Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd

1. INTRODUCTION 1 Coles (collectively the First and Second Respondents) is the second largest retailer of grocery products in Australia. Coles engaged in unconscionable conduct in its dealings with a number of suppliers of products that it sold. Coles' misconduct was serious, deliberate and repeated. Coles misused its bargaining power. Its conduct was "not done in good conscience". It was contrary to conscience. Coles treated its suppliers in a manner not consistent with acceptable business and social standards which apply to commercial dealings. Coles demanded payments from suppliers to which it was not entitled by threatening harm to the suppliers that did not comply with the demand. Coles withheld money from suppliers it had no right to withhold. Coles now admits that its conduct was contrary to law and involved serious breaches of s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) as it then stood in Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Act), meriting serious punishment. 2 Coles and the applicant (the ACCC), have reached agreement as to the relief they submit is appropriate to be sought from the Court to resolve the proceedings. As will be explained, Coles and ACCC have agreed that Coles should pay penalties totalling $10 million, should pay $1.25 million towards the ACCC's costs and should establish a system that will permit those harmed by Coles' conduct to recover compensation. Coles' conduct was of a kind which merits severe penalty. But for Coles making the admissions it has now made and acknowledging the gravity of its contravening conduct, the conduct and circumstances in which it was committed would have warranted imposing penalties at or close to the maximum the law permits. In light of Coles' admissions and acknowledgement, the time at which they were made and the other features of the orders upon which the parties agree (including in particular the arrangements for access to compensation), orders will be made substantially in the terms agreed by the parties.

1.1 The Proceedings 3 The ACCC filed two proceedings against Coles. 4 The first proceeding (VID 253 of 2014) (the ARC Proceeding) was commenced by the ACCC on 5 May 2014 following an investigation into dealings between Coles and what were called Tier 3 Suppliers. There were approximately 220 Tier 3 Suppliers, being suppliers where the annual sum spent by Coles on acquiring that supplier's grocery products was generally greater than $3 million and for whom Coles' documents stated Coles represented a "very significant part" of the supplier's business: Annexure 1, par 27. 5 The ACCC alleged, and Coles has now accepted, that Coles contravened s 22 of the (then) ACL in relation to five Tier 3 Suppliers when Coles made demand for payment of an Active Retail Collaboration rebate (the ARC rebate) in the course of its Active Retail Collaboration Program (ARC). The ARC rebate was a payment made from a supplier to Coles, calculated as a percentage of the price Coles paid for the products and deducted by Coles from monies owed to the supplier for products that it had already supplied to Coles. 6 Coles admits that the conduct disclosed in a statement of agreed facts and admissions (SoAFA), set out in Annexure 1 to these reasons for judgment, was unconscionable and contrary to law. The facts agreed to, and the admissions made, in the SoAFA are made pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) for the purposes of the ARC Proceeding, and are admissions upon which the Court may rely to pronounce judgment and make orders. It will be necessary to return to consider those facts and admissions. 7 Coles and the ACCC reached agreement as to the terms of relief they contended appropriate to be sought from the Court to resolve the ARC Proceeding whilst acknowledging that the question of relief is for the Court to determine in its discretion. In general terms, the ACCC and Coles asked that the Court make declarations of contraventions pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act), order payment by Coles of pecuniary penalties totalling $3,700,000 pursuant to s 224 of the ACL and order payment by Coles of a contribution to the ACCC's costs in the amount of $1 million pursuant to s 43 of the Federal Court Act. 8 The second proceeding (VID 609 of 2014) (the Claims Proceeding) was commenced by the ACCC on 16 October 2014. In the Claims Proceeding, the ACCC alleged that Coles, by its conduct in relation to its dealings with five named suppliers, contravened s 22 of the (then) ACL. In general terms, that conduct involved Coles seeking payments from those suppliers outside of the terms of the arrangements negotiated between the supplier and Coles. The payments demanded by Coles were for so called profit gaps, waste and markdowns and short or late deliveries and were deducted by Coles from monies due to be paid to that supplier for products that it had already supplied to Coles. Coles now admits that it had no reasonable basis for making the claims that it made and that conduct (disclosed in a separate SoAFA, set out in Annexure 2 to these reasons for judgment) was unconscionable and contrary to law. The facts agreed to and the admissions made in that SoAFA were again made pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act for the purposes of the Claims Proceeding, and are admissions upon which the Court may rely to pronounce judgment and make orders. It will be necessary to return to consider those facts and admissions. 9 Coles and the ACCC reached agreement as to the terms of relief they contended appropriate to be sought from the Court to resolve the Claims Proceeding whilst again acknowledging that the question of relief is for the Court to determine in its discretion. In general terms, the ACCC and Coles asked that the Court make declarations of contraventions pursuant to s 21 of the Federal Court Act, order payment by Coles of pecuniary penalties totalling $6,300,000 pursuant to s 224 of the ACL and order payment by Coles of a contribution to the ACCC's costs in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to s 43 of the Federal Court Act. 10 In relation to both proceedings, Coles has provided an undertaking under s 87B of the Act. It is Annexure 3 to these reasons for judgment. The undertaking is an important element of Coles' agreement with the ACCC and the Court's assessment of the relief the parties seek by agreement. It will be necessary to consider that undertaking later in these reasons for judgment. 11 Each proceeding will be considered in turn. For each proceeding, the reasons for judgment will address the nature and background to that proceeding, the admitted contraventions and the applicable principles in relation to the relief sought. The reasons will then consider the appropriateness of the proposed declarations of contravention and the pecuniary penalties.

2.1 Background 12 The following summary is sourced from, and cross referenced to, the SoAFA in Annexure 1. The contravening conduct occurred from about 1 April 2011 to about 31 December 2011 (the ARC relevant period): Annexure 1, par 3.

2.1.1 Coles' market share and power 13 During the ARC relevant period, Coles carried on business, in trade or commerce, as a supermarket retailer. Coles engaged in a business of acquiring grocery products from suppliers, and selling those products to customers in Australia through Coles' retail stores (the Coles business): Annexure 1, pars 4-6. Coles referred, and continues to refer, to the steps and infrastructure involved in acquiring grocery products for retail sale from suppliers and distributing them to Coles' retail stores for display and sale as its Supply Chain: Annexure 1, par 7. During the ARC relevant period, Coles supplied approximately 30% of the grocery products supplied for retail sale to customers in Australia. Together with Woolworths, Coles supplied approximately 60% to 70% of the grocery products for retail sale to customers in Australia: Annexure 1, par 9. 14 The Coles business had revenue in the order of $22.1 billion for the financial year ending 30 June 2011 and in the order of $23.3 billion for the year ending 30 June 2012: Annexure 1, par 10. 15 The Coles business was, and continues to be, structured by reference to groups of similar or related grocery products (General Categories): Annexure 1, pars 11-13. In that structure: (1) Each General Category was managed by a General Manager (GM); (2) Within each General Category, the Coles business was managed by reference to smaller groups of similar or related grocery products (Business Categories); (3) Each Business Category was managed by a Business Category Manager (BCM); (4) Each BCM reported to a GM; (5) Within each Business Category, the Coles business was managed by reference to smaller groups of similar or related products (Categories); (6) Each Category was managed by a Category Manager (CM); and (7) Each CM reported to a BCM. The GMs and BCMs were Coles' Senior Managers, and together with the CMs acted on behalf of Coles in relation to the contravening conduct. 16 Coles' suppliers range from large multinational companies to very small Australian suppliers. By about August 2011, Coles had created three categories of suppliers - Tier 1 Suppliers, Tier 2 Suppliers and Tier 3 Suppliers. The Tier 1 Suppliers were identified by Coles as its largest suppliers with the most complex supply chains, and included Nestle, General Mills and Procter & Gamble. The Tier 2 Suppliers were identified by Coles as large suppliers with "simple" supply chains. As noted earlier, the Tier 3 Suppliers comprised approximately 220 suppliers. Those suppliers were identified by Coles as, and believed by Coles to be, its "smaller" suppliers in terms of the annual sum spent by Coles on acquiring the supplier's grocery products (the COGS) as compared to the annual sum spent by Coles on acquiring grocery products from Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers, were suppliers whose COGS were generally greater than $3 million and were suppliers for whom Coles' documents stated Coles represented a "very significant part" of the supplier's business: Annexure 1, pars 24-27. 17 Many of Coles' smaller suppliers have total annual revenue which represents less than a fraction of one per cent of Coles' annual revenue, including the Tier 3 Suppliers the subject of the admitted contraventions: Annexure 1, par 10. 18 For the purpose of these admitted contraventions, the Tier 3 Suppliers were: (1) Austech Products Pty Ltd (Austech); (2) E.D. Oates Pty Ltd (Oates); (3) Paton's Macadamia Plantations Pty Ltd (Paton's); (4) Stuart Alexander & Co Pty Ltd (Stuart Alexander); and (5) Tru Blu Beverages Pty Ltd (Tru Blu).

