Young v King

Land and Environment Court (NSW)|2016-08-04|Before: Sheahan J

122 LGERA 216 McKinnon v Hallbridge, No 30148 of 1997, 10 July 1998 Mead v Watson as Liquidator for Hypec Electronics (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27; [2003] 1 AC 120 Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756 MGICA v Kenny & Good [No.4] (1996) 140 ALR 707 Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (unreported, 31 August 2004) Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 NA & J Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 98 Nadarajapillai v Naderasa (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 209 National Parks and Wildlife Services v Stables Perisher Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 573; (1990) 71 LGRA 286 New South Wales Bar Association v Murphy (2002) 55 NSWLR 23; [2002] NSWCA 138 Nobrega v The Catholic Church [1999] NSWCA 133 Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 455 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (Australasia) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1249 Port Stephens Council v Randell [2000] NSWLEC 169 Probiotec Limited v The University of Melbourne [2008] FCAFC 5; (2008) 166 FCR 30; (2008) 244 ALR 96 Re Felicity; FM v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (No 4) [2015] NSWCA 19 Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198; [2001] NSWCA 142 Rosniak v GIO (1997) 41 NSWLR 608 Sanko Steamship Company Ltd v Sumitomo Australia Ltd (unreported, Federal Court, 7 February 1996) Steindl Nominees Pty Ltd v Laghaifar [2003] 2 Qd R 683 Styles v Wollondilly Shire Council (No.3) [2001] NSWLEC 133 Tinda Creek Spiritual & Environment Centre v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 432 Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 Wyong Shire Council v Smith (unreported, NSWLEC, Bignold J, 24 December 1992) Young v Hones [2013] NSWSC 580 Young v Hones (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1429 Young v Hones (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 499 Young v Hones (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 792 Young v Hones (No.5) [2016] NSWSC 822 Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1176 Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 989 Young v King [2004] NSWLEC 93 Young v King (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 42 Young v King (No 5) [2012] NSWLEC 280 Young v King (No 6) [2015] NSWLEC 111 Young v King (No 7) [2015] NSWLEC 178 Young v King (No 8) [2015] NSWLEC 187 Young v King (No 9) [2016] NSWLEC 4 Young v King (No 10) [2016] NSWLEC 70 Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282 Yu v Cao [2015] NSWCA 276 Xabregas v The Owners - Strata Plan No. 79205; Moallem v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 1027 Category: Costs Parties: Margo Young (Applicant) Brendan King (First respondent) Kristina King (Second respondent) Ian Hemmings (Fifth respondent) Stephen Perrens (Sixth respondent) Hughes Trueman Pty Limited (Seventh respondent) Warwick Davies (Eighth respondent) Michael Brearley (Eleventh respondent) Ross Fraser (Twelfth respondent) Tony Tuxworth (Thirteenth respondent) Copland Lethbridge (Fourteenth respondent) Bee & Lethbridge Pty Limited (Fifteenth respondent) Geoff Goodyer (Sixteenth respondent) Victor Schubert (Seventeenth respondent) Leonardo Carlo Muriniti, Robert Duane Newell, and L C Muriniti & Associates (Respondents to personal costs applications) Representation: Counsel: Mr R Newell, solicitor (Applicant) Mr M Wright, barrister (First & second respondents) Ms A Horvath, barrister (Fifth respondent) Mr S Gray, barrister (Sixth & seventh respondents, with Mr Thornell deputising on 3 August) Mr T Faulkner, SC (Eighth respondent) Mr B Lim, barrister (Eleventh respondent) Ms J Reid, barrister (Twelfth respondent) Dr S Berveling, barrister (Thirteenth respondent) Mr E Cox, barrister (Fourteenth, fifteenth & sixteenth respondents, with Dr Berveling deputising on 2 August) Mr T Buterin, barrister (Seventeenth respondent) Mr D Lloyd, and Mr M Kalyk barristers (for Leonardo Muriniti, Robert Newell, and L C Muriniti and Associates)

Solicitors: L C Muriniti & Associates (Applicant) Stern Law (First & second respondents) Moray & Agnew (Fifth respondent) Kennedys Law (Sixth & seventh respondents) Gilchrist Connell (Eighth respondent) Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (Eleventh respondent) N/A (Twelfth respondent) TressCox Lawyers (Thirteenth respondent) Walker Hedges & Co (Fourteenth, fifteenth & sixteenth respondents) N/A (Seventeenth respondent) Yeldham Price O'Brien Lusk (for Leonardo Muriniti, Robert Newell, and L C Muriniti and Associates) File Number(s): 2016/1607672016/160933

Background

This latest chapter in this sorry litigation between neighbours concerns not only the pursuit of the applicant, Margo Young, for costs, but, especially, the pursuit of personal costs orders against her current legal advisors (hereafter "Young's lawyers", or, simply, "the lawyers").
The background history which brings this Court to this latest judgment was briefly summarised in Young v King (No 9) [2016] NSWLEC 4, at [3] - [11], and need not be repeated. (For a more detailed account, see also Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282, at [28] - [85].)
Young was ultimately unsuccessful in both the cases she ran before this Court - a "reopening" application she brought in Class 4 of this Court's ("LEC") jurisdiction, and a prerogative relief application, referred to this Court by the Supreme Court.
Young was ordered to pay the respondent Kings' costs of both matters: Young v King (No 6) [2015] NSWLEC 111.
I later ordered, on Kings' motion, that those costs be paid by her on an indemnity basis: Young v King (No 9) ([2] above).
In judgment No 6 (at [83] - [90]), I criticised, not for the first time, the way in which Young's post-2004 legal representatives, Leonardo Muriniti and Robert Newell, have conducted her litigation.
In fact, throughout this litigation, I have frequently referred to Young's and her lawyers' "flagrant disobedience" of directions, and to the prejudice and cost caused to the Kings by that behaviour. (See also judgment No 3 [2012] NSWLEC 42, at [118]; judgment No 5 [2012] NSWLEC 280, at [1] and [7]; judgment No 6, at [7]; and judgment No 9, at [110] and [111]. See also T2.8.16, p22, LL23 - 31.)
For their part, the Kings have long foreshadowed seeking, and have indeed already moved the Court to make, personal costs orders in their favour against Young's lawyers, namely Leonardo Muriniti (her solicitor), and Robert Newell (originally her counsel, briefed by Muriniti, and lately a solicitor employed by Muriniti and/or his firm), and also against that firm, known as "LC Muriniti & Associates" ("LCM" or "LCMA"), in respect of the substantive proceedings.
However, the Kings deferred this Court's consideration of their request for those personal costs orders, pending Young's appeals to the Court of Appeal against judgments Nos 6 and 9.
On 21 and 22 June 2016, the Court of Appeal dealt with Young's substantive appeals against judgment No 6, and those aspects of judgment No 9 which dealt with questions of costs as between Young and the Kings.
That Court delivered its judgment in those appeals on 19 October 2016: Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282 (see [152] below).
Young's appeals were dismissed with costs, but there remained six other relevant matters current before the Court of Appeal.
Despite the appellate outcome which became known in October, while this decision was reserved, this present judgment does not deal with those "personal costs orders" claims made by the Kings, in respect of the substantive proceedings. Those claims have yet to be argued.

Young unsuccessfully claimed her costs, from the Kings and others, by her Notice of Motion of 20 August 2015

On 20 August 2015, despite the costs order made against her in judgment No 6 (later amended to an "indemnity costs" order - see [5] above), Young filed a Notice of Motion ("NOM") in which she sought orders for indemnity costs in her favour against 18 named respondents, being the Kings ("R1 and R2"), who had succeeded in the proceedings, and 16 non-parties ("R3 to R18").
I will later identify the sixteen "non-parties" in detail (Section C, from [46]), but it should be noted immediately that the involvement of most of them in the subject matter of the main proceedings was minor, and/or peripheral.
Counsel for some of those "non-parties" described Young's 20 August 2015 NOM as "novel" and "bizarre" (T2.8.16, p25, LL32 - 34), and Mr Wright (for the Kings) called it "truly perverse" (T2.8.16, p44, L18), but, however it may be categorised, Young's NOM sought the following orders: 1. That the First through to the Eighteenth Respondents pay the Applicant's costs of the application to vacate the March 2004 orders on an indemnity basis from 8 March 2004 until final determination of these proceedings. 2. That the Third through to the Eighteenth Respondents indemnify the Applicant against any costs order that might be made against her in relation to the application to vacate the March 2004 orders on an indemnity basis from 8 March 2004 until the final disposal of these proceedings. 3. Such further and other orders as this Honourable court deems fit.
Insofar as her NOM affected the 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 18th of those 18 respondents, it was summarily dismissed, as an "abuse of process", on 1 December 2015, and Mrs Young was ordered to pay the costs of those respondents: Young v King (No 8) [2015] NSWLEC 187.
Insofar as it affected the Kings, and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th and 12th respondents, her NOM was dismissed, after a full hearing, but again on the basis that it was an "abuse of process", on 19 February 2016, and Mrs Young was ordered to pay the costs of all those respondents as well: judgment No 9.
In summary: In judgments Nos 8 and 9, this Court decided that Young's August 2015 costs NOM was an "abuse of process", in that it was an attempt by her to re-litigate issues already dealt with in this litigation, and/or in her related claims against those lawyers and the water expert who acted for her in its early stages: Young v Hones [2013] NSWSC 580, Young v Hones (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 499, and Young v Hones (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 792.
As such, Young's 20 August 2015 costs motion had "no reasonable prospects of success", and, in view of this Court's findings in its judgment No 6, it was doomed to fail (see judgment No 9 at [106] - 109]).

The Claims brought by the respondent Kings

While the Kings' claim for personal cost orders against Muriniti and Newell, in respect of the substantive proceedings, remains to be heard and determined, at a later date (see [8] - [9] above), the Kings presently seek an order that their costs on Young's dismissed 20 August 2015 NOM be paid by Muriniti.
Their Amended NOM in this respect (Court Book Vol 1, tab 1.6, fols 18 - 20) seeks the following orders: 1 That ... Muriniti, solicitor for Margo Young, ... pay to the first and second respondents, Brendan and Kristina King, the amount of the costs which the plaintiff, Margo Young has been ordered to pay consequent upon the dismissal of the (sic) her notice of motion dated 20 August 2015. 2 That ... Muriniti pay the costs of this notice of motion. 3 Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit.

Motions brought by the non-party respondents against Young's lawyers

Eleven of the 16 non-party respondents, who successfully resisted Young's August costs NOM, and obtained costs orders against Young ([17] and [18] above), then moved the Court for various orders, including orders for indemnity costs on that NOM, and for personal costs orders against Muriniti and Newell. (See Section C of this judgment for more detail of these claims.)
Orders for costs on a personal basis are sought on various bases, including: (a) the alleged "inherent" or "implied" jurisdiction of the Court, and/or (b) sections 98 and/or 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("CP Act"), and/or (c) relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 ("LPULA Act", or "the uniform law"), and/or (d) as compensation in the nature of "damages".
On 18 May 2016, Young and her lawyers unsuccessfully sought to stay the motions of those respondents, and Young and her lawyers were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of those stay applications: Young v King (No 10) [2016] NSWLEC 70.
The respondents' costs motions then came on for hearing before me on 2 to 4 August 2016.
This judgment deals with those motions for indemnity and/or personal costs orders against the lawyers, detailed particulars of which I will set out below (in section C of this judgment, pars [46] - [54]).

Representation

The Kings are still represented by Mr Michael Wright of counsel, instructed by Terence Stern, solicitor.
Young is represented by Muriniti (her solicitor) and Newell (now a solicitor advocate, employed and instructed by Muriniti).
"The lawyers" (Muriniti, his now employee Newell, and LCMA) are all represented in the present "personal costs" proceedings by Mr David Lloyd and Mr M Kalyk of counsel (instructed by solicitor Bruce Yeldham, of Yeldham Price O'Brien Lusk).
Insofar as there are outstanding claims pending against Newell in his former capacity as a barrister, he is represented by Barry.Nilsson.Lawyers.
I will list later the names of counsel who appeared for the other costs respondents who now seek orders (see again section C below, pars [46] - [54]).

B: Relevant Statutory Provisions

I will now set out the key statutory provisions which are relied upon, in various combinations and alternatives, and to varying degrees, by the respondents in their motions and submissions before the Court. (Most of the emphasis is mine.)

The Court Act

Part 3 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 ("the Court Act") details the jurisdiction of the Court.
Section 16 provides: Jurisdiction of the Court generally (1) The Court shall have the jurisdiction vested in it by or under this or any other Act. (1A) The Court also has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of any matter not falling within its jurisdiction under any other provision of this Act or under any other Act, being a matter that is ancillary to a matter that falls within its jurisdiction under any other provision of this Act or under any other Act. ...
Section 22 provides: Determination of matter completely and finally The Court shall, in every matter before the Court, grant either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by that party in the matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters may be avoided.
Section 23 provides: Making of orders The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Court thinks appropriate.

The UCPR

Regard should be had also to Rule 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ("UCPR"), which provides: 42.1 General rule that costs follow the event Subject to this Part, if the court makes any order as to costs, the court is to order that the costs follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.

