The "lower end of the mid-range"
48 The Commission's fourth ground is a matter of arithmetic. In the paragraph of his reasons headed "Conclusion on the quantum of penalties", the primary Judge said that he considered that the contravening conduct "should attract what might be described as a 'mid-range' penalty but leaning towards the lower end of the so-called mid range". His Honour said:
Applying the instinctive synthesis involved in the totality principle, whilst acknowledging the inexactness inherent in this process, the Court considers that the appropriate penalty should be as follows:
$200,000 for BAJV; and
$40,000 for Mr Ayers.
In a situation in which the relevant maxima were $2.2million for BAJV and $440,000 for Mr Ayers, it was submitted on behalf of the Commission that the penalties ultimately fixed by the primary Judge were a long way below anything that could be described as the lower end of the mid-range.
49 It is here important to note that the Commission's appeal does not, in any of its four dimensions, involve the proposition that the penalties actually determined by the primary Judge were manifestly inadequate. We would add that, from the exposure which we have had on appeal to the facts of the case below, and subject to the Commission's grounds as such, there is nothing in the case that would appear to sustain a conclusion of manifest inadequacy. Had there been something of that nature, this arithmetical curiosity on the part of his Honour might have contributed to the Full Court's understanding of how the inadequacy came about. It might then have played its appropriate part in the identification of relevant error. But, as we have said, that is not the situation.
50 In its written outline, the Commission proposed that, for BAJV, the "mid-range" penalty would have been one which lay between, say, $900,000 and $1.3million. As a matter of arithmetic, it may be accepted that this fell within, but did not delimit, a "mid-range". But, when invited by the Full Court to indicate the level of penalty that should be imposed on BAJV if error on the part of the primary Judge were found and the discretion had to be exercised again, the Commission submitted that the appropriate range was $300,000 - $350,000. On any view, therefore, a penalty which answered the description of lying at the lower end of the Commission's nominated mid-range would be well in excess of anything that ought to have been imposed in the circumstances of the case.
51 In fairness to his Honour, it may be that his reference to "a 'mid range' penalty" at the lower end should be read with his reference to the totality principle and the instinctive synthesis. The lower end of the mid-range for a single penalty was close to the pecuniary penalties that the primary judge imposed. It is likely that his Honour had in mind the cumulative effect of the penalty he imposed. The fact that each contravention considered alone might attract a lower end of the mid-range penalty does not mean that the sentencer will simply cumulate both penalties. The totality principle requires the sentencer to have regard to the overall impact on the contravener in structuring the sentence. The Commission did not contend that his Honour erred in imposing a single penalty without having first identified the separate penalties that were appropriate for both causes of conduct and then adjusting those under the totality principle: cp Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 62-63 per Wilson, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Lukatala v Birch (2008) 223 FLR 1 at 15-16 [75]-[77] per Rares J.
52 An appellate court must recognise that the sentencer has a very flexible discretion to mould an appropriate sentence within the parameters set by legislation and the need for consistency of approach. However, there is no single correct sentence: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 371 [26]-[27] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan J.
53 There is a tension - possibly even an inconsistency - between his Honour's comment about the lower end of the mid-range and the penalties which he in fact imposed. But the appeal is against his Honour's order, and there is no doubt but that he thought the penalties in fact imposed were appropriate. The fact that his Honour, in effect, got his arithmetic wrong in describing where his penalties would fit within the range (if that is what happened) was not, in our view, sufficient to vitiate the exercise of the discretion involved in the actual determination of the penalties to be imposed on the respondents. It would not justify appellate intervention. The Commission's fourth ground of appeal should be rejected.
The relationship between penalty and costs
54 Finally, we come to the Commission's first ground of appeal and the respondents' remaining ground of cross-appeal. Each relates to a letter which was sent by the respondents' solicitors to the Commission on 28 February 2011. This was subsequent to the examination, in October 2010, of Mr Ayers and others by the Commission as part of its investigations into the conduct of the Europcar franchisee in Tasmania. The letter referred to an invitation which had been extended to the respondents by the Commission "to participate in a without prejudice discussion about how the matters being investigated by the [the Commission] might be resolved". Such a discussion was, it seems, held.
