Public Interest Disclosures Act 2022

The Act defines and interrelates a compact set of legal concepts that determine coverage, duties, protections and remedies.

• Serious wrongdoing (s 13). The Act lists categories that constitute serious wrongdoing: corrupt conduct, government information contraventions, local government pecuniary interest contraventions, serious maladministration, privacy contraventions, and serious and substantial waste of public money. Further definitions appear in Schedule 2 (Dictionary).
• Public official (s 14). The definition is broad, encompassing employees, statutory officers, contractors and subcontractor employees who provide services on behalf of an agency, judicial officers, members of Parliament (including Ministers) and certain parliamentary staff. Regulations can add or exclude persons (s 14(2)). The breadth matters for both who may make disclosures and who receives protections.
• Agency and head of agency (ss 16-17). "Agency" covers Public Service agencies, large state services (NSW Police Force, NSW Health, Teaching and Transport Services), statutory bodies, integrity agencies, local government authorities, State‑owned corporations, Local Aboriginal Land Councils and parliamentary departments. The head of agency (s 17) is the person accountable for compliance under s 6(2) and has specific non‑delegable responsibilities (ss 6; 80).
• Categories of public interest disclosure (ss 21-24). Voluntary disclosures are those meeting specified maker, content and recipient requirements (ss 24-27). Witness disclosures are statements made in an investigation in response to a requirement or request (s 22). Mandatory disclosures are those made by a public official in the ordinary course of duties or under statutory/legal obligations (s 23), including the managerial obligation in s 51(1).
• Disclosure officers (s 18). The Act designates classes of persons who can receive voluntary disclosures, including heads of agencies, senior employees at work sites, governing body members, or persons named in the agency policy.
• Detriment and detrimental action (s 32). Detriment is defined expansively (injury, property damage, reputation, intimidation, career disadvantage, discrimination, disciplinary proceedings). Detrimental action includes acts or omissions that cause or threaten detriment; reasonable management action is expressly excluded (s 31), with a detailed non‑exhaustive list of actions that can constitute reasonable management action (s 31(3)) and situations where action is not reasonable (s 31(4)).
• Protections and limits (Part 3). Makers of public interest disclosures are shielded from civil, criminal and disciplinary liability in relation to making a disclosure (s 40), subject to specific carve‑outs (s 7, s 9 self‑ incrimination, s 10 public interest immunity) and the excluded protection for disclosures of the maker’s own past conduct (s 41) unless an Attorney General undertaking is given (s 41(2)-(5)).
• Oversight (Part 6). The Ombudsman is given guidance, audit, monitoring, reporting and conciliation roles (ss 72-76), and a Steering Committee is established to advise the Minister and review Ombudsman reports (ss 67-70).

These definitions and conceptual rules determine thresholds for agency action, protections, and exposure to criminal and civil penalties. Several concepts (e.g. "associated with", "relates to") are cross‑referenced in s 20 and Schedule 2 and therefore affect referral, risk‑management and reporting obligations. The Act also provides for deemed status (head of agency may determine a disclosure to be a voluntary disclosure even where it would not otherwise qualify, s 29) , a discretionary instrument that converts non‑qualifying disclosures into protected ones.

The Act’s coverage assigns obligations, rights and potential liabilities across several discrete groups. Listing those groups and the relevant statutory mechanics:

• Public officials (s 14). They can be makers of voluntary, witness and mandatory disclosures. They are the primary intended beneficiaries of protections: s 40 shields makers of public interest disclosures from civil, criminal and disciplinary liability arising from making the disclosure (subject to limits). Public officials are also subject to duties: managers have a duty to communicate disclosures (s 51); public officials must use best endeavours to assist in investigations (s 65); those who wilfully make false statements face penalties (s 84).
• Heads of agencies and disclosure officers (ss 6; 18; 17). Heads are responsible for ensuring agency compliance with the Act and the agency’s public interest disclosure policy (s 6(2)). They may designate staff to exercise agency functions (s 81) but some functions (e.g. the head's role as disclosure officer and responsibility under ss 34 and 61) are non‑delegable (s 80(2)). Disclosure officers are specified by s 18 and must be contactable via policy (s 43(4), s 18(2) note).
• Agencies (s 16). Agencies must adopt and publish a public interest disclosure policy (ss 42-47), receive and deal with disclosures (Part 5, esp. s 49-56), take risk management steps (s 61), provide annual returns (s 78) and respond to Ombudsman notices (s 75). Contracting obligations apply to agencies that engage external providers (s 82).
• Managers of public officials (s 15). Managers have a reporting obligation: where a manager receives a voluntary disclosure they must, as soon as reasonably practicable, pass it to a disclosure officer unless the maker has already made the same disclosure to the head or another disclosure officer (s 51). Section 51 creates a managerial duty backed by the protections and penalties regime.
• Ministers and ministerial staff (s 52). Oral disclosures to Ministers or their staff are not voluntary disclosures (s 24(3)(c)), but s 52 obliges Ministers and staff to pass disclosures to a disclosure officer of a responsible agency or to an integrity agency, or to direct the maker to remake the disclosure to a disclosure officer when it was oral.
• Integrity agencies (s 19). The Act treats integrity agencies separately in several respects: they are listed as agencies in s 16 and specifically enumerated in s 19 (Ombudsman, Auditor‑General, ICAC, LECC, Information Commissioner, Privacy Commissioner, Inspectors). The Act gives special investigative powers in certain circumstances (s 58).
• Contractors and subcontractors (ss 14(1)(e)-(f); s 82). Persons providing services on behalf of agencies are captured by the public official definition and by contract terms required by s 82. Agencies and head contractors must include clauses in agency service contracts imposing awareness, notification and cooperation obligations on service providers (s 82(2)(a)-(f)).
• The Attorney General (s 41). The Attorney General may give undertakings to persons who disclose their own past conduct while making a disclosure; integrity agencies may recommend such undertakings (s 41(2)-(3)).
• Courts and tribunals. Several remedies and enforcement pathways use courts: damages for detrimental action (s 35); employer liability orders (s 36); injunctions by the Supreme Court restraining or remedying detrimental action (s 37); and criminal prosecutions for detrimental action offences and other statutory offences (ss 33, 84, 85, 86).

Who pays or bears costs: agencies will bear administrative and compliance costs for policies, training (s 48(2)), record‑keeping and investigations (ss 43; 59; 55), and may be liable for damages for failures of risk management (s 62). The State may be liable where an agency is not a person (s 62(2)(b)). Individual wrongdoers face criminal penalties and civil damages where applicable (s 33; s 35). Heads of agencies are the accountable decision‑makers for compliance steps (s 6(2)).

The Act creates a matrix of affirmative duties (to do) and rights (to be protected, to information or remedies) for a range of parties. Key examples, with statutory anchors:

Agency duties

• Adopt and publish a public interest disclosure policy (ss 42-47). Policy must set out procedures for dealing with voluntary disclosures, acknowledging receipt, confidentiality, risk minimisation, corrective action, record‑keeping and internal oversight (s 43(1)(a)-(i)). Policies must identify disclosure officers and provide contact information (s 43(4)(a)-(b)). Policies must be published on the agency website and intranet (s 47(1)).
• Deal with disclosures that are or appear to be voluntary public interest disclosures in accordance with Div 2, Part 5 (s 49(1)). Agencies must decide how to deal with a voluntary disclosure and may investigate, refer to an integrity agency, refer to another authorised body, or use arrangements under s 81(2) (s 55(1)-(2)).
• Provide information to the maker of a voluntary disclosure as the matter becomes applicable, including how the disclosure is being handled, reasons for decisions not to investigate or to cease investigation, updates every three months during investigations, referral details and investigation outcomes (s 59(2)-(3), (4)). Agencies must give access to their policy (s 59(1)).
• Take steps to assess and minimise the risk of detrimental action arising from the disclosure (s 61(2)). Failure to comply can give rise to a damages claim (s 62).
• Provide annual returns to the Ombudsman about voluntary disclosures, actions taken and measures to promote a disclosure culture (s 78(1), (3)).

