Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014

The statute builds around a small set of legal concepts and statutory definitions that determine scope and effect.

• Vexatious application and vexatious proceeding (s 3). The Act defines both terms inclusively by reference to abuse of process, harassment or wrongful purpose, lack of reasonable grounds, and conduct that causes delay or detriment. Those definitions govern the substantive inquiry courts make when considering whether restraint orders or leave should be granted (see ss 11(1), 17(1), 29(1), 37(1)).

• Litigation restraint orders (s 3). This umbrella term covers limited, extended and general litigation restraint orders (Parts 2-4). Each is targeted differently. A limited litigation restraint order is case‑specific and restricts interlocutory applications in a particular proceeding (ss 11-15). An extended litigation restraint order addresses repeated vexatious litigation frequently brought against a person or about a matter and can apply across a court’s jurisdiction (Part 3, ss 16-27). A general litigation restraint order (Part 4, ss 28-33) is the most expansive, made only by the Supreme Court and directed to persons who persistently and without reasonable grounds commence or conduct vexatious proceedings (s 29(1), s 30).

• Acting in concert (s 4). The Act treats persons acting in concert with a restrained litigant as potential subjects of restraint: orders can extend to persons acting in concert and can impose corresponding litigation restraint terms (s 35). The Act explains who is “acting in concert” (s 4(1)) and excludes, explicitly, legal practitioners, litigation guardians and authorised persons acting for another as acting in concert (s 4(2)). The provision recognises proxies and collusion as mechanisms by which constrained conduct might be evaded.

• Leave to proceed (Parts 8). Where a restraint order applies, the person affected must seek leave to make or continue the restricted applications or proceedings (ss 50-55). The leave tests are centrally twofold: the proposed application or proceeding must not be vexatious and there must be reasonable grounds (ss 51(1), 53(a)-(b), 55(a)-(b)). The Act mandates substantive disclosure in leave applications (s 56) and allows courts to impose conditions, including security for costs (s 64).

• Appeals and appeal restrictions (Part 6 and Part 10). The Supreme Court and other courts can make appeal restriction orders that remove or limit the right to appeal decisions refusing leave (ss 37-42). Part 10 provides the pathway and gatekeeping arrangements for appeals from decisions under the Act: a person requires leave of the Supreme Court to appeal on a question of law in enumerated decisions (s 79), and the Act prescribes notification rules for leave to appeal (ss 80-84).

• Procedural controls and secrecy (ss 59-61, 66-68). The Act imposes limits on notice for leave and variation applications: applicants must not give notice unless the relevant court directs or orders it (ss 59, 66). When notice is given by court direction, specific persons must be notified and copies of applications provided; the court can allow written rather than oral submissions (ss 60-63, 67-71).

• Interaction with intervention order legislation (multiple provisions). “Intervention order legislation” (s 3) , principally the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 and the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 , is treated as a distinct class for extended restraint orders, acting in concert orders and appeal restriction orders. Specific rules modify scope (see ss 18-19, 22-23, 36, 39) and place explicit limits on publication of the names of protected persons (ss 85(4), 86).

Operationally, the Act gives courts and VCAT a broad, discretionary toolbox to control litigants,orders can be made on application or on the court's own motion (see ss 11(4), 17(4), 29(4), 35(2)). The immediate procedural effect of many orders is automatic: a restraint order stays the relevant proceeding on being made and renders any contravening start or application of no effect (see ss 13, 25, 32, 40, 75). The Act therefore merges substantive determinations about vexatiousness with procedural mechanisms to prevent further litigation activity.

The Act identifies the population it regulates and specific institutional actors who participate in administration.

• Subjects of orders: Any person may be the subject of a litigation restraint order, acting in concert order, appeal restriction order or variation or revocation application prevention order (see definitions in s 3 and the operative provisions in Parts 2-9). Orders can be tailored to a person, named entities or a described matter (for example, s 20(1)(a) allows the Supreme Court to restrict proceedings “against a person or other entity named in the order, or in respect of a matter described in the order”).

• Persons protected by orders: The Act contemplates orders made to protect identified persons or entities from repeated vexatious litigation. In intervention order contexts that protection may extend to a protected person’s child; the Magistrates’ Court and Children’s Court provisions make that explicit (see ss 22(2), 23(1)).