2.1.2 Coles' Trading Arrangements and the ARC rebate 19 During the ARC relevant period, Coles acquired grocery products for retail sale from its suppliers pursuant to arrangements negotiated between Coles and each supplier (Trading Arrangements): Annexure 1, par 14. Most of the conditions relating to the acquisition by Coles of grocery products from a supplier, including whether Coles would continue to acquire products from that supplier, were determined by representatives of Coles: Annexure 1, par 17. 20 The Trading Arrangements required that Coles be paid various rebates by the suppliers on an ongoing basis. Coles' conduct in relation to the incorporation of the ARC rebate into the Trading Arrangements for a supplier is the subject of the ARC Proceeding. The nature of a rebate, and the ARC rebate in particular, has been described earlier: see [5] above and Annexure 1, par 16. 21 By about 9 September 2011, Coles determined that the ARC rebate would be divided into two components (Annexure 1, pars 23 and 29): (1) An amount said to be attributed by Coles to the value to the supplier from Coles changing its ordering patterns to order grocery products from the supplier in more economically efficient ordering quantities (EOQ ordering); and (2) An amount said to be attributed by Coles to the value to the supplier of data sharing on an internet-based "Supplier Portal" and associated changes of 35 day order plan, nine week sales forecast, six week promotional lock-down and 12 week notice for product deletion (data sharing). 22 By about 10 October 2011, Coles had determined that the ARC rebate to be paid by Tier 3 Suppliers would be the sum of a data sharing component of 0.7% of the price Coles paid for a supplier's grocery products and an EOQ ordering component fixed at a percentage amount of the price Coles paid for a supplier's grocery products that equated to the value Coles attributed to the supplier of EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 31. 23 Coles calculated the rebate for EOQ ordering by: (1) Making a series of assumptions about Tier 3 Suppliers' activities when picking a pallet and delivering the pallet to Coles; (2) Attributing costs to each of those activities based on Coles' own costs; and (3) Inserting data about those activities, historical ordering patterns and costs into a standard formula that was used for all Tier 3 Suppliers regardless of each Tier 3 Supplier's individual circumstances. Coles set a target of $16 million for the amount of money it would seek to obtain in ARC rebates from Tier 3 Suppliers in the financial year ended 30 June 2012: Annexure 1, pars 32-33. 24 By about 14 October 2011, Coles had developed a plan for applying ARC to Tier 3 Suppliers (the Tier 3 ARC Plan). The Tier 3 ARC Plan was approved by Senior Managers: Annexure 1, pars 34 and 36. The Tier 3 ARC Plan was initially implemented by a CM. If necessary, action would be escalated to a BCM or GM. The Tier 3 ARC Plan involved a number of steps. The steps were deliberate, orchestrated and relentless. The steps were described in the following terms (Annexure 1, par 34): 34.1. CMs would: 34.1.1. on or around 17 or 18 October 2011, seek the agreement of each Tier 3 Supplier to make ongoing payments to Coles by the incorporation of the ARC rebate into their Trading Arrangements with Coles (referred to by Coles, and in the remainder of this document, as 'the Ask'); 34.1.2. deliver the Ask in accordance with a standardised script provided by Coles (the Script); 34.1.3. respond to questions from Tier 3 Suppliers about the benefits that were said to flow to them from data sharing and EOQ ordering using a set of prescribed answers; 34.1.4. at their discretion, provide the Supplier with a two-page document that was in a standardised form and purported to explain the basis on which the ARC rebate was calculated (the Background Materials); 34.1.5. at their discretion, provide Suppliers with a Supplier Portal information pack which explained some features of the portal; 34.1.6. record the agreement of Tier 3 Suppliers to the Ask in an executed amended version of the Supplier's Trading Terms incorporating the ARC rebate on an ongoing basis (the Revised Trading Terms); 34.1.7. not have the authority to negotiate on the amount of the ARC rebate with the Tier 3 Supplier but could escalate the negotiation to a more senior person within Coles; 34.1.8. seek to have Tier 3 Suppliers agree to the Ask within a number of days; 34.1.9 if the CM could not obtain the agreement of a Tier 3 Supplier to the Ask, notify the Tier 3 Supplier that its position on the Ask would be 'escalated' to a BCM. 34.2. if a CM could not obtain the agreement of a Tier 3 Supplier to the Ask, responsibility for obtaining the Tier 3 Supplier's agreement was to be 'escalated' from the CM to the BCM to whom the CM reported; 34.3. the BCM to whom responsibility for obtaining the Supplier's agreement to the Ask had been 'escalated' had authority to accept agreement from the Tier 3 Supplier to the Ask in circumstances where the amount of the ARC rebate the Supplier agreed to pay was less than the amount originally sought from the Supplier; 34.4. if a BCM could not obtain the agreement of a Tier 3 Supplier, the BCM was to consider: 34.4.1. notifying the Supplier that its position on the Ask would be escalated within Coles, such as to the GM to whom the BCM reported; 34.4.2. escalating the Tier 3 Supplier's position within Coles, such as to the GM to whom the BCM reported. 34.5. GMs had authority to accept an agreement by a Tier 3 Supplier in circumstances where the amount of the ARC rebate the Supplier agreed to pay was less than the amount originally sought from the Supplier; 34.6. 'escalation' of a Supplier's refusal of the Ask involved the BCM or GM to whom the matter had been elevated making contact with the Tier 3 Supplier in an attempt to secure the Supplier's agreement (Escalation). 25 The Script (identified in the extract in [24] above) contained statements to the effect that Coles had made changes to its Supply Chain, the changes Coles made to its Supply Chain would be of benefit to the supplier identified in the Script, and Coles had identified and calculated savings to that supplier's business in respect of data sharing and EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 37. The Background Materials contained statements to the effect that data sharing would lead to value to the supplier of well over 0.7% of the price Coles paid for the supplier's grocery products and EOQ ordering, where applicable to the supplier, would lead to value to the supplier of at least a specified percentage of the price Coles paid for the supplier's grocery products: Annexure 1, par 38. 26 For the reasons that follow, the Tier 3 ARC Plan and, in particular, the Script and Background Materials, were contrary to law. In putting forward the Script and the Background Materials, Coles had attributed a value to a data sharing benefit that it considered would apply to all Tier 3 Suppliers taken as a whole, but had not identified or calculated any particular savings to any individual Tier 3 Supplier's business, and had calculated the value of EOQ ordering by the method at [23] above but had not taken any steps to establish whether its assumptions reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to any individual Tier 3 Supplier's business: Annexure 1, par 39. In addition, the Script and the Background Materials did not contain information that explained or justified the basis on which the data sharing or EOQ ordering components of the ARC rebate had been determined by Coles: Annexure 1, par 40. 27 The CMs and the BCMs then attended training and were instructed to act in accordance with the Tier 3 ARC Plan: Annexure 1, par 41. For example, they were told (Annexure 1, par 42): 42.1 this is not optional for suppliers; 42.2. Coles 'needed' the CMs to achieve its $16 million target and that this was Coles' 'one off chance' to close [its profit] gap at scale'; 42.3. they would be given a Script to follow and provided with Background Materials and FAQs to be used in the Tier 3 ARC process; 42.4. they were to finalise trading terms with each Tier 3 supplier, incorporating an ARC rebate, within two to three days of making the Ask; 42.5. if a supplier did not agree to pay an ARC rebate within one to two days, the CM or BCM was to consider using commercial leverage; 42.6. various prizes would be awarded to CMs and BCMs who 'landed' suppliers. The training included presentations by Senior Managers. 28 The Tier 3 ARC Plan, as its core, was deliberate, orchestrated and relentless. As will be seen, its implementation by the CMs and the BCMs was also deliberate, orchestrated and relentless. 29 By about 14 October 2011, the CMs and BCMs had been provided with materials which directed their implementation of the Tier 3 ARC Plan: Annexure 1, par 43. The CMs had been provided with a list of the Tier 3 Suppliers to whom they were to deliver the Ask, as defined in the extract in [24] above. The BCMs had been provided with a list of the Tier 3 Suppliers to whom the CMs that reported to them were to deliver the Ask. CMs and BCMs had both been given a version of the Script for use by each CM in relation to each of the Tier 3 Suppliers, each of which contained the statements referred to in [25] above. The front page contained certain details concerning the supplier, including the supplier's name, its supplier ID number, the CM and the BCM responsible for the supplier. The second page contained the amount of the ARC rebate that was to be sought from the particular supplier. 30 CMs and BCMs had also been given access to a version of the Background Materials for use by each CM in relation to each Tier 3 Supplier, each of which contained the statements referred to in [25] above, the name of the supplier and the amount of the ARC rebate that was to be sought from the supplier. CMs had been given access to revised trading terms for each Tier 3 Supplier to whom they were to deliver the Ask, which included the ongoing payments sought by way of the ARC rebate. BCMs had been given access to revised trading terms for each Tier 3 Supplier to whom the CMs who reported to them were to deliver the Ask, which included the ongoing payments sought by way of the ARC rebate: Annexure 1, par 43. 31 When the Tier 3 ARC Plan was implemented from 17 October 2011, Coles (Annexure 1, par 45): (1) Had not consulted with any Tier 3 Supplier regarding the actual value of data sharing to the Tier 3 Supplier or the actual value of EOQ ordering to the Tier 3 Supplier; (2) Had not identified or calculated any particular savings to any particular Tier 3 Supplier's business in respect of data sharing; (3) Had not validated the assumptions it had made about the value of EOQ ordering to any particular Tier 3 Supplier with that Tier 3 Supplier; and (4) Had commenced negotiations with 18 of its Tier 1 and Tier 2 Suppliers about the amounts that those suppliers would pay to Coles in connection with the ARC program and only five of the 18 Tier 1 and Tier 2 Suppliers had agreed to pay any ARC rebate, and all for amounts below 0.7%. 32 Coles now accepts that by reason of the matters in [31] above, it should not have asserted to any Tier 3 Supplier that a 0.7% data sharing component of the ARC rebate reflected the actual value to that Tier 3 Supplier of data sharing and should not have made an assertion to any Tier 3 Supplier about the actual value of EOQ ordering to that Tier 3 Supplier: Annexure 1, par 46. 33 Against that background, it is appropriate to turn to the five admitted contraventions.

2.2.1 Section 22 of the ACL 34 Section 22 of the ACL (as it stood from 1 January to 31 December 2011, i.e. during the ARC relevant period) extended the unconscionable conduct provisions of the ACL to business transactions. It provided, relevantly, that a person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods from another person (other than a listed public company) engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. 35 Section 22(3) (as it stood during the ARC relevant period) set out a non-exhaustive series of considerations to which the Court may have regard for the purpose of determining whether Coles engaged in unconscionable conduct in relation to each of the Tier 3 Suppliers the subject of the admitted contraventions. Those considerations include, relevantly: (1) The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of Coles and each supplier: s 22(3)(a); (2) Whether each supplier was able to understand any documents relating to the acquisition or possible acquisition of their goods by Coles: s 22(3)(c); (3) Whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, each supplier by Coles in relation to the acquisition or possible acquisition of the supplier's goods by Coles: s 22(3)(d); and (4) The extent to which Coles was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with each supplier: s 22(3)(j)(i). 36 Courts have for some time characterised unconscionable conduct as conduct that is clearly unfair or unreasonable, or serious misconduct: see Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 147 at 179 and Hurley v McDonalds Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 172 at [22]. Recently, in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 at [41] the Court stated that "unconscionability" means "something not done in good conscience". The Court went on to describe "unconscionability" as "conduct against conscience by reference to the norms of society that is in question" and that the norm "must be understood and applied in the context in which the circumstances arise". It is against that test or description that the conduct is to be assessed.

2.2.2 Suppliers 37 Coles admits that during the ARC relevant period, it engaged in conduct, which was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL, in relation to each of the Tier 3 Suppliers identified in [18] above. 38 The admitted contravention for each supplier will be considered in turn. As will become apparent, Coles' conduct in relation to the suppliers had some recurring themes and actions. However, it also adopted certain tactics in relation to particular suppliers. 39 The recurring themes can be described as follows. Coles demanded that suppliers pay rebates to it. The rebates were amounts calculated by reference to past orders: orders that had been made and delivered. Coles pressed for speedy answers to its demands, often pointing to adverse commercial consequences it could and would impose on a supplier who did not agree. That conduct was unconscionable.

2.2.2.1 Austech Introduction and conduct 40 Austech manufactures a range of household consumer products under the Orange Power, Aware, Actizyme and Stain Magic brands, which it supplies primarily to supermarkets. Coles acquired ten household consumer products from Austech for sale in Coles' retail stores. Each product was sold by Coles under brands associated with Austech. The products acquired from Austech were part of the range acquired by Coles' Homecare Business Category: Annexure 1, pars 111-112. 41 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Austech, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sales of Austech's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Austech and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Austech with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 1, par 17. 42 The following aspects of Coles' admitted conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 1, pars 111-127: Coles' admitted conduct prior to and during the Austech Ask, Austech's response to the Austech Ask, Coles' admitted threat to Austech and Austech's agreement to the Austech Ask. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Finding of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 43 In October 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Austech, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the ARC relevant period). That unconscionable conduct involved Coles: (1) Requiring Austech to make an agreement to pay an ongoing rebate to it, and making threats of commercial consequences to Austech if Austech did not, namely that Coles would (i) provide certain ranging information requested by Austech but only after Austech agreed to pay the ongoing rebate and (ii) cease giving assistance to Austech from Coles' replenishers; (2) Refusing to take into account the reasons given to Coles by Austech as to why the ARC rebate would not have the benefit to it that Coles claimed, in all of the circumstances outlined in Annexure 1, Part III and pars 111 to 127. 44 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Austech: Annexure 1, par 113; (2) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Austech to understand how Coles had determined the figure of 0.7% for data sharing or the figure of 0.5% for EOQ ordering, which made up the Austech ARC rebate (Annexure 1, pars 117.3 and 121.3) and how the Austech ARC rebate reflected the value to Austech of data sharing: Annexure 1, par 127.1; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and unfair tactics on Austech by: (a) informing Austech that it was required to agree to the Austech Ask: Annexure 1, par 117.2.4; (b) making repeated requests for a response to the Austech Ask from Austech despite the matters in (2) above: Annexure 1, par 121; and (c) threatening Austech with commercial consequences as outlined in [43] above, if Austech did not agree to the Austech Ask; (4) Coles incorrectly asserting that the Austech ARC rebate reflected the value to Austech of data sharing and EOQ ordering in circumstances where it should not have made that assertion because Coles had not (Annexure 1, pars 39, 45, 117.4 and 118): (a) consulted with Austech regarding the actual value of data sharing or EOQ ordering to Austech; (b) identified or calculated any particular savings attributable to data sharing for Austech's business; and (c) established whether the assumptions it had used to calculate the EOQ ordering component of the rebate reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to Austech's business; and (5) Coles not conducting any informed negotiation with Austech about the value to Austech of data sharing or EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 127.2.

2.2.2.2 Oates Introduction and conduct 45 Oates supplies mostly imported janitorial cleaning products, including chemicals, brushware and mops to Australian retailers and wholesalers. Coles acquired 35 products from Oates for sale in Coles' retail stores. The products were sold under the Oates brand. The majority of the products Coles acquired from Oates were acquired for its Homecare Business Category: Annexure 1, pars 128-129. 46 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Oates, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sales of Oates' products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Oates and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Oates with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 1, par 17. 47 The following aspects of Coles' conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 1, pars 131-151: Coles' admitted conduct prior to and during the Oates Ask, Coles' admitted follow up to the Oates Ask, Coles' admitted escalation of the Oates Ask, Coles' admitted threat to Oates and Oates' agreement to the Oates Ask. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Finding of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 48 In October 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Oates, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the ARC relevant period). 49 Coles' unconscionable conduct involved requiring Oates to make an agreement to pay an ongoing rebate to it, and making threats of commercial consequences to it if it did not, namely that if Oates did not sign up to ARC: (1) This may impact on Coles' decisions about ranging Oates' products relative to other suppliers; (2) There may be risks to promotional activity for Oates' products; and (3) Oates would be classified as a 'transactional' supplier, which may have implications for ranging, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 1, Part III and pars 128 to 151. 50 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Oates: Annexure 1, par 130; (2) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Oates to understand how Coles had determined the figure of 0.7% for data sharing or the figure of 0.44% for EOQ ordering, which made up the Oates ARC rebate (Annexure 1, par 136.3) and how the Oates ARC rebate reflected the value to Oates of data sharing: Annexure 1, par 151.1; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and unfair tactics on Oates by: (a) Pressing Oates for a response to the Oates Ask within a short period of time: Annexure 1, pars 136.2.5, 136.2.6, 138.2, 138.3 and 143; (b) Informing Oates that it was required to agree to the Oates Ask: Annexure 1, para 136.2.7; (c) Making repeated requests for a response to the Oates Ask from Oates despite the matters in (2) above: Annexure 1, pars 138-140, 143 and 144; and (d) Threatening Oates with commercial consequences (see [49] above) if Oates did not agree to the Oates Ask: Annexure 1, pars 147.2, 148 and 149.2; and (4) Coles incorrectly asserting that the Oates ARC rebate reflected the value to Oates of data sharing and EOQ ordering in circumstances where it should not have made that assertion because Coles had not (Annexure 1, pars 39, 45 and 136.4): (a) Consulted with Oates regarding the actual value of data sharing or EOQ ordering to Oates; (b) Identified or calculated any particular savings attributable to data sharing for Oates' business; and (c) Established whether the assumptions it had used to calculate the EOQ ordering component of the rebate reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to Oates' business; and (5) Coles not conducting any informed negotiation with Oates about the value to Oates of data sharing or EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 151.2.