Head of agency duties and discretions

• Ensure agency compliance with the Act and the agency’s policy (s 6(2)). Heads may be personally accountable in practice because the Act treats non‑person agencies as functions exercised by the head (s 6(1)).
• Make written determinations to deem a disclosure a voluntary public interest disclosure even if it would not otherwise be one, provided the head honestly and reasonably believes the disclosure shows or tends to show serious wrongdoing; such determinations are admissible in proceedings (s 29(1)-(6)) and revocable if the maker wilfully misled (s 29(8)-(9)).
• The head may delegate many functions under the Act but cannot delegate the head’s functions as a disclosure officer or responsibilities under ss 34 and 61 (s 80).

Managerial duties

• A manager receiving a voluntary public interest disclosure must promptly communicate it to a disclosure officer for an appropriate agency unless the manager becomes aware the maker has already made the same disclosure to the head or another disclosure officer (s 51(1)-(2)). Section 51 implements the Act’s managerial reporting duty and connects employees to the formal disclosure pathway.

Ministerial duties

• Ministers and their staff to whom certain disclosures are made must communicate the disclosure to a responsible agency disclosure officer or to an integrity agency, or if the disclosure was oral, direct the maker to a disclosure officer to remake the disclosure (s 52).

Rights of makers and other persons

• Protection from civil, criminal and disciplinary liability for making public interest disclosures (s 40(1)(a)-(c)), subject to limits (s 7; s 9; s 10; s 41).
• Right to receive information about how a voluntary disclosure is handled and to receive updates and investigative results, unless waived or anonymous (s 59).
• Right to apply for internal review of certain agency decisions (s 60): decisions not to treat a disclosure as a voluntary disclosure, to cease treating it as such, or decisions described in s 55(3) (decisions not to investigate or to cease investigation) can be internally reviewed within 28 days (s 60(1)-(2)).
• Remedies where detrimental action occurs: criminal prosecution (s 33), civil damages against the wrongdoer (s 35), employer liability orders and joint liability (s 36), injunctions by the Supreme Court to restrain or remedy detrimental action (s 37). A person may also recover damages for an agency’s failure to comply with risk‑management obligations (s 62).

Limits and interplay with other laws

• The Act does not negate duties to disclose imposed by other laws (s 7(2)(a)) and does not protect from consequences of failing to comply with such duties (s 7(2)(b)).
• Provisions dealing with legally privileged communications, self‑incrimination and public interest immunity preserve existing rights and allow other Acts to prevail where they require or protect disclosures inconsistent with this Act (ss 8-10).
• Certain investigative powers in other statutes prevail over inconsistent provisions of this Act (s 11).

These duties and rights are enacted through specific timeframes (for internal review, s 60(2)(a) , 28 days; for agencies to supply annual returns, s 78(2) , within 30 days after return period unless the Ombudsman approves later), formal reporting routes (s 34 referral obligations), and procedural obligations to consult or have regard to Ombudsman guidelines (s 54(1), s 44).

The Act creates criminal offences, civil remedies, injunctive relief and administrative enforcement and oversight mechanisms. The principal enforcement measures are:

Criminal offences

• Detrimental action offence (s 33). A person must not take detrimental action against another person if, when taking the action, the person suspects, believes or is aware that the other person (or a third person) has made, may make, or proposes to make a public interest disclosure or is or may be investigating serious wrongdoing, and that suspicion etc. is a contributing factor. Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. The offence is indictable (s 33(3)). The accused bears the onus of proving either they did not have the suspicion/belief/awareness or that it was not a contributing factor (s 33(4)). It is not a defence that the suspicion or belief was mistaken (s 33(2)). There is a defence where the action constituted appropriate corrective action under s 66 (s 33(5)). Proceedings for a detrimental action offence must be brought within 3 years (s 33(6)).
• False or misleading statements (s 84). Wilfully making a false statement in making or purporting to make a public interest disclosure or in providing information relating to one attracts a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both.
• Offences related to influencing or impeding others (s 85). It is an offence to offer beneficial treatment to influence someone to refrain from or withdraw a public interest disclosure; to prevent or attempt to prevent persons or classes of persons from making disclosures. Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units.

