THE ASSOCIATION'S DEFENCES
130 The Association relied on a defence under s 65A of the Act in respect of its alleged contraventions of ss 52, 53(a) and 55. Having found that the Association did not contravene s 55, it is only necessary now to determine whether the defence avails it in respect of its contraventions of ss 52 and 53(a).
131 The Association contended that it was a "prescribed information provider" which had undertaken a series of prescribed publications on its website relating to the husbandry of chickens destined to be processed for the food market. It was a "prescribed information provider" as defined in s 65A(3) because it met the description of a person who "carries on a business of providing information." The impugned material had been published in the course of its carrying on that business. It was not subject to any of the qualifying provisions in the section.
132 The Association relied on the evidence of its Executive Director Dr Andreas Dubs about the content of the material appearing on the Association's website and the purpose which it served. That purpose was said to be informative and educational. Dr Dubs denied that the impugned publications constituted advertisements. The Association itself did not supply any goods to the public and the publications did not relate to any particular product marketed by any direct or indirect members of the Association.
133 The ACCC submitted that the Association was not, at relevant times, carrying on the business of providing information and that the relevant publications had not occurred in the course of carrying on such a business. The ACCC further submitted that the Association was, in any event, caught by the exceptions in s 65A(1)(a) and (b) because the publications had occurred in connection with the promotion of the supply or use of goods and were made on behalf of or pursuant to an arrangement with a supplier of such goods and because the publications constituted an advertisement.
134 Section 65A of the Act was added in 1984: see Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (No 2) 1984 (Cth). It became known as the "media safe harbour defence" because it was incorporated in the Act in response to concerns that, if news media published incorrect reports, the publisher might be liable for a contravention of s 52 of the Act: see Bond v Barry (2008) 173 FCR 106 at 113. In terms, however, the defence was more widely available because the definition of a "prescribed information provider" extends to all persons who carry on the business of providing information and is not confined to participants in the print and broadcast media who fall within one of the paragraphs in sub-section 65A(3): cf Sykes v Reserve Bank of Australia (1997) 151 ALR 579 at 593.
135 The first issue is whether the Association can be said to carry on the business of providing information. Its memorandum of association identifies a range of objects. One of these is the collection and circulation of "technical information and statistics and all other information relating to the industry which is or may be of assistance to members and to issue such publications as may be necessary." The Association's activities are funded by contributions from its members.
136 It may be accepted, as the ACCC contended, that the Association was principally concerned with the protection and promotion of the interests of participants in the chicken meat industry. It operated as a lobbyist for the industry.
137 In addition, however, as Dr Dubs deposed, the Association acts as a publicist for the industry in order to encourage consumers to purchase and consume chicken meat. Much of the information provided on the Association's website, including the media releases and other publications about which complaint is made, were put up for this purpose.
138 To this extent, in my view, the Association may properly be regarded as a "prescribed information provider" because it carried on the business of providing information to the public. The various publications had been put up on the website in the course of carrying on that business. This activity was supported by its objects. The impugned material may be regarded as being of assistance to members by placing chicken husbandry in a good light in order to encourage chicken meat consumption in the community.
139 It is necessary, then, to turn to the two exemptions on which the ACCC relied. They were provided for in s 65A of the Act. The ACCC contended that the protection otherwise conferred by s 65A(1) did not apply to the relevant material on the Association's website because the material was published in connection with the promotion of the use of chicken meat products by members of the Association and was made on behalf of the members or pursuant to an arrangement with Baiada and Bartter and other members who were suppliers of the chicken meat products referred to on the Association's website.
140 The purposes served by the exemptions contained in s65A(1) of the Act were explained by the Minister for Communications in his Second Reading Speech on the Amending Bill:
"These provisions ensure that information providers are not exempt from the consumer protection provisions of the Trade Practices Act in respect of the provision of information where they have what might be regarded as a commercial interest in the content of the information. In such cases, information providers must take the same responsibility for the accuracy of information as any other person who publishes information in trade or commerce. This can occur, for example, where a newspaper has agreed to publish a 'news' item about a product in exchange for the product supplier taking out paid advertising in that publication."
See Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 13 September 1984, pp 1296-7.
141 The phrase "on behalf of" "bears no single and constant significance" and "may be used in conjunction with a wide range of relationships, all however, in some way concerned with the standing of one person as auxiliary to or representative of another person or thing": see Re Ross; ex parte Attorney General (NT) (1980) 54 ALJR 145 at 149. The various publications about which complaint is made were made "on behalf of" the Association's members in this sense.
