6.1 Legal principles: penalty
47 In approaching considering the appropriateness of the agreed penalty, I recently explained in Oticon that:
41. ... the judicial restraint in scrutinising proposed settlements of controversies under the [ACL] and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), means that the Court will not substitute its own view of the orders or undertakings if the agreed orders, including penalties, fall with[in] the range of an appropriate disposition of the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [20]-[23] (French J (as his Honour then was)). As Burchett and Kiefel JJ observed in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 (NW Frozen Foods) at 291:
There is an important public policy involved. When corporations acknowledge contraventions, very lengthy and complex litigation is frequently avoided, freeing the courts to deal with other matters, and investigating officers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to turn to other areas of the economy that await their attention. At the same time, a negotiated resolution in the instant case may be expected to include measures designed to promote, for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market concerned. These beneficial consequences would be jeopardised if corporations were to conclude that proper settlements were clouded by unpredictable risks. A proper figure is one within the permissible range in all the circumstances. The court will not depart from an agreed figure merely because it might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure, or except in a clear case.
(emphasis added)
42. Thus the High Court in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate at [57] considered that it was open to the Court to receive submissions, including joint submissions, as to an appropriate penalty, and noted there was generally considerable scope given to parties to agree on an appropriate remedy.
48 Under s 224 of the ACL the Court may order a person to pay, relevantly, to the Commonwealth "such pecuniary penalty, in respect of each act or omission by the person to which [s 224] applies, as the court determines to be appropriate". This provision applies relevantly only to the contraventions of s 29 of the ACL.
49 The primary purpose of civil penalties "is deterrence: specific deterrence of the contravener and, by his or her example, general deterrence of other would-be contraveners": Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3; (2018) 262 CLR 157 (ABCC) at [116] (Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ (with whose reasons Kiefel CJ agreed at [50])) (citations omitted); see also Director, FWBII at [55], [59] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ) and [110] (Keane J); and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640 (TPG Internet) at [65]. Thus, with respect to specific deterrence, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in ABCC:
116. … According to orthodox sentencing conceptions as they apply to the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties, specific deterrence inheres in the sting or burden which the penalty imposes on the contravener. Other things being equal, it is assumed that the greater the sting or burden of the penalty, the more likely it will be that the contravener will seek to avoid the risk of subjection to further penalties and thus the more likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions; likewise, the more potent will be the example that the penalty sets for other would-be contraveners and therefore the greater the penalty's general deterrent effect. Conversely, the less the sting or burden that a penalty imposes on a contravener, the less likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions and the less the general deterrent effect of the penalty. Ultimately, if a penalty is devoid of sting or burden, it may not have much, if any, specific or general deterrent effect, and so it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, to achieve the specific and general deterrent effects that are the raison d'être of its imposition.
(citations omitted)
50 As such, as the parties submit, the various penalty factors are to be considered in setting a penalty of appropriate deterrent value. Consistently with this, the Full Court of the Federal Court has emphasised that "the punishment must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not such as to be regarded by that offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business" (Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20; (2012) 287 ALR 249 (Singtel Optus (FCAFC) at [62]). Furthermore, as the Full Court has also explained:
All other things being equal, the greater the risk of consumers being misled and the greater the prospect of gain to the contravener, the greater the sanction required, so as to make the risk/benefit equation less palatable to a potential wrongdoer and the deterrence sufficiently effective in achieving voluntary compliance. Tipping the balance of the risk/benefit equation in this way is even more important when the benefit in contemplation is profit or other material gain.
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; (2016) 340 ALR 25 (Reckitt) at [151] (the Court))
51 Subsection 224(2) provides that in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the Court must have regard to all relevant matters including:
(1) the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission;
(4) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(5) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Chapter 4 or Part 5-2 of the ACL to have engaged in any similar conduct.
52 Otherwise, potentially relevant factors include (but are not limited to):
(1) the size of the contravening company;
(2) the degree of power of the contravener, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market;
(3) the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended;
(4) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management of the contravener or at some lower level;
(5) whether the contravener has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the ACL as evidenced, for example, by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention;
(6) whether the contravener has shown a disposition to cooperate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the ACL in relation to the contravention;
(7) the financial position of the contravener; and
(8) whether the contravening conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert.
