Pecuniary penalty
110 Sections 224(1)(a)(ii) and (a)(iv) ACL came into force on 1 January 2011, and relevantly empower the Court in respect of contraventions of provisions of Div 1 of Pt 3-1 ACL (which includes s 29 and s 33) to order the contravener to pay such pecuniary penalty in respect of 'each act or omission' as the Court determines to be appropriate. Penalties are not provided in the ACL for contraventions of s 18.
111 Section 224 ACL was preceded by s 76E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The principles applicable to determining pecuniary penalties which have been applied by this Court in determining penalties under s 76E TPA are the principles which have been applied in determining pecuniary penalties under s 76 TPA for contraventions of restricted trade practices provisions, unless the context of the infringements makes plain that it cannot be so: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 279 ALR 609 per Perram J (at 624-625). Perram J's reasoning in this regard was not disturbed by the Full Court on appeal and was cited with approval by the Full Court in Global One Mobile Entertainment Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 134 (at [119]).
112 The principal purpose of imposing civil penalties under s 224 ACL is deterrence. French J observed in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1990) 13 ATPR 41-076 (at 52, 152) the 'primacy of the deterrent purpose in the imposition of penalty' and described deterrence, both specific and general, as the 'principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties'.
113 This approach has been consistently followed and has been reinforced by numerous subsequent decisions: see for example Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd (2006) ATPR 42-091 (at [11]); and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2007) 161 FCR 513 (at [60]).
114 By s 224(2) ACL in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty the Court must have regard to all relevant matters including: (a) the nature and extent of the act or omissions and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission; (b) the circumstances in which it took place; and (c) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Ch 4 or Pt 5-2 ACL to have engaged in any similar conduct. Other relevant factors set out with approval by the Full Court in Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249 (at [37]) include: (a) the size of the contravening company; (b) the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended; (c) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management of the contravener or at some lower level; (d) whether the contravener has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Competition and Consumer Act as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention; (e) whether the contravener has shown a disposition to cooperate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Competition and Consumer Act in relation to the contravention; (f) the financial position of the contravener; and (g) whether the contravening conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert.
115 The process to be applied in arriving at a particular penalty figure was considered by the High Court in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 in the context of criminal sentencing. That process has been consistently applied to the assessment of pecuniary penalties under s 76 and s 76E TPA and equivalent provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act and ACL: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) ATPR 42-070 per Gyles J (at [68]); Mandurvit (at [67]).
116 This Court has applied the process in arriving at a particular penalty as set out by the High Court in Markarian where Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ held:
(a) assessment of the appropriate penalty is a discretionary judgment based on all relevant factors (at [27]);
(b) careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick (at [31]);
(c) it will rarely be appropriate for a Court to start with the maximum penalty and proceed by making a proportional deduction from that maximum (at 31]);
(d) the Court should not adopt a mathematical approach of increments or decrements from a predetermined range, or assign specific numerical or proportionate value to the various relevant factors (at [37] citing Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (at [74]-[76]);
(e) it is not appropriate to determine an 'objective' sentence and then adjust it by some mathematical value given to one or more factors such as a plea of guilty or assistance to authorities (at [37] citing Wong (at [74]-[76]);
(f) the Court may not add and subtract item by item from some apparently subliminally derived figure to determine the penalty to be imposed (at [39]); and
(g) since the law strongly favours transparency, accessible reasoning is necessary in the interests of all, and, while there may be occasions where some indulgence in an arithmetical process will better serve that end, it does not apply where there are numerous and complex considerations that must be weighed (at [39]).
117 When the penalties have been agreed by the parties, in my view, the correct approach remains that described by the Full Court in Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (2004) ATPR 41-993 per Branson, Sackville and Gyles JJ (at [51]):
51 The following propositions emerge from the reasoning in NW Frozen Foods:
(i) It is the responsibility of the Court to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed under s 76 of the TP Act in respect of a contravention of the TP Act.
(ii) Determining the quantum of a penalty is not an exact science. Within a permissible range, the courts have acknowledged that a particular figure cannot necessarily be said to be more appropriate than another.
(iii) There is a public interest in promoting settlement of litigation, particularly where it is likely to be lengthy. Accordingly, when the regulator and contravener have reached agreement, they may present to the Court a statement of facts and opinions as to the effect of those facts, together with joint submissions as to the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
(iv) The view of the regulator, as a specialist body, is a relevant, but not determinative consideration on the question of penalty. In particular, the views of the regulator on matters within its expertise (such as the ACCC's views as to the deterrent effect of a proposed penalty in a given market) will usually be given greater weight than its views on more "subjective" matters.
(v) In determining whether the proposed penalty is appropriate, the Court examines all the circumstances of the case. Where the parties have put forward an agreed statement of facts, the Court may act on that statement if it is appropriate to do so.