The CP Act

"Costs" are defined in s 3(1) of the CP Act in these terms: costs, in relation to proceedings, means costs payable in or in relation to the proceedings, and includes fees, disbursements, expenses and remuneration.
Part 6, Division 1, of the CP Act makes the following relevant provisions regarding the roles of parties and representatives in the conduct of proceedings: 56 Overriding purpose (1) The overriding purpose of this Act and of rules of court, in their application to civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. (2) The court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose when it exercises any power given to it by this Act or by rules of court and when it interprets any provision of this Act or of any such rule. (3) A party to civil proceedings is under a duty to assist the court to further the overriding purpose and, to that effect, to participate in the processes of the court and to comply with directions and orders of the court. (3A) (Repealed) (4) Each of the following persons must not, by their conduct, cause a party to civil proceedings to be put in breach of a duty identified in subsection (3): (a) any solicitor or barrister representing the party in the proceedings, (b) any person with a relevant interest in the proceedings commenced by the party. (5) The court may take into account any failure to comply with subsection (3) or (4) in exercising a discretion with respect to costs. ... 57 Objects of case management (1) For the purpose of furthering the overriding purpose referred to in section 56 (1), proceedings in any court are to be managed having regard to the following objects: (a) the just determination of the proceedings, (b) the efficient disposal of the business of the court, (c) the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources, (d) the timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings in the court, at a cost affordable by the respective parties. (2) This Act and any rules of court are to be so construed and applied, and the practice and procedure of the courts are to be so regulated, as best to ensure the attainment of the objects referred to in subsection (1). 58 Court to follow dictates of justice (1) ... the court must seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice. (2) For the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in a particular case, the court: (a) must have regard to the provisions of sections 56 and 57, ... 59 Elimination of delay ... 60 Proportionality of costs In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute.
Part 6, Division 2, of the CP Act deals with the powers of the court to give directions, and the duty of parties and their representatives to comply: 61 Directions as to practice and procedure generally (1) The court may, by order, give such directions as it thinks fit (whether or not inconsistent with rules of court) for the speedy determination of the real issues between the parties to the proceedings. ... (3) If a party to whom such a direction has been given fails to comply with the direction, the court may, by order, do any one or more of the following: ... (f) it may direct the party to pay the whole or part of the costs of another party, (g) it may make such other order or give such other direction as it considers appropriate. (4) Subsection (3) does not limit any other power the court may have to take action of the kind referred to in that subsection or to take any other action that the court is empowered to take in relation to a failure to comply with a direction given by the court. 62 Directions as to conduct of hearing (1) The court may, by order, give directions as to the conduct of any hearing, including directions as to the order in which evidence is to be given and addresses made. (2) The court may, by order, give directions as to the order in which questions of fact are to be tried. ... (5) In deciding whether to make a direction under this section, the court may have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matters that the court considers relevant: ... (g) the costs that are likely to be incurred by the parties compared with the quantum of the subject-matter in dispute, ...
Sections 98 and 99 of the CP Act, dealing with costs, are found in Part 7, Division 2 of that Act, and provide: 98 Courts powers as to costs (1) Subject to rules of court and to this or any other Act: (a) costs are in the discretion of the court, and (b) the court has full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and (c) the court may order that costs are to be awarded on the ordinary basis or on an indemnity basis. (2) Subject to rules of court and to this or any other Act, a party to proceedings may not recover costs from any other party otherwise than pursuant to an order of the court. (3) An order as to costs may be made by the court at any stage of the proceedings or after the conclusion of the proceedings. (4) In particular, at any time before costs are referred for assessment, the court may make an order to the effect that the party to whom costs are to be paid is to be entitled to: (a) costs up to, or from, a specified stage of the proceedings, or (b) a specified proportion of the assessed costs, or (c) a specified gross sum instead of assessed costs, or (d) such proportion of the assessed costs as does not exceed a specified amount. ... 99 Liability of legal practitioner for unnecessary costs (1) This section applies if it appears to the court that costs have been incurred: (a) by the serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct of a legal practitioner, or (b) improperly, or without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which a legal practitioner is responsible. (2) After giving the legal practitioner a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the court may do any one or more of the following: (a) it may, by order, disallow the whole or any part of the costs in the proceedings: (i) in the case of a barrister, as between the barrister and the instructing solicitor, or as between the barrister and the client, as the case requires, or (ii) in the case of a solicitor, as between the solicitor and the client, (b) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner: (i) in the case of a barrister, to pay to the instructing solicitor or client, or both, the whole or any part of any costs that the instructing solicitor or client, or both, have been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the solicitor or client has paid those costs, or (ii) in the case of a solicitor, to pay to the client the whole or any part of any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other person, whether or not the client has paid those costs, (c) it may, by order, direct the legal practitioner to indemnify any party (other than the client) against costs payable by that party. ...
Sections 98 and 99 were discussed in a preliminary way in judgment No 9, (at [84] - [87]), but I will return to them in more detail (Section J, [132] - [136] below).
Section 101 (in Part 6, Division 3) of the CP Act has also been invoked in this case, because claims have been made by some respondents for interest: 101 Interest after judgment (1) Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on so much of the amount of a judgment (exclusive of any order for costs) as is from time to time unpaid. ... (4) Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on an amount payable under an order for the payment of costs. (5) Interest on an amount payable under an order for the payment of costs is to be calculated, at the prescribed rate or at any other rate that the court orders, as from the date the order was made or any other date that the court orders. ...

The LPULA Act

The LPULA Act relevantly provides: 61 Maximum costs in personal injury damages matters Schedule 1 contains provisions relating to maximum costs in personal injury damages matters. 62 Costs in civil claims - no reasonable prospects of success Schedule 2 contains provisions relating to costs in civil claims where there are no reasonable prospects of success. ... Schedule 1 Maximum costs in personal injury damages matters ... 5 Costs can be awarded on indemnity basis for costs incurred after failure to accept offer of compromise (1) If a party to a claim for personal injury damages makes a reasonable offer of compromise on the claim that is not accepted, this Schedule does not prevent the awarding of costs against another party to be assessed on an indemnity basis in respect of legal services provided after the offer is made. (2) An offer of compromise on a claim by a party is reasonable if the court determines or makes an order or award on the claim in terms that are no less favourable to the party than the terms of the offer. (3) The local regulations may make provision for or with respect to requiring disclosure by a law practice to the practice's client of information in relation to the operation of this clause in respect of any refusal by the client to accept an offer of compromise. (4) If it appears to the court in which proceedings are taken on a claim for personal injury damages that a law practice has failed to comply with any provision of the local regulations under this clause, and that the client of the practice has incurred an increased liability for costs as a result of refusing a reasonable offer of compromise in connection with the claim concerned, the court may of its own motion or on the application of the client make either or both of the following orders: (a) an order directing the law practice to repay to the client the whole or any part of those increased costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other party, (b) an order directing the law practice to indemnify any party other than the client against the whole or any part of the costs payable by the party indemnified in respect of legal services provided after the offer is refused. ... Schedule 2 Costs in civil claims where no reasonable prospects of success ... 5 Costs order against law practice acting without reasonable prospects of success (1) If it appears to a court in which proceedings are taken on a claim for damages that a law practice has provided legal services to a party without reasonable prospects of success, the court may of its own motion or on the application of any party to the proceedings make either or both of the following orders in respect of the practice or of a legal practitioner associate of the practice responsible for providing the services: (a) an order directing the practice or associate to repay to the party to whom the services were provided the whole or any part of the costs that the party has been ordered to pay to any other party, (b) an order directing the practice or associate to indemnify any party other than the party to whom the services were provided against the whole or any part of the costs payable by the party indemnified. (2) The Supreme Court may on the application of any party to proceedings on a claim for damages make any order that the court in which proceedings on the claim are taken could make under this clause. (3) An application for an order under this clause cannot be made after a final determination has been made under Part 7 by a costs assessor of the costs payable as a result of an order made by the court in which the proceedings on the claim concerned were taken. (4) A law practice or legal practitioner associate of the practice is not entitled to demand, recover or accept from a client any part of the amount for which the practice or associate is directed to indemnify a party pursuant to an order under this clause.

C: The Non-party Notices of Motion now before the Court

Those of the sixteen non-party respondents to Young's August 2015 costs motion who persist in the present costs motions, i.e. Rs 5 to 8, and 11 to 17, and the orders they respectively seek, are as follows:
The Fifth respondent (5R) - Ian Hemmings ("Hemmings"): Mr Hemmings advised Young and appeared for her in the original proceedings: Young v King [2004] NSWLEC 93. He was represented before me by Ms P A Horvath of counsel, instructed by Moray & Agnew Lawyers. ORDERS SOUGHT 1. An order pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] that: (a) the plaintiff's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; (b) the law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, legal practitioner pay the fifth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. In the alternative to order 1 2. An order pursuant to cl5(1)(b) of Schedule 2 of the [LPULA Act] that the law practice [LCMA] ... pay the fifth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. In the alternative to orders 1 or 2 3. An order that the plaintiff to (sic) pay the fifth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 4. An order pursuant to section 99 of the [CP Act] ... that: (a) the plaintiff's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; (b) the law practice [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, legal practitioner pay the fifth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 5. Interest pursuant to section 101(4) of the [CP Act] ... . 6. Such other order or orders as the court thinks fit.
The Sixth and Seventh respondents (6/7R) - Stephen Perrens, and the firm Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd ("Perrens"): Dr Perrens, then employed by that firm, was engaged by Young in 2003 - 2004 as her hydraulic expert. He was represented before me by Mr S E Gray of counsel, instructed by Kennedys (Australasia) Pty Ltd ("Kennedys"). ORDERS SOUGHT 1 An order pursuant to section 99(2)(c) of the [CP Act] that: a. ... Muriniti, a legal practitioner, the solicitor on the record for the Applicant, and the Principal of the law practice [LCMA] ...; b. The law practice [LCMA] ...; and/or c. ... Newell, a legal practitioner employed by [LCMA] ... indemnify the Sixth and Seventh Respondents against any costs payable by them in relation to the Notice of Motion filed on 20 August 2015 on behalf of Margo Young (the Motion). 2 In the alternative to Order 1, an order pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] ... that: a. ... Muriniti; b. [LCMA] ...; and/or c. ... Newell pay the Sixth and Seventh Respondents' cost of and incidental to the Motion, with such costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis. 3 In the alternative to Order 2, an order pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] ... that: a. ... Muriniti; b. [LCMA] ...; and/or c. ... Newell pay the Sixth and Seventh Respondents' cost of and incidental to the Motion, with such costs to (sic) awarded on the ordinary basis. 4 In the alternative to Orders 2 and 3, an order pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] ... that Margo Young, the Applicant on the Motion, pay the Sixth and Seventh Respondents' costs of and incidental to the Motion, with such costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis. 5 The costs of an (sic) incidental to this Notice of Motion, including on the identical basis as set out above. 6 Such other or further order as the Court thinks fit.
The Eighth respondent (8R) - Warwick Davies ("Davies"): Mr Davies was engaged by Young as a geotechnical engineer. He was represented before me by Mr T M Faulkner, SC, instructed by Gilchrist Connell. ORDERS SOUGHT 1. Pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, that ... Muriniti, principal of [LCMA] ... and/or the law practice [LCMA] ... and/or ... Newell, a legal practitioner associate of the law practice of [LCMA] ... pay the Eight (sic) Respondent costs of the Applicant's Notice of Motion filed on 20 August 2015. 2. Alternatively, pursuant to section 99 of the [CP Act] ... and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, that ... Muriniti, principal of [LCMA] ... and/or the law practice of [LCMA] ... and/or ... Newell, a legal practitioner associate of the law practice of [LCMA] ... indemnify the Eight (sic) Respondent against costs payable by him to his legal representatives in relation to the Applicant's Notice of Motion filed on 20 August 2015. 3. Costs.
The Eleventh respondent (11R) - Michael Brearley ("Brearley"): Mr Brearley is a civil engineer, engaged by Young in 2012. He was represented before me by Mr B Lim of counsel, instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright. ORDERS SOUGHT ... 1 An order pursuant to s 98 or s 99 of the [CP Act] ... that: (a) ... Muriniti, principal of [LCMA] ... and solicitor on the record for the Plaintiff (b) the law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, a legal practitioner associate of the law practice [LCMA] ... pay or indemnify the Eleventh Respondent's costs of and incidental to the Plaintiff's motion filed on 20 August 2015, such costs to be on an indemnity basis. 2 In the alternative to Order 1, the Plaintiff pay the Eleventh Respondent's costs of and incidental to the Plaintiff's motion filed on 20 August 2015, such costs to be on an indemnity basis. 3 An order pursuant to s 99 of the [CP Act] ... that: (a) ... Muriniti, principal of [LCMA] ... and solicitor on the record for the Plaintiff; (b) the law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, a legal practitioner associate of the law practice of [LCMA] ... pay to the Eleventh Respondent the costs referred to in Order 2 or any other costs that the Plaintiff is to pay to the Eleventh Respondent. 4 Such other order as the court sees fit.
The Twelfth respondent (12R) - Ross Fraser ("Fraser"): Mr Fraser is a civil engineer engaged by Young in 2008. He was represented before me by Ms J Reid of counsel. ORDERS SOUGHT 1 An order pursuant to s 98 of the [CP Act] ... that : a The applicant's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; b The law practice [LCMA] ...; and/or c ... Newell, legal practitioner pay the 12th respondent's costs of the applicant's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. In the alternative to order 1 2 An order pursuant to cl5(1)(b) of Schedule 2 of the [LPULA Act] ... that the law practice [LCMA] ... pay the 12th respondent's costs of the applicant's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. In the alternative to orders 1 or 2 3 An order that the applicant pay the 12th respondent's costs of the applicant's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 4 An order pursuant to section 99 of the [CP Act] ... that: a The applicant's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; b The law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or c ... Newell, legal practitioner Pay the 12th respondent's costs of the applicant's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion on an indemnity basis. 5 Interest pursuant to section 101(4) of the [CP Act]. 6 Such other order or orders as the court thinks fit.
The Thirteenth respondent (13R) - Tony Tuxworth ("Tuxworth"): Mr Tuxworth is a town planner engaged by Young in 2011. He was represented before me by Dr S Berveling of counsel, instructed by Tress Cox Lawyers. ORDERS SOUGHT ... 2. Order that, pursuant to s. 99 of the [CP Act] ... Muriniti indemnify the thirteenth respondent against any costs payable by the thirteenth respondent to his legal representatives in relation to the Motion, on an indemnity basis from 20 September 2015. 3. In the alternative to Order 2 above, order that, pursuant to s. 62 and clause 5(1)(b) of Schedule 2 of the [LPULA Act] ..., the law practice of [LCMA] ... and/or its associate ... Muriniti indemnify the thirteenth respondent against the whole of the costs payable by the thirteenth respondent to his legal representatives in relation to the Motion. 4. In the alternative to Orders 2 and 3 above, order that the applicant pay the thirteenth respondent's costs of the Motion. 5. Such further or other Order as the Court sees fit.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth respondents (14/15R) - Copland Lethbridge and his firm Bee & Lethbridge Pty Ltd ("Lethbridge") - and the Sixteenth (16R) - Geoff Goodyer ("Goodyer"): Mr Lethbridge is a surveyor who was engaged by Kings (I acknowledge my error in par [27] of judgment No 9 in this respect - see also T2.8.16, p46, LL12 - 17). Mr Goodyer is a town planner also engaged by Young. All three were represented before me by Mr E Cox of counsel, instructed by Walker Hedges & Co, and all three seek the same orders, namely: 2 Order that, pursuant to s.99 of the [CP Act] ... Muriniti indemnify the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Respondents against any costs payable by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Respondents to his legal representatives in relation to the Motion, on an indemnity basis from 20 September 2015. 3 In the alternative to Order 2 above, order that, pursuant to s.62 and clause 5(1)(b) of Schedule 2 to the [LPULA Act] ..., the law practice of [LCMA] ... and/or its associate ... Muriniti indemnify the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Respondents against the whole of the costs payable by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Respondents to his (sic) legal representatives in relation to the Motion. 4. In the alternative to Orders 2 and 3 above, order that the applicant pay the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Repsondent's (sic) costs of the Motion. 5. Such further or other Order as the Court sees fit. 6 Such other orders as the Court deems fit.
The Seventeenth respondent (17R) - Victor Schubert ("Schubert"): Mr Schubert is a town planner who was engaged by Kings in 2003. He was represented before me by Mr T Buterin. ORDERS SOUGHT 1. An order pursuant to section 98 of the [CP Act] ... that: (a) the plaintiff's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; (b) the law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, legal practitioner pay the seventeenth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 2. In the alternative to order 1, an order pursuant to cl. 5(1)(b) of Schedule 2 to the [LPULA Act] ... that the law practice of [LCMA] ... pay the seventeenth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 3. In the alternative to orders 1 and 2, an order that the plaintiff to (sic) pay the seventeenth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 4. An order pursuant to section 99 of the [CP Act] ... that: (a) the plaintiff's legal practitioner, ... Muriniti; (b) the law practice of [LCMA] ...; and/or (c) ... Newell, legal practitioner. pay the seventeenth respondent's costs of the plaintiff's notice of motion filed 20 August 2015, and the costs of this motion, on an indemnity basis. 5. Interest pursuant to section 101(4) of the [CP Act] .... 6. Such other order or orders as the court thinks fit.