(See Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR ¶41-076 at [52152] (French J (as his Honour then was)); NW Frozen Foods at 292 (Burchett and Kiefel JJ); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 761; (2011) 282 ALR 246 at [11] (Perram J) (reversed on appeal in Singtel Optus (FCAFC)), but not in a relevant respect))
53 There is, as Allsop CJ pointed out in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited [2015] FCA 330; (2015) 327 ALR 540 (ACCC v Coles [2015]) at [9], a degree of overlap between these factors and the statutory mandatory considerations. However, as his Honour further explained: "These factors do not necessarily exhaust potentially relevant considerations; nor do they regiment the discretionary sentencing function" (ibid).
54 In common with criminal sentencing, the process of arriving at the appropriate civil penalty under the ACL (and its predecessor, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) involves an intuitive or instinctive synthesis of all of the relevant factors rather than a sequential mathematical process: ACCC v Coles [2015] at [6] (Allsop CJ). This does not of course mean that all of the considerations which are relevant to criminal sentencing are also relevant to assessing an appropriate civil penalty. Rather it is the process itself which is the same. Instinctive synthesis in this sense was helpfully described by McHugh J in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 as meaning: "the method of sentencing by which the judge identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case" (at [51]); see also by analogy Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58 (Barbaro) at [34]-[35] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
55 As to the role of maximum penalties in determining the appropriate penalty, I explained in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2015] FCA 1090 (Homeopathy Plus!) at [27] that:
… careful attention to maximum penalties will always be required because the legislature has legislated for them, they invite comparison between the case before the court and the worst possible case, and they provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick: [Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357] at 372 [31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). However, even where the maximum penalty is high and the amount necessary to provide effective deterrence is large, the amount of the penalty cannot be so high as to be oppressive. As Burchett and Kiefel JJ explained in NW Frozen Foods, "[p]lainly, if deterrence is the object, the penalty should not be greater than is necessary to achieve this object; severity beyond that would be oppression" (at 293).
56 The course of conduct principle is also relevant to an assessment of pecuniary penalties. This recognises the commonality of legal and factual matters between two or more contraventions, and that a contravening party should not be punished twice for common contraventions. As Middleton and Gordon JJ explained, for example, in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39; (2010) 269 ALR 1:
39. … The principle recognises that where there is an interrelationship between the legal and factual elements of two or more offences for which an offender has been charged, care must be taken to ensure that the offender is not punished twice for what is essentially the same criminality. That requires careful identification of what is "the same criminality" and that is necessarily a factually specific enquiry.
(emphasis in the original)
57 Their Honours then further explained that:
41. … where two offences arise as a result of the same or related conduct that is not a disentitling factor to the application of the single course of conduct principle but a reason why a court may have regard to that principle, as one of the applicable sentencing principles, to guide it in the exercise of the sentencing discretion: Johnson v R (2004) 205 ALR 346; [2004] HCA 15 at [3]-[4] and [34] and Attorney-General v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 at 92-3 ... It is a tool of analysis (Tichy at 93) which a court is not compelled to utilise: Royer v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 139 at [21]-[34] and [153]-[156] (Royer).
(emphasis in the original)
58 The course of conduct principle has frequently been applied in imposing penalties for breaches of the ACL, particularly when the number of legally distinct breaches is large: see e.g. Reckitt at [139]-[145] (the Court); TPG Internet at [60]-[61]; and Singtel Optus (FCAFC) at [51]-[55].
59 Finally, the Court must consider all of the contravening conduct and determine whether the total penalty for each offence aggregated together exceeds that which is proper for the entire contravening conduct involved (the totality principle): Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 (Mill) at 63 (the Court) (by analogy). As such, the totality principle operates as a final check of the penalties to be imposed on the respondent, considered as a whole. As Goldberg J explained in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 36 (Safeway Stores) at 53:
The totality principle is designed to ensure that overall an appropriate sentence or penalty is [imposed] and that the sum of the penalties imposed for several contraventions does not result in the total of the penalties exceeding what is proper having regard to the totality of the contravening conduct involved.
60 The application of the totality principle will not necessarily result in a reduction in the penalty. Rather, as the parties submit, in cases where the Court considers that the cumulative total of the penalties to be imposed would be too high or too low, it should alter the final penalties to ensure that they are "just and appropriate": Safeway Stores at 53 (quoting Mill at 63).