© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2006] WASC 153
Supreme Court of WA
2006-08-02
Mr J, Heenan J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : STRIKER RESOURCES NL -v- AUSTRALIAN GOLDFIELDS NL (IN LIQ) [2006] WASC 153
BETWEEN : STRIKER RESOURCES NL (ACN 009 153 119)
AUSTRALIAN GOLDFIELDS NL (IN LIQ) (ACN 009 132 361)
Corporations - Contract - Underwriting agreement - Certainty - Damages - Failure to pay money - Cost of capital - Recoverability of alleged additional cost to company for raising capital from alternative sources - Estoppel - Relief due to estoppel - Counterclaim - Restitution - Set off - Mutuality of debts
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Declare plaintiff is entitled to a balance of damages of $1,002,078.45 after set off of defendant's counterclaim of $2,328,580.55
Aliferis v Kyriacou [2000] VSCA 123; [2000] 1 VR 447
Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 27; (2000) 22 WAR 101
Astor Properties Ltd v Tunbridge Wells Friendly Society [1936] 1 All ER 537
Attorney General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114
Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540
Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514
Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 62
Bonic v Field Air (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266
Branca v Cobarro [1947] 1 KB 854
Cadorange Pty Ltd v Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 26
Capitol Theatre Management Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2005] NSWSC 5; [2005] ANZ Conv R 180
Central London Property Trust Ltd v Hightrees House Ltd [1947] KB 130
Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786
City of Box Hill v E W Tauschke Pty Ltd [1974] VicRp 5; [1974] VR 39
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64
Coventry v Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd [2005] HCA 67; (2005) 80 ALJR 132
DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd [1978] HCA 12; (1978) 138 CLR 423
Duckworth v Ewart [1863] EngR 520; (1864) 2 H & C 129
Ettridge v Vermin Board of the District of Urat Bay [1928] SASR 124
Fletcher v Tayleur [1855] EngR 735; (1855) 17 CB 21
Flinn v Flinn [1999] VSCA 109; [1999] 3 VR 712
Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385
Forster v Wilson [1843] EngR 1141; (1843) 12 M & W 191; 152 ER 1165
G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v HC & JG Ouston [1941] AC 251
Garraway Metals Pty Ltd v Comalco Aluminium Ltd [1993] FCA 219; (1993) 114 ALR 118
Gebauer Nominees Pty Ltd v Cole [2006] WASC 57
Giumelli v Giumelli [1999] HCA 10; (1999) 196 CLR 101
Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199
Grundt v Great Boulder Goldmines Pty Ltd [1937] HCA 58; (1937) 59 CLR 641
Gye v Davies (1995) 37 NSWLR 421
Gye v McIntyre [1991] HCA 60; (1991) 171 CLR 609
Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EngR 296; (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145
Haines v Bendall [1991] HCA 15; (1991) 172 CLR 60
Harper v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1996] QCA 483
Hart v Mossensons [2000] WASC 295
Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235
Hoad v Swann [1920] HCA 50; (1920) 28 CLR 258
Holland v Wiltshire [1954] HCA 42; (1954) 90 CLR 409
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41
Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125
Israel v Foreshore Properties Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1980) 54 ALJR 421
Lamont v Heron [1970] HCA 47; (1970) 126 CLR 239
Lennon v Scarlett & Co [1921] HCA 42; (1921) 29 CLR 499
LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886
MacKay v Dick (1881) App Cas 251
Manchester and Oldham Bank Ltd v W A Cook & Co (1883) 49 LT 634
Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72; (1954) 91 CLR 353
Mays v Roberts [1928] SASR 217
McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd [1933] HCA 25; (1933) 48 CLR 457
Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker AB [1949] AC 196
Mooregate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414
Moses v Macferlan [1760] EngR 713; (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676
Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v Western Australian Club Inc [1993] HCA 45; (1993) 177 CLR 635
Oasis Dalby Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the Gladstone Unit Trust) v Sovereign Capital Ltd [2005] QSC 273
Old Style Confections Pty Ltd v Microbyte Investments Pty Ltd (In Liq) [1995] VicRp 65; [1995] 2 VR 457
Orr v Ford [1989] HCA 4; (1989) 167 CLR 316
Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 6; (2006) V Conv R 54-713
Palmer v Temple [1839] EngR 175; (1839) 9 Ad & E 508; 112 ER 1304
Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149; [2005] ANZ Conv R 52
Pheeney v Doolan (No 2) [1977] 1 NSWLR 601
Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR 165
Player v Isenberg [2002] NSWCA 186
Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd [1980] UKPCHCA 1; (1980) 144 CLR 300
Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350
Prehn v Royal Bank of Liverpool (1890) LR 5 Exch 92
Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381
Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 CLR 17
Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989
Riches v Hogben [1985] 2 Qd R 292
Roehampton Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] WASC 235
Sanrod Pty Ltd v Dainford Ltd [1984] FCA 154; (1984) 54 ALR 179
Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9
Schmierer & Anor v Taouk [2004] NSWSC 345; (2004) 207 ALR 301
SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1996) 69 FCR 346
Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 51; (1979) 144 CLR 596
Shepherd v Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359
Shevill v Builders' Licensing Board [1982] HCA 47; (1982) 149 CLR 620
Simeone v Pesatura General Contractors Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 453
Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton [1929] HCA 34; (1929) 43 CLR 310
South African Territories Ltd v Wallington [1898] AC 309
Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Ltd [2003] FCA 1025; (2003) 47 ACSR 285
Star v O'Brien (1996) 40 NSWLR 695
State Bank of New South Wales v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 371
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418
Terex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144
Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (1990) 3 WAR 486
Teviot Downs Estate Pty Ltd v MTAA Superannuation Fund (Flagstone Creek and Spring Mountain Park) Property Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 57; [2004] ANZ Conv R 152
Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 297
Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office [1998] NTSC 73; (1998) 148 FLR 441
Victoria Economic Development Corporation v Cloverdale Pty Ltd [1992] VicRp 40; [1992] 1 VR 596
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528
Wallis Chlorine Syndicate Ltd v American Alkali Co Ltd (1901) 17 TLR 656
Wallis v Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7; (1988) 164 CLR 387
Westdeutsche Bank v Islington LBC [1996] UKHL 12; [1996] AC 669
Western Waggon and Property Co v West [1892] 1 Ch 271
Whittle v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 129; (2006) 94 SASR 421
Witham v Witham [2000] WASC 236
Woodside Offshore Petroleum Pty Ltd v Atwood Oceanics Inc [1986] WAR 253
Young v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127
Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1956] HCA 51; (1956) 99 CLR 560
Australian Crime Commission v Gray [2003] NSWCA 318
Behzadi v Shaftesbury Hotels Ltd [1992] Ch 1
Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 81; (1986) 161 CLR 653
Central Brake Service (Sydney) Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Central Brake Service (Newcastle) Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 406
Community Developments Pty Ltd, Engwirda Construction Co [1969] HCA 47; (1969) 120 CLR 455
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 4; (1981) 146 CLR 336
Freeth v Burr (1874) LR9CP 208; [1874-80] All ER Rep 751
Galaxidis v Galaxidis [2004] NSWCA 111
Hiley v People's Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (In Liq) [1938] HCA 40; (1938) 60 CLR 468
Hotel Services Ltd v Hilton International Hotels (UK) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 74; [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 750
In re Norman Holding Co Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 757
Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2005] UKHL 3; [2005] 2 WLR 377
Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367
Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350
Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119
Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd (administrator appointed) v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34
Legione v Hately [1983] HCA 11; (1983) 152 CLR 406
March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506
National Westminster Bank plc v Somer International (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 970; [2002] QB 1286
Scottish Equitable plc v Derby [2001] EWCA Civ 369; [2001] 3 All ER 818
Thompson v Palmer [1933] HCA 61; (1933) 49 CLR 507
Unity Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Rocco Pezzano Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 38; (1998) 192 CLR 603
Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati [1957] 2 QB 401
1 The plaintiff, North Australian Diamonds Ltd, was at all times material to this action carrying on business under the name Striker Resources NL, a company engaged in the exploration and potential development of diamond mining leases in the Kimberley region of Western Australia and elsewhere. Its shares were, except for a period of about 12 months from March 1998 to March 1999, listed and traded on the Australian Stock Exchange ("ASX") . The alleged significance of the plaintiff's suspension from trading on the ASX in 1998-99 is relevant to an issue addressed later in these reasons. Because most of the documents and correspondence refer to the plaintiff under the name of Striker Resources NL it was convenient at the trial, and remains convenient, to refer to the plaintiff as "Striker".
2 The defendant, Australian Goldfields NL (now in liquidation), was, for much of the time material to this action, a company involved in the exploration for and development of goldmining tenements but also with an interest in diamond exploration and development through its then wholly owned subsidiary, Jade Creek Resources NL ("Jade Creek"). The defendant was also listed and traded on the ASX where its trading reference and acronym was "AGF". For this reason it was the practice at the trial and in much of the correspondence to refer to the defendant as "AGF" or, occasionally, as "AFN". In a manner which will be described in more detail later, AGF became the largest shareholder in Striker and appointed three directors to the board of the plaintiff, including its chairman. Striker had no significant revenues from its exploration activities and was dependent, for the continuation of this exploratory and developmental work, on funds introduced either as additional capital or as loans. AGF was the principal source of this financial support during the periods relevant to these proceedings and, for all these reasons, had substantial influence over the affairs of the plaintiff, if not effective control.
3 This action concerns the failure of an arrangement by which the defendant was to underwrite a share issue by the plaintiff. Because of initial delays and the eventual collapse of the underwriting the proposed share issue by the plaintiff never eventuated and, instead, but much later, it eventually raised other capital and obtained loans, by a variety of share placements, note issues and other borrowings. It claims to have suffered substantial losses and expenses as a result of the failure of the underwriting and seeks damages for the aggregate of these against the defendant. In a proof of debt lodged in the course of the liquidation, the plaintiff claimed damages of $11,566,621.44 which is the amount of damages it initially claimed in this litigation. However, since then the plaintiff has modified the claim and the aggregate of damages sought by the end of the trial was $6,393,729 (Exhibit Q1(2)).
4 The defendant denies any liability to the plaintiff on the grounds that there was never an enforceable contract concluded between them for this underwriting. The defendant's position is that the underwriting agreement relied upon by the plaintiff is incomplete and uncertain and that, although over the passage of about nine months from July 1997 to March 1998 there were many discussions, other communications and negotiations between the two parties about settling the terms of a proposed underwriting, no concluded or certain agreement was ever reached between them and their mutual dealings concerning the underwriting never passed the point of inconclusive negotiations or at the most an agreement to agree. Because of this stance by the defendant, the plaintiff advances an alternative case that if (contrary to its primary position) there was no certain and enforceable underwriting agreement, there was nevertheless a mutual assumption by the parties that the underwriting agreement was binding and enforceable and created a legal obligation for the defendant to underwrite the proposed share issue. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a series of representations to the effect that the underwriting agreement was in place and was in the process of being implemented, including statements made in its published reports and accounts and to the ASX which resulted in an assumption, acted on by the plaintiff as known to the defendant, that the underwriting obligation existed. These representations, the ensuing assumption by the parties as to the binding effect of the underwriting, realised and accepted by the defendant give rise, on the plaintiff's case, to an estoppel preventing the defendant from retreating from its implied promise to complete the underwriting - Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7; (1988) 164 CLR 387 - with the effect that the defendant is precluded from relying upon any unenforceability of the underwriting agreement and is liable for damages for its breach of that undertaking to the same extent as if the underwriting agreement had been valid and enforceable as a certain contract.
5 The primary position of the plaintiff is that the defendant was in breach of its underwriting obligations by about September 1997 and, despite the continuation of this breach during the course of the negotiations to arrange for the underwriting at times which were repeatedly deferred, a point came when it became apparent that the defendant was refusing to acknowledge any obligation to undertake the underwriting or to perform its obligations so amounting to a repudiation of its obligations, which repudiation the plaintiff accepted a short time later then terminating the underwriting contract. The plaintiff adopts the same position in relation to breach of obligations by the defendant if, despite its primary position, the only enforceable obligations arise because of estoppel rather than from the terms of the underwriting agreement itself. There is controversy over whether there was any repudiatory breach of the alleged underwriting obligations by the defendant and if so when, but the plaintiff contends for repudiation arising from the conduct of the defendant in May 1998 leading to an acceptance by it of that repudiation on or about 3 June 1998 or, alternatively, by 25 August 1998. The significance of this controversy, as submitted by the defendant, is that certain events occurred after May 1998 which, if there was an obligation to underwrite a share issue, entitled the defendant to activate one or more of the "drop-out clauses" in the underwriting agreement and, consequently, to become relieved of any obligation to proceed with the underwriting. It will be necessary to consider in detail these "drop-out clauses"; whether and when there was a repudiation accepted by the plaintiff; and, regardless of that, whether it was ever open to the defendant to invoke the "drop-out clauses" and become relieved of its obligation to perform the underwriting.
6 With regard to the content and the quantum of the plaintiff's claim for damages there are many controversies about the various heads of damage and their amounts which, at this stage, are better left for explanation and attention later in these reasons.
7 During the period from July 1997 until March 1998 while the underwriting of the plaintiff's share issue was delayed, cash flow difficulties were experienced which led to the defendant advancing funds to the plaintiff to the extent of $2,200,000. In addition, the defendant also paid, on behalf of the plaintiff, liabilities which the plaintiff had incurred to third parties to an aggregate of $128,580.55. During the period when these payments were made by the defendant the parties treated them as being, in effect, advance payments to the plaintiff which would be credited as subscriptions for capital in the new share issue when that eventuated, although the defendant contends that until the time when this "debt" was converted to equity, the advances would bear interest at commercial rates and, as that conversion never occurred, interest at commercial rates continued to accrue on the advances.
8 These advances by the defendant to the plaintiff totalling $2,328,580.55, together with the claim for interest upon them, are the subject of the defendant's counterclaim. To this the plaintiff responds by admitting that advances to the plaintiff or to third parties on its behalf were made totalling $2,328,580.55 but denying that there was ever any agreement or obligation to pay interest upon them. In addition, the plaintiff contends that, by reason of the alleged breach of the underwriting obligation by the defendant it is relieved from any obligation to repay those advances. Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that, if any part of those advances is repayable, with or without interest, that liability can and should be set off against the defendant's primary liability to the plaintiff for damages for breach of the underwriting obligation. This claim for set-off is itself disputed by the defendant which contends that the plaintiff is presently obliged to pay its liability on the counterclaim in full and can only prove in the liquidation of the defendant, for any liability for damages which it might establish in this action, ranking equally with other creditors of the same degree.
9 The foundation of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant is under a contractual obligation to underwrite the share issue is an underwriting agreement between the parties dated 2 December 1996. The agreement of 2 December 1996 was the result of a series of agreements between the parties resulting from transactions which brought the Jade Creek Diamond tenements under the control of Striker, with a share issue from Striker being made to AGF, and with reciprocal financial support provided to Striker by AGF. It was this transaction which led to three members of the board of Striker (including the chairman) being nominated by AGF. Part of the transaction involved the underwriting by AGF of the exercise of the June 1997 options to subscribe for shares in Striker which, if exercised, would produce an amount of $10,200,000 in new share capital for Striker, on terms set out in the underwriting agreement. This "primary underwriting obligation" was subject to a number of conditions including a series of specified "drop-out" conditions, the occurrence of which would, at the option of AGF, relieve it from any obligation to proceed with or complete the underwriting. It is common ground that one of the events allowing AGF to withdraw from this primary underwriting did occur and that notification of the existence of this "drop-out" contingency was given by AGF on 10 July 1997 so terminating all of its obligations under this primary underwriting. However, the case for the plaintiff is that the same underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 contained a "secondary underwriting obligation" for AGF to underwrite a substitute share issue as soon as possible and that it is this secondary obligation which AGF has failed to perform and which it eventually repudiated.
10 This secondary underwriting obligation contended for by the plaintiff was for the raising of $7,500,000 in share capital by the issue of ordinary shares as soon as practicable after 30 June 1997. The obligation arose, according to the plaintiff, under cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement (Exhibit 3) which provided as follows:
"In the event that the Underwriter terminates this Underwriting Agreement because of the occurrence of the contingency referred to in Clause 10.1(u), the Underwriter shall underwrite a new issue of shares by the Company, by pro rata offer, to all members of the Company, to raise a minimum amount of 7.5 million dollars ($7,500,000), by prospectus. That prospectus shall be issued as soon as possible after 30 June 1997. The Shares to be offered by the prospectus shall be offered at a price equal to at least ninety percent (90%) of the average of the closing prices for buying of Shares which are admitted to Official Quotation on ASX, as quoted in the daily trading statistics of ASX for each of the trading days during the month of June 1997. The Underwriting Agreement in respect of that pro rata issue shall contain contingencies for termination which are similar to those contained in this Underwriting Agreement apart from Clause 10.1(u)."
Obviously enough, cl 10.2 of the December agreement contemplated that:
• the capital to be raised by the share issue may be greater than the minimum specified of $7,500,000;
• the share issue would be accompanied by a prospectus;
• the subscription price for the shares to be offered may be greater than the minimum subscription price equal to 90 per cent of the average share trading on the ASX during the June month; and
• there would be a further underwriting agreement which would contain contingencies for termination "similar to" those contained in the December 1996 agreement (except for cl 10.1(u)).
11 The case for the defendant is that these contingencies, namely, an issue of potentially greater than $7,500,000; a share price possibly greater than 90 per cent of the historic June average; the contemplation that a further underwriting agreement would be executed; the need for a prospectus, the terms of which were left unspecified; and a reference to the terms in the new underwriting agreement containing contingencies for termination "similar to" those in the earlier underwriting agreement, all meant that the so-called secondary underwriting obligation was uncertain, incomplete and expressly subject to further agreement. On this submission no binding obligation was created in respect of the secondary underwriting obligation by the December 1996 agreement (Exhibit 3) and the plaintiff is left suing on an unenforceable agreement.
12 It is now possible to identify the major issues arising in this action and in the counterclaim. They are:
(a) Was there an enforceable contract between the plaintiff and the defendant for the latter to underwrite a capital raising by Striker by the issue of shares to the value of $7,500,000 set out in the secondary underwriting provisions in cl 10(2) of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996?
(b) If so, has there been a breach of that obligation by AGF by a repudiation of its alleged obligations in or about May, alternatively August 1998, or at some other date, entitling Striker to recover damages for the losses and expenses thereby caused?
(c) If the alleged secondary underwriting obligation contained in the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996, does not constitute a binding contract because, as the defendant alleges, it is uncertain or incomplete, has there nevertheless been an estoppel arising from the representations of the defendant and the conduct of the parties which prevents the defendant from relying upon the unenforceability of the alleged contract?
(d) If there has been such an estoppel, what is the relief necessary to give it proper effect: Is the plaintiff entitled to damages as if an enforceable contract had existed or is it limited to some more restricted and, if so, what remedy?
(e) Is the defendant entitled to judgment on its counterclaim for $2.328 million for advances made by it to the plaintiff for working capital and other payments during the period May 1997 to March 1998 and, if so, is interest recoverable on any part of that claim?
(f) In the event that the plaintiff establishes an entitlement to a money claim against the defendant, is the plaintiff entitled to set some or all of that claim off against an equivalent amount of the defendant's counterclaim (if established), notwithstanding that the defendant is in liquidation and that the plaintiff's claim has only been finally established and quantified after the commencement of the winding up?
(g) In the event that the plaintiff's claim for damages fails but the defendant's counterclaim succeeds, is the plaintiff entitled to defeat the counterclaim or reduce it by reason of the alleged estoppel?
13 The significance of the parties' contentions both in relation to the question of alleged uncertainty of the secondary underwriting obligation, and particularly with respect to the alternative formulation of the claim relying upon an estoppel, must be considered against the background of circumstances and relationships affecting both the plaintiff and the defendant in December 1996 when the underwriting agreement was made.
14 This is therefore an occasion when evidence relating to the factual background known to the parties at or before the date of the contract, including evidence of the "genesis" and objectively the "aim" of the transaction, is admissible: Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 per Lord Wilberforce at 1383 - 1385; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989; BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 so that in order for this agreement to be understood "it must be placed in its context" and not "isolated from the matrix of facts in which it was set" - per Lord Simon at 271 and Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 347 - 352; DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd [1978] HCA 12; (1978) 138 CLR 423 at 429 - see also Mooregate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 435. Each of those cases dealt principally with questions of whether or not an implied term to a particular effect, should be regarded as having been included in a written document subscribed by the parties but the rule also extends to considering the meaning and effect of particular language chosen by the parties in their agreement, where it takes a meaning or shade of meaning from the context or from existing relationships between the parties. These are also considerations which are apt to allow the true meaning of the parties to be identified in circumstances where it is said that a contract is uncertain for want of content and, even more so, when particular conduct or representations by one or both of the parties in the setting of their mutual commercial relationships are said to give rise to an estoppel.
Australian Goldfields NL (In Liq) - Corporations Act, ch 5, Pt 5.6, Div 1A
15 The defendant, AGF, appointed voluntary administrators on 6 March 1998. The company later went into liquidation and liquidators were appointed on 25 November 1998. For the purposes of the winding up, the commencing date of the winding up is taken to be 6 March 1998 - Corporations Act, ch V, Pt 5.6, Div 1A, ss 513A to 513D. As the defendant company was in liquidation these proceedings could not be commenced without leave of the court. There is no formal evidence that leave was granted but counsel have informed me that an application for leave to commence these proceedings against the defendant in liquidation was made and that no issue arises in this respect. Accordingly, I accept that this action was commenced pursuant to leave sought and granted under s 471B of the Corporations Act.
16 The plaintiff's original claim for damages for $11,566,621,44 was set out in a proof of debt for that amount lodged by the plaintiff with the liquidators under s 553D of the Act. It is common ground that no decision by the liquidators had been made to accept or reject that proof of debt by the time these proceedings had commenced but that, in effect, this action has been treated by the parties as the vehicle by which the existence and quantum of that claim is to be determined. However, in the course of the trial the plaintiff modified its claim which had been subject to the proof of debt dated 13 December 1999 (Exhibit Q1(1)) and reduced that substantially to $6,393,729 (see Exhibit Q1(2)). It follows that the liquidators have not formally received or considered this amended claim as any proof of debt or claim lodged with them under s 533D. I raised this specifically with counsel during the course of the trial and was assured that no procedural point was taken in this regard and that these proceedings were being treated, with the consent of the liquidators, as the appropriate means for the determination of the existence and quantum of any such claim. I also enquired whether this may potentially have any adverse affect upon other creditors, but again was informed that no dividends had been paid during the course of the liquidation and that the reduction in the amount of the claim produced by this amendment would have no adverse affect upon existing creditors or persons claiming to be creditors of the company. Accordingly, these proceedings have been treated by the parties as the appropriate means for determining the existence and quantum of any claim by the plaintiff rather than by the process of rejection of a proof of debt and appeal which would apply in other circumstances under s 554A of the Act.
Relationship between Striker, AGF and Jade Creek Resources in 1996 and 1997
17 As a company involved in exploration for diamonds Striker was dependent for working capital upon equity raisings which, in turn, were dependent upon the quality and prospects of the diamond mining opportunities which the company had on hand. As the plaintiff was not producing any income in the short or medium term it was unable to borrow funds from banks or other lending institutions. In 1996 Striker held tenements at Ashmore which gave encouraging signs for diamond exploration. The company wished to raise approximately $6,000,000 to $8,000,000 in order to conduct a trial mine. The capital raising which was to finance this exploratory venture became the subject of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 but that was part only of a larger series of transactions designed to accomplish that objective.
18 AGF's wholly owned subsidiary, Jade Creek Resources NL ("Jade Creek"), owned certain diamond tenements which were adjacent to Striker's Ashmore tenements and other gold tenements. Jade Creek's mining tenements for diamonds covered an area of approximately 1180 square kilometres within the north Kimberley Kimberlite province (see map - Exhibit 6) near Striker's tenements (map - Exhibit 11, p 11). In addition Jade Creek had an exploration licence near Sandstone in the east Murchison goldfield covering an area of about 220 square kilometres (the "Sandstone gold tenement"). In the latest accounts of AGF before December 1996, the defendant set a carrying value on its shares in Jade Creek at $1,080,000 (Exhibit 21, p 40). It was advantageous for both sets of tenements to be explored and developed as part of one overall project and for the several owners to contribute to the cost of this combined project.
19 This objective was accomplished by a series of three agreements between Striker and AGF each dated 2 December 1996. These were, respectively:
(a) the Underwriting Agreement (Exhibit 3);
(b) the Share Sale Agreement (Exhibit 4);
(c) the Financing Agreement (Exhibit 5).
20 The Share Sale Agreement, in effect, provided that:
- AGF would be entitled to transfer from Jade Creek the Sandstone gold tenement before completion;
- as a condition precedent, AGF would contribute capital to Jade Creek Resources by exercising 5,872,055 options over unissued fully paid shares in Jade Creek Resources NL at an exercise price of 20 cents per share - the objective of which, combined with cash at bank, would ensure that by the date for completion Jade Creek had clear funds in hand of $1,500,000
- AGF would sell its shareholding (all the issued shares) in Jade Creek to Striker in consideration for the issue of shares by Striker to the value of approximately $3,038,000 on the condition that, prior to settlement, AGF would take up additional shares in Jade Creek by the exercise of options described above.
21 The details of this transaction with respect to the sale of all the issued capital of Jade Creek to Striker was the subject of a lengthy joint announcement to the ASX and to the media by the plaintiff and the defendant on 3 December 1996 (Exhibit 6 and 7). For present purposes the following points of that announcement are pertinent:
"• AFN (AGF) has agreed to sell all of the issued capital of JCR to Striker for a consideration comprising the issue of 20,252,000 fully paid ordinary shares and 20,252,000 31 December 1999 options in the capital of Striker; subject to the approval of the members of Striker in general meeting.
• The assets of JCR at completion will comprise $1.5 million in cash at bank and all of its diamond tenements. AFN has also entered into an agreement to provide a short term loan of $200,000 to Striker for working capital until the sale and purchase is completed. AFN has also entered into an agreement to underwrite the exercise of all of the 30 June 1997 options currently on issue by Striker at an exercise price of 20 cents per share to assist Striker to raise up to $10.2 million subject to certain terms and conditions of the underwriting agreement.
• Upon completion of the sale and purchase of JCR, AFN will become the largest shareholder with approximately 19.9 per cent of the issued share capital of Striker. AFN expects that three of its nominees will be appointed to fill casual vacancies on the Board of Directors of Striker after the members of Striker have approved of the purchase of JCR. Mr Clayton Dodd (Chairman), Dr Robert Ramsay and Mr W Bergsma will continue as Directors of Striker.
• ... The financial and corporate support of AFN as a major shareholder will enable Striker to be developed as a pure diamond company and to realise the potential and value of its diamond projects."
22 The Financing Agreement (Exhibit 5) of the three documents effecting the objective described above was for AGF to provide a loan to Striker in the sum of $200,000 repayable on 1 March 1997 together with interest at a rate of 10 per cent per annum calculated on a daily basis and its purpose was to provide Striker with working capital during the period required for completion of the sale and purchase of JCR (Exhibit 6, par 2.2). This loan facility was drawn down by Striker on 20 December 1996 and subsequently repaid on 7 February 1997 with interest (see Exhibit 21, p 52 - AGF 1997 Annual Report).
23 The Underwriting Agreement (Exhibit 3) is the underwriting agreement upon which the plaintiff sues in this action. In December 1996 the parties were obviously concerned mainly with the primary underwriting obligation, rather than the alleged secondary underwriting obligation which is the subject of this litigation. However, the joint announcement by the parties to the ASX on this aspect of the transaction provided:
(a) the authorised capital of Striker is $60,000,000 divided into 300,000,000 ordinary shares each of 20 cents par value;
(b) the issued capital of Striker comprises -
(i) 81,517,436 fully paid ordinary shares ('the Issued Shares'); and
(ii) 50,930,673 options each of which entitles the holder to subscribe for one fully paid ordinary share of 20 cents par value in the capital of Striker at an exercise price of 20 cents per share on or before 30 June 1997 ('the 1997 Options');
(c) the listed and quoted securities of Striker comprise -
(i) all of the Issued Shares; and
(ii) 49,430,673 1997 Options.
AFN has entered into an agreement with Striker to underwrite the exercise of all the 1997 Options subject to commercial terms and conditions ('the Underwriting Agreement').
The Underwriting Agreement is subject to the condition precedent that the sale and purchase of JCR is completed in accordance with the Share Sale Agreement. Subject to the satisfaction of this condition precedent, AFN has the right to terminate its obligations to underwrite the exercise of the 1997 Options under the Underwriting Agreement in the event of the occurrence of any one or more of a number of events or contingencies normally found in commercial underwriting agreements. The contingencies are set out in full in clause 10 of the Underwriting Agreement, a copy of which accompanies this announcement. The contingencies include:
(a) Prior to the closing date for the receipt of option exercise forms, the All Ordinaries Index and All Resources Index of ASX falling by twenty (20) per cent or more below their respective point levels on the date of execution of the Underwriting Agreement.
(b) The closing price of buyers of issued shares of Striker admitted to Official Quotation as quoted in the daily trading statistics of ASX falling below twenty cents per share on 30 June 1997 and for more than five consecutive days during the month of June 1997.
If AFN terminates its obligations to underwrite the exercise of the 1997 Options, it will underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker to raise a minimum of $7.5 million by prospectus at an issue price of not less than ninety per cent (90%) of average daily closing price quoted for buyers of the shares of Striker for the month of June 1997 as recorded in national trading statistics of ASX subject to the usual contingencies for termination contained in the underwriting agreement.
AFN will receive an underwriting fee of 5 per cent of the total amount payable for the underwritten securities."
24 For present purposes there are certain prominent features of this overall transaction. Clearly enough, it contemplated the exploration and development of the Striker diamond areas at Ashmore together with the adjacent Jade Creek tenements which, by virtue of the transaction, would be controlled by Striker through its new wholly owned subsidiary Jade Creek. Striker did not have the funds to undertake the proposed exploration activity from its existing resources and, indeed, needed an interim loan of $200,000 from AGF as working capital until the sale was completed. The proposed exploration and development programme of the tenements would be financed either by the exercise of Striker's 30 June 1997 options (not the 31 December 1999 options issued to AGF under the share sale agreement) to raise up to $10,200,000 which AGF then agreed to underwrite. However, if pursuant to rights conferred by the Underwriting Agreement, AGF terminated its obligation to underwrite the exercise of Striker's June 1997 options it would underwrite a new issue of shares by Striker to raise a minimum amount of $7,500,000.
25 This substitute arrangement (the secondary underwriting obligation) appeared to be the only alternative means then in view for Striker to finance the exploration and development programme which this composite transaction was designed to achieve, in the event that AGF withdrew from its primary obligation to underwrite the exercise of its June 1997 options. Put another way, if circumstances arose which justified AGF in withdrawing from its obligation to underwrite the exercise of Striker's June 1997 options then, unless the secondary underwriting obligation was legally enforceable according to its terms, Striker would have taken on the burden of exploring and developing its own and Jade Creek's diamond tenements without any committed source of funding. Furthermore, as a demonstration of the close financial dependence of Striker upon AGF, and of the latter's role as largest shareholder in Striker, AGF would nominate three directors for the board of Striker who would serve with three continuing directors of the plaintiff.
26 If Striker's 30 June 1997 options were fully exercised there would be sufficient capital to carry out the intended exploration of the Ashmore areas but, if not, an alternative source of capital would be needed. The likelihood of the June 1997 options being exercised depended on the quoted price of Striker on the ASX during the period immediately before the final exercise date because if the quoted share price of Striker at that time was below 25 cents ("out of the money") it was most unlikely that the option holders would exercise their rights to take up shares because of their ability to purchase shares more cheaply on the market. In December 1996 there was no certainty that, by the following June, those options would be "in the money" and, if not, that would leave AGF exposed on its primary underwriting obligation to exercise all those options itself in the absence of its finding other sub-underwriters.
27 The crucial paragraph upon which the plaintiff sues, cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement, has already been set out in [10] above. However, there are other terms of the agreement which are also material. The underwriting agreement was prepared by the solicitor for the defendant and was formally executed by each of the parties under its corporate seal on 2 December 1996. The agreement commences with recitals recording details of the authorised and issued capital of Striker at the date of execution and confirming that its 50,930,673 issued options were due to expire on 30 June 1997 and might be exercised at any time prior to that date. The agreement also recited that Striker had requested AGF (referred to in the agreement as "the Underwriter") to underwrite the exercise of those options and that the defendant had agreed to do so upon the terms and conditions set out in the agreement. Within the definition clause of the agreement the options were described as being exercisable at 20 cents on or before 30 June 1997 and subject to the other terms and conditions of the issue of the options. The securities to be underwritten were the whole of the 50,930,673 options recited.
28 By cl 2.1 the defendant's obligations as underwriter were made subject to a condition precedent, namely, that on or before 31 January 1997 (or such other date as may be agreed between the parties), Striker should obtain approval of its members in general meeting to the company entering into and completing the Jade Share Sale Agreement, which had been defined as the agreement between the parties for the sale by AGF to Striker of all the issued share capital of Jade Creek Resources - the Share Sale Agreement mentioned in [20] above which was one of the three agreements constituting the combination of transactions intended to lead to the development of the Ashmore/Kimberley diamond prospects. This is an express recognition of the dependence of the underwriting upon the plaintiff's approval in general meeting of that venture. The formal obligation to underwrite the exercise of the options is set out in cl 3, the mechanism for the exercise of the options; dealing with any shortfall; and associated matters are dealt with in pars 4 - 7 inclusive.
