or more contraventions which arise out of the same or related conduct. Again, that is not this case. The parity principle applies in the criminal law when co-offenders are sentenced by the same judge for the same crime or crimes. In such cases, the sentences imposed on them should be proportionate to their respective degrees of culpability and to various personal factors aggravation and mitigation: Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46, (1984) 154 CLR 606; R v MacGowan (1986) 42 SASR 580 at 582-3. The parity principle may also be applicable in civil penalty cases (Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 941; (2018) 128 ACSR 289 at [69]) but the circumstances for its application are not present in this case. The Court is not asked to impose penalties on two or more contravenors and it was not suggested that the Court has previously imposed a penalty on a person contravening NER 4.4.3 and cl S5.2.2.
65 When regard is had to all the matters to which reference was made earlier, I consider that the penalty of $1 million on which the parties have agreed is an appropriate penalty in the circumstances of this case. The contravention of SWF2 was serious and it continued over an extended period. That suggests that a substantial penalty is appropriate. On the other hand, there are matters which may appropriately be brought into account in mitigation. Balancing those factors out, I consider the agreed penalty of $1 million to be appropriate. There will be an order to that effect.