Summary of the claims determined in this judgment

It can be seen that: 1. all eleven non-party respondents still before the Court rely upon s 98 and/or s 99 of the CP Act; 2. most of them also rely on the LPULA Act; 3. some also made specific claims for interest on the costs payable to them, even though s 101(4) of the CP Act ([44] above) renders such claims unnecessary; 4. a few argued for an inherent or implied jurisdiction to award the costs they sought, and/or for costs to be recoverable as "damages"; and 5. most adopted the submissions of others, with individual emphasis.

D: The Evidence now before the Court

Many affidavits have been read, many documents have been relied upon, and there have been voluminous written submissions, including reply submissions, made by the parties, prior to and during this present costs hearing.
Those documents mostly found their way into a four-volume (white) Court Book ("CB"), assembled by Yeldham Price O'Brien Lusk (acting for Young's current lawyers), or a two-volume (black) Supplementary Court Book ("SCB"), assembled by Kennedys (acting for Perrens and his firm).
Various other documents were separately tendered during the hearing:
Some were exhibits to affidavits (e.g. Exhibits RG1, RG2, RG3, and SER1), one was the transcript of the stay hearing on 18 May 2016 (Exhibit WD1), and another was a letter from Muriniti to Stern, dated 27 October 2015 (Exhibit K1).
On behalf of Perrens and Hughes Trueman (Rs 6 and 7), Mr Gray tendered part of one paragraph, and all of another, in an affidavit sworn and filed on 10 June 2016, by Muriniti, on Young's behalf, in her Federal Court appeal proceedings against his clients (Exhibit SP1).
On behalf of Lethbridge, his firm, and Goodyer (Rs 14 to 16), Mr Cox tendered a letter from his solicitors to Muriniti, dated 7 September 2015 (Exhibit BL1).
On behalf of Young, Newell tendered three folders of additional material (Exhibits Y1, Y2, and Y3), two construction certificate plans from earlier hearings (Exhibits A4 and A5), and an affidavit by Perrens, which was dated 5 December 2008, and had been filed in the substantive proceedings (Exhibit Y4).
No oral evidence was called.

E: "Early warnings" were given to Young and her lawyers, but were ignored

Young, Muriniti and Newell were placed on notice, from very soon after they filed Young's costs claims against 18 Respondents on 20 August 2015, that at least some of the respondents regarded such claims as an abuse of process.
On 31 August 2015, Hemmings's solicitors, Moray & Agnew, warned Muriniti in respect of Young's 20 August 2015 costs motion (CB Vol 1, tab 2.3, fol 40), in these terms: 1. We refer to your client's notice of motion filed in the above proceedings on 20 August 2015 ('motion'). 2. The motion is an abuse of process and will be dismissed. The issues sought to be agitated in the motion have been judicially determined. We refer you to the judgments in Young v King (6) [2015] NSWLEC 11 and Young v Hones (3) (sic ?) [2013] NSWSC 1429, (the latter of which was affirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the High Court of Australia). 3. Before our client incurs substantial costs in opposing the motion, we have been instructed to offer that the motion be resolved by orders that: (a) the motion is dismissed insofar as it seeks orders against the fifth respondent: (b) each of the applicant and the fifth respondent to bear her and his own costs of the motion. 4. The offer is open for acceptance until 4pm 8 September 2015 and is made pursuant to the principles set out in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 [("the Calderbank principles")]. 5. Should your client not accept the offer, our client will make an applicant that L C Muriniti & Associates or its solicitors pay our client's costs of the motion on an indemnity basis, and will seek to rely on this letter in respect of any application for costs.
On 2 September 2015, Gilchrist Connell (for Davies) wrote to Muriniti, complaining that Young's NOM did "not specify a basis" upon which she relied for orders against Davies, and seeking particulars (White CB, Vol 3, tab 4.3, fols 744 - 745). Davies's lawyers reserved all Davies's rights, "including his right to apply to have the [NOM] dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and (sic) abuse of process or otherwise".
Muriniti replied to Gilchrist Connell in somewhat intemperate terms that same day (fols 746 -747), saying, inter alia: Our client's proceedings against your client are not frivolous and vexatious as you contend. On the contrary, they are meritorious proceedings and should be taken very seriously by you and your client given that the proceedings are of an extremely serious nature and have not been commenced lightly but rather are proceeding (sic) which have been brought as a result of some 7 years of forensic investigations in order to unravel your client's conspiratorial conduct on the conduct of his follow (sic) conspirators. It should be self-evident to you that the allegations that have been made would not have been made unless we had proper and compelling reasons to do so and evidence to support those allegations. Accordingly, we invite you to withdraw your allegation that the proceedings are frivolous and vexatious. ... Your client has a great deal to answer for and will be held to account for his conduct. ... ... ... the [LEC] in this instance, has been vested with Supreme Court jurisdiction by virtue of orders that were made by the Supreme Court Court of Appeal last year and as such the court has the benefit of not only the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction but also the provisions of s76 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Muriniti attached to that reply a copy of his letter of 2 September 2015 to Kennedys, acting for Perrens (fols 748 - 750), which reiterated some elements of the conspiracy allegations against various respondents, by way of "broad-brush illustration of your client's complicity". That attachment, like his letter to Gilchrist Connell, failed to engage with the suggestion of abuse of process.
On 7 September 2015, the solicitor for Tuxworth, Alistair Little of Tress Cox, wrote to Muriniti (CB Vol 3, tab 8.2, fols 1055 - 1058), asserting (1) that Young's costs motion "has no prospects of success", (2) that Young "suffered no direct loss in regard to any alleged conduct of Mr Tuxworth", that Tuxworth is entitled to expert witness immunity, and (3) that, if the claim continued against Tuxworth, he would seek personal costs orders against Muriniti on an indemnity basis. There was no response to this letter.
Also on 7 September 2015, Walker Hedges & Co. wrote (Exhibit BL1) to Muriniti, on behalf of Lethbridge and Goodyer, suggesting that Young's costs motion of 20 August 2015, was "totally misconceived" and "hopeless", that she "should have been given advice that [it] is an improper use of the court", and that the claims she makes should be the subject of "separate and discrete" proceedings in the "proper court of jurisdiction". Again, personal costs claims were foreshadowed. As their counsel, Mr E Cox, points out in his submissions on Lethbridge's behalf (CB Vol 4, tab 9.2, fol 1227, par 5), "no actual involvement" in the conspiracy is alleged against him, only an error in his survey and a failure to correct it - it is alleged that this error "harmonised with the purposes of the conspiracy".
Kennedys reminded LCMA on 9 September 2015 (CB Vol 2, tab 3.3, fol 705, at par 13) of LCMA's "obligations pursuant to Rule 21.4 of the Solicitors' Rules, which provides that: "21.4 A solicitor must not allege any matter of fact amounting to criminality, fraud or other serious misconduct against any person unless the solicitor believes on reasonable grounds that: 21.4.1 available material by which the allegation could be supported provides a proper basis for it; and 21.4.2 the client wishes the allegation to be made, after having been advised of the seriousness of the allegation and of the possible consequences for the client and the case if it is not made out."
On 10 September 2015, when Young's NOM came before the Registrar, all 18 respondents appeared.
Mr Faulkner SC appeared for Davies, and made clear, at the outset (T10.9.15, p8, LL44 - 48), that Davies's position was that Young's application was "an abuse of process and ought be summarily dismissed ... without going into any evidence".
On 15 October 2015, Davies filed a NOM seeking such summary dismissal, and other respondents followed suit.
On 4 November 2015, Schubert (R17) wrote a personal "Calderbank" type letter to Muriniti (CB Vol 4, tab 10.3, fols 1238 - 1240), saying inter alia that any costs order against him would not be "in the interests of justice", but "extravagant and injust (sic)". Schubert was an expert town planner engaged by the Kings in 2003 - 2004. He heard nothing "further in relation to the 2003 proceedings until ... served with [Young's NOM] in late August 2015" (CB Vol 4, tab 10.3, fol 1236, par 4), by which time he was "a recent cancer survivor", advised by his oncologist that "stress may trigger a relapse" (fol 1239).
On or about 23 November 2015, Muriniti and Newell filed Young's 258 pages of submissions, in which (T2.8.16, p27, LL24 - 25) "not a single word ... addressed ... the abuse of process" point.
On 25 November 2015, Faulkner replied to Young's submissions (T2.8.16, p27, LL35 - 38), going "into the abuse of process point chapter and verse". Three days later Newell responded in a way described by Faulkner (Tp27, LL38 - 39) as "superficial and perfunctory in relation to the key point - nothing of substance was said to address the abuse of process".
On 26 November 2015, Moray & Agnew again sought to settle with Muriniti on (fol 496).
Muriniti did not properly respond in any substantive way to any of these warnings. In terms of the Calderbank principles (see par "4" in [65] above), Young did not reject the settlement propositions, nor seek time to consider her position.
In his oral submissions in support of summary dismissal of Young's NOM, on 30 November 2015, Faulkner developed the abuse point further, and he submits, correctly in my view, that Newell said (T2.8.16, p27, L45) "nothing of substance to resist" it.
When I delivered judgment No 8 on 1 December 2015, summarily dismissing about half of Young's claims for costs, Newell and I had the following exchange (T1.12.15 p79, CB Vol 2, tab 2.3, fol 591, at LL22 - 43): NEWELL: I understand that that is to happen in a moment, but what your Honour has indicated about the judgment and its substance would suggest that this is a rather situation, but it seems there is some question whether, if the motions have been dismissed on a summary basis, that the same submissions on a final basis cannot go any other way as matters presently stand. I am wondering if there is a better way of dealing with this than to incur the costs of dealing with HIS HONOUR: Well, you could surrender and pay the costs of the parties who have been brought here, if you expect the result to be the way you have just described it. NEWELL: Well, I was going to suggest the possibility that those applications could be stayed or adjourned until the matter in the Court of Appeal is dealt with. HIS HONOUR: Well, I my understanding is that the Court of Appeal would prefer as it is normal practice to deal with the whole of judgment number 6, of which this proceeding is part, so that request is denied. Now, if you do not want to proceed against these other parties, please let them go now. NEWELL: No, your Honour, we will proceed against all of the parties ...
As Mr Gray (for Perrens) observed (subs SCB Vol 1, fol 59, par 26), Newell did not even pause to confirm, after judgment No 8, that he had instructions to proceed, but he and Muriniti persisted with the remaining costs claims.

F: Mrs Young's role, her personal position, and her refusal to waive privilege

On 6 June 2016, Muriniti swore an affidavit in respect of a proposed out-of-time Federal Court appeal, which Young brought against the Federal Circuit Court's judgment (per Smith J on 29 April 2016) in Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 989 (to which case I referred in judgment No 10, at [52] - [61], and in respect of which see now also [137]ff below).
The copy of that affidavit which was tendered before me (Exhibit SP1) is deficient, in that pages 10 and 11 (pars 51 - 59) are missing from it.
However, in what this Court has seen of the affidavit, Muriniti: 1. referred (pars 3 and 5) to Young's "extremely limited resources" and "the limited resources of her legal representatives"; 2. complained (par 4) about a "concerted, aggressive smear campaign involving professional attacks" on her legal representatives by the respondents and their insurers. 3. deposed to the various proceedings she still has current in NSW Court of Appeal, and this Court, at the same time, and (par 21) to his having borne the expense of her disbursements; 4. deposed also that she was reconsidering the High Court outcome in her Young v Hones litigation (which turned on questions of immunity) in view of that Court's subsequent decision in Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16; and 5. foreshadowed (par 22) possible (further) proceedings against Hemmings, Hones and Perrens, and (pars 36 - 38) an application to at least stay Garling J's costs orders in Young v Hones.
In establishing Young's (conspiracy based) case for substantive for relief, and now for costs, Muriniti made clear (Exhibit K1 p2) that the "primary role" was to be played by Newell, as "lead advocate", requiring: ... a minute and detailed understanding and familiarity with a mountain of documents which have had to be analysed in order to weave together and forensically demonstrate convincingly the conspiracy in which your clients and others in these proceedings have been parties.
It is clear to the Court that Newell was the principal architect of this conspiracy approach, that Muriniti willingly embraced it, and that, together, they convinced Young to pursue it. Thereafter, with her approval, and apparently on her express instructions, they pursued it on her behalf. Despite all the stumbles along the way, they still enjoy her confidence. As she appears to have so far paid none of their fees, there seems little point in speculation as to where this matter would now stand if she were self-represented.

Young's Finances

In Young v Hones (No.5) [2016] NSWSC 822, Garling J said (at [85]): Mr Newell submitted, from the Bar Table, that the fact that there had been an act of bankruptcy committed by Ms Young ought to be taken by the Court as an indication that his client was impecunious. As well, Ms Young discloses her occupation on her affidavit as a pensioner. These matters give rise to a substantial question as to the financial capacity of Ms Young to meet the costs orders, but that issue was not specifically addressed by the evidence which, potentially, could have been done quite easily. There did not seem to be any suggestion as to any financial arrangement with respect to the payment of any costs associated with the prospective proceedings which would enable Ms Young to undertake those proceedings against, apparently, at least 18 respondents, in circumstances where she was wholly impecunious for the purposes of this application. None of these matters were adequately addressed. It means that there is no evidentiary basis for this Court to find, that Ms Young would be prejudiced by the failure of the Court to make the restraining orders which she seeks.
Moray and Agnew's Susan Reid annexes to her affidavit (CB Vol 2, tab 2.4, fols 677 - 683) a title search and several caveat documents regarding Young's land at 35 Calca Cres, Forestville.
Young has a mortgage with St George Bank, but also three caveats have been lodged on her title by Muriniti - one, dated 3 April 2012, reliant upon his cost agreement with her, dated 1 February 2008; a second, dated around 13 November 2013, reliant upon an unregistered second mortgage; and the third, reliant on a "loan agreement and unregistered mortgage", dated 17 September 2014.
It was clear, from her oral evidence before me in 2014, that Young is of very limited means (e.g. judgment No 6 at [12]), and her liability for solicitor-client costs has been estimated at, or asserted, without evidence, to be, $3M.
At the same time, several of the non-party respondents depose to having never been paid for services they rendered to her.
For example, Fraser (12R) acted for Young without fee, but she joined him in the conspiracy, without articulating any role he played, and without producing any evidence against him (see Ms J Reid's subs at CB Vol 3, tab 7.3, fols 1045 - 1047).
Tuxworth (13R) also deposed (CB Vol 3, tab 8.3, fol 1060, par 2) that Muriniti, on Young's behalf, engaged Coastplan Consulting to provide Tuxworth's services as an expert witness, on the basis that any fees would be "settled at the end of the court matter".
Tuxworth prepared a draft report (tab 8.3, fols 1096 - 1102), and eventually an amended final report (fols 1103 - 1117), and then engaged in a lengthy dialogue with Muriniti and Newell, from late May 2011 until August 2015 (fols 1118 - 1214). His expert services (costed at $9,893.15 - fol 1065, par 24) were never paid for.
Mr Gray's submissions (for Perrens) included the following (CB Vol 2, tab 3.2, fol 692, pars 30 - 31): 30. The Lawyers, at all times, had a duty to advise the Applicant as to the hopelessness of the Motion. That position was especially so in light of the various decisions that the Applicant was party to - not only in the Land and Environment Court but also in Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. 31. The written and oral submissions, and the years that has (sic) been spent trying to identify the conspiracy, which, whilst purportedly discovered many times has never been revealed to the Court in any admissible way (as distinct from a series of submissions without any evidentiary basis) do not give any confidence that the duty has been performed.
The affidavit of 15 October 2015 by Davies's solicitor, Mr R E G Guyomarc'h of Gilchrist Connell (CB Vol 3, tab 4.3, fols 726ff), annexes Young's affidavit of 20 August 2015. In it, Young repeats her attacks on several expert respondents, including Perrens, Davies, Lethbridge, Goodyer, and Schubert.
In his written submissions on behalf of Brearley, Mr Lim observed (CB Vol 3, tab 6.2, fol 1030, par 13), that it was unlikely that Young's lawyers could produce any evidence showing that they were not "personally responsible for the institution and maintenance of the costs motion and the manner in which it was conducted".
In this respect, he relies on a letter dated 27 October 2015, which Muriniti wrote to Stern (Exhibit K1) regarding delays caused in finalising Young's submissions, as a result of Newell's health issues (see Young v King (No 7) [2015] NSWLEC 178, delivered on 11 November 2015). Muriniti said: We are comfortable in announcing that we now believe that we have a firm, if not complete, understanding of what was done by whom and why and how both the court and our client were seriously misled to put it mildly.