• Applicants: Who may bring an application depends on the order type. For limited and extended restraint orders, the Attorney‑General, “the person who has been made the subject” (if the applicant is the victim of the vexatious application), or any person with a sufficient interest may apply (ss 10(1), 16(1)). For general litigation restraint orders only the Attorney‑General may apply to the Supreme Court (s 28). Acting in concert orders may be sought by the person who applied for the litigation restraint order or by a person named in a pending application who would be affected by it (s 34).

• Courts and registrars: The Supreme Court, County Court, Magistrates’ Court, Children’s Court (for intervention legislation matters), VCAT and VOCAT are within the Act’s reach (s 3 definitions). Registrars and principal registrars have administrative duties under ss 44, 47-49, 72-73 to distribute copies of orders and to direct notifications. Section 57 expressly empowers specific court officers (Prothonotary, registrars, principal registrars) to refuse to accept for filing an application for leave to proceed unless satisfied it is materially different from a prior application.

• Attorney‑General and executive: The Attorney‑General has multiple roles: a frequent applicant (ss 10, 16, 28); recipient of copies of orders (s 47); who must publish orders in the Government Gazette (s 85); and who may request documents from courts for the purpose of deciding whether to make an application (s 43). The Attorney‑General therefore has both informational rights and publication functions under the Act.

• Legal representatives and authorised agents: The definition of “acting in concert” (s 4) expressly excludes legal practitioners acting for a person, litigation guardians, professional advocates and others authorised by law from being treated as acting in concert. That creates a safe harbour for lawyers and certain court‑appointed representatives.

• Third parties with an interest: The Act contemplates persons who have a “sufficient interest” may apply for restraint orders (ss 10(1)(c), 16(1)(c), 18(1)(c)). The Act’s examples indicate that parties to related proceedings, police officers, guardians or family members seeking intervention orders may satisfy that test (s 10 example, s 18 example).

Who bears costs and burdens in practice: persons targeted by orders bear procedural burdens (need to seek leave, disclose prior litigation activity s 56, potentially provide security for costs as a condition of leave s 64). Applicants for orders other than the Attorney‑General must generally obtain leave to apply (ss 10(2), 16(2)), which imposes an up‑front gatekeeping cost. Registrars may refuse filings that appear materially the same (s 57), creating an administrative barrier. Courts may make costs orders against persons acting in concert (s 35(3)(e)) and the Act cross‑references existing costs regimes in intervention legislation (notes to ss 19 and 36). Publication and reporting obligations (ss 85, 87) affect the Attorney‑General and courts.

The Act creates duties for courts, registrars, applicants and the Attorney‑General and confers rights, principally procedural rights and rights of access subject to leave.

Duties on courts and tribunals

• Procedural fairness duty to hear or afford opportunity to be heard (s 45). Subject to limited exceptions, courts and VCAT must not make orders without hearing the person or giving an opportunity to be heard. For intervention order legislation matters the Magistrates’ Court and Children’s Court must hear both the person to be subject to the order and the person to be protected (s 45(2)).

• Requirement to ensure copies are provided to the Attorney‑General and other courts (ss 47-49). Courts and tribunal registrars must supply copies of orders to the Attorney‑General and, depending on the issuing court, to other courts and tribunals named in the section (s 48 prescribes recipients depending on issuing court).

• Statement of reasons for intervention order related extended litigation restraint orders (s 46). If the Magistrates’ Court or Children’s Court makes an extended litigation restraint order relating to intervention order legislation, the order must include or be accompanied by a statement of reasons.

• Reporting requirement (s 87). Each Court and VCAT must provide an annual report to the Attorney‑General summarising the number and types of litigation restraint, acting in concert and appeal restriction orders made, varied or revoked.

Rights and duties for applicants and persons subject to orders

• Who may apply and leave regimes. The Attorney‑General, victims of vexatious applications and persons with a sufficient interest are entitled to apply for certain orders (ss 10(1), 16(1)). Non‑AG applicants generally must obtain leave to apply (ss 10(2), 16(2)). Persons subject to orders have the right to make applications for leave to proceed (Parts 8: ss 50-55), and to apply to vary or revoke an order (s 65) with leave in some cases.

• Disclosure obligation when applying for leave (s 56). A person subject to a restraint order applying for leave to proceed must disclose prior applications for leave, prior interlocutory applications or proceedings that were vexatious or stayed/dismissed on the basis of lack of merit, and explain how the new application is materially different. Disclosure must be by affidavit unless court rules provide otherwise (s 56(2)).

