R v Van Ryn - [2016] NSWCCA 1 - NSWCCA 2015 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCCA

R v Van Ryn

[2016] NSWCCA 1

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2015-12-02|Before: Leeming JA, Johnson J, Hulme J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2015-12-02

Before

Leeming JA, Johnson J, Hulme J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (60 paragraphs)

[1]

Peiris v R [2014] NSWCCA 58; 240 A Crim R 114 PGM v R [2008] NSWCCA 172; 187 A Crim R 152 R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304 R v Cahyadi [2007] NSWCCA 1; 168 A Crim R 41 R v Campbell [2014] NSWCCA 102 R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 R v Doan [2000] NSWCCA 317; 50 NSWLR 115 R v El Masri [2005] NSWCCA 167 R v Fitzgerald [2004] NSWCCA 5; 59 NSWLR 493 R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56; 239 A Crim R 469 R v Gommeson [2014] NSWCCA 159 R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130; 171 A Crim R 267 R v Holder; R v Johnston [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 R v JP [2015] NSWCCA 267 R v KNL [2005] NSWCCA 260; 154 A Crim R 268 R v Lattouf; R v MF [2015] NSWCCA 283 R v Manners [2004] NSWCCA 181 R v McNaughton [2006] NSWCCA 242; 66 NSWLR 566 R v MF [2015] NSWCCA 283 R v Porte [2015] NSWCCA 174 R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704 R v West [2014] NSWCCA 250 R v Wheeler [2000] NSWCCA 34 R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 R v XX (2009) 195 A Crim R 38 RJA v R [2008] NSWCCA 137; 185 A Crim R 178 Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; 206 CLR 267 SHR v R [2014] NSWCCA 94 Simpson v R [2014] NSWCCA 23 SW v R [2013] NSWCCA 255 Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465 Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 WW v R [2012] NSWCCA 165 Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; 223 A Crim R 460 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Regina (Appellant) Maurice Van Ryn (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: Ms S Dowling SC (Crown) Mr S Odgers SC with Mr C Heazlewood (Respondent)

[2]

[7]

Count 2 - Victim 2 - Between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2007: Persistent sexual abuse of a child Section 66EA - maximum penalty 25 years. Indicative sentence: 8 years - NPP 4 years.

The family of victim 2 lived in the Bega district and were friends with the respondent's family. Victim 2 suffered from bullying at school and as a result spent a large amount of time at home on his computer. He would visit the respondent's home on most occasions that his parents did so. Victim 2 enjoyed being at the respondent's home because he was able to use the swimming pool, spa and play computer games. The respondent befriended him and the pair formed a close relationship. He gave him small gifts, soft drinks and lollies and paid him for performing odd jobs. Victim 2 began spending time alone with the respondent. When he was aged between 10 and 11 the respondent initiated sexual contact with him. This involved him sitting next to victim 2 on the lounge and rubbing his upper thigh.
The respondent's behaviour escalated to the point that when victim 2 was aged between 11 and 12 the pair would have a spa together. During those occasions he would place his hand on the upper thigh of the victim before moving it to touch his genitals. Victim 2 said this touching of his genitals happened "on a number of occasions". It was an agreed fact that this conduct occurred regularly in the period when victim 2 was aged 12 to 14.
On one occasion when victim 2 was aged 12 the respondent sat beside him on the lounge and masturbated his penis while masturbating his own penis. The respondent then commenced performing oral sex on victim 2, continuing until he ejaculated. The respondent performed oral sex on victim 2 on a number of occasions up until he turned 15.
On another occasion when victim 2 was aged 13½ he was with the respondent in his home office. The respondent played a pornographic CD on his computer. He began masturbating victim 2 whilst masturbating his own penis. He then performed fellatio upon victim 2 before standing in front of him with his own erect penis near the face of victim 2. He placed his hands on the back of the boy's head and attempted to pull his mouth towards his penis. Victim 2 turned his head away. The respondent said, "It's okay, just try it". Victim 2 declined but the respondent tried again to the point where his penis touched the mouth of victim 2. He then released the boy's head and they put their clothes back on.
A similar incident occurred a few months later in the lounge room after the respondent began playing a pornographic movie on the television. It culminated in him attempting to insert his penis into the mouth of victim 2. Victim 2 kept his mouth closed but could feel the respondent's penis pressing against his lips. The respondent said, "Just open your mouth up and stop tensing". Victim 2 shook his head and the incident concluded.
When victim 2 was aged 14 he went with the respondent on an overnight stay to Canberra. The respondent picked him up from school on a Friday afternoon and they went to watch a rugby game in a corporate box owned by Bega Cheese at Bruce Stadium. After the game they travelled to a motel room where the respondent gave him alcohol which he consumed. As they were sitting on a bed the respondent put on a pornographic movie on his laptop computer. He then began masturbating victim 2 and performed oral sex on him. He stopped and put victim 2, who was naked, onto his stomach and then straddled him. Victim 2 could feel the respondent's penis touching him between the cheeks of his backside. Victim 2 moved away and the respondent desisted. They then watched more of the pornographic movie and had another alcoholic drink before they went to separate beds.
There was another occasion when victim 2 went with the respondent to gather oysters on the Bega River. The respondent showed victim 2 a pornographic magazine and began rubbing victim 2's penis. He was rubbing his own penis as he did so. He then performed oral sex on victim 2.
Another incident occurred when victim 2 was aged 14½. He was in the lounge room at the respondent's house watching television. The respondent sat next to him and commenced masturbating him and himself and then removed their clothing. He knelt in front of victim 2 and tried to insert his penis into victim 2's anus. Victim 2 wriggled and the respondent's attempt failed. The respondent then rolled victim 2 onto his stomach and then achieved penetration of the boy's anus with his penis. This caused victim 2 pain and he called out. The respondent removed his penis and they put their clothes back on. Victim 2 had bleeding from the anus shortly after and the respondent did not attempt anal sex with him again.

[23]

Dr Bruce Westmore's report of 17 January 2015

Dr Westmore assessed the respondent shortly after he was arrested in July 2014. He referred the respondent to Dr O'Dea for treatment and reassessed him in January 2015.
Dr Westmore reported that the respondent had told him that he had pleaded guilty to 12 counts of "indecent assault basically".
The respondent told Dr Westmore that all of the offences occurred in his own home. He accepted that he had inappropriate relationships with the victims, "But they all loved being with me and unfortunately, I loved being with them. None of them ever turned on me for what I did to them".
Dr Westmore had available to him the Court Attendance Notices and the Statement of Facts. He said, "I note behaviour consistent with grooming and the detailed description of the offending behaviour in relation to each of the victims". He indicated that the respondent was not denying any of those details.
The respondent told Dr Westmore that his marriage had been a generally happy one and that he had a satisfactory sexual relationship with his wife although in recent years the frequency of intimacy had decreased.
The respondent described sexual attractions and fantasies which included younger women and sometimes teenagers and also, some less frequent fantasies involving pre-adolescent children. Dr Westmore said that the respondent's principal non-adult based sexual focus appeared to be directed towards children who are in the transition between being pre-pubertal into early puberty. He also acknowledged longstanding and repeated fantasies of exposing himself. His sexual thoughts, feelings and impulses towards very young teenagers, mainly girls but sometimes boys, had been more persistent and intrusive and had represented a problem for him for many years.
The respondent confirmed to Dr Westmore that he had been seeing Dr O'Dea and had commenced with anti-libidinal medication in November 2014. He told Dr Westmore that within two weeks his testosterone levels had reduced significantly and "the change that happened to me mentally was staggering. It was like a veil had been lifted, a breath of fresh air. Prior to the medication, most of my days were associated with inappropriate thoughts but, within a space of two or three weeks, my life changed mentally." He also said that "the constant intrusive inappropriate fantasies just weren't there anymore". He also said, "the tragedy of all of this is, you don't see ads on television (that say), if you are this way (sexually attracted to children), you can do something about it". He wondered why there was not more proactive information about these particular sexual problems.
The respondent told Dr Westmore that he had continued taking the medication after going into custody in December 2014 and intended to keep doing so, including after release. He also said that he would be "more than happy" to attend a sex offenders program.
The respondent said that he continued to receive strong support from his wife and three children and expects that this will continue when he returns to the community.
Dr Westmore asked the respondent whether the offending behaviour was wrong and the respondent replied, "Of course it was wrong, it is illegal and if it negatively and hurtfully hurt the victims (it was wrong)". He acknowledged a breach of trust: "I abused that trust that their parents gave me and the kids themselves gave me and for that, I'm eternally regretful".
The respondent spoke of being in protection as a "limited association prisoner" although he reported having no major difficulties; he got on with the officers and other inmates. He received a lot of visits from family members.
Dr Westmore described the respondent as presenting with complex Paraphilic Disorder. He diagnosed him as suffering from an Exhibitionistic Disorder (sexually aroused by exposing genitals to pre-pubertal children). He also considered it appropriate to make a diagnosis of Paedophilic Disorder (non-exclusive type - sexually attracted to both males and females). He noted that the respondent's self-reported aberrant sexual focus is towards pre-pubescent children who are entering early pubescence. Dr Westmore queried whether others might debate whether the respondent's condition was more consistent with Hebephilia. However he thought that was probably more of a semantic issue. Noting the age range of the victims (8 to 15) he thought the respondent might have both conditions.
Dr Westmore said that people who suffer from Paraphilia, such as the one suffered by the respondent, have a genetic/constitutional vulnerability to behave in such a way. The paraphilic component of the respondent's sexual profile was an integral part of his "sexual orientation". Dr Westmore did not believe that that component can be changed, altered or extinguished, but believed that, with appropriate psychiatric intervention, aspects of it could be contained and controlled.
Dr Westmore said it was too early to pass any definitive opinions in relation to the respondent's long-term risk but there were some early positive indicators which might suggest that his long-term risk of re-offending is in the lower range. In this regard, Dr Westmore said: "I note his positive biological response to the introduction of the antiandrogen medication, along with the self-reported positive psychological changes, which have occurred since he has been on this medication. I note he continues to receive strong support from his wife, mother and children and he has reasonably good insight into the wrongness of his actions, how he betrayed the trust of others, including the children, when committing the offending acts. His positive attitude towards his past, current and ongoing treatment is also a positive prognostic indicator, as is his willingness to attend a Sex Offenders' Programme whilst in custody."
Dr Westmore also acknowledged limitations associated with risk prediction. The extent to which the respondent participated in a sex offenders program would be important as would his ongoing willingness to take medication in the long-term, and perhaps for the rest of his life. He considered that the respondent would need to remain under the care of a psychiatrist indefinitely.