55 The letter of 28 February 2011 then proceeded as follows:
3. Having now considered carefully the transcripts of the examinations and given advice (in conjunction with counsel) to Europcar on its potential for exposure to claims under sections 51AB and 52 of the TPA, we are instructed to write to you with a view to progressing the discussions begun at the conclusion of the examinations. We begin by outlining our understanding of the circumstances said to give rise to the breaches alleged and then set out a proposal for resolution. As you will appreciate, that proposal is presently informed only by Europcar's own documents and the evidence given by the four examinees referred to above. The ACCC may be seized of documents and evidence of third parties that might cause Europcar to reconsider its position but, as presently advised, Europcar continues to have serious reservations about the form and basis for any claims against it and the proposal below has been formulated accordingly.
What followed in the letter may be broadly described as an articulated defence of the respondents' position, and could not be viewed as involving any concessions that the Commission might then reasonably have considered to be useful.
56 However, the letter concluded as follows:
25. As presently advised, although Europcar accepts that there have been isolated instances where dealings with particular customers have been less than satisfactory, Europcar does not accept that its conduct can be said to amount to contraventions of either s 51AB or s 52 of a repeated or systemic nature. In those circumstances, Europcar is willing to settle the claims so far made by the [Commission] by entering into an agreement pursuant to which Europcar will agree to:
(a) investigate vehicle damage claims, with a view to identifying those where a refund should have been given and, where appropriate, processing those refunds;
(b) better inform customers of how Europcar assesses vehicle damage, including by providing details of any standard charges for particular types of damage;
(c) implement systems that can identify and track the amount charged to a customer for vehicle damage, the cost of repair (and any associated fees and charges), whether a refund is due or may become due to the customer and the payment of that refund;
(d) develop and implement a TPA compliance and training program;
(e) agitate for a revision to the terms of Europcar's rental agreement, to ensure that it properly reflects a system under which Europcar only charges customers for the actual cost of damage plus appropriate allowances for downtime, administrative charges and the like; and
(f) the [Commission] making a public announcement on terms to be agreed with Europcar outlining the terms of the resolution.
26. In relation to paragraph 25(a) above, we are instructed that Europcar has commenced already a process of reviewing files of customers charged for vehicle damage since, say, 1 January 2009, with a view to identifying any files where refunds have been overlooked or otherwise and paying those refunds.
27. We reiterate that that proposal is presently informed only by Europcar's own documents and the evidence given by the four examinees referred to above. The ACCC may be seized of documents and evidence of third parties that might cause Europcar to reconsider its position. Europcar would welcome the opportunity to consider any further relevant matters that you are able to disclose, to discuss with you any comments you have on our analysis above and to flesh out the terms of an agreement along the lines suggested.
57 The Commission did not respond to the letter of 28 February 2011. The next the respondents knew of what the Commission intended to do about the case was the commencement of this proceeding on 10 November 2011. At the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the Commission did not advance any justification for the Commission's failure to respond to the letter: on behalf of his client, he accepted that there should have been a response.
58 The primary Judge referred to the Commission's failure to respond to the letter in three places in his reasons. First, under the heading "Co-operation with the [Commission]", his Honour noted that the letter had been "met with silence". Secondly, under the heading "Conclusion on the Quantum of Penalties", his Honour said:
It is significant that BAJV and Mr Ayers cooperated with the [Commission] and took steps to ensure that the offending conduct would not be repeated. The Court considers that the [Commission] should have taken a more proactive role in responding to the respondents' then lawyers' invitation to meet for discussions before instituting this proceeding.
Thirdly, in the final paragraph of his reasons, which dealt with the subject of costs, his Honour said:
BAJV and Mr Ayers propose that costs should be limited to a figure in the range of $25,000 to $50,000, having regard to their offer to meet with the [Commission] to attempt to resolve their dispute before the commencement of this action. However, I see no reason why costs should not follow the event, given that the [Commission]'s reluctance to negotiate has already been taken into account in the assessment of penalties.
59 Neither side was content with the way the primary Judge had treated these related issues of penalty and costs. For the Commission, it was submitted that it was one thing for his Honour to have taken into account the respondents' readiness to co-operate with the Commission, but it was another thing altogether for him to have taken into account what was perceived to be suboptimal negotiating behaviour on the part of the Commission as a factor tending towards the imposition of a lighter penalty. Such behaviour, it was submitted, was irrelevant to the determination of what was a proper penalty for the respondents' conduct.