2.2.2.3 Paton's Introduction and conduct 51 Paton's manufactures chocolate coated macadamia nuts and other chocolate coated confectionery for domestic and international customers. Coles acquired six chocolate coated confectionery products from Paton's for sale in Coles' retail stores. Five of those products were private label products, which were acquired by Coles for sale under Coles' own brands. The products were acquired from Paton's for its Snacks and Beverages, or 'Impulse', Business Category (Impulse Business Category): Annexure 1, pars 48-49. 52 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Paton's, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sales of Paton's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Paton's and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Paton's with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 1, par 17. 53 The following aspects of Coles' admitted conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 1, pars 51-67: Coles' admitted conduct prior to and during the Paton's Ask, Paton's response to the Paton's Ask, including Coles providing revised Paton's trading terms to Paton's, Coles' admitted escalation of the Paton's Ask, Coles' admitted threat to Paton's and Paton's agreement to the Paton's Ask. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Finding of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 54 In October 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Paton's, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the ARC relevant period). 55 Coles' unconscionable conduct involved requiring Paton's to make an agreement to pay an ongoing rebate to it, and making threats of commercial consequences to it if it did not, namely that Coles: (1) Would not promote Paton's products; (2) Would not acquire new products from Paton's; (3) Would not provide Paton's with forecasting information that had been provided without charge prior to the requirement, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 1, Part III and pars 48 to 67. 56 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Paton's: Annexure 1, par 50; (2) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Paton's to understand how Coles had determined the figure of 0.7% for data sharing or the figure of 0.55% for EOQ ordering, which made up the Paton's ARC rebate (Annexure 1, pars 56.3, 59.4, 62 and 65.3) and how the Paton's ARC rebate reflected the value to Paton's of data sharing: Annexure 1, par 67.1; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and unfair tactics on Paton's by: (a) Pressing Paton's for a response to the Paton's Ask within a short period of time: Annexure 1, pars 56.2.4, 56.2.5, 62.1, 65.1.2; (b) Informing Paton's that it was expected to agree to the Paton's Ask: Annexure 1, par 65.1.1; (c) Informing Paton's that the Paton's ARC rebate was a cost of doing business: Annexure 1, par 62.2; (d) Making repeated requests for a response to the Paton's Ask from Paton's despite the matters in (2) above: Annexure 1, pars 60, 62 and 65; and (e) Threatening Paton's with commercial consequences outlined in [55] above if Paton's did not agree to the Paton's Ask: Annexure 1, par 65.2; (4) Coles incorrectly asserting that the Paton's ARC rebate reflected the value to Paton's of data sharing and EOQ ordering in circumstances where it should not have made that assertion because Coles had not (Annexure 1, pars 39, 45, 56.4 and 57): (a) Consulted with Paton's regarding the actual value of data sharing or EOQ ordering to Paton's; (b) Identified or calculated any particular savings attributable to data sharing for Paton's business; and (c) Established whether the assumptions it had used to calculate the EOQ ordering component of the rebate reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to Paton's business; and (5) Coles not conducting any informed negotiation with Paton's about the value to Paton's of data sharing or EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 67.2.

2.2.2.4 Stuart Alexander Introduction and conduct 57 Stuart Alexander imports, markets and distributes branded products including chocolate, confectionery, chewing gum, salty snacks, beverages, sauces, syrups and tobacco, which it primarily supplies to supermarkets. Coles acquired goods for retail sale in Coles' retail stores from Stuart Alexander for five different categories, including confectionery products that were acquired by Coles for its Impulse Business Category. The confectionery products that Coles acquired from Stuart Alexander were imported branded confectionery products: Annexure 1, pars 68-69. 58 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Stuart Alexander, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sales of Stuart Alexander's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Stuart Alexander and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Stuart Alexander with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 1, par 17. 59 The following aspects of Coles' admitted conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 1, pars 71-92. Coles' admitted conduct prior to and during the Stuart Alexander Ask, Coles' admitted escalation of the Stuart Alexander Ask, Coles' admitted threat to Stuart Alexander, Coles' admitted provision of revised Stuart Alexander Confectionary trading terms to Stuart Alexander and Coles' admitted further threats and escalation of the Stuart Alexander Ask. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Finding of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 60 In October 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Stuart Alexander, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the ARC relevant period). 61 Coles' unconscionable conduct involved requiring Stuart Alexander to make an agreement to pay an ongoing rebate to it, and making threats of commercial consequences to it if it did not, namely that Coles would not acquire new products from Stuart Alexander and would not promote Stuart Alexander's products, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 1, Part III and pars 68 to 92. 62 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Stuart Alexander: Annexure 1, par 70; (2) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Stuart Alexander to understand how Coles had determined the figure of 0.7% for data sharing or the figure of 0.31% for EOQ ordering, which made up the Stuart Alexander ARC rebate (Annexure 1, pars 76.3, 80 and 84) and how the Stuart Alexander ARC rebate reflected the value to Stuart Alexander of data sharing: Annexure 1, par 92.1; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and unfair tactics on Stuart Alexander by: (a) Pressing Stuart Alexander for a response to the Stuart Alexander Ask within a short period of time: Annexure 1, pars 76.2.4, 85 and 88; (b) Making repeated requests for a response to the Stuart Alexander Ask from Stuart Alexander despite the matters in (2) above: Annexure 1, pars 79, 83, 85, 88 and 89; and (c) Threatening Stuart Alexander with commercial consequences (see [61] above) if Stuart Alexander did not agree to the Stuart Alexander Ask: Annexure 1, pars 83 and 88; (4) Coles incorrectly asserting that the Stuart Alexander ARC rebate reflected the value to Stuart Alexander of data sharing and EOQ ordering in circumstances where it should not have made that assertion because Coles had not (Annexure 1, pars 39, 45, 76.4 and 77): (a) Consulted with Stuart Alexander regarding the actual value of data sharing or EOQ ordering to Stuart Alexander; (b) Identified or calculated any particular savings attributable to data sharing for Stuart Alexander's business; and (c) Established whether the assumptions it had used to calculate the EOQ ordering component of the rebate reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to Stuart Alexander's business; and (5) Coles not conducting any informed negotiation with Stuart Alexander about the value to Stuart Alexander of data sharing or EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 92.2.

2.2.2.5 Tru Blu Introduction and conduct 63 Tru Blu manufactures, markets and supplies branded and private label carbonated (soft drink) beverages and cordials to retailers in Australia. The majority of the products that Coles acquired from Tru Blu for sale in Coles' retail stores were private label products, which Tru Blu manufactured for Coles and packaged under Coles' own brands. These products were acquired by Coles from Tru Blu on an order-to-order basis without a fixed-term contract. The products were acquired from Tru Blu for Coles' Impulse Business Category: Annexure 1, pars 93-94. 64 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Tru Blu, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sales of Tru Blu's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Tru Blu and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Tru Blu with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 1, par 17. 65 The following aspects of Coles' admitted conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 1, pars 96-110: Coles' admitted conduct prior to and during the Tru Blu Ask, Tru Blu's response to the Tru Blu Ask, Coles' admitted threat to Tru Blu and action by Coles, Coles' admitted further actions by Coles and Tru Blu's response to the Tru Blu Ask. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Finding of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 66 In October 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Tru Blu, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the ARC relevant period). 67 Coles' unconscionable conduct involved: (1) Requiring Tru Blu to make an agreement to pay an ongoing rebate to it, and making threats of commercial consequences to it if it did not, namely that Coles would not meet with Tru Blu and would not continue any contractual negotiations then on foot with Tru Blu; and (2) Refusing to take into account the reasons given to Coles by Tru Blu why the rebate would not have the benefits to it that Coles claimed, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 1, Part III and pars 93 to 110. 68 The circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Tru Blu: Annexure 1, par 95; (2) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Tru Blu to understand how Coles had determined the figure of 0.7% for data sharing or the figure of 0.1% for EOQ ordering, which made up the Tru Blu ARC rebate (Annexure 1, pars 99.4, 101 and 108.3) and how the Tru Blu ARC rebate reflected the value to Tru Blu of data sharing: Annexure 1, par 110.1; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and unfair tactics on Tru Blu by: (a) Pressing Tru Blu for a response to the Tru Blu Ask within a short period of time: Annexure 1, par 99.3; (b) Making repeated requests for a response to the Tru Blu Ask from Tru Blu despite the matters in (2) above: Annexure 1, pars 104.1, 105 and 108; and (c) Threatening Tru Blu with commercial consequences in [67] above if Tru Blu did not agree to the Tru Blu Ask: Annexure 1, pars 104.3, 105 and 108.2; (4) Coles incorrectly asserting that the Tru Blu ARC rebate reflected the value to Tru Blu of data sharing and EOQ ordering in circumstances where it should not have made that assertion because Coles had not (Annexure 1, pars 39, 45, 99.5 and 100): (a) Consulted with Tru Blu regarding the actual value of data sharing or EOQ ordering to Tru Blu; (b) Identified or calculated any particular savings attributable to data sharing for Tru Blu's business; and (c) Established whether the assumptions it had used to calculate the EOQ ordering component of the rebate reflected the actual value of EOQ ordering to Tru Blu's business; and (5) Coles not conducting any informed negotiation with Tru Blu about the value to Tru Blu of data sharing or EOQ ordering: Annexure 1, par 110.2.

2.3.1 Orders sought by agreement 69 The parties jointly sought the making of particular orders by the Court. 70 The applicable principles are well established. First, there is a well-recognised public interest in the settlement of cases under the Act: NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 291. Second, the orders proposed by agreement of the parties must be not contrary to the public interest and at least consistent with it: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [18]. 71 Third, when deciding whether to make orders that are consented to by the parties, the Court must be satisfied that it has the power to make the orders proposed and that the orders are appropriate: Real Estate Institute at [17] and [20] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Virgin Mobile Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 1548 at [1]. Parties cannot by consent confer power to make orders that the Court otherwise lacks the power to make: Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 at 163. 72 Fourth, once the Court is satisfied that orders are within power and appropriate, it should exercise a degree of restraint when scrutinising the proposed settlement terms, particularly where both parties are legally represented and able to understand and evaluate the desirability of the settlement: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Woolworths (South Australia) Pty Ltd (Trading as Mac's Liquor) [2003] FCA 530 at [21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Target Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1326 at [24]; Real Estate Institute at [20]-[21]; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Econovite Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 964 at [11] and [22] and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2007] FCA 1370 at [4]. 73 Finally, in deciding whether agreed orders conform with legal principle, the Court is entitled to treat the consent of Coles as an admission of all facts necessary or appropriate to the granting of the relief sought against it: Thomson Australian Holdings at 164.

2.3.2 Declarations 74 The Court has a wide discretionary power to make declarations under s 21 of the Federal Court Act: Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437-8; Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 581-2 and Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89 at 99. 75 Where a declaration is sought with the consent of the parties, the Court's discretion is not supplanted, but nor will the Court refuse to give effect to terms of settlement by refusing to make orders where they are within the Court's jurisdiction and are otherwise unobjectionable: see, for example, Econovite at [11]. 76 However, before making declarations, three requirements should be satisfied: (1) The question must be a real and not a hypothetical or theoretical one; (2) The applicant must have a real interest in raising it; and (3) There must be a proper contradictor: Forster v Jododex at 437-8. 77 In this proceeding, these requirements are satisfied. The proposed declarations relate to conduct that contravenes the ACL and the matters in issue have been identified and particularised by the parties with precision: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 378 at [35]. The proposed declarations contain sufficient indication of how and why the relevant conduct is a contravention of the ACL: BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2004] FCAFC 167 at [35]. 78 It is in the public interest for the ACCC to seek to have the declarations made and for the declarations to be made (see the factors outlined in ACCC v CFMEU at [6]). There is a significant legal controversy in this case which is being resolved. The ACCC, as a public regulator under the ACL, has a genuine interest in seeking the declaratory relief and Coles is a proper contradictor because it has contravened the ACL and is the subject of the declarations. Coles has an interest in opposing the making of them: MSY Technology at [30]. No less importantly, the declarations sought are appropriate because they serve to record the Court's disapproval of the contravening conduct, vindicate the ACCC's claim that Coles contravened the ACL, assist the ACCC to carry out the duties conferred upon it by the Act (including the ACL) in relation to other similar conduct, inform the public of the harm arising from Coles' contravening conduct and deter other corporations from contravening the ACL. 79 Finally, the facts and admissions in Annexure 1 provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations: s 191 of the Evidence Act; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at [57]-[59] endorsed by the Full Court in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 513 at [92]; Hadgkiss v Aldin (No 2) [2007] FCA 2069 at [21]-[22]; Secretary, Department of Health & Ageing v Pagasa Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1545 at [77]-[79] and Ponzio v B & P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 543. 80 For those reasons, declarations of contravention of s 22 of the ACL will be made recording Coles' unconscionable conduct in relation to Austech ([43]-[44] above), Oates ([48]-[50] above), Paton's ([54]-[56] above), Stuart Alexander ([60]-[62] above) and Tru Blu ([66]-[68] above).

