Regulated network service providers (transmission and distribution operators subject to revenue or price regulation—s 2(1)) bear the heaviest compliance burden. They must:
- Comply with transmission or distribution determinations (ss 14A–14B).
- Submit regulatory proposals, respond to regulatory information notices/orders, and provide performance reports (Divisions 4 and 5 of Part 3).
- Apply the binding rate-of-return instrument when preparing proposals (s 18H).
- Participate in access disputes and comply with access determinations (Part 10).
- For SA providers, observe uniform pricing and loss-factor rules (s 18).
Generators and storage operators must register (s 11(1)), comply with dispatch instructions, and may be subject to mandatory operation directions under the orderly exit regime (Part 8AA). Early-closure proposals trigger information and potential payment obligations.
Retailers and large purchasers are "liable entities" under the Retailer Reliability Obligation (s 14D). They must report net contract positions, maintain sufficient qualifying contracts to cover their share of one-in-two-year peak demand, and face civil penalties or procurer-of-last-resort cost recovery for non-compliance (ss 14P–14T, s 2AA(1a)).
AEMO is both market operator and, in adoptive jurisdictions, provider of declared network functions. It forecasts reliability gaps, issues market information instruments, maintains the National Transmission Network Development Plan, administers the orderly exit management fund, and may act as procurer of last resort. Its protected-information regime is stringent (Division 6 of Part 5).
The AER is the economic regulator, market monitor, compliance enforcer, and maker of the rate-of-return instrument. It issues regulatory information notices, conducts audits, prepares performance reports, and may seek penalties up to the indexed maxima in s 2AB. Its wholesale-market monitoring powers (Division 1A) are subject to strict limits on use of s 28 notices (ss 18EA–18EB).
The AEMC makes and amends the Rules after public consultation, conducts reviews, and maintains the targets statement for emissions objectives (s 32A). It must have regard to the national electricity objective, revenue and pricing principles, innovative trial principles, and any MCE statement of policy principles (ss 32, 33, 88–88C).
Large consumers and prospective network service users may initiate access disputes (s 125) and participate in rule-making and regulatory consultations. They benefit from reliability obligations and network-performance reporting but bear pass-through of network charges and potential reliability-instrument costs.
Small customers and households are indirectly affected through retail prices that incorporate network charges, reliability costs, and any capacity-scheme levies (Part 15B). They gain from uniform pricing in SA (s 18(5)(a)), performance reporting, and the consumer reference group in rate-of-return processes (s 18N).
Ministers and governments retain powers to issue T-3 reliability instruments (s 14JA), make mandatory operation directions (Part 8AA), and direct AEMO or the AER for information (ss 51, 118AO). The SA Minister has specific regulation-making power for capacity schemes that can modify the NEL (s 15B(2)(l)).
The financial vehicle established under Part 8AA administers the orderly exit management fund, receives contributions, makes payments to MOD generators, and recovers costs via distribution network service providers (ss 118AS–118AZD).
All participants are subject to confidentiality, information-provision, and compliance-audit obligations. Breach of civil-penalty provisions can result in penalties, enforceable undertakings, or disqualification from the market. Immunities protect AEMO, network service providers, and officials acting in good faith (Part 9).