• Restricted notice: applicants must not give notice of applications for leave or variation unless directed by the court (ss 59, 66). Where direction is given, the court identifies persons to be notified and requires a copy of the application and an invitation to make submissions (ss 60-61, 67-68). Courts may limit oral appearances and may decide matters on written submissions (ss 62-64, 71 and 84).

• Leave tests and conditional leave (ss 51, 53, 55, 64). Leave is discretionary with a substantive threshold: the application/proceeding must not be vexatious and must have reasonable grounds. Leave may be granted subject to conditions, e.g. security for costs (s 64 example).

Institutional duties and powers of registrars

• Power to refuse to accept filings for leave applications if not materially different to prior ones (s 57). This places a gatekeeper duty on court administrative officers (specified by court) and can be overridden by direction from the court.

Attorney‑General’s duties and powers

• Right to request documents from courts for deciding whether to seek an order (s 43). Courts may provide those documents.

• Publication duty (s 85). The Attorney‑General must publish a copy of any order given to the Attorney‑General, at minimum in the Government Gazette, and may publish in other ways unless publication involves protected persons under intervention order legislation (s 85(3)-(4)).

Rights of appeal

• Appeals require leave of the Supreme Court and are limited to questions of law in specified decisions (s 79). Where an appeal is permitted the Act prescribes notification rules and the court’s powers to determine the leave application on written submissions (ss 80-84).

Other procedural duties

• Courts may act on their own motion to make orders (ss 11(4), 17(4), 29(4), 35(2)), but must comply with hearing/opportunity requirements (s 45) and give required notices when directed (ss 60-61, 67-68).

These duties and rights combine to produce a regulated path for both attempting to curb vexatious conduct and for restrained persons to seek judicial permission to continue legitimate litigation. The Act’s disclosure, registrar gatekeeping and leave rules concentrate evidentiary burden and administrative friction on persons who have been subject to prior vexatious findings or who are repeatedly litigating.

The Act does not create criminal offences; enforcement is procedural, civil and administrative. The principal enforcement mechanisms are injunctive‑style orders, automatic stays, striking out and the administrative refusal to accept filings. Key enforcement features and consequences are as follows.

Automatic stays and nullity

• On the making of many orders, the Act provides for an immediate stay of the affected proceedings and declares that proceedings or interlocutory applications commenced in contravention of an order are of no effect. This is a direct procedural penalty: limited orders stay interlocutory applications in the specified proceeding (s 13), extended and general orders stay the relevant proceedings (ss 25, 32), and appeal restriction orders stay applications for leave to appeal (s 40). These statutory consequences mean that if a litigant ignores an order, the proceeding is treated as legally ineffectual.

Power to strike out and impose costs

• The Act allows courts to strike out interlocutory applications and to stay proceedings when making acting in concert orders (s 35(3)(c)-(d)). Courts may also order that the person acting in concert is liable for costs (s 35(3)(e)). Costs consequences provide a monetary enforcement lever against non‑compliant or opportunistic users of process.

Registrar gatekeeping and administrative refusal

• Registrars and principal registrars have express authority to refuse to accept leave applications for filing where the registrar is not satisfied that an application is materially different from a previous application made by the applicant (s 57). That administrative tool can function as an enforcement filter preventing repetition without judicial leave.

Conditions on leave, including security for costs

• When leave is granted, courts may impose conditions (s 64). The Act’s example identifies deposit of funds with the court as security for costs. Such conditions operate as practical enforcement,requiring resources up front,or as a deterent.

Variation or revocation application prevention orders

• Courts may make orders preventing a person from applying for variation or revocation of a litigation restraint order (s 74). These orders operate as an additional procedural restraint on litigants who repeatedly seek to vary or revoke restraint orders.

Appeal restriction orders

• Courts may remove or limit the right to appeal specified decisions about leave (s 37(2), s 38(2), s 39(2)). Where an appeal restriction order is made, applications for leave to appeal are stayed and any appeal taken contrary to the order is of no effect (s 40). This reduces opportunities for interlocutory appeals that would otherwise prolong litigation.