[24]

Dr Jeremy O'Dea's reports of 30 January 2015 and 5 August 2015

The respondent had seven consultations with Dr Jeremy O'Dea between the referral from Dr Westmore in July and when his bail was revoked in December 2014. Dr O'Dea saw him again on 24 January 2015 and provided a report a short time later.
Dr O'Dea's report included an account of the offence of indecent exposure committed in Melbourne in 1981. The respondent told Dr O'Dea that he had been driving his car at dusk one evening when he had his penis out. He said it was not erect and he was not masturbating. When he stopped at traffic lights a paperboy aged about 12 saw him and took his registration number. As a result the respondent immediately went to the police station and gave himself in. He received a fine and a bond with a condition that he attend a psychiatrist. He said that he had six to eight counselling sessions with a psychiatrist over four to six months.
(This account of the 1981 offence is at odds with what the respondent told Dr Rowe who said that "he reported being caught masturbating in his car".)
Dr O'Dea noted the various offences to which the respondent had (at that stage) pleaded guilty and noted that they included "apparent grooming behaviours, and repeated sexual relations with a particular male child … including anal intercourse". The respondent told him that the majority of his sexual offences against children "have been in my house … not outside … on my turf … after a period of friendship …".
The respondent reported lifelong specific and strong sexual fantasies and urges towards both male and female children. These urges had been experienced on a daily basis in the past. He said, "I thought they were my fantasies … that most of my life I could control them and keep them as fantasies". He also told Dr O'Dea of experiencing problems with exhibitionism which he described as a longstanding issue since his teenage years.
Dr O'Dea reported that the respondent said that he had a satisfactory sexual relationship with his wife.
In describing the respondent's presentation at interviews, Dr O'Dea said, "He has shown remorse, regret and contrition for his actions in relation to his paedophilia, exhibitionism and sex offending behaviours." (The doctor did not say how.)
Dr O'Dea diagnosed the respondent as suffering from "Paraphilic Disorders, namely Paedophilic Disorder, sexually attracted to both males and females, not limited to incest, predominant if not exclusive (so called Bisexual Paedophilia); and Exhibitionistic Disorder (Exhibitionism)".
It was Dr O'Dea who prescribed anti-libidinal/testosterone lowering medication to the respondent in November 2014. He described this being considered the most effective treatment for the respondent's diagnosed condition. After several weeks the respondent reported not having any sexual fantasies towards children. Testing by Dr O'Dea showed a significant reduction in testosterone levels. When the respondent was reviewed by Dr O'Dea in custody on 24 January 2015 he spoke of being in control of his paedophilic urges and fantasies and wanted to continue the medication through to his eventual release into the community.
Dr O'Dea said that the respondent would require ongoing forensic psychiatric assessment and treatment in the community in the long-term aimed at assisting him to successfully manage and minimise the risk of him engaging in further sex offending behaviours.
Dr O'Dea said that the type of paedophilia suffered by the respondent would be generally considered a form of sexual orientation that people would not necessarily choose. The treatment, including the anti-libidinal medication, was not a cure but allowed a patient to control and/or extinguish urges and fantasies and therefore control and extinguish abhorrent behaviours, thereby conducting themselves safely in the community.
Dr O'Dea provided a second report after being advised of the further charges that came to be placed on the second indictment. He said that those additional offences did not alter the substance of the opinions that he had expressed previously.

[25]

Dr Donald Rowe's reports of 4 February 2015 and 23 July 2015

The respondent saw Dr Rowe in November 2014 and January 2015. The history he gave included masturbation on an average of twice per day prior to receiving anti-libidinal medication. Dr Rowe opined that this was abnormal and a symptom of hypersexual behaviour.
The respondent told Dr Rowe of a "relatively normal sex life with his wife for approximately 20 years, after which it began to decline with little or no sexual intimacy for the past 5 to 10 years". Dr Rowe noted the coincidence of an absence of sexual relations with his wife with the commencement of the alleged offences in 2004. It was Dr Rowe's opinion that this "most likely contributed in part to more wayward avenues of sexual excitement and relief".
The respondent told Dr Rowe that he "semi-retired" in 2004/2005 which left him with additional recreational time. Again, Dr Rowe noted the coincidence with the commencement of the offences. He wrote: "In my opinion, the series of changes relating to an absence of sexual relations with his wife, reduced access to more legitimate avenues of sexual relief and his semi-retirement, in the context of what was a hypersexual disorder, most likely contributed to his abnormal touching of children and adolescents (due to having more time and contact) and eventual sexual behaviours with some of those young people. Mr Van Ryn due to being less occupied and more sexually frustrated would have also had more time to think about and focus on his deviant sexual obsessions and inadvertently at times involved pre-pubescent and pubescent children"
The respondent's report of an average of 14 and up to 28 orgasms per week throughout his adult life, generally obtained through masturbation, in addition to frequent thoughts of sexual acts, brothel visits and unprotected sex, were consistent with a chronic case of hypersexual behaviour.
Dr Rowe noted a high incidence of childhood ADHD in individuals with hypersexual disorder (17 %) and of those with both hypersexual disorder and a paraphilic disorder (50 %). He reviewed the respondent's high school reports and noted that his "scholastic background is consistent with the presence of ADHD type features and a probable diagnosis. Neuropsychological testing administered and interpreted by Dr Rowe confirmed in his mind a diagnosis of "high functioning ADHD". He wrote: "Notably, ADHD is associated with deficits weaknesses [sic] in the area of executive functions which are important for the maintenance of planning, organisation, self-monitoring, response inhibition/impulsivity, reasoning, consequential thinking, decision making and careful judgment. Such individuals are at risk of committing various criminal offences as shown in clinical and forensic studies. However, patients with ADHD alone do not necessarily commit criminal acts but in the presence of other factors such as hypersexuality and certain environmental factors the individual may not be able to sufficiently inhibit their strong sexual impulses or other impulsive behaviours."
Dr Rowe cited the offence committed against victim 8 (count 10) as an example of the effects of ADHD and hypersexual disorder. The respondent had told Dr Rowe that the victim and her mother had spent the prior two weeks with him and his wife. He said that there was a lot of playful and physical contact between himself and the victim. He told Dr Rowe, "I had a brain snap and quickly realised what I was doing was wrong and covered up … I didn't have an erection".
(I note that this is inconsistent with the agreed statement of facts which says that the victim and the mother were at the respondent's premises on the relevant evening for a meal and the child disclosed to her mother what had occurred on their way home. Further, the claim to having had a "brain snap" is seemingly at odds with the agreed fact that the respondent approached the child whilst she was alone in a downstairs area of the house playing with toys while her mother and the respondent's wife were upstairs.)
Dr Rowe summarised the significance of his findings of the respondent having ADHD, Hypersexual Disorder and Paedophilia/Hebephilia as follows: "Individuals, with each of these conditions alone, ADHD, HD and/or Paedophilia/Hebephilia do not necessarily commit criminal acts. However, as a result of their somewhat extreme interests and behavioural tendencies, like the respondent, they may be more physical and impulsive (without thought) in their interactions, such as leading to behaviours akin to sexual groping or molestation. The problem arises when such individuals are exposed to situations where their sexual drive is insufficiently satisfied and due to their underlying sexual impulsivity and paedophilic/hebephilic tendencies they are attracted to the idea of sexual relations with children and adolescents and if untreated inadvertently can act on these impulses, like that which occurred in the case of the respondent, as described in the NSW Police Facts Sheets. In my opinion, had the respondent not suffered from a combination of ADHD and/or HD he is likely to have been able to better inhibit his paedophilic behaviours. Or had he continued to remain in full time employment from 2004 onwards having less contact with young people and greater contact with adults, including more appropriate adult sexual interactions, it is most likely he would not have participated in such illegal behaviours." (Emphasis added)
Dr Rowe also reported that the respondent had suffered "deep regret and depression" over the experience. The respondent had said that he knew that what he was doing was wrong but at the time had not considered the consequences. He also acknowledged that "he had caused hurt to his family and was concerned about any potential damage he had inflicted on the victims".
Dr Rowe noted that the respondent had commenced taking anti-libidinal medication. He considered that he had displayed a motivation to treat his condition. The respondent had said to him, "If only these sorts of medication treatments were advertised for individuals with my sort of problem".
On the subject of risk of re-offending, Dr Rowe said: "In my opinion, given the respondent's acknowledgement of the illegality of his offences and if he were to continue with the full treatment program (which I have recommended in Appendix A and which he has partly commenced), then the likelihood of him suffering a relapse or reoffending would be significantly reduced and in all likelihood become increasingly negligible."
Dr Rowe provided a further report after being advised of the further offences in the second indictment. He, like Dr O'Dea, confirmed that they did not alter his previously expressed opinions.

[28]

Evidence by the respondent

The sentence hearing commenced before Jeffreys DCJ at the Bega sittings of the District Court on 4 February 2015. The first indictment was presented and pleas of guilty were entered. It should be noted that the respondent had previously entered pleas of guilty in the Local Court on 25 November 2014.
The respondent gave evidence when the hearing resumed on 26 February 2015. He confirmed that he had told the truth to the authors of the various reports and that what appeared in them accurately represented what he had said. He accepted the diagnosis of Paraphilic Disorder and he confirmed that he had been sexually attracted to children since his early teens.
In relation to the indecent exposure in Victoria in 1981, the respondent said that he saw a psychiatrist for two or three months over six to eight consultations but he did not derive any benefit from it.
He was asked by his counsel to explain why the offending started in 2004 and he said, that he could not: "I think it's fair to say that the control that I had over those sexual urges that I had, there were those odd moments unfortunately when I didn't exert the control that I should have". (Emphasis added)
He agreed that he knew that what he was doing was wrong and that it was against the law. He was asked whether he knew that it carried a risk of harm to children and he said that whilst it was not in the forefront of his mind at the time but he understood there was a "potential" risk of harm to children. He repeated that he "wasn't able to resist that urge that hit me at that moment … it was an urge to touch basically … I just did not have the control and I touched".
The respondent was reminded that the offending progressed beyond touching and he said, "It did in one case". (He had not been charged with the offences on the second indictment at that time.)
He was asked whether he groomed any of the children in the sense of engaging in behaviour designed to make them receptive to sexual offending and he gave a categorical denial. He denied planning any of the assaults and maintained that they were "all opportunistic at a moment in time".
He was asked whether he was aware of the existence of anti-libidinal medication prior to 2014. He said he was not and "that's a real part of the tragedy of the story". He added, "I've been pretty upset about the fact that there were things out there I could have done that I have never known about".
He gave the following evidence on the subject of remorse: "Q. Do you wish to say anything to the victims of these offences and their families? A. It's very emotional for me to do so because the parents - most of them are here - and the victims were quite frankly our dearest and closest friends. We had something special … where we socialised virtually on a daily basis and a few minutes of stupidity on my part wrecked something that was really good and really special so obviously I am extremely regretful about what happened, I am extremely sorry for any harm I might have hurt those kids, I'm really, really sorry that we destroyed friendships and relationships that were special, long-lasting, and you know if I could turn back the clock and get those friends back I certainly would try and do so." (Emphasis added)
Evidence was given about the conditions of custody he had experienced and he referred to being the subject of verbal abuse and accepted that he would always require protection within the prison system.
In cross-examination the respondent was asked about his reference to "a few minutes of stupidity" and it was suggested to him that he was "playing it down somewhat". He replied: "A. I don't believe it is. With I think it's 9 of the 10 counts they're activities that range between 15 seconds and a minute. With regard to the one particular boy where there was a longer term relationship yes that's a little bit different but with 9 of the 10 those activities were somewhere less than a minute. Q. You accept don't you that what you did wasn't just stupid it was grossly criminal? A. Of course."
The offence taken into account in relation to count 7 involved an incident that occurred a short time after the respondent had been arrested and he gave the following evidence about it: Q. You were arrested in relation to an incident in the June of last year? A. Yep. Q. And then there was a further incident that occurred which is one of the counts on the Form 1 whilst you were on bail? A. Yes. Q. Did the shock of being arrested in the middle of 2014 not bring you to your senses? A. Let's talk about what the incident was. It was a hand on a knee and an attempted kiss and I reckon that's pretty thin for an indecent assault. Q. Well in circumstances where you had previously been involved in more serious sexual activity you don't consider that that was a sexually motivated act? A. No it was not. Q. But you have given evidence that you felt sexually attracted to children without this treatment? A. (No verbal reply) Q. Without this medical treatment - you said you had constant thoughts of sexual attraction to children? A. Yep. Q. Well you hadn't had the treatment by then, by the time you committed that further offence on bail? A. Yeah but I had a very very close relationship and I'm not talking sexual, I had a very very close relationship with these particular people you're talking about and for me to put my hand on their knee or around their shoulder or whatever the case may be was literally a regular occurrence which was not considered by me or by them as a sexual event. Q. What about kissing a young boy? A. Well, it was an attempted kiss and it didn't get there and it was - you know it was a bit of a fun joke thing at the time, what can I say. Q. Is it the case that you received sexual gratification when you did these acts that you have pleaded guilty to? A. Yep. (Emphasis added)
He was pressed as to his denial of grooming behaviour. He denied that there were incentives for the victims to be at his house. He explained that he had a "very, very open house and a very, very sociable house" at which not only children but their parents and friends were welcome. He described himself as "an extremely hospitable person". He was asked whether having things such as pay TV, a pool, and a spa were things that attracted children but he said he could not see the point and asked rhetorically, "What am I going to do, fill in the swimming pool?" He agreed, however, that he did not do anything to discourage children from coming to his home.
In relation to victim 2 the respondent accepted that the events the subject of the persistent child sexual abuse charge spanned a four year period and covered a wide variety of activity up to and including intercourse. He maintained however that they were spur of the moment or spontaneous acts. He was pressed by reference to the trip to watch the rugby game in Canberra where he stayed overnight with victim 2 in a motel room. It was suggested that he would have had it in his mind that there would be sexual contact during that trip but he said, "Not necessarily, no".
Further on the question of remorse, there was the following evidence: "Q. With your apology to the family, is that in relation to the breach of the trust or in relation to the harm that's been carried out against these children? A. Everything - as I think I said in my apology, I apologised to the victims themselves for any harm I may have caused them. The apology is for a lot of things. It's for you know abusing the trust they gave me, it's for destroying a fantastic - fantastic friendships and a fantastic lifestyle that we had … , so it's an all-embracing apology. Q. Do you see the breach was not just against the parents of the children, but the children themselves? A. Of course."