29 In cl 6, dealing with the procedure to be followed in the event of a shortfall of the exercise of the 1997 options in requiring notice at a prescribed time and manner to be given to the underwriter, sub-cl 6.2 goes on to provide that within a specified time the underwriter shall lodge an application to the company for the number of shares equal to the amount of shortfall securities together with a bank cheque or cheques payable to the company for the amount necessary to subscribe for those securities at the rate of 20 cents per share and requiring those specific details to be provided. Importantly, sub-cl 6.2 contains a provision prohibiting the defendant underwriter, in the eventuality that it is called upon to perform the primary underwriting obligation, from delivering any application for the issue of shares in the plaintiff the acceptance of which would breach s 615 or any other provision of the Corporations Law or Regulations or any other law. This is of importance because of the potential for the exercise of the underwriting obligation to increase the shareholding of the defendant/underwriter from its then 19.9 per cent holding of the total shareholding of Striker above the 20 per cent limit in circumstances which would precipitate an obligation to make a takeover offer (see ch 6, Pt 6.1 and Pt 6.2 of the Corporations Act and, in particular, s 606 and s 611 - the latter dealing with exceptions to that prohibition).
30 In the event that the defendant underwriter did not comply with the provisions of the agreement relating to shortfall securities cl 6.2 went on to deal with the situation, as follows:
"If the Underwriter fails for any reason to so deliver the applications in accordance with this clause, the Company shall convene a meeting of members for the Company to approve of the issue to the Underwriter, in accordance with the Corporations Law, of the balance of the Shortfall Securities. If the members of the Company do not approve of this issue, there shall be no obligation on the Underwriter to take up the balance of the Shortfall Securities. If the members approve of this issue, the Underwriter shall subscribe for, pay for and be issued the balance of the Shortfall Securities forthwith."
31 The remuneration of the underwriter is fixed by cl 8 which provides:
The Company shall, within two (2) Business Days of the Underwriter complying with sub-clause 6.2 or the Company receiving valid Exercise Forms for all of the Underwritten Securities together with payment in full thereof, whichever is the earlier, pay to the Underwriter by bank cheque an underwriting commission of Five hundred and Nine Thousand Three Hundred and Six Dollars ($509,306) which equates to five per centum 5% of the total amount that is payable to the Company for the Underwritten Securities."
And the costs of the underwriting are dealt with by cl 11, as follows:
"11. Costs of offer of the underwritten securities
All of the reasonable costs, charges, expenses and stamp duty (including, without limitation, the costs and fees of the solicitors to the Underwriter) of or in connection with the exercise of the Underwritten Securities, this Underwriting Agreement and of the preparation, printing, mailing and distributing of communication to optionholders and of general advertising and publicity shall be paid by the Company. Should the Underwriter terminate this Underwriting Agreement, the Company shall pay such amount of the said reasonable costs, charges, expenses and solicitors' costs and fees as shall have been then reasonabl[y] incurred by the Underwriter or for which liability then exists."
Time was declared to be of the essence of the underwriting agreement, even after extension by consent of any relevant time limits, by cl 16 which provided:
Time shall be of the essence in this Underwriting Agreement, unless the Parties hereto agree in writing to any time requirement being extended, but in such event time will again be of the essence of this Underwriting Agreement in relation to such time requirement as so extended."
And by cl 17 there was provision for severance of any part of the agreement in the event that it should be invalid or not enforceable, but providing that:
"17. ... all other provisions or part thereof which are self-sustaining and capable of separate enforcement without regard to the invalid provisions, shall be and continue to be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms."
32 The various contingencies which were identified as providing a basis, should any eventuate, for the defendant to withdraw at its choice from the underwriting obligation, the eventualities which the parties referred to as "drop-out events", are specified in cl 10.1, as follows:
10.1 In the event of the happening of any one or more of the following contingencies after the Execution Date and prior to that date that is eight (8) Business Days after the Closing Date, the Underwriter may, at any time after becoming aware thereof, without cost or liability to itself, by notice in writing to the Company, terminate this Underwriting Agreement and be relieved of all its obligations hereunder, but no such notice shall operate to the prejudice of any liability of the Company arising out of any prior default by it hereunder. Any delay in giving such notice shall not be treated as a waiver of such right and a further notice or notices as aforesaid may be given notwithstanding that subsequently the relevant contingency ceases to exist and notwithstanding any activity on the part of the Underwriter which is consistent with the performance by it of its obligations hereunder. The contingencies referred to are:
(a) ASX gives a written notice that Official Quotation of the Shares to be issued pursuant to clause 6.2 will not be granted;
...
(c) apart from entering into and implementing the Jade Share Sale Agreement, the Company altering or announcing any intention to alter its capital structure or its memorandum or articles of association without the prior approval of the Underwriter;
...
(m) the occurrence of any material adverse change in the condition or financial position of the Company;
...
(q) there is any material breach of the undertakings referred to in Clause 9;
(r) prior to the Closing Date the All Ordinaries Index of ASX and the All Resources Index of the ASX falling by twenty per cent (20%) or more below their respective point levels as at the Execution Date;
...
(t) ASX imposing a suspension on trading in the securities of the Company; and/or
(u) the closing price for buyers of Shares, which are admitted to Official Quotation on ASX, as quoted in the daily trading statistics of ASX, falling below twenty (20) cents per Share and then for more than five (5) consecutive days during the month of June 1997 and then on 30 June 1997;
provided that nothing contained in this Clause 10 shall prejudice or nullify any claims for damages which the Underwriter may have against the Company for or arising out of any breach of covenant or failure by the Company to observe or perform the obligations on its part contained in this Underwriting Agreement and provided further that should the Underwriter terminate this Underwriting Agreement pursuant to this Clause 10, it shall thereupon cease to be entitled to payment of the underwriting commission pursuant to Clause 8 (but not the costs and fees incurred by the Underwriter as specified in Clause 11)."
Allegations of uncertainty and incompleteness
33 The submissions of the defendant with respect to the sufficiency and effectiveness of cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement to impose an enforceable obligation to underwrite a new share issue, if the defendant terminated its underwriting of the June 1997 options, as it did, advance the following contentions:
• The obligation relates to a prospectus for shares at a price equal to at least 90 per cent of the average closing prices for Striker shares over a defined period, and that the expression "at least 90 per cent" is inherently uncertain. The defendant submits that a contrary conclusion could require it to underwrite an issue at a price well above 90 per cent of the average price at whatever price is demanded by Striker and that this is unrealistic because the greater the price the greater is the likelihood of a shortfall in the securities being taken up by existing shareholders, and the greater the likelihood of an impact upon the underwriter.
• An obligation to enter an underwriting agreement in terms similar to those contained in the underwriting agreement (apart from cl 10.1(u)) is also uncertain and, particularly, where there would need to be variations in relation to terms which are likely to be contentious, including:
• the variation in the definition of the underwritten securities from that of the 1997 options to the new issue;
• whether or not the new share or rights issue to existing shareholders is to be renounceable or non-renounceable;
34 According to the defendant all these are terms upon which further agreement between the parties would be essential for there to be a new share issue and an enforceable underwriting agreement so that, in the absence of specified agreement or a mechanism for determining outcomes in the absence of agreement, that is no more than an agreement to agree - Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (1990) 3 WAR 486 per Ipp J at 496.
35 The defendant maintains that the provision in cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement specifying that the underwriting agreement for the secondary obligation would contain contingencies for determination similar to those contained in the original agreement necessarily connotes variations and hence uncertainty - Mays v Roberts [1928] SASR 217. But, accepting that "similar" is an ambiguous word does not mean, and did not in Mays v Roberts mean, that its employment must necessarily result in an uncertain or unenforceable obligation or that it gives rise to an expectation that a court would attempt to make a contract between the parties, as submitted by the defendant - G Scammell & Nephew Ltd v HC & JG Ouston [1941] AC 251.
36 On the other hand the plaintiff points to the need to adopt a construction of a contract, even if ambiguous, which will preserve the validity of the contract and not destroy a bargain: Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 27; (2000) 22 WAR 101 at 113 where Ipp J observed:
"Finally, in determining whether contracts are void for uncertainty 'courts should be astute to adopt a construction which will preserve the validity of the contract' (per Mason J in Meehan v Jones [1982] HCA 52; (1982) 149 CLR 571) and 'courts should be the upholders of bargains and not their destroyers': see Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (at 14, 570), per Kirby P. A striking example of this approach is Ampol Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 2; (1986) 60 ALJR 225."
37 The plaintiff's position is essentially that described by Burt CJ in Woodside Offshore Petroleum Pty Ltd v Atwood Oceanics Inc [1986] WAR 253 at 261 where the learned Chief Justice said:
"[Y]ou may enter into a final and binding agreement to sign a further contract in its terms, and by that contract to agree that it may contain further terms not inconsistent with the agreed terms and which are by the contract expressly or by implication required to be reasonable. It is the requirement of reasonableness which enables the court in the case of disagreement to settle the term and the term so settled does not depend upon or require any further agreement. But it is, I think, otherwise if the requirement of reasonableness is absent. Such an agreement does require some further agreement because in the case of disagreement there is no criteria by which the court can resolve it. In this case there is no requirement that the conditions to be inserted in the Assignment Agreement were to be reasonable."
38 There is no such stipulation in this underwriting agreement that the terms of the new underwriting agreement required for the performance of the secondary underwriting obligation were to be reasonable but, taking the agreement as a whole: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99 per Gibbs J at 109 - 110, it is evident that the secondary underwriting obligation, if it arose, was to be in substitution for the primary obligation as a means of securing the capital necessary for the exploration and development of the diamond tenements - that is, the same project for which the primary underwriting obligation, and the Share Sale Agreement were both directed to. Equally it is apparent, from the agreement as a whole that if the primary underwriting obligation was discharged, then the secondary underwriting and the new share issue would take place "as soon as possible after 30 June 1997" (cl 10.2) which, taken in conjunction with the obvious need for the working capital to be raised to enable the project to proceed is but another way of saying, in the context of this agreement, that all provisions relating to time were to be set on the basis that the capital would be available as soon as possible. Clause 16, which made time of the essence, and reinstates time as of the essence after any case of agreed extension emphasises that.
39 Significantly, the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 was, in relation to contingencies, to be a template for the new underwriting agreement and the essential terms of the new underwriting agreement were as specified in cl 10.2 imposing an underwriting obligation to raise an ascertainable amount of capital by a new share issue at a price to be agreed or determined as soon as possible. The question for decision is whether, in these circumstances, no binding obligation was intended or effected unless and until agreement upon the entire content of the new underwriting agreement, or at least in relation to those matters enumerated in [33] above, had been later achieved. To a degree this involves some determination as to whether or not the agreement of 2 December 1996 sufficiently identified all the essential terms of the new underwriting obligation, while leaving matters of detail to be resolved consistently with the principal obligations and the template which its own terms provided.
40 In addition to the matrix of background, genesis and commercial purpose of the contract, the plaintiff seeks to rely on evidence of the conduct of the parties following the execution of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 and, in particular, following the termination of the primary underwriting obligation, including the statements made by the company, and officers of the defendant, to the ASX and to each other about the intended performance of the secondary share issue and underwriting obligation. It submits that this evidence is relevant to the issue of whether or not there was a binding and enforceable contract in that it discloses the intention of the parties, not merely at those dates subsequent to the making of the contract, but that those statements were indicative of the intentions of the parties prior to and at the making of the underwriting agreement in December 1996. So long as this "evidence of intention" is treated as a source to determine objectively what the parties' intention was, in the sense of intention to contract rather than as evidence of personal intentions, and in particular whether or not they intended to create legal relations, that procedure is permissible - see per Ipp J in Anaconda Nickel v Tarmoola Australia (supra) at 111 and following. See also Woodside Offshore v Atwood Oceanics (supra) per Kennedy J at 273.
41 There is some controversy as to this proposition and there are authorities each way on the issue (see Cheshire & Fifoot's "Law of Contract" 8th Aust ed, Butterworths at 10.16, including decisions of this Court). Compare Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350 at 362 and Terex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144 at 160. In this case the evidence was tendered without objection (although it was obviously admissible on the estoppel issue) and it seems appropriate, therefore, that I should examine it, but with care in order to identify whether or not it constitutes a clear indication of a recognition of contractual obligations by the defendant and on that basis I address it - see also Gebauer Nominees Pty Ltd v Cole [2006] WASC 57; Sansom Nominees Pty Ltd v Meade [2005] WASC 9 at [96] and Roehampton Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] WASC 235.
42 In late June 1997, but before AGF's termination of the primary underwriting obligation on 10 July 1997, a meeting of directors of Striker took place. The minutes (Exhibit 20) reveal that attention was given to the requirements of the auditors who were preparing an audit certificate for Striker for the year ended 31 March 1997. One of the issues which the auditors had voiced was whether or not it was appropriate to certify the company's accounts on the basis that it was a viable going concern in view of the reliance which the directors were placing on the underwriting agreement with AGF to raise the finance necessary to undertake the Ashmore/Kimberley exploration development programme. At the auditor's suggestion, a note in the accounts was made referring to this so avoiding any need for the auditors to mention it in the audit report. The auditors had also requested a letter from AGF confirming the underwriting obligation and a letter on the letterhead of the defendant dated 25 June 1997 addressed to the auditors was prepared and delivered, which stated:
"Striker Resources NL Underwriting Agreement
For audit purposes we confirm that Australian Goldfields NL (AFN) has the capacity to meet its obligations under the terms of the Underwriting Agreement between AFN and Striker Resources NL which is subject to certain conditions as set out in clause 10 of that agreement. This agreement provides for a minimum underwriting commitment of $7.5 million.
Further, AFN will, if necessary, provide sufficient short-term funding to enable Striker Resources NL to meet its operating commitments until the proceeds from the capital raising are received. This capital raising is expected to be completed during September 1997.
Yours faithfully,
Cyril Quek
Managing Director"
43 Although the discussion took place at a board meeting of the plaintiff on 25 June 1997, and the letter from the defendant was on the same date, that is before the termination of the primary underwriting obligation under the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996, it is clear that this expression of support given by the defendant referred to the secondary underwriting obligation and not to the first. This is because, first, the minutes of the directors' meeting show that the share issue then under discussion was in respect to a pro rata new issue of shares, and not the conversion of existing options to shares. Second, the reference in the letter from the defendant of 25 June to a minimum underwriting commitment of $7,500,000 was to the secondary underwriting obligation to issue new shares to that value contained in cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement, as distinct from the conversion of the June 1997 options which would, had that occurred, have raised up to $10,200,000.
44 The letter from the defendant dated 25 June 1997 giving that support and directed to the auditors was signed by the defendant's managing director Mr C Quek who was then also a director of the plaintiff and present at the director's meeting held that day which addressed this subject.
45 Furthermore, in Striker's 1997 Annual Report (Exhibit 11) which was published and distributed before the general meeting of the company held on 15 August 1997, an initial statement from the chairman, Mr Keith Wong, was included. He had been appointed as a non-executive director of the plaintiff on 31 January 1997 and at the date of the report was currently the deputy chairman of AGF. His statement (Exhibit 11, p 1) included the following paragraph:
"Equally important, Striker entered into financing agreements with AFN through which it will proceed with a fully underwritten capital raising of a minimum of $7.5 million through a new offer and issue of securities to shareholders."
And, at 16 - 17 of that report, in a joint directors' report signed by Mr Dodd and Dr Ramsay, there is the passage:
"Should Australian Goldfields NL terminate its obligation to underwrite the exercise of the 30 June 1997 options, it will underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker Resources NL to raise a minimum of $7.5 million by prospectus."
And, again, at 33 of that report under the company's notes to the accounts, there is the passage:
"If AFN terminates its obligation to underwrite the exercise of the 1997 Options, it will underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker to raise a minimum of $7.5 million by prospectus. That prospectus shall be issued as soon as possible after 30 June 1997. The shares to be offered by the prospectus shall be offered at a price equal to at least ninety percent (90%) of the average daily closing price quoted for buyers of the shares of Striker for the month of June 1997, as recorded in national trading statistics of ASX subject to the usual contingencies for termination contained in the underwriting agreement.
AFN will receive an underwriting fee of 5 percent of the total amount payable for the underwritten securities."
46 A similar statement is to be found in note 1(a) of the notes to the plaintiff's accounts (Exhibit 11, at p 21) concerning the underwriting of a share issue for $7.5 million by AFG if it terminated its obligations to underwrite the exercise of the 1997 options. That note proceeded to record that:
"Taking the Underwriting Agreement into consideration and their knowledge of the state of affairs of the Company the directors are of the opinion that it is appropriate to prepare the accounts of the Company on a going concern basis. Further, the funds raised pursuant to the terms of the Underwriting Agreement will enable the Company to provide financial support to its controlled entities."
This report must be taken to have been approved by the board of the plaintiff, including the three directors who were also directors of AFN, and it is evident that two of those directors, namely Messrs Wong and Quek, specifically endorsed those statements of commitment.
47 Next, when the defendant AGF terminated its primary underwriting agreement in respect of the June 1997 options in Striker it made an announcement to the AGF of its intention to enter into a new underwriting agreement with Striker in terms which corresponded with cl 10.2 of the December 1996 agreement. That announcement dated 15 July 1997 (Exhibit 26) is on the letterhead of AGF and reads as follows:
"Announcement to Australian Stock Exchange
Underwriting of Securities of Striker Resources NL
The Directors of Australian Goldfields NL ('AFN') hereby advise that AFN will enter into a new underwriting agreement with Striker Resources N.L. ('Striker') to underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker by prospectus to raise a minimum of $7.5 million as provided in the Underwriting Agreement between AFN and Striker dated 2 December 1996 ('the Former Underwriting Agreement').
AFN terminated the Former Underwriting Agreement under which AFN was to underwrite the exercise of 50,930,673 30 June 1997 options on issue by Striker at an exercise price of 20 cents per share. The Former Underwriting Agreement was terminated pursuant to clause 10.1 on the grounds that the quoted price for buyers with the listed shares of Striker was below 20 cents per share for more than 5 consecutive days during the month of June 1997 and then on 30 June 1997.
The details of the new Underwriting Agreement and the terms and conditions of the new issue by Striker will be released in due course.
Yours sincerely
Australian Goldfields NL
Cyril Quek
Managing Director"
48 AGF published its Annual Report for 1997 (Exhibit 21) before its annual general meeting of 21 October 1997. At p 50 of the report in the notes dealing with events subsequent to the close of the previous financial year but before the publication of the report, there is a passage:
"(a) Underwriting of Securities of Striker Resources NL
On 15 July 1997 the Company announced that it would enter into a new Underwriting Agreement with Striker Resources NL to underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker Resources NL by prospectus to raise a minimum of $7.5 million."
Corporations Law - takeover provisions
49 It is convenient at this point to refer to one other aspect of the defendant's contention that the secondary underwriting obligation in the December 1996 underwriting agreement is uncertain or incomplete. Whether the proposed new shareholding would be likely to produce a situation where the defendant, as underwriter, was obliged to take up a large proportion of the new share issue because of lack of response from existing shareholders or the market and, in the process, exceed the 20 per cent shareholding and trigger the takeover provisions of the Corporations Law, was likely to depend upon the price at which the new shares were offered for subscription. More precisely, it would be likely to depend on the differential, if any, between the price at which the new shares were offered for subscription and the market price for existing shares listed on the ASX before and during the period when the offer was open. If the new shares were priced below the market value then commercial factors reveal that it would be likely that all or most of the existing shareholders would take up their pro rata entitlements under the new issue. However, the closer to the market value and, in particular, if the new shares were priced at or above the market value, the less would be the likelihood of existing shareholders taking up their entitlements - in this latter case the share issue would be "out of the money". In that latter situation there would be the probability that the underwriter may be required to take up a large proportion of the new share issue and, in the process, exceed the 20 per cent shareholding threshold. This could be avoided, of course, if there were sub-underwriters or new shareholders who would accept a placement but only if those others were not "associated" with the defendant.
50 None of this necessarily would require the plaintiff to convene a meeting of shareholders to obtain approval for the defendant to take up more than its pro rata entitlement of shares in the new issue as underwriter, nor infringe the takeover provisions of the Corporations Law. Section 611 of the Corporations Act provides exemptions to the general prohibition in s 606 against a person increasing his or her voting power beyond the 20 per cent level. Relevant exemptions in this context are to be found in items 7, 10 and 13. Item 7 provides an exemption for an acquisition approved previously by a resolution passed at a general meeting of the company if no votes are cast in favour of the resolution by the person proposing to make the acquisition and their associates or the person (if any) from whom the acquisition is to be made and their associates - the so-called s 623 meeting - see Corporations Law s 623 (as it applied before the 1999 CLERP amendments). Item 10 provides an exemption for share acquisitions made pursuant to a rights issue made to all shareholders. A number of conditions must be met and the exemption extends to an underwriter or sub-underwriter of such an issue. The exemption in item 13 is for an acquisition that results from an issue under a disclosure document of securities in the company in which the acquisition is made if the issue is to a person as underwriter to the issue or sub-underwriter and the disclosure document disclosed the effect that the acquisition would have on the person's voting power in the company.
51 In the setting of this new share issue and the defendant's underwriting obligation, one would expect that if the defendant was called upon to take up more than its pro rata entitlement to shares in the new issue because of its role as underwriter, it would have the benefit of the exemption under items 10 and 13 and that the disclosure document (in this case the prospectus for the issue) would include appropriate terms notifying shareholders of the potential effect of such an acquisition by the underwriter, and that this requirement would be no more than compliance with the application of the law in respect to the conduct of such an underwritten issue. In other words, this is not a matter which would require agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant as part of the underwriting or the arrangement of the share issue but, rather, it would be an incidental obligation imposed by law upon an agreement to underwrite a share issue in such circumstances. In that case the absence of any specific provision in the underwriting agreement for this contingency does not, in my view, constitute an area of uncertainty or incompleteness such as would result in invalidity of the underwriting agreement.
52 However, counsel for the defendant, in the course of submissions (t/s 759 - 765) at one point appeared to suggest that, despite the apparent exemption available under items 10 and 13, the plaintiff in this proposed underwritten share issue may be obliged to hold a s 623 meeting in order to obtain shareholder approval for an acquisition by the defendant of more than its pro rata entitlement in the new share issue in order to satisfy item 7 and that this potentiality meant that some provision in the new underwriting agreement or some further agreement between the parties to the litigation would be necessary to make provision for a s 623 meeting - in counsel's submission cl 6.2 of the original underwriting agreement would need some revision or adaptation to these new circumstances.
53 It is not exactly clear why a s 623 meeting would be needed in order to secure exemption from the provisions of s 606 under item 7 when an apparent unconditional exemption is available under item 10 or 13. The implication in the submission from counsel for the defendant was, however, that ASIC or ASX might regard a new share issue resulting in a larger than pro rata share acquisition by the defendant (particularly if the issue price was at or above the market value for the shares) as a disguised bid for control. The implication in the submission was that if it was open to the authorities or others to suspect that a bid for control was the reality behind this share issue and that it was not a genuine underwriting, then a s 623 meeting would be essential. That may be true if the hypothesis is accepted but there was no suggestion in the evidence, nor in the reactions of the market from the time of the December 1996 announcement that any part of this capital raising, which always had the potential to enlarge the defendant's holding to 20 per cent or beyond, was a disguised bid for control and I do not see any reason why I should accept that hypothesis or make a finding which would involve a conclusion that the parties were engaged in an attempt to avoid the provisions of the Corporations Law by deceit. Even if such a finding were to be made, the conclusion would be that the underwriting could not proceed unless it was approved by Striker in general meeting in a manner required by the then s 623 of the Corporations Law.
54 On the basis that a contract between parties to conduct an underwriting which, otherwise, is on fixed an enforceable terms, also involves an obligation to do all that is necessary to effectuate the completion of the agreed undertaking, there is no reason to suppose that the existing contract (if enforceable) would not have required the plaintiff to hold a s 623 meeting, if that had, as matters developed, been considered necessary and, also, required the defendant to accept that its obligations were, in that eventuality, subject to due compliance with the law - see MacKay v Dick (1881) App Cas 251 at 263; Secured Income Real Estate (Aust) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 51; (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 607; Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 137 - 138, and Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v Western Australian Club Inc [1993] HCA 45; (1993) 177 CLR 635 at 659.
55 In the course of further discussions between representatives of the plaintiff and the defendant during early 1997 it was evident that the plaintiff did not consider that any provision need be made in the proposed new underwriting agreement for a s 623 meeting (see draft underwriting agreement despatched under cover of letter 1 May 1997 - Exhibit 91). In the end the defendant does not appear to have pressed any proposition to the effect that the underwriting agreement was uncertain or incomplete because of the lack of any express reference to the potential need for a s 623 meeting or its equivalent. Therefore, it is perhaps unnecessary for me to take this issue any further. However, I should record my conclusion that I do not consider that any incompleteness or uncertainty in the underwriting agreement arises or could arise because of the potential for the underwriter to take up more than its pro rata proportion of the new share issue to such an extent as would take it beyond the 20 per cent threshold of shareholdings in the plaintiff. This is because I regard the situation as being covered by the exemptions contained in items 10 and 13 of s 611 of the Corporations Act or, if for any reason these exemptions were not applicable, because of the need in those circumstances for the parties to secure a resolution of the shareholders of Striker which would satisfy the requirements of item 7 of s 611. The need to comply with the formalities to satisfy each of those conditions would, in any eventuality, be part of the obligations necessary to render the underwriting agreement effective.
Plaintiff's submissions concerning uncertainty
56 The position adopted by the plaintiff in relation to the defendant's contentions that the secondary underwriting agreement is uncertain or incomplete can now be stated. Striker submits that the new underwriting agreement is required to contain contingencies for termination which are "similar" to those contained in the existing underwriting agreement, apart from cl 10.1(u). Clause 10.1 defines the contingencies for the termination and those contingencies assume the existence of other clauses in the existing underwriting agreement, namely, cl 10.1(a) refers to cl 6.2 and cl 10.1(q) refers to cl 9. Hence, so the plaintiff submits, if a new underwriting agreement is to contain similar termination contingencies the new agreement must also contain the clauses of the existing underwriting agreement expressly referred to in the agreement of 2 December 1996 (Exhibit 3). Further, upon the plaintiff's approach, the operation of the contingencies in cl 10.1 is governed by the final words of that provision, which state that should AGF terminate the underwriting agreement pursuant to cl 10, it shall thereupon cease to be entitled to the payment of the underwriting commission pursuant to cl 8 but not the costs and fees incurred by AGF as specified in cl 11. As the submission runs, this necessarily provides that the new agreement will contain clauses to the effect of the existing cls 8 and 11. Clause 8 deals with the underwriting commission payable, cl 9 provides for the covenants by Striker and cl 11 covers underwriting costs. Hence, the very terms of cl 10.2, in the plaintiff's submission, address and provide for the existence of provisions dealing with underwriting commission, termination contingencies, other costs of underwriting and covenants by Striker and so supply the content on those subjects alleged to be absent, or subject to further agreement, by the defendant. According to the plaintiff, this construction is supported by cl 10.2 which refers to the underwriting agreement in respect of that pro rata issue which, by cl 1.1, is defined to mean the existing underwriting agreement - an indication that, subject to minor variations as necessary, the December 1996 underwriting agreement shall provide the model and content for the "new underwriting agreement".
57 As for the time for performance of the new underwriting agreement, including the timing of all steps necessary to lead to its implementation, for example the announcement date, the time for acceptance, and the time for the publication of the prospectus and so on, having been left unspecified, the plaintiff's response is that cl 10.2 provided for the new share issue and the secondary underwriting to take place as soon as possible after 30 June 1997 and that that, combined with the presence of cl 16 making time of the essence, meant that all the consequent steps should be taken as soon as reasonably possible. Again, having regard to the need to raise capital for use in exploration and development programmes for the Kimberley/Ashmore tenements, these considerations can lead to the establishment of a time scale which, while it may give rise to differences of view, is capable of being resolved, if necessary, by a determination of a court having regard to the commercial context in which the parties agreed. That will not give rise to uncertainty or incompleteness in the contract or in the underwriting because the meaning of "as soon as reasonably possible" in that context is capable of ascertainment and decision.
58 Nevertheless, the defendant maintains that timing in this context is not a one dimensional factor because, as time passes, so it can be expected that the market price for the shares in the plaintiff quoted on the ASX may fluctuate and that changes in the market value of the issued shares in the plaintiff will have a big bearing on the price at which the new shares can be issued. Indeed, the defendant submits that the subsequent negotiations between the parties reveal that different views about a suitable price for the shares in the new issue were one of the differences between the parties which led to progressive postponement of the new issue and the underwriting and that this demonstrates the close relationship between time and price which existed in the commercial setting and, therefore, the need for the parties to agree specifically both upon timing and upon the price of the shares in the new issue.
59 One can readily accept that, for a company seeking to raise capital by a new share issue in the market, both the timing of the issue and the cost of the issue are factors which will affect each other and the likely success of the capital raising. It is not surprising, therefore, that when dealing with each other co-operatively with a view to implementing some existing obligation, the representatives of a company and its underwriter will give close attention to prevailing market trends, the timing of the issue and the cost of the securities being offered. None of this, however, means that an agreement between the parties which provides both for timing and cost is uncertain, incomplete or unenforceable because, during its currency, the representatives of the parties give attention to these factors even to the point of considering variations to the agreement to extend the time for the share issue or to increase or to diminish the proposed price at which the securities are to be offered. The provisions of the contract previously discussed dealing with the timing provide an objective and determinable time frame for the implementation of the new capital raising and underwriting and, cl 16 of the agreement contemplates that if time is extended, it again becomes of the essence after the extension. This contemplates that cl 16 is part of the new underwriting agreement which I am satisfied is implied by reason of the definitions in cl 1.1 and cl 10.2. As to the issue price, cl 10.2 of the December 1996 agreement fixes a minimum price of 90 per cent of the average quoted closing prices for Striker during June 1997. That it contemplates that the issue price may be higher (implying the need for agreement between the parties for such a higher price) does not detract from an agreement upon a minimum price so that if further agreement cannot be reached about a higher price, there is nevertheless certainty between the parties on that topic.
60 The defendant next submitted that there was no agreement between the parties nor any mechanism for establishing the content of the prospectus which it was expressly recognised may be necessary for the new issue. It is true that, apart from recognising the need for a prospectus, the agreement of December 1996 did not make any express provision for its content. Nevertheless, the basic terms of the issue, the number of shares, the issue price, that the issue should be pro rata to existing shareholders, and that it should be for capital to finance the exploration and development activities proposed for the Kimberley/Ashmore tenements the subject of the agreements leading to the plaintiff's takeover of the shareholding in Jade Resources, mean that the major terms and purposes of the share issue were all identified and acknowledged. Obviously, much further content would be necessary in the prospectus but that would be largely determined by law (see Corporations Act, Ch 6D - Fundraising - see previously Corporations Law, Pt 7.11 and 7.12) and the historical and objective details relating to the ownership of the tenements, available geological and prospective information concerning them and the objective details about the plaintiff's financial position, accounts and share structure at the date of the issue which could be readily identified. Because the need for a prospectus was recognised and its content readily capable of ascertainment, I do not consider that there is any lack of certainty or completeness in this respect. It is equally important to note that nothing in the underwriting agreement of December 1996 made the defendant's underwriting obligation conditional or dependent upon the content of the proposed prospectus, yet it did provide for a number of "drop-out contingencies" through the incorporation of cl 10.1 (except for cl 10.1(u)) all of which, having regard to their terms, were protective of the defendant's financial interests so that, had approval of a proposed prospectus been considered important or necessary, one would expect to find provision to that effect among those contingencies. The absence of such a provision is, therefore, not insignificant.
61 The defendant points to references in cl 10.1 relating to underwriting fees which, so it submits, do not fix the level of underwriting fees nor the responsibility for the payment of costs and expenses. But cl 8 acknowledged an underwriting commission of 5 per cent in relation to the total amount payable to the company for the underwritten securities. Admittedly, that commission was payable in relation to the underwriting of the June 1997 options but where the substitute obligations to underwrite a new share issue if the underwriting of the options did not proceed is to go ahead, it is plain from the agreement that it was to be for a commercial reward and that a 5 per cent commission was envisaged. It is true that cl 10.2, when using the language of "similar to" the drop-out condition specified in cl 10.1 when it came to equivalent provisions in the new agreement did not expressly extend beyond the drop-out conditions but, as already noted, there are references in cl 10.2 which extend to the entire underwriting agreement in terms which are indicative that it is a model for the agreement for the secondary underwriting obligation, and in my view, this incorporates the rate of commission which the original document specified.
62 The defendant points out that there are provisions in cl 9 of the agreement of 2 December 1996 which cannot be directly transposed to the proposed new share issue. Clause 9(a) restricts the right to apply for the securities to option holders - inconsistent, so the defendant submits, with a pro rata rights issue. Similarly, cl 9(d) provides that the recitals are true and correct in every respect but, it submits, those recitals are not applicable to the proposed share issue. There is no suggestion that the recitals were not true and correct at the date of the agreement of 2 December 1996 and the fact that they may or may not be material to a new substitute share issue is simply by the way. They do not have any effect upon the obligation which each of the parties assumed to one another under cl 10.2. Again, the defendant submits that cl 9(c) dealing with delivery to the underwriter of copies of documents relating to the exercise of the underwritten securities is not relevant and that cl 9(h) relating to the obligation of Striker upon the exercise of the options to seek approval for their quotation on the official list of the ASX, is likewise irrelevant. To the extent to which those provisions relate to underwriting of the exercise of specified options, it is clear that they do not and could not apply to the proposed new share issue. But that does not mean that the contract is unenforceable or that there is no obligation upon the plaintiff, or for that matter upon the defendant, to attend to all the practical requirements commercially necessary, or required by law, to accomplish the share issue and the quotation of the new securities. Those are matters of detail which are subsidiary to and derivative from the principal obligation.