Criminal procedure and jurisdiction

• Proceedings for offences under the Act, other than the detrimental action offence, are to be dealt with summarily in the Local Court (s 86). Detrimental action offences remain indictable but may be dealt with summarily under the Criminal Procedure Act provisions (s 86 note).

Civil remedies

• Damages for detrimental action (s 35). A person taking detrimental action is liable in damages to the victim for injury, damage or loss. The defendant bears the onus of proving absence of the relevant mental element or that it was not a contributing factor (s 35(4)). Damages may include exemplary damages (s 35(6)). A person cannot recover damages under s 35 and corresponding provisions in specified Acts for the same conduct (s 35(7)). Courts must account for compensation previously received under s 62 when awarding damages (s 35(8)).
• Employer liability (s 36). Courts may order the employer of an employee who took detrimental action to pay damages in whole or part, or declare joint and several liability.
• Injunctions (s 37). The Supreme Court may grant injunctions to restrain or require remediation of conduct that would constitute a detrimental action offence; injunctions can be sought by the Ombudsman, the maker, an integrity agency or (with AG approval) another agency (s 37(1)). The injunction remedy includes remedies such as formal apologies and reinstatement; injunctions cannot restrain appropriate corrective action or reasonable management action (s 37(6)). The Court may grant interim injunctions without requiring an undertaking as to damages (s 37(9)).
• Costs immunity (s 38). Persons who bring proceedings under ss 35 or 37 are not liable for costs unless the proceedings were instituted vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or the person’s unreasonable acts caused the other party to incur costs. The other party bears the onus of proving those exceptions (s 38(2)).

Administrative and oversight enforcement

• Ombudsman’s audit, monitoring and information powers (ss 72-76). The Ombudsman may publish guidelines and model policies (s 73), audit agencies and require statements or documents (s 75). Notices under s 75 must be complied with and are not limited by other Acts that restrict access to records (s 75(4)). Action taken in compliance with a s 75 notice does not attract liability for defamation or other civil liability (s 75(5)).
• Reporting obligations and internal review (ss 59-60; 78). Agencies must give reasons to makers for certain decisions (s 59(2)(c)) and must supply written reasons to the Ombudsman where they decide not to investigate or cease investigations (s 55(3)). Makers can seek internal review of certain decisions (s 60).
• Referral obligations for evidence of detrimental action (s 34). Agencies must refer evidence of a detrimental action offence to the Commissioner of Police and to ICAC or LECC in specified circumstances (s 34(1)). Subsequent referral to DPP or Attorney‑General is required where the receiving body forms the opinion an offence has been committed (s 34(2)).

Precedence and limits

• The Act preserves other statutory privileges and immunities: legal professional privilege (s 8), privilege against self‑incrimination (s 9) and public interest immunity (s 10). Several other Acts’ compulsion powers prevail over inconsistent provisions of this Act (s 11). Section 7 provides that the Act’s protections are additional to other laws and do not protect persons from consequences of failing to comply with statutory disclosure duties (s 7(1)-(2)).

Enforcement relies on a combination of criminal law, civil law remedies and administrative oversight. The Ombudsman’s information and audit powers (s 75) underpin administrative enforcement; courts and prosecutors enforce criminal and civil sanctions. The Act sets evidential and burden allocations in statutory offences and civil claims (for example, s 33(4) and s 35(4) place onus elements on accused/defendant).

