Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd
[2019] FCA 1456
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2019-09-06
Before
Middleton J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (32 paragraphs)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The parties confer and provide a minute of order reflecting these reasons, and any submissions on costs of the penalty hearing, within 7 days. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
OVERVIEW 1 This matter, now on remittal before me, calls on me to determine the appropriate relief and orders as to costs in respect of, as held by the Full Court on appeal (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 96), two instances in which the respondent ('LG') made false representations to certain consumers in contravention of ss 18 and 29(1)(m) of the Australian Consumer Law ('ACL'), being Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ('CCA'). 2 At trial, the applicant (the 'ACCC') alleged that LG made 41 false or misleading representations to consumers, retailers and repairers regarding their rights under the ACL. Of these, the Full Court concluded that LG had engaged in two instances of false or misleading conduct. The contraventions occurred when LG's agents represented that certain ACL consumer guarantees did not exist, were excluded, or had no effect in relation to LG televisions. In each of the two instances, the statements were made to individuals who were not in fact misled. 3 As held by the Full Court (at [3]), 'the ACCC did not prove that the consumers would have had a cause of action against the person who supplied the television to them or that LG would have been bound to indemnify the supplier as provided for in ss 259, 271 and 274 of the ACL'. As also held by the Full Court (at [3]), 'the ACCC also did not prove that either LG or the persons with whom it dealt knew or believed that the consumers would have any such cause of action or LG any such liability'. 4 Relevantly to my consideration of appropriate relief, and notwithstanding the two instances in question, there was no finding (by me or the Full Court) that there was a widespread or systematic programme of LG misleading consumers in the manner alleged by the ACCC. As held by the Full Court (at [6]-[7]): [6] … The ACCC did not plead or run its case on the basis that LG's policy, practice or system for dealing with consumers who complained about faulty televisions contravened ss 18(1) and 29(1)(m) of the ACL. During the hearing a witness, Ms Warwood, who was the team leader of LG's Direct Dealer Support team, gave evidence in which she agreed that "unless the ACL was specifically invoked by the consumer, your training was that you should not treat it as an ACL claim". Ms Warwood did not agree that this was a "way of heading off the invocation of the ACL". The ACCC did not seek to amend its case before the primary judge as a result of this evidence. It did not raise with the primary judge any suggestion to the effect that LG's policy, practice or system for dealing with consumers who complained about faulty televisions contravened ss 18(1) and 29(1)(m) of the ACL. For the ACCC now to be given leave to run such a case would offend the principle that in an appeal of this kind a party is bound by the way in which it conducted its case below; had such a case been put below, LG might well have called other evidence about its training, policies, practices and systems. [7] Apart from this, proving the existence of a policy, practice or system of dealing with consumers does not itself prove a contravention of ss 18(1) or 29(1)(m) of the ACL. Contraventions, if they exist, arise from the actual dealings with consumers (that is, conduct). The existence of a particular policy, practice or system, if proven, may support the drawing of various inferences including that a particular dealing or dealings occurred or did not occur in a particular way or that dealings were likely to mislead or deceive. Theoretically it may be that having an indiscriminate system in place of never mentioning the ACL consumer guarantee regime unless raised could, depending upon the circumstances, be conduct likely to mislead (if communications informed by such a policy were made to a class of persons likely to include persons ignorant of such rights). But no such case was run here. 5 It follows that the focus of my determination as to the appropriate relief must be on the two contraventions identified by the Full Court; not on an alleged (and unproven) 'system' at play within LG. However, I do take into account the circumstances surrounding the contraventions, including the training, policies, practices and systems that may well have been relevant to or given rise to the proven contraventions. 6 Having regard to this appropriate focal point, I substantially accept the submissions of LG and have concluded that the two contraventions must be viewed in light of the following circumstances: (1) each contravention involved statements made to only one customer; (2) the customers involved in the two contraventions had a good working knowledge of the consumer guarantees and neither of them were misled; (3) the customers did not suffer loss or damage as a result of the infringements, with LG bearing the cost of the labour and the parts for the repair in both instances; (4) the contravening statements were made by low-level customer service agents in contravention of LG's policies and procedures, and as such were not authorised by senior LG personnel; (5) noting that LG receives between 20,000 and 25,000 telephone calls per month, 14% of which result in referrals to service agents, the occurrence of errors like the contraventions does not demonstrate that LG's customer service training and processes were fundamentally deficient; and (6) the contraventions occurred following the recent transition of LG's call centre operations to the Philippines, and occurred despite a detailed training process of the new call centre agents. 7 However, I note that three representatives were involved in the first infringement, and a separate representative was involved in the infringement relating to the second infringement. These are not single incidents; they are better characterised as relatively isolated incidents. This is certainly not a case where LG has been involved in wholesale or systematic fault in its training process, as seems to be pressed upon by the ACCC in this remittal. 8 For the reasons that follow, I find that the appropriate relief in respect of each contravention is a pecuniary penalty of $80,000 (for a total of $160,000). I do not find that the other relief sought by the ACCC is appropriate in the circumstances of the two contraventions in question.