2.3.3 Penalties 81 Sections 224(1)(a)(i) of the ACL relevantly empowers the Court, in respect of contraventions of provisions of Pt 2-2 (including s 22), to order the contravener to pay such pecuniary penalty in respect of "each act or omission" as the Court determines to be appropriate. 82 The ACCC and Coles jointly submitted that the Court should make orders imposing pecuniary penalties, pursuant to s 224, upon Coles totalling $3,700,000, in respect of its five admitted contraventions of s 22 of the ACL.

2.3.3.1 Factors relevant to setting a penalty 83 Section 224(2) of the ACL provides that, in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the Court must have regard to all relevant matters including the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission, the circumstances in which the act or omission took place and whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Ch 4 or Pt 5-2 of the ACL to have engaged in any similar conduct. Those mandatory considerations are non-exhaustive.

2.3.3.2 Other penalty factors including approach to penalties sought by agreement of the parties 84 Section 224 of the ACL came into force on 1 January 2011. It was preceded by s 76E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA) (now the Act) which came into force on 15 April 2010. The principles applied by this Court in determining penalties under s 76 of the TPA apply to penalties under s 76E of the TPA and s 224(2) of the ACL, unless the context of the infringements makes it plain that cannot be so: see Global One Mobile Entertainment Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 134 at [114]-[119]. 85 Recently, in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Renegade Gas Pty Ltd (trading as Supagas NSW) [2014] FCA 1135 at [74]-[83], I addressed the other considerations that may be relevant to an assessment of a pecuniary penalty. I adopt that analysis. In conclusion, as stated in that judgment at [83]: I remain of the view … that the role of the Court is to assess what it would do itself based on the facts. What penalty would the Court impose that is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct? There is no prescribed method. The method will invariably vary depending on the facts. 86 It is against that background that I turn to consider the proposed penalties.

2.4 Analysis of Proposed Penalties 87 In applying those principles, the ACCC and Coles submitted that the proposed total penalty of $3.7 million is not inadequate or excessive, having regard to all relevant matters. 88 The maximum penalty for a body corporate for each act or omission that relates to a provision of Pt 2-2 of the ACL, which includes s 22, is $1.1 million. In considering the maximum penalties, Coles is not liable to more than one pecuniary penalty in respect of the same conduct: s 224(4)(b) of the ACL.

2.4.1 Nature, extent and duration of conduct and the circumstances in which conduct took place

2.4.1.1 Extent of the conduct 89 The admitted conduct occurred from April 2011 to December 2011. It concerned, and occurred during the course of, Coles' communications with each of the five suppliers. The ARC rebates (the subject of these contraventions) have continued to apply to the Trading Arrangements of the five suppliers throughout the three year period since December 2011. Therefore, while the admitted contravening conduct itself occurred during a nine month period in 2011, the effects of those contraventions were experienced by each of the five suppliers from 2011 to 2014.

2.4.1.2 Background circumstances relating to the contravening conduct 90 Unconscionable conduct falls to be determined "in all the circumstances": see Section 2.2.1 above. The conduct admitted by Coles to be unconscionable and in contravention of s 22 of the ACL in relation to each of the five suppliers took place in the context of the circumstances set out in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. Particular aspects of those circumstances should be emphasised.

2.4.1.2.1 Coles general business practices and profit targets 91 During the ARC relevant period, Coles set broad financial targets for its General Categories and Business Categories, including profit targets: see Annexure 1, par 19. Achieving profit targets was a significant focus of Coles in the ARC relevant period, and Coles incentivised its CMs and BCMs to meet these targets by way of prizes: see Annexure 1, pars 19 and 42.6. 92 One way for Coles' CMs and BCMs to meet profit targets was by demanding or seeking additional payments from suppliers. Coles set aside specific days for this purpose (Annexure 1, par 19.3), and encouraged its CMs and BCMs to seek rebates and additional payments from suppliers. In addition to broad financial targets, Coles also set specific profit targets for particular initiatives. One such initiative was the Tier 3 ARC rebate target: Annexure 1, pars 19 and 33.

2.4.1.2.2 Development of the ARC Plan 93 In or around April 2011, Coles had identified that it could increase its EBIT by identifying opportunities for the recovery from suppliers of cost savings which Coles considered had been, or would be, achieved across its end to end supply chain: Annexure 1, par 21. In about October 2011, Coles introduced the Tier 3 ARC Plan to its CMs and BCMs and conveyed to them that the Tier 3 ARC Plan was a one-off chance for Coles to close its profit gap: Annexure 1, pars 41 and 42. 94 The Tier 3 ARC Plan, as developed by Coles, was a strategy for Coles to close what it described as a "profit gap" which included the following features: (1) Seeking payments from its suppliers by way of an ongoing rebate in the suppliers' Trading Arrangements: Annexure 1, pars 20-23 and 28; (2) The division of its suppliers into "tiers", with Tier 3 comprising suppliers considered by Coles to be smaller and for whom Coles' documents stated that Coles represented a "very significant part" of the supplier's business: see Section 2.1.1 above and Annexure 1, pars 24-27; (3) Modification of the method by which Coles would seek payment of the ARC rebate from suppliers, by reference to the size of the supplier: Annexure 1, pars 34-35; (4) Pre-determined targets of the amount of money it wanted to obtain from suppliers, including $16 million from the Tier 3 Suppliers: Annexure 1, par 33; (5) Attributing values to the ARC rebate to be paid by each supplier to Coles but without having identified or calculated any such value to any particular Tier 3 Supplier: Annexure 1, pars 31 and 32; (6) Coles' CMs and BCMs seeking the ARC rebate from its Tier 3 Suppliers based on the values Coles had attributed to the ARC rebate: Annexure 1, pars 56.1, 76.1, 98, 117.1 and 136.1; and (7) Conveying those instructions to CMs and BCMs, in the context of the importance of the Tier 3 ARC Plan to Coles: Annexure 1, pars 41-44.

2.4.1.2.3 Delivery of the ARC instructions 95 The ARC instructions included the following features (see Section 2.1.2 above): (1) They conveyed a focus on the importance of the ARC Plan to Coles' profits, including by BCMs and GMs (who are Coles' Senior Managers); (2) They conveyed that the CMs were not to negotiate the Ask; (3) They conveyed that there was a sense of urgency about having each supplier agree to new trading terms incorporating the ARC rebate within a number of days; and (4) They did not provide the CMs and BCMs with sufficient information about how Coles had attributed the values to the ARC rebate, such that those CMs and BCMs were then unable to provide adequate explanations of the ARC rebate to the supplier to whom they delivered the Ask.

2.4.1.3 Relationship of the background circumstances to specific instances of unconscionable conduct 96 Coles' practices, plans and instructions were deliberate, orchestrated and relentless and formed the circumstances in which the unconscionable conduct against the five specific suppliers occurred.

2.4.1.4 Nature of the conduct 97 The conduct had common elements which are factors relevant to the determination of the appropriate penalty. 98 The five suppliers the subject of the admitted contraventions from whom Coles sought payment of the ARC rebate: (1) Were significantly smaller than Coles (all had annual revenue of less than a fraction of 0.1% of Coles' annual revenue); (2) Were highly dependent on their ongoing sales to Coles for their business to remain viable; (3) Would have experienced significant detriment if Coles had ceased, or substantially decreased, its trading with them; (4) Were provided with inadequate and incorrect information by Coles in relation to the value to them of the ARC rebate; (5) Did not agree with, or could not understand, the value that Coles had attributed to the ARC rebate; (6) Were pressured by Coles to agree to the ARC rebate; (7) Feared the impact on their ongoing dealings with Coles if they refused to pay the ARC rebate, and felt that they had no choice but to agree to the ARC rebate; and (8) Commenced paying, and continued to pay, the ARC rebate, despite the fact that they did not consider, at the time they agreed to the ARC rebate, that ARC had the value to their business as represented by Coles. 99 In relation to these suppliers, Coles was motivated by profit in seeking agreement to the ARC rebate, did not convey to the suppliers that it was optional for them to agree to the ARC rebate, did not provide the suppliers with adequate information, or provided them with incorrect information, about the ARC rebate, and threatened commercial consequences as leverage to obtain the agreement of the suppliers. 100 In addition to those common elements, each supplier was subjected to particular threats of commercial consequences as follows: (1) In relation to Austech, Coles would cease giving support to the supplier from Coles' replenishers and would provide certain ranging information requested by Austech but only after it agreed to pay the ongoing ARC rebate: see Section 2.2.2.1 above; (2) In relation to Oates, if it did not agree to the ARC: (a) this may impact on Coles' decision about the ranging of Oates' products relative to other suppliers; (b) there may be risks to promotional activity for Oates' products; (c) Oates would be classified as a 'transactional' supplier, which may have implications for ranging; (3) In relation to Paton's and Stuart Alexander: (a) Coles would not promote the supplier's products; (b) Coles would not acquire new products from the supplier; (4) In relation to Paton's, Coles would not provide it with forecasting information that it had previously been provided with, without charge, prior to the Paton's Ask; (5) In relation to Tru Blu, Coles would not meet with it about its business and Coles would not continue contractual negotiations then on foot with it. 101 The ACCC submitted, Coles accepts and the Court finds that each of those acts in [100], in all of the circumstances, was contrary to conscience and in contravention of s 22 of the ACL. 102 Coles' misconduct was serious. I reject Coles' submission that these contraventions are somehow distinguishable, or of a less serious nature, because they did not involve vulnerable consumers. Coles' conduct did not involve vulnerable consumers. Coles' conduct did involve vulnerable suppliers - some of Coles' smaller suppliers: see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above. Indeed, their lack of size was one of the reasons why they were classified as Tier 3 Suppliers and targeted by Coles. These vulnerable suppliers were up against Coles - the second largest retailer of grocery products in Australia. It is unsurprising that Coles admits that it had substantially stronger bargaining power. It is difficult to envisage circumstances involving a larger disparity in bargaining power. 103 Coles' conduct was also serious because the admitted unconscionable conduct was difficult for the ACCC to detect due to the reluctance of smaller suppliers to report complaints about, and assist the ACCC with investigations into, the conduct of major retailers, when they rely on these retailers for the ongoing viability of their businesses. The contraventions also showed a failure of Coles' internal compliance systems and processes, which had the potential to impact a number of suppliers with whom representatives of Coles had dealings. 104 Coles' misconduct was serious, deliberate and repeated. Coles misused its substantial bargaining power. Its conduct was "not done in good conscience". 105 Coles accepted that in its dealings with the five suppliers it treated them in a manner inconsistent with acceptable business practice, was not respectful of the suppliers' needs for full and timely transparency, and nor did it properly respect the responsibility attached to Coles' bargaining power. 106 The ACL provides for significant penalties for these contraventions. It is a matter for the Parliament to review whether the maximum available penalty of $1.1 million for each contravention of Pt 2-2 of the ACL by a body corporate is sufficient when a corporation with annual revenue in excess of $22 billion acts unconscionably. The current maximum penalties are arguably inadequate for a corporation the size of Coles.

2.4.2 Amount of loss caused and profit gained 107 Where it is easy to imagine detriment to consumers, the Courts have stated that the absence of evidence of loss or damage to consumers constitutes a factor in mitigation of penalty: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20 at [58]-[59] and the case there cited. That principle applies equally in assessing detriment to suppliers. Of course, the inability to quantify financial loss caused to the suppliers by the contraventions does not mean that no loss or harm has been suffered: see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Global One Mobile Entertainment Limited [2011] FCA 393 at [135]. 108 Here, it was common ground that the five affected suppliers received access to the Supplier Portal and had their products ordered using EOQ ordering. However, it is not known whether those suppliers actually received the benefits alleged to exist by Coles throughout the period that those suppliers were making the demanded payments to Coles. 109 Coles' wrongful conduct denied the five suppliers the ability to decide not to pay the ARC rebate, as their choices were to pay the additional rebate or be subject to commercially detrimental consequences, which would have likely caused them loss. That is unconscionable. The full extent of any loss or damage caused to the five suppliers by Coles' unconscionable conduct has not been quantified. However, it can and should be inferred that Coles' unconscionable conduct had a detrimental effect on each of the five suppliers.