(vi) Where the parties have jointly proposed a penalty, it will not be useful to investigate whether the Court would have arrived at that precise figure in the absence of agreement. The question is whether that figure is, in the Court's view, appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In answering that question, the Court will not reject the agreed figure simply because it would have been disposed to select some other figure. It will be appropriate if within the permissible range.
118 The Full Court made some additional observations (at [53], [54] and [58]), including:
53 First, the rationale for giving weight to a joint submission on penalty is said by the Court to be the savings in resources for the regulator and the Court, as well as the likelihood that a negotiated resolution will include measures designed to promote competition. As Jeremy Thorpe points out, a related advantage is that the savings in resources can be used by the regulator to increase the likelihood that other contraveners will be detected and brought before the courts. This has the effect of increasing deterrence which is one of the principal justifications, if not the only justification for imposing civil penalties under the TP Act or the Sites Act: J Thorpe, "Determining the Appropriate Role for Charge Bargaining in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act" (1996) 4 Comp & Cons LJ 69, at 72-74. Of course the arguments in favour of negotiated settlements have to take account of the fact that it is the Court that bears the ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriate penalty.
54 Secondly, the sixth proposition drawn from the reasoning in NW Frozen Foods does not mean, in our opinion, that the Court must commence its reasoning with the proposed penalty and limit itself to considering whether that penalty is within the permissible range. A Court may wish to take that approach. However, it is open to a Court, consistently with the reasoning in NW Frozen Foods, first to address the appropriate range of penalties independently of the parties' proposed figure and then, having made that judgment, determine whether the prepared penalty falls within the range.
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58 Fifthly, there is nothing in NW Frozen Foods that is inconsistent with any of the following propositions:
(i) The Court, if it considers that the evidence or information before it is inadequate to form a view as to whether the proposed penalty is appropriate, may request the parties to provide additional evidence or information or verify the information provided. If they do not provide the information or verification requested, the Court may well not be satisfied that the proposed penalty is within the range.
(ii) If the absence of a contradictor inhibits the Court in the performance of its duties under s 76 of the TP Act, s 13 of the Sites Act, or similar legislation, it may seek the assistance of an amicus curiae or of an individual or body prepared to act as an intervenor under FCR, O 6 r 17.
(iii) If the Court is disposed not to impose the penalty proposed by the parties, it may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances, for each of them to be given the opportunity to withdraw consent to the proposed orders and for the matter to proceed as a contested hearing.
119 There are several cases in which the Court has imposed penalties different from those agreed by the parties, but in most cases the penalty sought by consent or agreement between the parties has been accepted by the courts. The Full Court in Mobil Oil followed the observations of Sheppard J in Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 4) (1981) 37 ALR 256 where his Honour said (at 259):
It is, of course, true that the penalty has been suggested to me by the agreement of the parties. Uninformed of their agreement, I may have selected a different figure, but I am satisfied that it would not have been very different from theirs. There is from time to time, amongst members of the profession and amongst the public, discussion concerning plea bargaining. Sometimes it is suggested that it involves disreputable conduct. It is my opinion that that is so if it at all implicates the court in private discussions as to what the court's attitude will or would be likely to be if a particular course is taken. In this case nothing of that kind has occurred. The parties have made their own agreement and put it to the court for approval, not knowing what its attitude was likely to be. That was the course adopted, perhaps in a less positive way, in a customs prosecution heard in the original jurisdiction of the High Court: Chipp (Minister for Customs) v. Campbell Beaumont Trading Pty Ltd (22 December 1969, unreported). The court there accepted the parties' view of the matter. This, of course, is not a criminal case; the liability is civil only. But, even in the most serious criminal cases, it is not unusual for the prosecution to accept a plea to a lesser charge, subject always to the approval of the court. I have said what I have only to explain that the course which the parties have adopted is both proper and not uncommon, even though perhaps novel in the comparatively new field of trade practices.
120 In the recent decision of Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 372 the High Court, by majority, held that it was not the role or duty of the prosecution in criminal matters to make submissions on the available range of sentences for an offence, being the upper and lower limits outside of which a criminal sentence would be subject to appellable error.
121 This principle was applied to penalties in the context of the Competition and Consumer Act in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Limited (No 3) [2014] FCA 292. However, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 336, Middleton J held (at [140] - [152]) that Barbaro does not implicitly overrule NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 or Mobil Oil and does not preclude the regulator from making submissions as to the quantum of penalty of appropriate deterrent value. I took a similar view in Mandurvit (at [37]-[80]) as did Davies J in Tax Practitioners Board v Dedic [2014] FCA 511 (at [3]). (This approach was also applied in Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Love [2014] WASC 389 by the Full Court (at [74]).