142 The representations, made on the Association's website, about chickens being free to roam in large barns were intended to promote the sale of chicken meat. That promotion was undertaken by the Association as the representative body of its members to advance the commercial interests of those members. As an information provider the Association was, like Baiada and Bartter, required to ensure that publication did not contravene ss 52 and 53(a) of the Act. This it failed to do.
143 As a result the exception provided for in s 65A(1)(a)(iii) and (vi)(A) applied. The consequence is that the Association is not able to claim the benefit of the "media safe harbour defence".
144 The second exception, provided for in s 65A(1)(b) of the Act, was that an 'advertisement' was not to be treated as a "prescribed publication."
145 Although it is not strictly necessary, in light of my findings in relation to the first of the claimed exceptions, I will also consider this second exception.
146 The ACCC contended and the Association denied that any of the relevant publications constituted an advertisement within the meaning of s 65A(1)(b).
147 The word "advertisement" is susceptible to a wide range of meanings. At its broadest it conveys the notion of making something generally or publicly known or giving the public notice of something: see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd (1971) 45 ALJR 518 at 521. The present context, supported by the Minister's observations in the Second Reading Speech, suggest a narrower meaning which requires a business or commercial element to a publication before it answers the description of an "advertisement" in s 65A(1)(b).
148 In Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1985) 5 FCR 330 at 338 the Full Court of this Court held that the word "advertisement", standing alone, had a meaning which the Tribunal had attributed to it. That meaning was: "matter which draws the attention of the public, or a segment thereof, to a product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, that product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct." In that case the Court was concerned with what was said to be cigarette advertising. It said (at 339) that:
"That issue is to be objectively determined; the question being whether the material, on its face and without reference to the actual intentions of those concerned with its production or transmission, appears to be designed or calculated to draw public attention to, or to promote the sale or use of, cigarettes or to promote the practice of smoking. It does not matter that some part or parts of the total material do not, in itself or in themselves, answer the description of an advertisement for cigarettes or for smoking. The question is to be determined by reference to the nature of the material, considered as a whole. It is, of course, a common place of cinematic and television advertising that a significant proportion of the total footage is material free of any discernable commercial message, being designed primarily to attract and develop viewer interest. The expressly commercial content is often a small proportion of the whole.
As Gibbs J made clear [in Rotary Offset], material which otherwise answers the description of being 'advertising material' - or in the instant cases 'an advertisement for, or for the smoking of, cigarettes or cigarette tobacco' - does not lose its character as such merely because it is calculated to serve other purposes as well. Advertisements are often designed to entertain or to amuse, sometimes to instruct. Material does not cease to be an advertisement of a relevant type simply because it is calculated to achieve such ends or because some viewers may value it more for these qualities than for its commercial message. Similarly, many advertisements are calculated - and in a subjective sense intended - to enhance the general reputation or, to use the current jargon, 'corporate image' of the advertiser. The fact that a particular advertisement may have that propensity, or that it may be produced with that intention, does not preclude its characterisation - if it meets the test set out above - as an advertisement for a particular product or practice." (Emphasis added).
149 The relevant publications were either media releases or brochures. All appeared on the Association's website. The publications and their impugned contents are identified above at [53]. In one way or another each publication sought to promote the consumption of chicken meat in Australia. This was done, in part, by emphasising the nutritional value of chicken meat, rising consumption volumes and the quality of the husbandry of growing chickens. The "free to roam" representations were plainly directed to making chicken meat attractive to potential consumers who might have had ethical qualms about purchasing chicken products if the birds had been raised in cages or in other unpleasant circumstances.
150 The ACCC submitted that the statements did not constitute published information but were clearly advertisements because they contained statements that also appeared on product packaging. Unlike product packaging, however, the statements were not associated with a particular brand or manufacturers name or product. There is, nonetheless, an evident commercial purpose served by the press releases and brochures. It is, as I have already found, to promote the consumption of chicken products.
151 Even if it be accepted that the "free to roam" statements are informative in nature this does not, in the present contexts, mean that they cannot also be regarded as advertising material. The press releases and statements were directed to members of the public who were actual or potential consumers of chicken meat products. The publications as a whole and the impugned statements in particular, conveyed a favourable impression of both the process of raising chickens and the processed products which were sold in the market place. Although the material does not refer to specific brands or specific products it is cast in terms which clearly apply to all brands and products. The representations would be so understood by the reasonable reader of the Association's website.
152 Each of the Association's publications about which complaint is made is, in my opinion, an "advertisement" within the meaning of s 65A(1)(b) of the Act. Accordingly, the second exception on which the ACCC relied has been made out.
153 For this reason also the Association is not able to claim the benefit of the defence provided for in s 65A of the Act.