2.4.3 Whether the respondent has engaged in similar prior conduct 110 Coles has not previously been alleged by the ACCC, nor been found, to have engaged in unconscionable conduct. Coles has, on a previous occasion, been found by the Court to have engaged in conduct in contravention of the ACL. These contraventions related to claims made by Coles that partially baked bread sold in its stores was freshly baked, or baked that day, which were held to be misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18, false or misleading representations about goods in contravention of s 29 and misleading conduct as to the nature of goods in contravention of s 33: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2014] FCA 1022. It is necessary to add to that analysis the findings of contravention in relation to the Claims Proceeding in Section 3 below. They cannot be, and should not, be ignored.

2.4.4 Size of contravener, including market share, and its financial position 111 These matters have been addressed earlier: see Section 2.1.1 above. 112 During the ARC relevant period, Coles was the second largest supplier of retail grocery products to customers in Australia supplying approximately 30% of the grocery products supplied for retail sale to customers in Australia and, together with Woolworths, supplied approximately 60-70% of the grocery products supplied for retail sale to customers in Australia: Annexure 1, par 9 and 10. Coles operated retail stores in every Australian State and mainland Territory. During the 2011 to 2012 financial year, Coles' annual sales revenue derived from Coles' retail supermarkets was about $23.3 billion and its profits were increasing. 113 Coles' commercial activities substantially permeate the commercial and consumer life of the public. It is appropriate to take those facts into account in determining an appropriate level of penalty: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) ATPR 41-562 at 43,815-6.

2.4.5 The deliberateness of the contravening conduct 114 The conduct in relation to each of the five suppliers was deliberate and was engaged in within the context of the broader ARC Program and the Tier 3 ARC Plan: see [5] and Section 2.1.2 above.

2.4.6 Involvement of senior employees or management 115 The ARC Program and Tier 3 ARC Plan have been described earlier: see [5] and Section 2.1.2. They were approved Coles' corporate strategies. The contravening conduct in relation to the five suppliers involved Coles' CMs and BCMs. BCMs are part of Coles' senior management: Annexure 1, par 13. 116 Coles does not admit that any other members of Coles' senior management engaged in the conduct the subject of the contraventions. However, Coles admits that its GMs and BCMs (who are Coles' Senior Managers), at least were aware of, and encouraged, the practice of seeking money from suppliers to meet profit targets, endorsed the ARC plan, gave the ARC instructions to Coles' CMs and BCMs and did not take adequate steps to prevent the contravening conduct by CMs and BCMs.

2.4.7 Culture of compliance and corrective measures in response to contravention 117 At the time of the contravening conduct, Coles had trade practices compliance policies in place. They did not prevent the conduct occurring. The conduct of Coles' CMs and BCMs the subject of the admitted contraventions indicates that the programs Coles had in place were inadequate. Coles accepts that significant penalties are both a necessary and sufficient deterrent. 118 As these reasons for judgment record, Coles and the ACCC have negotiated a resolution of these proceedings. The ACCC now holds the view that Coles has accepted, at the most senior level of its business, that the conduct the subject of the contraventions was unacceptable and that there is genuine contrition at that level of the company regarding Coles' treatment of its smaller suppliers. At the hearing, Senior Counsel for Coles informed the Court that Coles did accept, at the most senior level of its business, that the contravening conduct was unacceptable and involved serious contraventions, and Coles was genuinely contrite about its treatment of its suppliers. 119 It is important to record that Coles has undertaken to the ACCC to have an independent arbiter review its conduct with the Tier 3 Suppliers and assess their entitlement to refunds of any relevant payment. That undertaking, which is Annexure 3 to these reasons for judgment, is addressed further in Section 2.4.8 below. 120 The ACCC also acknowledged that Coles has taken a number of steps to address the failures that led to these contraventions including: (1) A best practice compliance framework and additional training to ensure Coles' suppliers are treated in an open and fair manner; (2) A Supplier Charter, which sets out public commitments made by Coles in relation to how it will deal with suppliers; (3) A dispute resolution framework, which provides suppliers with the right to raise concerns on a confidential basis with an independent arbiter; and (4) Public support for a Food and Grocery Code. 121 Coles provided the Court with a copy of documents which recorded the matters referred to in [120] above. I have read those documents. I accept that on their face they record that Coles has taken the steps outlined. It is by no means clear that the steps address the failures that led to the contraventions because what led to them was not explained.

2.4.8 Co-operation 122 Coles has cooperated with the ACCC during the course of its investigation and in relation to the resolution of the proceeding. 123 Coles also has offered to the ACCC (and the ACCC has accepted) the statutory undertaking set out in Annexure 3 to these reasons for judgment in respect of the Tier 3 Suppliers. That undertaking is an important part of the resolution of this proceeding. As the ACCC submitted, this undertaking facilitated the confinement of these proceedings with the result that the ACCC no longer considers it necessary to pursue orders to protect the interests of all the Tier 3 Suppliers listed in Annexure A to that undertaking. 124 This cooperation, and Coles' agreement to resolve the proceedings, has saved the ACCC and the Court (and hence ultimately the community) the cost and burden of a long, complex and expensive case. In those circumstances, Coles is entitled to a discount on the penalty that otherwise would have been appropriate, for its voluntary acknowledgment of liability and cooperation. Had Coles not cooperated, and had it been found to have committed the alleged contraventions following a contested hearing, the ACCC would have sought and the Court would have imposed significantly higher penalties.

2.4.9 Maximum penalties and one transaction principle 125 As noted above, the maximum penalty for a body corporate for each act or omission that relates to a provision of Part 2-2 of the ACL, which includes s 22, is $1.1 million: Item 1 of s 224(3) of the ACL. 126 Courts are required to pay careful attention to maximum penalties when imposing penalties because the Parliament has legislated for them, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time and, in that regard they provide a yardstick, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [31]. 127 In considering the maximum penalties, Coles is not liable for more than one pecuniary penalty in respect of the same conduct: s 224(4)(b) of the ACL. In determining what constitutes the same conduct, regard may be had to the "one transaction" or "one course of conduct" principle as explained by the majority of the Full Court in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill (2010) 194 IR 461 39 at [39] and [41]: The principle recognises that where there is an interrelationship between the legal and factual elements of two or more offences for which an offender has been charged, care must be taken to ensure that the offender is not punished twice for what is essentially the same criminality. That requires careful identification of what is "the same criminality" and that is necessarily a factual specific inquiry. … In other words, where two offences arise as a result of the same or related conduct that is not a disentitling factor to the application of the single course of conduct principle but a reason why a Court may have regard to that principle, as one of the applicable sentencing principles, to guide it in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. It is a tool of analysis which a Court is not compelled to utilise. (Citations and emphasis omitted.) 128 The five admitted contraventions of s 22 of the ACL each involve discrete conduct against five individual suppliers. It is appropriate that a discrete penalty is imposed for each admitted contravention.

2.4.10 Identifying the penalties for particular contraventions 129 Having regard to all of those factors, I accept that the following penalties for each contravention are appropriate and they are imposed in relation to: (1) Austech, in the sum of $700,000; (2) Oates, in the sum of $800,000; (3) Paton's, in the sum of $800,000; (4) Stuart Alexander, in the sum of $700,000; (5) Tru Blu, in the sum of $700,000. 130 These penalties provide a significant mark of the Court's disapproval for the wrongdoing associated with each course of conduct (when examined against the statutory maximum for a single breach). It also makes appropriate allowance for the various mitigating features identified above. 131 The ACCC submitted, and Coles accepted, that the threats made to Oates and Paton's were the more serious of the threats made against the five suppliers, as they involved threats to cease existing agreements with those suppliers, which would significantly impact the supplier's business and ability to supply products to Coles in the future. The higher penalties in relation to Oates and Paton's reflect this and are appropriate.

2.4.11 Totality principle 132 In determining the appropriate penalty, it is also relevant to take into account the "totality principle". Put simply, the total penalty for related offences ought not to exceed what is proper for the entire contravening conduct involved: Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-375 at 40,169. That principle applies to civil penalties: Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd at 43,817.

2.4.12 Conclusion on appropriate penalty 133 In all these circumstances, taking into account the factors relevant to setting a penalty as well as applying the totality principle, the total pecuniary penalties for Coles of $3,700,000 are appropriate for the admitted contraventions. That sum should be paid to the Commonwealth within 30 days.

2.5 Costs 134 Coles agreed to pay $1 million towards the ACCC's costs of and incidental to this proceeding within 30 days of the Court's order. That order will be made.

3.1 Background 135 The following summary is sourced from, and cross referenced to, the SoAFA in Annexure 2. As will be apparent, it repeats certain elements of the SoAFA filed in relation to the ARC Proceeding (see Annexure 1). Where the common material has been addressed in the context of the ARC Proceeding, the earlier analysis is identified and cross referenced to Annexure 2. 136 The circumstances relevant to the conduct in the Claims Proceeding relate to the period from about December 2010 to January 2012 but the conduct the subject of the admitted contraventions occurred from June 2011 to about December 2011 (Claims relevant period). 137 The Tier 3 Suppliers the subject of the Claims Proceeding were: (1) Austech; (2) Oates; (3) Colonial Farm (Aust.) Pty Ltd (Colonial Farm); (4) Baview Seafoods Pty Ltd (Bayview); and (5) Benny's Confectionary Pty Ltd (Benny's), (collectively, the Claims Suppliers). 138 Coles acquired grocery products for retail sale from the Claims Suppliers pursuant to Trading Arrangements negotiated between Coles and each supplier: see Section 2.1.2 above and Annexure 2, par 13. The Claims Proceeding concerns unconscionable conduct where Coles sought payments from the Claims Suppliers outside of the Trading Arrangements. The payments were for so called profit gaps, waste and markdowns, and short or late deliveries and were deducted by Coles from monies due to be paid to that supplier for products that it had already supplied to Coles. Related conduct in relation to "deferred deals" and unauthorised withholding or retention of money was also unconscionable as outlined below.

3.1.1 Coles' market share and power 139 Coles' market share and power during the Claims relevant period is the same as that considered in Section 2.1.1 above: see Annexure 2, pars 4-12. The Claims Suppliers had, during the Claims relevant period, total annual revenue of less than 0.5% of Coles' total annual revenue.

3.1.2 Coles' Trading Arrangements 140 As with the ARC Proceeding, most of the conditions relating to the acquisition by Coles of grocery products from a supplier, including whether Coles would continue to acquire products from that supplier, were determined by Coles: Annexure 2, par 16.

3.1.3 Coles' Business Practices 141 During the Claims relevant period, Coles continued to set sales and profit targets for its General Categories and Business Categories, and encouraged and / or required its CMs and BCMs to meet these profit targets, including by engaging in three practices - in relation to profit gaps, waste and markdowns and penalties for short or late deliveries (the Claims Proceeding Practices). It also awarded prizes to its CMs and BCMs for meeting profit targets and set aside days which were referred to within Coles as "Profit Day" or "Perfect Profit Day" and set targets for Business Categories of money to be "secured" by the Business Categories from suppliers, including for the Claims Proceeding Practices: Annexure 2, par 18. Each of these practices will be considered in turn.

3.1.3.1 Profit Gaps 142 Coles expected its profit in respect of a supplier's products to increase in line with a supplier's sales growth. If Coles' profit on a supplier's product was growing behind the supplier's sales to Coles, Coles referred to the difference between the supplier's sales growth and Coles' profit growth as a profit gap: Annexure 2, par 19. 143 Coles knew that profit gaps in respect of any particular product could be caused by Coles' own acts and omissions and by other matters which were largely or entirely outside the control of suppliers. That did not deter Coles. Instead, during the Claims relevant period, Coles encouraged and / or required its CMs and BCMs to seek payments or other funding from suppliers in order to make up purported profit gaps: Annexure 2, pars 20-21.

3.1.3.2 Waste and Markdowns 144 During the Claims relevant period, Coles recorded what it claimed to be the cost to it of products that Coles acquired from a supplier that were identified as lost, damaged or unfit for sale while in Coles' retail stores (waste) and the cost to it of Coles' employees or agents reducing, or marking down, the price in Coles' retail stores of products Coles acquired from a supplier (markdowns): Annexure 2, par 22. 145 As was the case with profit gaps, Coles knew that waste and markdowns in respect of any particular product could be caused by its own acts or omissions rather than any act or omission by the supplier of that product. Again, that did not deter Coles. Instead, during the Claims relevant period, Coles encouraged and / or required its CMs and BCMs to seek payments from suppliers on the premise that Coles had recorded waste or markdowns for the supplier's products: Annexure 2, pars 23-24.

3.1.3.3 Short or Late Deliveries 146 During the Claims relevant period, Coles determined that it would impose "penalties" or "fines", in the form of monetary penalties, on suppliers that Coles had recorded as not delivering the products that Coles had ordered from them on time and in full in accordance with the order placed by Coles (short or late deliveries): Annexure 2, par 25. 147 Coles encouraged and / or required its CMs and BCMs to seek those monetary penalties but those monetary penalties were not calculated by reference to any assessment by Coles of the likely cost to Coles, if any, of the short or late delivery and where short or late deliveries may not lead to any loss to Coles: Annexure 2, par 26.