Privilege

Young has confirmed (her affidavit of 29 April 2016, in CB Vol 4, at tab 11.1, fol 1247, par 10) that she does not wish to waive privilege over the file held for her by Muriniti, at least not "whilst there are appeals on foot", with a rehearing of her substantive case possible.
Accordingly, Mr Lloyd has not had full access to that file - it is not "open to Muriniti's legal advisers to trample all over that privilege by looking at the documents" (T18.5.16 p9, LL22 - 23). Certainly it would be appropriate for Muriniti to get legal advice before swearing an affidavit in his own defence on costs (p20, LL21 - 26), and for his legal representatives to "have a look at some documents" (LL28 - 29) - a "confidential disclosure for a limited purpose that protects the privilege against all the world" (LL31 - 33).

G: Some Submissions of General Application to the Court's consideration

Mr Gray (for Perrens) said (T2.8.16, p56, LL39 - 42) of Young's pursuit of costs from non-parties: This is a costs application brought by an unsuccessful party seeking costs on an indemnity basis from persons not party to the proceedings, on the identical basis upon which the unsuccessful party lost in number 6.
The basis upon which Young sought to recover costs was "precisely" the same conspiracy argument she had put unsuccessfully in the substantive case.
In this respect, Mr Wright (for the Kings) makes these submissions in respect of the conduct of Young, Muriniti and Newell, after Young lost her case, and was ordered to pay the Kings' costs: 1. (par 16, CB Vol 1, tab1.5, fol 16): No responsible practitioner, whether or not acting on express instructions, should have brought and maintained an application for costs against the successful party to proceedings in the absence of clear evidence of disentitling conduct by the successful party. There was no such evidence. 1. (par 20, ibid fol 17): Where the Court had already dismissed the same claim against the Kings in judgment 6, it is incomprehensible that a comepetent (sic) and responsible practitioner could advance a claim for costs on the same basis against the successful party to the proceedings. Yet again, Mr Muriniti has been responsible for putting the Kings to the cost of responding to prolix and irrelevant submissions made in the absence of any probative evidence to support any of the allegations made against them. 1. (T4.8.16, p123, LL31 - 41): The reality is - and it is comfortably open to your Honour to find on the materials that were before your Honour both in the proceedings leading to your Honour's decision in 6 and in the hearing leading to your Honour's decision in 9 - that the whole of Mrs Young's conspiracy construct was the product of Mr Newell's imagination - that is very clear from the evidence Mrs Young gave before your Honour in 2014 - and that the manner in which the case has been conducted, both the enormity of the allegations, the prolixity of the submissions, the vastness of the irrelevant evidence and Mr Newell's forensic decisions, are the very matters which have contributed to not only the fact that costs have been incurred but the fact that the case has been so painfully long and large. and 1. (T4.8.16, p124, LL19 - 24): In light of the findings in judgment 6 and the history of the litigation, there could be no reasonable basis upon which the lawyers could seriously be satisfied that they could promote an argument, the same argument, in pursuing a costs application against my clients - not only a costs application but an application for indemnity costs - on precisely the same grounds which had failed before your Honour at the trial.
Ms Horvath (for Hemmings) submits (pars 13 - 14, CB Vol 1, tab 2.2, fols 27 - 28): 13. Having regard to the conclusion in Young No.6 and the well known doctrine of abuse of process, the Practitioners could not have reasonably believed that applying the 'provable facts', to a 'reasonably arguable view of the law' meant that the Costs Motion had reasonable prospects of success. In commencing the Costs Motion and pursing it to finality, the Practitioners' actions were 'quite plainly unjustifiable'. 14. It might be put by the Practitioners that the [LPULA Act] has no application because the Costs Motion was not a claim for damages. Any such submission should be rejected. Whilst brought as a motion for costs, it was in fact a claim for damages by reason of the claimed conspiracy. That was the reason the Practitioners wanted an order for pleadings and for the matter to be listed for hearing for a minimum of 10 days .... That is also apparent from a review of the evidence and submissions relied upon by the applicant ....

H: The Law of Indemnity Costs

In Styles v Wollondilly Shire Council (No.3) [2001] NSWLEC 133, I set out (at [6] - [14]) a summary of the relevant principles for the awarding of indemnity costs: 6. Essentially, orders for costs are compensatory, not punitive. Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534. 7. So, in what circumstances are costs orders, therefore, to be made on an indemnity basis? 8. The cases require the court, in its costs discretion, to conclude somewhat along the following lines: • The case is "manifestly hopeless" or "demonstrably devoid of merit", and the relevant party either should, if properly advised, have known it had "no chance of success", had some "ulterior motive", or chose to wilfully disregard relevant facts or clear law. They are the concepts in Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397. OR· • The relevant party relied upon a "false and deliberately concocted" claim or defence - that was Holland J's finding in Degmam Pty Ltd v Wright No.2 [1983] 2 NSWLR 354 - or the party's conduct was "ethically or morally delinquent" - Rosniak v GIO (1997) 41 NSWLR 608. OR· • The case was continued after it patently became totally hopeless and pointless, such as when the fire-damaged building was demolished in Carver & Anor v Bankstown City Council [1999] NSWLEC 130 (my judgment delivered 27 April 1999). OR· • In the context of failure to settle, the courts have adopted the test of whether it was "unreasonable" of the relevant party to continue after the relevant offer was made and refused. 9. The court has today been referred to a number of authorities within and outside this court. 10. Many involve proceedings not relevantly similar to this court's class 4 jurisdiction, such as those in class 3 encroachment cases, where there is a specific statutory provision, and a practice discretion to be considered and applied (see e.g. my judgment in McKinnon v Hallbridge, No 30148 of 1997, 10 July 1998), but the principles I have just summarised are clearly established and frequently applied by Judges in the exercise of their "discretion at large" (as Hamilton J described it in Aghajanian v Stanley Thompson Valuers Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 215). See e.g. Einfeld J in Christofidellis v Zdrilic [2000] FCA 679, adopted and applied by Cowdroy J in the class 4 case Port Stephens Council v Randell [2000] NSWLEC 169. 11. I have been referred also to the Court of Appeal decision in Nobrega v The Catholic Church [1999] NSWCA 133 (see Powell JA at par 21), in which I note that the court adopted the caution of Shepherd J in Sanko Steamship Company Ltd v Sumitomo Australia Ltd (unreported, Federal Court, 7 February 1996) that even a "true" Calderbank letter should not be regarded as the automatic trigger for the subsequently successful party to secure an order for indemnity costs. 12. Each case turns on its own facts, as they may be found to display the reasonableness or otherwise of the parties' conduct. 13. So far as this court is concerned, although written in a class 3 encroachment case, I can find no fault or shortcoming in the statement of the appropriate principles by Lloyd J in his recent and considered judgment on costs in Hofer v Howell Developments Pty Ltd [No.2] [2001] NSWLEC 42. 14. I conclude, therefore, that there must be at least circumstances which are "out of the ordinary", such as an element of abuse of process, ulterior or extraneous purposes, or unreasonableness. See MGICA v Kenny & Good [No.4] (1996) 140 ALR 707 and Hofer at par 17. As Gummow & Gaudron JJ called it, in Oshlack v Richmond River (1998) 193 CLR 72 (at 89 - par 44), a "relevant delinquency on the part of the unsuccessful party".
Campbell J stated the principles, to similar effect, in Hypec Electronics Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v Mead (2004) 61 NSWLR 169, at [40] - [46]. Although there was a successful appeal in that case - Mead v Watson as Liquidator for Hypec Electronics (2005) 23 ACLC 718; [2005] NSWCA 133 - there was no challenge, on appeal, to His Honour's statement of the principles, and the Court of Appeal said ([8] - [10]): 8 The primary judge set out these principles in [40]-[46] inclusive of the costs judgment and there is no challenge to their accuracy. In summary, although the discretion to award indemnity costs is absolute and unfettered, it must be exercised judicially in the sense that there is some special or unusual feature in the case justifying such an award. Thus, for instance and relevantly, the discretion is enlivened where a party persists in what should have been seen to be a hopeless case. 9 Furthermore, the impugned conduct of the party against whom such an award of indemnity costs is sought must be connected with the litigation itself. In particular, it must be related to the way the litigation is conducted. It is thus insufficient that the party against whom the award is sought has engaged in unconscionable conduct or breaches of fiduciary duty in a particularly deplorable way. The latter conduct comprises the subject matter of the litigation rather than a delinquency in its conduct. Thus, as Lindgren J observed in NMFM Property Pty Limited v Citibank Limited (No 11) (2001) 109 FCR 77 at 92, "In my opinion, there is no counterpart ordinary rule that in the absence of special circumstances indemnity costs will be ordered where the losing party was guilty of ethical or moral delinquency in the antecedent facts which have given rise to the litigation. … The conduct of the party that is relevant to the issue of indemnity costs is the party's conduct as litigant." 10 It follows from the foregoing, and the primary judge acknowledged, that indemnity costs could only be awarded in the costs proceedings if there was found to be inappropriate conduct on the part of Hypec or Mr Watson in the conduct of the litigation itself.
Mr Lim's submissions (for Brearley (11R) at pars 14 to 18), outline the principles in these terms: Costs on an indemnity basis 14 There must be a "sufficient or unusual feature" or "relevant delinquency" to justify awarding costs on an indemnity basis: Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 233; Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72. 15 It is well-recognised that indemnity costs may be awarded in cases where there is no chance of success: Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 12 at [4]. This includes where the matters raised have been previously decided: Bayne v Blake (No 3) (1909) 9 CLR 366. 16 It is equally well-recognised that indemnity costs may be awarded in cases that are an abuse of process: Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ted Manny Real Estate Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 359. 17 Indemnity costs may also be appropriate in cases involving unfounded allegations of fraud or improper conduct: Maule v Liporoni (No 2) (2002) 122 LGERA 216. 18 For the reasons advanced above ..., this is a case attracting the well-known bases for awarding costs on an indemnity basis. The interests of justice favour Mr Brearley being fully indemnified for the costs he has incurred in responding to the applicant's costs motion.
In Elbaf v Kayellou [2015] NSWLEC 81, I applied the principles I had earlier stated in Styles, and I see no reason to depart from them as a summary of the appropriate test to apply in the present case.
Hopelessness of proceedings, and even a proliferation of unnecessary, inappropriate, and/or premature interlocutory applications, were not sufficient to tilt the interests of justice in the direction of indemnity costs in Metsikas v Quirk [2010] NSWSC 756.
However, Mr Lim argues (par 18) that this present case satisfies all the "well known bases for awarding costs on an indemnity basis", and I agree.

I: Two Questions of Jurisdiction

Two jurisdictional questions have been raised: (a) Mr Lim (for Brearley (11R)) argued, and Mr Faulkner (for Davies (8R)) suggested (par 22), without fully arguing the point, that the Court had an implied (or inherent?) jurisdiction to make personal orders against the lawyers; and (b) Dr Berveling (for Tuxworth (13R)) argued that the Court may have jurisdiction to order costs against the lawyers pursuant to some "damages" power.

(a) Implied or Inherent Jurisdiction?

Jurisdictional issue (a) can be quickly despatched.
Mr Lim submitted (CB Vol 3, tab 6.2, fols 1027 - 1028, pars 4 to 6): 4 The [LEC] has the jurisdiction vested in it by the [the Court Act] and any other Act. That vesting of jurisdiction carries with it an implied jurisdiction to supervise the legal practitioners who appear before it in matters within its jurisdiction. Section 98 of the [CP Act] applies to Class 4 proceedings in the LEC: s 4(1) and Sched 1 of the [CP Act]. That section confers on the LEC the widest discretion to determine costs in a proceeding. In exercising the discretion, the Court is expressly authorised to "take into account any failure" by a solicitor or barrister to comply with his or her obligation not to cause a party to be put in breach of its duty to assist the court to further the overriding purpose of facilitating the just, quick, and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceeding: s 56(5) of the [CP Act]. The wide discretion conferred by s 98, informed by s 56(5), and coupled with the implied jurisdiction to supervise the legal practitioners who appear before it, is sufficiently ample to authorise the making of personal costs orders against legal practitioners. 5 The power is analogous to that exercised by the Supreme Court in its own supervisory jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court's power may also be an incident of its inherent jurisdiction, there is no reason to think that the power is any more confined in the LEC simply because it arises an incident of an implied jurisdiction. 6 In particular, the power is not limited by s 99 of the [CP Act]. Although that section deals in terms with costs orders against legal practitioners, it is limited in its scope and does not disclose any intention to remove or restrict the other powers of the LEC: "It is quite inappropriate to read provisions conferring jurisdiction or granting powers to a court by making implications or imposing limitations which are not found in the express words": ... Re Felicity; FM v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (No 4) [("Felicity")] [2015] NSWCA 19 at [20].
However, Mr Lim conceded, in oral argument (Tp68, LL1 - 15), that I would need to depart from a decision of a former Chief Judge of this Court, McClellan J, in order to uphold the submission.
Ironically, the relevant decision was His Honour's costs finding in the first Young v King judgment in this Court ([2004] NSWLEC 93), which predated the CP Act.
His Honour said (at [84] - [85]): 84 The Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) makes express provision for the Supreme Court to make an order directing a solicitor to indemnify any party in relation to costs: see s 76C. Express provision for liability of a solicitor is also made in the Supreme Court Rules 1970 in Part 52A rule 43 in circumstances where costs are incurred improperly or without reasonable cause, or are wasted by undue delay or by any other misconduct or default, and it appears to the court that a solicitor is responsible. Provisions to that effect are not found in [the Court Act], although s 69(2) provides that the court may, subject to the rules and any other Act, determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid. This power has been interpreted and applied as permitting the court to make orders for indemnity costs and to order non- parties to proceedings to bear a costs burden. 85 Without traversing the principles upon which the latter decisions are based (see Wyong Shire Council v Smith unreported, NSWLEC, Bignold J, 24 December 1992; Tinda Creek Spiritual & Environment Centre v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 432), I am satisfied that a power to make an order in relation to a solicitor is not presently available to a judge of this Court. The Supreme Court has a supervisory role in relation to legal practitioners and their professional conduct. This Court is a court of statutory jurisdiction and, although it has implied powers - some refer to them as inherent powers (see Logwon Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 33 NSWLR 13) - on any view, they do not extend to the supervision of the conduct of the legal profession. Accordingly, insofar as that rule underpins any capacity in the Supreme Court to order a solicitor to pay the costs of proceedings, it is not available to this Court. In my opinion, before such an order could be made, express statutory provision would be necessary.
I believe that His Honour was correct.
I, therefore, respectfully adopt his finding, and choose not to depart from it.
Accordingly, I reject Mr Lim's and Mr Faulkner's submissions, insofar as they urge me to rely upon the "implied jurisdiction basis" for making costs orders in the circumstances of the present case.

