The relevant factors and comparative cases
122 Section 224(2) of the Australian Consumer Law provides that in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the court must have regard to all relevant matters including:
(a) the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission; and
(b) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(c) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Chapter 4 or this Part to have engaged in any similar conduct.
123 These mandatory considerations are only three of the matters to which the Court must have regard. Although other factors are commonly described as "discretionary factors" there is no real discretion involved. Once another factor is relevant, the Court is required to have regard to it.
124 Some of the commonly relevant matters other than those in (a) to (c) to which the Court must have regard if relevant were described by Perram J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 761; (2011) 282 ALR 246, 250-251 [11] (a list which was referred to without objection on appeal: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20; (2012) 287 ALR 249, 258 [37] (the Court)):
(1) the size of the contravening company;
(2) the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended;
(3) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management of the contravener or at some lower level;
(4) whether the contravener has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act (or the new Australian Competition and Consumer Law) as evidenced by educational programmes and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention;
(5) whether the contravener has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention;
(6) whether the contravener has engaged in similar conduct in the past;
(7) the financial position of the contravener; and
(8) whether the contravening conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert.
125 Underlying many of these factors is what numerous authorities describe as the principal object of deterrence in the award of civil penalties. Deterrence can be "specific" to the particular person who committed the contravention and also "general" to persons in the same or similar circumstances to the person being subjected to the pecuniary penalty.
126 A consideration of deterrence, general and specific, also means that the following factors will also commonly be relevant:
(9) the extent of contrition;
(10) whether the contravening company made a profit from the contraventions;
(11) the extent of the profit made by the contravening company; and
(12) whether the contravening company engaged in the conduct with an intention to profit from it.
127 There was some dispute in this case about whether payments of compensation made by Woolworths is a relevant factor. As I explain later, I consider that this is a relevant factor to consider both directly and indirectly (as a matter which is relevant to contrition).
128 There are deep philosophical questions that underlie the process of reasoning to a conclusion by reference to multifarious factors and also by comparison with other cases. It is necessary to say something about these issues to explain why I do not accept a submission, powerfully pressed, by senior counsel for Woolworths.
129 Consistency and the rule of law require consideration of the penalties awarded in similar cases, particularly if it is possible to discern a range from those cases. But how can the penalties in similar cases be compared if the weight of the relevant factors differs and those factors are incommensurable? Professor Sunstein has argued that "[a]n especially large task for legal theory is to offer an adequate description of how, in legal contexts, choices should be made among incommensurable goods and among different possible kinds of valuation": Sunstein C "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law" (1993) 92 Mich Law Rev 779, 861. Can problems of incommensurability be resolved by the adoption of a common metric and, if so, what should that metric be? Can they be resolved by lexical ordering? If so, are formal notions of Right conceptually prior to utilitarian notions of Good as suggested by Chapman B "Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument" (1998) 146 Uni Penn Law Rev 1487?
130 Courts have generally given short shrift to these concerns. In criminal law, the dominant approach to sentencing based on the triptych of purposes of punishment (retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence) involves an "instinctive synthesis" of the factors relevant to those purposes. An already complicated process of sentencing should not be made more complicated by attempting to reduce sentencing to some formula or to make it overly technical: Weininger v The Queen [2003] HCA 14; (2003) 212 CLR 629, 645 [50] (Kirby J); Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; (2001) 206 CLR 267, 309-310 [144] (Hayne J). In Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610, 622-623 [39], McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ explained why, in criminal law, "excessive subtleties and refinements" must be avoided. Quoting from Sir John Barry their Honours said that criminal law:
… has to employ methods which are, in important respects, rough and ready, and in the nature of things it cannot take fully into account mere individual limitations and the philosophical considerations involved in the theory of moral, as distinct from legal, responsibility. It must be operated within society as a going concern. To achieve even a minimal degree of effectiveness, it should avoid excessive subtleties and refinements. It must be administered publicly in such a fashion that its activities can be understood by ordinary citizens and regarded by them as conforming with the community's generally accepted standards of what is fair and just. Thus it is a fundamental requirement of a sound legal system that it should reflect and correspond with the sensible ideas about right and wrong of the society it controls, and this requirement has an important influence on the way in which the judges discharge the function of imposing punishments upon persons convicted of crime.
131 The same "instinctive synthesis" approach does not directly apply to civil proceedings (see Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 90 ALJR 113, 127 [56] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ)). But there is a common process of assessing the relevant factors and synthesising a conclusion as to penalty where the parties have not agreed an appropriate penalty and the central purpose of the penalty is deterrence.
132 These matters are important in this case because the submissions of the parties focused upon several significant cases involving pecuniary penalties as comparable cases. In oral submissions, both counsel properly accepted that these few cases of contravention did not establish a range. The circumstances in the cases cited were simply too different from this case and from each other. Indeed, Woolworths' attempt to consider the limited possible comparison between this case and the other different cases involved unarticulated assumptions about factors that might be thought to be incommensurable. A simple hypothetical example might be two cases of misrepresentation which are similar in all other respects except in one case the misrepresentation was intentional and cynical but with relatively minor consequences and in the other case the misrepresentation was careless but with very major consequences. How can those incommensurable factors be weighed?
133 In the course of making reference to cases which were said to be comparable, in oral and written submissions Woolworths referred to the "parity principle". That principle does not assist Woolworths. It does not suggest that incommensurable factors in the different circumstances of single cases can or should be compared. In NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285, 295, Burchett and Kiefel JJ said that a "hallmark of justice is equality before the law, and, other things being equal, corporations guilty of similar contraventions should incur similar penalties". But their Honours went on to say that different circumstances mean that "other things are rarely equal when contraventions of the Trade Practices Act are concerned". Further, as their Honours observed, cases are authorities for matters of principle. But a penalty decided on the basis of findings of fact in one case which differs from the circumstances of another case cannot dictate the penalty in that other case.
134 In summary, although the cases to which I refer below were discussed in some length by Woolworths, there are a number of reasons why these cases are, at best, of very limited utility in explaining the appropriate penalty.
135 The first reason is the lack of any range that emerges from those three or four cases. Even the notion of deriving a range from other cases is not acceptable in some circumstances: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20; (2012) 287 ALR 249, 264 [60] (the Court). Without a range, direct comparisons of cases involving different factual circumstances can be very misleading. An example is the submission by senior counsel that the penalty imposed in Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (considered below) should be regarded as an "outlier" or the outer limit for the most extreme contraventions. But what does this mean? Is this outer limit the penalty imposed by the Full Court ($3.61 million)? Or is it the penalty imposed by the primary judge, based on findings of fact which were overturned but where the Full Court did not suggest that the penalty was otherwise manifestly excessive ($5.26 million)? Senior counsel seemed to assume that the former penalty was the outlier. Even if this were so, what does it mean for a case to be an "outlier" when compared with only two other cases which involve different circumstances? And, even on the facts found by the Full Court, why should the amount of $3.61 million be the outlying amount when the Full Court did not suggest that $3.61 million was the outer limit of the awards that might have been made?
136 The second reason is more fundamental. There is little utility in comparisons with the cases cited is the unarticulated, but intuitive, assumptions involved in the process of comparison between incommensurables.
137 The third reason becomes apparent upon consideration of the cases below. To reiterate the point from NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd, the comparison is of very little use due to the considerable variety of the different circumstances involved in those cases.