The Act affects three main classes of person.

First, "persons aggrieved". Section 7 defines this term expansively. A person is aggrieved by a decision if their interests are adversely affected by it. The same test applies to conduct preparatory to a decision and to a failure to make a decision. Where the decision is a report or recommendation, a person is aggrieved if their interests would be adversely affected were a decision made or not made in accordance with that report or recommendation. The term "person" includes an unincorporated body (s 3).

Second, decision-makers. Any person or body making a decision of an administrative character under an enactment, or under a non-statutory scheme funded by public moneys, falls within the Act. This expressly includes the State, State authorities, local governments, officers and employees (s 4). "Duty" extends to duties imposed on Crown servants (s 3). Specific exclusions, however, remove GOCs listed in Schedule 6 (to the extent provided by their application provision), rail government entities (to the extent of Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 s 486), State electricity entities (to the extent of Electricity Act 1994 s 256), and decisions made under Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 chapter 8 part 3A (ss 18A and 18C). Decisions under the enactments listed in Schedule 1 part 2 are wholly outside the Act, while Schedule 1 part 1 enactments continue to operate according to their own terms despite the Act (s 18(2)).

Third, the Supreme Court and its judges. The Court is given jurisdiction to hear and determine all applications (s 19). A "judge" means a judge of the Supreme Court (s 3). The Court of Appeal’s leave is required to appeal certain dismissal orders (ss 15(4) and 48(5)) and costs orders (s 49(5)). The Attorney-General may intervene in any proceeding (s 51) and is then treated as a party for costs purposes.

The Act therefore casts a wide net over Queensland public administration while carving out commercialised government businesses and particular infrastructure functions.

Decision-makers carry several duties. The most immediate is the duty to provide a statement of reasons within 28 days of a valid request (s 33(1)). That statement must contain the findings on material questions of fact, the evidence or material relied upon, and the actual reasons (s 34 and the definition of "reasons" in s 3). If the decision-maker believes the requester is not entitled to the statement, the decision-maker must either notify the requester or apply to the Court under s 39 within 28 days; failure to do either triggers the requester’s right to seek a compliance order (s 38). Where information falls within the personal/business affairs or Attorney-General certificate exceptions, the decision-maker must still give notice explaining the omission (s 37).

Applicants enjoy a suite of rights. They may apply for a statutory order of review on any of the grounds in ss 20–22. They are not limited to the grounds stated in their originating application; the Court may allow amendment (s 27). An applicant may join interested persons as parties (s 28). The mere making of an application does not stay the decision, but the Court or a judge may suspend its operation or stay implementation (s 29). On a successful application the Court may quash the decision (with effect from any specified date, including a past date), remit the matter with directions (including time limits), declare rights, or order parties to do or refrain from doing anything necessary to do justice (s 30). For conduct or failure cases the remedial palette is slightly narrower but still includes declaratory and mandatory relief.

The Act expressly states that its review rights are additional to any other rights the person may have (s 10(1)). Conversely, an applicant has the right to have an application for reasons determined on the merits; the Court may order costs in the applicant’s favour if the application succeeds even in part (s 50).

The Act contains no criminal offences or civil penalties. Enforcement is entirely through court orders. A decision-maker who fails to supply reasons after a valid request may be ordered by the Court to do so within a specified period (s 38(2)). A statement that is inadequate may be supplemented by further order (s 40). Decisions may be quashed, set aside, declared invalid, or subjected to mandatory orders requiring the decision-maker to perform a duty according to law (s 30). Stays and suspensions are available to prevent implementation or further steps (ss 29, 47(4)).

Costs operate as the practical sanction. Under s 49 the Court may order another party to indemnify an applicant’s costs on a party-and-party basis from the date a costs application is made, or may cap each party’s liability to its own costs, having regard to the applicant’s financial resources, any public-interest element, and the reasonableness of the case. The Court may later vary or revoke such orders if the applicant’s conduct changes or diligence lapses. In applications for reasons, the respondent decision-maker faces an asymmetric costs risk: the Court may order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs on partial success, but may order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs only if the applicant was wholly unsuccessful and the application lacked reasonable basis, was frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process (s 50).

Appeals from dismissal orders under ss 15 and 48, and from costs orders under s 49, lie only with leave of the Court of Appeal.