63 The defendant also submits that nothing in cl 10.2 or in the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 adverted in any way to whether or not the proposed pro rata share issue was to be renounceable or non-renounceable by existing shareholders in Striker. The submissions on behalf of AGF were that if the entitlement to the new shares were to be renounceable that would give rise to a market in the rights to the new shares so that an existing shareholder who is disinclined to take up his pro rata entitlement would be able to dispose of his rights to do so to some third person or entity who, so it is to be presumed, would be more disposed to do so. By this means, so it was submitted, there would be a greater prospect of the share issue being fully subscribed or largely subscribed if the rights were to be renounceable than if they were not renounceable. Whether that is so or not is likely, in my view, to depend upon the market price of the quoted shares in Striker during the offer period and the manner in which the market measures the prospects for appreciation in Striker's shares, by the performance of the exploration and development which the capital raising was to finance. No conclusion in this regard can be drawn because of the absence of evidence as to the these matters and it is therefore not possible to conclude that a renounceable, rather than a non-renounceable share issue (or vice versa) would be more favourable for the underwriter. So far as it is necessary to do so, I consider that the wording of the cl 10.2 which refers to a "new issue of shares by the company by pro rata offer to all members of the company ... " implies that the offer is non-renounceable. The only evidence about the potential significance of the renouncability of the shares in the new issue was from the plaintiff's witnesses Mr Hart and Mr Dodd, each of whom said that whether the new share issue was renounceable or not would not affect the underwriter's obligation and this question never appears to have been an issue between the parties. I do not consider that the absence of any provision in the underwriting agreement relating to whether or not the new shares were to be renounceable or not renders the agreement uncertain or incomplete.
64 It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider whether or not, despite the potential for variation in several respects in the content of the secondary underwriting agreement, there is nevertheless a fixed and certain minimum obligation sufficient to create a binding obligation imposed by the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996, notwithstanding that further steps were contemplated before its implementation.
65 An obvious starting point for this analysis is the much quoted passage from the decision in Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72; (1954) 91 CLR 353 at 360:
"Where parties who have been in negotiation reach agreement upon terms of a contractual nature and also agree that the matter of their negotiation shall be dealt with by a formal contract, the case may belong to any one of three classes. It may be one in which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms, but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect. Or, secondly, it may be a case in which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that which their agreed terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more of the terms conditional upon the execution of a formal document. Or, thirdly, the case may be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract."
The plaintiff submits that cl 10.2 of Exhibit 3 is a species of an agreement which comes within the first category of contracts recognised in Masters v Cameron (supra), namely, that the parties have reached finality on all the terms of their bargain, intend to be immediately bound but propose that those terms will be restated in a fuller and more precise form, not different in effect, later. However, the case is rather more complex than that because of the substance of cl 10.2 of Exhibit 3 which recognises that the final underwriting agreement may be for a larger capital raising and at a higher share price than the specific mechanics of cl 10.2 provide but, so the plaintiff submits, cl 10.2 nevertheless specified that there was a minimum obligation to underwrite a $7,500,000 share issue on precise terms ascertainable in fact notwithstanding that it reserved a potentiality for a bigger issue at a higher share price and that the format, including these potential variations, was to be included in a later underwriting agreement. It is the prescription of the minimum terms creating a present binding obligation but, nevertheless, subject to increase by subsequent negotiation, which goes to the heart of the plaintiff's submission.
66 The authorities recognise a fourth category by way of variation of the first category in Masters v Cameron (supra). In Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 62 at 628 McClelland J described this fourth category as being one where the parties intend to be bound immediately by the terms which they have agreed upon, while expecting to make a further contract in substitution for the first contract containing, by consent, additional terms. In this regard, McClelland J relied on Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton [1929] HCA 34; (1929) 43 CLR 310 at 317. There may be some controversy about the effect of such a fourth class of case but it is well accepted that, in such an eventuality, the initial agreement would be enforceable unless superseded by a later enforceable agreement - Tern Minerals NL v Kalbara Mining NL (supra).
67 In Branca v Cobarro [1947] 1 KB 854 the written agreement for the sale of certain real property contained a term stating that it was a "provisional agreement until a fully legalised agreement" was drawn up and signed. Nevertheless, the decision was that the provisional agreement was enforceable unless and until it was replaced by the further agreement - see also Lennon v Scarlett & Co [1921] HCA 42; (1921) 29 CLR 499; City of Box Hill v E W Tauschke Pty Ltd [1974] VicRp 5; [1974] VR 39; Lamont v Heron [1970] HCA 47; (1970) 126 CLR 239 and Sinclair Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (supra) at 317. In such a situation the contemplated second agreement can be expected, in most but not necessarily all instances, to replace and discharge the primary agreement, but unless it does the former remains enforceable and comprehensive in its creation of the binding obligations of the respective parties.
68 The fact that the second agreement, contemplated by the first, may, subject to further agreement or by consent, contain additional terms is not fatal to the existence of the primary obligation in circumstances where agreement on the potential additional terms is not reached - LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 886 at [38] per Barrett J - see also Harper v Ariadne Australia Ltd [1996] QCA 483.
69 Two recent cases where, despite written evidence suggesting that an agreement had been reached on final terms of the alleged contract, the courts have concluded that there was no real intention by the parties to be bound, pending the execution of an ultimate agreement containing all the terms, are to be found in Teviot Downs Estate Pty Ltd v MTAA Superannuation Fund (Flagstone Creek and Spring Mountain Park) Property Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 57; [2004] ANZ Conv R 152 and Peter Warren (Properties) Pty Ltd v Jalvoran Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 1149; [2005] ANZ Conv R 52 - see article (2005) 79 ALJ 205 at 205 - 206. However, every case depends upon its own facts and whether or not the anterior agreement itself imposes binding obligations, notwithstanding its potentially provisional status, as opposed to the situation where it is evident that any binding obligation is to be deferred until agreement upon other terms and/or a formal contract.
70 This fourth category of cases, as an addition to the Masters v Cameron (supra) trilogy, has been endorsed in many subsequent decisions besides GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (supra). Some, only, of those are Pasdonnay Pty Ltd v STS Corp Ltd [2005] WASCA 9; Oasis Dalby Pty Ltd (as Trustee for the Gladstone Unit Trust) v Sovereign Capital Ltd [2005] QSC 273 per Moynihan J at [22] and Player v Isenberg [2002] NSWCA 186 per Beazley JA at [49] - see also Helmos Enterprises Pty Ltd v Jaylor Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 235 per Young CJ in Eq at [25], [82] and particularly at [69] - [70] where his Honour said:
"There has been recent academic discussion as to whether there really is a fourth class to be added to the three specified in Masters v Cameron; see the article in (2004) 20 JCL 156 by Peden, Carter and Tolhurst, 'Where three just isn't enough'. However, an article by academics which attacks a considered view of M H McClelland J, one of the greatest Equity Judges of the Twentieth Century, in a decision which was upheld in the Court of Appeal and since followed by almost every Judge of the Court of Appeal and of the Equity Division, as not being of any authority and contrary to what the High Court said in Masters v Cameron, does not rate serious attention. Indeed no-one gave it more than passing reference in the instant case.
It needs to be realised that in an arrangement that falls within the fourth class, as McHugh J pointed out in the GR Properties case at 635, 'If the parties agreed on additional terms they would be added to the formal contract. If they did not, the formal contract would only give effect to the agreed terms and conditions of the correspondence.' Thus, if it is abundantly clear that essential terms cannot be added subsequently, the contract will fail."
As to the recognition of the fourth category see also Capitol Theatre Management Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2005] NSWSC 5; [2005] ANZ Conv R 180 per McDougal J at [25].
71 In the present case the alleged secondary obligation is contained, not in pre-contractual negotiations or correspondence emanating from them, but in a formal underwriting agreement between the parties. Accordingly, despite the magnitude of the obligation contemplated, the context in which the alleged obligation is placed demonstrates that the prospect was a considered future course of obligation embedded in a contract upon which both of the parties had obtained legal advice and which itself was clearly intended to be binding. These features appear to me to refute, to a significant extent, the indications which may sometimes arise from the magnitude of the obligation contemplated as telling against the existence of a certain and final obligation - see per McHugh J in the Baulkham Hills case (supra) at 634 and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Player v Isenberg (supra) at [49] - [54].
72 It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine whether or not the remaining potentialities for variation in the obligation render the secondary underwriting obligations in Exhibit 3 uncertain and unenforceable. These, again, are:
• the potentiality for the capital raising to be greater than $7,500,000;
• the potentiality for the issue price of the shares to be greater than 90 per cent of the average June 1997 trading prices on the ASX;
• the requirement that the final underwriting agreement contain contingencies for drop-out "similar to" those in Exhibit 3 but not identical to that document;
• certain incongruities in the recitals and in cl 9 of the agreement;
• the absence of any provision relating to the content of the prospectus of the new share issue;
• the lack of specification as to whether or not offers for the new shares were to be renounceable or not by existing shareholders.
73 In my view all the indications are that the parties to the 2 December 1996 underwriting agreement intended that it should be immediately binding and enforceable, both with respect to the primary underwriting obligation relating to the June 1997 options and with respect to the secondary underwriting obligation provided for by cl 10.2. Indeed, the very purpose of the trio of agreements of December 1996 was to secure a major capital raising to allow the exploration and developments of the Ashmore/Kimberlite prospects. The formality by which the initial underwriting agreement was recorded and the announcements which both parties made to the Stock Exchange immediately afterwards indicate the importance and commercial significance attached to the agreement. Every commercial indication points towards the objective need for Striker to secure a commitment towards the underwriting of the capital raisings which it envisaged, first the exercise of the June 1997 options and, failing that, the new substitute share issue. There would have been little point in embarking upon the Share Sale Agreement for the takeover of Jade Resources and the major share issue by Striker to AGF, unless there was to be a substantial commitment for the joint exploration and development of those tenements.
74 The more pertinent issue, in my view, is whether, despite their intentions to enter into a binding and enforceable legal obligation, the parties successfully achieved this in relation to the secondary underwriting obligation contained in cl 10.2 or whether, for any or all of the reasons advanced by the defendant, they inadvertently failed to do so. It is at this point that counsel for the plaintiff rely on the decision in Anaconda Nickel v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd (supra) and, in particular, the judgment of Ipp J at 111 - 112 with whom Pidgeon J agreed (Anderson J dissenting) where, at 112, his Honour said:
"As Barwick CJ stated in Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd [1968] HCA 8; (1968) 118 CLR 429 at 436 - 437, 'A contract is affected by uncertainty only if its essential terms are uncertain or lacking'.
It does not follow that any omission will make a contract incomplete or uncertain in the sense of rendering it invalid. It is only the omission of an essential term that will have that effect. As to the meaning of 'essential' in this context, the following words of Lloyd LJ (with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed) in Pagnan SpA v Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep 601 at 619 are helpful:
'It is sometimes said that the parties must agree on the essential terms and that it is only matters of detail which can be left over. This may be misleading, since the word "essential" in that context is ambiguous. If by "essential" one means a term without which the contract cannot be enforced then the statement is true: the law cannot enforce an incomplete contract. If by "essential" one means a term which the parties have agreed to be essential for the formulation of a binding contract, then the statement is tautologous. If by "essential" one means only a term which the court regards as important as opposed to a term which the court regards as less important or a matter of detail, the statement is untrue. It is for the parties to decide whether they wish to be bound and, if so, by what terms, whether they are important or unimportant. It is the parties who are, in the memorable phase coined by the Judge, "the masters of their contractual fate". Of course, the more important the term is the less likely it is that the parties will have left it for future decision. But there is no legal obstacle which stands in the way of the parties agreeing to be bound now while deferring important matters to be agreed later. It happens every day when parties enter into so-called "heads of agreement".' "
75 In this case I consider that such matters of detail relating to timing, the content of a prospectus, and the scope for increasing (by agreement), the issue price for the new shares do not deprive the secondary underwriting obligation of certainty or completeness. For reasons already described, I consider that questions of timing, price and content of the prospectus are all matters which are incidental to, and derivative from, the obligation and its principal terms contained in the December 1996 agreement. To the extent to which cl 10.2 adopts the December 1996 agreement as the model or template for the new underwriting obligation, but with the need to include terms which are similar to the terms of that document, it is a signification that such alterations as were necessary to accommodate the new timing, the fact that it is a share issue rather than the underwriting of options, with the different practical formalities which that entails are the only changes which are to be made and that those alterations are obvious and derivative, and hence identifiable, from the change in the nature of the underwriting which had already been agreed upon. For that reason, therefore, I consider that the agreement is sufficient and complete.
76 In view of my decision that cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 and its references to other provisions of that underwriting agreement, establishes a certain and enforceable legal obligation between the parties in relation to the secondary underwriting obligation, it is strictly unnecessary to determine the plaintiff's alternative case based on alleged estoppel which would have the effect of precluding the defendant from relying upon any alleged uncertainty or unenforceability of that agreement. However, as this issue was fully addressed by the parties and much of the evidence at the trial was devoted to it, it is desirable that I should determine it as if it were the only basis upon which the plaintiff could succeed. This involves assuming, contrary to my earlier finding, that the secondary underwriting obligation referred to in cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement is unenforceable because of uncertainty or incompleteness.
77 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] HCA 7; (1988) 164 CLR 387 confirms that the doctrine of equitable promissory estoppel will allow for the enforcement of voluntary promises in certain circumstances. At 164 CLR 406 Mason and Wilson JJ said that the doctrine of equitable promissory estoppel:
" ... extends to the enforcement of voluntary promises on the footing that a departure from the basic assumptions underlying the transaction ... must be unconscionable. As a failure to fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, mere reliance on an executory promise to do something, resulting in the promisee changing his position or suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more would be required. Humphreys Estate [1987] 1 AC 114 PC suggests that this may be found, if at all, in the creation or encouragement by the party estopped in the other party of an assumption that a contract will come into existence or a promise will be performed and that the other party relied on that assumption to his detriment to the knowledge of the first party. Humphreys Estate referred in terms to an assumption that the plaintiff would not exercise an existing legal right or liberty, the right or liberty to withdraw from the negotiations, but as a matter of substance such an assumption is indistinguishable from an assumption that a binding contract would eventuate."
And, also in Waltons Stores, Brennan J said at 424 that:
"When these elements are present, equitable estoppel almost wears the appearance of contract ... ".
78 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114 (Humphreys Estate) has been applied at the highest level in Australia, not only in Waltons Stores (supra) but also in Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 at 411 and in Orr v Ford [1989] HCA 4; (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 329. It has recently been considered and applied in Whittle v Parnell Mogas Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 129; (2006) 94 SASR 421, a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia which concluded that the anterior agreement upon which the parties had relied, was an unenforceable contract and could not be sued upon, although the majority of the court went on to conclude that the promissory estoppel alleged in that case would not have intervened to prevent the defendant from relying upon the lack of legal effect of the anterior understanding. Humphreys Estate (supra) is a case in which the agreement relied upon by the parties was expressly said not to be binding until necessary documents were executed and registered. Because those final steps were never taken, the Privy Council concluded that there was not a case of promissory estoppel arising. As was said by Lord Templeman speaking for the Board at 127 - 128:
"In the present case the government acted in the hope that a voluntary agreement in principle expressly made 'subject to contract' and therefore not binding would eventually be followed by the achievement of legal relationships in the form of grants and transfers of property. It is possible but unlikely that in circumstances at present unforeseeable a party to a negotiation set out in a document expressed to be 'subject to contract' would be able to satisfy the court that the parties had subsequently agreed to convert the document into a contract or that some form of estoppel had arisen to prevent both parties from refusing to proceed with the transactions envisaged by the document. But in the present case the government chose to begin and elected to continue on terms that either party might suffer a change of mind and withdraw."
In the present case there was no such attenuation of the obligations contained in the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 which purported to be explicit. It is not as if the parties to that document intentionally put off the day when they anticipated formal legal obligations would commence. Rather, they expressed themselves in terms suggesting that they were then entering into formal legal relations. The defendant's position is that no such obligation ever arose because the terms used by the parties were ineffective to bring about immediate legal obligations because of their uncertainty - see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540. For reasons already canvassed, I rejected that submission but, even if that were not so, this case represents a much closer approach to the intentional creation of legal obligations and a stronger representation of an intention to be bound than occurred in Humphrey's Estate (supra) and similar cases where the anterior agreement was expressed to be "subject to contract" or contained some similar express reservation or postponement against producing immediate legal obligation. It therefore provides a stronger basis for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
79 Even where a claim based on a promissory estoppel can be made out it does not follow that the consequences will always be the same as if formal obligation assumed between the parties which forms the basis of the estoppel, was in fact valid and enforceable in all circumstances. The measure of the equity necessary to protect against the detriment involved by departing from that assumption - Grundt v Great Boulder Goldmines Pty Ltd [1937] HCA 58; (1937) 59 CLR 641 per Dixon J at 674 - 675 may be something less than a full vindication of the rights which were supposed to have existed. So, for example, the effect of the estoppel recognised in Central London Property Trust Ltd v Hightrees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 was only to allow temporary extension of the right of occupation to the premises for which there had been a promise to lease, but not for the full term. As held in Giumelli v Giumelli [1999] HCA 10; (1999) 196 CLR 101 the minimum equity may be less than would be provided on the basis of the detriment avoided if the representation were upheld, see at 123 - 125.
80 In this case as the defendant was the major shareholder in the plaintiff it had a special interest in underwriting the capital raising which meant that it was difficult or impossible to find a substitute underwriter or financier. The result of the failure of the underwriting was that the plaintiff was left without the means of raising working capital essential, not merely to the performance of the exploration and development activities on the diamond tenements, but also for continuation of the essential operations of the plaintiff which were in jeopardy. It is the costs of dealing with this emergency which the plaintiff seeks to recover in damages and, for reasons to be developed later, it is apparent that the same considerations which affect the scope and measure of damages recoverable are relevant to the extent of the equity necessary to give effect to the alleged estoppel if established.
81 The plaintiff submits that it is unnecessary for the representations or assumptions giving rise to the alleged estoppel to be contractually certain before equity will intervene - Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 at 610; Flinn v Flinn [1999] VSCA 109; [1999] 3 VR 712 at 738 - 744 and Witham v Witham [2000] WASC 236 per Owen J at [89]. But that is almost self-evident because, if a representation is contractually certain it would be unlikely that it would be necessary to resort to the doctrine of estoppel. The effect which the plaintiff asserts arises from the alleged estoppel is that by reason of the conduct of the parties AGF represented to Striker that it was bound by and would give effect to the residual underwriting commitment to such an extent and in such a manner as to preclude AGF from now relying upon any uncertainty or incompleteness relating to the asserted secondary underwriting obligation.
82 The particular matters which Striker asserts give rise to this alleged estoppel are:
(a) the terms of AGF's announcement to the ASX on 15 July 1997;
(b) the content of a facsimile transmission from Naylor on behalf of AGF to Hart on behalf of Striker dated 25 July 1997;
(c) the joint participation by representatives of both parties over the period from August 1997 to March 1998 and efforts to draft or approve a proposed prospectus for the new share issue and in the performance of a due diligence exercise leading to the secondary underwriting;
(d) statements by the AGF nominated directors of Striker at board meetings of the plaintiff held during the period July 1997 to March 1998;
(e) an oral statement made by Mr Gore of AGF to Mr Hart of Striker on 29 October 1997;
(f) an oral statement by Mr Naylor on behalf of AGF to Mr Hart of Striker on 2 December 1997;
(g) a letter from Quek of AGF to Messrs Price Waterhouse dated 12 December 1997;
(h) the approval by the AGF nominated directors of Striker to notes contained in Striker's annual financial statements for the period 31 March 1997 to 30 September 1997;
(i) a note published in AGF's annual financial statements of 30 June 1997 regarding its commitment to Striker (Note 30(a));
(j) the absence of any conduct or statement by any representative of AGF to any representative of Striker of any refusal, lack of intention or disinclination by AGF to perform the secondary underwriting commitment during the period when the efforts, apparently for its implementation, were being made.
83 As a result of these actions Striker alleges that it was led to assume that AGF at all times regarded the secondary underwriting commitment as binding upon it and that it would perform that obligation. Further, Striker asserts that it relied upon that assumption to accept interim funding advanced to the extent of $2,200,000 from September 1997 to March 1998, yielded to the modified schedule for the timing of the underwriting proposed by AGF from time to time and made no efforts to seek capital or underwriting from any alternative sources. All this was done, so Striker alleges, on the basis of a common assumption of both parties. The plaintiff's reliance upon the anticipated performance of the secondary underwriting obligation by AGF was plainly known to AGF.
84 In response to the plaintiff's alternative claim based on the alleged estoppel, and the detailed allegations advanced to support it, Striker denies that any estoppel arose, pleads that the asserted conduct did not amount to any representation as to the enforceability or performance of the secondary underwriting agreement and asserts that the conduct and representations relied upon by the plaintiff was merely consistent with AGF negotiating in good faith in an attempt, which was never achieved, to reach agreement upon terms which would ultimately give rise to a binding legal agreement. Detailed answers are made by AGF in pars 17A - 17U of its amended defence to the various allegations advanced by the plaintiff to support the asserted estoppel which will be addressed in detail shortly. At present, however, it is enough to describe these as expressing, in various ways, AGF's essential points that the discussions and communications between the representatives for the parties concerning the proposed secondary underwriting, the prospectus and due diligence were no more than continuing negotiations about terms of the proposed secondary underwriting agreement and of a prospectus for the new share issue which never culminated in any agreement and which proceeded against a background in which the parties realised that further agreement would be necessary before any binding obligation for a secondary underwriting would arise.
85 With this introduction it is now possible to turn to the particular allegations relied upon by Striker to give rise to the alleged estoppel:
86 The details of this have already been mentioned in [47] above where this release was relied upon by Striker as conduct by the defendant, subsequent to the contractual arrangements, which was relevant to disclose the objective intention of the parties at the time the December 1996 underwriting agreement was reached. It came very shortly after the defendant's notification of termination of the primary underwriting agreement due to a contingency event which was given on 10 July 1997. The announcement to the ASX by Mr C Quek, managing director of AGF, is Exhibit 26, the terms of which are:
"Announcement to Australian Stock Exchange
Underwriting of Securities of Strike Resources NL
The Directors of Australian Goldfields NL (AFN) hereby advise that AFN will enter into a new underwriting agreement with Striker Resources NL (Striker) to underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker by prospectus to raise a minimum of $7.5 million as provided in the Underwriting Agreement between AFN and Striker dated 2 December 1996 (the former Underwriting Agreement).
AFN terminated the Former Underwriting Agreement under which AFN was to underwrite the exercise of 50,930,673 30 June 1997 options on issue by Striker at an exercise price of 20 cents per share. The Former Underwriting Agreement was terminated pursuant to clause 10.1 on the grounds that the quoted price for buyers of the listed shares of Striker was below 20 cents per share for more than 5 consecutive days during the month of June 1997 and then on 30 June 1997.
The details of the new Underwriting Agreement and the terms and conditions of the new issue by Striker will be released in due course.
Yours sincerely,
Australian Goldfields NL
Cyril Quek
Managing Director"
87 AGF admitted making an announcement to the ASX on 15 July 1997 but otherwise denied this allegation. I find that a notice in the terms of Exhibit 26 was given, to the ASX, and thereby published to the market, by AGF on 15 July and that it contained an unequivocal representation of AGF's intention to underwrite a new issue of shares by Striker in the manner and upon the terms to be found in cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement of December 1997 and that the detailed terms of the new underwriting agreement and share issue would be released to the market shortly afterwards.
88 This document is Exhibit 29. It is a facsimile transmission from Mr M Naylor of AGF to Mr K Hart of Striker containing a draft of a proposed statement by Mr Wong as chairman of Striker to be inserted in Striker's annual report for the year ended 31 March 1997. This statement, although relating to the year ended 31 March 1997, was to be published after the termination of the primary underwriting agreement and the notification to the ASX and the market of 15 July 1996 (Exhibit 26), yet it included the following statements:
"In December 1996, Striker entered into agreements with Australian Goldfields NL (AFN) to acquire all the issued capital of Jade Creek Resources NL to expand and consolidate its strategic regional coverage of diamond bearing kimberlites in the north Kimberley Kimberlite province of Western Australia.
Equally importantly, Striker entered into financing agreements with AFN through which it will proceed with a fully underwritten capital raising of a minimum of $7.5 million through a new offer and issue of securities to shareholders."
This draft statement ultimately materialised in the published Striker Annual Report for 1997 (Exhibit 11, p 1) under the name of Mr Wong. Its significance at this point, however, is that it is an unequivocal statement, intended for public release, to be made by the chairman of Striker, who was also a director of AGF, sourced from AGF's officers after the termination of the primary underwriting agreement, of AGF's intention to carry out the secondary underwriting. As such, Striker alleges, it discloses the common intention of the senior management of both parties that the underwriting was to proceed and, as well, reveals that AGF was fully aware that Striker was acting on the expectation that that underwriting by AGF would proceed as stated.
89 By its defence, Striker admits that there was a facsimile transmission from Naylor to Hart on 25 July 1997, but says that this transmission was not for or on behalf of the defendant but was for preparation of a draft Chairman's statement for the plaintiff and that it did not contain nor convey the alleged representations. I accept that the draft statement the subject of this facsimile was for the content of a statement to be made by the chairman of the plaintiff, but that does not dissociate the defendant from knowledge or participation in the statement. Quite the contrary. The chairman of AGF at this stage, Mr Quek, was also a director of Striker. This proposed statement to the market and to the shareholders of Striker was being made with the full knowledge of AGF and, as I find, with AGF's approval. I also find that it accurately contains and represents the joint understanding of Striker and AGF in July 1997 that the secondary underwriting was to proceed in the manner contemplated by cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting and as announced previously to the market on 15 July 1997 (Exhibit 25).
90 The plaintiff relies on a series of steps said to demonstrate a joint assumption and understanding of an obligation by the defendant to perform the secondary underwriting. The first of these steps is the conduct of Mr Quek (an AGF nominated director of Striker) at the plaintiff's board meeting of 14 August 1997. The minutes of this board meeting of the plaintiff are part of Exhibit 1 (p 26). The meeting took place on 14 August 1997 and was attended by Messrs Wong, Dodd, Quek, Ramsay and Bartley, all directors of the plaintiff and by the plaintiff's secretary, Mr Hart. Of the five directors present, three were also directors/nominees of AGF, namely, Messrs Wong, Quek and Bartley. With regard to the proposed pro rata rights issue, the minutes record that:
"Cyril Quek advised that in his opinion Striker shares were worth 20 - 25 cents per share and that any issue should be set around that price.
Clayton Dodd agreed with this but pointed out the difficulty in raising funds at that price with the market price at its current levels.
Cyril advised the meeting that he would be in Asia shortly and that the Striker issue was an item on his agenda.
The secretary advised the meeting that a draft pro forma prospectus had arrived from Jim Swann [solicitor for AGF] and that he would commence drafting the short form prospectus."
91 AGF admits that between August 1997 and March 1998 Striker, by its board and officers, commenced drafting a prospectus and carrying out a due diligence exercise but says that neither of these activities was completed and that at the Striker board meeting of 14 August 1997 Mr Hart, as secretary of the plaintiff, advised the plaintiff's directors of the receipt of a draft pro forma prospectus from Mr Swann and of Hart's intention to commence drafting a short pro forma prospectus. AGF denies that the conduct alleged by the plaintiff in this respect was the conduct of the defendant and denies that it gave rise to any representation as alleged.
92 I accept that the conduct relied upon by the plaintiff in this respect all occurred at a board meeting of Striker, but that does not dissociate the defendant from concurrence with, and responsibility for, the assumption alleged by the plaintiff that the secondary underwriting agreement was then acknowledged and that efforts were being made to implement it. The presence of the three AGF nominated directors at this board meeting and the discussions about an appropriate price for shares in Striker can only mean that steps were being taken to implement the secondary underwriting by both Striker and AGF and that their representatives were then discussing a possible price for the new share issue and the terms of a prospectus. That the share price and the prospectus terms were then regarded as being still subject to further discussion does not detract from the mutual assumption that the secondary underwriting was to take place in accordance with the December 1998 agreement and the subsequent statement to the ASX (Exhibit 25). I am satisfied that the mutual understanding of the parties at the time was that the secondary underwriting was on foot and was being implemented in accordance with those terms.
93 Although these minutes contain no reference to any disagreement upon the terms of the proposed prospectus, as between the draft submitted by AGF's solicitor Mr Swann, and the views of the directors or representatives of Striker, it is perhaps necessary to observe that the responsibilities for the terms of the prospectus would lie with Striker and with those of its officers or agents who contributed content to the prospectus - see Corporations Act, Ch 6D, Pt 6D.2, Div 4. No doubt AGF was interested in the terms of the prospectus so long as Striker was willing to accommodate its views or wishes in that respect, but there is nothing in the agreement of December 1996 or otherwise to give rise to a necessity that the underwriter must approve the terms of the prospectus or that the underwriting obligation was conditional upon the details of the prospectus which contained all the information and content required by law for a share issue of the kind proposed. Similarly, the fact that there was discussion between the directors of Striker at the meeting of 14 August 1997 about the proposed share price, including discussions between AGF nominated directors and other directors about the share price does not mean that led to any uncertainty or contingency in the proposed share issue or the underwriting. It is not surprising that directors of the company which were seeking to raise capital by new share issue would debate the price at which the shares would be issued. So long as a share raising in conformity with cl 10.2 of the original underwriting agreement was proposed, that is a share raising at not less than 90 per cent of the weighted average June 1997 share price for Striker, that was within the ambit of the obligation which the parties were then addressing.
94 By this letter Mr Hart, the plaintiff's company secretary, wrote to Mr Swann, the solicitor for AGF, advising that he had been requested by his board and the underwriter to canvas Mr Swann's willingness to accept an appointment as chairman of the Striker Due Diligence Committee to oversee the preparation of Striker's prospectus, enquiring about his willingness to accept and his likely costs (Exhibit 69A). In reply, by letter dated 29 January 1998 (Exhibit 69B), Mr Swann confirmed that he would be willing to act as chairman of the Striker Due Diligence Committee to oversee this process, gave an estimate of his professional costs and advised that he would be sending by mail a short form due diligence check list for consideration. The defendant admitted that these communications had been sent but denied that either constituted conduct of the defendant as alleged. In the circumstances, I find that at the date of this correspondence in late January 1998, both the plaintiff and the defendant were taking positive steps to proceed towards the implementation of the underwriting and each had agreed that the defendant's solicitor, Mr Swann, should be requested to chair a committee to settle the prospectus, and that he agreed to do so. I am satisfied that this must have occurred to the knowledge of both parties and that it was done on the common understanding that each was proceeding with the secondary underwriting as the means to raise the necessary capital for the exploration and development of the diamond prospects.
95 Next, the plaintiff alleges that its secretary, Mr Hart, presented a draft prospectus to the Striker board meeting of 23 January 1998 and that the plaintiff's board of directors resolved to form a committee containing representatives of Striker and the defendant to meet each week to progress the prospectus with completion to take place in mid-February. This board meeting of the plaintiff was attended by Messrs Naylor, Gore, Quek and Wong, the latter two being AGF nominated directors of the plaintiff. Not only does Exhibit 1, pages 18 and 19, confirm that such a meeting of the directors of Striker occurred on that date and resolved as the plaintiff alleges, but it reveals that in addition to four directors and the secretary of Striker attending the meeting (Wong and Quek also being directors of AGF), Messrs Michael Naylor and Brendan Gore attended by invitation. Those two were, respectively, a consultant to the defendant and the defendant's company secretary. AGF admits that such a meeting was held but otherwise denies that it resolved, as alleged, and pleads further that by the terms of the draft prospectus and the incomplete matters contained in the draft prospectus, such conduct did not amount to a representation as alleged by the defendant. The only evidence on the issue is that the plaintiff resolved, as is recorded in the minutes of the directors' meeting of 23 January 1998, and I find that it did. I also find that this resolution and the proposed steps to form a committee upon which representatives of both parties were to serve to progress the prospectus with completion in mid February, constituted the understanding upon which both parties were then working, namely, the preparation of the prospectus for a new share issue to be underwritten by the defendant to raise capital in terms of the earlier agreement and the announcements to the ASX. Plainly, the common assumption by the parties at this date was that the capital raising was proceeding in accordance with the secondary underwriting arrangements set out in the December 1996 agreement.
96 The plaintiff then alleges that its secretary, Hart, sent a copy of the draft prospectus to the defendant on 19 February 1998 and that this was discussed at a meeting on 23 February 1998 attended by Messrs Naylor (consultant to AGF), Gore (AGF's secretary) and Striker representatives and that at the end of the meeting it was agreed to recommence discussions on 25 February 1998 to discuss the prospectus further. The defendant admits that a draft prospectus was sent on about 19 February but says that it proposed an issue of shares in terms inconsistent with the alleged secondary underwriting obligation; does not admit that there was any meeting as alleged on 23 February 1998 but says that if such a meeting did occur then it did not convey or constitute any representation as the plaintiff alleges. The evidence shows that a draft prospectus (Exhibit 73) was sent by Hart to AGF as the plaintiff claims, but that it was very much a preliminary document requiring the number of shares and issue price and the details of the underwriting to be added, together with much additional information. In fact it included (on its cover) a reference to the underwriter being Hartley Poynton Ltd and the indications are that it was very much a precedent which required remodelling, variation and additional content. Mr Hart kept a file note of the meeting of 23 February 1998 (Exhibit 74), which I accept is accurate. In addition to Messrs Naylor and Gore of AGF at the meeting the Striker representatives were Messrs Dodd, Ramsay and Hart. This note recorded that matters under discussion involved proposals for AGF to obtain funding from several banks which was expected to be approved by 31 March and that the Striker funding was tied up with those arrangements.
