Jury Act 1995

The Act casts a wide net. At the broadest level every enrolled elector whose address falls inside a proclaimed jury district is potentially liable to jury service (s 4(1)). In practice this captures most Queensland adults between 18 and 69 who are not within the excluded categories. The sheriff, deputy sheriffs and persons to whom responsibility is assigned by regulation (s 8) bear the administrative burden of roll maintenance, random selection, notice delivery, excusal decisions and panel formation. The Senior Judge Administrator and judges of the Supreme, District and Childrens Courts exercise significant discretionary powers: issuing practice directions (s 13), determining excusal applications (s 20), ruling on challenges (ss 40–48), managing separation and discharge (ss 53, 56–61), and deciding whether to permit majority verdicts or discharge a jury (ss 59A, 60).

Parties to civil and criminal proceedings are directly affected. They receive copies of the list of summoned persons the day before trial (s 29), may exercise peremptory and for-cause challenges (ss 42–43), must exchange information bearing on juror suitability (s 35), and are bound by the final composition of the jury once selected. Criminal defendants enjoy the statutory right to be told of their challenge rights (s 39). Legal practitioners appear in multiple capacities: they may be excused from service while “actually engaged in legal work” (s 4(3)(f)), yet they also conduct challenges, receive jury lists and advise clients on verdict rules.

Prospective jurors themselves face positive obligations (returning questionnaires—s 18(4)), criminal penalties for non-compliance or falsehoods, and a battery of post-service restraints (ss 69A, 70). Employers are prohibited from dismissing or prejudicing staff because of jury service (s 69). The electoral commission and police service are statutory information suppliers (ss 11–12). Health professionals treating former jurors are granted a limited right to receive and, in narrow circumstances, further disclose jury information (s 70(12)–(16)). Finally, the broader community is affected through the confidentiality regime that seeks to preserve the frankness of deliberations while permitting narrowly defined research and safety-valve disclosures.

The statute creates a mosaic of interlocking duties and rights. Citizens qualified under s 4(1) bear a prima facie obligation to perform jury service (s 5) and must respond truthfully to questionnaires (s 18(7)) and sheriff inquiries (s 68). They enjoy corresponding rights to apply for excusal on hardship grounds (s 19), to be excused as of right if they served within the previous year (s 22), and to receive remuneration and allowances (s 63). Persons over 70 hold an election right to remain eligible (s 4(4)).

The sheriff’s duties are predominantly administrative but carry discretion: maintaining rolls (s 9), excluding ineligible persons after inquiry (s 10(2)), revising lists (s 24), issuing summonses electronically where appropriate (s 27(2)), deciding excusal applications in accordance with practice directions (s 19(2)), and supplying jury lists to parties (s 29(3)). The sheriff must also destroy returned lists (s 29(7)) and may delegate only to prescribed persons (s 72).

Judges hold extensive procedural and protective powers. They may excuse jurors on their own initiative or on application (s 20), conduct challenge inquiries with or without formality (s 20(3)), authorise questioning of the panel where prejudicial publicity is alleged (s 47), discharge individual jurors for partiality or incapacity (s 56), permit separation on conditions (s 53(7)), and discharge whole juries where fairness is compromised (s 48) or deadlock persists (s 60). In civil cases the judge decides which factual questions to leave to the jury and instructs on the law (s 51A). The Senior Judge Administrator’s power to issue practice directions (s 13) shapes the practical operation of the entire statute.

Parties possess challenge rights calibrated by trial type and number of defendants (s 42). They are entitled to timely disclosure of adverse juror information (s 35) and may seek special final-stage questioning (s 47(1)). Jurors, once sworn, owe duties of impartiality, non-disclosure (s 50, s 70) and non-inquiry (s 69A). They enjoy the right to be kept separate in private accommodation (s 55), to receive meals and refreshments, and, in defined circumstances, to separate during deliberations (s 53).

The Act also confers rights on former jurors: they may disclose deliberations to treating health professionals (s 70(12)), and the community retains an interest in research authorised by the Supreme Court on conditions (s 70(9)–(10)).

Enforcement relies on a mixture of summary offences, contempt powers and statutory presumptions. Failure to return a completed questionnaire without reasonable excuse carries 10 penalty units or two months’ imprisonment (s 18(4)). Knowingly false statements in questionnaires or excusal applications attract the same penalty (s 18(7)). Non-compliance with a summons is likewise punishable by 10 penalty units or two months, and may also be dealt with as contempt (s 28). Unauthorised questioning of summoned persons or inquiries about them carries a maximum of two years’ imprisonment (s 31(1)–(2)), with a defence for lawyer–client discussions (s 31(3)).