60 For the respondents, it was submitted that a qualification of the Commission's conventional entitlement to costs was the most obvious means by which the court should have marked its disapproval of the Commission's failure to accept the invitation, extended on 28 February 2011, to enter into constructive discussions. Particularly having regard to s 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), such a qualification was called for in the circumstances of the case before the primary Judge. It was wrong for his Honour, it was submitted, to have used an unquantified measure of restraint in the fixation of penalties as an expedient to avoid having to make what was on any view an appropriate costs order in the circumstances of the case.
61 In response to the Commission's appeal, the respondents accepted that the Commission's "reluctance to negotiate" could not be a proper basis for discounting the amount of the penalty that would otherwise have been imposed. However, they submitted that this was not what his Honour did. Other than in the passage last referred to in [58] above, the context in which his Honour mentioned the Commission's response to the letter of 28 February 2011 was the respondents' readiness to co-operate. In the context of that passage, counsel for the respondents referred to what had been said in their own written submissions before the primary Judge on the question of costs: "The [Commission] chose to bring these proceedings instead of accepting BAJV and Mr Ayers' offer to meet and attempt to resolve matters between them." It was put that all the primary Judge was doing was to refer to that submission, and to reject it.
62 In response to the cross-appeal, the Commission submitted that the respondents had not advanced any "proper basis" for costs to be limited to a figure between $25,000 and $50,000; that the outcome of the case vindicated the position which it had taken from the outset, and did not reflect the "denials and justifications" in the letter of 28 February 2011; and that it could not be inferred that the costs of the proceeding were increased, or that the resolution of the underlying dispute was slower, less efficient or more expansive, as a result of its failure to respond to the letter. The Commission also pointed out that there had, in fact, been discussions between the parties at various points both before and after the commencement of the proceeding below.
63 While the essentially pragmatic approach taken by the primary Judge may, on one way of looking at it, have had its attractions, ultimately we are unable to read his Honour's reasons in the way proposed by the respondents. His Honour said that the Commission's reluctance to negotiate had been taken into account in the assessment of penalties: this was not merely, as the respondents submitted, by way of rejection of their submission on costs. The primary Judge should be taken at his word. Once that understanding of his Honour's reasons is established, the respondents did not seek to defend such an approach to the assessment of penalties. Although we would not want to be understood as laying down any categorical proposition applicable to all situations, in the circumstances of the present case we accept the Commission's submission that it was not open to the primary Judge to reduce the penalty that would otherwise have been appropriate because the Commission did not, before commencing its proceeding, engage in a sufficiently conscientious conversation with the respondents in an attempt to head off the proposed litigation. Other than the making of generalised submissions focussing upon the Commission's reluctance to negotiate in advance of litigation, the facts that may or may not have been unfolding between February and November 2011 were largely left unexplored in the present proceeding and not exposed to judicial scrutiny. The factors which should inform the assessment process have been referred to above, and, indeed, otherwise provided a conventional template for the approach which the primary Judge took. Those factors do not allow for a consideration of the failure of the Commission to respond to the respondents' letter of 28 February 2011.
64 The foregoing reasons should not, of course, be taken as casting any doubt on the propriety of a court taking into account the impact, including the deterrent effect, which the costs of the regulator's litigation have had on a contravener in the determination of penalty: see eg Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities v Gas Point Guildford West Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 621 at [30] and Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities v Fairglen Pty Ltd (trading as Liberty Braybrook) [2014] FCA 273 at [84]-[95]. That the chastening effect of the cost of litigation, including the need to pay all or part of the costs of the successful regulator, may, in an appropriate case, be taken into account is uncontroversial, but the present case was not an example of such an approach on the part of the primary Judge.
65 On the facts of the present case, it must be concluded that, in the assessment of penalties, the primary Judge allowed himself to be influenced by an irrelevant consideration. That was, with respect, an error on his Honour's part that should be corrected on appeal. It follows that his Honour's discretion on the determination of costs also miscarried. It was accepted by counsel for the Commission that, if we should uphold their client's first ground of appeal, the first ground of cross-appeal should also be upheld. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider for ourselves the level of penalties that ought to be imposed on the respondents in the circumstances of the case, and also whether costs should be limited as proposed in the cross-appeal.