[29]

Report of Professor David Greenberg of 15 April 2015

The sentence hearing was adjourned to Sydney on 20 April 2015. At that point the Crown tendered a report of Professor David Greenberg of 15 April 2015. Professor Greenberg is a forensic psychiatrist who described himself as an internationally recognised expert in the area of sex offenders and treatment of paraphiliac disorders. Professor Greenberg had not conducted an assessment of the respondent but had reviewed the documentary evidence including the reports of Drs Westmore, O'Dea and Rowe.
Professor Greenberg, speaking generally, said that "sexual child predators often use grooming behaviours which are deliberate tactics such as befriending and establishing an emotional connection with a child to lower the child's inhibitions and gain their trust in order to sexually abuse them". He referred to references in the documentary material to the respondent having a home with a spa, swimming pool, a computer and computer games. He noted that access to these would have been attractive to young children. He also referred to the agreed fact that the children were provided with small gifts, lollies and soft drinks. He referred to the use of pornographic material in relation to some of the children. There was also the reference to victim 2 having been shown pornography and provided with alcohol on the trip to Canberra. Reference was also made to the outing to the Bega River to gather oysters and, in respect of victim 5, giving a 15 year old boy a driving lesson. Professor Greenberg continued: "These related behaviours are in my view all common grooming activities used by paedophiles to entice children and to obtain their trust and compliance of these children with intended later sexual activity".
Professor Greenberg agreed with the diagnosis of Drs O'Dea and Westmore that the respondent likely had a Paedophiliac Disorder. He noted that Dr Rowe had referred throughout his report to the respondent having "paedophilic tendencies" but pointed out that the respondent met the DSM-IV criteria for having a Paedophiliac Disorder.
Professor Greenberg also agreed that the respondent likely had a "Hebophilic Activity because of sexual activity also involved these children during their pubertal development [sic]".
Professor Greenberg was critical of Dr Rowe's apparent acceptance of the respondent's claim in relation to the offence in count 10 that he had a "brain snap". He said that paedophiliac activity is associated with "goal directed behaviour"; "there is often planning and intentional behaviour to get access to children".
Reference was made to Dr Rowe's diagnosis of the respondent having "high functioning Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder". Professor Greenberg said that whilst the respondent may or may not have ADHD, persons with such a disorder do not sexually abuse children. He saw no causal relationship between the respondent having that condition and his sexual molestation of eight children over a decade. He noted that the respondent had tertiary qualifications and had worked at a high level in a business for many years and said, "It is therefore questionable how these deficits or weaknesses in executive functioning was of great significance in his decision making, reasoning, consequential thinking and careful judgment".
Professor Greenberg took issue with Dr Rowe's diagnosis of the respondent having Hypersexual Disorder. He noted that it was not accepted in the DSM-V or any earlier versions as being a mental disorder. "The acceptance of such a condition as a disorder has not gained wider acceptance in the general clinical sex offender expert community as yet and its validity has been questioned by some researchers".
Reference was made to the differing accounts given by the respondent to Drs Westmore, O'Dea and Rowe about his sexual experience with his wife. It was Professor Greenberg's opinion that, "not having a sexual outlet with his wife is not a causative factor for paedophiliac behaviour and lack of sexual outlet cannot be used to justify his paedophilic behaviour". Professor Greenberg noted that "individuals with a Paedophiliac Disorder often deny, minimise and justify their behaviour".
He also disagreed with Dr Rowe's assessment that if recommendations for treatment were implemented, the likelihood of the respondent having a relapse or re-offending would become increasingly "negligible".
Professor Greenberg concluded his review of Dr Rowe's report as follows: "I therefore cannot concur with Dr Rowe's opinion that the respondent's absence of sexual relations with his wife, reduced access to more legitimate avenues of sexual relief and his semi-retirement as well as his "hypersexual disorder" and his high functioning Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder significantly contributed to him committing his sexual offences. Although Dr Rowe's theoretical model of the respondent's sexual offending against eight children, may or may not be true, this view would not be the accepted view of most experts working with paedophiles."
Professor Greenberg agreed with Drs Westmore, O'Dea and Rowe that with psychosexual treatment combined with anti-libidinal treatment the respondent's risk of re-offending may possibly or likely be reduced. He added, "Although less likely, it may over time not be reduced because there is no cure for this disorder".
Generally on the subject of anti-libidinal treatment, Professor Greenberg said that many sex offenders who voluntarily undertake such treatment use it until such time as their parole expires. The treatment is voluntary and is often ceased at that point. Such treatments cannot be enforced on any individual. Moreover, individuals may also develop medical complications and may have to cease treatment as a result.

[30]

Oral evidence of Professor Greenberg

Professor Greenberg was called to give evidence. He maintained his view that if the respondent did suffer from ADHD it did not have any significant role to play in the causation of his paedophilia activity. He was informed that the respondent had described his offending behaviour as "minutes of madness" (in fact "a few minutes of stupidity"). He gave this evidence: "Q. Is describing the sexual activity that he's pleaded to as "minutes of madness", in your view, symptomatic of people with this disorder they try to minimise? A. Yes, they often justify, minimise, deny, rationalise their behaviour."
In cross-examination Professor Greenberg was tested as to his inability to see the link between ADHD and the offending. His response was to the effect that it was necessary to distinguish between impulsive behaviour generally and sexual impulsivity.
The sentencing judge took up the questioning on this subject and Professor Greenberg explained that if there was impulsivity in terms of a lack of control by somebody with ADHD "it would apply to all actions, it wouldn't be specifically only with sexual behaviour with children".
In relation to Dr Rowe's diagnosis of Hypersexuality Disorder, Professor Greenberg expressed the need for caution in that it was based on self-report by a person facing legal sanction.
Lastly Professor Greenberg was asked about "grooming behaviours" used by child sexual predators and referred to the opinion expressed in his report that the facts of the respondent's offences included a description of activities consistent with grooming. He maintained that they were consistent, "in the context of having eight children who were reportedly sexually abused". He agreed that this could have been conduct carried out with an intention or a plan to create opportunities for sexual activity but he agreed that this was not necessarily the case. "Q. In order - and I'm focusing on the latter, you accept that it's while the conduct was consistent with 'intentional grooming' if I might use that phrase it was not necessarily a situation of intentional grooming? A. It may not be, yes that is correct, I mean people with paedophilia don't walk down the street and sexually abuse every child they see."
In re-examination Professor Greenberg was asked again about the respondent having ADHD: "Q. Just assuming for a moment that Mr Vanryn has been a successful businessman over some decades? A. Right. Q. Is that a factor, if you accept that to be the case for argument sake, is that a factor you would take into account in determining whether he has deficits in executive functioning? A. Yes, the issue of so called high functioning, it's a question, it's a spectrum, so he has lesser symptoms than a person with full-blown ADHD who has a diagnosis consistent with DSM-5. So the effect of having a much lesser or milder form of ADHD, how that would impact on all areas, it wouldn't be specifically to one area, one would expect it to be, impact on all areas of functioning where he had deficits."

[33]