(b) Costs as Damages?

Jurisdictional issue (b) concerns the line of authority on the question of this Court's power (if any) to award damages, a line in which a key decision is that of the Court of Appeal in National Parks and Wildlife Services v Stables Perisher Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 573; (1990) 71 LGRA 286, which predated the enactment of s 16(1A) of the Court Act ([35] above).
In this case, submissions were made by some of the non-party costs claimants that Young's costs claims against them were, in reality, claims for damages, based on the conspiracy she alleges, but "cloaked" in claims for costs.
In that submission, the non-parties become parties to the case by virtue of Young's NOM, which should be seen as "originating process" against them.
Young's claims were rejected by this Court as abuses of process.
However, Dr Berveling (for Tuxworth (13R)), in the context of his LPULA submissions, appeared to put an argument (in his Reply submissions, at pars 7(c)(ii)(c), and 7(c)(ii)(e)(ii)) that, as the costs orders sought by the respondents, are "compensatory in nature" (Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; [1990] HCA 59, and see also Oshlack), they would fall squarely within the definition of "damages", as such a costs order "seeks to remedy the detriment arising from legal costs incurred in successfully defending (or fending off) proceedings" (being Young's costs claims).
Mr Lloyd took that submission seriously enough to respond to it (Tpp72 - 74), but there are, indeed, many judicial pronouncements, albeit some of them obiter, which indicate that the argument should not be entertained.
By way of examples: 1. In Harley v McDonald [2001] 2 AC 678, the Privy Council was keen ([51]) to separate the jurisdiction to award costs from the jurisdiction to discipline lawyers, and/or from the jurisdiction to determine if there might be a cause of action against them in negligence, saying (at [52]): ... the distinction which must always be observed between these different processes is fundamental to a proper understanding of the limits of the inherent summary jurisdiction of the court. The court's only concern when it is exercising this jurisdiction is to serve the public interest in the administration of justice. 1. Giles JA said, in Harrison v Schipp [2001] NSWCA 13 (at [136]): ... unconscionable conduct ... leads to compensatory or other relief and costs on the normal basis, and more must be established for a special order as to costs"; 1. Barrett J, in Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2) ("Degiorgio") (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3 (at [15] - but see also [13] and [14]), suggested that a "claim for damages" submission, such as has been made in the present case, was "not a question that need be addressed" in that case; 2. McColl JA said in Yu v Cao ("Yu v Cao") [2015] NSWCA 276 (at [147]): "the determination of costs is a summary procedure, not necessarily subject to all the rules that would apply in an action"; and 1. When dealing with an argument about the "reasonable prospects" provisions in the Legal Profession Act 2004, Katzmann J said in Grabovsky v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2015] FCA 244 (at [51]): First, they apply to claims for damages and defences to those claims. The application in the AAT was an application to review a decision that Mr Grabovsky be refused a disability support pension. Mr Grabovsky argued that he had suffered damage because he was penalised in costs and denied a pension. Be that as it may, that does not make his application in the AAt or his appeal from the AAT's decision a claim for damages. Mr Grabovsky's application in the AAT was an application to review a decision of an administrative decision-maker. It was not a claim for damages. Neither was the appeal to this Court.
The costs discretion is not "unfettered, ... and must be exercised judicially and in accordance with general legal principles pertaining to the law of costs", including consideration of "the interests of justice": per Mason CJ and Deane J, Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd ("Knight") (1992) 174 CLR 178, at 192.
Like Barrett J in Degiorgio, I have no need to go beyond the established "general legal principles", the relevant statutory provisions, and consideration of "the interests of justice", to decide the present costs motions.
Hence, I will not entertain the "costs as damages" ground.
I turn, therefore, in the next section of these reasons, to examine the costs provisions in the CP Act, upon which these motions most relevantly fall to be assessed.

J: Sections 98 and 99 of the CP Act

Section 98 ([42] above) is patently a general costs power, and is so applied in this Court on a daily basis.
Section 99 ([42] above), equally clearly, deals only with those cases where there is some fault to be found on the part of a legal practitioner.
As Mr Faulkner (for Davies (8R)) said (T4.8.16, p114, LL16 - 21): The two provisions address different situations. Section 99 has to do with the competence, the neglect, the improper conduct of legal practitioners, who have special duties, and s 98 deals with all third parties and the circumstances in which costs orders might be made against them, and there's no reason to think why s 98 does not apply of all the world just to solicitors.
I agree with that submission, and with those I will next quote from his written submissions.
Mr Faulkner submitted (CB Vol 2, tab 4.2, at fol 722 - 724, pars 17 - 21): 17. For the purposes of section 99: (a) the reference to "neglect" (or "negligence") is to be understood in an untechnical way to denote a failure to act with the competence reasonably to be expected of ordinary members of the profession; (b) the reference to "improper" means improper according to the consensus of professional (including judicial) opinion and does not require breach of a professional code of conduct; (c) the reference to "without reasonable" (or "unreasonable") means vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference whether it occurs by excessive zeal and not by improper motive. 18. Given Ms Young's costs application was funded (sic) on very serious allegations which were hopeless and an abuse of process, the bringing of the application is correctly described as: (a) serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct by the Firm; or (b) improper, in circumstances for which the Firm is responsible; or (c) without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which the Firm is responsible, 19. Mr Davies' costs to his legal advisors where (sic) directly caused by Ms Young making her costs application and therefore the Court's power to make an order against the Firm under section 99(2)(c) is enlivened. 20. The power is discretionary. It ought to be exercised in this case. Factors favouring the exercise of the discretion include: (a) Mr Newell knew the costs application was based on precisely the same matters as had already been decided by the Court in July 2015; (b) the application was an abuse of the Court's process by reason of Rippon v Chilcotin [Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198; [2001] NSWCA 142]; (c) no substantive submissions were made against this particular defect; (d) because of the abuse of process, the application was hopeless; (e) the bringing of hopeless application (even on instructions) was a breach of the Firm's duty to the Court under section 56 of the [CP Act], to which regard must be had when exercising the discretion under section 99; (f) the application was founded upon very serious allegations which the Firm had a duty to the Court not to bring unless there was a proper basis for them, which there was not; (g) the application was made against 18 respondents, was estimated by Mr Newell to take 10 days to hear and was supported by 258 pages of written submissions and more than 10 lever arch fodders (sic) of evidence, which foretold the appalling waste of resources, including Court resources, caused by the application; and (h) from the outset Mr Muriniti has been aware of the personal costs consequences of pursuing Ms Young's costs application. The solicitors acting for Mr Tuxworth raised the possibility in correspondence on 7 September 2015. The Kings raised it in Court on 10 September 2015. Mr Muriniti recorded his awareness of the personal costs implications in his email to the Court on 4 November 2015. 21. It may be accepted that a costs order will not be made against solicitors personally merely because they have acted on an application which did not succeed. However, where the case is an abuse of process, such a costs order may be made. Pertinently to this case, such an order may be made where: (a) the proceedings seek to evade rules intended to safeguard the interests of justice - the rule against collateral attacks on judgements (sic) is such a rule; or (b) the proceedings are brought without any, or any proper consideration to the prospects of success - it may be inferred that that is what happened here given the failure by the Firm to address the principles governing costs orders against non-parties and abuse of process in Ms Young's submissions in chief.

K: "Parallel" Judicial Consideration of Young's Litigation

On 10 June 2016, in judgment No 10, which dealt with applications by Young and her lawyers for a stay, I referred to a judgment, delivered on 29 April 2016 by the Federal Circuit Court, in an unsuccessful challenge by Young to a bankruptcy notice issued to her by Perrens, and his employer, in respect of costs ordered in their favour by Garling J in Young v Hones (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 499: Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 989, per Smith J (see also [83] above).
I referred (No 10, at [58] - [61]) to Smith J's comments regarding Young's "underlying allegation of conspiracy". His Honour said (at [18] - my emphasis) that: ... It is unarguable and should not, on any view, have ever been argued by members of the legal profession. Justice Sheahan was correct to find that the application for costs was an abuse of process.
Later, His Honour said (at [23] - again my emphasis): This application was ill-conceived, ill-prepared and poorly presented. Mr Newell, who has represented the applicant in numerous cases in numerous jurisdictions since 2008, and who appeared for her in these proceedings submitted that the matter was complicated and difficult. He was wrong. It is simple. There is no evidence of a conspiracy of any sort and no basis whatsoever for setting aside the bankruptcy notice. The application is dismissed.
Since I reserved this present judgment, the NSW Court of Appeal has dismissed Young's appeals (see [11] above, and [152]ff below), at least in so far as they involved the Kings.
Also, the Federal Court has rejected an application by Young for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Smith J.
Insofar as those two decisions might bear upon this Court's consideration of the serious step of making personal costs orders against Young's lawyers, some of the Court's remarks should be noted.

The Federal Court

The Federal Court "extension of time" application was decided by Bromwich J on 30 September 2016: Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1176.
His Honour found ([6]) that Young's proposed appeal against Smith J's decision had a "complete lack of merit", and ([7]) "no realistic prospect of success".
His Honour noted the unsupported assertion by Young that her own costs were a "remarkable" $3 million ([48] and [74]), to which she claimed an entitlement because of "a wildly improbable conspiracy", of which there is no evidence (see also [65]).
His Honour said (at [25]), in respect of Young's 20 August 2015 costs NOM, that: ... The applicant (and her lawyers) treated the leave granted to file notices of motion to seek a different costs order as a result of the applicant's motion failing as a means of seeking to have all 18 respondents pay her costs of the entire L&E Court proceedings. This application was plainly beyond the evident purpose and intention of the stay of the costs orders made against the applicant by Sheahan J on 9 July 2015. and (at [28]): ... it is difficult to see how any competent lawyer could ever imagine that to respond to failing on a motion by seeking costs against persons who were not parties to that motion, or indeed to those proceedings, was appropriate in the circumstances of that case. That is not to say that third party costs orders can never be made, but rather no attempt appears ever to have been made to establish a proper factual or legal foundation for such an application.
His Honour attempted (at [30]ff) to summarize Young's conspiracy/collusion arguments, and commented (at [34]): Mr Newell's argument about what the terms of the undertaking in fact meant, the work that was in fact required to be carried out to address the problem created by excavation, and the material difference between the two, entails understanding some convoluted, and indeed confusing, arguments advanced by him. Those arguments were disjointed, laced with technical terms and asserted regulatory and other legal and technical requirements, and were very difficult to follow, let alone understand. I do not consider that I need to become a de facto L&E Court judge and attempt to decide whether this threshold argument is correct or not. and (at [37]f): 37 ... the applicant's case before the primary judge [(Smith J)] and before this Court relied upon the only reasonable explanation for the terms of the undertaking that she regarded not just as unsatisfactory, but fraudulent, being a collusion between not just her neighbours, their lawyers, and their expert witness in achieving an unduly favourable outcome against her, but also involving her own lawyers, her own expert witness and his employer company (who together are the present respondents), officers of the local council and others. That alleged collusion has been advanced on the applicant's behalf as being in the nature of a conspiracy to defraud her of what she was entitled to obtain from her success in the L&E Court proceedings. 38 During the course of the hearing of this application for an extension of time I repeatedly indicated to Mr Newell that he would need to satisfy me that there was a proper factual foundation for drawing the necessary inference as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy and that it was up to him on behalf of his client to make good that claim, at least to the point of it being an arguable or prima facie case. Mr Newell's argument seemed to be largely based upon an assertion that the series of events that had taken place leading up to the settlement of the L&E Court proceedings in 2004, including in particular the terms of the undertaking when compared to work that actually needed to be carried out, were so unreasonable and unacceptable and involved such a measure of departure between what the applicant thought she was settling the case for and what she was in fact settling the case for, that this could only be explained by a wide-ranging and extraordinary conspiracy or collusion.
His Honour then commented (at [40]ff): 40 ... I have used the term "arguable case" and not just "prima facie case", because pointing to a bare prima facie case alleging conspiracy may not suffice to support the grant of an extension of time. In the result, that distinction did not need to be decided because not even a prima facie case was established for the existence of a conspiracy, and thus there could not be any arguable case. 41 During oral submissions, in common with the prior written submissions signed by Mr Muriniti, Mr Newell devoted most of his time to the intricacies of the problems with the applicant's property caused by the excavation next door, why the works contemplated by the undertaking were incapable of remedying those problems, and the disparate things that were said by various people on that topic at the time and since then. It seems that this was done in order to prove the existence of a conspiracy by reverse engineering the existence of that conspiracy as being the only explanation for this disparity. Repeated requests made to Mr Newell to identify any basis for a conspiracy beyond this were to no avail. The case for a conspiracy at no time rose higher than an assertion that collusion in the nature of a conspiracy was the only explanation for what had happened. It never got close to even the barest of prima facie cases, and certainly never came close to excluding a range of possible innocent explanations, such as mistake or miscommunication, or even adverse conduct by the neighbours and their advisors independently, relevantly, of the respondents. 42 The applicant, both in this Court and before the primary judge, has therefore failed at the first hurdle of showing any proper basis for inferring the existence of the conspiracy that she relied upon. That is so both to ground the costs application she needs to succeed in order to have a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the costs order upon which the bankruptcy notice was based, and, as a practical matter, to ground the abuse of process argument based on the alleged collateral purposes behind the bankruptcy notice. The applicant did not even get to the point of excluding other reasonable explanations for how the undertaking underpinning the 2004 Consent Orders was arrived at so as to mislead her as these were not even addressed, let alone displaced. There has not been placed before me a single scrap of evidence capable of demonstrating the existence of a conspiracy, in the sense of supporting the reading of anything extra into the face of the events, documents and transactions to which I was referred, let alone one to which the present respondents were either a party, or in some way accessories. Indeed the allegation of conspiracy or collusion does not appear to have any factual foundation at all. 43 It simply will not do for any party in litigation to make such serious allegations upon nothing more substantial than a bare assertion that this is the only possible explanation for what has transpired. It is no answer to say, as Mr Newell did, that the alleged conspiracy was only the factual matrix relied upon to ground the applicant's entitlement to costs, so as to establish a prima facie or arguable case for the likely existence of a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the costs order upon which the bankruptcy notice was based. ... 45 The success of the application for an extension of time to bring an appeal against the decision of the primary judge ultimately depended on demonstrating that such a conspiracy exists, and then in demonstrating how it entitles the applicant to the relief she now seeks in this Court. The applicant's central problem is that the conspiracy she alleges has never risen above a theory, and a mostly fanciful theory at that. Unfortunately, the applicant's lawyers have fuelled this conspiracy theory and appear to be resolutely convinced of its existence as the only explanation they can find for their lack of success in acting for the applicant over many years. 46 The balance of these reasons proceed on the basis of the finding that I have made that no prima facie or arguable case has been established for the existence of the conspiracy upon which the applicant relies, nor of any like impropriety by way of collusion or otherwise on the part of the respondents in contributing to the process by which the undertaking, including its terms, came to be given by the applicant's neighbours as part of the making of the 2004 Consent Orders. It follows that I have independently reached the same conclusion as the primary judge that no conspiracy has been proven.
His Honour then analysed Smith J's reasoning, noting (at [51]): The primary judge concluded by characterising the applicant's case as ill-conceived, ill-prepared and poorly presented. Rather than being complicated and difficult as asserted, the primary judge stated that the matter was simple as there was no evidence of a conspiracy of any sort as relied upon by the applicant and no basis whatsoever for setting aside the bankruptcy notice.
Bromwich J went on to deal (at [52] - [92]) with the hearing before him, in respect of the fifteen grounds Young relied upon for her extension of time. In doing so, His Honour expressed the view (at [63]) that Young's appeal to the Court of Appeal against my judgment No 6 had "at best, very poor prospects of success", and (at [64]) that: The failed application to seek costs of the L&E Court proceeding at large as against non-parties, including the present respondents, decided by Young v King (No 9) was hopelessly misconceived and doomed to failure. I can see no realistic possibility of the applicant's Court of Appeal proceedings in relation to Young v King (No 9) succeeding. I can discern no error on the part of the primary judge in forming the same view. That is because the suggested counter-claim, set-off or cross demand relied upon the applicant succeeding in convincing the Court of Appeal that: (1) she should have been granted a costs order in her favour following her failed application for interlocutory relief, without being able to point to any other outcome in her favour in the L&E Court proceedings to ground an application for costs; and (2) the costs order should have extended beyond the parties to the interlocutory application to the respondents (and to 16 others), despite them not having been parties to the failed application or to the prior proceedings in the L&E Court, and despite the L&E Court judge finding that the costs application was an abuse of process.
Finding no sound basis for extending the time in which Young should file her appeal against Smith J's decision, Bromwich J added these comments "on legal representation" (at [93] - [94]): 93 The asserted conspiracy underlying this litany of litigation has never risen above a conspiracy theory, in the pejorative sense in which that term is used in common parlance. It is unfortunate, but perhaps understandable, that a lay person seeking to explain to themselves and those closest to them an undesirable outcome might assume the worst and, by a process of reverse engineering, conclude that this is the only explanation for what has happened. In the hands of a legal practitioner such fevered imaginings are unacceptable. Courts are entitled to expect that lawyers acting for litigants will remain dispassionate, and examine what is before them calmly and rationally and have proper regard to what can be proved and not merely asserted. Of equal importance, members of the public are also entitled to expect those qualities of their lawyers. 94 The conduct of the applicant's solicitors in this matter can only be described as reprehensible. The way in which the application has been brought in the Federal Circuit Court and in this Court is a matter that should be considered by the appropriate regulatory authority for the legal profession. Due regard may also need to be had to the conduct of the litigation in the L&E Court, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal that preceded the applications before the primary judge and before me. I will therefore direct the District Registrar of this Court to provide a copy of these reasons to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal

On 19 October 2016, the New South Wales Court of Appeal published its judgment on Young's appeals against my judgments Nos 6 and 9 ([2016] NSWCA 282 - see also [11] and [140] above).
In that Court's principal judgment, Emmett AJA said (at [90] to [98]): 90 The entire thrust of the complaints made by Mrs Young, through her counsel, is directed at the conduct of her legal advisors and witnesses in 2004. There is not a skerrick of evidence of the conspiracy hinted at by Mrs Young involving: • Mr and Mrs King and their advisors; • Mrs Young's former advisors; and • the Council. Despite the very extensive and unnecessarily complex allegations of fraud, which are set out briefly above and more fully in the schedule to these reasons, there is nothing to link those advising Mrs Young with either Mr and Mrs King and their advisors or the Council. The allegation of a conspiracy involving Mrs Young's advisors is completely without foundation in the evidence and should never have been made. The primary judge said as much in his reasons. His Honour was not directed to any evidence of conspiracy involving Mrs Young's advisors. There was simply assertion after assertion without reference to any evidentiary support. 91 In those circumstances, Mrs Young was bound by the actions of her advisors. There has never been any suggestion that Mr Hones, Mr Hemmings or Dr Perrens acted without authority. Mr Hones was instructed by Mrs Young to act for her in the Original Proceedings. Mr Hones delivered a brief on hearing to Mr Hemmings. There is not a skerrick of evidence to suggest that either of them exceeded their authority in negotiating the Settlement Agreement and asking McClellan CJ to make the Original Orders. 92 Mrs Young has had ample opportunity to adduce such evidence as she wished as to any mistake on the part of her legal advisors. There was no evidence of any mistake. There is no evidence that Mr Hones or Mr Hemmings was under any misapprehension as to the existence of a valid discharge point, such as is alleged on the part of Mrs Young. 93 No basis whatsoever has been advanced in support of a contention that the primary judge acted in accordance with a wrong principle or ignored relevant material or decided on the basis of a misapprehension of the facts, in exercising his discretion to refuse Mrs Young the opportunity of calling Mr Hones, Mr Hemmings, Dr Perrens and Mr Warwick Davies. His Honour explained in some detail the indulgences that had been given over and over again to Mrs Young and her advisors. There is no basis upon which this Court could conclude that the primary judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in declining to issue subpoenas and setting aside other subpoenas directed to Mr Hones, Mr Hemming, Dr Perrens and Mr Warwick Davies, especially given the aforementioned procedural history immediately preceding the hearing before his Honour. It follows that there is no basis for admitting fresh evidence on the hearing before this Court. 94 Mrs Young is bound by the conduct of her advisors at the relevant time, acting within the scope of their authority. Whether or not Mrs Young has a cause for complaint against her advisors is not a matter that can be entertained in the proceedings presently before this Court. As I have indicated, she has, hitherto, been unsuccessful in pursing (sic) such a complaint. That is of no relevance to the present proceedings. 95 The primary judge made perfectly clear his reasons for rejecting Mrs Young's allegations of fraud, notably the lack of evidence of any real, probative value that would warrant a finding of fraudulent behaviour, especially given the Briginshaw [v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34] standard for proving serious allegations of fraud. There was no error on his Honour's part in that regard. Mrs Young's complaint concerning unilateral mistake is misconceived in circumstances where her legal advisors acted within the scope of their authority and there was no evidence of any mistake or misunderstanding on their part. 96 Regardless of whether or not there were representations made by Mr Griffiths, Mr Springett or Mr and Mrs King, and whether or not the representations were false or misleading, there is no basis whatsoever in the evidence for concluding that Mrs Young's advisors were induced to advise her to enter into the Settlement Agreement by reason of any misapprehension or misunderstanding of the facts on their part. 97 The final ground of appeal, that the cumulative effect of the several decisions of the primary judge gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the primary judge, is completely without substance. The ground amounts to nothing more than a complaint that Mrs Young has been completely unsuccessful in all of her various attempts to have the Original Orders set aside. While the 2012 Orders were held to have been made in error, by reason of a misapprehension as to the jurisdiction of the L&E Court, there can be no suggestion that a reasonable observer might have any concern that his Honour might not decide Mrs Young's case impartially. 98 It follows from the above that Mrs Young has not made out any grounds of appeal. It must also follow that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed and that the notice of appeal should be dismissed. Mrs Young should pay Mr and Mrs King's costs of both proceedings.