The Act contains explicit interaction and supremacy rules and preserves existing legal rights. Main interaction themes, with statutory references:

• Complementarity, not displacement (s 7). The Act’s obligations, protections and remedies are "additional" to other laws; it does not affect duties to disclose imposed by other Acts and does not protect a person from consequences of failing to comply with such duties (s 7(1)-(2)). Except for specific sections listed (ss 8-11, 59(6), 64(4)), the Act prevails over inconsistent provisions of other Acts (s 7(4)).
• Privilege and immunity preservation (ss 8-10). The Act acknowledges that other Acts or laws may require disclosure despite legal professional privilege, or entitle a person to refuse (s 8). Privilege is not waived merely because a disclosure is made in breach (s 8(2)). The privilege against self‑incrimination is preserved (s 9(1)), but other Acts that require disclosures despite privilege prevail to the extent of inconsistency (s 9(2)). The right to claim public interest immunity is preserved (s 10(1)-(2)), and other Acts may prevail.
• Specific statutory precedence for compulsion powers (s 11). The Act expressly states that certain compulsion and entry powers under ICAC Act ss 24, 25 and 37, LECC Act ss 56, 58 and 74, and Ombudsman Act ss 21 and 21A prevail over inconsistent provisions of this Act (s 11).
• Corporations Act exclusion (s 12). The Act declares an agency to be an "excluded matter" for purposes of the Commonwealth Corporations Act s 5F in relation to s 1317AAB, ensuring agencies are not regulated entities under Corporations Act Part 9.4AAA.
• Cross‑agency referrals and sharing (ss 54-58; 57; 83). Agencies may refer disclosures to integrity agencies or bodies authorised by other Acts (s 55-56). Section 57 imposes duties on agencies to consider appropriateness and risk of referral, and requires integrity agencies not to refer disclosures to another integrity agency without considering the other agency's views (s 57(3)). Section 83 permits agencies to provide information to other agencies if reasonably necessary for the exercise of either agency’s functions under the Act, and to persons/bodies investigating offences under other States, Commonwealth or Territory laws (s 83(1)-(2)). Section 83 applies "in addition to" other authorisations.
• Limitations where other Acts prevail (s 64(4)). For disclosure of identifying information of a maker, provisions of the ICAC Act, the Ombudsman Act or the LECC Act prevail over s 64 to the extent of inconsistency.
• Ombudsman Act overlay (ss 72-76). The Ombudsman exercises functions under this Act that overlap with the Ombudsman Act, and the Act expressly says conferral here does not limit conferrals elsewhere (s 72(2)). Special reporting provisions tie into the Ombudsman Act (s 76(5)-(7)).
• Transitional and savings (Sch 1 Part 2). The Act preserves protection and reporting obligations for disclosures made under the former scheme (Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994) as if that Act had not been repealed (Sch 1, cl 3). Remade disclosures are covered under certain rules (Sch 1, cls 4-5).
• Regulations and exemptions (s 88). The Governor may make regulations; the Minister must certify consultation with the Steering Committee before recommending regulations (s 88(2)). Regulations may exempt specified agencies or classes of agencies from specified provisions (s 88(3)).

Practical consequence: the Act sits in a network of laws that collectively determine compulsion, privilege, immunity and investigatory powers. Where inconsistency arises, the Act provides a hierarchy for specific classes of provisions (ss 8-11, s 64(4), s 7(4)). Agencies must therefore interpret their obligations in light of both this Act and the other statutes listed, and must be alert to where other statutes require disclosure or protect against disclosure despite this Act.

The text of the Act as presented includes a small number of recorded amendments and savings notes. The explicit amendment annotations in the provided text are:

• Section 6: annotated "s 6: Am 2023 No 7, Sch 3.23." This indicates that s 6 was amended by the 2023 No 7 amending instrument (Schedule 3.23) and that the current text reflects that amendment.
• Section 67 and section 70: annotated "s 67: Am 2023 No 35, Sch 4.36." and "s 70: Am 2023 No 35, Sch 4.36." indicating amendments in 2023 No 35, Schedule 4.36.
• Schedule entries show various repeals and amendments of Schedules 3-8, and notes the Public Interest Disclosures Regulation 2022 is taken to be a regulation via Sch 1 (Sch 1, cl 6 and Sch 1, cl 6(1)-(5) are relevant in the transitional material). Schedule 3 is repealed commentary shows sch 3: Rep 2022 No 14, Sch 1, cl 6(5), and other schedule repeals and amendments are noted.