The Act is expressly stated to have effect despite any law in force at its commencement (s 18(1)). However, it does not affect the operation of the enactments listed in Schedule 1 part 1, nor does it apply to decisions made under the enactments listed in Schedule 1 part 2 (s 18(2)). Section 16 provides a rule of construction: where a provision of the Commonwealth Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 expresses an idea in particular words and this Act appears to express the same idea in different words merely because of drafting practice, the ideas are not to be taken as different. A comparative table appears in Schedule 3.

Part 1 Division 3 governs the relationship with other review rights. The statutory rights are additional (s 10(1)). Nevertheless, the Court may dismiss an application made otherwise than under the Act because a statutory-order application has already been filed (s 11). Conversely, an application under ss 20–22 or 43 may be dismissed (s 12) or must be dismissed (s 13) where adequate alternative review is available before another court, tribunal, authority or person, having regard to the interests of justice. Section 14 adds a mandatory dismissal power where the challenged matter arises in the course of an "initial proceeding" before a tribunal or person and review of the final decision would be available; the Court must weigh the balance of convenience, public interest and consequences of delay.

Section 18A excludes GOCs, rail government entities and electricity entities to the extent provided by their respective governing statutes. Section 18C excludes State and relevant-entity decisions under Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 chapter 8 part 3A. The definition of "enactment" includes Acts and statutory instruments (s 3), so the Act interacts with every other Queensland statute that confers administrative power unless expressly excluded.

The rules of court made for the Supreme Court govern procedure (s 3 definition of "rules of court" and ss 25, 45). Strict compliance is not required; substantial compliance suffices (s 56). No filing fee is payable on applications under Part 4 (s 57).

The provided text records a series of amendments that illustrate the Act’s evolving scope. The definition of "corporatised corporation" was substituted in 2009 by the Local Government Act 2009 (s 3 amendment history). "Rail government entity" was inserted in 2013 by the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 amendments (s 3). Section 18A was substituted in 2013 and amended in 2016 to align exclusions for GOCs, rail entities and electricity entities with their sector-specific legislation (s 18A amendment history). Section 18C was inserted in 2010 to exclude transport infrastructure functions (s 18C). The definition of "royalty" was inserted in 2020 by reference to the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (s 3).

These changes were not random. They reflect a policy of removing commercialised government activities from general judicial-review oversight so that corporatised entities can operate on a more commercial footing without the risk of routine statutory-order challenges. The insertion of "competitive commercial activity" into the definitions (s 3) and its use in the confidentiality exceptions (s 35(2)(c)) shows a parallel concern to protect State authorities and local governments from having to disclose commercially sensitive information that could harm their competitive position. The overall trend visible in the text is one of progressive carve-out for entities that have been moved to a more market-oriented structure while preserving the Act’s application to core governmental regulatory and spending decisions.

The Act itself does not record specific court challenges, but its provisions anticipate recurring points of contention. The breadth of the definition of "decision to which this Act applies" (s 4) has generated disputes about whether a particular act is "of an administrative character" or is instead legislative or managerial. The extension to non-statutory schemes funded by public money (s 4(1)(b)) invites argument about whether funds are sufficiently "provided or obtained" from parliamentary appropriations or authorised levies.

The "person aggrieved" test in s 7, which uses the language of interests "adversely affected", has been the gateway through which standing arguments are run. Because the Act expressly includes persons who would be affected by a report or recommendation (s 7(1)(b)), challenges often arise at the preliminary-report stage of multi-stage decision processes.

Sections 11–14 create a thicket of discretionary and mandatory dismissal powers. Courts must therefore routinely decide whether "adequate provision" for review exists elsewhere (s 12(b)), whether the "interests of justice" require dismissal (s 13), and whether the balance of convenience favours letting an interim challenge proceed or requires it to await the final decision (s 14). The requirement in s 15(4) and s 48(5) that appeals from such dismissal orders may be brought only with leave of the Court of Appeal has itself been a source of satellite litigation.

The confidentiality exceptions in ss 35–37, particularly the test for information that "could reasonably be expected to adversely affect a State authority or local government authority in relation to its competitive commercial activities" (s 35(2)(c)), invite evidence about markets, competitors and commercial disadvantage. Attorney-General certificates under s 36 raise separation-of-powers questions about the justiciability of public-interest claims.

