35 As a consequence, during the relevant period, the HPR was not capable of providing 41MW of FCAS at the frequency of 49.50Hz, which was required in order for it to comply with the applicable dispatch instruction or market ancillary service offer (as explained at [25] and [32] above).
36 On 9 October 2019, there was an unplanned outage at Kogan Creek Power Station in Queensland (the Kogan Creek event). The respondent did not cause or contribute to the Kogan Creek event. In response to the Kogan Creek event, the power system frequency fell and the respondent was required to deliver fast raise services in accordance with the amount it was enabled to provide. The FCAS response that the respondent provided by using HPRG1 following the Kogan Creek event was less than expected and could not exceed 46% of the amount of FCAS that the respondent offered and was enabled for in the dispatch instructions in accordance with the MASS. This was caused by the change in settings which altered the droop as a consequence of the firmware update on 23 July 2019.
37 Although the FCAS response that the respondent provided (using HPRG1) following the Kogan Creek event response was less than the amount for which it had been enabled, the response assisted to bring system frequency within the normal operating frequency band as set by the Frequency Operating Standards.
38 On 12 November 2019, AEMO informed the respondent that the response of the HPR was less than the enabled contingency FCAS and not in line with the agreed droop of 1.7% when delivering FCAS.
39 The respondent was not aware until it was informed by AEMO that the contingency FCAS response from the HPR was less than what it had offered in its ancillary market services offers and been enabled to provide in dispatch instructions.
40 On 13 November 2019, Tesla investigated the under-delivery of the FCAS response from the HPR. On 14 November 2019 at 5.10 pm, the relevant settings on the firmware effecting the droop for the HPR were corrected to 1.7%. On 20 November 2019, Tesla completed its investigation and identified that the firmware update of 23 July 2019 was the cause of the under-delivery of FCAS by the HPR during the Kogan Creek event.
41 During the relevant period, AEMO gave and the respondent received 197,508 dispatch instructions pursuant to cl 4.9.3A(a) of the NER for market ancillary services that required the respondent to be ready and capable of providing, at the specified time if required, the service stated, at the nominated range, in the dispatch instruction and in which the "range" was a range of the amounts of the nominated service, up to the maximum amount specified as being enabled in the dispatch instruction, expressed in MW.
42 Of these 197,508 dispatch instructions, there were 185,738 dispatch instructions (being 97,588 dispatch instructions for HPRG1 ancillary services generating unit and 88,150 dispatch instructions for HPRL1 ancillary services load) which required the respondent to be ready and capable of providing, at the specified time if required, the range enabled in the dispatch instruction, and the respondent did not provide the capacity for which it was enabled.
43 As a result of these two matters, the respondent did not comply with 185,738 of the dispatch instructions given by AEMO as required by cl 4.9.8(a) of the NER (Version 126), which is as follows:
A Registered Participant must comply with the dispatch instruction given to it by AEMO unless to do so would, in the Registered Participant's reasonable opinion, be a hazard to public safety or materially risk damaging equipment.
Note
This clause is classified as a civil penalty provision under the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations. (See clause 6(1) and Schedule 1 of the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations.)
44 The respondent's failure to provide the capability to deliver the required proportionate response relative to the size of the frequency excursion in accordance with the MASS represented a failure to provide the relevant market ancillary service specified in the dispatch instruction, in circumstances where the HPR was, during the relevant period, enabled to deliver its full FCAS capacity.
45 During the relevant period, there were 32,602 trading intervals during which the respondent was not able to comply with its latest market ancillary service offer for the trading interval because those offers were for a response capability exceeding the maximum dispatch capacity of the HPR during the corresponding trading interval.
46 As a result of these matters, the respondent was not able to comply with the market ancillary service offers made by it for 32,602 trading intervals as required by cl 4.9.8(d) of the NER, which is as follows:
A Market Participant which has classified a generating unit or load as an ancillary service generating unit or an ancillary service load, as the case may be, must ensure that the ancillary service generating unit or ancillary service load is at all times able to comply with the latest market ancillary service offer for the relevant trading interval.
Note
This clause is classified as a civil penalty provision under the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations. (See clause 6(1) and Schedule 1 of the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations.)