Transitional and savings provisions (Sch 1 Part 2) implement carry‑over rules from the former Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994, including that:

• Former scheme disclosures continue to be governed by the former legislation as if it had not been repealed (Sch 1, cl 3(1)). Protections and reporting obligations under the former legislation continue (Sch 1, cl 3(2)).
• Remade disclosures and the options for agencies not to continue to exercise functions in relation to remade disclosures are provided (Sch 1, cl 4). There are special provisions for remade disclosures to members of Parliament or journalists (Sch 1, cl 5).

Regulatory instruments

• The Act contemplates and cross‑references the Public Interest Disclosures Regulation 2022 (Sch 1 Part 2 cl 2; also see s 88 which authorises regulations). Sch 1 contains specific transitional arrangements related to that regulation (Sch 1, cl 6).

The provided text does not include a full amendment history listing earlier versions or extensive amendment chronology beyond these annotations and schedule notes. The Act provides for a statutory review of the legislation (s 89) to be undertaken by a joint parliamentary committee five years after assent, with consultation with Steering Committee members (s 89(1)-(6)), so further legislative change is contemplated by the Act’s review process.

The text supplied contains no case law, judicial decisions or litigation history. The Act itself anticipates and creates litigation pathways and judicial participation:

• It makes determinations and documents admissible in proceedings (e.g. head of agency determination under s 29(5) is admissible in criminal or civil proceedings as evidence that the disclosure is a voluntary public interest disclosure).
• It provides statutory causes of action and remedies that will be litigated in courts: damages claims for detrimental action in "a court of competent jurisdiction" (s 35(2)), enforcement of risk management liability against agencies or the State (s 62), and injunction proceedings in the Supreme Court to prevent detrimental action (s 37).
• The Act prescribes jurisdictions and procedures for offences (s 86), noting Local Court summary jurisdiction for most offences and indictment procedures for the detrimental action offence.

Because the supplied Act text does not reference any cases or report judicial decisions, there is no litigation history to summarise from the source. Practitioners will need to monitor subsequent case law on application of the Act’s novel or contested provisions (for example, evidentiary status of heads’ determinations under s 29(5), the meaning of "contributing factor" in s 33, and the interface between reasonable management action (s 31) and detrimental action) as those issues emerge in courts.

The Act contains many technical traps and interactional nuances likely to catch practitioners, employers and agencies if overlooked. The following are concrete, source‑grounded pitfalls to watch for, with statutory pointers:

1. Not all disclosures to public office‑holders are "voluntary public interest disclosures". A disclosure made orally to a Minister or a member of a Minister’s staff is not a voluntary disclosure (s 24(3)(c)). Ministers and staff must re‑route oral disclosures (s 52). Practitioners should not assume mere communication to a Minister equals protected disclosure.

2. Tight conditions for disclosures to MPs or journalists (s 28). For a disclosure to a member of Parliament or journalist to enjoy voluntary disclosure status, it must be substantially true, the maker must previously have made substantially the same disclosure to a head/disclosure officer/manager or Minister/staff (s 28(1)(b)), and the previous disclosure must not have been anonymous (s 28(1)(c)), among other conditions. The Act therefore restricts whistleblowing via media or MPs unless internal channels have been attempted and the statutory preconditions are met.

3. Head‑of‑agency determinations are powerful but discretionary (s 29). A head may deem a disclosure a voluntary public interest disclosure even if it would not otherwise qualify, but the head must honestly and reasonably believe the disclosure shows or tends to show serious wrongdoing (s 29(2)-(3)). That determination is admissible evidence in court (s 29(5)), and the head must provide written reasons if refusing a request to make a determination (s 29(7)(b)). Heads who make these determinations take on evidentiary exposure.

4. Reasonable management action carve‑out is substantive but limited and context‑sensitive (s 31). Employers can take actions that would otherwise appear adverse (performance appraisals, suspension, redeployment, redundancy) if reasonable. However, action is not reasonable if it is taken in an unreasonable manner, corruptly, to conceal wrongdoing, or where the actor had an awareness of a disclosure and that was a contributing factor (s 31(4)). The onus for proving absence of the mental element for the detrimental action offence rests with the accused in criminal cases (s 33(4)) and similar onus in civil damages claims (s 35(4)).