The sentencing judgment

In view of the widespread attack made by the Crown in relation to the sentencing judgment it is appropriate to summarise it in some detail. It comprised the following components: A verbatim recitation of the terms of each count in the two indictments. (ROS 1-4) Reference to the Form 1 offences. (ROS 4-5) Reference to the applicable maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods for the offences. (ROS 5-6) A verbatim recitation of the purposes of sentencing listed in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. (ROS 6) Quotation from R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 68 ("the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex"; "erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of a particular factual circumstance"; etcetera). Quotation from R v Lattouf (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 12 December 1996, unrep) (a paramount objective of sentencing is "the achievement of justice in the individual case"). Citation of five cases in which "those observations have been endorsed". A statement of reasons for reducing sentences by 25 per cent for the utilitarian benefit flowing from the pleas of guilty. (ROS 7-8) Reference to the sentence being backdated to 10 December 2014; the date the respondent was refused bail. (ROS 8) Recitation of the facts for each offence. (ROS 8-18) A reference to the need for "grooming", as contended by the Crown, to be proved beyond reasonable doubt: The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at [27]. (ROS 18) A reminder of the need to sentence only in relation to the offences charged and not for uncharged offences; although permissible to have regard to offences charged not being isolated incidents. Quotations in this regard from R v Bamford (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 23 July 1991, unrep), R v Dousha [2008] NSWCCA 263 at [27]; and R v Kozakiewicz (Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 June 1991, unrep). (ROS 19) Quotation of cases in relation to the seriousness of sexual assaults upon children: R v Fisher (1989) 40 A Crim R 442 at 445: including that "This Court must serve notice upon judges who impose weakly merciful sentences in some cases of sexual assault upon children that heavy custodial sentences are essential". R v Skinner (1993) 72 A Crim R 151 at [154]: "general deterrence is of great importance". R v JCW (2000) 112 A Crim R 466 at [121]: "In circumstances where grave and repeated sexual assaults were perpetrated upon a young child, in particular by a person in a position of trust and authority, condign punishment is called for". R v BJW (2000) 112 A Crim R 1 at [20]: "community abhorrence of and concern about adult sexual abuse of children". R v Burchell (1987) 34 A Crim R 148 at 150: the need for severe punishment; the "element of general deterrence is of prime importance". Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146 at [71]: the need to have regard to standard non-parole periods prescribed for aggravated indecent assault. GAT v R [2007] NSWCCA 208 at [22]: the actual character of the indecent assault is of considerable significance in assessing objective seriousness of such an offence. R v AJP [2004] NSWCCA 434; 150 A Crim R 575 at [24]: enforced fellatio is not necessarily below the mid-point of objective seriousness for an offence of having sexual intercourse with a child. R v Russell (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 21 September 1996, unrep): anal intercourse is always degrading. Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38; 181 A Crim R 378: persistent sexual abuse of a child (s 66EA) is a more serious offence than the offences which comprise the individual acts. R v Fitzgerald [2004] NSWCCA 5; 59 NSWLR 493 at [13]: sentencing for a s 66EA offence "should [not] be more harsh in outcome than sentencing for the same course of conduct had it crystallised into convictions for a number of representative offences". R v Manners [2004] NSWCCA 181: an offence against s 66EA can involve a wide range of seriousness of conduct. (ROS 19-25) The victim impact statements are taken into account by recognising the harm done to the victims and the community pursuant to s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. (ROS 25) A breach of trust, in that the majority of the offences occurred when the victims were guests in the respondent's home, is an aggravating factor. (ROS 25-26) Rejection of a Crown submission that it was an aggravating factor that the offence taken into account in relation to count 7 was committed whilst the respondent was on bail. (ROS 26) Summary of some aspects of the respondent's personal circumstances including his tertiary education and "extremely good work history". (ROS 26) Summary of the circumstances of the 1981 offence of indecent exposure; holding that this disentitled him to be considered as a first offender "to a very minor extent". (ROS 27) Good character, although given significantly less weight than in sentencing for other offences, was still necessary to be taken into account. (ROS 27-28) Contrition was evident from the respondent's early admission of wrongdoing, immediate recourse to psychiatric treatment and taking steps to address offending by involvement in anti-libidinal treatment. It was also evident from his wife's statement and the report of Dr O'Dea. The judge rejected the Crown's submission that contrition was not evident from the respondent's oral evidence. The respondent "has shown deep contrition". (ROS 28-29) "On limited occasions, sporadically, the offender offended in relation to a number of the children". The judge was unable to say that the respondent's denial of "grooming" was untruthful. He was also not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that grooming was involved and that sexual activity with Victim 2 was intended in relation to the trip to Canberra. (ROS 29-30) The judge considered it important to take into account that the respondent was previously unaware of the availability of anti-libidinal treatment. (ROS 29) Discussion of the diagnoses of the psychiatrists with quotations from their reports. (ROS 31-33) Quotations from the respondent's evidence about his good progress in relation to anti-libidinal medication. The respondent has "reasonable prospects of not offending whilst ever he is on that treatment". (ROS 34-35) Reference to the judgment of McClellan CJ at CL in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194; 243 FLR 28 at [177]-[178] for principles relating to sentencing an offender with a mental health condition. (ROS 35-36) Discussion of the diagnosis of Dr Rowe, in particular of the respondent having ADHD. Dr Rowe had the advantage of examining the respondent, conducting tests and reviewing school and other reports. Professor Greenberg did not have such advantage. The judge was satisfied that the respondent suffered from ADHD and said he would take it into account as well as what Dr Rowe said about it impacting upon the respondent's inhibitions. (ROS 36-37) In accordance with Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 there was a need to structure sentences so as to reflect the totality of criminality. (ROS 37) There was also a need to take into account that a number of the offences under s 61M(1) and s 61M(2) could have been disposed of in the Local Court. (ROS 37-38) Reference to statements of principle about concurrency and accumulation of sentences for sexual assault offences committed against multiple victims: R v Wicks [2005] NSWCCA 409 at [49] and R v Katon [2008] NSWCCA 228 at [41] were cited. (ROS 38) Extra curial punishment as described in the respondent's wife's statement and in his oral evidence should be taken into account. Mokhaiber v R [2011] NSWCCA 10 at [31] and R v El Hani [2004] NSWCCA 162 were cited. (ROS 38-39; 40-41) Reference was made to R v Clinton [2009] NSWCCA 276 at [24] and JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [71] on the subject of protective custody. A submission that protective custody and prison overcrowding should be taken into account was rejected. (ROS 39-40) Special circumstances pursuant to s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were found on the bases that the respondent had not previously served a term of imprisonment; he would need a longer period of support in relation to his mental problems when he re-enters the community; and that it was in the interests of the community that he have a long period of parole because of the likelihood of treatment being successful. The judge "referred" to R v Carter [2003] NSWCCA 243; R v Tuuta [2014] NSWCCA 40; Sayed v The Queen [2012] WASC 17; and R v Moore [2015] SASCA 9 (without saying what he derived from any of them). (ROS 41). The judge concluded by announcing the indicative sentences for each offence and then the aggregate sentence.
A prominent feature of the sentencing judgment is the fact that it comprises many statements of general principles but very little reasoning is exposed. It is one thing to state a principle; more important is some explanation of how it is being applied. This will be a recurring theme when I come to deal with the specific errors for which the Crown contends.

[34]

Principles applicable to a Crown appeal against sentence

In R v JP [2015] NSWCCA 267, Hoeben CJ at CL conveniently provided the following statement of principles applicable to a Crown appeal against sentence brought pursuant to s 5D(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act: "[43] A claim of manifest inadequacy requires the party advancing that complaint to establish that the sentences imposed were unreasonable or plainly unjust. In a sentencing environment where there is no single "correct" sentence, judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with the application of proper principle and consistency of approach (R v Dinsdale [2000] HCA 54; 202 CLR 321 at 325; Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [25]); Hili v R; Jones v R [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at 538 [58]). [44] The High Court has stated on a number of occasions that the primary purpose of a Crown appeal against sentence is to lay down principles for the governance and guidance of courts having the duty of sentencing convicted persons and that the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 5D Criminal Appeal Act 1912 retains a residual discretion to decline to interfere with a sentence even though the sentence is erroneously lenient: Green v R; Quinn v R [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462 at [1]".
It should also be noted that in Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462 at [69] the plurality also stated that epithets such as "gross" or "an affront to the administration of justice" are "indicative of a qualitative judgment that the inadequacy of the sentences imposed is so marked that the need for its correction to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system outweighs other considerations, including any resulting disparity with unchallenged sentences against a co-offender".
Even if appellable error is established, it remains for the appellant to persuade the Court to vary the sentence imposed by the court of trial: CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales [2015] HCA 9; 317 ALR 308 at [6] (French CJ and Gageler J); [56]-[66] (Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

[36]

Submissions

As can be seen from the summary of the sentencing judgment set out above, nowhere was any indication given by the judge as to the view he formed as to the seriousness of the offences.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that making an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences is such a basic aspect of the sentencing task that it is "implausible that this experienced sentencing judge failed to perform" it. The task was likened to processes such as engaging in an intuitive synthesis of all relevant facts; something judges do all the time without being expected to state that they have adhered to the requirement. The problem with this argument is that making and stating an assessment of objective seriousness is not a process; it is an essential task required by authority.
Authorities were cited for the proposition that post-Muldrock (Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120) a judge is not required to specify where on a scale of objective seriousness an offence falls: Badans v R [2012] NSWCCA 97 at [55] (in relation to offences carrying a standard non-parole period) and Belghar v R [2013] NSWCCA 245 at [58]-[60]. However, the Crown's complaint is not that the judge failed to specify objective seriousness on a scale; it is that he failed to make, or state, any assessment at all.
The written submissions set out a list of "numerous indications" in the sentencing judgment that the judge did make an assessment of objective seriousness. The majority of the items listed are simply references to statements made by the judge of general propositions. The judge only stated two findings he had made concerning the seriousness of the offences: rejection of the Crown's contention that there had been "grooming" and acceptance that the offences were aggravated by there having been a breach of trust.
In oral submissions, Mr Odgers SC contended that the judge was not required to resolve disputes between the parties as to the level of objective seriousness of the offences; an assessment could be made as to what he thought about their seriousness by looking at the sentences imposed. However, it was also accepted that the judgment "wasn't as transparent as it should have been and the reasons are not as well articulated as they should have been". Nevertheless, the primary submission was that the ultimate issue was whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate and that any inadequacy of reasons was not determinative.

[37]

Conclusion

In the summary of the sentencing judgment set out above it is clear that apart from reciting the facts of the offences the judge made no assessment of their objective seriousness or, if he did, he said nothing about it. Latham J observed in R v Cage [2006] NSWCCA 304 at [17] that: "A bare recitation of the facts constituting the offences and a reference to the 'objective features of the offences' does not satisfy the requirements of sentencing."
In R v Campbell [2014] NSWCCA 102 at [27] Simpson J (as her Honour then was) (with whom Hall J agreed) stated: "In my opinion, the assessment of objective seriousness is, and has always been, a critical component of the sentencing process: R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554; R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349; Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357; Khoury v R [2011] NSWCCA 118; 209 A Crim R 509 at [71]-[72]. These cases were all decided before judgment was given in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 240 CLR 120. There is nothing in that judgment that cuts across the principle stated. Muldrock exposed error in this Court in over emphasising the assessment of objective gravity in offences to which Pt 4 Div 1A of the Sentencing Procedure Act applies, of notional offences in the mid-range of objective seriousness. It does not preclude proper attention being paid to the objective seriousness of the particular offence under consideration: see, for example, R v Koloamatangi [2011] NSWCCA 288 per Basten JA."
One reason that it is important for there to be some assessment of the seriousness of an offence is because one of the purposes of sentencing is to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence: s 3A(a) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. Another reason is the requirement that a sentence should not exceed, or be less than, what is proportionate to the gravity of the crime: R v McNaughton [2006] NSWCCA 242; 66 NSWLR 566 at 572 [15] (Spigelman CJ). Further, it enables use of the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty and any prescribed standard non-parole period: R v West [2014] NSWCCA 250 at [27] (Adamson J).
In Delaney v R; R v Delaney [2013] NSWCCA 150 the Crown raised a ground asserting that the sentencing judge had failed to determine the objective criminality of the offences. Hoeben CJ at CL (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) responded (at [56]): "While it is true that his Honour did not in terms assess the objective gravity of the offending, he did specifically refer to the factors which bore upon its objective seriousness. His Honour took account of the amount involved, the role of the appellant, the nature of the conduct and the period over which it took place. While it may have been preferable for his Honour to have made a specific assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending, he did implicitly do so. I am satisfied that the factors to which his Honour referred were relevant and important and were given proper weight in the sentencing process. While his Honour may not have expressly determined the objective criminality of the offences, he clearly took that into account."
That is not this case. Jeffreys DCJ simply recited the facts by reference to the statement of agreed facts. There were lengthy references to, and quotations from, various authorities on the seriousness of sexual assault offences committed against children. It is one thing to refer to the general proposition that child sexual assault is a serious crime; it is another to identify the relative seriousness of the case at hand.
Both parties made submissions to the judge about the objective seriousness of the individual offences. For example, in written submissions, counsel for the respondent urged a finding that most of the offences were serious but below the middle of the range. A concession was made that the offence against s 66EA of persistent child abuse was above the mid-range but the judge was urged to find that it was not at or near the top of the range. In the main, the Crown's submissions were that the offences were at or above mid-range, although it was conceded that the offence in count 9 was below that level. The judge did not engage with these submissions at all.
The only way of discerning what his Honour thought of the objective seriousness of the individual offences is by drawing an inference from the indicative sentences he specified. For example, he clearly regarded the aggravated indecent assault offences in count 7 of the first indictment (indicative sentence 3 years) and count 2 in the second indictment (indicative sentence 2 years 6 months) as more serious than all of the other aggravated indecent assault offences (indicative sentences of 12 months). But this is as far as one can go in inferring what his Honour thought about the objective seriousness of offences.
By drawing inferences from the indicative sentences the most that can be said is that his Honour engaged in no more than a broad brush fashion with the assessment of the seriousness of the offences. For example, 12 months was considered an appropriate sentence for seven of the nine offences against s 61M(2) regardless of the age of the victim ("the younger the victim the more serious the offence" (RJA v R [2008] NSWCCA 137; 185 A Crim R 178 at [13] (Spigelman CJ))) and despite a concession by the Crown that the offence in count 9 was less serious than the other offences against this provision.
I am satisfied that the sentencing process miscarried, either by the judge failing to make any assessment of the seriousness of the offences or, if he did, failing to say anything about his reasoning and conclusions as a result of such assessment.
In these circumstances, it remains for this Court to make some assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences in the course of determining the issue posed by the second ground as to whether the aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate.