97 Other transactions involving New Sage were also discussed and imminent changes to the directorship of Striker were foreshadowed, as a result of which consequential changes to the draft prospectus would be needed. Finally, it was resolved that the meeting of joint representatives would recommence on 25 February to discuss sales agreements in the prospectus further. I am satisfied that the events described in those records did occur and that they took place in a setting where both parties were moving towards the implementation of the secondary underwriting proposal for the new share issue in Striker which was then believed to be proceeding in accordance with the arrangements already noted.
98 The plaintiff alleges, and I find, that at a meeting of directors of Striker held on 14 August 1997 Mr Quek advised those present that any share issue should be at about 20 to 25 cents per share and that the Striker issue was on his agenda (Exhibit 1, p 26). The Striker/AGF directors at this meeting were Messrs Wong, Quek and Bartley.
99 I also find that at the meeting of directors of Striker held on 30 September 1997 attended by Messrs Wong, Dodd, Quek, Ramsay, Bartley and Hart, with AGF secretary Brendan Gore also present by invitation, Mr Quek, also a director of AGF, addressed the meeting on the topic of the pro rata rights issue after Clayton Dodd had expressed concern at a request by AGF to delay the underwriting further until March 1998, pointing out the disadvantages that the delays were causing Striker. The response given by Mr Quek, also a director of AGF, was that market conditions were then not ideal for a rights issue because of the upcoming Telstra float and that if the shares were issued at 12.5 cents there would be a significant current dilution of shareholdings, including AGF. Quite why this would be so where AGF was the underwriter does not emerge from the minute. Quek also informed the meeting that AGF was not requesting a delay until March 1998 but to the first quarter of 1998. The discussion then turned to a new unconditional underwriting agreement and for AGF to advance $3,000,000 in return for a convertible note secured against the underwriting agreement and there were to be further discussions to prepare such an underwriting agreement.
100 The defendant simply denies that any such statements were made and pleads further that if they were made they did not constitute conduct giving rise to representations as alleged by the plaintiff and that any reliance upon them was unreasonable. However, I am satisfied that at the board meeting of the plaintiff on 30 September 1997 its directors, who were also directors of its major shareholder AGF, requested the deferment of the proposed share issue until the first quarter of 1998, for the reasons recorded and that this resulted in concern being expressed by the non AGF directors of Striker leading them to seek interim funding by the $3,000,000 convertible note issue and for a new underwriting agreement that was to be "unconditional" which, in the context, must be taken to be one without any of the drop-out clauses, thus giving an unconditional commitment to the underwriting, the proposed share issue and access to a minimum of $7,500,000 for new working capital. I find this to reflect the common approach by both parties that the new share issue would proceed, underwritten by AGF as originally agreed, but that rather than taking place in the second half of 1997 or "as soon as possible after 30 June 1997" it would be deferred to the first quarter of 1998 because of perceived market conditions. This was absorbed, somewhat reluctantly by the other directors of Striker who raised the need for interim working capital pending the share issue and who also sought a new underwriting agreement which would give an unconditional commitment by AGF. This, in my view, confirms the mutual reliance of parties on the proposed share issue to raise the capital needed for the diamond exploration and development activities always contemplated but a postponement of that giving rise to the need for some alternative short term source of capital or working finance. Involving as it does a deferment of the underwriting obligation of AGF it maintains the assumption that the share issue would proceed and be underwritten by the defendant but, simply, that it would be delayed and that the delay gave rise to a desire for other interim arrangements.
101 At the meeting of directors of Striker held on 20 October 1997 (Exhibit 1, p 21) there was further discussion about the pro rata rights issue. This meeting was attended by Messrs Wong, Dodd, Quek, Bartley and Lambert with the plaintiff's secretary, Mr Hart, also attending. The defendant's representatives, Naylor and Gore, also attended by invitation. Quek advised the meeting that AGF would enter into a convertible note facility tied to the underwriting agreement and secured by Striker's shareholding in the New Sage Resources. Instructions were given to Gore (for AGF) to proceed with the drafting of the convertible note agreement and the underwriting agreement "on substantially similar terms as the previous agreement" and both these agreements were to be finalised before 31 October 1997. Quek informed the meeting that AGF would not renege on the underwriting agreement and that the group was financially secure and the meeting resolved upon the preparation of a timetable leading to the completion of the rights issue for March 1998. Again, the defendant did not admit that any such statements were made or that they gave rise to any representations. I find that the minutes accurately record the agreements reached at that directors' meeting and that the common assumption then was that the new share issue in Striker fully underwritten by AGF would proceed as originally contemplated, except that it would be deferred until March 1998 and, in the interim, that a loan of $3,000,000 would be made by AGF to Striker on a secured convertible note in advance of the capital raising. This reflects a continuing commitment by AGF to the secondary underwriting but at a later date than previously contemplated.
102 Next, at a Striker's directors' meeting held on 23 January 1998 (Exhibit 1, p 18) attended by Messrs Wong, Dodd, Quek, Ramsay and Hart with the defendant's representatives Naylor and Gore attending by invitation, a draft prospectus for the share issue was presented and the director's resolved to form a committee comprising representatives of both parties to meet weekly to progress the prospectus for completion in mid February. Mr Gore, for AGF, undertook to finalise the agreements relating to the rights issue by AGF by the week ending 30 January 1998. The defendant denies that any such statements were made at that meeting, that if they did they constituted conduct by the defendant or gave rise to any representations. However, I am satisfied that the minutes accurately recall what transpired at the meeting and that officers of the plaintiff and the defendant had agreed that the share issue fully underwritten by the defendant would proceed in March 1998 and that steps were being taken to do all that was necessary to achieve this, including the finalisation of the underwriting agreement and the prospectus. Having regard to the need for the capital to be raised by this issue and the interim need for $3,000,000 to be raised by the convertible note, it is also quite apparent that AGF realised that Striker was dependent upon this share issue and underwriting for the working capital which was now becoming urgently necessary and that it was relying upon AGF adhering to its underwriting arrangements for that capital.
103 Striker alleges that in a telephone conversation between Mr Kevin Hart (of Striker) and Mr Gore (of AGF) at approximately 12 noon on 29 October 1997, Mr Gore said words to the effect that AGF was not going to renege on the underwriting. AGF does not admit such a statement was made and says further that if such a statement was made by Gore to Hart, then the statement was made in the course of a conversation during which Gore also indicated to Hart that draft underwriting agreements had not been finalised and accordingly, by the conversation conveyed to Hart, that there were matters in respect of the proposed underwriting agreement that required agreement and finalisation.
104 Mr Hart's file note of the conversation between himself and Mr Gore is Exhibit 51. The file note records that Mr Hart rang Mr Gore "to find out timing on receipt of convertible note and Underwriting Agreement as was supposed to be ready earlier this week". It next records that Mr Gore said that the drafts had not been finalised and that he was having a meeting with Jim Swann, the solicitor for AGF, on Thursday 30 October to finalise the drafts. Mr Hart asked for a time frame and Mr Gore said "hopefully next Monday". Mr Hart asked if Striker should have any concerns over the delay and Mr Gore indicated that it need not. Then it is recorded: "I said market rumours were that AFN were going to renege on the Underwriting Agreement. He said 'that AFN were not going to renege on the underwriting'."
105 Counsel for AGF put to Mr Hart and submitted that what was being discussed in the conversation was not the secondary underwriting obligation but a new proposal for the finalisation of a convertible note agreement and an unconditional underwriting agreement as contemplated at the meeting of directors of Striker of 20 October 1997. Accordingly, so counsel submitted, the conversation was not capable of conveying the representation contended for by the plaintiff. I accept that the reference to the underwriting agreement in this context must be taken to be a reference to the new Unconditional Agreement that it had been contemplated was to be finalised before 31 October 1997, and that the reference to reneging on the underwriting must also be taken to refer to this. However, I am satisfied that notwithstanding this the conversation is consistent with and reflective of the common assumption of the parties that the underwriting was proceeding, and that the delay involved no more than a short deferment of the underwriting obligation of AGF.
106 Striker alleges, and AGF does not admit, that a telephone conversation took place between Mr Kevin Hart (of Striker) and Mr Michael Naylor (for AGF) on 2 December 1997 during which Naylor explained that he was travelling to Malaysia to discuss the underwritings with Johor "representatives" to finalise details and that the underwriting and convertible note agreements would be available by 8 December 1997 for finalisation ahead of audit sign-off. As well as its refusal to admit this allegation, AGF says that if any such statements were made they conveyed by implication that the underwriting agreement required finalisation and agreement as to both terms and content.
107 Mr Hart's note of this conversation is recorded in Exhibit 54 which I find to be accurate. Such a conversation did take place during a call in which Naylor telephoned Hart to discuss the underwriting and the convertible note agreements. Naylor advised that he was going to Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday 3 December 1997 to discuss the Striker underwriting with Johor representatives and to finalise details. The reference to Johor representatives was a reference to substantial shareholders or financial backers of AGH. Naylor told Hart that everything was progressing, that the agreements would be available Monday 8 December and that "we will be able to finalise before audit sign-off that week". The conversation included a reference to a model to be used for the underwriting agreement and an assurance that Striker would be happy with the draft agreements. I find this to be an assurance by an authorised representative of AGF to Striker that the underwriting was proceeding, that the completion of necessary formalities was imminent and, in the circumstances, this was in effect an assurance by AGF to Striker that the underwriting and the proposed capital raising was secure and on track to allow the issue to occur in March 1998.
108 Striker alleges that the representations giving rise to the estoppel included the terms of a letter of 12 December 1997 by Mr Quek on behalf of AGF to Striker's auditors Price Waterhouse. The defendant does not admit that any such letter was sent, but says that if it was it expressly stated that the terms and conditions of any underwriting agreement were yet to be finalised and, therefore, could not give rise to the representation alleged. This plea of non-admission and avoidance, rather than confession and avoidance, does little to enhance the reliability of the facts alleged by the defendant in its pleading. It was proved by the plaintiff (Exhibit 59) that AGF provided Striker with a letter intended to be delivered to the plaintiff's auditors to deal with the going concern query already described in [42] above. This letter, over the hand of Mr Quek as managing director of AGF, was as follows:
"Striker Resources NL: Representation Letter
For audit purposes we advise that Australian Goldfields NL (AFN) intends to enter into a formal underwriting agreement with Striker Resources NL (Striker) pursuant to which AFN will underwrite a rights issue by Striker to raise approximately $7.5 million. The terms and conditions of the Underwriting Agreement are being finalised.
Further AFN will, if necessary, provide sufficient funding to Striker to meet its ongoing operations expenditure commitments for at least the next twelve months up to a maximum of approximately $3 million.
In addition, AFN confirms that it will not call for repayment of loans to Striker to the detriment of Striker or any of its controlled entities within the next twelve months.
Yours sincerely,
Australian Goldfields NL
Cyril Quek
Managing Director"
109 In this context the only commercial significance which could be placed on this letter was that it contained an assurance by AGF that it was backing Striker to the extent of $7,500,000, would make an advance on those funds of $3,000,000 to meet short-term obligations and would not call for repayment any loans from Striker within 12 months. It did not refer to the proposed underwriting agreement being finalised but the representations, as a whole, indicated a firm commercial commitment to that underwriting, and a realisation that the commitment was being offered in circumstances where Striker was relying upon it for audit approval where that capital raising was vital to the plaintiff's liquidity.
110 The plaintiff relies on certain notes to its financial accounts for 31 March 1997 and 30 September 1997 as reflecting agreement by AGF/Striker directors on its board that the underwriting was proceeding. By par 17O the defendant does not admit the existence of the alleged notes but, again, with the pleader's revealing adroitness, asserts that such conduct was that of the plaintiff and not of the defendant. Note 21 to Striker's Annual Report for 1997 (Exhibit 11, p 33) recording the terms of the secondary underwriting obligation by AGF has already been referred to. At note 4 to Striker's financial statements for the half year ended 30 September 1997 (Exhibit 62, p 8 and 9) there is also the following passage:
"AFN has advanced the Company approximately $700,000 to fund on-going operations to 30 September 1997. Subsequent to 30 September 1997, AFN has advanced the Company an additional $800,000. AFN has agreed to not call on these amounts to the detriment of the economic entity. In addition, AFN has pledged further financial support until the new Underwriting Agreement has been finalised.
The Company and AFN are in the process of finalising the Underwriting Agreement for the new issue of shares by pro rata offer to members and a convertible note agreement in respect of current borrowings. It is expected that the Company will repay its borrowings to AFN from the issue of new shares."
That report was signed in accordance with the resolution of the directors of Striker on 12 September 1997. While the reports and the notes are certainly reports of Striker, there is no doubt that they reflect statements and beliefs of those of the company's directors who were also directors of AGF and that they are the product of decisions in which representatives of AGF participated.
111 The AGF directors on Striker's board did in fact agree to these notes (see minutes of directors' meeting of 25 June 1997, Exhibit 1, p 29, attended, among others, by Messrs Young, Wong and Quek who were each directors of AGF at the time) and at a meeting of directors on 20 October 1997 (Exhibit 1, p 21), also attended by Messrs Wong and Quek and by invited representatives of AGF being Messrs Naylor and Gore. The need for the inclusion of the notes in these accounts to avoid the possibility of an audit qualification, previously mentioned, was the subject of a memorandum from Mr Hart to the chairman and directors of Striker dated 1 December 1997 (Exhibit 53), and the draft financial statements for the half year ended 30 September 1997 containing (at p 3, Exhibit 55) a reference to AGF's underwriting of a new pro rata share issue to raise a minimum of $7.5 million by prospectus was distributed to all directors of Striker on 8 December 1997 under cover of a memo which referred to communications between the company's auditors and AGF to discuss the audit issue. This was followed by a distribution from Mr Hart to all the directors of Striker and to Mr Wong and to Mr Lambert of AGF of the final half yearly statements to 30 September 1997, including the changes requested by Price Waterhouse in Note 4 (Exhibit 60).
112 I am satisfied that these notes were included in the Striker accounts with the knowledge and with the approval of AGF and reflected a continuing assurance of AGF that it would complete the underwriting for the new share issue.
113 To support the alleged estoppel, Striker also relies upon a note in AGF's published annual report for 1997 (Exhibit 21, p 50) where, under the heading "Subsequent Events", there is the following entry:
"(a) Underwriting of Securities of Striker Resources NL
On 15 July 1997 the company announced that it would enter into a new underwriting agreement with Striker Resources NL to underwrite a new issue of shares by pro-rata offer to members of Striker Resources NL by prospectus to raise a minimum of $7.5 million."
The defendant admits that this note forms part of its financial statements for the year ended 30 June 1997 but denies that it conveys or constitutes a representation in the terms alleged or at all. That annual report was published to the shareholders of AGF and to the market in or about late September 1997. Having regard to the other information which had been published to shareholders and to the market (the 15 July 1997 announcements to the ASX (Exhibit 25)) and to the importance of the proposed exploration of the diamond tenements at Kimberley/Ashmore, such an announcement can have no purpose or significance other than to constitute a public assurance of AGF's intention to undertake that underwriting.
114 This allegation is not admitted by the defendant who further pleads that it is incapable of giving rise to any such representation as alleged and that its repeated statements that the underwriting agreement was yet to be finalised was an implied representation that the defendant did not regard itself as being bound by the terms of the secondary underwriting commitment. Up until the appointment of administrators to AGF on 6 March 1998 there was no advice, communication, correspondence or information from AGF to Striker that it could not or would not proceed with the underwriting of the proposed share issue. The appointment of administrators to AGF in March 1998 was, however, a very ominous sign of a possible inability of AGF to discharge that obligation and prompted immediate enquiries from Striker as to AGF's intentions in this respect, leading to correspondence with one of the administrators and a meeting with him in late March and early April 1998 (Exhibits 84, 85 and 86) resulting in the administrator advising that he was taking legal advice about the position. The first intimation of the possible uncertainty, and lack of enforceability of the secondary underwriting agreement, is contained in the Administrators' report to creditors of about 17 June 1998 (see Exhibit 106). By then, however, Striker had regarded the agreement as having been repudiated by AGF and claims to have accepted that repudiation and terminated the agreement in either June or August 1998.
115 Putting to one side the question of whether or not there was an act of repudiation, and if so whether and when it was accepted, I am satisfied that at least until March 1998 AGF maintained its position that it would underwrite the proposed share issue in conformity with the representations originally made in cl 10.2 of the December 1996 agreement and repeated in various ways since then, as alleged by the plaintiff by the events and representations said to give rise to the estoppel which have now been examined. I am satisfied that the common understanding of the parties was that the secondary underwriting arrangements would proceed, that for various reasons not entirely acceptable to Striker, the share issue would be deferred until the first quarter in 1998 and, that to AGF's knowledge this was the only source of capital being pursued by Striker at the time.
116 Striker's plea of estoppel also advances the assertion that, in reliance upon the common assumption induced by AGF that the secondary underwriting would be performed and while AGF at all times realised that Striker was relying upon its representations that the secondary underwriting would be performed, the plaintiff acted in such a way which has made it unconscionable for the defendant to depart from the common assumption that it would obtain the necessary working capital by the share issue fully underwritten by the defendant in early 1998. The factors which provide this final ingredient of reliance and preclusion necessary to establish the estoppel are, according to the plaintiff:
(a) the plaintiffs acceptance of the timing schedule for the underwriting proposed by AGF from time to time, involving, as this did, progressive deferrals of the underwritten share issue;
(b) its reliance upon the anticipated underwritten share issue rather than seek alternative underwriting, working capital or other funds while it was waiting for performance of the secondary underwriting by the defendant; and
(c) its acceptance of the assurances from the defendant's representatives that it would not renege on the underwriting and would proceed in accordance with the deferred schedule for the share issue.
117 That the postponement of the fully underwritten share issue to raise $7.5 million "as soon as possible after 30 June 1997" to the end of March 1998 and beyond caused the plaintiff problems because of its need to fund operational and administrative expenditure and to meet other outgoings has been accepted by AGF. One of the expedients proposed to deal with this lack of access to capital, believed at the time to be only temporary, was, as I have already described, the proposal for up to $3,000,000 to be advanced by AGF to Striker on the issue, by the latter, of a convertible note secured against its New Sage assets and to be repaid by its conversion to shares in the new issue. The meetings of directors of the plaintiff, attended by representatives of AGF, reveal that it was agreed that such convertible note accommodation would be provided and that instructions were given to AGF's solicitors to draft the necessary note. However, this was never completed and, in retrospect, it seems that the period during which this was to receive attention, coincided with a period of financial difficulty for the defendant which led to the appointment of the administrators.
118 As another temporary expedient, the defendant advanced funds to the plaintiff to the total amount of $2,200,000 and paid accounts for the plaintiff to the further extent of $128,580.55. These payments were made over the period 1 August 1997 to 13 February 1998 (see Exhibit 113). With respect to these advances, I am satisfied that the understanding was that they would be repayable out of the moneys raised from the new underwritten share issue when that occurred.
119 There is a separate issue as to whether or not they would, for any period, bear interest at commercial or other rates but I shall defer attention to that issue until later in these reasons.
120 It did not clearly emerge from the evidence how, if at all, these advances were to be treated if the convertible note issue actually proceeded and it is certainly a possibility that, had that occurred, the advances would have been treated as forming part of the convertible note facility but nothing turns on this. The feature common to this temporary accommodation, whether by advance in anticipation of the share issue or advance upon a convertible note, was that the plaintiff would accept this financial accommodation from the defendant in the expectation that it would be satisfied in the relatively short term, by capital raised in the share issue.
121 The advances made by AGF to Striker under the interim accommodation which had been agreed were as follows:
7 August 1997 - $50,000
15 August 1997 - $50,000
18 August 1997 - $150,000
26 August 1997 - $150,000
5 September 1997 - $300,000
6 October 1997 - $400,000
5 November 1997 - $450,000
12 December 1997 - $200,000
22 January 1998 - $100,000
23 January 1998 - $100,000
13 February 1998 - $250,000
$2,200,000
This information comes from Exhibit 113 and shows that the advances began before the meetings in September 1997 when AGF first broached the deferment of the share issue until March 1998 which gave rise to discussions and eventual agreement that a convertible note issue should be made to secure advances up to $3,000,000. As the above figures reveal, advances by AGF to Striker totalling $700,000 had already been made before late September 1997. There is no evidence about the precise terms or understanding upon which these early advances were made, but I am satisfied that the mutual understanding of the parties was that AGF would fund the plaintiff for its necessary expenditure as required until the capital raising and that such advances would be repaid from the capital so raised and that this understanding became express from late September 1997 onwards when the share issue was delayed and Striker's need of funds for operational activities became larger and more pressing.
122 The plaintiff alleges that by accepting these temporary advances from AGF against the expectation that they would be satisfied only from the moneys raised by the underwritten share issue, it has also acted in a way which would render it unconscionable if the underlying assumption were to be departed from. This contention is rather Delphic. In its most absolute form it involves the contention by the plaintiff that, in the events which have happened, it is not liable to repay any part of the $2,328,580.55 to the defendant at all. Although not advanced in these terms, this submission is tantamount to an assertion that the advances made by AGF to the plaintiff (now the subject of the counterclaim) were only, if ever, repayable from capital to be raised from the share issue which the defendant was obliged to underwrite - that is, that they were, in reality, a form of non-recourse loans arising from the alleged estoppel. Modified, and in a more attractive form, the plaintiff's contention is that these advances are repayable on demand but that no demand could be made for repayment until a sufficient time had passed to allow Striker a reasonable opportunity to raise capital or finance from alternative sources once it became apparent that the new share issue would not be underwritten by the defendant. Further, in this eventuality, costs and losses occasioned by the need to make alternative arrangements to raise capital and to satisfy demand for the repayment of the loans could be set off against the indebtedness once the time for repayment had been reached.
123 AGF denies that the advances which it made to Striker pending the anticipated completion of the underwritten share issue gave rise to any estoppel but pleads further that it refrained from demanding repayment of the $2,200,000, from 17 June 1998 until 30 June 2000, thereby providing a reasonable opportunity for Striker either to raise additional capital (which in fact the plaintiff did) or to obtain alternative funding.
124 AGF further asserts that if, which it denies, any estoppel arose, then by reason of its forbearance in demanding repayment of those loans, it is not unconscionable nor to the detriment of the plaintiff for the moneys to be repaid now as sought by its counterclaim. It further alleges that from 17 June 1998 the plaintiff was able to raise further capital by the issue of shares or securities and that, accordingly, there is no justification in the plaintiff's claim that it is permanently estopped from recovering what, on AGF's approach, is a debt now due and payable. According to Mr Dodd, whose evidence I accept, the plaintiff would not have agreed to accept this interim funding if it were not to be treated as repayable out of the proceeds of the proposed share issue. In this respect the plaintiff points to a draft underwriting agreement (Exhibit 76) which provided for a share issue to raise only $5,375,000 which can be reconciled (approximately) to the intended $7,500,000 capital raising if credit is given for a little less than the $2,200,000 then being advanced.
125 On this evidence I am satisfied that there was a mutual understanding that the plaintiff would make a new share issue sufficient to raise at least $7,500,000 fully underwritten by the defendant at a time and at an issue price in accordance with the provisions of cl 10.2 of the December 1996 agreement and that, to the defendant's knowledge, the plaintiff proceeded on the basis until, at the earliest, March 1998 that this was a binding obligation and would be performed. I also accept that, in acting this way, neither party gave any consideration to the plaintiff raising capital, or other funds for its necessary expenditures, from any alternative sources believing all the while that funds would be available from the new underwritten share issue. I also accept that as a result of this common understanding, and to the knowledge of the defendant, Striker was relying upon it to underwrite a share issue which would raise this capital, accepted advances from AGF totalling $2,200,000 by the end of February 1998 and requested AGF to pay on its behalf other creditors totalling $128,580.55 on the understanding that all of those moneys would be repaid out of the capital raised by the underwritten share issue.
126 Had I concluded that the secondary underwriting obligation contained in cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement had been unenforceable because of lack of certainty or incompleteness, I would have held that, notwithstanding the absence of a binding contractual obligation to underwrite the share issue, the conduct of AGF and the plaintiff's reliance upon it to the defendant's knowledge, did create an estoppel which produced several, but limited, effects.
127 Firstly, I consider that such an estoppel would have prevented AGF from demanding repayment of any or all of the advances totalling $2,328,580.55 until Striker had a sufficient opportunity to raise capital from alternative sources or to obtain other financial accommodation from which those advances could be repaid and that the additional cost (if any) of raising capital or moneys from alternative sources to satisfy those advances could be set off by Striker against the outstanding balance of the advances. I say the additional cost of raising alternative capital because the intended source of capital from the unwritten share issue was not itself without cost. A 5 per cent underwriting commission was to be paid to the defendant as underwriter and I consider that it is equitable to attribute a 5 per cent commission to the costs of raising the $2,380,000 so that the amount which could be set off against the repayment is the cost of alternate finance or capital in excess of $116,429 ($2,328,580.55 x 5 per cent) and that, having regard to the circumstances of this case, the estoppel meant that the defendant could not demand repayment of those advances before 1 July 2000 - that is approximately two years after the disappearance of any prospect of the share issue being underwritten by AGF.
128 Another measure of relief necessary to give effect to the estoppel, in my view, is to allow compensation to the plaintiff for the effect of not being able to raise $7,500,000 less the costs of the capital raising at the end of March 1998 or, in other words, the cost of raising replacement capital and any other losses or expenses within the contemplation of the parties associated with the lack of access to that capital until a sufficient opportunity had been reached for it to be replaced. It is a nice question whether this is to recognise an entitlement to damages as if the contract had existed and, if so, whether a measure of those damages should be the same as if a contract had occurred or, on the other hand, to provide a species of compensation in equity for equivalent losses and expenses proceeding, as equity does by following the law (see Meagher Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 4th ed, Butterworths LexisNexis 2002 at ch 3 [3-040].
129 In Waltons Stores v Maher (supra) the remedy granted was that at first instance by Kearney J, namely, damages in lieu of specific performance of an agreement to grant a lease. Damages in lieu of specific performance are available under Lord Cairns Act and are in the nature of a hybrid equitable remedy (see McDermott "Equitable Damages" Butterworths 1994 at 50 - 55). In Giumelli v Giumelli [1999] HCA 10; (1999) 196 CLR 101 the relief appropriate in equity to recognise the estoppel was a payment of a monetary sum secured by a charge over the property in question, that is in effect a species of equitable charge to secure monetary compensation.
130 The variety of relief from which equity will select a remedy appropriate to the estoppel arising in any one situation was referred to, in a non-exclusive way in Giumelli v Giumelli (supra) at 113 and was expanded upon in the passage, cited by approval by the court at 121 from the judgment of McPherson J in Riches v Hogben [1985] 2 Qd R 292 at 300 - 301, leading to the conclusion at [48] at 125 that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not foreclose the making of an order for the payment of money - not to fulfil the expectation or assumption generated by the defendant's conduct, but to grant sufficient relief to compensate for the effects of departure from it, even if that only be the payment of a monetary sum (see also [50]).
131 The more is this approach apposite in the present case when one accepts, as is unavoidable, the fact that full performance of the underwriting contract, involving as it did a pro rata offer of new shares to existing shareholders, would have resulted in the defendant having the opportunity to take up a further 19 per cent or so of the shares offered by virtue of its then existing shareholding in Striker, to say nothing of the prospect of enlarging its holding to a greater extent had it been required to take up any shortfall of the issue. This means that it is impossible to grant relief which would, in effect, see the full performance of the assurance that a new share issue would be fully underwritten by the defendant, nor to grant equitable relief in the form of monetary compensation which would be fully equal to the damages which would be recoverable at common law had an enforceable underwriting contract existed. The measure of monetary relief must be to relieve against the consequences and reliance upon the expectation generated in the plaintiff, to the knowledge of the defendant, by acting on the common assumption or representation. In some cases, perhaps the present, this may equal or approximate the damages which would have been recoverable had an enforceable underwriting contract existed, but there is no reason that that should always be the case and the particular result will depend on the particular consequences caused by reliance on the representation or assumptions generated by the defendant's conduct. For a pre-Giumelli analysis of the limitations on relief, or in cases of promissory estoppel distinguishing between expectation loss and restitutionary loss, see Carter: "Contract Restitution and Promissory Estoppel" (1989) 12 UNSW Law Journal at 30 and, in particular, the discussion of Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self Serve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582. Hence, it is unnecessary to address the difficult question of whether "expectation damages" could be a component in the monetary relief granted in such a case of estoppel, where such damages would be available for breach of contract - cf Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64.
132 In the present case, I have already examined the consequences of the estoppel arising from accepting the interim payments and the measure of relief appropriate to that aspect of the estoppel. However, had the plaintiff's only entitlement to relief been dependent on this promissory estoppel, it would be necessary to examine the relief appropriate to the consequences of the removal of the assurance that the underwriting would be fully underwritten by the defendant. It seems to me that, as a matter of principle, losses or expenses suffered by the plaintiff during the period when it was acting on the expectation that the defendant would fully underwrite the new share issue, that is, from early July 1997 until August 1998, should be recoverable under this doctrine. In addition, the costs and expenses occasioned to the plaintiff by further delay before substitute financial accommodation or capital could be raised should also come within the purview of this relief. The additional costs, if any, of raising necessary working capital or other financial accommodation do not, however, seem to me to be necessarily recoverable. Such initial costs would clearly be recoverable in an action for damages for breach of an enforceable contract to perform the underwriting as flowing directly from the breach of contract involved. However, that does not seem to me to be a measure of relief for such an estoppel because of its connection with the enforcement of the particular contract concerned. For example, the cost of raising capital from alternative sources or obtaining financial accommodation may have been much greater than the cost which the defendant represented would be involved in raising capital by its underwriting, but that does not mean that that additional cost should be recoverable as relief for the estoppel so created, because reliance on the common assumption or representation has not had the effect, on that hypothesis, of depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to raise the capital or obtain the financial accommodation at that cheaper rate. However, if reliance upon the representation or assumption which forms the basis of the estoppel did in fact deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity to raise capital more cheaply or earlier from other sources, the onus of proof of which would rest upon the plaintiff, then that would be a detriment resulting from reliance upon the representation or common assumption which would warrant a corresponding measure of relief.
133 There was no suggestion in the present case that, at any time between June 1997 and August 1998, the plaintiff could have raised $7,500,000 from the capital markets or from other sources more cheaply than such money would cost had the defendant performed the secondary underwriting and, in this case, therefore, no such loss of opportunity has been established. Accordingly, the measure of the relief, based solely on the estoppel generated, would be the costs, expenses and losses incurred by the plaintiff by reason of the delay in raising capital or obtaining other financial accommodation during the period when Striker was acting on the common assumption and for a period after that until there had been a reasonably sufficient opportunity for Striker to seek or obtain replacement capital or other financial accommodation once the common assumption or representation was finally exploded.
134 Because I have concluded that there is an enforceable contract between the parties for the performance of the secondary underwriting obligation, which is enforceable at the suit of the plaintiff leading to an entitlement to damages at law, it is not necessary for me to formulate and quantify the measure of monetary relief which would have been recoverable had the plaintiff's cause of action been confined to relief consequent upon the estoppel alleged proved.
135 Returning now to consider the consequences of the conclusion that the secondary underwriting obligation contained in cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement constituted an enforceable contract, it is necessary to note the position of the parties over whether or not there was any breach of that contract and, if so, whether that amounted to a repudiation which the plaintiff accepted to terminate the contract.
136 The significance of the dispute over whether or not there was any termination of the contract by the plaintiff because of an alleged repudiation of the obligations of the defendant lies in the further pleas by the defendant that, because of certain alleged subsequent drop-out events it was, in any event, relieved from the obligation to perform that secondary underwriting. These alleged further drop-out events date from June 1998 and, so the defendant contends, even if there had been a termination of the contract by the plaintiff, which it denies, a termination after the occurrence of any one or more of these drop-out events would not prevent the defendant from relying upon them to relieve it from any obligation to perform the underwriting, even when the defendant did not seek to rely upon any of those alleged drop-out events until after the commencement of this action.
137 As previously noted, underwriting of the new share issue by Striker to raise $7,500,000 was, according to cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement, to take place "as soon as possible after 30 June 1997". On 19 September 1997 Mr Gore (of AGF) rang Mr Dodd to request that a meeting be held at the offices of AGF to discuss the timing of this rights issue. What occurred at that meeting is, I find, accurately summarised in the memorandum of 23 September 1997 prepared by Striker (Exhibit 46). Messrs Dodd and Hart of Striker attended and were told by Gore that AGF wished to delay the timing of the rights issue until 31 March 1998 and needed an estimate of Striker's cash requirements for the period to that date. The Striker representatives were surprised and concerned at this request and there was discussion over whether or not such a delay was permitted under the underwriting agreement. An endeavour was made to reach a commercial solution and the need for interim funding for Striker gave rise to discussion about a convertible note issue for $3,000,000 and fixing the price of the shares for the rights issue for 31 March at 20 cents. No agreement was given at this meeting by the representatives of Striker to defer the capital raising but they pointed out it that would be necessary for a formal Striker board meeting to be held to consider the request.
138 Mr Hart of Striker reported on this development to the independent directors of the plaintiff, Messrs Dodd and Ramsay, by a memorandum of 22 September 1997 (Exhibit 45) in which he mentioned that the request for the deferment of the capital raising had "come out of the blue". Mr Hart set out a series of concerns, including the need for Striker to rely on loan funds to meet its debts and the risk that even a deferred underwriting commitment may disappear through the occurrence of any of the drop-out clauses which remained in the underwriting obligation. Mr Hart concluded by advising that a Striker board meeting had been called for 26 September 1997 to discuss the further rights issue and confirmed that he had advised the AGF secretary, Mr Gore, that the Striker group required $2,200,000 through to March 1998.