5. Confidentiality and identifying information exceptions are broad (s 64). Identifying information of the maker must not be disclosed generally (s 64(1)), but the Act lists several exceptions, including where the maker consents in writing, where disclosure is necessary to deal with the disclosure effectively, or where it is necessary to protect someone from detriment (s 64(2)(a), (c), (h)). Agencies must therefore document consultations and reasonable considerations before disclosing identifying information.

6. Agency service contract terms are compulsory but non‑compliance does not void contracts (s 82). From commencement, agencies must include specified terms in agency service contracts (s 82(2)(a)-(f)), including awareness obligations for contractors and notification/cooperation duties. However, failure to include such terms does not render the contract void (s 82(3)). Agencies therefore face reputational and compliance exposures but not automatic contractual invalidity.

7. Multiple overlapping obligations and information flows create practical complexity (ss 49-57; 83). Agencies must decide how to deal with disclosures, consider referrals carefully (s 57), and balance risk of detrimental action (s 61) against duty to investigate or refer. Section 54(3) clarifies that Division 2 does not authorise agencies to act beyond powers available under other laws, so agencies must ensure investigations are lawfully authorised.

8. Regulatory and statutory precedence matters in practice (s 7; ss 8-11). Where other laws require disclosure even if privileged, or where compulsion powers under integrity statutes prevail, agencies must follow those laws. This affects legal privilege, self‑incrimination rights and public interest immunity.

9. Timeframes and internal review windows are short (s 60). Internal review applications must be made within 28 days of notification of the agency decision (s 60(2)(a)). Agencies must provide updates every three months during investigations (s 59(3)). Administrative processes must be promptly maintained and documented.

10. Transitional carry‑over and remade disclosure decisions (Sch 1). Agencies receiving remade disclosures have choices under Sch 1 cl 4 to cease to exercise functions within 28 days of becoming aware the disclosure is remade. They must notify the maker in writing of such a decision (Sch 1 cl 4(2), (4)). Failure to correctly treat remade disclosures may create parallel obligations under the old and new schemes.

Practitioners should map internal processes to the Act’s procedural triggers (who receives a disclosure, what counts as receipt s 50, when to record oral disclosures s 53, when to refer s 55-57) and document decisions: decisions not to investigate or to cease investigations must be notified with written reasons to the Ombudsman (s 55(3)) and to the maker (s 59(2)(c); s 59(4)).

Practical, source‑grounded steps an agency should take to comply with the Act, mapped to statutory provisions:

1. Adopt, publish and maintain a public interest disclosure policy (ss 42-47).

   • Draft policy content to meet s 43(1): procedures for dealing with voluntary disclosures; acknowledgement and communication procedures; steps to assess and minimise risk of detrimental action (s 43(1)(a)-(c)); procedures for dealing with allegations of detrimental action (s 43(1)(d)); confidentiality procedures (s 43(1)(e)); corrective action processes (s 43(1)(f)); record‑keeping and reporting (s 43(1)(g)); internal oversight (s 43(1)(h)); and compliance obligations (s 43(1)(i)).
   • Include responsibility statements identifying the head’s responsibilities and managers’ responsibilities under s 43(2)(a)-(b).
   • Prominently list disclosure officers by class/role/name and provide contact details (s 43(4)(a)-(b)); ensure these are easily accessible on both public website and intranet (s 47(1)).

2. Ensure training and awareness (s 48).

   • Deliver training for the head, other disclosure officers and managers of public officials as required by s 48(2).
   • Publicise how to make voluntary disclosures to all public officials associated with the agency and ensure staff are aware of procedures and the right to further action if dissatisfied (s 48(1)(a)-(c)).

3. Establish receipt and record procedures (Part 5 Div 1).

   • Adopt processes to determine when the agency has "received" a disclosure (s 50). Make and retain written records of oral disclosures made to persons who may receive disclosures in compliance with s 27 (s 53(1)), except for Ministers and their staff (s 53(2)).
   • Ensure managers know the duty to communicate disclosures to disclosure officers promptly (s 51) and that ministerial staff and Ministers know how to re‑route oral disclosures (s 52).