47 The response capability set out in each of the 345 market ancillary service offers made during the relevant period for the fast raise service, the slow raise service and the delayed raise service did not reflect the technical characteristics at the relevant time of HPRG1. The response capability set out in each of the 345 market ancillary service offers made during the relevant period for the fast lower service, the slow lower service and the delayed lower service did not reflect the technical characteristics at the relevant time of HPRL1. As a result of these matters, the values associated with the 690 market ancillary service offers made by the respondent did not represent the technical characteristics of HPRG1 and HPRL1, respectively, as required by cl 3.8.7A(l) of the NER, which is as follows:
The following requirements apply to all market ancillary service offers for each type of market ancillary service:
…
(l) the values associated with the market ancillary service offer referred to in clause 3.8.7A(j) must represent technical characteristics of the ancillary service generating unit or ancillary service load …
Note
This clause is classified as a civil penalty provision under the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations. (See clause 6(1) and Schedule 1 of the National Electricity (South Australia) Regulations.)
48 The contraventions previously identified were caused by the update to the firmware performed by Tesla on 23 July 2019, which was corrected on 14 November 2019. A provider of contingency FCAS must ensure that the provider's generating unit or load is able to respond when required in accordance with amounts for which it has been enabled.
49 During the relevant period, the respondent had in place a Generator compliance program to promote its compliance, as required under the NER. This compliance program was developed such that retrospective analysis of the HPR was to be triggered by the occurrence of significant contingency events. This involved an assessment of the response of the HPR to the frequency deviation (meaning the active power fluctuation when the frequency is outside of the normal operating bands set out in the Frequency Operating Standards). However, the respondent did not identify a risk to changes in the frequency settings and therefore did not test the technical characteristics, compliance or performance of the HPR following the firmware upgrade in July 2019. As a result, the respondent did not know whether or not it could satisfy the offers that it was making.
50 The respondent did not conduct sufficient ongoing performance monitoring of the HPR's contingency FCAS performance using real-time high-speed frequency data after a major frequency deviation. During the relevant period, the respondent's systems did not detect and correct its non-compliance before being notified by AEMO on 12 November 2019, following AEMO's analysis of the Kogan Creek event.
51 Following the relevant period, the respondent immediately reviewed its compliance program and the compliance program was updated to: (1) improve its change management process, to ensure the potential impacts of firmware updates are appropriately addressed including with post-implementation controls; (2) increase real-time monitoring of the system's capability to provide frequency response; (3) include automatic frequency event response check with real-time alarming system provided by Telsa; and (4) include systematic frequency response checks post contingency event and perform at least one check per week of the system's frequency response to any deviation from the normal operating band within the last seven days if no contingency event occurred.
52 AEMO relies upon the providers of contingency FCAS such as the respondent to do what they have bid or offered to do and been enabled to provide. The HPR's inability to respond in accordance with the respondent's market ancillary service offers over a period of nearly four months impacted AEMO's ability to plan and prepare for frequency deviations.
53 While the HPR was not capable of providing 41MW of FCAS at the frequency of 49.50Hz, which was required in order for it to comply with the applicable dispatch instruction or market ancillary service offer, the HPR was capable of providing 41MW of FCAS at the frequency of 49.09Hz. The lower limit of the containment band is 49Hz for a network event or separation event, and 47Hz for a multiple contingency event. If one of these events had occurred and was sufficiently large, the HPR would have been capable of providing 41MW of FCAS at a frequency of 49.09Hz and up to the registered FCAS capacity of 100MW at a frequency of 48.00Hz (while not in compliance with the applicable instruction or offer). The frequency of 49Hz is a point at which customers are likely to be interrupted and the frequency of 48Hz is a rare and extreme frequency deviation.
54 The respondent generated revenue of $32,310,557 and delivered a profit of $10,741,006 for the year ended 31 December 2019. The majority of this revenue was produced through the supply of market ancillary services. During the relevant period, the respondent was paid $6,431,237.63 to provide contingency FCAS at the HPR. In response to a request from AEMO, in March 2021 the respondent repaid $3,383,631.51 for contingency FCAS for the relevant period by AEMO deducting that amount from amounts otherwise payable to the respondent.
55 The respondent has not been previously found to have engaged in similar conduct.
56 I turn now to the relief sought by the applicant.