139 The board meeting of Striker to consider this development was in fact held on 30 September 1997 (Exhibit 1, p 23 - 24) and was attended by Wong, Quek and Ramsay (also directors of AGF) and by AGF's secretary, Mr Gore, who attended by invitation. The substance of the request for the deferment of the share issue put by Mr Quek was that market conditions were not then ideal for a rights issue and, subject to making interim arrangements for capital advances of $3,000,000 on convertible note and to request a new unconditional underwriting agreement at a set date and price, the Striker Board seems to have absorbed the inevitability of AGF's request and to have initiated planning for a rights issue at the end of March 1998. This gave rise to considerable concern by the officers of Striker because the ability of the plaintiff to pay its debts as they fell due, that is its solvency, depended upon access to the capital to be raised from this new share issue and, pending that, the provision of loans to it by AGF which would not be repayable before that capital had been raised. It was these considerations which led the officers of Striker to press for an unconditional new underwriting agreement which, in this setting, signified an underwriting obligation without drop-out clauses.
140 I am satisfied that there was never any abandonment by the plaintiff of the secondary underwriting obligation as contained in cl 10.2 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement, nor any release by it of the defendant from its obligations under that contract. Instead, what I conclude occurred was that somewhat reluctantly and in return for agreement for interim funding, Striker agreed to defer the new fully underwritten share issue until not later than 31 March 1998 but still subject to the terms of cl 10.2 that it should be as soon as possible.
141 The appointment of the voluntary administrators by AGF on 6 March 1998, before the new underwritten share issue expected to take place in March that year was, except for the most optimistic onlooker, a tolling of the knell for the performance of this underwriting obligation by the defendant. But despite this Striker continued to demand that AGF carry out the underwriting doing so in no less than 10 letters dated from 30 March 1998 to 25 June 1998 (Exhibits 84, 87, 91, 93, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101 and 106). Under cover of one of these, the letter of 1 May 1998 (Exhibit 91), Striker submitted to AGF a proposed prospectus and a formal underwriting agreement for execution, but AGF neglected to sign, accept or execute either document. It is this lack of response by AGF which the plaintiff contends constituted a repudiation by AGF of its secondary underwriting obligation.
142 The plaintiff then alleges that, after giving further notice demanding performance on 13 May 1998 (Exhibit 100), it elected to accept the alleged repudiatory breach of the secondary underwriting obligation either on 3 June or, alternatively, 25 August 1998, so terminating for breach the underwriting agreement.
143 The position of AGF in relation to these allegations of breach and termination, however, is that the plaintiff was never ready, willing and able to perform its obligations under the proposed fully underwritten share issue because no final prospectus or underwriting agreement was ever submitted, the documents which were submitted being incomplete and calling for either agreement upon, or specification of, further content. Because of this, so AGF argues, there was no repudiatory breach by AGF and no basis for termination of the contract by Striker. Alternatively, so AGF argues, no termination occurred before 25 August 1998 and, before then, drop-out events occurred upon which the defendant is entitled to rely to relieve it from any obligation to perform the underwriting notwithstanding that reliance upon those was not attempted at the time.
144 It is necessary, therefore, to examine the alleged breaches of contract by the defendant, to consider whether or not any or all of them amounted to a repudiation of the defendant's obligations under the underwriting agreement and, if so, when this occurred and whether the agreement was terminated for this reason by the plaintiff and, if so, when.
145 By letter dated 30 March 1998 from the plaintiff's managing director to Mr Tony Woodings, the Administrator of the defendant (Exhibit 84), the plaintiff wrote:
"Re Australian Goldfields NL (in Administration)
We refer to an agreement entered into between AGF and Striker dated 2 December 1996 whereby AGF has agreed to underwrite a pro-rata new issue of shares in Striker for a minimum amount of $7.5m.
In view of the appointment of yourself to the administration of AGF, could you please advise your position in relation to this matter.
Yours faithfully
Clayton Dodd
Managing Director"
That was followed by a meeting between the Administrator, Mr Woodings, and Messrs Hart and Dodd of Striker and representatives from the Corporate Advisory Service. At the meeting Mr Dodd asked about the rights issue and in the course of the discussion Mr Wooding said that he had the opinion that the underwriting agreement was no agreement and that the loan, resulting from the advances, was repayable. There was discussion over this and Mr Woodings indicated that he was taking legal advice on the subject and confirmed that by letter the same day (Exhibit 86).
146 On 6 April 1998, Striker wrote again to Mr Woodings (Exhibit 87) asserting the plaintiff's view that there was a valid and enforceable obligation upon AGF to underwrite the new share issue by pro rata offer to all members of Striker to raise a minimum of $7,500,000 by prospectus in accordance with cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996. This letter set out the history of the delays which had occurred, the arrangements for interim funding and concluded with Striker's assertion that the underwriting obligation remained valid and enforceable, stating that Striker would proceed with the rights issue as soon as possible and would forward shortly a draft underwriting agreement. This was followed by another letter of the same date (Exhibit 88) seeking approval from AGF to the issue of a convertible note to raise $550,000. Mr Woodings responded on 21 April stating that he was not prepared to approve that the convertible note issue (Exhibit 89).
147 By letter dated 1 May 1998 (Exhibit 91), Striker wrote to Mr Woodings reaffirming its assertion that the underwriting obligation remained valid and enforceable, stating that Striker had resolved to proceed with the rights issue and enclosing an underwriting agreement and a proposed prospectus. In this letter Mr Dodd and the plaintiff also said:
"I note that the core provisions of clause 10.2 are contained in the draft Underwriting Agreement together with certain ancillary provisions of a supplementary nature arising from the nature of the Underwriting Agreement being for a rights issue rather than an option deal. Any failure to agree to the ancillary provisions of the documents does not impact upon the substance of the core commitment and Striker is not prepared to waste time arguing over such ancillary provisions to the detriment of implementing the core commitment which is not negotiable."
The letter included a request for Mr Woodings to execute and return the underwriting agreement by 5 pm on Monday 4 May 1998. The underwriting agreement enclosed (Exhibit 91(2)) was an adaptation of the December 1996 underwriting agreement with variations considered appropriate to deal with the share issue rather than the conversion of options, providing for the shares to be issued, providing for the issue of the new shares at 20 cents par value, providing for a prospectus registered by the ASC, containing warranties by the company indicating that the terms of the prospectus were still in the course of preparation and providing for drop-out contingencies modelled on the December 1996 underwriting agreement, except for cl 10(1)(u). The closing date for the offer, upon the terms of this draft agreement was to be specified in the prospectus.
148 Mr Woodings queried (by Exhibit 94) Striker over the resolution to proceed with the rights issue and asked when the decision was made by the board and for the directors present to be named. The reply from Striker (Exhibit 94(3)) was that the resolution to proceed occurred on 1 May 1998 and that the decision was taken by Messrs Dodd and Ramsay being those Striker directors who were not also directors or associates of AGF - that is, Wong, Quek and Bartley who, it was suggested, were required to abstain from voting. By that letter Mr Dodd said the decision had yet to be ratified by a formally convened meeting of Striker's board.
149 By letter of 6 May 1998 Mr Woodings enquired about the assertion that he had an obligation to execute the draft underwriting agreement and return it by 4 May and queried the source of the alleged obligation. Also on 6 May 1998 (Exhibit 97), Woodings wrote to Striker requesting its proposal for the repayment of the loan of $2,200,000 and asking whether repayment was totally contingent upon Striker obtaining further equity funds asking, in that case, when Striker expected those funds to be available. This is somewhat disingenuous as it must have been apparent to Mr Woodings, for it was certainly known to the directors of AGF, that Striker had always been looking for the fully underwritten capital raising as to source of the repayment of those advances.
150 This was followed by a reply from Striker of 7 May 1998 (Exhibit 98) identifying the underwriting obligation as originating in cl 10.2 of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 and then saying:
"I reiterate that, in view of the prior delays requested by AFN, Striker is now placed in a position where it needs to move quickly in respect of the rights issue in order to provide much needed funding for its activities and also to allow Striker to repay the interim funding provided by AFN.
Indeed I am becoming increasingly concerned that your failure to unequivocally to respond to this matter may be evidence of AFN's intention to repudiate its underwriting obligation under clause 10.2.
Therefore I request that you execute and return the Underwriting Agreement to me by 5.00 pm Friday 8 May 1998."
This was followed by a second letter of 7 May 1998 (Exhibit 99) essentially making the same assertions and demands, asserting that the interest rate on the interim funding was nil and asking again for a response by AGF to Striker's request "to advance the remaining $800,000 available pursuant to AFN's funding obligation". This request for additional interim funding of $800,000 would, if given, have increased the advances to $3,000,000 and must be taken to be made on the basis that, before administration, AGF had agreed to provide interim funding to a total of $3,000,000 to be secured by a convertible note.
151 There was no response by Mr Woodings or AGF to these demands so Striker wrote again on 13 May (Exhibit 100) expressing surprise at the lack of response in the light of the urgency of the situation and then stating:
" ... Striker is prepared to offer you one last opportunity to execute and return the Underwriting Agreement to me by 5.00 pm Wednesday 13 May 1998.
If we do not hear from you then, Striker will have little option but to treat your failure to respond as a repudiation of AFN's obligations under clause 10.2 of the Underwriting Agreement dated 2 December 1996. Striker reserves all its rights in that regard."
To this, there was no response from Mr Woodings or AGF and Striker wrote yet again on 3 June (Exhibit 101) alluding to Mr Dodd's understanding that offers to refinance AFN or to acquire its assets were being submitted to Mr Woodings and stating that any reorganisation of AFN which took into account the underwriting agreement and the advance of $2,200,000 made against the underwriting agreement would require Striker's consideration and approval prior to any formal agreement being entered into. The letter intimated that an appropriate extension of time might be considered for the execution or assignment of the underwriting agreement if such refinancing or acquisition proposals were occurring.
152 A simple letter of acknowledgement from Mr Woodings dated 10 June 1998 was sent in reply (Exhibit 104) but this made no reference to whether or not the underwriting would proceed, or whether the draft underwriting agreement was acceptable or what, if any, financial support or reconstruction for AFG was being considered.
153 Due to its urgent need for operating funds Striker had in May and early June, entered into discussions with Poynton Corporate Ltd resulting in the issue of a secured convertible note by the plaintiff to raise $500,000. An announcement to that effect was made by Striker to the ASX on 8 June 1998 (Exhibit 105).
154 As there was no further response from Mr Woodings, Striker prepared a memorandum to the Creditors' Committee of AGF which referred to a report to creditors by the administrators made pursuant to s 439A of the Corporations Law setting out the Administrator's opinion on certain major issues arising for AFN creditors in relation to Striker, namely:
• whether the defendant was liable to Striker to underwrite a rights issue to raise approximately $7,500,000;
• whether AFN was liable to extend further funding to Striker;
• whether AGF was able to recover the unsecured loan made to Striker.
This memorandum of the plaintiff's advised that Striker had obtained Queen Counsel's opinion, with which the Directors agreed, that AGF was liable to underwrite the new share issue, that it was also liable to extend further funding of $800,000 and that the $2,200,000 of interim advances was repayable but not until 12 December 1998 at the earliest and then only out of the proceeds of a rights issue. This letter was accompanied by a lengthy annexure setting out in more detail the relevant background and Striker's position maintaining the alleged obligation of the defendant to underwrite the share issue.
155 Later, on 21 July 1998, AGF entered into a deed of assignment of "all of its right title and interest in and to the loan and any rights pursuant to the Underwriting Agreement in the further funding on the terms of this deed" - a purported assignment of the benefit, and perhaps also the obligations, which it had under the underwriting agreement of December 1996. This assignment, made without notice to, or consent of, the plaintiff (Exhibit 109) was subject to approval by the ASIC for a modification of s 698 of the Corporations Law (condition 2.1(a)), which in the events which happened, was refused by ASIC (Exhibit 140) on 7 August 1998. Nevertheless, up to the date of this purported assignment by AGF the defendant had given no notice, as required under cl 10.2, of the occurrence of, or reliance upon, any alleged drop-out event to relieve it from any obligation to carry out the underwriting.
156 Striker's submission to the AGF Creditors' Committee of 25 June 1998 (Exhibit 106) addresses particular assertions made by the administrators to the creditors. Significant among these were certain propositions advanced by the administrators to the company's creditors which had led the administrators to state that the defendant had no potential liability to Striker for the underwriting obligation. In short, the basis for that conclusion, put forward by the administrators, was that:
• The obligation to enter a new underwriting agreement was so uncertain as to be unenforceable.
• AGF's obligations to underwrite were essentially subject to the same contingency conditions as those contained in the underwriting agreement.
• Certain of such contingencies had occurred with the effect that AGF was released from any underwriting obligation. These contingencies being:
These assertions by the Administrators of AGF must be taken into account in the context of the time which was passing during which AGF was making no response to the demands from the plaintiff that it should execute the underwriting agreement proffered on 1 May 1998 and in the situation where it was known that the raising of capital was both urgent and essential for the continued operation of the plaintiff's business.
157 The Striker Annual Report of 1998 published in late October or early November 1998 contains a passage in the notes (Exhibit 119, p 32), as follows:
"On 25 August 1998, the Company advised the Administrators of AFN that AFN's continuing failure to comply with its Underwriting Obligation was a repudiatory breach which the Company accepted, and reserved all its rights against AFN including a claim for all the loss and damages suffered by the Company as a result of the breach which the Company accepted."
A note to similar effect is to be found in Striker's Annual Report for 1999 published in or about late October 1999 (Exhibit 120, p 30).
158 Significantly, the letter of 25 August 1998 (Exhibit 121(2)) from Mr Dodd as managing director of Striker, to Mr Woodings as joint Administrator of AGF, says:
"I refer to my letters of 7 May, 13 May and 3 June 1998 and note from your Circular to Creditors dated 20 August 1998 that:
1. AFN has sold all its shares in Striker to Diamond Rose NL pursuant to the takeover bid made by that company.
2. AFN continues to deny the validity of the $7.5 million underwriting commitment to Striker.
3. At a meeting of the creditors of AFN to be held on 28 August 1998, you intend to request the creditors to decide to either execute a deed of company arrangement or to wind AFN up and that your administration will terminate. The proposed deed of company arrangement makes no provision for the performance of the underwriting commitment referred to in 2 above.
In all circumstances, AFN's failure to comply with its $7.5 million underwriting commitment to Striker is a continuing repudiation of AFN's obligations under cl 10.2 of the Underwriting Agreement dated 2 December 1996. Striker hereby accepts AFN's repudiatory breach and claims all damages arising as a result thereof.
Striker hereby reserves all its rights against AFN, including a claim for all the loss and damages suffered by Striker as a result of the repudiatory breach of AFN. I will write to you shortly in relation to the extent of Striker's loss and damage, but you will no doubt appreciate that such damages will be significant.
Yours faithfully
Clayton Dodd
Managing Director"
Then, on 1 September 1998, Mr Hart, as secretary of Striker, notified the ASX, which in turn published the notification to the market immediately in the following terms:
"Striker Resources NL ('Striker') has advised Australian Goldfields NL (Administrators Appointed) ('AFN') that Striker has accepted the repudiatory breach of AFN's underwriting obligations and has reserved all rights against AFN, including a claim for all the costs and damages suffered by Striker as a result of the repudiatory breach.
K R Hart
Company Secretary"
159 Counsel for AGF, however, points to Exhibit 121(1), a letter from Mr Hart to an officer of the ASX of 25 August 1998, which encloses a copy of the letter of 25 August to Mr Woodings accepting the alleged repudiation of the underwriting agreement which includes the sentence: "This letter is part of the legal process in setting up a counterclaim and rights of set off". The suggestion put by counsel for AGF to Mr Hart in cross-examination was, essentially, that Striker always realised that there was no concluded enforceable secondary underwriting obligation, and for that reason it accepted the deferral of the share issue in the latter part of 1997 and early 1998 and, without any legal commitment to the underwriting had accepted borrowings from AGF which, when the company went into administration, meant that Striker was exposed to a demand for repayment of the borrowings without a firm underwriting commitment or other access to capital and that the assertion of a claim for damages and of "breaches of the secondary underwriting agreement" were simply ploys by Striker to stave off an inevitable claim from the defendant for the recovery of the $2,200,000 and other moneys advanced and were, as Exhibit 121(1) states, simply designed to "set up a counterclaim" which had no merit. These several assertions were all rejected by Mr Hart. In the first place I am satisfied that at all times Messrs Hart and Dodd, and for that matter all the directors of Striker, including the AGF nominated directors, believed and accepted until March 1998 that the secondary underwriting obligation was and remained legally enforceable.
160 Having regard to the events which transpired after the appointment of administrators, I consider that there was a repudiation by AGF, through its administrators, of that obligation, for reasons set out in more detail below, and that, acting on legal advice Striker's directors considered that they were entitled to accept that repudiation and terminate the contract and did so by their communications of 25 August 1998. I do not consider that there was anything suspicious about that acceptance of the repudiation. I can accept that, having regard to the express desires of the administrators of AGF for the repayment of the interim advances, there was every incentive for Striker to crystallise any possible entitlement to damages or other monetary relief which it might have had against the defendant so that this could be asserted as a set-off, if necessary, against the anticipated claim from AGF for the payment of the interim advances. However, there is nothing artificial, surreptitious or discreditable about this for it was a logical and necessary step to take by the directors of Striker who, necessarily, were acting to advance and preserve the interests of their company.
161 Because I have concluded that the acceptance by Striker of a repudiation of its obligations by AGF occurred on 25 August 1998 it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to address the defendant's submissions that the demands for the execution of the draft underwriting agreement made by Striker by its letter of 3 June 1998 were not effective because there had been no proper meeting of all the directors of the board and there had not then been any ratification of the decision by the two non-AGF directors to demand execution of the preferred underwriting agreement. There is no evidence to suggest that the demand by Striker, by its letter of 3 June 1998 for the execution of the draft underwriting agreement, was not in fact authorised by the company or that the two directors who had given instructions for the demand to be made did not have the authority of the company to act in that fashion. No such lack of authority was ever pleaded or put in issue by the defendant and no evidence was called by the defendant from other former directors of the plaintiff to suggest that the demand was unauthorised. Furthermore, there was no point taken at the time that the demand was not authorised, despite Mr Woodings' query as to the manner in which, and the source from which, it originated.
162 On an examination of the correspondence relied on by the plaintiff over the period from 30 March to 25 August 1998 it becomes apparent that the first and only unequivocal statement of an acceptance of a repudiation was the letter of 25 August 1998 and that, until then there was still, although somewhat faint and progressively diminishing, some prospect of imminent performance. However, in the time which had elapsed by 25 August 1998 and having regard to the urgency of the performance of the underwriting as the source of the needed capital, there was clearly a basis upon which Striker could conclude that the defendant had neither the intention nor the ability to perform its obligations and that its conduct had been sufficiently demonstrated to constitute a repudiation of that obligation which was thereupon accepted.
Default by AGF under the underwriting agreement
163 For reasons already canvassed, I have concluded that by 25 August 1998 AGF had unequivocally shown that it was not prepared to perform its secondary underwriting obligations in accordance with the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996 and that that conduct amounted to a repudiation which was accepted by Striker on 25 August 1998.
164 An additional question arises as to whether, and if so when, AGF was in breach of its secondary underwriting obligation before then. The secondary underwriting obligation provided for a fully underwritten share issue "as soon as possible after 30 June 1997". Obviously the parties intended, and by the use of this language achieved, a certain elasticity for the timing of the underwritten share issue which, having regard to the context of the agreement and its commercial purpose, can be taken to acknowledge that a certain degree of delay in the timing might be inevitable or desirable because of market conditions and any practical problems which might be experienced in the evolution of the steps taken to achieve the listing. Nevertheless, the provisions for timing placed a premium on celerity rather than on a tolerant and indulgent patience. This is apparent not merely from cl 16 of the December 1996 agreement which provided for time to be of the essence, and to continue to be of the essence even if extensions were granted, but also because the commercial object of the secondary underwriting was to achieve a capital raising which would replace, if necessary, the capital which would otherwise have been raised on 30 June 1997 by the exercise of the June 1997 options.
165 The proposals discussed at the board meeting of directors of Striker on 30 September 1997, and in the earlier meetings with directors of AGF, to postpone the underwritten share issue until not later than the end of the March quarter 1998 themselves show that such an extension was outside the scope of the flexible time limits which were in the minds of the representatives of the contracting parties and, further, the need for interim substitute finance by way of unsecured advances and/or the convertible note issue that were then being discussed reinforce that conclusion.
166 Neither of the parties made any submissions as to whether that extension of the underwriting until the end of March 1998 at the latest was an agreed variation of the underwriting agreement or, alternatively, constituted a breach which was waived by Striker. In the circumstances I consider that I should regard that as a reluctant extension of the time for performance, both of the share issue and the underwriting but one which left time as of the essence of the contractual obligation. By then AGF was in default in failing to adhere to a timing which would allow the share issue to occur "as soon as possible" after 30 June 1997 and nothing in the extension of time showed a waiver of that default by Striker or of its potential consequences. In retrospect it is now apparent that AGF was "going slow" in relation to the underwriting and was doing this from September 1997 at least. For the proposed underwritten share issue to have taken place on or before 31 March 1998 it would have been essential for a prospectus to have been prepared and the derivative terms of the issue, that is as to timing and share price to have been established a month or so before then, but there was simply no significant progress towards those ends. I am satisfied that the relative inactivity and lack of progress during this period was due to AGF, not merely because there were no commitments formally forthcoming from AGF or its representatives but, more significantly, because the AGF nominated directors on the Striker board were taking no steps to force a rapid conclusion of the share issue/underwriting arrangements. Having regard to AGF's large shareholding in the plaintiff, and Striker's dependence on AGF for continuing funding, it was not commercially realistic for the independent directors of Striker to force the pace or to make an issue about the desultory rate of progress.
167 The consequence of this, in my view, is that AGF was in breach of its obligations to participate in taking all steps necessary to render the contract effective so as to achieve an underwritten share issue not later than the extended date of 31 March 1998 and that the defendant was in breach of this obligation from not later than September 1997 and quite possibly earlier. By appointing administrators on 6 March 1998 AGF effectively demonstrated that it was in no position to underwrite such a share issue at or before the end of March or at any period within the next few months or so - as events actually demonstrated.
168 From the time of the appointment of the administrators onwards the readiness and willingness of AGF to acknowledge and perform its underwriting obligation became more and more doubtful. Not only was there no acknowledgement by the administrators of the existence of such an obligation but there was an actual refusal to give any positive commitment to it at the meeting between Mr Woodings and the plaintiff directors of 3 April 1998. Further, as is noted below, during the period of April and May 1998 when Striker was attempting to address the liquidity problems arising from the failure of the underwriting, the Administrator of AGF declined to authorise the raising of a small interim loan by the issue of a convertible note to a third party or the issue of a share placement to Hartley Poynton/Rio Tinto to raise much needed funds yet pushed for a timetable for the repayment of the $2,200,000 advances.
169 This was occurring after the end of March 1998 when AGF was already in default in performing its obligations to underwrite the share issue on time but when AGF was also putting into question the existence of any obligation to do so - Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 CLR 17; Shevill v Builders' Licensing Board [1982] HCA 47; (1982) 149 CLR 620 at 626 and Foran v Wight [1989] HCA 51; (1989) 168 CLR 385. The attempted assignment by AGF of the underwriting agreement to Diamond Rose NL is a further demonstration of renunciatory or self-disabling conduct - Hoad v Swann [1920] HCA 50; (1920) 28 CLR 258 at 264 - see generally Cheshire & Fifoot's "Law of Contract", 8th Australian ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2002 at [21.10]. I am satisfied that, from September 1997, that is before the appointment of administrators to AGF on 6 March 1998 the defendant was never ready, willing and able to perform its obligations to underwrite the proposed share issue.
Reliance upon occurrence of contingencies to trigger drop-out clauses
170 A question which arises upon the pleaded issues and the evidence is whether AGF is entitled to rely on any of the drop-out clauses in the secondary underwriting agreement to relieve it from the obligation to perform the underwriting during the period in which it had delayed performance or was progressively demonstrating an intention not to be bound - ultimately culminating in repudiation.
171 It is well established that rights which have accrued to the defaulting party before termination may be enforced, even after the termination of the contract on the ground of that claimant's default - Ettridge v Vermin Board of the District of Urat Bay [1928] SASR 124. However, once the contract has been terminated, either because of breach or because of the election by the plaintiff to accept the defendant's repudiation, it is determined for all purposes and is discharged - McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd [1933] HCA 25; (1933) 48 CLR 457; Holland v Wiltshire [1954] HCA 42; (1954) 90 CLR 409 per Dixon CJ at 416 and Victoria Economic Development Corporation v Cloverdale Pty Ltd [1992] VicRp 40; [1992] 1 VR 596 at 602 - 603.
172 Later in these reasons I address the particular issue whether or not any of the drop-out contingencies which might have entitled the defendant to withdraw from the underwriting agreement had occurred before the date of termination, but the mere occurrence of such a drop-out condition does not entitle the defendant to withdraw from the underwriting. A notice of intention to do so, specifying the drop-out contingency, is required under the provisions of cl 10.1. If no such notice in writing terminating the underwriting agreement is ever given, the underwriting agreement continues with the defendant's obligations unabated.
173 No such written notice by AGF relying upon any alleged drop-out contingency to relieve it from its obligations under the secondary underwriting obligation was ever given by the defendant before the termination of the contract, nor was any such notice given subsequently. Nevertheless, the defendant submits that reliance upon the drop-out contingencies may be maintained and that, by AGF's defence and counterclaim, sufficient notice of such reliance has been given and that this entitles AGF to terminate the underwriting agreement, even if belatedly, and to relieve it from any obligations.
174 The first response of the plaintiff to this contention is that once the underwriting agreement has been terminated because of an acceptance of repudiation by the defendant the defendant is unable to rely in any respect upon the terms of the agreement to enforce rights or entitlements which had not accrued before the date of termination - McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (supra). However, the defendant next relies on the terms of cl 10.1 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement for the submission that the right to rely on a drop-out contingency after termination has been expressly preserved because of the provisions in cl 10.1 that:
"In the event of the happening of any one or more of the following contingencies after the Execution Date and prior to that date that is eight (8) Business Days after the Closing Date, the Underwriter may, at any time after becoming aware thereof, without cost or liability to itself, by notice in writing to the Company, terminate this Underwriting Agreement and be relieved of all its obligations hereunder, but no such notice shall operate to the prejudice of any liability of the Company arising out of any prior default by it hereunder.
Any delay in giving such notice shall not be treated as a waiver of such right and a further notice or notices as aforesaid may be given notwithstanding that subsequently the relevant contingency ceases to exist and notwithstanding any activity on the part of the underwriter which is consistent with the performance by it of its obligations hereunder."
Plainly, cl 10.1, contemplates notice of termination to be given in writing but at any time after AGF becomes aware of the existence of a drop-out contingency. Any delay is not to be treated as waiver and notice of termination may be given notwithstanding conduct on the part of the underwriter consistent with the performance of its obligations under the agreement - such as in the present case the conditional assignment for the benefit of the underwriting agreement to Diamond Rose NL by the defendant on 21 July 1998 (Exhibit 109).
175 The defendant cited Shepherd v Felt and Textiles of Australia Ltd [1931] HCA 21; (1931) 45 CLR 359 in support of its submission that the benefit of the right to terminate the underwriting obligation under cl 10.1, notwithstanding delay in giving notice, survives acceptance of repudiation. Shepherd's case concerned the termination of an employment contract and stands for the proposition that a party is entitled to rely on grounds for termination that were not known to the party at the time of termination - see at 370 - 371 per Rich J, at 373 per Starke J and at 377 - 378 per Dixon J. However, reliance on the unknown ground is permitted to the party not in breach who nevertheless terminates the contract because of an alleged breach. Shepherd does not support the converse proposition advanced by the defendant that a party in breach may, after termination of the contract because of its repudiation exercise a right conferred on it by the contract which had not accrued before the termination. Of course, termination will not prevent reliance upon secondary obligations governing liability for the breach - Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd [1980] UKPCHCA 1; (1980) 144 CLR 300. Such secondary obligations, the enforceability of which would survive termination would include, among others, a choice of law or choice of forum clause, express provisions relating to the limitation of liability (in Port Jackson Stevedoring - a "Himalaya" clause) or an arbitration clause). This was recognised in Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd at 306 - 307, where Lord Wilberforce said of the "Himalaya" clause in the bill of lading which purported to bar an action if not brought within a year of delivery of the goods:
"Moreover it is quite unreal to equate this clause with those provisions in the contract which related to performance. It is a clause which comes into operation when contractual performance has become impossible, or has been given up: then, it regulates the manner in which liability for breach of contract is to be established. In this respect their Lordships find it relevantly indistinguishable from an arbitration clause, or a forum clause, which, on clear authority, survive a repudiatory breach (Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356; Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] UKHL 2; [1980] AC 827. [Counsel] appealed for support to some observations by Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (supra at 849) where reference is made to putting an end 'to all primary obligations remaining unperformed'. But these words were never intended to cover such 'obligations' to use Lord Diplock's word, as arise when primary obligations have been put an end to. There then arise, on his Lordship's analysis, secondary obligations which include an obligation to pay monetary compensation. Whether these have been modified by agreement is a matter of construction of the contract."
176 Returning to the terms of cl 10.1, it is immediately obvious that the option for the underwriter to terminate the obligation in the event the occurrence or one or more of the named contingencies was intended to operate while the contract remained executory and before the underwriter was required to pay for, or to take up, any shortfall in the share issue offered to the existing shareholders. Its commercial purpose, obviously enough, was to allow the underwriter to terminate its obligations if any certain specified events which would probably diminish the prospect of the share issue being fully subscribed were to occur or, in other words, to protect the underwriter from a more exorbitant obligation than anticipated because of the occurrence of events productive of a fall in the demand or the market price for the securities being offered. Such a protective right would avail the underwriter only so long as, otherwise, it remained liable to perform its underwriting obligation. This right of termination is a right to excuse performance, and not a right to insist on the absence or limit of liabilities which will accrue if the contract has been terminated because of a refusal to perform by the underwriter.
177 This is enough to conclude that no notice of termination of the underwriting obligation because of any alleged drop-out contingency having been given by the defendant for termination before 25 August 1998, the defendant may not now, by its defence and counterclaim, and could not have at any time since the termination of the contract because of its repudiation, put an end to its underwriting obligation because of a drop-out contingency eventuating.
178 The plaintiff relies on a further submission to exclude AGF's post-termination attempt to rely upon any drop-out contingency. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the events relied upon by AGF to justify termination under the drop-out clauses were caused either by the defendant's breach of cl 10.2 or by the defendant unconscionably withdrawing from its representation that it would underwrite a further share issue with the consequence that AGF is not entitled to rely upon its own breach of contract or unconscionable action to avoid the consequences of breach in cl 10.2 or an estoppel.
179 It is necessary to remove from that submission the references to unconscionable conduct or to avoid the consequences of an estoppel because if there is no enforceable contract there could be no reliance upon the drop-out clauses. In that eventuality the significance of drop-out contingencies would need to be measured as part of the expectation or assumption upon which the plaintiff had relied when determining what relief was appropriate to vindicate the estoppel created. That is quite a separate and different issue from that which arises in the light of binding contractual obligations here being examined. Nevertheless, the balance of the plaintiff's submissions remain and are supported by passages in the judgment of Latham CJ, Williams and Fullagar JJ in Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418 at 440 - 441, including the passage at 441:
"But if the stipulation be that the contract shall be void on the happening of an event which one or either of them can by his own act or omission bring about, then the party, who by his own act or omission brings that event about, cannot be permitted either to insist upon the stipulation himself or to compel the other party, who is blameless, to insist upon it, because to permit the blameable party to do either would be to permit him to take advantage of his own wrong ... per Lord Atkinson in New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1 at 9".
180 On this basis the drop-out contingencies could not be relied upon by the defendant if the particular contingency or contingencies which arose had occurred because of the conduct of AGF. It is appropriate, therefore, to turn to an examination of the defendant's allegations in this respect.
181 There are five drop-out events which the defendant alleges enable it to terminate any underwriting obligation. All occurred after the appointment of administrators to the defendant on 6 March 1998. The five contingencies are:
(a) the suspension of Striker's shares from quotation on the ASX on 9 March 1998 - cl 10.1(t);
(b) the announcement by Striker on 20 March 1998 that it entered into a variation of a joint venture known as the New Sage Joint Venture relieving New Sage from the obligation to make further contributions to the joint venture - cl 10.1(m);
(c) a takeover offer made in April 1998 by Diamond Rose for all the ordinary issued shares of Striker - cl 10.1(m);
(d) Striker's agreement on or about 8 June 1989 to issue convertible notes to a value of $500,000 - item 10.1(c);
(e) issue of shares and options by Striker to a value of $500,000 without AGF's approval as part of the Ashton Exploration Joint Venture - item 10.1(c).
183 This occurred and was done at the request of Striker. The resolution to request the suspension is contained in Exhibit 79 and records that the operations of Striker were being financed by AGF until the completion of the capital raising and that the directors believed that it was in the interests of the plaintiff and all shareholders to suspend trading in its securities until the position of AGF was resolved and, if necessary, alternative financing arrangements were made for the company. Those were the terms of the announcement made by the plaintiff to the market.
184 I am satisfied that this was the only reason which led to the request for the suspension of the securities and that it was prompted by the appointment of administrators by the defendant. However, the act of appointment of administrators was not in itself a breach of the underwriting agreement, let alone a breach amounting to repudiation. It was never treated as such by the plaintiff and, consequently, the rule that an event brought about by the wrongful conduct of a party to the contract cannot be relied upon by that party to discharge it from an obligation, so raising the issue concerning Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (supra), does not arise. However, no notice of termination relying upon this contingency was ever given by the defendant before the termination of contract on 25 August 1998 and, consequently, this event may not now be relied upon by the defendant to relieve it from the consequences of its failure to meet the agreed underwriting obligation.