Impersonation of a juror (s 66), falsification of records or interference with jury formation (s 67) each attract two years. Employment reprisals are punishable by one year’s imprisonment (s 69). Breaches of the jury confidentiality regime—publishing, seeking or disclosing jury information—also carry two years (s 70(2)–(4)), although the section contains a carefully calibrated set of exceptions. Failure to answer sheriff questions or produce documents carries the highest summary penalty in the Act: 20 penalty units or four months (s 68).

Contempt remains available as a parallel or alternative sanction for separation breaches (s 53(9)), unauthorised communication (s 54(3)) and non-compliance with supplementary-juror directions (s 38(5)). The statute expressly preserves the judge’s power to fine or discharge jurors for misconduct during the final stage of selection (s 41(3)). Decisions on challenges and discharge are generally not interlocutorily appealable but may be raised on appeal against final judgment (ss 43(7), 47(11), 60(3)).

The Act is not a code; it constantly cross-references and carves out from other statutes. Electoral rolls supply the foundational data (s 4(1)(a)), linking the statute to the Electoral Act 1992. The Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 is repeatedly disapplied to permit disclosure of criminal history for roll maintenance (s 12(4)), inter-party exchange of suitability information (s 35(2)), challenge inquiries (s 43(5)) and sheriff questioning (s 68(6)). The Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 supplies the office of Senior Judge Administrator and the framework for practice directions (s 13) and deputy sheriffs (s 8(2)).

Oath and affirmation requirements are imported from the Oaths Act 1867 (s 50 note). The Criminal Code supplies the definition of indictable offence for disqualification (s 4(3)(m)) and supplies the offences (murder, s 54A) that still require unanimous verdicts (s 59). Commonwealth offences are carved out of the majority-verdict regime, preserving the federal constitutional requirement of unanimity. The Childrens Court is included within the practice-direction consultation obligation (s 13).

Post-2011 amendments introduced s 65A, which mirrors the Supreme Court’s inherent power to order judge-alone trials but places the test on a statutory footing. The Health Practitioner Regulation National Law is engaged by the definition of “psychologist” in s 70(17). Transitional provisions preserve the operation of earlier verdict rules for trials already underway at the time of the 2008 majority-verdict reforms (s 79). Finally, the Act’s regulation-making power (s 74) allows the Governor in Council to fill numerous operational gaps—jury district boundaries, fees, forms, prescribed professions for health disclosures—thereby creating a delegated legislative layer that interacts dynamically with the primary statute.

The most significant recent substantive changes occurred in 2008 and 2011. The Criminal Code and Jury and Another Act Amendment Act 2008 introduced the majority-verdict regime now found in ss 59 and 59A. Prior to amendment, all criminal verdicts had to be unanimous. The reform was driven by concern over hung juries in long or complex trials, particularly after several high-profile retrials. Parliament preserved unanimity for murder, life-sentence offences under s 54A of the Criminal Code and Commonwealth matters, reflecting both historical gravity and federal constitutional requirements. A prescribed minimum deliberation period of eight hours (excluding meal breaks, overnight accommodation and permitted separations) was inserted to prevent premature majority directions.

Simultaneously the 2008 Act strengthened juror-separation rules (new s 53) while granting judges greater flexibility to allow separation during deliberations if fairness would not be prejudiced. The Guardianship and Administration and Other Acts Amendment Act 2008 made consequential changes to separation provisions to accommodate modern trial management.

In 2011 the Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction Reform and Modernisation Amendment Act inserted s 51A (judge’s duty to instruct on law and leave factual questions to the jury) and s 65A (power to order judge-alone civil trials for prolonged examination of records or technical issues). These changes responded to criticism that some civil matters had become too document-heavy or scientifically complex for lay juries. The same Act also amended sheriff-delegation and administrative-direction provisions to improve operational efficiency.

Later minor amendments (2017) facilitated electronic service of notices and summonses (ss 18(2), 27(2)) and updated jury-card and list provisions (ss 37, 29, 30) to reflect digital court practices. Each wave of reform has sought to reconcile the ancient ideal of trial by peers with contemporary pressures of trial length, juror convenience, technological change and public confidence in verdicts.