3.2.1 Section 22 of the ACL 148 This provision has been addressed earlier: see Section 2.2.1 above. Section 22 of the ACL was in the same form during the ARC relevant period and the Claims relevant period.

3.2.2 Suppliers 149 Coles admits that during the Claims relevant period it engaged in conduct which was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable in contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as it stood at the time), in relation to each Claims Supplier. The admitted contraventions for each Claims Supplier will be considered in turn. Again, as will become apparent, Coles' conduct has some recurring themes and actions. However, it also adopted certain tactics in relation one or more of the Claims Suppliers.

3.2.2.1 Austech Introduction and conduct 150 The products Austech manufactures and supplied to Coles are summarised in Section 2.2.2.1 above. During the Claims relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Austech: see Section 2.2.2.1 above and Annexure 2, par 29. 151 The following aspects of Coles' admitted conduct are set out in detail in Annexure 2, pars 30-78: Coles' admitted purported profit gap claims, Coles' admitted claims for retrospective waste payment, Coles' admitted conduct in seeking and having Austech agree to the deferred deal and then refusing to end the deferred deal. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Findings of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 152 In June 2011 (in relation to the profit gap and retrospective waste claims) and from July to November 2011 (in relation to the deferred deal conduct), Coles in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Austech engaged in conduct that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable resulting in three separate contraventions of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the Claims relevant period). Profit gap 153 The unconscionable conduct towards Austech which related to the profit gap involved Coles demanding that Austech make payments of $25,845 and $15,516.74 to it in relation to profit gaps, when the payments were not the subject of prior agreement between Coles and Austech and the payments were attributable to issues that arose before Austech owned the relevant product, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 27 to 48. 154 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Austech: Annexure 2, par 29; (2) Coles knew or ought to have known it had no reasonable basis to believe that it was entitled to seek the payments: Annexure 2, pars 33, 39.2, 39.5, 40.1, 41 and 44.2; (3) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Austech to understand the basis upon which the demands for payments were made, and how each of the Austech purported profit gaps were calculated and were caused, despite requests for such information: Annexure 2, pars 31.3, 34.3, 35.1, 36.5, 38.1, 42.2 and 43.2; (4) Coles exerting undue pressure on Austech by pressing Austech for an urgent response to Coles' demands for payments (Annexure 2, pars 35.3, 39.7 and 43.5) and asserting an entitlement to a higher payment for a profit gap, which it had no reasonable basis to believe it was entitled to, if Austech did not agree to make the payments referred to in [153] above (Annexure 2, pars 43.3, 44.2 and 45); and (5) Coles not being willing to negotiate the payments, including the amount or when Coles would withhold the money: Annexure 2, pars 31.2, 39.6, 43.4, 45, 46.4, 47 and 48. Retrospective waste 155 The unconscionable conduct towards Austech which related to retrospective waste involved Coles demanding that Austech make a payment of $5,700 to it in relation to retrospective waste and using a purported profit gap claim as leverage in negotiations, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 27 to 29 and 49 to 58. 156 Those circumstances were similar to those identified earlier in relation to the profit gap claim and included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Austech: Annexure 2, par 29; (2) Coles knew or ought to have known it had no reasonable basis for asserting an entitlement to seek the payment: Annexure 2, pars 52 and 57.1; (3) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Austech to understand the causes of waste, what contribution, if any, Austech had made to the causes of waste, the basis upon which the demands were made or how the payment was calculated: Annexure 2, pars 51.1, 53 and 57.2; (4) Coles exerting undue pressure on Austech by pressing Austech for an urgent response to Coles' requests for payments (Annexure 2, pars 50.3 and 57) and asserting an entitlement to a payment for a profit gap, which it had no reasonable basis to believe it was entitled to, if Austech did not agree to make the payment referred to in [155] above: Annexure 2, pars 54-57; and (5) Coles not being willing to negotiate the payments, including the amount: Annexure 2, pars 50.1, 53, 54 and 58. Deferred deal 157 During the Claims relevant period, Coles used the term "deferred rebate" to refer to a rebate paid by a supplier to Coles that was calculated per unit of a supplier's product and would be in effect for a certain period of time or would apply to a certain number of units of product. 158 During the Claims relevant period, Coles conducted a range review in relation to household cleaning products that it acquired from its suppliers for sale in Coles' retail stores. Following that review, Coles advised Austech that its Shower Cleaner line was to be deleted, and Coles required Austech to fully fund the markdown of that product line. 159 Following a request from Austech, Coles agreed not to delete Shower Cleaner from Coles' retail stores. Coles informed Austech that in order for Coles to continue to acquire products from Austech, Coles needed to improve its profit margin on those products, and required a deferred rebate from Austech. 160 On 25 August 2011, Austech indicated to Coles that it was financially difficult for Austech to make changes to improve Coles' profit margin, partly because Austech had not increased its price to Coles for a number of years, despite an increase in the costs of essential raw materials. Notwithstanding that difficulty, after informing Coles that Austech considered it was necessary for Austech to have its products available for sale in Coles' retail stores, Austech agreed to offer temporary deferred rebates on three of its product lines to improve Coles' profit margin (the Austech deferred deal). 161 The unconscionable conduct towards Austech which related to the Austech deferred deal involved Coles refusing to end the Austech deferred deal and cease deducting payments pursuant to that agreement, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 27 to 29 and 59 to 78. 162 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Austech, and particularly in relation to the relevant product: Annexure 2, pars 29 and 62; (2) Coles being informed that it was financially difficult for Austech to make the payments for the Austech deferred deal: Annexure 2, par 67; (3) Coles using unfair tactics by giving assurances that the Austech deferred deal would conclude on the agreed date in the context of a request for that assurance from Austech when Austech was at the same time being asked by Coles to consider a separate rebate being sought by Coles for the ARC rebate, and then refusing to end the Austech deferred deal (Annexure 2, pars 71-75); and (4) Coles not being willing to negotiate with Austech about the Austech deferred deal: Annexure 2, pars 75 and 78.

3.2.2.2 Oates Introduction and conduct 163 The products Oates manufactures and supplied to Coles are summarised in Section 2.2.2.2 above. During the Claims relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position that Oates: see Section 2.2.2.2 above and Annexure 2, par 81. 164 Coles' admitted purported profit gap claims and unauthorised withholding and retention of money is set out in detail in Annexure 2, pars 82-110. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Findings of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 165 In June 2011 (in relation to the profit gap claims) and from July to December 2011 (in relation to the unauthorised withholding and retention of money), Coles in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Oates engaged in conduct that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable resulting in two separate contraventions of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the Claims relevant period). Profit gap 166 The unconscionable conduct towards Oates which related to the profit gap involved Coles demanding and processing a payment for a purported profit gap of $246,000 towards Coles' profit, which was outside previously agreed terms and conditions, and without the agreement of Oates, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 79 to 93. 167 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Oates: Annexure 2, par 81; (2) Coles knew or ought to have known it had no reasonable basis for asserting an entitlement to seek the payment (Annexure 2, par 86) because, amongst other things, the payments were not the subject of prior agreement between Coles and Oates (Annexure 2, par 82) and Coles knew that a substantial cause of the profit gap was due to the unilateral actions taken by Coles: Annexure 2, pars 85.3 and 87.3; (3) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to enable Oates to understand the basis upon which the demands were made, and how the Oates purported profit gap was calculated and was caused, despite requests for such information: Annexure 2, pars 83.3, 88-91 and 92.1; and (4) Coles exerting undue pressure and using unfair tactics on Oates by pressing Oates for an urgent response to Coles' requests for payments (Annexure 2, pars 84.2 and 89.4), by informing Oates that Coles would not work collaboratively with Oates for the next year if Oates did not make the payment and by processing the payment without Oates' approval: Annexure 2, par 89.2; and (5) Coles not being willing to negotiate the payment, including when Coles would withhold the money: Annexure 2, pars 83.2, 85, 87, 89.1 and 93. Unauthorised withholding and retention of money 168 The unconscionable conduct towards Oates which related to the unauthorised withholding and retention of money involved Coles refusing to repay, and retaining, the monies referred to in relation to the profit gap above, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 79 to 81 and 94 to 110. 169 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Oates: Annexure 2, par 81; (2) Coles knew or ought to have known it had no lawful entitlement to withhold and retain the money: Annexure 2, pars 94-99 and 102.2; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and using unfair tactics on Oates by failing to return the money that it had withheld, without agreement or approval, from money due to Oates despite repeated requests from Oates for that to occur (Annexure 2, pars 97-99, 102, 105 and 107) and implying that the issue needed to be resolved so that Oates and Coles could continue their commercial relationship: Annexure 2, par 100.

3.2.2.3 Colonial Farm Introduction and conduct 170 Colonial Farm manufactures "value-added" protein products such as meatballs or chicken kievs, which it supplies to retailers and other customers. Coles acquired approximately 11 frozen processed food products from Colonial Farm for sale in Coles' retail stores. Three products were private label products, which were acquired by Coles for sale under Coles' own brands. The products that Coles acquired from Colonial Farm were acquired by Coles for its Frozen Business Category and were supplied by Colonial Farm to Coles with a minimum shelf life of at least 12 months: Annexure 2, pars 111-2. 171 During the Claims relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Colonial Farm, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sale of Colonial Farm's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Colonial Farm and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Colonial Farm with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 2, par 16. 172 Coles' admitted contravening conduct is set out in detail in Annexure 2, pars 114-138. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Findings of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 173 In October and November 2011, Coles, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Colonial Farm, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable, resulting in a contravention of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the Claims relevant period). 174 The unconscionable conduct involved requiring that Colonial Farm agree to pay for 100% of the cost of waste in relation to its products, when Coles was aware that Colonial Farm was in financial difficulty (Annexure 2, par 121.2) and when Coles did not take into account Colonial Farm's explanation that its products were not appropriate for a 100% waste agreement (Annexure 2, par 123.2), in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 111 to 138. 175 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Colonial Farm: Annexure 2, par 113; (2) The effect of requiring Colonial Farm to agree to the 100% waste agreement was that Colonial Farm indemnified Coles against all of the purported costs of waste or markdowns, including those that were caused by Coles and were outside the control of Colonial Farm: Annexure 2, pars 115 and 130.3; (3) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details, despite requests for such information, to enable Colonial Farm to understand the causes of waste and markdown, what contribution, if any, Colonial Farm had made to the causes of waste and markdown and the basis upon which Coles required the waste agreement: Annexure 2, pars 117, 123.1 and 125-130; (4) Coles exerting undue pressure on Colonial Farm by pressing Colonial Farm for a response to Coles' requests for the 100% waste agreement (Annexure 2, pars 125.4, 128.2 and 129.4), by informing Colonial Farm that Coles required Colonial Farm to agree to a 100% waste agreement (Annexure 2, pars 122.1, 125.2, 129.3 and 133.2) and by inferring that Colonial Farm's future business with Coles depended on Colonial Farm agreeing to the waste agreement: Annexure 2, pars 122.2 and 125.3; and (5) Coles not being willing to negotiate with Colonial Farm about the agreement without also indicating that Coles required Colonial Farm to pay another unrelated rebate: Annexure 2, pars 133 and 136.