4. Investigations and referral protocols (Part 5 Div 2).

   • Create decision workflows for dealing with voluntary disclosures (s 55): investigating, referring to integrity agencies, referring to authorised bodies, or using arrangements under s 81(2).
   • If deciding not to investigate or to cease an investigation, promptly prepare written reasons for the Ombudsman (s 55(3)) and the discloser (s 59(2)(c); s 59(4)).
   • Review s 57 obligations before referring disclosures to other agencies , consider appropriateness and risk of detrimental action (s 57(2)) and consult other integrity agencies before referring (s 57(3)).

5. Information to disclosers and confidentiality (s 59; s 64).

   • Provide the maker with access to the agency’s public interest disclosure policy (s 59(1)) and update the maker as matters become applicable (s 59(2)); provide updates at intervals of no more than three months during investigations (s 59(3)).
   • Treat identifying information of makers as not to be disclosed (s 64(1)), and document the rationale and any consents for permitted disclosures under s 64(2).

6. Risk management and record‑keeping (ss 61; 43(1)(g)).

   • Ensure a risk assessment process is in place to assess and minimise the risk of detrimental action for makers and for public officials the disclosure concerns (s 61(2)).
   • Maintain records that will support compliance with future claims for damages under s 62 and with Ombudsman audits.

7. Agency service contracts and third‑party providers (ss 81-82).

   • Where the agency engages external entities to receive or deal with disclosures or to provide training, ensure contracts include the terms required by s 82(2): awareness obligations, notification obligations, cooperation in investigations, acknowledgement of corrective action and termination rights, and equivalent subcontracting terms (s 82(2)(a)-(f)).
   • Publish details of any arrangement under s 81(2) or (3) on the agency’s public website and intranet and notify the Ombudsman (s 81(4)).

8. Internal review and timeframes (s 60).

   • Implement an internal review mechanism independent of the decision‑makers for decisions listed in s 60(1). Ensure reviewers were not substantially involved in the original decision (s 60(2)(c)).
   • Track notification dates to ensure internal review applications are accepted/finalised within statutory timeframes (application within 28 days, s 60(2)(a)).

9. Reporting to Ombudsman and compliance with information notices (ss 75; 78).

   • Prepare to provide annual returns to the Ombudsman within 30 days after the return period unless otherwise approved (s 78(1)-(2)). Ensure systems capture the required information about disclosures, actions taken and culture‑promotion measures (s 78(3)).
   • Maintain procedures for responding to s 75 notices to provide statements, documents or things in the time and manner specified. Note that s 75(4) displaces other Acts that restrict access to records for the purpose of compliance.

10. Legal privilege and other statutory conflicts (ss 7; 8-11).

• In circumstances involving legal professional privilege, privilege against self‑incrimination or public interest immunity, identify whether another Act requires or permits disclosure despite those privileges (s 8-10). Seek legal advice before disclosing privileged material.
• Where compulsion powers of integrity agencies are engaged (s 11), comply with the prevailing statutory powers.

11. Operational choices and delegations (ss 29; 80-81).

• Decide whether to exercise the head‑of‑agency power to deem disclosures voluntary (s 29) and document reasoning.
• Use s 80 and s 81 delegation and arrangement provisions prudently; note non‑delegable functions under s 80(2) (disclosure officer functions and ss 34 and 61 responsibilities).

12. Monitor Ombudsman guidelines and Steering Committee advice (ss 44; 54(1); 72-73; 68).

• Align agency policy and practice with any Ombudsman guidelines or model policy (ss 44, 73). Ensure the Minister consults the Steering Committee when proposing regulations (s 88(2)).

These steps respond directly to statutory mandates. Agencies should adopt documented policies, audit trails for decisions to refer or not investigate, and training and communication plans so that statutory duties (records, notifications, protections, referrals) are demonstrably met. Legal advice is likely necessary when disclosures intersect with privilege, criminal investigations, or cross‑jurisdictional enforcement.