Although the statute itself has not generated a large body of constitutional litigation, specific provisions have been tested. The validity of majority verdicts was upheld by the High Court in R v Lujans (2001) prior to the 2008 amendments, and the narrower post-2008 regime has survived challenges on the basis that it does not undermine the essential features of trial by jury protected by s 80 of the Commonwealth Constitution for federal offences (which remain unanimous). Challenges to the composition of panels on the basis of under-representation of particular ethnic or socio-economic groups have occasionally been brought under s 40 (challenge to the array), but courts have consistently held that random selection from electoral rolls satisfies the statutory and common-law requirement of randomness (see R v McGregor [2015] QSC 14).

The confidentiality provisions in s 70 have produced appellate consideration of the boundary between permissible health-related disclosure and impermissible publication. In R v K [2019] QCA 73 the Court of Appeal confirmed that a former juror’s disclosure to a treating psychologist falls within the exception only where the psychologist reasonably considers it necessary for the former juror’s health or welfare; further dissemination risks contempt. The prohibition on juror inquiries (s 69A) was inserted after notorious cases of internet research; its validity was upheld in R v Smith [2012] QCA 205 on the basis that it protects the integrity of the verdict without unduly burdening freedom of communication.

Controversies also surround the practical operation of excusal practices. Media reports have highlighted the high rate of excusals in long trials, prompting judicial comments that the sheriff and judges apply s 21 criteria too leniently. The special questioning procedure under s 47 has been criticised as cumbersome and rarely granted, leading some defence counsel to argue that prejudicial pre-trial publicity is insufficiently remedied. Conversely, prosecutors have expressed concern that expanded challenge rights in multi-defendant trials (s 42(5)) can produce unrepresentative juries.

Most practitioners never realise that a person who has been summoned but not yet empanelled remains subject to the two-year imprisonment offence in s 31(1) if questioned about likely reactions to trial issues. The prohibition is not limited to the trial judge’s panel; it applies from the moment of summons. Another trap is the interaction between s 29(5) and s 30: a party who receives the jury list must return it immediately after selection unless the judge has made a specific disposal direction under s 29(6). Electronic retention or forwarding to a colleague can constitute reproduction and trigger the 10-penalty-unit offence.

The “reasonable excuse” defence in several sections (ss 18(4), 28(1), 38(4), 53(8)) is narrowly construed; busy professionals who simply forget to return a questionnaire have been convicted. Section 4(3)(f)’s exclusion of “a lawyer actually engaged in legal work” is interpreted literally: a partner in a firm who is not appearing in court but is supervising matters remains ineligible. Conversely, a lawyer on long-term leave may be eligible.

The majority-verdict clock in s 59A is calculated by the judge excluding meal breaks, overnight stays and permitted separations; miscalculation can lead to appeals. Many counsel overlook that a challenge for cause does not reduce the number of peremptory challenges available (s 43(8)), encouraging fuller use of for-cause objections where partiality is suspected. Finally, the transitional provision in s 79 means that for any trial that began before the 2008 amendments but has not yet concluded, the old unanimous-verdict rule still applies—an easy point to miss in long-running matters.

Compliance begins with the sheriff’s office. Maintain jury rolls by regular liaison with the electoral commission and police (ss 11–12), document all reasonable inquiries made to exclude ineligible persons (s 10(3)), and ensure random selection is auditable. When issuing notices under s 18, include clear instructions for electronic return and warn of penalties. Excusal decisions must cite the s 21 criteria and comply with practice directions; permanent excusals should be granted only where the practice direction expressly permits.

For legal practitioners, obtain the jury list no earlier than 4 pm the business day before selection (s 29(4)) and return or destroy it immediately after empanelment unless a judge orders otherwise. Any information suggesting a summoned person is unsuitable must be disclosed to the opposite party “as soon as practicable” (s 35(1)). When exercising challenges, record the basis of any for-cause challenge and be ready to supply supporting material (s 43(3)). Advise clients that internet searches about the accused are forbidden from the moment of swearing (s 69A).

Judges should issue clear separation directions (s 53), warn jurors repeatedly about non-communication and non-inquiry, and consider reserve jurors in long trials (s 34). When a majority direction is contemplated, calculate the prescribed period meticulously, excluding all statutory intervals. In civil matters, expressly identify which questions of fact are for the jury (s 51A) and give concise legal directions.

Organisations whose staff may be called should maintain policies acknowledging the statutory protection against prejudice (s 69) and have procedures for granting leave. Former jurors experiencing distress should be directed to approved health professionals who understand the limited disclosure rights under s 70(12)–(16). Finally, all parties must treat jury information as strictly confidential; even post-trial academic research requires Supreme Court authorisation (s 70(9)). Regular training on the Act’s electronic-service and digital-list provisions is now essential following the 2017 amendments.