185 AGF contends that this constituted a material adverse change in the financial position of Striker and so triggered the contingency entitling AGF to give notice under cl 10.1(m) of the December 1996 agreement. Due consideration of this contention requires an examination of the rather elaborate dealings which the company, New Sage Resources Limited ("New Sage"), conducted in 1997 and 1998. There was considerable evidence about this at the trial but, in the end, the parties agreed upon the details of the relevant background and the narrative of them from which the following account is principally taken.
186 New Sage was incorporated in Canada. At 31 March 1997 (financial year end) Striker held 64 per cent of the issued capital of New Sage with a book value of $2,936,431 (Exhibit 11, p 29, note 15). During the 1997 financial year Striker acquired a further 4 per cent of the issued capital of New Sage. This small increase arose as a result of raising $670,515 via a private placement of 640,000 Special Warrants to Striker. The issue was facilitated by Striker selling 2,500,000 tradeable shares in New Sage and using the proceeds to take the full private placement together with the issue of 1,000,000 full paid shares in satisfaction of an amount of $1,517,000 owed by New Sage to Striker as a result of past and outstanding exploration cash calls.
187 There were two main aspects to New Sage's activities. First, as set out in Striker's Annual Report for 31 March 1997 (Exhibit 11, p 10), New Sage was in a joint venture with Striker for the Beta Creek diamond exploration tenements, the Seppelt diamond exploration tenements and the Collison diamond exploration tenements. In each case Striker had a 70 per cent entitlement and New Sage a 30 per cent entitlement in the joint ventures. Secondly, New Sage was expending money to earn a 54 per cent interest in the Sankarani gold project in Guinea, West Africa, a 180 sq kilometre area located in northeast Guinea on the Guinea-Mali border (see Exhibit 11, p 8).
188 During the financial year ended 30 June 1998 (Striker changed the end of its financial year from 31 March to 30 June 1998) Striker was engaged in a series of transactions with New Sage, the effects of which are set out in Striker's 1998 company accounts. For present purposes the relevant transactions were:
(a) Striker's shareholding in New Sage decreased from 64 per cent to 62 per cent (Exhibit 119, p 35, note 17).
(b) The carrying value of the investment in Striker's accounts was reduced from $2,936,431 to $897,498 to reflect a decline in the market value of the investment. The market value of the investment at 31 March 1997 was $2,878,604 and at 27 October 1998 $609,276.
(c) The change in Striker's shareholding in New Sage (Exhibit 119, p 21) was described in the report. Striker sold 1,144,000 tradeable shares in New Sage and used the proceeds to acquire Special Warrants. At the date of this Annual Report Striker was renegotiating this arrangement (see Exhibit 120).
(d) On 29 April 1998 Striker entered into a conditional share sale agreement to dispose of its interest in New Sage Resources for an amount of $1,659,320 to Wharton Securities (Exhibit 119, p 31). This share sale was conditional upon New Sage, among other things, completing a new issue of securities to raise not less than CDN$15,000,000 on or before 20 May 1998, later extended to 31 October 1998. An announcement was made by Striker on 27 October 1998 that this share sale agreement would not proceed due to New Sage being unable to complete the capital raising.
(e) Striker's 1999 accounts (Exhibit 120) show that at the end of the financial year on 30 June 1999, Striker deconsolidated the accounts of New Sage having sold down its interest in the company to 14 per cent. Deconsolidation occurred as at 30 September 1998 giving rise to a small profit of $13,382 (Exhibit 120, p 27). After this deconsolidation, Striker acquired a further 32 per cent interest in New Sage bringing its percentage holding back up to 46 per cent (Exhibit 120, p 33). The carrying value of the investment of 46 per cent in New Sage was shown by Striker in a note to its accounts (Exhibit 120, p 33, note 18) at $350,000 which was its market value at that date (Exhibit 120, p 129).
189 As already noted, one of the assets of New Sage was a 30 per cent contributing interest in the Beta Creek and Forrest River diamond projects. On 20 March 1998 Striker announced to the market (Exhibit 81) a restructure of the Beta Creek and Forrest River diamond projects. The terms of the restructure so announced were:
• New Sage had earned a 30 per cent interest in the joint venture by contributing $2,000,000.
• By letter dated 12 March 1998 New Sage had elected not to repay outstanding joint venture cash calls amounting to $1,644,000 and had requested that its interest be diluted.
• New Sage had acknowledged that it did not have the capacity to meet its share of future cash calls.
As a result Striker undertook to contribute, on behalf of New Sage, all the joint venture expenditure required for the Beta Creek and Forrest River diamond projects until such time as a decision to mine was made by the Management Committee in return for an increase of Striker's joint venture interests. The interests in the two joint ventures from then on were to be Striker with a 90 per cent contributing interest and New Sage with a 10 per cent free carried interest until a decision to mine. The tenements in which New Sage's interest was diluted from a 30 per cent contributing interest to a 10 per cent free carried interest to decision to mine included the Ashmore diamond project tenements. These of course were the tenements which were to be explored and developed by the new share issue that AGF was underwriting and, to that extent, Striker increased its commitment to the expenditure in the joint venture with New Sage from 70 per cent to 90 per cent nominally and released New Sage from any obligation to make contributions to expenditure until a decision to mine. The effect of the transaction is recorded in Striker's 1998 Annual Report (Exhibit 119, in the balance sheet, p 24). One effect of the transaction was to reduce Striker's loan to New Sage and to increase Striker's deferred exploration expenditure (which was capitalised in the plaintiff's accounts) to show the plaintiff's increase in the joint venture tenements from 70 per cent to 90 per cent.
190 The minutes of the meeting of directors of Striker held on 23 January 1998 (Exhibit 1, p 18) reveal that in January 1998 the plaintiff's directors contemplated that AGF would purchase all of Striker's shares in New Sage. At that meeting the plaintiff's directors resolved that:
• Striker would enter into discussions with AGF for the defendant to purchase all Striker's shares in New Sage (subject to shareholder approval and independent expert's advice) at a price of $1.50 per share;
• the jurisdiction of New Sage be moved from Canada to Bermuda;
• the debt of approximately $1,500,000 owing by New Sage to Striker would be restructured against New Sage's interest in the Beta Creek project leaving New Sage with a 10 per cent free carried interest in the project.
AGF was to provide the necessary funding for the finance costs associated with a change of jurisdiction of New Sage to Bermuda.
191 In addition New Sage was to consider a silver project proposed by International Gold Consultants Pty Ltd (Exhibit 74). Mr Naylor, consultant to AGF, was reported as having advised that this silver deal proposed for New Sage was not going to eventuate but that "a substantial asset of PJB (AGF's largest shareholder) was going to be put into New Sage". Mr Naylor and AGF's company secretary, Mr B Gore, attended this meeting of directors of the plaintiff on 23 January 1998.
192 Striker's involvement with New Sage had earlier been discussed at a meeting of the plaintiff's directors on 25 June 1997 (Exhibit 1, p 29). The minutes of that meeting show that:
• In order for New Sage to complete its audit for the year ended 31 March 1997, the directors of Striker resolved to provide the necessary financial support to New Sage for it to meet its debts as and when they fell due so as to enable New Sage to remain as a going concern whilst under the control of Striker.
• That Mr Clayton Dodd be empowered to seek new proposals for New Sage to release $50,000 tradeable shares in New Sage Resources held by Striker, with such shares to be replaced with restricted (12 months) stock.
• That a loan of $100,000 from AGF to Striker be ratified for the use of New Sage creditors by Striker.
193 Again, the relationship between Striker and New Sage was discussed at a meeting of directors of the plaintiff on 14 August 1997 when one of the directors, Mr C Quek (also a director of AGF), enquired about the operating cost of New Sage. At that date the general administration expenditure was $10,000 per month and the exploration commitment on the Sankarani project was a further US$600,000 to earn 54 per cent; with $400,000 already having been spent to earn a 25 per cent interest in the project. The resolution passed at that board meeting was that a strategy document should be prepared for submission to the Striker board setting out the options available to minimise expenditure and commitments given the group's current position.
194 In these circumstances the defendant now contends that the variations in the participation with New Sage in the joint venture operations have meant that Striker is left with a greater obligation to fund current exploration activities and that the change in shareholding and the alteration in the carrying value in Striker's accounts for the loans advanced to New Sage have, each, and in combination, resulted in a material adverse change in the financial position of Striker. Striker admits that it entered into a variation of the New Sage joint venture but denies that this constituted any material adverse change in the financial position of Striker. The plaintiff further pleads that the action was undertaken with the knowledge, encouragement and consent of AGF. The plaintiff's position is that there is no evidence of the true value of Striker's interests in the joint venture before and after the variation and that at the time of the variation the loan due from New Sage to Striker was effectively non-recoverable.
195 With respect to the plaintiff's contention that the change in the joint venture arrangements were made with the knowledge and consent of AGF, the defendant responds by contending that the formal resolution agreeing to the change in the terms of the New Sage joint venture, and the terms of the announcement to the ASX was passed at a meeting of directors of Striker on 20 March 1998 (Exhibit 1, p 14), that is, after the appointment of administrators to the defendant and at a time when the role of Messrs Wong and Quek (who were present at the meeting of 20 March 1998) as directors of AGF had ceased upon the appointment of administrators to the defendant - s 437C(1) of the Corporations Act. That section provides for the administrators to assume control of the company but existing directors are not removed from office. However, they cannot act or control the affairs of the company in any way without the administrator's written approval - s 437C - and it may therefore be taken that the endorsement of Messrs Wong and Quek at the meeting of directors of the plaintiff on 20 March 1998 to the variation in the New Sage joint venture terms did not carry with it any consent or approval by AGF. Despite this, however, the changes had been the subject of discussions and negotiations reaching back before 23 January 1998 and I am satisfied that, at least up until the point of the appointment of administrators, the change in the New Sage joint venture did have the approval of AGF and, indeed, could not have proceeded without it. No objection was made on behalf of AGF to the variation in the joint venture terms at any subsequent stage until the allegations contained in the defence and counterclaim in this action.
196 Furthermore, I do not consider that it is possible to conclude, on the evidence adduced in this trial, that the variation in the terms of the New Sage joint venture was a material adverse change in Striker's financial circumstances. It is, of course, possible to compare, on paper, the nominal positions of the plaintiff and New Sage in the joint venture before and after this change and to note that before the alteration the plaintiff had a debt in a specified amount due to it from New Sage and a 70 per cent holding in the tenements with a corresponding 70 per cent obligation to contribute to exploration and development expenditure. After the changes it had a smaller debt, a greater shareholding in New Sage (which was to be sold to AGF), a higher percentage proportion in the tenements and a correspondingly higher commitment for expenditure in relation to them. Whether that amounts to an improvement or a deterioration in its financial position, or constitutes no material change, depends very much upon the value of the tenements, New Sage's capacity to repay the loans, the value of shares in New Sage, and the ability to fund the exploration expenditure commitment. There was no evidence on any of those issues at the trial and, as the onus of proof of demonstrating the existence of material adverse change rests upon the defendant, there can be no doubt that it has failed to establish such a contingency as a fact.
197 Significantly, however, no point was ever taken about this alleged drop-out contingency by the defendant until after the termination of the underwriting obligation by Striker in August 1998 and, for reasons already given, the termination of the contract because of AGF's repudiation means that it may no longer avail of such a circumstance, even if it had been proved.
198 This alteration in the terms of the New Sage joint venture was not caused by AGF's continuing breach of its contractual obligations to underwrite the proposed share issue, but when the change was outlined and initially approved by the directors of Striker on 23 January 1998, and when it was formally approved by Striker's board of directors on 20 March 1998, AGF was in a continuing state of breach of its contractual obligation to underwrite this share issue.
199 In April 1998 a hostile takeover offer was made by Diamond Rose NL ("Diamond Rose") for the issued share capital in Striker. AGF pleads that this constituted a material adverse change in the financial position of Striker so as to trigger cl 10.1(m) of the December 1996 underwriting agreement affording AGF the option to give notice of termination of its underwriting obligation. No such notice was ever given and the first allegation to this effect from AGF was by its defence in these proceedings. The submission of AGF is that the takeover offer compelled Striker to mount a defence to the takeover and, in the process, to expend a material amount of money opposing it.
200 In its Reply Striker denies that the takeover offer constituted a material adverse change in its financial position and says that the defendant never invoked cl 10.1(m) against Striker as a basis to terminate the defendant's underwriting obligations, either at the time of the takeover offer or once it had been made and, further, that on 21 July 1998 the defendant entered into a conditional agreement with Diamond Rose to assign the residual underwriting agreement to that company and, as a consequence, AGF is now precluded from relying upon any such circumstance as a basis upon which it might have been entitled to terminate the underwriting agreement. Again, the background of material details of the Diamond Rose takeover is common ground between the parties and, their joint account of this provides the basis of the following findings.
201 Diamond Rose made an announcement to the ASX on 20 March 1998 that it proposed to make a takeover offer for Striker. The Part A takeover statement was received by Striker on or about 5 May 1998. The terms of the offer were one Diamond Rose share for every 10 Striker shares and the offer was due to expire on 22 July 1998. Based on the trading price of Diamond Rose's shares on 20 March 1998 this offer amounted to an equivalent of 5 cents per share for each of Striker's issued shares. The directors of Striker issued a Part B response to the takeover offer on 19 May 1998 recommending that the Striker shareholders reject the offer. By 20 July 1998 Diamond Rose had received acceptances representing approximately 1.4 per cent of Striker's issued shares.
202 On 21 July 1998 Diamond Rose made an announcement to the ASX to the effect that Diamond Rose had entered into an agreement with AGF to take a deed of assignment of a debt due to AGF by Striker and of the rights of the underwriting agreement. The terms of the conditional assignment were contained in the deed of 21 July 1998 (Exhibit 109). In that deed it is recorded that AGF had agreed to sell, assign and transfer to Diamond Rose all of the defendant's right, title and interest in and to the loan (from Striker) and any rights pursuant to the underwriting agreement (the December 1996 agreement) and further funding. The assignment was subject to a number of conditions, including approval from the ASC of an application by Diamond Rose for a modification of s 698 of the Corporations Law. That approval was not granted (Exhibit 140).
203 On 24 July 1998 Diamond Rose and AGF made an application to the Federal Court of Australia seeking injunctions to prevent the issue by Striker of convertible notes alleging that the issue of such notes constituted a breach of the Corporations Law. The applicants in those Federal Court proceedings also sought orders compelling Striker to convene a meeting of shareholders to approve a proposed share placement.
204 On 27 July 1998 Striker announced to the ASX that it had received a notice issued by AGF (Administrators Appointed) under the then s 249 of the Corporations Law seeking the removal of Striker's directors and of the company secretary and the appointment of Messrs M Ryan, A Woodings (joint administrators of AGF) and Mr M L Bennett as directors of Striker and the appointment of Mr M Ryan as the plaintiff's secretary. On the day before Striker's AGM, namely 3 September 1998, Striker announced that Messrs Woodings, Ryan and Bennett had withdrawn their consent to act as directors and, accordingly, that initiative by AGL to seize control of the board of Striker ended.
205 On 11 August 1998 Diamond Rose announced an increase in its bid for Striker offering one Diamond Rose share and 12.5 cents cash for every five Striker shares. That offer was later extended to 2 September 1998.
206 On 13 August 1998 the directors of Striker recommended that shareholders reject the amended bid and, on the same date, Diamond Rose announced that AGF had accepted the revised bid. That acceptance gave Diamond Rose 21.48 per cent of the issued shares in Striker and thereupon Diamond Rose became the largest shareholder in the plaintiff. The takeover bid closed on 2 October 1998 with Diamond Rose holding 23,567,185 shares in Striker - representing 22.24 per cent of Striker's issued share capital.
207 Then, on 21 October 1998, Striker entered into a share subscription agreement with Diamond Rose whereby Diamond Rose was to subscribe for 83,250,000 ordinary shares and attaching options in the plaintiff by payment of 8 cents per share - an issue which would raise $6,600,000 capital for the plaintiff. That amount was later varied to $6,066,000. Diamond Rose had until 20 November 1998 to complete a due diligence and arrange the funding. This new share issue was subject to share holder approval as required by s 623 of the Corporations Law. A placement fee of 7 per cent was paid by Striker to Diamond Rose, together with an arrangement fee of $200,000.
208 Diamond Rose provided Striker with a further working capital loan of $350,000. That advance was interest free and was secured against the plaintiff's plant and equipment. Upon completion of the share subscription agreement, the advance was secured by a second mortgage over the Ashmore tenements and the equipment mortgage was discharged. A further $150,000 was advanced to Striker by Diamond Rose on the same terms to meet the expenses of convening a shareholders' meeting to approve the share subscription agreement. It was further agreed between Striker and Diamond Rose that, in the event that Diamond Rose did not complete a placement transaction, the advances which it made would become payable out of any capital or debt raising completed by Striker, or subject to shareholder approval, Diamond Rose would be granted the right to convert the funds advanced to shares at 8 cents or to underwrite a pro rata issue to the value of the loan within a period of 13 months (see Striker's Annual Report for 1998, p 22, Exhibit 119).
209 On 16 March 1999 the share issue and placement was approved by Striker at a general meeting (Striker 1999 Annual Report, Exhibit 120, p 19). In the result 75,825,000 ordinary shares payable at 8 cents each were issued by Striker raising $6,066,000, together with 75,825,000 free options expiring on 30 September 2002 and exercisable by the payment of 20 cents each.
210 On 22 July 1999 the chairman of Striker despatched a letter to all shareholders and released this to the ASX (Exhibit 126) reporting on a series of transactions relating to this share placement in order to allow the placements to be considered, and if thought fit approved, at the annual general meeting of Striker to be held on 27 August 1999. In that letter Striker's chairman reported that:
• on 11 June 1999 Quantum Dolphin plc, a company associated with the Soros Group, commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Diamond Rose claiming ownership and the transfer of 35,000,000 shares and 35,000,000 options in Striker from Diamond Rose. Quantum Dolphin lodged a Substantial Shareholder Notice with Striker claiming an entitlement to 19.3 per cent of Striker's issued capital;
• on 17 June 1999 Striker advised the ASX and Diamond Rose that the Diamond Rose facility had expired;
• on 24 June 1999 Diamond Rose issued a change in substantial shareholding advising that it had sold on market 2,500,000 shares in Striker;
• on 8 July 1999, Diamond Rose announced to the ASX that it had amicably settled the action brought against it by Quantum Dolphin - the result being that Diamond Rose transferred to Quantum Dolphin 33,443,432 shares and 35,000,000 options in Striker then making Quantum Dolphin Striker's largest shareholder; and
• progressively from 13 July 1999 until 22 July 1999 Diamond Rose decreased its holding in Striker to 11,505,661 shares or 5.56 per cent of the company.
In Striker's Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999 (Exhibit 120, p 1) Striker's chairman reported that Diamond Rose had sold all its remaining shares in Striker.
211 The basis for AGF's plea that the Diamond Rose takeover offer (and for that matter the resulting contest) constituted a materially adverse change in the condition or financial position of Striker depends largely, if not entirely, on an admission by the plaintiff's witness Mr Hart that the defence of the takeover by Striker required the expenditure of significant funds. However, apart from this, and the detailing of the sequence of events leading to the change in the defendant's shareholding in Striker, no evidence was adduced by AGF nor any attempt made to quantify the amount or nature of the financial impact of this takeover upon Striker. As the agreed narrative of events shows, it ultimately resulted in Striker making a new issue of shares and options and raising $6,066,000 in the share placement, but the defendant makes no attempt to bring that development into account for its allegation of material adverse consequence.
212 I do not consider that, on the evidence adduced, any finding is warranted that the takeover offer constituted a material adverse circumstance. More significantly, perhaps, it clearly emerges that AGF took the opportunity provided by the takeover to sell most of its holding in the shares of Striker to Quantum Dolphin after it gave up its joint initiative with Diamond Rose to seize control of Striker's board through the Federal Court action and the then s 249 of the Corporations Law notice. This and the attempt by AGF to assign to Diamond Rose the debt due to the defendant from Striker and the benefit of the underwriting agreement indicates that, far from being dissatisfied with the consequences of the Diamond Rose takeover, AGF saw the unfolding of events as an opportunity to realise to its advantage the rights which it had until then held in its capacity as a creditor, as a shareholder of Striker and as an underwriter to the new share issue. None of this justifies a finding, as sought by the defendant, that a material adverse event occurred to Striker's financial position or condition by the Diamond Rose takeover.
213 Again, significantly, no attempt to rely on such an alleged contingency was made by AGF until this issue was formulated in the pleadings in this action, that is long after the termination of the underwriting obligation by the plaintiff's acceptance on 25 August 1998 of AGF's repudiation of its obligations. For reasons already given, I have concluded that AGF cannot now rely upon any such alleged contingency as giving right to a contractual entitlement to terminate its underwriting obligation. Again I record that, at all material times from the announcement of the Diamond Rose takeover and during the evolutions leading to the new share placements by Striker, AGF was in breach of its obligation to underwrite the new share issue.
214 On 8 June 1998 Striker entered into an agreement to issue convertible notes to the value of $500,000 and announced to the ASX on 10 June a placement of $500,000 worth of shares and options. Neither of those issues or placements was approved by AGF and, accordingly, AGF pleads that it is entitled to rely on the contingency specified in cl 10.1(c) of the December 1996 agreement to give notice of termination of its underwriting obligation. The proposal to issue the convertible notes was notified to the administrators of AGF by letter of 16 April 1998 (Exhibit 88). By that letter Mr C Dodd, as managing director of Striker, referred to recent discussions with the administrators about funds for working capital and the request for AGF to advance the remaining $800,000 available "pursuant to AGF's funding obligations", a reference to the agreement for AGF to advance up to $3,000,000 on a convertible note at the 30 September/20 October directors' meetings of 1997. Striker asserted that it was in urgent need of working capital to protect its assets and infrastructure and that it was apparent then that funding by AGF would not be forthcoming in the immediate future. The letter explained that because of the circumstances and without prejudice to the plaintiff's request for funding from AGF, the commercial advisors Hartley Poynton Ltd had arranged a convertible note issue to provide $550,000 over a term of 12 months at an interest rate of 8 per cent secured on 2,100,000 shares held by Striker in New Sage. The note was to be convertible to shares in Striker at a price of 8 cents per share or at any lower price of a share issue by Striker.
215 Because Striker was then subject to the Diamond Rose takeover offer it sought shareholder approval from the convertible note issue in order to comply with s 7.9 of the ASX Listing Rules and specifically sought AGF's approval to the note issue. Mr Woodings, on behalf of AGF, replied on 21 April 1998 (Exhibit 89) advising that at that time the administrators were not prepared to approve of the proposed transaction. Striker asserts that it entered into this transaction after AGF had repudiated its obligations under the underwriting on 3 June 1998. However, as I have already found, there was no acceptance of repudiation by AGF until 25 August 1998 and the underwriting agreement therefore remained on foot at the time these notes were issued without the consent of AGF. Nevertheless, the agreement to issue the notes occurred after the appointment of administrators to the defendant and during the period when the defendant was in continuing breach of its underwriting obligation.
216 In this case I am satisfied that the need for working capital, which prompted the decision to issue the notes was a direct consequence of the default of the defendant in completing the underwriting before the end of March 1998 and of the defendant demonstrating, by means already described after the appointment of the administrators, that there was no prospect of the defendant underwriting the share issue in the immediate future if at all. This is sufficient, in the particular circumstances of this alleged contingency to prevent AGF from relying upon it as a ground to give notice of termination of its underwriting obligation even if that were, otherwise, available. However, no attempt was made by AGF to give notice of termination of its underwriting obligation on this ground before the termination of the contractual obligations by the plaintiff's acceptance on 25 August 1998 of AGF's repudiation. After that, I have concluded that it was not open to AGF to attempt to do so.
217 The defendant pleads that on or about 16 June 1998, Striker issued shares and options to a value of $500,000 without its approval and that this gives rise to a contingency specified in cl 10.1(c) of the December 1996 agreement entitling it to give notice of termination of its underwriting obligation as it is purported to do so by its defence in this action. Striker pleads, in reply, that it issued shares and options to the value of $500,000 without the defendant's approval on 27 August 1998 as a direct consequence of AGF's breach of its underwriting obligation. The share issue, so Striker alleges, was pursuant to an agreement with the Ashton Exploration Joint Venture ("AEJV") and secured a payment to Striker of $500,000, being funds necessary to maintain operations on Striker's interest in mining tenements and to protect them from exposure to forfeiture as well as to finance continual overhead and administrative expenses. The plaintiff further pleads that AGF never invoked cl 10.1(c) in respect of this transaction to purport to terminate its underwriting obligations.
218 Again the parties have agreed upon a statement of facts relating to the relevant background between Striker, Rio Tinto and the Ashton Mining Joint Venture. The details of the circumstances leading to the $500,000 share placement with the AEJV were announced to the market by Striker in a communication to the ASX dated 10 June 1998 (Exhibit 105). They are also summarised in the directors' report for the 15th month period ended 30 June 1998 in Striker's 1998 Annual Report (Exhibit 119) at pp 20 and 21 where the following explanation is to be found:
"• On 10 June 1998 the company entered into a letter agreement with the Ashton Exploration Joint Venture ("AEJV") participants. In accordance with that agreement, the AEJV subscribed to a placement of shares and options in the Company being 4,000,000 shares at a price of 12.5 cents and 4,000,000 unlisted options exercisable on or before 27 August 2000 by payment of 25 cents each. The shares and options were issued subsequent to the end of the financial year.
• If AEJV elects to increase its interest in the tenements from 51% to 85%, the AEJV will subscribe to a further placement of shares and options being $500,000 in shares at an issue price being the higher of 25 cents or 85% of the average daily closing price for a 30 day period preceding the election and unlisted share options exercisable at the placement price for a period of 2 years, such that if exercised $1.00 million will be paid to the Company."
And, further, in the same report dealing with events subsequent to balance date, the directors reported that the AEJV was required to spend at least $1,000,000 on exploration on certain of the Beta Creek and North King George tenements within 12 months and that, following the first $1,000,000 expended on exploration, the AEJV had the right to spend an additional $4,000,000 within the next three years to earn a 51 per cent interest in the tenements noted and, further, the AEJV had the right to increase its interest in the above tenements to 85 per cent by spending a further $5,000,000.
219 The overall transaction with the AEJV was first raised at a board meeting of Striker on 19 May 1998 (Exhibit 1, p 12). Resolutions for the issue of shares were passed by the board on 25 June 1998 and 27 August 1998. The transaction essentially involved a "farm-in" agreement in relation to 1650km2 out of a total of 5300km2 of ground Striker held within the North Kimberlite Province. It excluded Striker's diamond bearing kimberlite discoveries at Ashmore and lower Bulgurri and did not include the adjoining Forrest River Diamond Project area of 3650km2.
220 The AEJV was an exploration joint venture between Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Ltd (as to 60 per cent) and Ashton Mining Ltd (as to 40 per cent) and the farm-in rights granted by Striker were to that joint venture and were to be in two stages:
• the AEJV would subscribe to a placement of shares and options in Striker being 4,000,000 shares at a price of 12.5 cents to raise $500,000 and 4,000,000 listed options exercisable within two years at a price of 25 cents each;
• the AEJV was required to spend $5,000,000 on exploration within a four year period to earn the 51 per cent interest. It was required to complete a minimum expenditure of $1,000,000 before withdrawing from the joint venture in the initial year.
(b) The AEJV had the right, but not the obligation, to fund further expenditure of $5,000,000 within four years (making a total of $10,000,000 of expenditure within eight years) to earn an aggregate 85 per cent interest. In that event the AEJV was required to subscribe for a further $500,000 in Striker at an issue price being the higher of 25 cents or 85 per cent of the average closing price quoted in the daily trading statistics of the ASX in a 30 day period preceding the date of election. There were options issued as part of the share placement which were exercisable at the placement price within a period of two years and, if exercised, would raise a further $1,000,000 for Striker.
221 The AEJV became the manager of the joint venture and took marketing rights on the sale of diamonds from operations within the joint venture area. In the 1998 Striker Annual Report (Exhibit 119, p 2) this transaction was described in these terms:
"Farm in agreement with Rio Tinto and Ashton Mining ('AEJV') over the North King George and Beta Creek projects (excluding the Ashmore discoveries). This agreement saw the injection of $500,000.00 into the company through the issue of new shares at 12.5 cents and options exercisable at 25 cents to Rio and Ashton. The AEJV has a right to earn up to an 85% interest in the joint venture by completing expenditure of $10 million and subscribe for additional shares and options in the company to the value of $500,000.00."
222 No meeting of shareholders of Striker was required for the issue of these shares or options.
223 Following this agreement with the AEJV field work on the joint ventures areas commenced during June 1999. In excess of 50 targets had been identified for ground based assessment including drilling. Expenditure by the AEJV in the period August 1998 to 30 June 1999 amounted to $1,452,295 (Exhibit 120, p 19). However, the AEJV later gave notice withdrawing from this participation with Striker after the initial year.
224 I am satisfied that the commercial factors which led Striker to enter into the joint venture with Rio Tinto and Ashton Mining were the urgent need of working capital to carry out exploration and development work and the need to preserve its tenements which were rendered necessary by the disappearance of any short-term prospect of raising capital from the underwritten share issue contemplated in the December 1996 agreement. The need for funds and the urgency was made more apparent by the increasingly obvious disinclination or incapacity of AGF to provide funds or to underwrite a share issue after the appointment of the administrators on 6 March 1998 and the events which then followed as previously described. Both the agreement to enter into the joint venture with Rio Tinto and Ashton Mining and the issue of shares and options pursuant to that agreement occurred at times when, as I have found, AGF was in breach of its underwriting obligation. The actual issue of shares to the AEJV to raise $500,000 did not occur until 27 August 1998, after the termination of the underwriting obligation, but I am satisfied that the commitment to do that was established before then. As with the other alleged "drop-out contingencies", no notice terminating its underwriting obligation pursuant to cl 10.1 was given by AGF before the termination of that contract by the plaintiff's acceptance of the defendant's repudiation on 25 August 1998. And, as with other allegations of termination for drop-out contingencies, I have concluded that this cannot be done after that termination.
225 On the pleadings, and in its final written submissions, AGF identified the foregoing five transactions or occurrences as being the contingencies which it relied upon to assert that AGF was entitled to terminate its underwriting obligation because of the provisions of cl 10.1 of the December 1996 underwriting agreement. However, in the defendant's opening written submissions, it advanced a sixth occurrence as constituting a contingency entitling it to terminate the underwriting obligation. In those initial submissions the defendant asserted that the appointment of administrators to AGF on 6 March 1998 constituted a material adverse change in the condition or financial position of the plaintiff because, at that time, AGF was Striker's largest shareholder (holding 19.8 per cent of the issued share capital) and was providing Striker with essential working capital. This was a point which the administrators had raised for consideration by AGF's Creditors' Committee on 25 June 1998 (see [156] above).
226 Perhaps it is not surprising that this submission was not pressed during the trial or in the final written submissions of the defendant, but, to its implication that the appointment of administrators forecast a sudden severing of an important source of financial backing to the plaintiff, and hence constituted material adverse change in the financial position of the company, there are clear and obvious answers. In the first place, it did constitute a material financial threat to the ongoing liquidity of the plaintiff and it was for that reason that Striker sought and obtained the suspension of its securities from quotation on the ASX. It was that immediate prospect that denial of future funding, which turned out to materialise, would occur which, as I have already found, prompted Striker to issue the convertible notes through Hartley Poynton Ltd and to issue shares and options to the AEJV. Most importantly, however, the appointment of the joint administrators to the defendant was a forecast of a probability that the defendant was unable to perform its underwriting obligation and, as such, a sign of anticipatory breach which might have been acted upon by the plaintiff at that point. I am satisfied that the defendant cannot rely on its own appointment of administrators to invoke a drop-out contingency in cl 10.1 but, again, even if it could, it did not attempt to do so at any time before the termination of the contractual obligations because of its own repudiation of them.
227 It is necessary now to turn to the nature and amount of the claim for damages which Striker makes against AGF in these proceedings. As noted earlier, the first formulation and quantification of its claim for damages was in the proof of debt lodged by Striker with the liquidators of AGF on 18 May 1999, later amended on 13 December 1999 (Exhibit Q1(1)) to a figure of $11,566,621.44. It was further amended at trial on 21 November 2005 (Exhibit Q1(2)) to the amount of $6,393,729.
228 Generally speaking, the defendant has put the plaintiff to proof on all components of this claim for damages but, in addition, pleads that if the plaintiff has suffered damages as alleged it has failed to mitigate those damages and, in addition and inconsistently, that it did take steps to mitigate the damages by raising capital and loans from alternative sources to the extent of $7,500,000 or more and that this was an effective substitute for the share capital which was to be raised by the issue underwritten by the defendant. Before dealing with these defences specifically it is necessary to identify the items constituting the plaintiff's claim for damages and then to consider the principles which apply to the identification of the nature and quantum of damages which are recoverable in like circumstances.
229 The enumeration of the plaintiff's amended claim for damages at the end of the trial is as follows:
1. STRIKER RESOURCES NL OPERATING EXPENDITURE
Administration September 1997 - March 1999 1,133,395.00
Exploration September 1997 - March 1999 2,180,614.00
6. STAMP DUTY PENALTY - JADE CREEK ACQUISITION
29/1/97 Diatech Minerals - Diatech Job 96-118 11,209.73
230 The essential nature of the obligation of an underwriter under an agreement such as that of 2 December 1996 in this case, is to pay money for the issue of the shares or other securities which are to be underwritten if they are not fully subscribed. That character of the obligation has many similarities to the role of a lender under a contract of loan where the obligation is to pay money. In the latter case the payment of money by the lender results in a debt which is fully repayable on agreed terms, with or without interest, whereas in the present situation there would be no repayment ever made or expected, but nevertheless the contract of underwriting has many of the other characteristics of contracts for the payment of money. While these are governed by all the general principles of law of contract there are particular features of them, due to the fungible nature of money, which have an impact on the nature of damages which may be recoverable - Halsbury: "Laws of England", vol 32, 4th ed reissue [115].