L: Consideration

I will not repeat what I have said in earlier judgments regarding personal costs orders (e.g. No 8, at [17] - [27]; No 9, at 82 - (viii), [84] - [87], and [108] - [113]; and No 10, at [7], and [35] - [40], but I must here expand upon those earlier comments.
In Knight, in 1992, the High Court held that a rule which gave a court the power, or a discretion, regarding the burden of costs (e.g. s 98(1) in [42] above) was wide enough to allow an order to be made against a non-party.
The majority agreed with the "broader approach" taken by the House of Lords in Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965, but stressed that the wide jurisdiction in this regard "must be exercised judicially and in accordance with general legal principles pertaining to the law of costs" (Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 455, per Lambert JA at 462).
In the leading judgment in Knight, Mason CJ and Deane J (with whom Gaudron J agreed) said (at 192 - 193): Obviously, the prima facie general principle is that an order for costs is only made against a party to the litigation. As our discussion of the earlier authorities indicates, there are, however, a variety of circumstances in which considerations of justice may, in accordance with general principles relating to awards of costs, support an order for costs against a non-party. Thus, for example, there are several long-established categories of case in which equity recognized that it may be appropriate for such an order to be made ... . For our part, we consider it appropriate to recognize a general category of case in which an order for costs should be made against a non-party ... Where the circumstances of a case fall within that category, an order for costs should be made against the non-party if the interests of justice require that it be made.
Dawson J reasoned differently but to the same effect, saying (at 202 - 203): The cases therefore establish a long-asserted jurisdiction to award costs in appropriate cases against a person who is not a party to the proceedings where that person is the effective litigant standing behind an actual party or where there has been a contempt or abuse of the process of the court. ... [T]he real litigant rather than the nominal party may be made liable for costs. ... The circumstances in which it would be appropriate to award costs to a non-party would necessarily be confined, but that is a question of discretion, not jurisdiction. I should add that the discretion to award costs is to be exercised judicially so that a person against whom costs may be awarded must, if not a party, be brought before the court. (See also the discussion of Knight by Basten JA in FPM Constructions Pty Ltd v The Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340.)
In introducing my consideration of the respondents' NsOM, for personal costs orders against Young's lawyers, I adopt the following statements of general principle by McColl JA, in 2015, in Yu v Cao (at [136] - [140], citations omitted): 136 Prima facie, an order for costs is only made against a party to the litigation. However, in the exercise of the Court's costs discretion pursuant to s 98, CPA (a discretion which is unfettered, save that it should be exercised judicially in accordance with general legal principles relating to the law of costs) an order for costs may be made against a non-party if, in the circumstances of the case, the interests of justice require that it be made. ... 137 The s 98 discretion is not subject to any express limitations. ... Such an order may be made "where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party, or some person on whose behalf he or she is acting or by whom he or she has been appointed, has an interest in the subject of the litigation." ... While some criteria have been identified as present when a non-party costs order is made, those criteria are not closed or exhaustive and it is not necessary for each to be present before a costs order may be made under s 98. ... 138 Non-party costs orders have been said to be exceptional. ... They should not be made where "an exercise of the jurisdiction against a non-party would be extravagant and unjust." ... Elsewhere it has been said that such applications should be treated "with considerable caution" ... and that the power should be "exercised sparingly." ... 139 "[E]xceptional in this context means no more than outside the ordinary run of cases where parties pursue or defend claims for their own benefit and at their own expense … [t]he ultimate question [being] whether in all the circumstances it is just to make the order." The power to order non-party costs "is inevitably to some extent a fact-specific jurisdiction and … there will often be a number of different considerations in play, some militating in favour of an order, some against." ... 140 As will be apparent from Knight, the non-party's connection to the proceedings is central to the inquiry whether a non-party costs order should be made. Further, there must be a causal connection between the actions of the non-party and the occasion for ordering costs. ...
Her Honour further said (at [156]) that "the overriding test is what the 'interests of justice' require".
The prospect that so-called "wasted costs", or "personal costs", orders might be sought and obtained against lawyers was recognised long before Yu v Cao.
The important English Court of Appeal decision Ridehalgh v Horsefield ("Ridehalgh") [1994] Ch 205 was made not so very long after Knight.
The Court noted (at 226) the "tension between two important public interests", namely, the importance of lawyers feeling no threat of a personal liability flowing from their representation of their clients, and the freedom of litigants from financial prejudice caused by the unjustifiable conduct of litigation by lawyers on either side.
The Court also accepted (p229) that the jurisdiction to make personal costs orders against lawyers should be "exercised with care and discretion and only in clear cases [where] ... the proceedings would be, or have become, an abuse of process of the court, or unjustifiably oppressive", and that "a solicitor against whom a claim is made must have a full opportunity of rebutting the complaint".
The Court also acknowledged that, in responding, the solicitor "may be hampered ... by his duty of confidentiality to the client".
McColl JA noted, in Kelly v Jowett (2009) 76 NSWLR 405 (at [61], citations omitted): The wasted costs jurisdiction is based on the court's right and duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors: ... The underlying principle is that the court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which the solicitor is engaged professionally. The jurisdiction is exercised where it is demonstrated that the solicitor has failed to fulfil his or her duty to the Court and to realise his or her duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of and is frequently exercised in order to compensate the opposite party in the action ...
Emmett JA, when giving the principal judgment (in which McColl and Macfarlan JJA concurred) in Nadarajapillai v Naderasa (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 209, said (at [9] - [17], citations omitted): 9 ... [T]his Court has a general power to make orders that a legal representative personally pay the opposing party's costs directly. That power arises out of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court with respect to legal practitioners admitted by the Court. That jurisdiction is not to be read down by reason of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act. ... The jurisdiction is exercised where it is demonstrated that a legal representative has failed to fulfil his or her duty to the Court and to realise his or her duty to aid in promoting, in his or her own sphere, the cause of justice. ... 10 In considering whether to order costs against a legal representative, it is necessary to balance carefully two different interests. The first is the public interest in maintaining and nurturing a legal profession that provides vigorous representation to litigants in court, uncompromised by a fear of personal sanctions for failure. The other is the public interest in the efficient administration of justice. The latter finds express recognition, in mandatory terms, in the overriding purpose provisions (ss 55-60) of the Civil Procedure Act. ... 11 Where, as here, the power sought to be invoked is that contained in s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act, the voluminous case law relating to the making of costs orders against legal practitioners in different statutory contexts is of less assistance than where, for example, an application is made solely on the basis of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction. ... Section 99 is described as applying where costs have been incurred "by the serious neglect, serious incompetence or serious misconduct of a legal practitioner", or "improperly, or without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which a legal practitioner is responsible". ... The (undefined) concepts in that subsection may be given meaning in the light of the discussion of the terms "improper", "unreasonable" and "negligent" in [Ridehalgh] as well as the principles collected in [Lemoto]. ... The power conferred in s 99 must also be understood in the context of the obligations contained in ss 56-60 of the Civil Procedure Act: for example, a solicitor must not, by his or her conduct, cause a party to breach the duty to assist the court to further the "overriding purpose", [12] and the court may take into account a failure to do so in exercising a discretion with respect to costs. ... 12 In the present proceedings, the Lender's Statement of Claim alleged that the Borrower was in default of his repayment obligations pursuant to a loan agreement and had ignored the Lender's demands for repayment. As a result of admissions made in the Borrower's Defence, the principal material fact in issue before the primary judge was whether the Lender had given the Borrower 90 days' notice before demanding repayment, as required by the loan agreement. The primary judge concluded on the evidence that the requisite notice had been given and that the Lender was entitled to verdict and judgment in an amount of $128,471.72. 13 The Notice of Appeal, filed on 23 June 2014, states that it was filed by the Borrower personally, and does not mention a legal representative. Mr Patel did not represent the Borrower before the District Court. However, Mr Patel told this Court that he believed that he prepared the grounds stated in the Notice of Appeal. ... The original appeal grounds included contentions that the primary judge had denied the Borrower natural justice and had failed to take into account all relevant facts and matters. The original written submissions filed in support of the Notice of Appeal, which were signed by Mr Patel, primarily criticised a perceived lack of particulars in the original pleadings, notwithstanding that that argument had not been raised before the primary judge, and notwithstanding that the Borrower's Defence admitted virtually all of the allegations made by the Lender in his Statement of Claim. The Borrower filed further written submissions dated 26 March 2015, also signed by Mr Patel, that canvassed similar arguments. 14 As I have said above, when the appeal was called on for hearing, Mr Patel sought to rely on amended grounds of appeal without supporting written submissions and without a satisfactory explanation for his application to rely on them. There was no substance to any of those new grounds of appeal, and Mr Patel's oral submissions in support of them were characterised by a persistent reticence to answer the Court's questions directly. The oral submissions were, as I have said, quite incomprehensible. 15 In his written submissions in opposition to the notice of motion, Mr Patel refers to his duty to present any argument that he believes is reasonably arguable in the best interests of his client, and states that it is not always easy to decide what is reasonably arguable and what is not. Mr Patel does not submit that he had advised the Borrower that the appeal to this Court had no prospects of success but that he had nevertheless been instructed to pursue the appeal. 16 If that were the case, different considerations may have arisen. However, even in that situation, the conduct of a legal practitioner in putting another party to expense unnecessarily and inappropriately may have constituted a breach of the practitioner's obligations under s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act. ... It may be that, in such circumstances, both the practitioner and the client would be liable for the costs thus incurred. ... 17 I consider that the conduct of Mr Patel, in instituting and maintaining an appeal that had no prospects of success, and no merit, constituted serious incompetence on his part as a legal practitioner and that costs have been incurred improperly and without reasonable cause, in circumstances for which he is responsible. Mr Patel should bear the costs that the Borrower was ordered to pay to the Lender.
As Pain J pithily observed, in NA & J Investments Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (No 2) ("NA & J") [2011] NSWLEC 98 (at [254]), "without s 99 an opposing party has no ability to recover costs wasted as a result of the conduct of the other party's lawyer".
However, as I noted in judgment No 10 (at [7]), echoing the English Court of Appeal's caution in Ridehalgh ([162] above), Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd ("Lemoto") (2006) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153 is authority for "courts to be extremely cautious and circumspect in considering the making of personal costs orders against legal practitioners ...".
I went on to examine Lemoto in some detail (No 10, at [35] - [40]): 35 Lemoto concerned an application for a personal costs order against a solicitor under Pt 11 Div 5C of the Legal Profession Act 1987. Such matters depend often upon disputes about the existence or perception of there having been "reasonable prospects of success", or not, when action was taken. The Court of Appeal was alive to the prospect that even the process of a Div 5C application can cause prejudice to the client who obtains such an order. 36 Ipp JA agreed with both Hodgson and McColl JJA, and added no comments of his own, but Hodgson JA agreed with McColl JA's lengthy judgment, adding only "a few comments" of his own, notably (at [5]) concerning how time-consuming, expensive, and complicated the necessary hearing(s) may be. 37 His Honour added (at [6]): Further, the whole process may be complicated by considerations of the interests of the party represented by the persons against whom an order is proposed. A s.198M order is, in itself, in the interests of that party, in that it may relieve that party of the costs of the proceedings; but the process of determining whether such an order should be made may be very much against that party's interests, by depriving that party of its legal advisers and thereby hindering proper consideration of the possibility of an appeal and the institution and conduct of an appeal, and also by giving rise to disclosure of privileged communications (which, even if it does not involve loss of the privilege for other purposes, could be to the detriment of that party). This may not be a serious difficulty if it is this party itself that applies for the s.198M order, because in that case the party chooses to subject itself to these possible disadvantages. But if, as in this case, the process is initiated by another party, or by the Court, the possible disadvantages to the party for whom the relevant legal services were provided need to be kept steadily in mind. 38 McColl JA noted (at [19]) that the legislative intention of Div 5C was, at least in part, to prevent "unmeritorious claims" and "spurious defences". 39 The factual history in Lemoto was very complex, and Her Honour went through it, and the history of the provisions, in painstaking detail. She cautioned several times that the discretion to make such serious orders must be exercised with "care", "discretion", "circumspection", and only "in clear cases", extending every element of natural justice to the practitioner involved - the order must be "just in all the circumstances" ([138]).
Although Lemoto concerned a different statutory regime from that in the present case, the following general observations made by McColl JA (at [189] - [196]), which I set out in No 10 at [40], are helpful: 189 First, the fact that Division 5C appears in legislation which makes elaborate provision in Part 10 for the discipline of legal practitioners suggests that Division 5C should not be invoked where the conduct impugned is "sufficiently egregious to give rise to a contention that a person is permanently, or at least indefinitely, unfit for practice": see New South Wales Bar Association v Murphy [2002] NSWCA 138; (2002) 55 NSWLR 23 at [5], [27] per Spigelman CJ. This tends to reinforce the proposition that the Division 5C power should be exercised with caution. 190 Secondly, no doubt Division 5C was introduced with the purpose of eliminating claims for damages which are not "fairly arguable". However, it runs the grave risk of becoming an instrument of injustice if not properly understood and applied. Division 5C requires the legal practitioner to form a belief about the prospects of success in circumstances where he or she is not merely considering the client's interests and the duty to the court, but will inevitably be concerned about his or her potential exposure to a personal costs orders. There is a real risk that the over-cautious will refuse to act, potentially depriving a client of an effective remedy. As Lord Steyn said in Medcalf [v Mardell ("Medcalf") [2002] UKHL 27; [2003] 1 AC 120] (at [42]):"The law reports are replete with cases which were thought to be hopeless before investigation but were decided the other way after the court allowed the matter to be tried." 191 Lord Steyn's observation highlights the necessity to approach a submission that a legal practitioner has contravened s 198J with considerable circumspection. It would be a sad consequence of Division 5C if it influenced legal practitioners to become "timorous souls" as opposed to "bold spirits": cf Candler v Crane Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 at 178 per Lord Denning. 192 Thirdly, because Division 5C operates at the fault line between a legal practitioner's duty to the Court and his or her duty to the client it has the potential to expose clients to unfortunate consequences. Thus in [Degiorgio], where the defendant sought costs on an indemnity basis not only from the unsuccessful plaintiff but also from his solicitor, the solicitor withdrew from the retainer immediately it became clear that an application for a costs order against him would be pursued. At the hearing on costs, the plaintiff appeared without legal representation and his former solicitor was represented by counsel. 193 There is a real risk if s 198M applications are made immediately after proceedings have concluded (which I accept is the most realistic time for any such application) that the client may be prejudiced if the legal practitioner ceases to act because of a perceived conflict of interest leaving the client unable to secure advice as to the prospects of a successful appeal from the person most familiar with the proceedings. 194 Fourthly, I share the concern expressed elsewhere of the risk of a practice developing whereby solicitors endeavour to browbeat their opponents into abandoning clients or particular issues or arguments for fear of personal costs orders being made against them: see Levick v Commissioner of Taxation [("Levick")] [[2000] FCA 674; (2000) 102 FCR 155] (at 166); Patrick v Capital Finance Corp (Australasia) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1249. 195 Finally, as I earlier noted, in [Ridehalgh] at 238 - 239, the Court of Appeal warned that judges "must be astute to control what threatens to become a new and costly form of satellite litigation". Despite this warning the House of Lords observed in Medcalf (at [13]):"… [T]he clear warnings given in [Ridehalgh] have not proved sufficient to deter parties from incurring large and disproportionate sums of costs in pursuing protracted claims for wasted costs, many of which have proved unsuccessful." 196 What has happened in this case is a salutary warning to courts to ensure that Division 5C applications do not assume a costly life of their own.
For completeness, I note that, during argument in the present costs proceedings, this Court was taken also to pars [123], [124], and [132] of McColl JA's judgment in Lemoto, and I should include those paragraphs here.
Her Honour said (in [123] and [124]): 123 The grave consequences to which Division 5C exposes a legal practitioner and his or her client indicates that "[t]he construction of the section and the application of the jurisdiction should … be no wider than is clearly required by the statute": cf Medcalf at [56] per Lord Hobhouse. 124 There are some general observations which can be made. First, Division 5C represents a departure from the historical basis upon which legal practitioners could be exposed to personal costs orders. A legal practitioner is now required to ensure that a claim, or a defence to a claim, for damages has "reasonable prospects of success" and, to that extent, to become a judge of the client's cause. The legislature has endorsed the proposition that it is not in the public interest, nor a function of the due administration of justice, for legal practitioners to provide legal services in circumstances which involve representing clients who wish to pursue or defend claims for damages which have no reasonable prospects of success.
Her Honour went on to refer to, and to quote at some length from, Barrett J's decision in Degiorgio. Barrett J said (at [17]): A helpful analysis of the elements underlying s.198M(1) is to be found in the judgment of Judge Neilson of the District Court of New South Wales in Momibo Pty Ltd v Adam (unreported, 31 August 2004). His Honour identified five such elements. The first is that reasonable belief (as subjectively held by the practitioner) encompasses the other four and entails a proposition or propositions that can be regarded as logically arguable in an objective sense. The second element is that the reasonable belief must have its objective foundation in material available to the practitioner at the relevant time, which material is not confied (sic) to admissible evidence as such and may extend to material that is credible but not strictly admissible. Third, it must be seen that the material thus identified constitutes a proper basis for alleging each relevant fact. Fourth, the claim must proceed according to a reasonably arguable view of the law, a matter not to be approached narrowly: arguably available extension and innovation may be contemplated. The fifth element is that there be reasonable prospects of damages being recovered in the action - not necessarily damages as claimed but some damages, however modest.
His Honour suggested: (a) (at [19]) - that "...a lawyer may with impunity act for a client in proceedings which are apparently hopeless, provided that the lawyer is not aware that the proceeding might amount to an abuse of process": (b) (at [21]) - that "[i]n some contexts, 'reasonable prospects of success' signifies no more than 'arguable'"; (c) (at [22]) - that "[i]t may also be said that 'reasonable prospects of success' connotes something less than likelihood of success; and (d) (at [23]) - that the term "reasonable prospects of success" means that the subject claim "is not hopeless or entirely without merit", or has "a real chance, a prospect that is strong enough to be acted on by a reasonable landlord minded to go ahead with plans which require permission, as opposed to a prospect that should be treated as merely fanciful or as one that should sensibly be ignored by a reasonable landlord. A reasonable prospect does not entail that it is more likely than not that permission will be obtained" (taken from Cadogan v McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd [2002] (sic ?) L&TR 249, at 253 - 4 per Saville LJ).
His Honour further suggested (at [24]) that the position taken should be "rationally based", and not "irrational, absurd or ridiculous", and went on to quote (at [26]) the following comments by Davies JA in Steindl Nominees Pty Ltd v Laghaifar [2003] 2 Qd R 683 (at 689): "... it is one thing to present a case which is barely arguable (but arguable nevertheless) but most likely to fail; it is quite another to present a case which is plainly unarguable and ought to be so to the lawyer who presents it. In my opinion, with respect, it is improper for counsel to present, even on instructions, a case which he or she regards as bound to fail because, if he or she so regards it, he or she must also regard it as unarguable."
Barrett J concluded (at [28]) by adopting "the construction of 'without reasonable prospects of success' that equates its meaning with 'so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable'. The concept is one that falls appreciably short of 'likely to succeed'".
McColl JA said of this analysis (Lemoto at [132]): 132 Barrett J's construction of the expression "without reasonable prospects of success" appears to me to accommodate both the purpose of Division 5C and to reflect the language of s 198J. The test, whether a claim or a defence was "so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable", must be applied, however, in the context of the constituent components of s 198J. In that context the question becomes whether the solicitor or barrister held a reasonable belief that the provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law meant that the prospects of recovering damages or defeating a claim or obtaining a reduction in the damages claimed were "fairly arguable". These are matters about which reasonable minds might differ. The question will be whether the solicitor or barrister's belief that they had material which objectively justified proceeding with the claim or the defence "unquestionably fell outside the range of views which could reasonably be entertained": Medcalf at [40] per Lord Steyn.
Mr Lloyd also drew attention to par [92] of Her Honour's judgment in Lemoto, viz (many citations omitted): 92 The new Division 5C should be construed against the background of the following principles which can be gleaned from the English and Australian authorities which have considered the power to order legal practitioners to pay the costs of proceedings in which they have represented parties: "(a) The jurisdiction to order a legal practitioner to pay the costs of legal proceedings in respect of which he or she provided legal services must be exercised 'with care and discretion and only in clear cases': Ridehalgh (at 229), ... ; (b) A legal representative is not to be held to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently simply because he or she acts for a party who pursues a claim or a defence which is plainly doomed to fail: Ridehalgh (at 233); [Medcalf] at [56] per Lord Hobhouse; White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) [("White")] (1998) 156 ALR 169 (affirmed on appeal, Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 773; (1999) 87 FCR 134); Levick ... ; (c) the legal practitioner is not 'the judge of the credibility of the witnesses or the validity of the argument': ... the legal practitioner is not 'the ultimate judge, and if he reasonably decides to believe his client, criticism cannot be directed to him': ... ; (d) A judge considering making a wasted costs order arising out of an advocate's conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the exigencies of acting in that environment; only when, with all allowances made, a legal practitioner's conduct of court proceedings is quite plainly unjustifiable can it be appropriate to make a wasted costs order: Ridehalgh (at 236, 237); (e) A legal practitioner against whom a claim for a costs order is made must have full and sufficient notice of the complaint and full and sufficient opportunity of answering it: ... Ridehalgh (at 229); (f) Where a legal practitioner's ability to rebut the complaint is hampered by the duty of confidentiality to the client he or she should be given the benefit of the doubt: ... Ridehalgh (at 229); in such circumstances '[t]he court should not make an order against a practitioner precluded by legal professional privilege from advancing his full answer to the complaint made against him without satisfying itself that it is in all the circumstances fair to do so': Medcalf [at [23] per Lord Bingham]; (g) The procedure to be followed in determining applications for wasted costs must be fair and 'as simple and summary as fairness permits … [h]earings should be measured in hours, and not in days or weeks … Judges … must be astute to control what threatens to become a new and costly form of satellite litigation': Ridehalgh (at 238 - 239); ... Medcalf (at [24])."
I respectfully adopt Her Honour's summary (in [92]).
However, I have independently reviewed many of the cases to which McColl JA referred in Lemoto (at [92]), and/or in Yu v Cao, and upon which counsel relied in argument in the present case.
In Felicity, a case in which s 99 was invoked, Basten JA said (at [14] - [15], and [18]): 14 What can be derived from the case law is important, but needs no anxious analysis of authority. It is that to order costs against a lawyer requires a careful balancing of the public interest in maintaining and nurturing a legal profession which provides vigorous representation for litigants in court, uncompromised by a fear of personal sanctions for failure, against the need to maintain and nurture the obligation to provide independent advice to litigants and to give proper weight to the public interest in the efficient administration of justice. It is this latter element of the public interest which finds express recognition, in mandatory terms, in the overriding purpose provisions of the Civil Procedure Act. 15 The power invoked in the present case is that contained in s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that that power must be read contextually, with explicit regard to ss 56-60 of the same Act and must be applied with explicit regard to those provisions in a specific factual context. Indeed, s 56(5) expressly empowers the court in exercising a discretion with respect to costs to take into account any failure to comply with the duty of a party or legal representative to assist the court to further the overriding purpose. ... 18 The absence of a basis in s 99 for an order that the solicitor pay the opposing parties directly, is not an end of the matter. There is a general power in this Court to make such orders in the supervisory jurisdiction with respect to legal practitioners admitted by the Court. ...
While Ridehalgh has been regarded since 1994 as a primary authority in this area of costs law, it has not been universally followed.
Pembroke J distinguished it in Ireland v Retallack (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 1096 (at [50] - [54]), but Pain J followed it in NA & J.
In Xabregas v The Owners - Strata Plan No. 79205; Moallem v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 1027, White J noted (at [61]) that Pembroke J had apparently not been referred to the NSW Court of Appeal's decision in Wentworth v Rogers [1999] NSWCA 403, in which the Court of Appeal considered rules of court similar in their terms to s 99(1), and said (at [41]): It follows that the Australian cases do not suggest that the general approach taken in England ought not to be followed here. ... [I]t is clear that there is no difference of substance in the approach taken in the United Kingdom and the approach taken here. Accordingly, the English authorities provide guidance for courts here in a matter such as this.
White J noted ([62]) that the then current Legal Profession legislation "imposed a more demanding standard on lawyers than was applicable in cases whereby a costs order was sought against a party's lawyer on general law principles ... [which] included the principles under s 99 of the Civil Procedure Act".
His Honour went on to conclude ([63]) that "it is not sufficient ... that the [relevant proceeding] ... had no reasonable prospects of success and was doomed to fail", and then added ([64]): These authorities do not distinguish between a case where the client acts on the advice of his solicitor or client and a case where the client is determined to proceed with a claim or defence that has no reasonable prospects of success contrary to legal advice. Given that there is a public policy in litigants having legal representation, there is less ground for making a solicitor or barrister liable for costs if he or she has advised the client against proceeding on a claim that is doomed to fail than if the client is acting on the lawyer's advice. But the reasoning in [Ridehalgh] is directed to whether the lack of reasonable prospects of success means that the claim or defence amounts to an abuse of process. As the Court of Appeal observed this is a question of degree. Acting for a client on a frivolous claim ... can expose the lawyers concerned to a personal costs order because the lawyers themselves could not have been satisfied that the points they raised were at least seriously arguable. ...
In Felicity, Basten JA found ([24]) that: The preferable course is that adopted in [Ridehalgh], ... addressing the power of the court to order costs against a solicitor personally where such costs had been incurred by a party "as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative" ...
Emmett JA agreed with Basten JA, and Ward JA found (at [48]): In the absence of any evidence that the legal practitioner had advised against raising the untenable arguments that were raised on this application, it can only be concluded that the costs of the proceedings have been incurred by the serious incompetence of the legal practitioner and it is appropriate that the legal practitioner bear the costs of the father and the Secretary in this Court.
I have earlier (at "(2)" in [127]) referred to Harrison v Schipp. In discussing the question of indemnity costs as a means of "restitution", Giles JA said, in that case, that ([136] - my emphasis): The unconscionable conduct or breach of fiduciary duty leads to compensatory or other relief and costs on the normal basis, and more must be established for a special order as to costs.
In many of the English and New South Wales cases I have mentioned already, there was: 1. a focus on not commencing cases with no reasonable prospects of success; 2. sensitivity to the need for care, discretion, caution, circumspection etc in deciding to invoke the "wasted costs" jurisdiction; and 3. the obligation to give the target of the proposed order a hearing.
However, there was also reliance on some evidence of neglect, incompetence, misconduct, impropriety, negligence, omission or unreasonableness, by way of "something more". Ridehalgh notes (at 233) that there can be overlap among these descriptions of "failure" or "shortcoming" on the part of the lawyer. The Court said: Conduct which is unreasonable may also be improper, and conduct which is negligent will very frequently be (if it is not by definition) unreasonable. We do not think any sharp differentiation between these expressions is useful or necessary or intended.
This concept of "more" needing to be established, in order to win a special order, has also been discussed at length in several cases in the Federal Court.
I turn now, therefore, to some relevant Federal Court decisions.
In doing so, I am conscious that s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 creates a subtly different costs regime, but aware also that the general law principles analysed in Federal cases can be very useful in this Court. For example, see pars [152] to [163] of my judgment in Friends of King Edward Park Inc v Newcastle City Council (No 3) [2016] NSWLEC 74, where I discussed, in a State context, Rares J's judgment in Probiotec Limited v The University of Melbourne [2008] FCAFC 5; 166 FCR 30; 244 ALR 96.
In White ("92(b)" in [179] above), Goldberg J found (p229) that a law firm had instituted a proceeding alleging fraud, "when there was no factual basis for that allegation and in respect of a cause of action which it believed could not be won", and proceeded to decide the question of costs on the basis of s 43, and the court's "ability ... to enforce duties owed by practitioners to the Court" when they "have acted with impropriety".
Goldberg J said that the jurisdiction "is compensatory rather than punitive or disciplinary" (c.f., e.g., Pain J's use of the word "penal" in NA & J at [131]), but His Honour agreed (p230) with Viscount Maugham in Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 (at 292), and other like decisions, that the jurisdiction "ought only to be exercised where there has been a 'serious dereliction of duty'", likely involving (p230) gross negligence or misconduct. "Commencing or maintaining proceedings which have no or substantially no prospect of success" is not sufficient, and "something more must be added to the equation ..." (pp231 and 236). His Honour said (at pp236 - 237): The authorities do not support the proposition that simply instituting or maintaining a proceeding on behalf of a client which has no or substantially no prospect of success will invoke the jurisdiction. There must be something more namely, carrying on that conduct unreasonably. It is not clear what is encompassed by ``unreasonably'' initiating or continuing proceedings if they have no or substantially no chance of success. It seems to me that it involves some deliberate or conscious decision taken by reference to circumstances unrelated to the prospects of success with either a recognition that there is no chance of success but an intention to use the proceeding for an ulterior purpose or with a disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of success. Expressing the principle this way accommodates the competing principle that a party is entitled to have a practitioner act for him or her even in an unmeritorious case. This principle was expressed succinctly in [Ridehalgh] ... ... [A] solicitor does not act improperly or in breach of his or her duty to the court by acting for a party with a hopeless case.
Such pronouncements force the courts to address questions of "reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" of the circumstances generated by the behaviour complained of. Goldberg J then described at some length (pp231 - 239) the facts of many cases, questions of reasonableness, and the concept of "something more".
His Honour found (pp248 - 249) that Flower & Hart had "unreasonably initiated" the proceedings, with the "ulterior purpose ... to postpone and delay an inevitable outcome ...", and "not to vindicate a right of [their] client". In so doing, the firm had "breached the duty it owed the court to conduct proceedings with propriety, not to be a party to an abuse of process, and not to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice". The firm's conduct was "oppressive", and "enlivened" the jurisdiction (p250) to order it to pay the costs of the opposing party (White), on an indemnity basis (pp251 - 252).
His Honour noted in White (p251 - my emphasis) that: The impetus for the institution of the proceedings came from the lawyers.
Essentially, that is what the present respondents allege in respect of Young's costs claims against them.
White, and the related case of Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd ("Caboolture") (1993) 45 FCR 224, were discussed by the Full Federal Court in Levick ("194" in [171] above).
The Court approved White, applied Caboolture, and endorsed again (at [43]) "the emphasis on caution in making orders against solicitors". The Court then said (at [44] - [45]) that: 44 ... it is equally important to uphold the right of a court to order a solicitor to pay costs wasted by the solicitor's unreasonable conduct of a case. What constitutes unreasonable conduct must depend upon the circumstances of the case; no comprehensive definition is possible. In the context of instituting or maintaining a proceeding or defence, we agree with Goldberg J that unreasonable conduct must be more than acting on behalf of a client who has little or no prospect of success. There must be something akin to abuse of process; that is, using the proceeding for an ulterior purpose or without any, or any proper, consideration of the prospects of success. 45 ... This is a case where the lawyers themselves thought up the "legal" points and advanced them on behalf of the client. It is unreasonable, in the sense of a dereliction of duty (to both the client and the court), for any lawyer to take that course without first being satisfied that the points are, at least, seriously arguable. We agree it was not necessary in the present case that the lawyers be satisfied that the points would succeed; but it was necessary they be satisfied there was a rational basis upon which they might succeed.
In Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCA 18, Mansfield J noted (at [13]) that he was "bound to follow" the Ridehalgh/White/Levick line of authority.
His Honour also noted (at [15]) a solicitor's obligation to "conduct such investigations, and to give such advice, as is appropriate in the circumstances, before the institution of the proceedings. It is for the client whether to take that advice". His Honour considered that, if the client decided to proceed when advised not to do so, there may be some public interest in continued legal representation, as the solicitor owes a duty to the court "not to incur costs improperly or without reasonable cause", and the advocate has "duties of independence and frankness to the Court". His Honour opined: Proceedings, even hopeless proceedings, are likely to be conducted more efficiently by a solicitor for a party than by a litigant in person: ... The fact that instructions are given to pursue an apparently hopeless claim may demonstrate that, had the solicitor not acted in the matter, the litigant would have pursued the claim unrepresented. In such cases it may be difficult to discern that the conduct of the solicitor has in fact led to the other party incurring costs which otherwise would not have been incurred; generally the costs incurred are likely to have been less by reason of the representation.
All of these issues were raised throughout the submissions and argument in the present case, and I believe that I, like Mansfield J - but not Pembroke J ([184] above) - should follow the Ridehalgh/White/ Levick line of authority.

