Consent orders and admissions
23 In determining whether to make the orders the Court must be satisfied that what is proposed is in the public interest. The Court weighs the public interest and the desirability of an agreed resolution of enforcement proceedings: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc (1999) 161 ALR 79.
24 The Court's power to make orders extends to making orders in proceedings resolved between the parties by consent. The principles were stated by Lee J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Target Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1326 at [24] as follows:
It is the Court's duty in receiving consent orders in any matter to scrutinise such orders as to their appropriateness. However, after being satisfied as to the appropriateness of the orders, the Court should be slow to impede final settlement of such matters, particularly those involving public interest considerations. Moreover, the public has an interest in the mutual resolution of litigation, and subject to the foregoing the Court should be careful not to refuse to make orders simply because the orders may have been different had it been the Court's task to formulate them.
25 In deciding whether consent orders conform with legal principle, the Court is entitled to treat the Respondents' consent as involving an admission of all facts necessary or appropriate to the granting of the relief sought: Thomson Australian Holdings Proprietary Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 at 164 per Gibbs CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ.
26 Where the parties have reached an agreed position in relation to declarations, the position may differ from the general principles stated above. In BMI Ltd v Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (1983) 51 ALR 401 at 413-414, Keely and Beaumont JJ stated:
We think that it is generally undesirable that the Court should grant relief by way of declaratory orders under s 108 in the absence of any contest on the question. If the matter were merely one of private right between particular parties, for example, a question as to the respective rights of parties under a contract, it may well be appropriate for a court to make a declaration as to those rights by consent. In such a case, the public and other parties cannot be affected, let alone bound, by such a declaration.
27 In the 2009 decision, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allergy Pathway Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 960 at [18] -[19], Finkelstein J, citing BMI, made declarations in terms that had been submitted by consent by the parties. However, in doing so, his Honour stated:
The declaration cases, however, require proof by way of evidence. An assurance by parties (whether by admission or agreed statement) that asserted facts are true will not suffice. Moreover, the House of Lords did not think a departure from this rule was justified because of administrative expediency.
For the time being, at least until a Full Court holds otherwise, it is, in my view, incumbent upon a single judge of the Federal Court to follow BMI and therefore not grant a declaration involving a public right in the absence of evidence that supports the declaration.
28 Since then, by way of illustration, this Court, in the following decisions, has made declarations supported by a signed statement of agreed facts: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cosic Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1579; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Wilson Parking 1992 Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1580; Minister for the Environment, Heritage & the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Limited [2010] FCA 48.