[39]

Error 1 - finding that the respondent did not engage in grooming behaviours

Professor Greenberg observed that child sexual predators often use grooming behaviours by which he meant "deliberate tactics such as befriending and establishing an emotional connection with a child to lower the child's inhibitions and gain their trust in order to sexually abuse them. They obtain access to children by creating opportunity to interact with children. They may rely on psychological manipulation and desensitization methods with these children to obtain eventual compliance with their sexual acts. They may also try to make them feel special by giving these children attention, gifts, or special treats".
Professor Greenberg referred to some of the respondent's conduct as set out in the agreed facts and described it as "common grooming activities used by paedophiles".
Dr Westmore referred to the statement of facts and said: "I note behaviour consistent with grooming".
Dr O'Dea also described "apparent grooming behaviours" set out in the statement of facts. It should be recalled that Dr O'Dea had seven consultations with the respondent before writing his report. It may be assumed that the claim by the respondent in his evidence that he did not engage in grooming was not conveyed to Dr O'Dea.
Despite this expert evidence, Jeffreys DCJ was not satisfied that the respondent was being untruthful in his evidence denying grooming any of the victims. This is a surprising finding, particularly in relation to Victim 2 (count 2) and Victim 9 (counts 1 to 4 in the second indictment).
In the course of discussing this issue in his sentencing remarks, the judge said some remarkable things. In the context of referring to the frequency with which there would be visitors including children at the respondent's home he said: "On limited occasions, sporadically, the offender offended in relation to a number of the children."
There were 17 offences that the respondent had pleaded guilty to or had asked the judge to take into account. They occurred from the beginning of 2003 to mid-2014. The agreed facts also referred to numerous other occasions of offending by way of masturbation, fellatio and anal intercourse in relation to Victim 2 and Victim 9. To describe the offending as occurring "sporadically" is a serious understatement.
The judge rejected the Crown's contention that grooming was evident on the occasion the respondent took Victim 2 (when he was 14 years' old) to see a rugby game in Canberra with tickets to a corporate box, an overnight stay in a motel room, alcohol being provided and pornography being displayed on his laptop computer. The judge said that grooming was not the only available inference and so he was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent "intended when he got the complainant there to participate in sexual activity". He did not say what alternative inference there was.
The Crown contended that the judge was in error in ignoring the preponderance of the evidence and giving unwarranted weight to the opinion of the respondent that he did not groom his victims. By doing so he failed to take into account a matter that seriously exacerbated the criminality of the offending.
Counsel for the respondent pointed out that whilst the judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was grooming, equally he did not make a finding in the respondent's favour that there was not grooming. It was also submitted that for the Crown to succeed in relation to this asserted error it was necessary for it to persuade the Court that the judge's failure to be satisfied of an aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt was "not reasonably open". Where the psychiatric evidence was couched in terms of behaviour "consistent" with grooming and "apparent" grooming behaviour, it was submitted that the judge's finding was reasonably open.
In my view, the submissions of counsel for the respondent should be accepted; but that is not the end of the issue. Some of the things the judge said in this context are concerning. More significant, however, is that his Honour did not engage with the undisputed evidence which gave rise to the Crown's contention. These are matters that are relevant to an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences; something with which this Court will need to engage with in the absence of the sentencing judge having done so.

[40]

Error 2 - finding "deep contrition"

The sentencing judge referred to various aspects of the evidence from which he concluded that "the offender has shown deep contrition" (ROS 29.3).
The Crown referred to s 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which provides that remorse is a mitigating factor if the offender has provided evidence of acceptance of responsibility for his or her actions and has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused (or made reparation).
It will be evident from the earlier summary of the respondent's evidence that he was not completely forthcoming with an acknowledgement of the harm his offences occasioned his victims. He used terms such as "potential risk of harm"; "I might have hurt"; and "harm I may have caused". The strident response he gave when cross-examined about the indecent assault of Victim 5 during a driving lesson ("I reckon that's pretty thin for an indecent assault") was hardly indicative of "deep contrition". Further, he sought to downplay the seriousness of many of the offences by his description of them being "a few minutes of stupidity". At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Odgers conceded that "it's pretty clear from [the respondent's] evidence that he did have tendencies to somewhat underplay the seriousness of the offending".
Despite the above, the judge was uncritical of any of the respondent's evidence. To the limited extent that he referred to it, he accepted it.
Aside from the respondent's evidence, his Honour also took into account that he had acknowledged his guilt from a very early time and had promptly sought out psychiatric treatment. There were also the various expressions of his remorse set out in the medical reports and his wife's statement.
Despite the respondent's earlier reticence to fully acknowledge the harm he had caused his victims, towards the end of his evidence he said that he understood the long term consequences of such offences. It was open to the judge to accept that on the balance of probabilities this made good the second limb of the mitigating factor in s 21A(3)(i).
Using the expression "deep contrition" is rather extravagant in the light of some of the evidence given by the respondent. But I cannot conclude that a finding of remorse was not open to the judge to make, particularly in light of the fact of the early pleas of guilty.

[41]

Error 3 - the approach to the finding of ADHD

Dr Rowe assessed the respondent as having "high functioning ADHD" as well as a Hypersexual Disorder. He said that patients with ADHD do not necessarily commit criminal acts, "but in the presence of other factors such as hypersexuality and certain environmental factors the individual may not be able to sufficiently inhibit their strong sexual impulses or other impulsive behaviours".
Neither Dr Westmore nor Dr O'Dea made these diagnoses or were asked to comment upon Dr Rowe's opinion about causality.
Professor Greenberg did not dispute the diagnosis of ADHD but disagreed that there was a causal connection with the respondent's sexual offending. He said in his report, "there is no causal relationship between having 'high functioning ADHD' (or ADHD for that matter), and sexual molestation incidents with eight children over a period of a decade". He noted Dr Rowe's assessment of the respondent having a "high average to superior level of intelligence"; his tertiary qualifications; and his management of a large public company. He said, "It is therefore questionable how these deficits or weaknesses in executive functioning was of great significance in his decision making, reasoning, consequential thinking and careful judgment". Further, he said "To date there is no credible literature to support a significant causality between 'high functioning ADHD' and paedophilic re-offending (sexual recidivism)".
In his oral evidence, Professor Greenberg referred to the absence of any suggestion of impulsivity in the respondent's life aside from his offending. He said that a person with ADHD would be impulsive in all activities, including, for example, their work.
The sentencing judge referred to the conflict between Dr Rowe and Professor Greenberg on this issue and accepted the opinion of Dr Rowe on the basis that he had the advantage of having assessed the respondent, seen school reports and administered tests.
It would seem that the judge found that there was a causal connection between the condition of ADHD and the offending behaviour: "I am able to accept on balance that the offender was also suffering from ADHD at the time and I need then to take into account the fact of what Dr Rowe says about that impacting on the offender's inhibitions."
The Crown submitted that Dr Rowe entered the field of psychiatry in expressing any opinion about a link between the offending and the respondent having "high functioning ADHD". In WW v R [2012] NSWCCA 165, which was concerned with sentencing for driving in a manner dangerous causing death, a psychologist ventured the opinion that the offender's ADHD "affected him to some degree at the time of the offence, particularly around the area of inattention on the road". Hoeben JA said: "[60] It was open to Mr Mahoney [the psychologist] to test the applicant for indications that at the time of testing he was suffering from ADHD. He could describe the characteristics of the condition of ADHD. What he could not do as a psychologist was to express an opinion as to whether and to what extent the ADHD condition affected the applicant at the time of the offence. Counsel for the applicant, in the sentencing proceedings, could make a submission to his Honour linking the test results and the characteristics which can be experienced by somebody with ADHD. His Honour could accept that submission but was not obliged to do so."
The Crown submitted that another way in which Dr Rowe went beyond his expertise was to express opinions about the efficacy and suitability of various medications which he was not qualified to prescribe and of which he had no personal experience.
There is force in these submissions by the Crown but it needs to be recognised that Dr Rowe's report was placed before the sentencing judge without any objection. Further, the prosecutor who appeared in the District Court did not ask the judge to completely reject Dr Rowe's opinions about the significance of ADHD; he simply submitted that it would not have "any great significance in this particular case". Counsel for the respondent in this Court submitted that this was an acceptance that it could be given some weight and the judge did not indicate that he gave it any more than "some weight".
If the opinion of Dr Rowe about a causative link between the respondent's hypersexuality, ADHD and his offending behaviour had not been before the court, it still would have been open to the respondent's counsel to have adduced evidence of his client having those two conditions and, in conformity with WW v R, to have submitted that the judge should accept that there was such a link.
The Crown made other criticisms of Dr Rowe's opinions. It is unnecessary to refer to them all but it is worth mentioning the submission that Dr Rowe's diagnosis of Hypersexual Disorder was not made by the psychiatrists. That may be because it is not a condition listed in DSM-V. Professor Greenberg explained that hypersexuality as a disorder "has not gained wider acceptance in the general clinical sex offender expert community as yet and its validity has been questioned by some researchers". However, he added: "It is generally held true that individuals with a higher sex drive would have more difficulty controlling paedophiliac urges and paedophiliac behaviour".
Dr Rowe's "diagnosis" of "Hypersexuality Disorder" was based upon a history provided by the respondent and he was not challenged on that history in cross-examination by the prosecutor. It follows that whether or not there is a recognised "disorder" of hypersexuality, it was open to be accepted that the respondent had a higher sex drive which could mean he had more difficulty controlling his paedophiliac urges.

[43]

Error 4 - error in approach to the respondent's paedophilia and questions of general deterrence and personal deterrence

The Crown contended that there was error in the judge's failure to find that general and personal deterrence were important considerations on sentence and that this led to (or contributed to) the imposition of a manifestly inadequate sentence.
The Crown referred to EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21 at [42] where Hoeben CJ at CL said: "General deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the community are principles of sentencing which are relevant to cases involving child sexual abuse. The concern of the courts is to send a message to those who would sexually abuse children intentionally and repeatedly that their actions will not be tolerated and that they will receive significant punishment."
Where an offender suffers from some mental condition it may be relevant to sentencing in the variety of ways described by McClellan CJ at CL in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa at [177]. One result might be that less weight is given to the need for general and personal deterrence and denunciation.
The judge made reference to general principles but said nothing to indicate whether, and if so to what extent, he was factoring into the assessment of sentence any need for general or personal deterrence.
The Crown referred to Benitez v R [2006] NSWCCA 21; 160 A Crim R 166 at 175 and R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 at 51 where it was said that when an offender with some form of mental condition acts with knowledge of what they are doing and of the gravity of their actions, any moderation of general deterrence need not be great. This was a matter of some significance in the Crown's submission. Whatever be the mental condition of the respondent, he was an intelligent man who made the following concessions to the questioning of his counsel: "Q. You were aware that what you were doing was wrong? A. Yes. Q. You knew it was against the law? A. Yes."
The respondent's primary mental condition was one of paedophilia. It did not involve any cognitive impairment. His offences involved conscious and deliberate actions accompanied by knowledge that it was both wrong and illegal. For these reasons it was submitted that the respondent remained an appropriate vehicle for general deterrence, denunciation and personal deterrence.
The written submissions for the respondent referred to the acceptance in the court below that general and personal deterrence had a role to play; the submission was simply that less weight might be given to them. It was open to the judge to accept that submission.
It was also submitted for the respondent that there was no fixed or predetermined degree to which general deterrence should be taken into account in sentencing: R v Lattouf; R v MF [2015] NSWCCA 283 at [56]; Muldrock v The Queen at [20]; and Veen v The Queen [No 2] [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465 at 476.
The submissions of both parties convey a debate in a vacuum. It is all very well to argue about how deterrence and denunciation might have been taken into account. But it is impossible to know whether, and if so how, the sentencing judge dealt with these issues. He certainly referred to general principles but said nothing about how he applied them.
Given the importance of deterrence in cases involving the sexual assault of children, particularly of general deterrence, this, like the failure to make (or state) any assessment of objective seriousness, represented another way in which the sentencing process miscarried. There was, to use the words of Johnson J in R v Porte [2015] NSWCCA 174 at [88], "a clear and fundamental failure to explain how the sentence to be imposed had been arrived at".