Publication and reputational enforcement

• The Attorney‑General must publish copies of orders given to the Attorney‑General (s 85). Publication in the Gazette and elsewhere may have reputational consequences for persons named in orders, subject to protections where the order relates to intervention order legislation (s 85(3)-(4), s 86).

Limits on enforcement and judicial discretion

• The Act preserves inherent and implied jurisdiction of courts (s 8). Section 7 provides that the Act prevails to the extent of inconsistency with other statutory or common law powers, which consolidates enforcement in the Act’s framework but does not eliminate court discretion. The Act also repeatedly vests broad discretion in courts and tribunals to take any matters they consider relevant when deciding whether to make orders (see ss 11(2), 17(2), 29(2)).

No express criminal sanctions

• The Act relies on civil process and court powers rather than criminal sanctions. There are no fines or imprisonment provisions in the text. Enforcement therefore operates through denial of civil process, costs, and administrative blocking of filings rather than criminal penalties.

The enforcement architecture places weight on judicial and administrative decision‑making rather than prescriptive statutory penalties. The substantive sanctions are loss of access to courts unless leave is obtained, exposure to costs, and potential reputational publication.

The Act is framed to operate across Victorian courts and tribunals and to co‑exist with, and where necessary, displace inconsistent statutory powers.

Primacy and preservation

• To the extent of inconsistency, the Act prevails over any statutory jurisdiction, common law power or power under any other Act (s 7). This gives it primacy when a conflict arises between this Act’s restraint regime and other statutory procedural powers in Victorian courts and tribunals. Section 8 provides an important textual limit: it does not limit the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction or a court’s implied jurisdiction. That preserves baseline judicial control and suggests the Act should be read as complementing, rather than entirely displacing, inherent powers.

Application across jurisdictions

• The definition of an “Australian court or tribunal” (s 3) includes courts and tribunals of the Commonwealth and of other States and Territories, and the definition of “Victorian court or tribunal” lists the courts and tribunals within Victoria (s 3). However, the powers conferred are expressed as applying to Victorian courts and tribunals (s 6(1)). The Act therefore governs litigation in Victorian courts and tribunals, but it recognises, for evidentiary and relevance purposes, orders and conduct in other Australian courts and tribunals (the courts may take into account previous orders made elsewhere when deciding about restraint orders , see ss 11(2)(b), 17(2)(b), 29(2)(b)).

Interaction with intervention order legislation

• The Act contains tailored provisions for “intervention order legislation” (defined in s 3 to include Family Violence Protection Act 2008 and Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010, among others). For extended orders that relate to intervention order legislation there are distinct application pathways (ss 18-19), content rules (ss 22-23), publication protections (s 85(4), s 86), and special costs cross‑references (notes to ss 19 and 36 referencing s 154 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 and s 111 of the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010). These carve outs reflect interactional adjustments to protect victims and the particular practices of intervention orders.

Transitional conversion of prior orders

• The Act provides explicit transitional provisions converting prior vexatious‑litigant orders under the Supreme Court Act 1986, the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 and the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 into the new categories of this Act (ss 91-99). Those provisions preserve the terms of existing orders unless varied or revoked under the new Act. The transitional scheme therefore preserves continuity, ensuring existing orders remain enforceable and are migrated into the new framework.

VCAT rules and requirements

• When exercising powers under the Act VCAT must be constituted by a member who is an Australian lawyer (s 9). The Act also modifies VCAT’s usual rules on statements of reasons to the Attorney‑General: copies of VCAT orders given to the Attorney‑General under s 47 or to courts under s 48(5) and s 73(5) do not have to include statements of reasons otherwise required by s 117(6) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (see ss 47(2), 48(6), 73(6)). This changes ordinary VCAT practice when interacting with the Attorney‑General and courts under this Act.

Rules and regulations

• The Act contemplates enabling rules and regulations that may regulate practice and procedure (s 88) and authorises broad regulation‑making powers (s 89). Rules of court made under the Act may regulate practice and procedure for matters within the Act (s 88). Those subordinate instruments will govern detailed interaction points with existing procedural rules.

Limits on notice and publication

• The Act imposes statutory limits and pathways for notification of leave, variation and appeal applications (ss 59-61, 66-68, 80-82). It requires a court’s direction before notice can be given, which interacts practically with other civil procedure rules that assume notice of proceedings. Publication of orders is mandated to the Attorney‑General and then to the Gazette (s 85), but the Act permits removal of names of protected persons from published copies in intervention order cases (s 85(3)-(4)) and allows the Magistrates’ Court or Children’s Court to permit publication in exceptional public interest circumstances (s 86).

