10 Suzlon is an international wind turbine supplier and it designed, supplied and installed the wind turbines at each of the Hallett wind farms.
11 During the relevant period, each wind turbine at each of the Hallett wind farms featured a low voltage ride through capability (the LVRT capability). The LVRT capability was a control system that was activated when the voltage at the generating unit terminals dipped below 80% of the nominal voltage level. The purpose of the LVRT capability was to enable a wind turbine to ride through transient voltage dips of specified depths for specified durations. It was agreed between the parties that the LVRT capability of wind turbines and other generating plant is important to AEMO's ability to maintain and restore power system security, by seeking to ensure that generating units are capable of "riding through" certain voltage disturbances that may be caused by faults or other occurrences on the power system, so as to mitigate against the risk of cascading failures on the power system.
12 Each wind turbine at each of the Hallett wind farms included a number of protection systems, including a repeat low voltage ride-through protection system (the repeat LVRT protection system). During the relevant period, the repeat LVRT protection system was set so as to be triggered if the LVRT capability was activated three times within a 120 second period.
13 The purpose of the repeat LVRT protection system was to avoid the potential for damage to, and failure of, the Hallett wind farms' generating units and plant caused by multiple voltage disturbances in a short period of time on the external network. Unexpected failure of the generating units could, in turn, potentially jeopardise power system security. In the event that the repeat LVRT protection system was triggered, it caused the rotational speed of the wind turbine to slow and the wind turbine to cease generating active power. In this way, the repeat LVRT protection system prevented the generating unit's LVRT capability from operating in the event that the voltage on any of the three phases at the generating unit terminals fell below 80% of nominal voltage three times within a 120 second period.
14 Neither the NER nor any of the generator performance standards or transmission connection agreements applicable to the Hallett wind farms set an explicit threshold for the number of disturbances a wind farm would be required to ride through.
15 There were differences between the Hallett 1 wind farm on the one hand, and the Hallett 2, Hallett 4 and Hallett 5 wind farms on the other in terms of the version of the NER which applied.
16 The performance standards for the Hallett 1 wind farm were determined prior to 15 March 2007 and, therefore, were required to comply with Version 12 of the NER (NER v12), which were in operation at that time. Those performance standards determined under NER v12 continued to apply to the Hallett 1 wind farm throughout the relevant period.
17 Prior to connecting the Hallett 1 wind farm to the power system, the respondents were required to: (1) negotiate and determine with ElectraNet a set of performance standards, including for the technical requirements addressed in Sch 5.2 to the NER and ElectraNet was required to consult with NEMMCO in relation to the technical requirements that NEMMCO was required to be involved in negotiating under cl 5.3.3(b1)(4) of NER v12; and (2) jointly with ElectraNet, provide NEMMCO with the details of the performance standards, once they were agreed. Chapter 5 of NER v12 is titled "Network Connection" and Sch 5.2 is titled "Conditions for Connection of Generators". Of particular importance in Sch 5.2 is cl S5.2.5.3 ("Generating unit response to disturbances in the power system") and cl S5.2.5.8 ("Protection of generating units from power system disturbances"). The generator performance standards for the Hallett 1 wind farm were set out in the documents annexed as Appendix A to the Statement of Agreed Facts.
18 The relevant version of the NER with respect to the Hallett 2, Hallett 4 and Hallett 5 wind farms is Version 82 (NER v82). With respect to the Hallett 2, Hallett 4 and Hallett 5 wind farms, prior to connecting each of those wind farms to the power system, the respondents were was required to: (1) negotiate and determine with ElectraNet a set of performance standards, including for the technical requirements addressed in Sch 5.2 to NER v82, and ElectraNet was required to consult with AEMO in relation to the technical requirements that were designated as AEMO advisory matters; and (2) jointly, together with ElectraNet, provide AEMO with the details of the performance standards, once they were agreed. The technical requirements that were required to be addressed in the performance standards, each of which was designated an AEMO advisory matter, included the following:
(1) generating system response to voltage disturbances (cl S5.2.5.4);
(2) generating system response to disturbances following contingency events (cl S5.2.5.5); and
(3) protection of generating systems from power system disturbances (cl S5.2.5.8).
The performance standards for each of the Hallett 2, Hallett 4 and Hallett 5 wind farms were annexed to the Statement of Agreed Facts as Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D respectively. In the Joint Submissions, the parties identified the performance standards relevant to the ability of the respondents' turbines at each of the Hallett wind farms to "ride though" undervoltage disturbances. It is not necessary for me to set out those matters.
19 It is agreed between the parties that during the relevant period:
(1) the Hallett wind farms were connected to, and supplied electricity to, the power system;
(2) the respondents were required to operate each of the Hallett wind farms in accordance with its generator performance standards;
(3) the respondents were required, in accordance with Sch 5.2 and Chapter 5 of the NER, to provide any necessary automatically initiated protective device or systems to protect their plant and associated facilities against abnormal voltage excursions of the power system; and
(4) the respondents were only permitted to apply settings to a control system or a protection system that were necessary to comply with performance requirements of Sch 5.2 of the NER if the settings had been approved in writing by ElectraNet, and also by AEMO if the requirement was an AEMO advisory matter, and were prohibited from allowing their generating units to supply electricity to the power system without such prior approval.
20 None of the generator performance standards for the Hallett wind farms contained a reference to the repeat LVRT protection system installed in the Hallett wind farms' generating units, or its settings. Prior to and during the relevant period, neither ElectraNet nor AEMO gave approval in writing for the settings of the repeat LVRT protection system. Prior to, and until shortly before, the end of the relevant period, the respondents did not assess the repeat LVRT protection system on generating units of any of the Hallett wind farms for compliance with the applicable generator performance standards. Prior to, and until shortly before, the end of the relevant period, the respondents were not aware of the repeat LVRT protection system or of its settings that had been applied to all the wind turbines at the Hallett wind farms. Those settings had been designed and applied by Suzlon.
21 By reason of the matters referred to in [19(1)] and [20] above, during the relevant period, the respondents allowed the Hallett wind farms' generating units to supply electricity to the power system in circumstances where the repeat LVRT protection system settings had not been approved in writing for use at the Hallett wind farms by ElectraNet or AEMO, as required by cl S5.2.2 of the NER. By reason of those matters, the respondents did not, in accordance with Sch 5.2, provide protective systems to protect their plant and associated facilities against abnormal voltage excursions of the power system, as required by cl 4.4.3 of the NER.
22 On 28 September 2016, five transmission line faults occurred on the power system, resulting in six undervoltage disturbances, within a period of approximately 90 seconds. The first undervoltage disturbance did not result in the repeat LVRT protection system for the Hallett wind farms' generating units detecting an undervoltage disturbance, but it did do so for the second, third and fourth undervoltage disturbances. In response to the fourth undervoltage disturbance, the repeat LVRT protection system was activated on the following generating units and those generating units ceased supplying active power to the power system:
Hallett 1 16
Hallett 2 11
Hallett 4 36
Hallett 5 21