[44]

Error 5 - the approach to the respondent's prospects of rehabilitation and failure to consider the risk to the community

The sentencing judge found that "the offender has been progressing extremely well in relation to anti-libidinal treatment and it is my view that he has reasonable prospects of not offending whilst ever he is on that treatment".
I do not believe there is any error in this finding. It was appropriately qualified by the concluding seven words. It cannot be said that it was not a finding that was open to be made. Importantly, it was not a finding that there were "good" prospects of rehabilitation so as to amount to a mitigating factor pursuant to s 21A(3)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
The judge did not expressly refer to any finding on the subject of the protection of the community. At an early stage of his judgment he quoted s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which includes as one of the purposes of sentencing: "to protect the community from the offender". Later he quoted from [177] in the judgment of McClellan CJ at CL in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa as follows: "Mr Justice McClellan, CJ at CL, said at para 177: 'Where an offender is suffering from mental illness, intellectual handicap or other mental problems the courts have developed principles to be applied when sentencing.' His Honour referred to a number of cases. His Honour then continued, 'They can be summarised in the following manner: • When the state of a person's mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way the offender's moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in sentence.' His Honour referred to a number of cases: • 'It may also have the consequence that the offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.' His Honour referred to a number of cases: • 'It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on the person because the sentence would be more onerous for that person, the length of the prison term or conditions under which it is served may be reduced.' His Honour referred to a number of cases: • 'It may reduce or eliminate the significance of deterrence.' His Honour referred to a number of cases. Then his Honour in the next dot point said 'Conversely'. In my view I am not satisfied that on balance I ought to take that particular dot point into account."
The "dot point" the judge declined to take into account was as follows: "● Conversely, it may be that because of a person's mental illness, they present more of a danger to the community. In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence: Israil at [24]; Henry at [28]. Where a person has been diagnosed with an Antisocial Personality Disorder there may be a particular need to give consideration to the protection of the public: R v Lawrence (2005) NSWCCA 91 per Spigelman CJ at [23] - [24]."
Counsel for the respondent submitted that by not being satisfied that he should take that "dot point" into account, the judge was not saying that he did not take protection of the community into account at all. It rather suggested that he was not satisfied that the respondent was a high danger to the community or that there was "a particular need to give consideration to the protection of the public".
The Crown submitted that the way the judge put aside the final "dot point" indicated that the judge did not consider there was a need to take protection of the community into account.
The submissions for the respondent should be preferred. The final dot point in paragraph [177] of the judgment of McClellan CJ at CL simply indicates that in the circumstances referred to there may be a need to give additional weight to specific deterrence and the protection of the community. I do not take his Honour to be suggesting that where those circumstances do not arise there is no need to give any weight to either of those purposes of sentencing.
However, nowhere in the judge's reasons is there any indication that he regarded personal deterrence and community protection as being of any importance.
The Crown submitted that where the cause of the respondent's offending was an incurable sexual orientation (Paedophilic Disorder) and where prospects of reoffending are entirely dependent on the voluntary acceptance of drug treatment, it will always be necessary to consider the need for protection of the community and to balance that consideration against the prospect of rehabilitation.
Even though early signs might be seen as encouraging, the evidence of Drs Westmore and O'Dea was to the effect that it was too early to make any definitive finding about the respondent's risk of reoffending. The respondent's stated intention was that he would continue taking anti-libidinal medication for the long term. However, there could be no guarantee of this. The taking of such medication may be precluded by side effects; it cannot be enforced; and Professor Greenberg spoke of his experience of many sex offenders ceasing treatment at the end of their parole period.
Once again, the error in relation to these topics of personal deterrence and community protection is not so much a matter of positively not taking them into account but the lack of any indication that they were.

[45]

Error 6 - error in the approach to special circumstances and the setting of an erroneously lenient non-parole period

The non-parole period specified by the judge constitutes 53 per cent, or 7 years of the 13 year aggregate term. If the judge had not made a finding of special circumstances pursuant to s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act the non-parole period would have been one of 9 years 9 months.
One of the reasons for finding special circumstances was that the respondent had not previously been imprisoned. The Crown noted that this has been doubted as a sound basis for making such a finding: Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49 at [12]; Collier v R [2012] NSWCCA 213 at [36]. However, this was not the only basis for the finding. It would seem that the more significant basis was the need for the respondent to have a longer period under parole supervision in the community to ensure compliance with his treatment needs: "a longer period of support in relation to his mental problems when he re-enters the community". His Honour also said: "The fact that the offender has been progressing well in relation to anti-libidinal treatment, it is my view, in the interests of the community that he be on a long period of parole because I am satisfied that it is likely that the treatment will be successful."
It is notable that the judge did not indicate why a potential parole period as long as six years was thought necessary to serve these purposes for reducing the non-parole component of the sentence.
The Crown argued that there was error in both the finding of special circumstances as well as the extent by which the non-parole period was reduced.
The Crown submitted that there was no evidence that a parole period in the usual statutory proportions (in this case 3 years 3 months) would be inadequate to assist the respondent's rehabilitation.
The Crown's primary submission, however, was that a non-parole period of 7 years "could not possibly reflect the profound criminality involved in the respondent's conduct". Reference was made to various authorities, including the judgment of Spigelman CJ in R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704 at [65] where his Honour spoke of the need for a non-parole period to reflect "all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender - including the objective gravity of the offence and the need for general deterrence".
In Caristo v R [2011] NSWCCA 7 I summarised the relevant principles: [27] The non-parole period is the minimum period of actual incarceration that the offender must spend in custody having regard to all the elements of punishment, including rehabilitation, the objective seriousness of the offence and the offender's subjective circumstances: Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26; 131 CLR 623 at 627-629; R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704 at [59]; R v Cramp [2004] NSWCCA 264 at [34]. [28] A finding of special circumstances is a discretionary finding of fact in respect of which this Court will be slow to intervene: Jiang v R [2010] NSWCCA 277 at [83]. [29] "As a practical matter there are unlikely to be many cases in which this Court will interfere unless the non-parole period is found to be manifestly inadequate or manifestly excessive": R v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172 at [19]; R v Cramp at [36]. [30] Simply because there are circumstances which are capable of constituting special circumstances, the court is not required to make such a finding and reduce the non-parole period: R v Fidow , above, at [22]. [31] The degree or extent of any adjustment of the "statutory ratio" is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge: R v Cramp, above, at [31]; Trad v R [2009] NSWCCA 56 at [33].
Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the Crown Prosecutor had not opposed a finding of special circumstances, saying "It's the first time that Mr Van Ryn has been in custody". The prosecutor's opposition was confined to an argument that the non-parole period should not be reduced to 50 per cent of the overall term as had been submitted on the respondent's behalf.
Having regard to the position adopted by the Crown below, I would reject its contention here that there was error in making a finding of special circumstances. Whether this Court would make such a finding is another matter. And the question whether a 7 year non-parole period is manifestly inadequate will be considered below.

[46]

Error 7 - error in the approach to the Form 1 offence committed on bail

This error is said to have affected the manner in which the judge took into account the Form 1 offence when assessing the sentence for count 7.
When a sentencing court is asked to take an offender's guilt in respect of one or more other offences into account, the task is still confined to imposing sentence for the primary offence. However, in doing so it may increase the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate by giving greater weight to the need for personal deterrence which the commission of the other offences will frequently indicate is called for and to retribution because of the community's entitlement to extract retribution for serious offences when there are offences for which no punishment has in fact been imposed: Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518; 56 NSWLR 146 at [42] (Spigelman CJ). See also Abbas, Bodiotis, Taleb and Amoun v R [2013] NSWCCA 115; 231 A Crim R 413.
The additional offence taken into account in relation to count 7 was committed whilst the respondent was on bail. He had been charged with the offence in count 10 on 16 June 2014 and committed the offence that was on the Form 1 with Victim 5 on 23 July 2014.
The sentencing judge refused to find that committing the Form 1 offence whilst on bail was an aggravating factor because: "It seems to me that there is a danger of double-counting if I take into account as an aggravating factor the matter on a Form 1".
It is difficult to understand that statement. On one view, his Honour may have misconceived the issue. The Form 1 offence was not an aggravating factor in respect of the principal offence. That the Form 1 offence was committed on bail was an aggravating feature of that offence itself. In any event, I cannot understand what concern his Honour held about "double-counting".
In any event, I do not consider that this asserted error requires resolution of the competing submissions. The indicative sentence for count 7 was 3 years, the longest for any of the offences against s 61M(2). The Crown's appeal is against the aggregate sentence, not the indicative sentences. Assuming the Crown's contention is correct, the indicative sentence for count 7 should have been longer; but not by any substantial margin. In the context of the totality of the respondent's criminality, a slightly longer indicative sentence for count 7 would not have had a material bearing upon the assessment of the aggregate term.
However, one statement by the sentencing judge should not escape mention. He said: "I note having availed himself of this arrangement, that is the Form 1 matters, the offender has the benefit of not facing sentences of imprisonment for those additional offences. By clearing the slate in this way, as it is described, he has provided considerable utility which must be brought to account for the offender." (Emphasis added)
The emphasised words mirror what his Honour said when sentencing the offender in Hinchcliffe v R [2013] NSWCCA 327. In the course of allowing the appeal against the manifestly inadequate sentence imposed in that case it was said by Johnson J (Leeming JA and Hall J agreeing) that Mr Odgers (who coincidentally appeared) "acknowledged that this observation of the sentencing judge did not accord with principle". Johnson J explained: "[219] It appears that his Honour's approach to the Form 1 matters involved a type of double counting in favour of the respondent. It is no doubt correct that the Form 1 procedure involves a type of clearing the slate by an offender. In this way, an offender obtains an advantage in that there is a cap upon the available sentence confined to the primary offence, in relation to which the Form 1 matters are to be taken into account. However, it is erroneous to, in some way, seek to afford a further benefit to an offender because he or she has co-operated in such a process. To the extent that his Honour's words indicate that such an approach was taken, it was erroneous."

[47]

Error 8 - error in the approach to the fact that the s 61M and s 61O offences are capable of being prosecuted in the Local Court