M: Conclusion

I am satisfied that a clear case has been established (1) for personal costs orders to be made against Young's lawyers, (2) for those orders to be made on an indemnity basis, and (3) for interest to be paid on the costs ordered.
As I noted above (at [100] - [101]), counsel for the lawyers raised as an issue the impact/relevance of Young's insistence on not waiving her privilege over the lawyers' files on her litigation.
I can find no evidence whatsoever that the lawyers have been in any way precluded, hindered, or hampered in fully defending themselves by this circumstance (see Medcalf at [23], and Lemoto at [6]).
I find that Young's lawyers behaved incompetently, unprofessionally, inappropriately, and against the true interests of their client, who was entitled to expect competent and reasonable representation.
They not only brought, on her behalf, a costs application which had no arguable basis; I am satisfied that they, and especially Newell, were the real authors of the folly which it became, so compounding his mounting of a conspiracy case, without a factual basis, in the substantive proceedings (see [87] above).
Having embarked on these futile courses, the lawyers continued to incur, on Young's behalf, unnecessary liability for her own costs and the costs of those she unreasonably pursued, and they must be held responsible.
In terms of the need for "something more" than incompetence etc. ([192], [197], and [198] above), I am satisfied that that test is met - the lawyers were, indeed, "the impetus" for the costs applications (c.f. [200] above).

N: Orders

The Court, therefore, makes the following orders: (A) In respect of proceedings 2016/160767 and 2016/160933, Leonardo Carlo Muriniti is ordered to pay to the First and Second Respondents: (1) the amount of costs which the Applicant has been ordered to pay consequent upon the dismissal of her Notice of Motion dated 20 August 2015; and (2) the costs incurred by the First and Second Respondents in pursuing their amended Notices of Motion, filed 12 July 2016 seeking order (A)(1). (B) Pursuant to the provisions of sections 98 and/or 99 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, and/or relevant provisions of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, Leonardo Carlo Muriniti solicitor, and/or Robert Duane Newell, solicitor, and/or the law firm/practice known as "L C Muriniti & Associates", are jointly and severally ordered to pay, on an indemnity basis: (1) all costs incurred by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Respondents in resisting the Applicant's Notice of Motion filed 20 August 2015; and (2) all costs incurred by those Respondents in their respective Notices of Motion seeking Orders along the lines of Order (B)(1). (C) Pursuant to section 101(4) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, Leonardo Carlo Muriniti, solicitor, and/or Robert Duane Newell, solicitor, and/or the law firm/practice known as "L C Muriniti & Associates", are jointly and severally ordered, insofar as a specific order to this effect be necessary, to pay interest, at the prescribed rate, on the costs ordered to be paid to the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Respondents. (D) Any outstanding Notices of Motion, brought by the First and Second Respondents, seeking personal costs orders against any one or more of Leonardo Carlo Muriniti, Robert Duane Newell, and/or the law firm/practice known as "L C Muriniti & Associates", are to be included in the Registrar's list on Thursday 27 April 2017, for case management and the making of any necessary directions. (E) Subject to the retention by the Court of various Notices of Motion, and some submissions etc., which were included in various Court Books and Evidence Books, the following exhibits and other documents are returned, as nominated: (1) To the Applicant and her legal team: Evidence Book folders numbered 2 to 5 Court Book "Folder 1" Supplementary Court Book "Folder 7" 4-volume Court Book, 2 - 3 August 2016 "Exhibit folder" to affidavit of Young dated 29 April 2016 "Exhibit folder" to affidavit of Young dated 2 September 2014 "Exhibit folders" entitled MY1(2), MY2, MY3, MY4, MY5, MY6(3), and MY7 Authorities folder Exhibits numbered "A4" and "A5" Exhibits numbered "Y1" to "Y4" Exhibit "RDN" to affidavit of Newell dated 10 November 2015 (2) To the First and Second Respondents (per Stern Law): Exhibit numbered "K1" (3) To the Fifth Respondent (per Moray & Agnew): Authorities folder Exhibits numbered "5R1" and "5R2" (4) To the Sixth and Seventh Respondents (per Kennedys Law): 2-volume Supplementary Court Book, filed 1 August 2016 Exhibit numbered "SP1" (5) To the Eighth Respondent (per Gilchrist Connell): Authorities folders (2) Exhibits numbered "WD1" and "8R1" (6) To the Thirteenth Respondent (per TressCox Lawyers): Authorities folders (2) The bundle of exhibits to Tony Tuxworth's affidavit dated 15 October 2015 (7) To the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Respondents (per Walker Hedges & Co): Exhibit numbered "BL1" (2 copies) (8) To Yeldham Price O'Brien Lusk: Exhibit folder "BAY1" to Mr Yeldham's affidavit dated 26 April 2016

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 27 March 2017

(2002) 122 LGERA 216

(1998) 100 LGERA 432

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