Finally, the costs provisions in ss 49 and 50 have produced controversy about when public-interest litigation should be protected from adverse costs orders. The statutory criteria—financial resources, public-interest element, reasonable basis—are mandatory considerations, yet their application in any given case remains intensely factual.

Most practitioners miss three structural features that can fatally derail an application.

First, the 28-day time limit in s 26 is calculated from a complex "relevant day" that turns on when written reasons are actually received, when a s 32 request is answered or refused, or when the bare decision document is given. An applicant who waits for internal review or further correspondence can easily fall outside the period; the Court’s power to extend is discretionary and must be sought before or after expiry, but late applications risk refusal under s 26(3) if the Court considers the delay unreasonable having regard to when the applicant first knew of the decision.

Second, the mandatory dismissal rules in ss 13 and 14 are often overlooked. If another law gives a right of review before "another court or a tribunal, authority or person", the Court must dismiss the statutory-order application if satisfied it is in the interests of justice to do so. Section 14 adds a further mandatory dismissal where the challenge is to an interim step in an "initial proceeding" and the balance of convenience (including delay to that proceeding) favours waiting for the final decision. These are not discretionary case-management tools; once the jurisdictional facts are established the Court has no choice but to dismiss.

Third, the interaction between the confidentiality exceptions (ss 35–37) and the duty to give notice means that a decision-maker can lawfully withhold an entire statement of reasons if including the protected information would render the statement false or misleading (s 37(1)(b)). An applicant who receives only a notice under s 37 may have to commence a fresh court application under s 38 simply to test whether the exception was correctly claimed. Because the Court retains power to order discovery and to require production of documents notwithstanding s 37(5), the real battle often shifts from the reasons statement to interlocutory processes that are themselves reviewable.

Another trap is the respondent rule in s 53: an application concerning a Governor in Council decision must name the responsible Minister, not the Governor or the Council itself. Failure to observe this produces a misjoinder that can be cured only by amendment under s 54, which the Court may allow on terms.

Finally, the Act’s preservation of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction (s 10(2)) is subject to s 41: the old writs cannot be issued. An originating process that still prays for a writ of certiorari will be treated as an application for the equivalent order, but the point can generate unnecessary argument about form.

For decision-makers the compliance pathway is clear. Maintain accurate contemporaneous records of material questions of fact, the evidence considered, and the reasoning process. When a s 32 request arrives, assess within 28 days whether the requester is a "person aggrieved" and whether any s 35 or s 36 exception applies. If an exception is claimed, give the precise notice required by s 37. If in doubt, apply to the Court under s 39 rather than simply refusing. Where a statement is given, ensure it contains the three mandatory elements listed in the definition of "reasons" (s 3). For decisions under excluded regimes (GOCs, rail entities, electricity entities, transport chapter 8 part 3A), confirm the relevant carve-out before assuming the Act applies at all.

For applicants, file within time. For statutory orders of review, calculate the "relevant day" under s 26(5) with care; lodge the application in the prescribed form, set out the grounds, and attach the decision document. If reasons have not been given, make a formal written request under s 32 before or concurrently with the application. Consider joining interested parties early under s 28. If a stay is needed, file an interlocutory application under s 29 at the same time as the principal application. When drafting grounds, use the exact language of ss 20(2), 21(2) or 23 and be prepared to amend under s 27 if new grounds emerge.

Both sides should be alive to the Court’s broad dismissal powers. A respondent should promptly consider whether ss 12, 13, 14 or 48 can be invoked and, if so, bring the point on at the earliest appropriate time (s 15(1)(b)). An applicant should address alternative remedies and the balance of convenience in the originating material.

Finally, keep the costs provisions in mind. An applicant with limited resources who can point to a public-interest element should consider making a protective costs application under s 49 at the outset. A decision-maker facing a reasons application should weigh the s 50 costs asymmetry before deciding to resist on technical grounds that lack reasonable basis.

Compliance is therefore not merely procedural; it requires a working knowledge of the definitional mesh in s 3, the layered dismissal regime in Part 1 Division 3, the strict timing rules, and the evidentiary thresholds in ss 23–24 and 35–36. When those elements are respected, the Act functions as Parliament intended: a transparent, accessible and efficient mechanism for ensuring that Queensland public power is exercised according to law.