This asserted error refers to the following passage of the remarks on sentence (which, despite the statement of the error, is confined to s 61M offences): "I also need to take into account the fact that in relation to a number of the offences under s 61M(1) and also 61M(2) that those offences could have been disposed of in the Local Court. The authorities are clear that I need to take that into account. The authorities are clear that I am not constrained to impose sentences that the Local Court might impose but I am nevertheless to take the sentences that might be imposed in the Local Court into account and I propose to do so."
When announcing the indicative sentences that would have been imposed for the individual offences, his Honour commenced: "In relation to the first indictment on the first count an indicative sentence, bearing in mind that it is a matter which would most likely be dealt with in the Local Court, is nine months."
His Honour did not say anything about the possibility of summary disposal in the Local Court when announcing any of the other indicative sentences. It is doubtful that this means that he did not think it was relevant to any other offence as it seems clear from his earlier statement that he regarded it as relevant to all of the s 61M offences.
Offences against ss 61M and 61O(2) may be dealt with summarily in the Local Court unless either the prosecutor or the accused elects for them to be dealt with on indictment: s 260 and Table 1 in Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed by the Local Court in either case is 2 years: s 267(2). That is a "jurisdictional limit" of the Local Court, not the maximum penalty for the offence: R v Doan [2000] NSWCCA 317; 50 NSWLR 115 at 123 [35].
Reference should be made to the judgment of Johnson J in Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; 223 A Crim R 460 at [84]-[121] for a comprehensive survey of the principles relating to summary disposal of indictable offences and when it may be appropriate when sentencing in the District Court to take into account the possibility that an offence may have been dealt with in the Local Court.
The Crown contended that because of the objective seriousness of the offences against s 61M and s 61O, and the fact that other offences could only be dealt with on indictment, it was not the case that these offences would have been the subject of summary disposition in the Local Court. Whilst the judge was technically correct as to the possibility, the practical reality was that there was no mitigation flowing from this at all.
Guideline 8 of the Prosecution Guidelines of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales furnished pursuant to s 13 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) makes clear that an election to proceed on indictment should be made in a case such as this where the criminality of the offender could not be adequately accommodated within the sentencing parameters available in the Local Court and where the offender is also charged with strictly indictable offences.
Counsel for the respondent submitted (with reference to authority) that "the applicable principle is that where an offence could reasonably (or 'appropriately') have been disposed of in the Local Court, the sentencing court should take into account that fact". So much may be accepted. But the fact is that it would not have been reasonable or appropriate for any of the present offences to be finalised in the Local Court.
It was also submitted that "as a general proposition, it would be appropriate to impose the likely sentence that the offender would have received in the Local Court if the offences had been disposed of there".
Johnson J made an observation in Zreika v R (at [112]) to the effect that the theoretical availability of summary disposal is not a relevant sentencing consideration unless it can be shown that "it is plainly wrong that the offence is in the District Court". A common example of it being "plainly wrong" is where the offence was only in the District Court because the offender was also prosecuted for a strictly indictable offence for which he or she was there acquitted. The two authorities cited by counsel for the respondent for the "general proposition" just mentioned, Peiris v R [2014] NSWCCA 58; 240 A Crim R 114 and R v El Masri [2005] NSWCCA 167, were both examples of such a case.
Counsel for the respondent maintained that in accordance with Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 it is necessary for a judge in a multiple offence sentencing exercise to first determine the appropriate sentence for each individual offence before turning to a consideration of totality. In this way, it was submitted, the individual offences could have been considered as appropriate for summary disposal in the Local Court. With respect, I cannot accept the logic of this in a case where there are a significant number of charges with some being strictly indictable. Although it was said that it was not necessary for a judge to look at each offence in a vacuum, it was submitted that the gravity of the offences must be determined individually. I accept the latter but it does not justify invocation of an artificial consideration that if each offence was prosecuted in isolation from the others they might have been dealt with in the Local Court.
I am satisfied that the judge was wrong to take into account the sentences that might have been imposed in the Local Court for the s 61M offences where it would have been entirely inappropriate for such indictable offences to be the subject of summary disposal.

[48]

Error 9 - error in the approach to totality

Street CJ described the principle of totality in sentencing in R v Holder; R v Johnston [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 at 260 as follows: "The principle of totality is a convenient phrase, descriptive of the significant practical consideration confronting a sentencing judge when sentencing for two or more offences. Not infrequently a straightforward arithmetical addition of sentences appropriate for each individual offence considered separately will arrive at an ultimate aggregate that exceeds what is called for in the whole of the circumstances. In such a situation the sentencing judge will evaluate, in a broad sense, the overall criminality involved in all of the offences and, having done so, will determine what, if any, downward adjustment is necessary, whether by telescoping or otherwise, in the aggregate sentences in order to achieve an appropriate relativity between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the sentences. "
In R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130; 171 A Crim R 267 at [46], the Court (McClellan CJ at CL, Hulme and Hislop JJ) emphasised the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice when sentencing for multiple offences by endorsing the remarks of Sully J in the two-judge bench decision in R v Wheeler [2000] NSWCCA 34 at [36]-[37]: "... (There) is the need to ensure public confidence in the administration of criminal justice; and, in particular, to ensure that there does not emerge in the community at large a perception that there is not all that much to choose between the person who commits one or two offences, and the person who commits six or seven offences, for the reason that somehow or other they all manage to finish up with effective sentences between or among which there is hardly anything in practical terms to choose. It needs to be clearly understood by all concerned that a person who commits a deliberate series of discrete offences, - and the present applicant's case, is a good example of the kind, - he must not be left with the idea that by intoning references to the principle of totality as though it were some magic mantra, he can escape effective punishment for the offences which follow successively one upon another throughout the whole course of a studied and deliberate course of criminal behaviour."
In R v XX (2009) 195 A Crim R 38 at [52], Hall J set out a number of propositions derived from the case law concerning the discretionary exercise of ordering sentences to be served concurrently or cumulatively in accordance with the principle of totality. They included reference to the following passage in the judgment of Howie J in R v Cahyadi [2007] NSWCCA 1; 168 A Crim R 41at [27]: "… [T]here is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both." (Emphasis added)
The Crown contended that the indicative sentences were unduly lenient (which is a matter left for consideration in relation to the overall complaint of manifest inadequacy) but there was also an inadequate notional accumulation of those sentences in arriving at the aggregate sentence.
Whilst the Crown accepted that the approach to totality is not strictly mathematical, it sought to illustrate and make good this complaint by reference to the indicative sentences specified in relation to Count 2 on the first indictment and counts 3 and 4 on the second indictment. Count 2 has an indicative sentence of 8 years and each of counts 3 and 4 has an indicative sentence of 4 years. If the sentencing exercise had involved only these offences, an appropriate measure of partial accumulation would have yielded an aggregate term very close to, or the same as, the 13 year aggregate term arrived at by Jeffreys DCJ. This was said to be illustrative of the fact that the aggregate sentence did not reflect the totality of the respondent's criminality as it left largely unpunished the multitude of offences committed in relation to seven other victims.
Counsel for the respondent, correctly with respect, pointed out that the Crown's complaint in relation to this asserted error is not specific. It simply raises a question as to whether the aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate. It was submitted that "the starting point sentence of 17 years imprisonment was appropriate, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offences committed by the respondent".
Jeffreys DCJ adverted to the principle of totality (ROS 37.8). The question is whether there was error in the manner in which he exercised his discretion in applying the principle. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to proceed to consider the overarching question, whether the aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate.

[50]

Section 66EA - Persistent sexual abuse of a child

Section 66EA provides that it is an offence to engage in conduct with a child that constitutes a sexual offence on three or more separate occasions during any period of time. A "sexual offence" includes offences of aggravated indecent assault (s 61M), sexual intercourse with a child aged between 10 and 14 (s 66C(1)) and sexual intercourse with a child aged between 14 and 16 (s 66C(3)). The conduct need not be of the same nature nor constitute the same offence. It is immaterial if some of the offences were committed outside of the State. It is unnecessary for the prosecution to specify or to prove the dates or the exact circumstances of the various occasions on which the conduct constituting sexual offence occurred.
The maximum penalty for an offence against s 66EA is imprisonment for 25 years.
It has been said that an offence against s 66EA is more serious than the offences which comprise the individual acts: Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38; 181 A Crim R 378 at [115] (McClellan CJ at CL). However, it also has been accepted that there is "nothing … to suggest that the Parliament intended sentencing for a course of conduct that had crystallised into a s 66EA conviction to be more harsh than sentencing for the same course of conduct had it crystallised into convictions for a number of representative offences": R v Fitzgerald [2004] NSWCCA 5; 59 NSWLR 493 at 503 [13]; R v Manners [2004] NSWCCA 181 at [21].
The agreed facts for this offence particularised a number of offences of aggravated indecent assault and sexual intercourse committed by the respondent against Victim 2 in the 5-year period from January 2003 to December 2007 when Victim 2 was aged 10 to 14 years' old. They are described above (at [13]-[20]). There were multiple occasions of indecent assaults and a progression to fellatio and anal intercourse. There were four instances of the respondent showing pornography to Victim 2 as a prequel to his sexual acts. The particularised offences (eight offences against s 61M(2) and seven against s 66C (two being attempts)) were not isolated incidents; it was an agreed fact that indecent assaults and oral sex occurred on many other occasions.
As noted earlier, the sentencing judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was "grooming" behaviour by the respondent. It was an agreed fact that he befriended Victim 2 and afforded him the opportunity to enjoy the facilities at his home: computer games, the spa and swimming pool. He gave Victim 2 money for performing odd jobs and gave him small gifts, soft drinks and lollies. He took him away to Canberra to watch a rugby game from a corporate box and took him on a trip to gather oysters on the Bega River. This was activity engaged in by a man in his late 40's - early 50's in relation to a boy aged 10 to 14. Even if there might be doubt about whether this was grooming behaviour, it remains a serious aspect of the offending that the respondent engendered a comfortable and generous relationship with the young boy and sexually violated him in that context.
Having regard to these features I am satisfied that the concession made by the respondent's counsel in the District Court and maintained in this Court that the objective seriousness of this offence was above the middle of the range was appropriate. I would consider it to be comfortably above that level but I also accept counsel's submission that it was not "at or near the top of the range".

[51]

Section 61M - Aggravated indecent assault

The actual character of the assault, including the degree of physical contact involved, is of considerable significance in assessing the objective seriousness of indecent assaults against children: Corby v R [2010] NSWCCA 146 at [72] (Johnson J).
As an example of how this Court has regarded the seriousness of an offence against s 61M(2), constituted by an adult touching a child's genitalia, in GSH v R; R v GSH [2009] NSWCCA 214, Latham J observed that "it is difficult to justify a finding below the mid-range for an offence under s 61M(2) constituted by the touching of the genitalia of a nine year old girl". Contrary to the finding of the primary judge, her Honour assessed the offence as "well above the mid-range, although not in the worst category" (at [59]). It involved the offender asking the child, a visitor to his home, to sit on his lap and when she did so he touched her on the outside of her vagina.
Other matters bearing upon the assessment may include the age difference between the perpetrator and the child (Corby v R at [77]). The age of the child relative to the range encompassed by the offence is also relevant - "the younger the child the more serious the offence": R v KNL [2005] NSWCCA 260; 154 A Crim R 268 at [42] (Latham J); RJA v R at [13] (Spigelman CJ).
The aggravated indecent assault offences in the first indictment involved (except in the case of Count 9) skin on skin touching of children's genitalia and/or buttocks. In the context of an offence with an age range up to (but not including) 16, the ages of the children and the activity involved were: Count 1 Victim 1 Aged 10 Touched girl's buttocks and genitalia Count 3 Victim 3 Aged 10-11 Touched and held boy's genitals Count 4 Victim 4 Aged 8-9 Rubbed boy's buttocks Count 5 Victim 4 Aged 9-10 Touched boy's genitalia Count 6 Victim 4 Aged 12 Touched boy's genitalia Count 7 Victim 5 Aged 13 Stroked boy's penis; spoke of fellatio Count 8 Victim 6 Aged 13 Rubbed boy's penis Count 9 Victim 7 Aged 13 Touched boy's genitalia
Counsel for the respondent submitted that the offences in counts 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 were "serious but below the middle of the range of objective seriousness". The submissions included that the offences were "opportunistic" and there was no "grooming". The offence in count 4 was said to be of low objective seriousness but the submissions incorrectly describe the offence as involving a "touching" of the child's bottom and do not mention that the child was aged 8-9. The offence in count 10 was submitted to be "below the middle of the range" but no reason was given for why that should be so.
I would regard each of the offences as being considerably serious examples of their type and the more so the younger the victim. The offence in count 7 was more serious as well because it involved stroking the boy's penis and speaking of a desire to perform fellatio in the future although I do not accept that it was at a greater level of seriousness that the indicative sentence of 3 years compared to the indicative sentences of 9 or 12 months for the other indecent assault offences would indicate. The offence in count 8 was more serious because it involved more than just touching.
The aggravated indecent assault offences in the second indictment occurred in the context of a relationship engendered by the respondent. It was part of the agreed facts that he welcomed the boy to use the facilities at his home and a relationship developed in which Victim 9, who was 15 years' old, looked upon him as a father figure and role model. Count 1 involved the respondent sitting the child on his lap with his erect penis pressing against the child's back. The Form 1 offence in relation to count 1 involved pulling Victim 9's swimmers down in the spa and rubbing his erect penis against the boy's buttocks whilst groaning. Count 2 involved the respondent masturbating the boy's penis.
Counsel for the respondent submitted in the District Court that the objective seriousness of these offences "would not exceed the middle of the range". In this Court it was submitted that the offence in count 1 was "below the middle of the range" and the offence in count 2 was "significantly more serious".
Although the victim was at the upper end of the age range for this offence, the activity involved was particularly serious and they were not isolated incidents. In my view, the offence in count 1 was of middle range seriousness and I agree that the offence in count 2 was comparatively worse.