Overall, the Act is drafted to be the principal statutory instrument for managing vexatious litigation in Victoria and to operate alongside existing procedural rules and tribunal statutes. It both displaces inconsistent statutory powers and leaves room for inherent jurisdiction and context‑specific adjustments, particularly where intervention order matters and victim privacy are concerned.

The Act as published incorporates a small number of amendments and contains transitional repeal and conversion clauses.

Key dates and instrument changes

• Assent and commencement. The Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 received assent on 17 June 2014 and came into operation on 31 October 2014 by s 2(2) (see endnotes and s 2).

• Repeals of Part 13 and s 100. The table of provisions and endnotes record that Part 13 (ss 102-137) was repealed on 31 October 2015 and that section 100(4) repealed s 100 on 31 October 2016 (endnotes section).

• Statute Law Revision and Justice Legislation Amendment. The text as provided incorporates amendments by the Statute Law Revision Act 2015 (No. 21/2015), which commenced item 60 in sch 1 on 1 August 2015 (endnotes), and by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Court Security, Juries and Other Matters) Act 2017 (No. 38/2017), with s 95 commencing on 30 August 2017 (endnotes). The marginal notes in the Act identify specific amendments, for example the note to s 3 records that the definition of legal practitioner was amended by No. 38/2017 s 95(1), and s 9 was amended by No. 38/2017 s 95(2).

• Transitional provisions. Part 12 (ss 90-101) contains an extensive transitional scheme. Sections 91-99 in particular convert orders declared under prior statutes into the corresponding classes of orders under this Act. For example, s 91 converts Supreme Court “vexatious litigant” orders under s 21(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 into general litigation restraint orders under s 29 of this Act. Sections 94-99 perform similar conversions for Family Violence Protection Act 2008 and Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 orders, with preservation of existing terms (ss 94(2), 97(2)) unless varied or revoked.

Citation of consequential instruments

• The Act’s endnotes list the amending Acts and give assent and commencement dates for those amendments. The edition provided is “Version incorporating amendments as at 30 August 2017” (top matter). The Statute Law Revision Act 2015 and the Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2017 are expressly recorded (endnotes 2).

No further amendment history details or explanatory memoranda are included in the provided text beyond the references to the Minister’s second reading speech in the endnotes (Legislative Assembly 19 February 2014; Legislative Council 3 April 2014). The Act’s text itself includes notes and examples that illustrate legislative intent and specify interaction with repealed provisions (Part 12 transitional provisions).

The Act’s text does not list judicial decisions interpreting its provisions. The only materials in the provided source relevant to legislative history are the parliamentary procedural notes and the endnotes recording the ministerial second reading speech references and the assent and commencement dates (endnotes). In short, there is no case law contained in the source to report.

What the Act itself records about prior legal history

• The Act replaces and consolidates prior statutory schemes for declaring vexatious litigants. The transitional provisions (Part 12, ss 91-99) convert existing orders under the Supreme Court Act 1986 (s 21), the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Part 11), and the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Part 10) into orders under the new Act. Those provisions preserve existing orders and terms, unless varied or revoked under the Act.

• The Explanatory endnotes note the Bill’s long title and reference the Minister’s second reading speech in the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council (endnotes). They also record the Act’s policy purpose in s 1: to reform and consolidate the law relating to vexatious proceedings and to balance access to courts with interests in efficient justice (s 1).

What is absent in the text provided

• The statute does not include any reported judicial decisions, examples of judicial application, or statistical litigation outcomes. It also does not supply guidance about the Act’s post‑commencement interpretation by courts. Users should therefore consult reported decisions and tribunal determinations after the Act’s commencement when seeking examples of application or judicial reasoning.

For practitioners preparing submissions under the Act or advising clients, the absence of adjudicative material in the statutory text means reliance will be necessary on subsequent case law, court practice notes and rules of court. The Act’s internal references to how courts “may” take matters into account (see ss 11(2), 17(2), 29(2)) indicate that judicial development of doctrine is expected.

The Act contains procedural rules and drafting features that have concrete, sometimes non‑obvious, legal effects. The following are practical traps and points that commonly matter in advising litigants and courts.