3.2.2.4 Bayview Introduction and conduct 176 Bayview manufactures and supplies "value-added" gluten free and fish protein products to retailers and other customers. The goods Coles acquired from Bayview were frozen food products, with a long shelf life. They were acquired by Coles for its Frozen Business Category: Annexure 2, pars 139-140. 177 During the Claims relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Bayview, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sale of Bayview's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Bayview and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Bayview with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 2, par 16. 178 By October 2011, Coles was aware that Bayview was suffering financial hardship, partly as a result of the terms of its trading relationship with Coles: Annexure 2, par 142. 179 Coles' admitted claim for a 100% waste agreement and its admitted imposition of a penalty for late delivery is set out in detail in Annexure 2, pars 143-169. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Findings of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 180 In October and November 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Bayview, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable, resulting in two separate contraventions of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the Claims relevant period). That conduct related to a 100% waste management agreement and the imposition of a penalty for late delivery. 100% waste agreements 181 The unconscionable conduct towards Bayview in relation to the 100% waste agreement involved Coles requiring that Bayview agree to pay for 100% of the cost of waste in relation to its products, when Coles was aware that Bayview was in financial difficulty (Annexure 2, par 142) and when Coles did not take into account Bayview's explanation of the cause of the waste (Annexure 2, par 146.1), in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 139 to 152. 182 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Bayview: Annexure 2, para 141; (2) The effect of requiring Bayview to agree to the 100% waste agreement was that Bayview indemnified Coles against all of the purported costs of waste or markdowns, including those that were caused by Coles and were outside the control of Bayview: Annexure 2, par 115; (3) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details, despite requests for such information, to enable Bayview to understand the causes of waste, what contribution, if any, Bayview had made to the causes of waste and the basis upon which Coles required the waste agreement: Annexure 2, pars 146.2 and 148; (4) Coles exerting undue pressure and using unfair tactics on Bayview by pressing Bayview for a response to Coles' requests for payments despite the matters in (3) above (Annexure 2, par 145.5), conveying to Bayview on multiple occasions that it was necessary for Bayview to enter into the waste agreement (Annexure 2, pars 145.3, 147.1.2 and 152) and indicating that Coles' ongoing trading relationship with Bayview and the viability of ranging Bayview's products would be affected if Bayview did not agree to the 100% waste agreement: Annexure 2, pars 145.4 and 152. Penalty for late delivery 183 The unconscionable conduct towards Bayview in relation to the penalty for the late delivery involved Coles requiring and accepting payment of a penalty of $30,500 from Bayview when the payment was not the subject of prior agreement between Coles and Bayview and Coles was aware that Bayview was in financial difficulty (Annexure 2, par 142), in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 139 to 141 and 153 to 169. 184 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Bayview: Annexure 2, par 141; (2) The penalty was not reasonably necessary for the protection of Coles' legitimate interests because it was not calculated by reference to any assessment by Coles of the likely cost to Coles, if any, of Bayview not delivering on time: Annexure 2, pars 154 and 161.7; (3) The terms and conditions of the Trading Arrangements between Coles and Bayview did not include a term pursuant to which Coles could impose, or Bayview was required to pay, a penalty: Annexure 2, par 155; (4) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details, despite requests for such information, to enable Bayview to understand whether, and to what extent, the alleged late delivery had resulted in lost sales to Coles: Annexure 2, pars 161.6 and 163; and (5) Coles exerting undue pressure and using unfair tactics on Bayview, in circumstances where Coles was aware Bayview was suffering financial hardship, by pressing Bayview for an urgent response to Coles' requests for payment (Annexure 2, par 159.2), making repeated requests for a response from Bayview (Annexure 2, pars 158, 159.2 and 162) and implicitly threatening that Coles would take measures that were commercially detrimental to Bayview if Bayview did not agree to make the payment: Annexure 2, par 162.3.

3.2.2.5 Benny's Introduction and conduct 185 Benny's manufactures and supplies hard boiled lollies to supermarkets in Australia. Coles acquired a hard boiled confectionery product from Benny's for sale in Coles' retail stores. The product was acquired from Benny's by Coles for Coles' Impulse Business Category: Annexure 2, pars 170-171. 186 During the Claims relevant period, Coles was in a substantially stronger bargaining position than Benny's, in particular because Coles represented a significant proportion of the sale of Benny's products, Coles determined whether it would continue to acquire grocery products from Benny's and whether it would substitute grocery products it was acquiring from Benny's with products acquired from another supplier, and due to the matters set out in Annexure 2, par 16. 187 During the Claims relevant period, the Trading Arrangements between Benny's and Coles did not include a term that required Benny's to make a payment to Coles for short or late deliveries: Annexure 2, par 173. 188 Coles' admitted imposition of a penalty for short or late delivery and its admitted unauthorised withholding and retention of money is set out in detail in Annexure 2, pars 174-193. It is that conduct which provides the foundation for the following findings of contravention. Findings of contravention of s 22 of the ACL 189 In August to November 2011, Coles, in trade or commerce, in connection with the acquisition of grocery products from Benny's, engaged in conduct that was, in all of the circumstances, unconscionable, resulting in two separate contraventions of s 22 of the ACL (as in force during the Claims relevant period). That conduct related to penalties for short or late delivery and unauthorised withholding and retention of money. Penalty for short or late delivery 190 The unconscionable conduct towards Benny's which related to the penalty for short or late deliveries involved Coles demanding that Benny's pay two penalties totalling $1,639 in relation to alleged short or late delivery, when the payments were not the subject of prior agreement between Coles and Benny's, and in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 170 to 193. 191 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Benny's: Annexure 2, par 172; (2) The terms and conditions of the Trading Arrangements between Coles and Benny's did not include a term pursuant to which Coles could impose, or Benny's was required to pay, a penalty: Annexure 2, par 173; (3) The penalty was not reasonably necessary for the protection of Coles' legitimate interests because it was not calculated by reference to any assessment by Coles of the likely cost to Coles, if any, of Benny's not delivering on time: Annexure 2, pars 174, 175.2, 181.2, 181.4, 185.3 and 186.1; (4) The penalty was unfair and unreasonable because it was a standard rate fine for all suppliers and exceeded the margin that Benny's made on each carton of the relevant product that Coles acquired from Benny's: Annexure 2, pars 177.5, 181.2 and 181.4; and (5) Coles failing to disclose sufficient details to Benny's about the alleged short or late deliveries, despite the requests for such information by Benny's, and the disputes Benny's raised about the accuracy of the information being relied upon by Coles: Annexure 2, pars 177, 181, 185.2, 188 and 192. Unauthorised withholding and retention of money 192 The unconscionable conduct towards Benny's which related to the unauthorised withholding and retention of money involved Coles refusing to repay the penalties referred to above, in all of the circumstances set out in Annexure 2, Part III and pars 170 to 193. 193 Those circumstances included: (1) Coles being in a substantially stronger bargaining position relative to Benny's: Annexure 2, par 172; (2) The circumstances outlined in [191] above; (3) Coles exerting undue pressure and using unfair tactics on Benny's, by withholding the payments in circumstances where Coles knew that Benny's disputed Coles' entitlement to the payments (Annexure 2, pars 177-193) and withholding the payments in circumstances where Coles knew or ought to have known that the amounts sought were unfair and unjustified having regard to the value of the penalty when compared to the price Coles paid to Benny's for the products it acquired from Benny's: Annexure 2, pars 177.5 and 185.3; (4) Coles not being willing to negotiate with Benny's about the claims including informing Benny's that the claims Coles had raised would stand (Annexure 2, pars 182 and 186.2), informing Benny's that Coles would continue raising such claims against Benny's (Annexure 2, par 186.3) and not meeting or discussing the claims with Benny's: Annexure 2, pars 183, 184, 191 and 192.

3.3 Principles applicable to relief 194 These principles have been addressed in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 above and are applicable in the Claims Proceeding. 195 In the Claims Proceeding, the prerequisites for the making of the declarations are satisfied: (1) The proposed declarations relate to conduct that contravenes the ACL and the matters in issue have been identified and particularised by the parties with precision; (2) The proposed declarations contain sufficient indication of how and why the relevant conduct is a contravention of the ACL; (3) It is in the public interest for the ACCC to seek to have the declarations made and for the declarations to be made; (4) There is a significant legal controversy in this case which is being resolved. (5) The ACCC, as a public regulator under the ACL, has a genuine interest in seeking the declaratory relief and Coles is a proper contradictor because it has contravened the ACL and is the subject of the declarations. 196 The declarations sought are appropriate because they serve to record the Court's disapproval of the contravening conduct, vindicate the ACCC's claim that Coles contravened the ACL, assist the ACCC to carry out the duties conferred upon it by the Act, including the ACL, in relation to other similar conduct, inform the public of the harm arising from Coles' contravening conduct and deter other corporations from contravening the ACL. 197 Finally, the facts and admissions in Annexure 2 provide a sufficient factual foundation for the making of the declarations. For those reasons, declarations of contravention of s 22 of the ACL will be made recording Coles' unconscionable conduct in relation to Austech ([152]-[156] and [161]-[162] above), Oates ([165]-[169] above), Colonial Farm ([173]-[175] above), Bayview ([180]-[184] above) and Benny's ([189]-[193] above).

3.4 Analysis of Proposed Penalties 198 The principles relevant to the imposition of a pecuniary penalty have been addressed earlier: see Section 2.3.3. In applying those principles, the ACCC and Coles submitted that the proposed total penalty of $6.3 million is not inadequate or excessive, having regard to all relevant matters.

3.4.1 Nature, extent and duration of conduct and the circumstances in which conduct took place

3.4.1.1 Extent of the conduct 199 The conduct the subject of the admitted contraventions occurred from June 2011 to December 2011, and the circumstances relevant to the conduct occurred from about December 2010 to about January 2012: Annexure 2, par 3. It occurred during the course of Coles' communications with the suppliers in the context of Coles acquiring grocery products for sale in its retail stores.

3.4.1.2 Background circumstances relating to the contravening conduct 200 Background circumstances relevant to this contravening conduct were addressed in Section 2.4.1.2.1 above in relation to the ARC Proceeding and are equally applicable in this proceeding: see Annexure 2, par 18.

3.4.1.3 Relationship of the background circumstances to specific instances of unconscionable conduct 201 Coles' practices, demands and threats were deliberate, orchestrated and relentless and formed the circumstances in which the unconscionable conduct against the five specific suppliers occurred.

3.4.1.4 Nature of the conduct 202 The nature of the conduct is described in Annexure 2. The ACCC submits, and Coles accepts, that in broad terms Coles' conduct in relation to each of the suppliers in the Claims Proceeding did not have a legitimate commercial basis, was inconsistent with acceptable business practice and took place in circumstances where Coles had substantial bargaining power and, by its conduct, took advantage of that bargaining position. 203 That conduct had common elements which are factors relevant to the determination of the appropriate penalty. The suppliers the subject of the admitted contraventions from whom Coles sought payments: (1) Were significantly smaller than Coles (and all had annual revenue of less than 0.5% of Coles annual revenue: Annexure 2, par 9); (2) Were highly dependent on their ongoing sales to Coles for their business to remain viable; (3) Would have experienced significant detriment if Coles had ceased, or substantially decreased, its trading with them; (4) Were provided with inadequate information by Coles as to the basis for the payments demanded, even after requests were made by the suppliers for such information; (5) Did not agree with, or could not understand the basis for the payments that Coles had demanded; and (6) Were pressured by Coles to agree to make the payments. 204 In seeking payments from these suppliers, Coles was motivated by profit, pressured the suppliers to make the payments, sought the payments despite not being entitled to them under the existing Trading Arrangements with the supplier, did not provide the supplier with adequate, or any, information about the basis for the payments, indicated that there would be commercial consequences if the supplier refused in order to obtain the supplier's agreement and deducted money from payments owed to the supplier for products that it had already supplied to Coles. In addition to those common elements, each supplier was subjected to the particular threats of commercial consequences set out in Section 3.2.2 above. 205 The ACCC submitted, Coles accepts and the Court finds that the conduct outlined in Section 3.2.2 above, in all of the circumstances, was contrary to good conscience and involved serious contraventions of s 22 of the ACL. All of the conduct involved a claim for payments which were not provided for under Coles' Trading Arrangements and which Coles had no reasonable basis to demand. 206 Further: (1) The profit gaps that were claimed against Austech and Oates arose from prior actions taken, or decisions made, by Coles rather than by those suppliers: Annexure 2, pars 34.4, 36.3, 36.4, 39.5 and 40 in relation to Austech and pars 85.3, 87.2 and 87.3 in relation to Oates; (2) The agreements demanded for future waste payments involved demanding payment for matters that could be beyond the control of the supplier, including Coles' own negligence, in relation to loss of or damage to products in Coles' stores. These payments were seen as a source of additional revenue: Annexure 2, pars 114-115; and (3) The penalties in relation to short or late deliveries were levied without regard to the reasons for the short or late delivery, or whether there was in fact any loss to Coles whatsoever. Coles took no account of the value of the goods and the penalties were levied even when the supplier disputed that there was a short or late delivery. 207 The matters raised in [206(3)] above were exemplified by Coles' conduct in relation to Benny's where the fine well exceeded Benny's total profit on the goods delivered: Annexure 2, par 177.5. When Benny's sought to demonstrate there had not even been short or late delivery, Coles refused to provide information or engage with Benny's on the issue and kept the money it had taken: Annexure 2, pars 178, 179, 182-188. 208 Coles' conduct which is the subject of the admitted contraventions was serious for the additional reasons set out in [102]-[103] above. 209 Coles accepted that in its dealings with the Claims Suppliers it treated them in a manner inconsistent with acceptable business practice, was not respectful of the suppliers' needs for full and timely transparency, and did not properly respect the responsibility attached to Coles' bargaining power. As noted earlier, the ACL provides for significant penalties. 210 The Claims Proceeding again raises the issue of the adequacy of the maximum penalty when a corporation with annual revenue in excess of $22 billion acts unconscionably.