231 So it is that default in repaying a loan on time or at all means that the amount recoverable is the amount of the debt together with such interest from the time when it becomes payable under the contract, or by statute, or as the court may allow, regardless of the inconvenience the plaintiff has suffered from the failure to pay on the due day: Fletcher v Tayleur [1855] EngR 735; (1855) 17 CB 21 at 29, notwithstanding that this rule was said to be unreasonable by Jessel MR in Wallis v Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243 at 257 CA. However, where the circumstances are that a special loss is foreseeable at the time of the contract as a consequence of delayed payment, or a refusal to pay, damages may be recoverable for that loss - Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 297 at 306, and also at first instance at [1952] 1 KB 285 at 224 - see also Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker AB [1949] AC 196 and Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528.
232 Similarly, damages for breach of a contract to lend money may be nominal or substantial according to the circumstances which will, in each case, determine the reasonable contemplation as to the loss which is likely to result from the breach. Here, too, a distinction is recognised between the measure of damages for non-payment of a money debt and breach of a contract to lend money or to accept bills - Prehn v Royal Bank of Liverpool (1890) LR 5 Exch 92 and also Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd (supra). Therefore, the costs of raising money elsewhere may be recoverable as a natural result: Prehn v Royal Bank of Liverpool (supra) and Astor Properties Ltd v Tunbridge Wells Friendly Society [1936] 1 All ER 537. Commissions payable for a temporary, as well as a permanent, loan will not always be allowed - see Astor Properties (supra) at 534.
233 Where the defendant had knowledge of other probable consequences of his breach, he may have to render full compensation for the loss thereby inflicted upon a plaintiff: Manchester and Oldham Bank Ltd v W A Cook & Co (1883) 49 LT 634; South African Territories Ltd v Wallington [1898] AC 309; Wallis Chlorine Syndicate Ltd v American Alkali Co Ltd (1901) 17 TLR 656. Damages for breach of contract to make a loan may, however, be only nominal - Western Waggon and Property Co v West [1892] 1 Ch 271 at 277. Where allowed, damages may include loss of business profits where such loss was within the parties' contemplation: Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co (supra).
234 "McGregor on Damages", 16th ed (2003) says, at [25-024]:
"In contracts for the loan of money the normal measure of damages for the lender's failure to provide the money is the amount required by the borrower to go into the market and effect a substitute loan for himself less the amount that the contractual loan had required. It has been said by Day J in Manchester and Oldham Bank v Cook (1883) 49 LT 674 at 678 that 'Nominal damages ... are usually given in the case of a breach of contract to lend money, for the reason that usually if a man cannot get money in one quarter he can in another'. Thus in South African Territories v Wallington [1897] 1 QB 692 affirmed [1898] AC 309, since the claimants gave no evidence showing a loss beyond this, nominal damages were awarded. But the Court of Appeal recognised that the damages could be substantial for failure to provide the loan".
235 The learned author goes on to describe how, in addition, there may be consequential losses. So the damages may include the cost of raising the money elsewhere. However, where two sets of such costs were claimed in Astor Properties v Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society (supra) one for a temporary and the other for a permanent loan, two sets were held not to be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties and only one was allowed in damages - compare Duckworth v Ewart [1863] EngR 520; (1864) 2 H & C 129 (a complex set of facts not precisely a contract of loan, where the cost of an aborted mortgage was allowed as damages but, by a majority, nothing further).
236 Further, a claimant may recover the loss of any contract which hinged upon the loan if the defendant was aware of the purpose for which the claimant was entering into the loan - Manchester and Oldham Bank v Cook (supra) where the claimant asked the defendant bank for a loan to enable him to purchase an interest in a colliery. In that case the defendant agreed but failed to find the money and the claimant was unable, apparently, to obtain the money elsewhere and so unable to complete the purchase. It was held that he could recover damages in respect of the loss of the colliery purchase, the court stressing that "the bank had express notice of the purpose for which the money was required", at 678 and 679.
237 In Astor Properties v Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society (supra) where the money to be lent was to be used by the claimant for a purchase-money mortgage, damages were allowed for the estimated loss of the rents that the claimant would have obtained from the property for the period of delay before the claimant obtained the property by means of a substitute loan.
238 In Australia there has now been specific recognition of the fact that damages for a breach of contract for the provision of a specific sum of money, may include losses arising from the unavailability of the use of the money which should have been paid - Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125 - see also Garraway Metals Pty Ltd v Comalco Aluminium Ltd [1993] FCA 219; (1993) 114 ALR 118; Simeone v Pesatura General Contractors Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 453; Tropicus Orchids Flowers and Foliage Pty Ltd v Territory Insurance Office [1998] NTSC 73; (1998) 148 FLR 441; Bonic v Field Air (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636 and Hart v Mossensons [2000] WASC 295.
239 These authorities have also been examined in "Contract Law in Australia", 3rd ed, by Carter and Harland at [2151]. Of the earlier rule that only interest or nominal damages would be recoverable in the event of a breach of contract to repay money or to repay it on time, the learned authors said that the rule is not relevant where the contract is terminated for repudiation. In those cases the defendant becomes liable to pay loss of bargain damages, even if its principal obligation was only to pay money - Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd (supra). In view of the decision in Hungerfords v Walker (supra) it is unnecessary in the present case to determine that proposition because Hungerfords v Walker (supra) effected a more direct modification of the rule. Because of the loss of the use of the money the plaintiffs in Hungerfords' case had been deprived of the opportunity to invest or, alternatively, had incurred a borrowing cost and suffered loss by having to borrow money to pay their tax - see also Sanrod Pty Ltd v Dainford Ltd [1984] FCA 154; (1984) 54 ALR 179 at 171. In Hungerfords the High Court made it clear that recovery was based on the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EngR 296; (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145, namely that the defendant was regarded as having contemplated such loss possibly resulting according to the usual course of things by reason of the defendant's breach.
240 Approaching the assessment of the plaintiff's entitlement to damages at a broad level before turning to the individual components of a claim, the foregoing authorities require certain preliminary findings to be made. Because Striker was an exploration company with no prospect of significant earnings in the short-term, I am satisfied that it could not obtain money for its operations by loans from banks or from other lending institutions. Finance for its ongoing operations, whether by loan or equity, could only be obtained from investors who wished to participate in, and share the risk of, the exploration activities being conducted on the diamond tenements, or from those, who for any reason, found it advantageous to combine the proposed exploration activities on the plaintiff's tenements with exploration or development activities on their own tenements close by.
241 The terms of the 2 December 1996 underwriting agreement, and the associated share sale and financing agreements with the defendant, reflected a perception by both parties that there was a substantial risk that the June 1997 options would not be exercised by the option holders and hence the provision for the defendant to underwrite the exercise of the options (subject to conditions) and, failing that, to underwrite a substitute share issue to raise $7,500,000 or more. This demonstrated a realisation by both parties that it was doubtful that any capital raising in the market would succeed at the price for the exercise of the June 1997 options (20 cents a share) and that any share issue would need to approximate closely the market price of shares if it were to be taken up by existing shareholders on a pro rata basis. A share issue, by way of placement or otherwise to new shareholders would, very probably, dilute the holdings of existing shareholders, most significantly the defendant who from December 1996 until March 1998 (when administrators were appointed) effectively exercised control of the board of Striker. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the 2 December 1996 underwriting agreement and also a consequence arising naturally from the normal course of their business and mutual dealings, that the capital to be raised by the secondary underwriting, if that became necessary, would be essential to the continued operations of the plaintiff and to any hope of carrying out the announced exploration and development plans for the Ashmore Diamond areas.
242 I am also satisfied that it was within the contemplation of the parties that a certain minimum amount of exploration and development activity on those tenements would be essential for the retention of the tenements and to maintain the reputation of the plaintiff in the market as a genuine exploration company with promising prospects of success. For the same reasons, I am satisfied that it was within the contemplation of the parties at all times that Striker would need to maintain and finance its administrative organisation, including its executive and specialist staff, and to engage and pay various contractors and agents to carry out activities associated with both its exploration and administrative obligations. In particular, I am satisfied that, at all times, and certainly at December 1996, it was apparent to AGF that Striker was dependent upon financial support from AGF for the raising of the $7,500,000 proposed in the share issue and that amount was the pre-estimate of the parties of the money needed to carry out the exploration and development activities at Ashmore which had been jointly agreed upon and for the continued administrative operation of Striker.
243 Also I am satisfied that from before December 1996 AGF realised that, if the proposed capital raising for Striker did not proceed, there would be no prospect of Striker obtaining loan funds from banks or other lending institutions and that, to avoid ceasing activities entirely or going into insolvency, Striker would be forced to seek alternative capital or short-term borrowings from other sources with interests in diamond exploration in circumstances where it would be dependent on the terms offered by any such lender/investors - in other words, that it would become a borrower of necessity with all that implies about adverse terms and costs of raising capital or loan funds.
244 Another feature which I consider flowed normally and directly from a failure by the defendant to meet its underwriting obligation for the proposed share issue, is that this inevitably revealed to the market that Striker was in critical financial difficulties, affected its share price and rendered borrowings or capital raisings from other sources even more difficult. Significantly, in the events which happened, this also left Striker exposed to hostile takeover attempts from the many opportunists always ready to take advantage of a sudden financial weakness of an otherwise promising listed company.
245 I turn now to the individual components of the plaintiff's claim for damages (previously set out in par [229] above).
246 The first item of claim is for Striker's operating expenditure as follows:
Administration September 1997 - March 1999 $1,133,395
Exploration September 1997 - March 1999 $2,180,614
$3,314,009
247 In evidence, both Messrs Dodd and Hart explained that this item of damages related to the period from 1 September 1997 to 31 March 1999. The commencement of this period, in their view, was when AGF should have performed the secondary underwriting obligation, in accordance with cl 10.2 of the December 1996 agreement, and marked the point when Striker was without access to the $7,500,000 capital which should have been available by then from the proposed share issue. The end of the period on 31 March 1999 was the date when the suspension of Striker's shares on the ASX ended and the company was restored to normal listing. That was possible because of the alternative arrangements which, by then, Striker had concluded to obtain replacement capital and loan facilities and represented the point at which Striker could resume normal operations without the severe liquidity problems which had followed from lack of access to capital because of the failed underwriting.
248 Mr Dodd, whom I accept as a completely reliable witness, explained that during this intervening 18 month period Striker was effectively sitting on its hands and was unable to proceed with its proposed exploration and development programme yet was still obliged to maintain its administrative and operating structure and its personnel and, so, incur overhead and administrative expenditure. In this respect I note that, in September 1997, when interim funding was sought by Striker from AGF because of the forced deferment of the underwritten share issue to late March 1998, the request for funds and the agreement by AGF to provide interim funding proceeded on the basis that the anticipated essential operating expenditure for Striker was running at about $250,000 per month. By contrast, the $3,314,009 claimed under this item for expenditure for the 18 month period from September 1997 reveals an average monthly rate of expenditure appreciably less than this indicating a reduction in the scale of operations during that period.
249 The basis for this claim is described by Mr Dodd in Exhibit 136, pars 255 - 259 and by Mr Hart in his statement (Exhibit 124, pars 26 - 45). The aggregate of the exploration expenses of $2,180,164 is supported by the plaintiff's spreadsheets which are Exhibits Q6 - Q11 inclusive, which, I am satisfied, establish that the expenditure was made. Similarly, Exhibits Q12 and Q13, being further print outs of the plaintiff's administrative expenditure, demonstrate that the amount of $1,133,395 was outlaid by the plaintiff during this period.
250 Mr Dodd has explained that, for the first six months of this period, that is until March 1998, Striker was using the interim advances from AGF to carry on its normal activities but, because of the lack of access to the anticipated capital raising, was delayed in undertaking its major exploration enterprise, namely, the proposed Ashmore trial mine. Nevertheless the plaintiff needed to keep together its team of geologists, its processing laboratory and its head office administration in order to proceed quickly with the exploration activity as soon as the capital became available.
251 In his oral evidence Mr Dodd explained that the failure of the underwriting meant that Striker was suspended from ASX quotation for 12 months and lost 18 months of exploration activity, including the six months of reduced activity immediately preceding the suspension. Mr Hart explained, and I accept, that the exploration expenditure during this period was on the plaintiff's tenements at Ashmore, Seppelt and North King George and it was necessary to maintain the tenements in good standing to avoid the possibility of forfeiture by action by the Mines Department or by other persons who may covet these areas.
252 March 1999 was when Striker actually got the funds from the share placement to Diamond Rose and, accordingly, when it was in a position to proceed with the delayed major exploration activities. The major exploration operation intended was to conduct a trial mine at Ashmore and that was undertaken after March 1999. Had the underwritten share issue been conducted in the last quarter of 1997 that would have avoided about 18 months of holding costs before the trial diamond mine was commenced. From early September 1997 to the end of June 1998 exploration costs for Striker averaged about $168,000 per month, whereas for the period from 1 July 1998 to 31 March 1999 the average monthly exploration costs were about $83,000 demonstrating this marked reduction in the scale of operations. The result of the trial mine at Ashmore, which was undertaken after March 1999, showed that there were diamond resources in the area but that it was not economic to exploit them and, consequently, further investment in those areas ceased. This meant that the decision not to mine or exploit these areas was deferred by approximately 18 months and that the extra holding and operation costs incurred before this conclusion could be reached proved to be of no tangible benefit to the plaintiff.
253 Through counsel the defendant meets this aspect of the claim by submitting, first, that the exploration expenses have been capitalised by the plaintiff in its published accounts and, therefore, no loss has been demonstrated; second, that the administration expenses include a component of double counting for expenditure already contained within the claim for exploration expenses; and third, that a number of the other items within the claim for administration expenses represent expenditure which would have been incurred in any event regardless of any breach of contract by the defendant.
254 It is the case that, upon the conventions adopted in the plaintiff's published accounts, all exploration expenditure was capitalised and retained as an asset in the various balance sheets. Mr Hart and Mr Dodd, however, responded by saying that this does not represent the reality of the position because this particular exploration expenditure resulted in no benefit to the company and has, effectively, been thrown away. Counsel for the defendant counters with the submission that that explanation is inconsistent with the implied representation to the market, to the shareholders and to the public that the plaintiff's accounts present a true and fair position of its assets and liabilities at the times of publication and that accumulated exploration expenditure is an asset of the company.
255 There was no accounting evidence, expert or otherwise, about the conventions followed in the treatment of exploration expenditure by mining or exploration companies apart from some general observations that different companies adopt different conventions and, for those who capitalise such expenditure, it is often the case that, when appropriate later, some or all of that expenditure is written off. That may well be appropriate when a productive mine or other profitable operation is established because of the potential deductibility of such expenditure against income when derived. For a publicly listed exploration company the perception of its value is largely determined by the market price of its listed securities, rather than by the carrying value of its assets, particularly where those assets include intangibles such as accumulated exploration expenditure. I therefore do not see any inconsistency or lack of candour in Messrs Dodd and Hart maintaining that, despite the capitalisation of that expenditure in the accounts, it resulted in no real benefit to the company and should be treated as a loss. No evidence to the contrary was offered by the defendant and, therefore, I accept the explanations of the plaintiff's witnesses that this expenditure was necessarily incurred and paid, at a time when, because of the lack of access to the capital to be raised by the underwritten share issue, it could not be turned to value by the plaintiff.
256 It was however demonstrated and acknowledged by Mr Hart that there was a degree of duplication in the quantification of expenditure for exploration and administration. The details of the duplication are found in Exhibit Q1(3) and these totals $338,327 which, I am satisfied, must be deducted from this aspect of the plaintiff's claim.
257 The further submissions by the defendant were that the administration expenses included items for the preparation of an annual report, the payment of ASC fees, entertainment expenses, rent of premises, salary and wages, travel within Australia and payment for investment information, all of which would have been incurred regardless of whether or not there had been any breach of contract. That is only partly an answer to the plaintiff's claim because the plaintiff contends that it was obliged to incur expenditure without deriving the full benefit from that expenditure which it would have obtained had it been in a position to carry on productive operations instead of marking time. However, I consider that in relation to some of those items of expenditure the defendant's submission holds good and, from an examination of Exhibits Q12 and Q13 it is possible to identify the following amounts which, for this reason, should be excluded from the plaintiff's claim. These items which should be excluded from the claim for administration expenses are, in my view:
ASC charges $7,699
Auditor's fees $43,065
Bank charges $3,059
Employees' entertainment $19,548
Government charges $7,133
Investment information $16,384
Rent $145,789
Share Registry expenses $21,835
Share Registry expenses - ASX $22,108
ASX fees $16,164
Telephone $37,608
Travel within Australia $5,278
Fee $345,670
258 Inevitably, there is a degree of approximation involved in selecting these various items and in deducting the total for some of the components as, for example: employees' entertainment; rent; telephone; and travel because, certainly in those instances it is probable that the value of those various amounts of expenditure for the plaintiff was diminished because of the inability to undertake major exploration or development activity. This is an instance where an assessment of damages must yield to approximation rather than reflect precision. The approach which I have taken is more likely to result in under compensation than the reverse, but a degree of uncertainty about the precise quantum of the damages suffered does not relieve the defendant from the necessity of paying damages - Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 per Vaughan-Williams LJ at 792 and Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 per Bowen LJ at 532 - 533.
259 Therefore, after deducting from the claim for administration expenses the following components:
$338,327 (duplication - see [256] above)
$345,670 (see [257] above)
$683,997
the damages established by the plaintiff which I consider it is entitled to recover are $449,398 ($1,133,395 - $683,997). For reasons given in [255] above, I allow the claim for $2,180,640 for the loss of the benefit of exploration expenditure, bringing the recoverable damages under item 1 to a total of $2,630,012.
260 The second item of damages claimed by the plaintiff is for share placement expenses, being:
261 The basic submission by the plaintiff is that this expenditure was necessarily incurred by Striker in taking steps to issue shares by placements from August 1998 to September 1999 which are detailed later in [286] below and which resulted in capital and loans to the value of more than $13.50 million being eventually raised. The largest component of the capital raised was from the share placements to Diamond Rose in March 1999 and September 1999. Striker's position is that AGF was obliged to underwrite a share issue and that when this failed to materialise it was forced to adopt a number of measures to obtain capital and loans from alternative sources and incurred this expenditure in doing so. The components of the claim totalling $238,225 are set out in the invoices and accounts which comprise Exhibit Q44 and I am satisfied that this expenditure was made.
262 The defendant contends that the component of legal fees totalling $20,864 is not recoverable because these services were not due to any breach of contract. The reason for the legal fees, in connection with a general meeting of shareholders of Striker to approve a share placement, was, in the defendant's submission, a necessity which would have been incurred in any event had the share issue underwritten by the defendant proceeded because of the provisions of cl 6.2 of the underwriting agreement of 2 December 1996.
263 The plaintiff's explanation for the claim for the legal fees can be found in the statement of Mr Kevin Hart (Exhibit 124, at pars 16 - 18), and in the Craig Readhead & Co correspondence and invoice analysis (Exhibit Q2), the last page of which identifies the components of five invoices from 1 November 1998 to 1 March 1999 as including fees for the share issue (see also Exhibit Q3). I do not consider that it is possible to find that it was more probable than not that a general meeting of shareholders of Striker would have been necessary had the fully underwritten share issue contemplated by the December 1996 agreement proceeded. By contrast, however, I am satisfied that it was not possible for the plaintiff to conclude the substitute raising of capital involving the placement to Diamond Rose without outlaying fees for legal advice in connection with a general meeting then thought to be necessary and, accordingly, I conclude that this is an additional component of expense suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's failure to underwrite that issue.
264 A further objection to this claim by AGF is that it includes significant amounts of travel expenses and other fees paid by Striker to Diamond Rose, for personnel of Diamond Rose and Striker to visit Tel-Aviv in Israel and New York as part of a road show to gain support for the placement and that this was voluntary expenditure by Striker when there was no legal obligation for it to be paid. It is clear that Diamond Rose may, at best, have only had a tenuous legal basis to demand payment of these expenses by Striker. But having regard to the circumstances, Striker was in no position to refuse if the capital to be raised by this placement was to be obtained and the solution reached for Diamond Rose to become the largest shareholder in the plaintiff, in place of the defendant, rather than to risk a renewal of the hostile takeover, was to be achieved. While there is more than a doubt about whether these demands for payment by Diamond Rose were legally enforceable, I am nevertheless satisfied that, from Striker's point of view, the expenditure was reasonable and necessary in order to gain access to the capital necessary and to put an end to the uncertainty surrounding the company and its prospects of raising finance, which resulted from the earlier hostile takeover bid by Diamond Rose.
265 Accordingly, I am satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled to damages as claimed for $238,225 under item 2 of Exhibit Q1(2).
266 The plaintiff then claims for interest expenses:
267 Striker submits that the interest which it was obliged to pay for loan accommodation pending capital raising by share placements was necessary and unavoidable in the light of the defendant's failure to underwrite the share issue. The details of the interest paid on the convertible notes of $500,000 are set out in Exhibit Q21 and the interest rate was 8 per cent. I am satisfied that this interest was paid; that the rate was reasonable in the circumstances; and that this cost to the plaintiff flowed directly from the defendant's breach.
268 The component of $21,888 for interest to directors represents interest at 8 per cent plus a further 4 per cent redemption fee on personal loans to the company made by Messrs Dodd and Ramsay at a time when the plaintiff was critically short of funds. The loans were unsecured and neither interest nor any redemption fee was payable until the loans were repaid in full. Through counsel, AGF submits that the plaintiff has failed to explain why attempts were not made to obtain finance elsewhere, but I am satisfied that after the defendant's underwriting collapsed and no interim or other financial backing from AGF was likely, there was virtually no prospect of the plaintiff obtaining funds for administrative and operational expenditure from outside sources. Both directors stood a substantial risk that, if alternate capital raisings were not obtained, the plaintiff would have to go into administration or liquidation and that, in that eventuality, there would be little prospect of recovery of these loans. In those circumstances the terms do not appear unreasonable. Again, this is a cost to the plaintiff caused by the failure of the defendant to underwrite the intended source of capital.
269 Geoterrex-Digham Pty Ltd ("Geoterrex") was Striker's largest creditor at the date AGF went into administration in March 1998. Striker was in default in payment to Geoterrex which, through solicitors, threatened legal proceedings. This dispute was eventually compromised in correspondence between the plaintiff's solicitors and Geoterrex's solicitors (Exhibit Q27). This produced a compromise under which Striker paid interest on the overdue debt, as set out in the letter from Messrs Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks, solicitors for Geoterrex (part of Exhibit Q27) and Striker paid that interest. I am satisfied that this was an additional payment flowing directly from the defendant's default in underwriting the capital raising which had left the plaintiff in the situation when it could not satisfy this creditor when its debt was due and payable.
270 For these reasons I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established an entitlement to damages for interest expense totalling $66,615 as claimed.
271 Striker next claims $262,657 for share issue fees. This relates to the share placement with Diamond Rose. The consideration payable by Striker to Diamond Rose was fixed by the terms of the Share Subscription Deed dated 21 October 1998 between Diamond Rose, Striker and Striker's directors (Exhibit Q18). Under cl 1.1 Striker was to pay to Diamond Rose:
and these amounts were paid. A combination of those charges amounts to a fee of 9.11 per cent of the capital of $6,066,000 raised. Had AGF performed its underwriting obligation under the agreement of 2 December 1996 it would have been entitled to a 5 per cent underwriting commission but, on the larger amount of capital raised. Adjusting pro rata for the capital derived from the placement to Diamond Rose, the incremental cost to Striker is $262,657 as claimed. I am satisfied that this follows directly from the defendant's breach and is recoverable by the plaintiff as damages.
272 Striker then claims for fees payable in connection with the convertible note issues, as follows:
Hartley Poynton $20,000
Craig Readhead - legal $31,821
Freehill Hollingdale & Page - legal $15,000
$66,821
Striker maintains that the costs of raising these loan funds to provide liquidity when the underwritten share issue did not proceed were additional costs which it was obliged to incur directly as a result of the defendant's breach of contract. AGF accepts the Hartley Poynton fee and the Freehill's fee but submits that the legal fees charged by Craig Readhead should not be recoverable because of the date of the invoices.
273 The fees charged to the plaintiff for legal expenses are tabulated, as already mentioned, in Exhibit Q3, which is an apportionment by Mr Hart of various invoices from the solicitor for different tasks which were being performed concurrently. The aggregate of $31,821.40 for legal fees for the convertible notes relates to invoices issued by the solicitor from 4 May 1998 to 1 October 1998. The evidence establishes that Striker entered into negotiations to issue convertible notes in early June 1998, that the convertible note agreement was dated 5 June 1998 (Exhibit 102) and that on 21 June 1999 the notes were converted into shares and options. In these circumstances there is nothing incongruous or inconsistent about the dates of the invoices submitted by the solicitor to Striker for legal advice in connection with these notes. Mr Hart was not shaken in any way in his testimony that this was expenditure incurred for this purpose. I accept Mr Hart as a truthful and reliable witness and there is simply no reason for me to reject his testimony that this expenditure was incurred for this purpose and I consider that it forms part of the plaintiff's damages recoverable under this head.
274 Next, the plaintiff claims $6169 being penalty interest which it was required to pay to the Commissioner of State Taxation for late payment of stamp duty payable on the documents giving effect to the Jade Creek acquisition. The stamp duty assessment issued by the State Revenue Department is Exhibit Q32 and issued from the SRD on 11 August 1998 for a total of $61,643.50. It related to stamp duty on four documents to which Striker and AGF were each parties, all dated 2 December 1996, including the Share Sale Agreement and related documents. As the assessment was not paid a penalty of a little over 10 per cent was imposed by the State Revenue Department (Exhibit Q33) and an extension of time for payment was granted until 31 March 1999. The liability for payment fell due at a time when Striker was acutely short of funds because of the failure by the defendant to underwrite the proposed share issue and when it was urgently seeking loan and equity funds from other sources.
275 Nevertheless, counsel for the defendant submits that there was no sufficient explanation given for the delay in paying this assessment because cash funds were available in the accounts of Jade Creek, by then a wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff. This submission cannot be accepted because there was no basis laid in the evidence for suggesting that the directors of Jade Creek would be justified in employing that company's funds for the payment of a liability of Striker in connection with the transactions leading to purchase of shares in Jade Creek by the plaintiff and the transfer of Jade Creek's gold tenements to the defendant. There is no basis to conclude that Striker could, or should, have procured the payment of this stamp duty liability from assets of Jade Creek. The penalty stamp duty was equivalent to interest and would not have been incurred had the plaintiff been in funds to satisfy this clear obligation. In my view it forms part of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.
276 By item 7 of the amended proof of debt (Exhibit Q1(2)) the plaintiff claims as damages an amount of $60,130 paid to Hartley Poynton for fees associated with its defence of the Diamond Rose takeover. The plaintiff's submission is that this takeover offer would not have eventuated had the plaintiff been in funds through the capital raised by the fully underwritten share issue. This was explained by Mr Dodd in his oral evidence and by Mr Hart in Exhibit 124, pars 114 - 117, whose evidence, again, on this subject I accept.
277 There can be little doubt that, because of its acute financial difficulty arising from the failed underwritten share issue, Striker was vulnerable to any opportunistic takeover bidder and I am satisfied that that is what prompted the Diamond Rose bid. Counsel for the defendant submits that there was no evidence why the takeover was defended, nor any evidence that it was necessary to engage Hartley Poynton or others to advise on a defence of the takeover.
278 The defendant's submissions must be rejected because the analysis of the takeover contest conducted in [199] to [213] above shows that it put a value of only 5 cents on each of Striker's shares at the time of the first offer on 20 March 1998. There was a very low level of acceptances of that bid - approximately 1.4 per cent by mid July 1998, suggesting that shareholders did not find it attractive. There was a substantial increase in the bid on 11 August 1998 which led to AGF accepting the revised bid. The takeover offer closed on 2 October 1998 with Diamond Rose holding 22.24 per cent of the issued capital - that is, only a little more than AGF's holding. The subsequent share placement with Diamond Rose was at 8 cents a share but involved a working capital loan to be provided by Diamond Rose.
279 All this suggests that the directors of Striker were well justified in fully investigating, and then opposing, the initial Diamond Rose bid and contesting the attempts made by Diamond Rose and AGF to remove the existing directors from Striker. The final position after the takeover offer was that, a solvent major shareholder was substituted for AGF and as a result of this new capital and loan facilities were made available to Striker. On any view, the actions of Striker's board in investigating and defending the Diamond Rose takeover initiatives appear to have been well justified. Those costs, the quantum of which was not challenged and the payment of which was proved, in my view, were both directly caused by the defendant's breach of obligation and should also be taken to be within the contemplation of the contracting parties in December 1996.
280 In this case the largest single component in the plaintiff's claim for damages is the amount of $2,320,000 claimed as the premium reduction on shares issued. Essentially, this is said to be the loss suffered by the plaintiff in raising replacement capital as a result of the breach of AGF to perform the secondary obligation under the December 1996 underwriting agreement. The component for the loss is made up as follows:
(a) cost to Striker of raising capital on the issue of
shares at a lower issue price (average 8 cents) $1,886,000
281 The details of the claim are to be found in the testimony of Mr Kevin Edwards, a senior accountant and managing partner for Price Waterhouse Coopers, whose evidence is to be found in Exhibits 133 and 134 which set out his opinion as an experienced senior accountant relating to the cost and effect of raising capital for corporations in the market and current business practices. The opposing view, that the nature of the loss sought by the plaintiff in this case is not a true loss to the corporation seeking to raise the capital is set out in the expert reports of the defendant's consulting accountant, Mr Keith Jones, a senior partner of Delloitte Touche Tohmatsu, chartered accountants, in Exhibits 142 and 143.
282 The basis of Mr Edwards' evidence is that, had AGF complied with its obligation under the December 1996 underwriting agreement, Striker would have received $7,500,000 of additional capital (less the expenses of the issue) in about September 1997 in return for issuing 62,500,000 new shares at 12 cents each. By contrast, in the events which happened, by September 1999 Striker had only been able to raise $7,066,000 in new capital for the issue of 86,075,000 new shares at an average issue price of slightly greater than 8 cents per share (see Exhibit 133, p 9). According to Mr Edwards (Exhibit 133, p 11) by March 1999 Striker had issued 23,575,000 more shares and 86,075,000 options to achieve gross proceeds which were lower by $434,000 than would have been the case under the underwriting agreement. His quantification of the alleged ensuing loss is $2,332,000 representing the difference in the proceeds achieved from the issue of 62,500,000 shares which were to have been issued under the underwriting agreement calculated as follows:
Number Issue price Gross
of shares per share proceeds
from issue
$
Underwriting Agreement 62,500,000 12 cents 7,500,000
Terms achieved from the issue of the
equivalent number of shares in the
capital raisings made to replace the
shares which were to have been issued
under the Underwriting Agreement:
Convertible notes terms of
conversion 6,250,000 8 cents 500,000
Placement to AEJV 4,000,000 12.5 cents 500,000
Balance of shares - placed as part of
the March 1999 issue of 75,825,000
shares to Diamond Rose, FAI
and others 52,250,000 8 cents 4,180,000
62,500,000 5,180,000
Quantified Damages
- (shortfall) (2,320,000)
Mr Edwards' method of calculation recognises the additional share options which were issued by Striker to raise the amount of $7.066 million by March 1999.
283 The additional "cost of capital" suffered in this situation, so the plaintiff's case submitted, was the inability to raise the "shortfall" of $434,000 capital together with the difference in the share price for the capital which was actually raised, namely the difference between 12 cents per share and the average issue price of just over 8 cents per share. In the opinion of Mr Edwards, this reduction in the amount which the market was willing to pay for shares to be issued in Striker represented a perception by the market that the company had a greater risk and that, accordingly, for share capital to be subscribed, an investor would demand a higher rate of return which, in the circumstances, would convert to the reduction in the price to be paid per share. Again, in the opinion of Mr Edwards, this reflected a phenomenon well recognised by commercial people in the market, namely, that the cost of capital, that is raising the additional working capital for Striker, had become more expensive because more shares needed to be allotted for the raising of the same, or an equivalent, amount of capital as originally intended. Not only was this a loss occasioned in the particular instance but, according to Mr Edwards, it had a perpetuating effect because the probabilities are that future capital raisings, if required by Striker, would also be more expensive, that is they will require more shares to be issued at a lower price to raise any desired amount of capital.
284 This concept of "cost of capital" can perhaps be appreciated most clearly if one takes the example of a well-established diversified trading company which is operating profitably and regularly paying dividends. If more capital is required by such a company it has the choice of borrowing money, either by direct loan or by the issue of notes, or, alternatively, by issue of further shares. If working capital is to be raised by a loan then, obviously, the interest margin payable on the loan will represent the cost of that working capital on a recurrent basis. By comparison, if new shares are issued then the dividends payable on the new shares will represent the "cost" of capital. A comparison of the two will determine whether it would be preferable for the company to raise capital by one means rather than by the other, assuming of course, that additional borrowings are possible or would not prejudice the company's overall trading position.
285 Striker, of course, was never in the position where dividends were payable or imminent but, so Mr Edwards explained, this does not matter because the readiness of the market to invest in a non-dividend paying mining exploration company lies in its prospect for future returns, whether through capital appreciation or dividends out of profits or a combination of each. On this approach the "cost of capital" for a non-dividend paying company will simply be deferred because, eventually, the investor will expect some return on the capital invested.