Notice is strictly controlled; secret gatekeeping is allowed (ss 59, 66, 80). Applicants for leave to proceed, for variation/revocation, and applicants for leave to appeal must not give notice unless the court directs. That means affected persons may not receive advance warning of an application unless the court orders or directs it. If you represent an applicant or an affected person, do not assume automatic notice. Instead, anticipate the court directing who must be given notice under ss 60-61 and 67-68 and prepare for written submissions rather than an oral hearing (see ss 62-63, 71).

Registrar refusal powers can block filings (s 57). Specified registrars may refuse to accept for filing an application for leave to proceed if not satisfied it is materially different to a prior one. Practitioners should ensure an application clearly sets out material differences and file the affidavit disclosures required by s 56 to avoid administrative refusal.

Disclosure obligations are strict and evidential (s 56). An applicant for leave must provide details (often by affidavit) of prior applications, prior proceedings declared vexatious or stayed/dismissed for lack of merit, and explain material differences. Failure to comply can result in dismissal or refusal to accept the filing. The required disclosure includes matters adverse to the applicant (s 56(1)(e)).

VCAT composition and statement‑of‑reasons exceptions (s 9, ss 47(2), 48(6), 73(6)). VCAT must be constituted by an Australian lawyer when exercising powers under this Act (s 9), and copies of certain VCAT orders given to the Attorney‑General or courts need not include statements of reasons otherwise required by s 117(6) of the VCAT Act. That can affect appeals and judicial review strategies that depend on reasoned decisions.

Acting in concert has defined exceptions (s 4(2)). Legal practitioners, litigation guardians, professional advocates and persons authorised by law are not treated as acting in concert. However, a court may still make acting in concert orders against others. When evaluating risk of an “acting in concert” order, examine whether the defendant is truly a proxy or a legally authorised representative safely excluded by s 4(2).

Orders are capable of indefinite duration and extension (ss 27(2), 33(2), 42(2)). Courts may specify that orders remain in force indefinitely and may extend them. Indefinite duration raises present and future access‑to‑justice implications, and should be a focus of variation or revocation applications.

Publication and privacy in intervention order contexts (ss 85(3)-(4), 86). The Attorney‑General publishes orders, but where an order relates to intervention order legislation the Act requires removal of the name of any protected person from published copies (s 85(4)). The Magistrates’ Court or Children’s Court may exceptionally permit publication if satisfied it is in the public interest and just (s 86). Practitioners must check whether a restraint order intersects with intervention order matters before assuming publication is permissible.

Registrar and court distribution obligations (s 48). Copies of orders must be distributed by court officers to other courts and tribunals. This cross‑notification can have systemic effects: a restraint order made in one jurisdiction will be circulated widely, creating immediate cross‑jurisdictional awareness and potentially preventing forum‑shopping.

No criminal sanctions; remedies are procedural (Parts 2-9). The Act’s penalties are civil and procedural (stays, nullity, cost orders, refusals). Do not expect fines or imprisonment; enforcement relies on court process.

Transitional conversion of older orders (Part 12). Older vexatious‑litigant orders are taken to be orders under this Act and retain their terms unless varied or revoked (see ss 91-99). Practitioners must review historical orders carefully; an older “vexatious litigant” declaration may still be in force as an equivalent order under the new Act.

Court discretion is broad (see ss 11(2), 17(2), 29(2)). The Act repeatedly states courts “may take into account any matter it considers relevant”, meaning outcomes are substantially fact‑driven and discretionary. Litigants should prepare focused factual matrices showing frequency, pattern and reasons why conduct is or is not vexatious.

Appeal rights are limited and require leave (s 79). Appeals from many decisions under the Act require leave of the Supreme Court and are only on questions of law. This heightens the importance of making robust high‑quality submissions at first instance.

Finally, the Attorney‑General’s information power (s 43) means the executive may request and receive court documents when deciding whether to bring an application. This interaction between the executive and courts may surprise practitioners who do not expect the Attorney‑General to become involved in apparently private disputes.

If advising a client who either seeks a restraint order, is the target of one, or is a third party likely to be affected, the Act prescribes concrete steps and evidence. The following notes are procedural, grounded in the Act’s provisions.