3.4.2 Amount of loss caused and profit gained 211 Again, it is difficult to quantify with precision the financial impact on each supplier of Coles' conduct. The conduct took place within the context of ongoing commercial relationships between Coles and each supplier. Demands for payments were often leveraged against each other and the exact quantum of amounts paid or rebates withheld is complicated or unknown (such as in the case of the waste agreements). In the case of Oates, monies were deducted without authorisation and were agreed to be repaid some months later in exchange for further payments from Oates. 212 At the very least, Annexure 2 records the following identifiable losses suffered by the Claims Suppliers: (1) In relation to Austech, a payment of $5,700 for retrospective waste and payments of the three rebates under the deferred deals for six months beyond that of the agreement between Coles and Austech, which can no longer be quantified; (2) In relation to Oates, an inability to use money that was unlawfully retained by Coles for more than five months; (3) In relation to Bayview, a payment of $30,500 for short or late deliveries; and (4) In relation to Benny's, two payments totalling $1,639 for short or late deliveries. 213 As explained in Section 2.4.2 above, the inability to further quantify financial loss caused to the suppliers by the contraventions does not mean that no loss or harm has been suffered. 214 Coles accepts that the payments made pursuant to the contravening conduct were applied directly to Coles' revenues. While the extent of any loss or damage caused to the Claims Suppliers by the contravening conduct has not been quantified with precision, it can be inferred that it had a detrimental effect on the Claims Suppliers.

3.4.3 Whether the respondent has engaged in similar prior conduct 215 This factor has been addressed in Section 2.4.3 above. It is necessary to add to that analysis the findings of contravention in relation to the ARC Proceeding in Section 2 above. They cannot be and should not be ignored.

3.4.4 Size of contravener, including market share, and its financial position 216 These matters have been addressed in Section 2.4.4 and apply equally to the Claims Proceeding.

3.4.5 The deliberateness of the contravening conduct 217 The conduct engaged in by Coles involved the intentional use of unfair tactics and undue pressure in dealings with suppliers in relation to whom it knew that it had substantial bargaining power: see Sections 3.1 and 3.2.2 above.

3.4.6 Involvement of senior employees or management 218 The contravening conduct in relation to the Claims Suppliers was committed by CMs and BCMs. As noted earlier, BCMs are considered by Coles to be Senior Managers: Annexure 2, par 12. 219 As with the ARC Proceeding, Coles does not admit that any other Coles senior management engaged in the conduct the subject of the contraventions. However, Coles admits that its GMs and BCMs (who are Coles' Senior Managers) were aware of, and encouraged, the practice of seeking money from suppliers to meet profit targets and were aware of, and either encouraged, or did not discourage, the contravening conduct by CMs and BCMs.

3.4.7 Culture of compliance and corrective measures in response to contravention 220 These matters have been addressed in Section 2.4.7 and apply equally to the Claims Proceeding. 221 It is important to record that Coles has undertaken to the ACCC to have an independent arbiter review its conduct with the Claims Suppliers and assess their entitlement to refunds of any relevant payment. That review is the subject of paragraph 11 and following of the s 87B undertaking which is Annexure 3 to these reasons for judgment.

3.4.8 Co-operation 222 These matters have been addressed in Section 2.4.8 and apply equally to the Claims Proceeding: see also [221] above.

3.4.9 Maximum penalties and one transaction principle 223 These matters have been addressed in Section 2.4.9 and apply equally to the Claims Proceeding. 224 The ten admitted contraventions concern discrete but at times related conduct against five different suppliers. As is self-evident, much of the conduct against particular suppliers overlaps - claims or threats of claims of one type are used to leverage payments of another and suppliers are often confronted by numerous claims simultaneously. Indeed, some of the admitted conduct was consequent upon a refusal of a particular demand made by a Claims Supplier. 225 However, the unlawful retention of suppliers' money, and the subsequent refusal to repay it when Coles was asked to do so, are separate acts. They were engaged in by different personnel of Coles over time and are not the same act. A failure to treat them as separate acts, especially in relation to Oates, would not sufficiently reflect the gravity and nature of Coles' conduct.

3.4.10 Identifying the penalties for particular contraventions 226 Having regard to all of those factors, I accept that the following penalties for each contravention are appropriate and they are imposed: (1) Profit gap unconscionable conduct in relation to Austech: $650,000; (2) Retrospective waste unconscionable conduct in relation to Austech: $500,000; (3) Deferred deal unconscionable conduct in relation to Austech: $650,000; (4) Profit gap unconscionable conduct in relation to Oates: $650,000; (5) Unauthorised withholding and retention of money in relation to Oates: $900,000; (6) Waste and markdowns agreement unconscionable conduct in relation to Colonial Farm: $550,000; (7) Waste and markdowns agreement unconscionable conduct in relation to Bayview: $550,000; (8) Short or late deliveries unconscionable conduct in relation to Bayview: $650,000; (9) Short or late deliveries unconscionable conduct in relation to Benny's: $600,000; (10) Unauthorised retention of monies in relation to Benny's: $600,000. 227 These penalties provide a significant mark of disapproval for the wrongdoing associated with each course of conduct (when examined against the statutory maximum for a single breach). They also make appropriate allowance for the various mitigating features discussed above.

3.4.11 Totality principle 228 This principle has been addressed in Section 2.4.1.1 above and applies equally to the Claims Proceeding.

3.4.12 Conclusion on appropriate penalty 229 In all these circumstances, taking into account the factors relevant to setting a penalty as well as applying the totality principle, the total pecuniary penalties for Coles of $6,300,000 are appropriate for the contraventions admitted. That sum should be paid to the Commonwealth within 30 days.

3.5 Costs 230 Coles has agreed to pay $250,000 towards the ACCC's costs of and incidental to the Claims Proceeding within 30 days of the Court's order. That order will be made. I certify that the preceding two hundred and thirty (230) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon.

Associate: Dated: 22 December 2014 ANNEXURE 1 - VID 253 OF 2014 STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS AND ADMISSIONS PURSUANT TO s 191(3)(a) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 1995 (Cth) PART I INTRODUCTION

1. This Statement of Agreed Facts and Admissions (SoAFA) pursuant to s 191(3)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act), is made jointly on behalf of: 1.1 the applicant, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC); and 1.2 the first respondent, Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (Coles Supermarkets) and the second respondent, Grocery Holdings Pty Ltd (GHPL), together Coles.
2. This SoAFA details admissions by Coles that it contravened the then s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) being Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the Act).
3. The admissions of Coles in this SoAFA are made by Coles for the purposes of this proceeding only and unless otherwise stated, relate to the period from about 1 April 2011 to about 31 December 2011 (the relevant period). PART II BACKGROUND Coles
4. Coles Supermarkets: 4.1 is and was at all material times a corporation within the meaning of section 4 of the CCA; 4.2 carries on, and at all material times carried on, business in trade or commerce as a supermarket retailer; and 4.3 supplies, and at all material times supplied, grocery products for retail sale to customers in Australia.
5. GHPL: 5.1 is and was at all material times a corporation within the meaning of section 4 of the CCA; 5.2 carries on, and at all material times carried on, business in trade or commerce as a supermarket wholesaler; and 5.3 acquires, and at all material times acquired, grocery products from manufacturers and other suppliers (collectively Suppliers) for retail sale by Coles Supermarkets to customers in Australia.
6. Coles engaged, and continues to engage, in a business of acquiring grocery products from Suppliers and selling those products to customers in Australia through Coles' retail stores (the Coles business).
7. Coles referred, and continues to refer, to the steps and infrastructure involved in acquiring grocery products for retail sale from Suppliers and distributing them to Coles' retail stores for display and sale as its Supply Chain.
8. Coles operated, and continues to operate, retail stores in every Australian State and mainland Territory.

Undertaking to ARC Renegotiation and Repayment 8. Coles and GHPL undertake, for the purposes of s 87B of the Act, to give effect to the matters set out at paragraphs 9 to 17 below. 9. Within two weeks of the commencement date, Coles will appoint the Honourable Jeff Kennett AC as an Independent Arbiter to undertake the reviews set out below. 10. With respect to each supplier identified by Coles for the purposes of the ARC program introduced to suppliers in October 2011 who Coles described as Tier 3 suppliers, listed in Annexure A to this Undertaking, the Independent Arbiter will: (a) Retain a partner of an independent accounting firm (the firm), with relevant expertise and appropriate resources, approved by the ACCC and Coles to assist the Independent Arbiter. (b) Instruct the firm to prepare an analysis of each Tier 3 supplier that identifies the extent to which the supplier has utilised ARC including: (i) in relation to the Portal, how often and which elements of the Portal each supplier has used since it gained Portal access; (ii) in relation to EOQs, whether each supplier has been obtaining EOQs at the level indicated by Coles during ARC negotiations. (c) Within eight weeks of appointment (or a period otherwise agreed between Coles and the ACCC), provide the details and results of the firm's analysis to each Tier 3 supplier (and to Coles) together with a summary of the amount paid by the Tier 3 supplier to Coles in ARC rebates each financial year. (d) At the same time as providing the details and results at (c) above, provide the following options (to be available to the Tier 3 suppliers for a period of 6 weeks) to each such Tier 3 supplier, noting that eligibility for any refund of prior payments will be based on the matters set out in paragraphs (e) and (f) below: (i) Remain in ARC, but initiate a review to be conducted by the Independent Arbiter of eligibility for any refund of prior payments and the rebate to be paid going forward. (ii) Exit ARC but initiate a review to be conducted by the Independent Arbiter of eligibility for any refund of prior payments. ARC payments would cease immediately and ARC benefits would cease after 6 months. Senior Coles Management, in good faith, will work with the supplier on how it can continue to supply Coles without access to the Portal and EOQ. (iii) Exit ARC without participation in a review by the Independent Arbiter. ARC payments would cease immediately and ARC benefits would cease after 6 months. Senior Coles Management, in good faith, will work with the supplier on how it can continue to supply Coles without access to the Portal and EOQ. (iv) Remain in ARC on current terms, without participation in a review by the Independent Arbiter. (e) Upon election by a Tier 3 supplier requesting a review under 10(d)(i) or (ii) above, the Independent Arbiter will review the circumstances of the supplier and assess whether each supplier should receive a refund and or any adjustment to the rebate. In relation to any review conducted by the Independent Arbiter, the Independent Arbiter will invite the Tier 3 supplier and Coles to provide information and submissions in respect of the assessment and, as appropriate, discuss the assessment with the supplier and Coles. A supplier or Coles may provide any submissions confidentially to the Arbiter. The Arbiter will conduct the review confidentially. (f) Without limiting the information and submissions referred to in paragraph (e), when determining the eligibility for any refund of prior payments and the rebate to be paid going forward the Independent Arbiter must take into account: (i) the circumstances of the Tier 3 supplier's agreement to commence paying the ARC rebate, including the information that was provided by Coles at the time the agreement was made and whether the Tier 3 supplier had an opportunity to decline to participate in ARC or to negotiate the terms of the ARC rebate amount; and (ii) the benefit in broad terms the Tier 3 supplier considers it has received from access to ARC over and above the arrangements it had with Coles prior to the implementation of ARC. (g) Any Tier 3 supplier that elects pursuant to paragraph 10(d)(ii) or (iii) to exit ARC may rejoin ARC at any time. Such a supplier may, within 3 months of the election to leave ARC, request that the Independent Arbiter review and assess the ongoing rebate that would be applicable if the supplier had not exited ARC, and thereafter rejoin ARC at its request at the rate determined by the Independent Arbiter. 11. With respect to the suppliers named in the second proceedings, the Independent Arbiter will review the circumstances of the suppliers in respect of whom Coles has made admissions in a Statement of Agreed Facts, and assess, without restriction or limitation, whether each supplier should be paid a refund of relevant payments to Coles or GHPL. This review is to be completed within 3 months from the commencement of the undertaking. 12. The Independent Arbiter may retain any other resources he or she considers necessary or desirable to efficiently conduct the reviews contemplated by this proposal. 13. The Independent Arbiter must complete the review set out in paragraphs 10(d)(i) and (ii) and make a determination within a three month period commencing from the date a Tier 3 supplier elects under either paragraph 10(d)(i) or (ii) above, or in the case of a request under paragraph 10(g) within 3 months of the supplier making that request (in each case unless the supplier and Coles agree to extend the period). 14. Coles and GHPL must provide any information or documents requested by the Independent Arbiter, and will be bound by the determination of the Independent Arbiter in respect of each supplier. 15. At the conclusion of the review process, without revealing the identity of any supplier or information confidential to specific suppliers the Independent Arbiter will report publicly on the outcome of the reviews including on the amount of refunds provided to suppliers in accordance with paragraphs 10(d)(i) and (ii) and 11. 16. Coles or GHPL will pay to each supplier any refund determined by the Independent Arbiter within 28 days of the determination. 17. Coles will bear the costs of the Independent Arbiter and the firm as well as the costs of any additional resources retained by the Independent Arbiter. Acknowledgments 18. Coles acknowledges that: 18.1 the ACCC will make this Undertaking publicly available including by publishing it on the ACCC's public register of section 87B undertakings on its website; 18.2 the ACCC will, from time to time, make public reference to this Undertaking including in news media statements and in ACCC publications; and 18.3 this Undertaking in no way derogates from the rights and remedies available to any other person arising from the alleged conduct. Executed as an Undertaking Annexure A to s 87B Undertaking by Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd and Grocery Holdings Pty Ltd - List of Tier 3 Suppliers SUPPLIER