The Court is not bound to give effect to parties' joint submissions
55 The ACCC and Medibank in their proposed orders seek an order that, pursuant to s 224 of the ACL, Medibank pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the sum of $5 million in respect of the admitted contraventions referred to above. Medibank accepts that each of the Representations involve a separate contravention of the ACL. As a consequence, the conduct for which penalties are sought gave rise to approximately 1,396 legally distinct contraventions (Medibank having admitted that the Representations were made on approximately 1,396 occasions to approximately 849 Affected Members): SOAFA [36]. At all times during the Relevant Period, the maximum pecuniary penalty under s 224(3) of the ACL applicable to each contravention was limited to $1.1 million.
56 Whilst the parties have jointly submitted that $5 million is an appropriate penalty, the Court is not bound to give effect to that joint submission. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft [2019] FCA 2166, Foster J said at [164]-[165]:
First, it is the responsibility of the Court, and the Court alone, to determine the appropriate pecuniary penalty under s 224 of the ACL once the Court is satisfied that the person upon whom it proposes to impose that penalty has contravened one or more relevant provisions of the ACL. In order to discharge that responsibility, the Court must examine all of the circumstances of the case. Where the parties have put forward a statement of agreed facts, the Court may act upon that statement if it considers that it is appropriate to do so. The Court may also act upon such other evidence as may be admitted for the purpose of its determination of an appropriate pecuniary penalty.
Second, where, as here, a specialist regulator and the contravener reach an agreement as to the amount of the pecuniary penalty which they suggest the Court should impose, the Court is not bound to give effect to that agreement and impose the agreed penalty. The responsibility to fix "… such pecuniary penalty … as the court determines to be appropriate" (s 224(1)) remains with the Court at all times. The Court must not act as a mere "rubber stamp". As Wilcox J said in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v FFE Building Services Limited (2003) ATPR ¶41-969 (FFE) at 47,805 [34]-[36]:
There is a danger in judges of this Court being overly influenced by the view as to penalty taken by the ACCC. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd (2002) ATPR ¶41-880; [2002] FCA 619, Weinberg J was confronted with a case where the ACCC and the respondent had agreed upon a particular penalty figure. Although he eventually decided to adopt the agreed figure, his Honour made it clear at [29] that he thought it too low. His Honour went on to make some comments that apply equally to a situation where the Court is presented with an agreed narrow range of penalties. His Honour said, at [34]:
"There are dangers associated with this approach. The Court may be seen, perhaps not altogether incorrectly, to act as a 'rubber stamp' in simply approving a decision taken at an executive level by a body charged with investigating and prosecuting contraventions of the Act, but having no role in actually imposing particular sanctions for those contraventions. Negotiated settlements are an important vehicle for resolving complex matters such as those involved in the present case. It must be borne in mind, however, that there is a public interest in ensuring that corporations that engage in behaviour of the kind that occurred in this case are dealt with appropriately, and that proper recognition is given to the need for specific and general deterrence. There are important parallels between the fixing of a pecuniary penalty under s 76, and the ordinary sentencing process which is quintessentially a matter for the courts."
Weinberg J noted the tendency of the Court simply to adopt the agreed figure. He said at [32]:
"I acknowledge that both the ACCC and Colgate have accepted that the figure proposed is in no way binding upon the Court. However, when pressed to point to a single instance when the Court has not, in the past, endorsed such a figure, counsel found it difficult to do so."
This seems to me a most unsatisfactory position. It involves an abrogation of responsibility by the Court. My concern is exacerbated by the level of penalties often accepted by ACCC. In 1992, Parliament made a dramatic revision of the scale of penalties available for breaches of Part IV of the Act. The maximum penalty for a corporate respondent was increased from $250,000 to $10,000,000. Parliament obviously intended to achieve a quantum leap in the size of penalties imposed for breaches of Part IV. Yet, as the cases cited to me demonstrate, ACCC has continued to negotiate penalties that are but a small fraction of the new maximum.
In FFE, his Honour more than doubled the agreed penalty submitted to the Court by the parties. I agree with these observations made by Wilcox J and propose to keep them in mind when determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty in the present case.
57 It is therefore a matter for this Court on the basis of the admitted facts to determine the quantum of an appropriate penalty. The High Court has made it clear that, in considering what is an appropriate penalty, the Court can receive and, if appropriate, accept an agreed submission as to the amount of the pecuniary penalty to be imposed. In Commonwealth v FWDII, the plurality observed at [57]:
[I]n civil proceedings there is generally very considerable scope for the parties to agree on the facts and upon consequences. There is also very considerable scope for them to agree upon the appropriate remedy and for the court to be persuaded that it is an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, settlements of civil proceedings are commonplace and orders by consent for the payment of damages and other relief are unremarkable. So are court-approved compromises of proceedings on behalf of infants and persons otherwise lacking capacity, court-approved custody and property settlements, court-approved compromises in group proceedings and court-approved schemes of arrangement. More generally, it is entirely consistent with the nature of civil proceedings for a court to make orders by consent and to approve a compromise of proceedings on terms proposed by the parties, provided the court is persuaded that what is proposed is appropriate.
58 In this respect, I agree with the observations of Wigney J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] FCA 1516; 118 ACSR 124 (ACCC v ANZ) at [104] where his Honour observed the following:
In considering whether the proposed agreed penalty is an appropriate penalty, the Court should … generally recognise that there is no single appropriate penalty and that an agreed penalty may be an appropriate penalty if it falls within a range within which any of the figures could be considered to be appropriate having regard to all relevant circumstances. The Court should also recognise that the agreed penalty is most likely the result of compromise and pragmatism on the part of the [ACCC], and to reflect, amongst other things, the [ACCC]'s considered estimation of the risks and expense of the litigation had it not been settled.
59 I also agree with the observations of Mortimer J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 602. After referring to Wigney J's observations in ACCC v ANZ extracted above, her Honour said at [19] that "it is important to emphasise that considerations of pragmatism and compromise on the part of the regulator do not absolve the Court from forming its own opinion that the proposed penalty is, on the evidence, within an appropriate range and proportionate to the conduct constituting the contraventions".
60 I now turn to consider the application of these principles to this case.