For applicants seeking a limited or extended litigation restraint order

• Confirm eligibility and jurisdiction. Under ss 10(1) and 16(1), applicants can be the Attorney‑General, the person against whom vexatious proceedings were commenced, or a person with a sufficient interest. If the applicant is not the Attorney‑General and is not the immediate target, obtain leave to apply from the court or tribunal hearing the proceeding (ss 10(2), 16(2)). Prepare a concise leave application showing merit and that the application itself would not be an abuse of process (see s 10(3), s 16(3)).

• Assemble documentary evidence. Provide copies of relevant interlocutory applications and proceedings, including orders from other Australian courts or tribunals that show repeated vexatious conduct (ss 11(2)(a), 17(2)(a), 29(2)(a)). If relying on prior orders, include certified copies and timelines demonstrating frequency or pattern.

• Draft a clear proposed order and reasons. The Act permits orders on various terms (see ss 12, 20-24 for content). Be explicit about the persons or matters to be protected and the duration sought; where intervention order legislation is involved, follow the notice requirements in s 44.

For persons subject to a litigation restraint order

• Apply promptly for leave to proceed where necessary. Under Parts 8, a restrained person must apply for leave: limited order leave under ss 50-51; extended order leave under ss 52-53; general order leave under ss 54-55. Make the application to the court that made the order unless the order provides otherwise (s 52(3)-(4), s 54(2)). Ensure the application is accompanied by the disclosures required by s 56.

• Comply with the disclosure requirements (s 56). Prepare an affidavit setting out all prior leave applications, prior proceedings declared vexatious or stayed/dismissed for want of merit, and an explanation of how the new matter is materially different. Full disclosure is mandatory and may be determinative.

• Anticipate conditions. If leave is granted, the court may impose conditions (s 64). Be ready to propose reasonable conditions acceptable to the court, including security for costs where appropriate.

For parties defending or responding to an application for a restraint order

• Seek directions on notice. If you are an affected person, apply promptly for a direction under ss 60-61 or 67-68 to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court may limit oral hearings; prepare strong written submissions (ss 62-63).

• Use the registrar’s refusal power where appropriate. If the restrained person files a leave application that appears materially the same as prior ones, consider applying to the registrar under s 57 to refuse filing, or ask the court to exercise its supervisory power.

Administrative and publishing compliance

• Ensure copies of orders are provided to the Attorney‑General and to other courts as required by ss 47-49 and 72-73. Administrative officers (Prothonotary, registrars, principal registrars) have specific duties to circulate orders; ensure the correct recipients are on file.

• Where an order relates to intervention order legislation, follow privacy protections on publication (s 85(4), s 86). If you are the issuing court, include an express direction on publication or non‑publication; if you represent a protected person, apply for non‑publication where necessary.

Variation or revocation applications

• Seek leave where required. A person subject to a restraint order must apply with leave to the court that made the order (s 65). The applicant must not give notice unless the court orders (s 66). Prepare evidence demonstrating a material change of circumstances and address any earlier non‑compliance.

Appeals

• Obtain leave for appeals where required. Part 10 requires leave of the Supreme Court for appeals on questions of law in specified decisions (s 79). Follow the notice directions in ss 80-84 and prepare targeted legal submissions on points of law rather than re‑litigation of facts.

Practical drafting tips

• Always certify correspondence and filings with a clear chronology of prior litigation and rulings; the Act’s inquiry is pattern‑based (ss 11(2), 17(2), 29(2)).

• Use plain factual matrices to show why a proposed application or proceeding is materially different from prior conduct (s 56(1)(d)).

• Where an application might impact children or victims under intervention order laws, include sensitivity to privacy and any statutory constraints on naming protected persons (s 85(4), s 86).

• Anticipate security for costs and costs orders. Include evidence of capacity to comply and suggest reasonable security proposals where appropriate (s 64 example; s 35(3)(e) allows costs in acting in concert cases).

• Monitor court rules and subordinate instruments. The Act contemplates rules of court (s 88) and regulations (s 89) that can materially affect procedure; check current rules for filing processes, timelines and forms.

In practice, compliance is about meticulous disclosure, jurisdictional precision, and anticipating the court’s discretion. The Act centralises the evidentiary focus on frequency, lack of merit, and pattern; ensure submissions and affidavits foreground those elements and align with the statutory tests in ss 11(1), 17(1), 29(1) and the leave provisions in Part 8.