[53]

Section 61O(2) - Act of indecency towards child under age 10

To understand the seriousness with which Parliament recognises offences involving acts of indecency it is necessary to look at both s 61N and s 61O.
Section 61N provides for act of indecency offences with maximum penalties of 2 years if the victim is under the age of 16 and 1 year 6 months if the victim is of or above that age.
Section 61O(1) provides for an aggravated act of indecency offence against a person under the age of 16. The circumstances of aggravation are either that the offender is in the company of another person or persons; the victim is under the authority of the offender; the victim has a serious physical disability; or the victim has a cognitive impairment. The maximum penalty is imprisonment for 5 years. Section 61O(1A) provides for such an offence but in relation to a victim who is of or above the age of 16 and the maximum penalty is 3 years.
Section 61O(2) provides for an act of indecency offence with a maximum penalty of 7 years where the victim is under the age of 10. No circumstance of aggravation is required.
Section 61O(2A) provides for an aggravated form of the s 61O(2) offence, the aggravation being that the offender knows that the act is being filmed for the purpose of producing child abuse material. The maximum penalty is 10 years.
From this review it may be seen that Parliament has regarded an act of indecency offence involving a child under 10 as considerably more serious than offences involving persons of a greater age.
The offence involving Victim 8 in count 10 of the first indictment involved the respondent approaching an 8-year old visitor to his home who was playing with toys in an area well away from the adults. He approached her with his penis exposed and put his hands on her arms and pulled them towards him but she pulled away. It may be inferred that she was sufficiently distressed by the experience to make a complaint to her mother on their journey home.
Again, this is a particularly serious example of an offence of its type.

[54]

Submissions

The Crown's submissions in relation to the indicative sentences for each offence included reference to the maximum penalty and, in most cases, the applicable standard non-parole period. These are important guideposts in the assessment of sentence: Muldrock v The Queen at 132 [27].
It was submitted by the Crown that almost all of the indicative sentences specified by the primary judge were inadequate having regard to the serious nature of the offending.
It was also submitted that there was some inexplicable (that is, unexplained by the judge) disparity in relation to some of the indicative sentences. For example, the sentence for count 7 was three times greater than the sentences for other aggravated indecent assaults in the first indictment. The first count in the second indictment required a very serious indecent assault to be taken into account yet it had an indicative sentence of only 12 months compared to the 2 years 6 months indicated for the second count in that indictment.
The Crown also contended that the aggregate sentence failed to reflect the totality of the respondent's criminality to an extent that it was manifestly inadequate and below the range of sentence that could be justly imposed consistently with sentencing standards: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at 588 [24]. That criminality included the commission of very serious crimes over a long period of time in circumstances where the respondent constantly found new victims.
Reference was made to observations made in this Court as to the profound and long-term deleterious effects that child sexual assault offences have upon victims: R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 at [92]. Reference was also made to SW v R [2013] NSWCCA 255 where Johnson J stated (at [52]): "Sexual abuse of children of very tender years will inevitably give rise to psychological damage emanating from (at least) the confusion in the young mind of the victim of abuse."
Submissions for the respondent emphasised the favourable findings made by the sentencing judge in relation to his subjective case (they are included in the summary of the sentencing judgment above at [122]). It was contended that these findings permitted a degree of leniency.
It was submitted that in the light of these findings, "the starting point sentence of 17 years imprisonment was appropriate". I interpolate that the judge did not adopt such a "starting point". He reduced each of the indicative sentences by 25 per cent before then considering what the aggregate term should be having regard to the principle of totality. It would have been erroneous to proceed in the reverse fashion so as to arrive at an aggregate term and then apply the discount for the pleas of guilty: SHR v R [2014] NSWCCA 94 at [35]-[43].
The submissions also cited authorities in which there is a discussion of "individualised justice", "the application of a degree of mercy", and "leniency [being extended] to encourage reform". For example, in Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; 248 CLR 483 at 494 [27] the High Court said: "[T]he factors bearing on the determination of sentence will frequently pull in different directions. It is the duty of the judge to balance often incommensurable factors and to arrive at a sentence that is just in all of the circumstances. The administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice, the attainment of which is acknowledged to involve the exercise of a wide sentencing discretion."
It is important, in my view, to note that the Court immediately went on to speak of the need for judges to "act in accordance with statutory and any applicable common law principles and in a manner that is consonant with reasonable consistency" and referred to a statement by Gleeson CJ in Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 at 591 [6] that included: "The outcome of discretionary decision-making can never be uniform, but it ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge who happens to hear the case."
In oral submissions it was accepted that the sentence appeared on its face to be a relatively lenient one. However, it was contended that various subjective factors rendered this case "very different from almost all other cases involving the sentencing of persons guilty of child sexual assault offences". For this reason, so-called comparable cases were not comparable at all. Moreover, it was submitted that this was a case in which there was justification for giving less weight to general and specific deterrence and the protection of the community and more weight to rehabilitation.
Counsel referred to certain statements made by McHugh J in Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21; 206 CLR 267 in relation to the sentencing of paedophiles. His Honour only engaged with the issue because of certain statements made by Kirby and Callinan JJ in their judgments. It is important to note that in concluding his judgment, McHugh J said (at 285 [56]): "Nothing I have said about sentencing paedophiles or the weight to be given to the publicity and opprobrium accompanying conviction is intended to or could be definitive. Nor are my remarks intended to be an exhaustive discussion of these issues. And, since they were not made in deciding a litigated issue, they are not binding on any judge or magistrate."

[55]

Determination

The Crown devoted effort to submissions as to the asserted inadequacy of indicative sentences. Of course, the appeal is primarily concerned with the aggregate sentence. In JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 I discussed the relevance of indicative sentences in an appeal that is concerned with an aggregate sentence. The following propositions (at [40]) are presently relevant: 11. The indicative sentences recorded in accordance with s 53A(2) [of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act] are not themselves amenable to appeal, although they may be a guide to whether error is established in relation to the aggregate sentence. 12. Even if the indicative sentences are assessed as being excessive, that does not necessarily mean that the aggregate sentence is excessive. 13. A principal focus of determination of a ground alleging manifest inadequacy or excess will be whether the aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminality involved." (Citation of authorities omitted)
The submissions for the respondent about this case justifying less weight being given to general and specific deterrence and the protection of the community and more weight to rehabilitation is problematic in that it remains unknown whether that was an approach taken by the primary judge. His Honour quoted such matters as being part of the purposes of sentencing listed in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act but said nothing about how significant he found any of them.
A summary of "comparative cases" was annexed to the written submissions for the Crown. Counsel for the respondent replied by providing written "Notes on Appellant's Summary of Cases". Neither party made any submissions about any of the cases except that for the respondent it was submitted that this case was unique and so no case was comparable. In the result, there was no suggestion on behalf of either party that there was a range of comparable sentences that would bear upon the assessment of sentence in this case. In those circumstances, the assessment should be based upon general sentencing principles with regard to the guideposts of the maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods provided by Parliament.
Counsel accepted in oral submissions that there were flaws in the sentencing judgment such that it came down to this Court making its own determination of what the sentence should be and then comparing that with what was imposed. The question was said to be: "is the difference so great that no reasonable judge sitting at first instance could properly, in accordance with all the relevant principles, even though he hasn't articulated everything, come to the conclusion that he did?" In my assessment, the answer to that question is in the affirmative.
I have come to the view that both the aggregate sentence of 13 years as well as the non-parole period of 7 years are manifestly inadequate in the sense that they are unreasonably and plainly unjust. A significantly higher assessment was required in order for there to be a sentence that was proportionate to the objective gravity of the offences. The sentence imposed completely fails the first purpose of sentencing (s 3A(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act), namely to ensure the respondent is adequately punished for his predatory sexual abuse of 9 children in a period exceeding 10 years. It also fails to sufficiently denounce his conduct and to recognise the considerable harm he has caused (s 3A(f) and (g)).
True it is that there were a number of significant matters in the respondent's subjective case that called for not inconsiderable mitigation. But giving due recognition to those matters cannot be allowed to prevail over the well-established sentencing principle described by Spigelman CJ in R v McNaughton [2006] NSWCCA 242; 66 NSWLR 566 at 572 [15]: "It is authoritatively established that the common law principle of proportionality, propounded in Veen No 2, requires that a sentence should not exceed what is proportionate to the gravity of the crime, having regard to the objective circumstances. (Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348 at 354.) In a line of cases, commencing with R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354, referred to and affirmed by a five judge bench in R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252 at [156]-[158], the proportionality principle is also held to apply so that a sentence should not be less than the objective gravity of the offence requires."

[57]

Exercise of the sentencing discretion afresh

I have previously indicated my view as to the seriousness of the offences (see above at [237]-[263]).
A number of subjective mitigating factors legitimately identified by the primary judge should be brought to bear on the assessment of sentence. In this regard I have in mind the 25 per cent reduction of sentence for each individual offence on account of the respondent's early pleas of guilty. I also have in mind his otherwise prior good character (I agree that the 1981 indecent exposure offence is too removed in time to have significance). His charitable and other community engagements are significant matters.
No submissions were made as to whether or not s 21A(5A) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, which prohibits good character and a lack of previous convictions being taken into account in child sexual assault cases, should apply. It applies if either of those factors was of assistance to the offender in committing the offences. Arguably it does apply but the situation is not entirely clear and in the absence of the Crown raising it I would not apply it. I bear in mind, however, that good character is of less significance in cases such as this involving repeated sexual offending against children over a lengthy period of time: see, for example, PGM v R [2008] NSWCCA 172; 187 A Crim R 152 at [43]-[44]; Dousha v R [2008] NSWCCA 263 at [49].
I am prepared to accept that, to a degree, the respondent is remorseful. His early guilty pleas, entered before a brief of evidence was compiled and served and his prompt seeking out of psychiatric treatment for his paedophilic condition are significant matters. The manner in which he gave evidence in the sentence proceedings (arrogance and belligerence is apparent even from the transcript e.g. "What am I going to do, fill in the swimming pool?"), and the acceptance by his counsel in this Court that he sought to understate the seriousness of some of his offences, points in the opposite direction.
The finding by the primary judge that there are "reasonable" prospects of rehabilitation should be maintained. The qualifier to this is, as his Honour stated, "whilst ever he is on that treatment". (It was common ground that the respondent had continued treatment whilst in prison.)
I am not prepared to accept that the condition of ADHD (assuming the respondent has it) reduces his moral culpability for the offences or justifies any reduction in the weight to be given to general deterrence. He is a very intelligent man who was a highly successful businessman. He acknowledged in his evidence that he knew what he was doing was wrong and against the law. Yet he repeatedly offended against different children for years. If his offending was at all impulsive, which I doubt, he continually allowed himself to be presented with opportunities, and on many occasions sought out opportunities, to offend.
The difficulties the respondent's wife has experienced and his anxiety in relation to it should be taken into account.
I am not prepared to find that there are special circumstances warranting a reduction of the proportion of the sentence represented by the non-parole period. There is a significant purpose in the respondent being supervised in the community when released on parole and that is to ensure that he maintains treatment directed to minimising the risk of further offending. However, the potential period of parole incorporated by a sentence that is framed in the usual statutory proportions will be more than adequate for that purpose. Mr Van Ryn is a mature and intelligent man who claims to understand the link between him maintaining treatment and reduction of his risk of reoffending. He should not need to have a parole officer looking over his shoulder for a greater period of time to ensure he is doing what needs to be done.