286 There are a number of practical responses which the defendant makes to this claim for damages besides challenging its very propriety. In the first place, the comparison between 8 cents per share and 12 cents per share postulates that the shares to be issued under the original underwriting agreement would have been issued at 12 cents per share, whereas the evidence discloses that the June 1997 weighted average share sale price for Striker was less at approximately 11.62 cents per share. However, adjustments can readily enough be made for that difference. The second objection is that the calculation advanced by Mr Edwards only holds good if the time for assessment is taken as March 1999 and not later. This is because after 30 June 1999 Striker did, by a variety of measures, raise additional working capital to a total sum of about $13,500,000 or more by a series of issues and borrowings. The parties have agreed upon the details of these issues and borrowings and the source of the information is Striker's 1999 Annual Report (Exhibit 120, pp 19 - 20 and 32). The position can be summarised as follows:
Capital Raisings by Striker:
Capital
Raised
1. On 27 August 1998 Striker issued to participants
of the AEJV 4,000,000 ordinary fully paid shares
at 12.5 cents per share and 4,000,000.00 unlisted
options $500,000
2. On 16 March 1999 shareholders approved the
placement of 75,825,000 ordinary shares and
75,825,000 options to Diamond Rose and FAI
Insurance Ltd and others $6,066,600
3. By a convertible note Agreement dated 5 June $500,000
1998 (exhibit 102) Striker issued convertible notes (originally
to raise $500,000.00. On 21 June 1999 the notes convertible
were converted into 6,250,000 ordinary fully paid note loan funds
shares and 6,250,000 options later converted
to equity)
4. On 14 July 1999 the company made a share and
option placement of 18,800,000 shares with an
issue price of 8 cents per share together with
9,400,000 free options $1,504,000
5. On 15 September 1999 the company completed a
share and option placement of 50,000,000 shares
and 25,000,000 options at a price of 8 cents per
share with 1 free option for every two shares $4,000,000
6. On 24 September 1999 options issued as part of
the Diamond Rose transaction were exercised -
the company issued 3,250,000 ordinary fully paid
shares at a price of 16 cents each $520,000
$13,090,600
Borrowings by Striker:
The details of these borrowings are set out in Note 12(a) to the accounts in the Striker report (Exhibit 119 at p 32). They are:
2. $375,000 raised by the issue of convertible notes plus a further $125,000 raised after the end of the 1998/1999 financial year - total $500,000.
3. $586,000 borrowed from Diamond Rose drawn from 22 October 1997 and repaid on 18 March 1998.
At Exhibit 119, p 39, it appears that the directors' loans totalled $187,261 (see also p 32). They were unsecured, repayable at call and carried interest on repayment at 8 per cent per annum. A fee equal to 4 per cent of the amount advanced was also payable on repayment. Interest and fees in respect of the funds advanced to 30 June 1998 amounted to $8980 - Exhibit 119 - the 1998 Striker report.
287 For reasons which follow it is unnecessary to make adjustments to Mr Edwards' calculations of the cost of capital due to an assumed price which shares in the new issue would have been priced in September 1999 or to carry out an assessment in the difference in the "cost of capital" applying had the underwriting been performed by the defendant in September 1999 in comparison with the "cost of capital" actually incurred by the plaintiff in the capital raisings which resulted from share issues and conversion of options from March 1998 onwards which are set out in the above tabulation. This is because I have reached the conclusion that this so-called "cost of capital" does not constitute damages recoverable by the plaintiff. In this respect I accept the essential submissions made by the defendant AGF.
288 In relation to the claim of damages for the "cost of capital" AGF has submitted that:
• Striker in fact paid nothing for the new capital raised, it simply issued further shares at a price determined by its estimation of the market for such additional securities.
• No loss was, or could have been, brought to account in Striker's balance sheet, or profit and loss account for the alleged cost of capital.
• The simple elements of the transaction were that Striker received an average of just under 8 cents per share for every new share issued and the capital so raised became an asset of the company with no corresponding loss.
• Any discrepancy between the price paid for the shares in the new issue and the actual or perceived market value of shares already on issue in Striker would represent a loss (if at all), not to the company itself, but to the individual former shareholders. The value of their holdings may be diluted pro rata by the new share issue at a lower share price.
289 Essentially, these submissions reflect the evidence of the defendant's consultant accountant, Mr K F Jones, which has already been mentioned. However, while I have had regard to and accept the evidence of Mr Jones, I consider that the essential differences between the opinions of the two accounting experts, Mr Edwards for the plaintiff and Mr Jones for the defendant, are in reality opinions about questions of law which only the court can or should determine.
290 The basis for the plaintiff's claim for damages under this heading depends upon acceptance of the concept of the "price" of new capital for the company and it meets its answer in the response that the company does not pay anything for the issue of new capital. The issue of new shares to raise further capital does not represent a cost of any kind to the company (except for the administrative, legal and associated expenses of the capital raising). The position was fully examined by McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) [2001] HCA 31; (2001) 207 CLR 165 where a claim for damages by a company for alleged losses due to the issue of shares for a consideration other than cash at what turned out to be an undervalue failed in a claim which had been brought against the advising accountants who had certified the reasonableness of the value of the consideration for the share issue. The basis for the failure was that any loss sustained by the issue of new shares was not a loss by the company. At 207 CLR 190 in [47] - [49], their Honours said:
"[47] The word 'price' may obscure more than it reveals. The part of the 'price' to which attention is now directed consisted in the company's creating bundles of new rights and obligations. Those rights, once created, were of value to the holder and could be freely traded. But Kia Ora, the issuing company, once it had issued the shares, could not turn them to any commercial account for its own benefit.
[48] It may be accepted that the issue of the new shares affected the existing shareholders. The nature and extent of that effect on the value of shares held by those existing shareholders would largely depend upon the perception of participants in the market for Kia Ora's shares of the relationship between the terms of the new issue and the value of Kia Ora's shares before the issue. If, as now has been found to be the case, the terms of the new issue was seen to be very disadvantageous (in the sense that the consideration given in return for the shares issued were worth far less than had been assumed) the effect on existing shareholders would have been very large. But the enquiry is, as we have pointed out earlier, an inquiry about what Kia Ora lost, not about what effect the transaction may have had on those who held shares in the company immediately before the takeover.
[49] It would be wrong to treat the effect on these shareholders and on the company itself as indistinguishable. First, to do so would be to deny that the company is a separate legal entity. Secondly, there are very practical reasons not to do so. ... "
The reasons for judgment in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (supra) went on to point out that the new shareholders in Kia Ora, including those who took up the new shares, were not all persons who had relied on the recommendation about the adequacy of the consideration offered for the issue of the new shares and, further, that former shareholders may or may not have sold shares and actually incurred losses.
291 All this amounts to a clear distinction being made between the role of the company itself which, in the case of a new share issue, simply obtains an agreed amount of capital for the issue of an agreed number of shares. That is a transaction which does not involve any profit or loss but simply a payment of money in return for the issue of an ascertainable number of shares. The contrast in the change of position of existing shareholders is quite different. In their case the value of existing shares may be diminished or diluted by the new share issue, particularly if it is made at a discount, and that will be their loss and not a loss of the company. This is also true in instances of new capital being raised by the issue of shares at a premium to share prices at which existing shareholders purchased their shares. That "profit" is not a profit for the company. The same can be said about the potential effect of any such share issue on future capital raisings. If future capital can only be raised by issuing shares at a lower price, that will not represent any loss to the company even though it may mean that the value of the shares of existing shareholders is further diminished. These considerations resulted in the rejection of a loss of this character by the High Court in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (supra) and must lead to the same result in the present case.
292 It is therefore not necessary to deal with the practical responses made by the defendant, namely that a capital raising under the secondary obligation in the December 1996 share writing agreement, would have only been at 11.8 cents per share. This would (if relevant) only have a mathematical reduction on the asserted claim for damages under this heading which can readily be computed if ever that may become necessary. The second response: that Striker was successful in raising the desired capital and more after September 1999 is of a different character. That does not consign this category of loss into any different category so as to make it recoverable, but had it been recoverable, it would have meant that the loss of capital or the extra expense of raising capital would have been incurred once and for all and that the true measure of the plaintiff's loss would be the damages for the deprivation of moneys which it suffered by not having access to share capital of $7,500,000 during the period September 1998 to September 1999 or to the exact date or dates when the replacement capital was eventually raised. No claim for damages based on this secondary possibility has been advanced by the plaintiff.
293 Finally, under item 13 of the amended proof of debt (Exhibit Q1(2)), the plaintiff claims for an aggregate of $60,103.44 for expenditure on tenement administration or tenement work at various dates. The claim falls into three components, namely:
294 Counsel for Striker accepted that none of these items represented a claim for damages arising from AGF's breach of its underwriting obligation under the agreement of 2 December 1996 but, rather, that each was an alleged transaction giving rise to an independent cause of action for the recovery of moneys paid for, or to the use of, the defendant. Counsel for AGF took no objection to the incongruous way in which these claims were advanced and, in effect, agreed that the merits of the plaintiff's claim for these amounts should be determined in these proceedings, notwithstanding that the claims were unrelated to the breach of contract alleged. In the circumstances it is both appropriate and convenient that I should determine the claims on this footing.
295 With regard to the first group of claims totalling $22,364.18 for tenement administration, the details are set out in Striker's invoices forming Exhibit Q41. However, there was no evidence to establish what work was done; that it was done at the defendant's request; or that the defendant ever ratified or accepted the benefit of the work. In those circumstances this component of the claim must fail.
296 The second component of $25,529.53 represented liabilities incurred by Jade Creek before the shares in that company were acquired by the plaintiff. At that time, because Jade Creek was a wholly owned subsidiary of AGF, it was the practice for AGF to pay its expenditures directly. When Striker acquired Jade Creek this was expenditure which had been incurred but not paid and, as Mr Hart said, Striker paid it in a spirit of goodwill. The fact of the matter is that the liability for the payment of Jade Creek's debt remained with Jade Creek both before and after all the shares in that company had been acquired by Striker. If Striker sought an obligation that AGF should pay the pre-takeover liabilities of Jade Creek then that would require a distinct agreement in that respect which one would have, perhaps, expected to find in the Share Sale Agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. In the absence of such an agreement to indemnify Striker for any liabilities of Jade Creek it is not open to Striker to impose such a liability on AGF. This claim must fail.
297 The third component of item 13 is the $11,209.73 paid by Striker to Diatech. This again was the discharge by the plaintiff of a liability of Jade Creek incurred by the latter before the takeover. It is a transaction of exactly the same character as that just previously discussed and the claim must fail for the same reasons.
298 To recapitulate, in summary form, I consider that the plaintiff has established part, but not all, of its claim for damages and that the damages proved, using the numbering selected by the plaintiff in Exhibit Q1(2) are:
Item 1 $2,630,012
Item 2 $238,255
Item 3 $66,615
Item 4 $262,657
Item 5 $66,821
Item 6 $6,169
Item 7 $60,130
Item 8 Nil
Item 13 Nil
Total $3,330,659
299 No distinct plea is made in the statement of claim by the plaintiff for interest upon any part of the damages claimed, although interest may be allowable as part of the damages claimed under the doctrine in Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125 and also under s 32 of the Supreme Court Act. Because AGF's counterclaim includes a component for interest on the interim advances it is necessary to address the question of whether interest should be awarded in respect of any part of the plaintiff's claim because of the plea of set-off. If this is not done then the counterclaim may be increased by a component of interest up to the date of judgment in circumstances where a set-off is claimed against a claim of damages, the quantification of which is arrived at by taking into account only events up to the latter part of 1999 when the last component of the plaintiff's damages was incurred.
300 Another way of presenting the issue is to enquire whether, if there is to be a set-off, the quantum of the defendant's claim should, for the purposes of the set-off, be determined at the same date when the whole of the plaintiff's damages finally accrued or whether the defendant's claim may be permitted to be enlarged by interest which accrues upon it from then on. By analogy with the computation of entitlements to interest in claims of a personal injury where the defendant may set off pre-payments of lost wages or medical expenses received by the claimant as workers' compensation, and be liable to pay interest only on the balance after the set-off - Pheeney v Doolan (No 2) [1977] 1 NSWLR 601 and Haines v Bendall [1991] HCA 15; (1991) 172 CLR 60 - it seems that a claimant should not have the benefit of interest accruing upon a claim which is wholly the subject of a set-off. The appointment of the administrators to the defendant in March 1998 does not affect the position because the control of the assets which the administrators thereby acquired was subject to equities of which a right of set-off is one - Young v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127 and Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 and Meagher Gummow and Lehane's "Equity Doctrines and Remedies" 4th ed, at 938 - 939.
301 To ensure that any set-off is truly effective by giving equal recognition to the opposing claims requires some recognition of the timing of those claims where, as in the present case, one of them would steadily increase because of an entitlement to interest. This necessary result could be achieved by selecting a date for the set-off which maintains the equivalence of both claims. In the present case that can be done by giving effect to the set-off when the defendant first made demand for payment of the interim advances in June 2000 or, if interest is to be permitted on the defendant's counterclaim, to match this with an appropriate award of interest accruing on the plaintiff's claim up until the date of judgment.
302 Because the issue of interest in the setting of a proposed set-off was not directly addressed by the parties, either in their pleadings or in their submissions, it seems that the preferable course to take is to direct a set-off of the respective entitlements of the parties, without any interest component. In the particular circumstances of this case the plaintiff's claim overtops the defendant's counterclaim where it is only upon the counterclaim that a claim for interest is advanced. Treating the claims as being set-off in the manner described will exhaust the defendant's counterclaim and, with it, any accruing right to interest. That being so, there is no need to introduce any component of interest into the plaintiff's claim to maintain parity and this coincidence avoids the incongruity of doing so when such a claim has not been expressly pleaded or addressed by the defendant. The result will be that the plaintiff has an entitlement to damages for the surplus after the set-off but without interest.
303 As previously noted the plaintiff admits that it has received advances from the defendant to the total of $2,200,000 which, when paid, were intended to be repaid out of the $7,500,000 capital raising fully underwritten by the defendant but which has never eventuated. The plaintiff further admits that the defendant has paid various third parties for liabilities incurred by the plaintiff and that these payments were also originally intended to be repaid out of the fully underwritten share issue. Those payments, totalling $128,580.55, were at issue during the course of the trial but were ultimately agreed by the plaintiff. The details were not strictly proved because of the agreement but were supported by the schedules to a letter from Messrs Taylor Woodings dated 10 August 1998 which, although only marked for identification as "Q43" should, in my view, because of the agreement accepting the figures advanced, be treated as an Exhibit Q43.
304 It follows from these agreements that the defendant has established its counterclaim in the amount of $2,328,580.55, representing the principal moneys advanced.
305 Two questions remain, namely, whether in view of the alleged estoppel this sum is repayable at all and, if it is, whether any part carries interest as claimed by the defendant. For the reasons set out when dealing with the alternative claim for estoppel, I am satisfied that these amounts are recoverable and that it is not unconscionable for the defendant to recover these moneys so long as compensation, in the form of damages, is paid by the defendant for the breach of contract involved by the defendant failing to undertake the underwriting.
306 This leaves the defendant's claim for interest upon these advances.
307 For interest to be recoverable upon any part of the counterclaim of $2,328,580.55 it is necessary for the counterclaiming defendant to prove that there was an express or an implied agreement by the plaintiff to pay interest on some or all of these moneys or to establish a discretionary entitlement to interest under the provisions of s 32 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 or to identify another basis for the award of interest. No question of an entitlement to interest in equity has been raised or could be raised in this case. If there is an express or implied agreement to pay interest there will be no power for interest to be awarded under s 32 - see s 32(2). In considering this claim it is necessary to distinguish between the series of advances of capital made by the defendant to the plaintiff totalling $2,200,000, on the one hand, and the series of payments of debts or other expenses incurred by the plaintiff but discharged on its behalf by the defendant making up the balance of $128,580.55.
308 No written agreement relating to the advances of $2,200,000 was ever signed by the parties. The only record of the payments is Exhibit 113, the plaintiff's general ledger, where the receipts are recorded. However, the solicitors for AGF, Messrs Stark, Swann and Nolan, prepared drafts of proposed agreements between the defendant and the plaintiff relating to financial accommodation to be provided by AGF and for liabilities resulting to be charged upon assets of the plaintiff and secured by a guarantee in indemnity from New Sage. These are respectively:
• Draft Deed of Guarantee in Indemnity (Exhibit 115);
These were submitted to Striker on or about 13 August 1997 for consideration and included provision for the payment of interest at 10.95 per cent. Mr Hart did not reject the proposal for the payment of interest and the defendant has submitted that this suggests that an agreement to pay interest at 10.95 per cent may have existed between the parties or, was not unacceptable to Striker. However, the preparation of those documents and their submission to Striker occurred at a time when the proposed fully underwritten share issue was expected to take place in the immediate future, that is before the September 1997 board meeting at which the AGF representatives proposed and achieved a delay of the share issue until not later than 31 March 1998. The financing proposals which these documents addressed were, therefore, for a shorter term and for a smaller accommodation - approximately $350,000, whereas, from September 1997 onwards it became evident that advances up to $3,000,000 may have been necessary and would be provided.
309 This change in time scale led to discussions about the issue of the commercial note to AGF for accommodation advances of up to $3,000,000, and I am satisfied that it was this altered proposal which resulted in discussions between representatives of the parties in October 1997 about borrowing money at commercial rates. Mr Clayton Dodd, however, denies that he ever agreed, or would have agreed, to pay interest on the interim advances of $2,200,000 and there was no evidence to contradict him. I regarded Mr Dodd as a thoroughly reliable, honest and meticulous witness and I accept his evidence. The fact that the draft of the proposed convertible note agreement provided for the payment of interest does not detract from this conclusion because it was linked to the underwriting and neither proceeded. There was no evidence from Mr Swann, the defendant's solicitor, nor any other representatives of the defendant and had there been an oral agreement to pay interest as counsel for the defendant submitted was probable, one would expect to have evidence of it from one or more of those sources. Counsel for the defendant further submits that an agreement to pay interest can be implied because of the course of dealings between the parties, but this was not pleaded nor pressed by any evidence to suggest this.
310 It is true that, in a commercial setting, the advance of money by way of loan by parties dealing at arm's length can ordinarily be expected to imply an agreement to pay interest on the loan at agreed or ascertainable rates - this is simply the way of commerce because, otherwise, there would be no benefit and only risk of prejudice to the lender. However, the setting of the transactions which led to these advances was, in material respects, different from that of a borrower and lender dealing with each at arm's length. In the first place the defendant had a substantial interest in the welfare and success of the plaintiff and its operations, holding as it did a large interest in the shareholding of the plaintiff. The defendant was, therefore, indirectly interested in the continued successful operation of the plaintiff and its proposed undertaking to explore the Ashmore mineral fields for diamonds, that is, in the performance of the particular exploratory activities which this capital raising was intended to finance.
311 Secondly, in a setting where it was anticipated that the share issue would proceed, I am satisfied that the mutual understanding of the parties was that these advances, although initially debts repayable on demand, would not in reality be repaid but, rather, would be converted to equity in exchange for an agreed value of an equivalent number of shares in the proposed issue which the defendant was to underwrite. In that eventuality there would be no thought of, let alone any entitlement to, interest upon the moneys advanced from the time when those loans were converted to equity in the form of new shares. From then on the defendant's interest in the plaintiff would be solely as a shareholder and not a creditor.
312 That leaves the possibility of an agreement arising by implication to pay interest for the duration of the debt, that is, from the dates of the respective advances until the point of conversion of the debt to equity. Again, I do not consider that any such arrangement is consistent with the commercial objectives which I am satisfied were being pursued by both parties. These payments were in the nature of emergency relief, to tide the plaintiff over until the capital raising then in prospect could be effected and completed. From the plaintiff's point of view, the time for the capital raising was already well overdue and this facility was only a temporary and very short-term measure. I am satisfied that this was also the way in which it was characterised by the defendant at the times the advances were made although, as the defendant's liquidity position deteriorated and insolvency threatened, it seems that there was a change of heart and efforts were made to defer the capital raising and the consequent obligation to subscribe for further securities in the plaintiff. That, however, was a tactical position developed by the defendant and its officers as its financial position worsened and does not, in my view, reflect the actual agreements, express or tacit, reached when the advances were agreed upon and made.
313 That then leaves the question of whether, in the events which happened, the failure of the underwriting and share issue means that there is an implied agreement or other obligation to pay interest by the defendant upon these advances from the time when it became obvious that the share issue would not occur.
314 Had the contract to underwrite the issue of shares been performed then these initial advances would have been converted to equity and there would have been no question of any entitlement to interest on the capital so subscribed by the defendant. This being so, the commercial indications, indeed any implications which might be drawn from the commercial objects of the transaction and the factors which led to the advances, tell against any common intention that there should be a payment of interest upon the moneys if they were not converted to capital at or about the time originally contemplated. This is matched by the fact that the remedy for the defendant as lender in those circumstances would be to demand repayment of the loan, perhaps not upon an immediate demand without prior notice but after a reasonable period, when the commercial objective of conversion from loan to capital was clearly no longer likely to be effected.
315 Another feature which tells against any obligation for the plaintiff to pay interest upon these advances after the date of expected conversion from debt to equity had passed, is that the failure of the anticipated intention to convert the loan into shares was due, as I have found, to a breach of contract by the defendant in failing to meet its underwriting obligations under the contract. To imply an agreement to pay interest in those circumstances would, in a limited sense, allow the defendant to benefit from its own unilateral breach of contract and the difficult position in which that breach had placed the plaintiff.
316 Similarly, to grant interest under s 32 of the Supreme Court Act in these circumstances would be to allow the defendant to derive a benefit from its breach of contract unless this additional expense, itself a loss or damage flowing from the self same breach of contract, was recoverable by the plaintiff as part of its damages. If appropriate damages are awarded then the plaintiff would be compensated for this additional expense. The question then is whether, if after proper compensation in the nature of damages is awarded to the plaintiff, Striker should also benefit by having capital for its use, without interest, from the defendant after a point when it can either have been expected to adjust for the loss and damage which it suffered, or is entitled to receive compensation, that is damages, for that breach of contract.
317 This brings sharply to focus the nature of the defendant's counterclaim for the recovery of the moneys advanced. As there was no express agreement to repay those moneys because it was never contemplated that the relationship of debtor and creditor should remain between the plaintiff and the defendant it is necessary to look beyond the terms of contractual obligations to identify the remedy which the defendant can advance for the repayment. While the defendant counterclaims in debt, that cause of action can be raised in many circumstances when money becomes payable whether under contract or otherwise - demonstrating the breadth of the old form of action in debt - see Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1956] HCA 51; (1956) 99 CLR 560 at 567 - 568 and the common law count for money had and received - Moses v Macferlan [1760] EngR 713; (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at 1012; [1760] EngR 713; 97 ER 676 at 681.
318 In essence the defendant's counterclaim is for restitutionary relief following upon the failure of the contract to subscribe for capital due to the defendant's own breach - see Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 6; (2006) V Conv R 54-713 per Chernov JA at [9] - [13], Schmierer & Anor v Taouk [2004] NSWSC 345; (2004) 207 ALR 301 - SCNSW White J and Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management Ltd [2003] FCA 1025; (2003) 47 ACSR 285 per Finkelstein J.
319 Once the agreed underlying commercial purpose of the contract had failed, even when due to the breach of contract by the defendant, the defendant became entitled, upon remedying the breach by the payment of damages or otherwise, to credit for the moneys advanced. Had the contract been performed credit would have been provided by the conversion of the debt to shares in the plaintiff company. Where that is no longer possible the credit becomes an entitlement to restitution of the moneys which had been paid for a specific purpose which had failed. The fact that the failure of purpose was due to the defendant's own breach does not disentitle the defendant to restitution, so long as countervailing compensation is made. Once it becomes evident that the underwriting contract cannot be performed then, subject to the payment or establishment of the liability to pay damages by the defaulting defendant, the defendant is entitled to recover the capital advanced because of the total failure of the contract to subscribe (via underwriting) the capital for the share issue which never eventuated. In these circumstances the restitutionary claim is not denied because it was the defaulting defendant who was in breach - see McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (supra) per Dixon J at 477 - 478 applying Palmer v Temple [1839] EngR 175; (1839) 9 Ad & E 508 at 521; [1839] EngR 175; 112 ER 1304 at 1309.
320 In these circumstances the discharge of the underwriting contract because of the breach of an essential term by the defendant, or by acceptance of an act of repudiation, whether actual or anticipatory by the defendant, results in the termination of the contract from that time and not retrospectively, leaving intact the plaintiff's right to claim damages for the breach, but also leaving the corresponding right to restitution for the defendant. In most circumstances that could be expected to result in a set-off in equity although, as this case demonstrates, there is a need to examine the plaintiff's claim to set-off because of wider considerations applying for the application of strict rights of set-off at law or in equity, now that the defendant is insolvent.
321 In modern times it is recognised that with claims in restitution, full restitution may require the payment of interest as well as the return of the capital: Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125 at 143 and Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] UKHL 12; [1996] AC 669 at 681 - 682 and 691, so that regardless of any entitlement to interest under statute, the common law will permit a restitutionary claim to include interest where it is necessary to do justice between the parties: State Bank of New South Wales v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 371 at 378 - 382; SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1996) 69 FCR 346 at 377 - 378 and Star v O'Brien (1996) 40 NSWLR 695 per Clarke J at 703 and per Beazley JA at 707.
322 Another perspective leading to the same result is that the advance of $2,200,000 and the payment of expenses by the defendant to the plaintiff, in anticipation of its later conversion to equity upon the share issue, constituted a benefit to the plaintiff which became repayable in the event that the full transaction, namely conversion of loan to equity, was never achieved - compare Cadorange Pty Ltd (in liq) v Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 26.
323 The $128,580.55 paid by the defendant at the request of the plaintiff to third parties to discharge various debts of the plaintiff is, of course, recoverable on a count for money paid - Israel v Foreshore Properties Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1980) 54 ALJR 421 at 443 - 444. Usually the entitlement to interest upon such a payment would run from the time when the defendant (to counterclaim) was enriched by the receipt - per Schmierer & Anor v Taouk (supra) [66], but in this case these advances for the discharge of debts of the plaintiff to the third parties were inspired by the same anticipation that they would eventually be converted to equity in shares about to be issued. It is this factor which differentiates the present case from those which recognise an immediate right to interest from the point of "enrichment".
324 Had the defendant's counterclaim stood alone, I consider that the defendant would have been entitled to interest upon the moneys initially advanced to the plaintiff but only from the point when that money became due or payable, which in the present circumstances was from the date first demanded by the defendant. Such demand was made by letter from the liquidator dated 30 June 2000 (Exhibit 111). That demand was for $2,200,000 (the capital advances). There is no evidence of any demand being made for the additional $128,580.55. It is from this date that I consider that interest should have run. As it is not a contractual entitlement to interest it is inappropriate that reference should be made to bank overdraft or other market rates and, in the absence of any other indicium suggested by the parties, I consider that the rates should have been those allowed by analogy with judgments under s 32 of the Supreme Court Act published by regulations.
325 However, as described above, in this case there is a complicating factor in that the plaintiff's claim would overtop the defendant's claim even if an entitlement to interest on the moneys advanced were recognised. For reasons set out above, I consider that in these circumstances the appropriate course is to not allow any interest on the counterclaim which is to be treated as exhausted by the plaintiff's claim for damages.
Set-off of plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant's counterclaim - liquidation of AGF
326 The issue dividing the parties in relation to the plaintiff's plea of set-off is whether or not Striker's claim for liquidated damages may be set off against the counterclaim, or whether the counterclaim must be paid in full to the liquidator, leaving Striker to prove as an unsecured creditor in the liquidation for the amount of its damages and bearing the risk of receiving less than 100 cents for each dollar of the debt. The effect of allowing a set-off in these circumstances would be that the $2,328,580.55 would be satisfied in full, or pro tanto, without apportionment with other creditors.
327 The issue concerning the claimed set-off is whether or not the obligation giving rise to Striker's claim for damages and AGF's entitlement to restitution vindicated by its counterclaim are properly to be regarded as mutual dealings under s 553C of the Corporations Act.
328 A claim for set-off in such circumstances was analysed in the decision of the High Court in Coventry v Charter Pacific Corporation Ltd [2005] HCA 67; (2005) 80 ALJR 132. In that case Gleeson CJ made reference at [30] to the rights of set-off between solvent parties, being significantly enlarged in cases of bankruptcy by legislation dating from 1705. See Gye v Davies (1995) 37 NSWLR 421 at 424 - 425; Forster v Wilson [1843] EngR 1141; (1843) 12 M & W 191 at 203 - 204; [1843] EngR 1141; 152 ER 1165 at 1171. In bankruptcy legislation (as it developed) rights of set-off were broadened to deal with "mutual dealings". Three Australian decisions of relevance are Gye v McIntyre [1991] HCA 60; (1991) 171 CLR 609; Aliferis v Kyriacou [2000] VSCA 123; [2000] 1 VR 447 and Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4 CLR 1514. The decision in Aliferis v Kyriacou was criticised in Coventry's case (supra), but the ultimate conclusion was that the statutory claim for damages under the Trade Practices Act was not a claim arising by reason of contract and was therefore not a claim provable in the bankruptcy. This meant that it was not eligible for the special extended scope of set-off for mutual dealings under s 82 of the Bankruptcy Act (the equivalent of s 553C of the Corporations Act).
329 In the present case Striker's claim for damages arose plainly from the breach of the secondary obligation in the underwriting agreement. Not only is it pleaded in that fashion but the contractual entitlement for damages has succeeded. That brings the case within the rule in Gye v McIntyre (supra) and Old Style Confections Pty Ltd v Microbyte Investments Pty Ltd (In Liq) [1995] VicRp 65; [1995] 2 VR 457 and gives rise to a right of set-off under s 553C. It is not necessary for the plaintiff's claim to be vested, liquidated or enforceable at the time of the liquidation or the commencement of the winding up. Contingent debts at that date which are of a kind that will ultimately mature into pecuniary demands susceptible of set-off are capable of satisfying the requirements of s 553C.
330 Accordingly, I conclude that the plaintiff may set off its proved damages of $3,330,659 against the defendant's counterclaim of $2,328,580.55 plus interest. This would ordinarily result in judgment being entered for the balance of $1,002,078.45 in favour of the plaintiff but, because of the procedure adopted by the parties with leave of the court to treat this litigation as determining a dispute about claims made to the liquidators in the course of the winding up there will need to be declaratory relief rather than a judgment or judgments for any liquidated sum.
331 In view of the conclusions which have been reached in these reasons I consider that the relief which should be granted by the court should be as follows:
(a) Declare that the defendant repudiated its obligation fully to underwrite an issue of shares in the plaintiff to raise $7,500,000 or more in accordance with the terms of the Underwriting Agreement between the parties dated 2 December 1996 and that, subsequently, the plaintiff accepted that repudiation and terminated the agreement on 25 August 1998.
(b) Declare that, as a result of the defendant's breach of contract the plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $3,330,659 and that the aggregate liability of damages is, from the date of this judgment a debt due by the defendant to the plaintiff.
(c) Declare that the defendant is entitled to the recovery of $2,328,580.55 upon its counterclaim.
(d) Declare that the plaintiff is entitled to set off its entitlement to damages from the defendant against the defendant's counterclaim.
(e) Declare that after the set-off there is: $1,002,078.45 due by the defendant to the plaintiff which should rank as a claim for that amount in the liquidation of the defendant.
However, I will allow the parties an opportunity to make submissions about the details of the orders to be made to give effect to these conclusions.
Striker Resources Nl
Australian Goldfields Nl
(2000) 22 WAR 101
(1989) 16 NSWLR 582
(1973) 129 CLR 99
(1988) 18 NSWLR 540
(1907) 4 CLR 1514
(1986) 40 NSWLR 62
(1977) 180 CLR 266
(1990) 20 NSWLR 26
(1982) 149 CLR 337
(1991) 174 CLR 64
(1990) 170 CLR 394
(2005) 80 ALJR 132
(1978) 138 CLR 423
(1989) 168 CLR 385
(1993) 114 ALR 118
(1999) 196 CLR 101
(1937) 59 CLR 641
(1995) 37 NSWLR 421
(1991) 171 CLR 609
(1991) 172 CLR 60
(1920) 28 CLR 258
(1954) 90 CLR 409
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(1989) 171 CLR 125
(1980) 54 ALJR 421
(1970) 126 CLR 239
(1921) 29 CLR 499
(1954) 91 CLR 353
(1933) 48 CLR 457
(1984) 156 CLR 414
(1993) 177 CLR 635
(1989) 167 CLR 316
(2001) 207 CLR 165
(1980) 144 CLR 300
(1999) 21 WAR 350
(1985) 157 CLR 17
(1984) 54 ALR 179
(2004) 207 ALR 301
(1996) 69 FCR 346
(1979) 144 CLR 596
(1931) 45 CLR 359
(1982) 149 CLR 620
(1993) 60 SASR 453
(1929) 43 CLR 310
(1996) 40 NSWLR 695
(1995) 62 FCR 371
(1950) 81 CLR 418
(1988) 1 WAR 144
(1990) 3 WAR 486
(1998) 148 FLR 441
(1988) 164 CLR 387
(2006) 94 SASR 421
(1956) 99 CLR 560
(1986) 161 CLR 653
(1992) 27 NSWLR 406
(1969) 120 CLR 455
(1981) 146 CLR 336
(1938) 60 CLR 468
(1996) 70 FCR 34
(1983) 152 CLR 406
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(1933) 49 CLR 507
(1998) 192 CLR 603
(1982) 149 CLR 571
(1986) 60 ALJR 225
(1968) 118 CLR 429