(See also R v McAllister (1982) 30 SASR 493 at 500.)
53 In R v Burtt (1981) 5 A Crim R 34 at 35, King CJ referred to Wells J's observations in White and added:
"It is extremely difficult in assessing the appropriate penalty for a crime of assault with intent to rob while armed, to take into account in any intelligent way the fact that the offender has also committed crimes of false pretences. I think that it would have been better if the learned judge had declined the appellant's request."
54 In R v Harris at [36], Simpson J indicated that taking into account offences on a Form 1 which are "of an entirely different kind" to the primary offence, makes the sentence "rather artificial".
55 In another case, Simpson J suggested that it was not appropriate to adopt the procedure in that case "having regard to the serious and diverse nature of the charges on which the respondent appeared". (R v Irusta (2000) 117 A Crim R 6 at [29].)
56 These various observations reflect the difficulties involved in the intellectual exercise of 'taking into account', in a particular respect, matters which may appear to be disproportionate or not comparable to the primary matter under consideration.
57 Further, there is a balance to be struck between the number and gravity of charges on an indictment and the number and gravity of charges on a Form 1. A sentencing judge will find it difficult to undertake the statutory task if the number and gravity of the charges on the indictment do not appropriately reflect the total criminality of the whole course of criminal conduct revealed by the indictment and the Form 1.
58 Subject to the agreement of the accused, in accordance with the statutory scheme, the determination of the appropriate balance is a matter for the Crown. This will generally occur in the context of charge negotiations between the prosecution and the defence.
59 The New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions has published a Prosecution Policy and Prosecution Guidelines. The only express reference in either document to the issue of balance between the charges on an indictment and on a Form 1 is a simple statement that "Some charges may be suitable for inclusion on a Form 1". That statement appears under "Policy 6: Charge Bargaining". (Alternative terminology of "charge negotiations" or "charge discussions" appears to be preferable. See Report by the Honourable Gordon Samuels AC, Review of the New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions Policy and Guidelines for Charge Bargaining and Tendering of Agreed Facts, Sydney, May 2002.)
60 A number of the principles reflected in the DPP Prosecution Policy and Guidelines would appear to be capable of application, with adaptation, to the issue of determining suitability for inclusion of charges on a Form 1. I refer, for example, to the following sentence in Policy 6:
"An alternative plea will not be considered where its acceptance would produce a distortion of the facts and create an artificial basis for the sentencing or where facts essential to establishing the criminality of the conduct would not be able to be relied upon, or where the accused intimates that he or she is not guilty of any offence."
61 Perhaps consideration should be given to providing guidance explicitly directed to elaborating the 'suitability' of offences for inclusion on a Form 1. Any such consideration would need to have in mind the Court's discretion to refuse to take into account Form 1 offences, notwithstanding the agreement of the prosecution and defence to that course.
62 Two distinct, but consistent, rationales have been advanced for the Form 1 procedure, a practice which emerged before its statutory formulation and which remains non-statutory in some jurisdictions. (See White "Taking Offences into Account in Australia" [1976] Crim L R 232; Fox and Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (1999) at 2.326-2.331; Potas, Sentencing Manual: Law, Principles and Practice in New South Wales (2001) at 193-197.)
63 First, the opportunity for an offender to emerge from the sentence for the primary offence with a clean slate promotes the objective of rehabilitation. (See e.g. R v Anderson at 977 per Lord Diplock; R v Bavadra at [31] per Wood CJ at CL; Margrave-Jones "Taking Other Offences into Consideration" [1959] Crim L R 18, 108, 197 esp at 197; White, Newark and Samuels "Offences Taken into Consideration" [1970] Crim L R 311 at 311-312.)
64 Secondly, there is a utilitarian value in the admission of guilt which may save resources for law enforcement agencies, particularly where investigations are continuing. (See e.g. R v Bavadra at [31] per Wood CJ at CL; R v Perese at [84] per McLelland J; Margrave-Jones at 197; White, Newark and Samuels at 312-313.)
65 These two purposes do not, however, provide definite guidance for the balance between matters on an indictment and matters on a Form 1. Generally, the 'clean slate' will occur and the utilitarian benefits will accrue whatever course is taken. Acknowledgement of guilt always has utilitarian benefits in terms of saving limited public resources and avoiding inconvenience to witnesses. In either case the admissions may relate to offences about which the accused may never have been inculpated. These are real public benefits. Law enforcement agencies and even courts may receive a perceived organisational benefit from increased disposal rates, but such institutional advantages should not be confused with the public interest.
66 The effect of inclusion on a Form 1 is to give the offences so included a significantly lower salience in the sentencing process. There will be an obvious advantage, and hence a greater incentive to admit guilt, where the Form 1 procedure is employed. In my opinion, the issues that arise are broadly equivalent to those involved in the Crown deciding not to prosecute for the full range of offences open to it or to accept a plea to a lesser charge, albeit in the context of multiple, and often divergent, criminal offences.
67 By reason of the express statutory power, a sentencing judge must assess whether it is appropriate to proceed to sentence on a basis where no separate penalty is to be imposed for admitted offences. There will be cases in which, for example, the administration of justice could be brought into disrepute by the court proceeding to sentence a person guilty of a course of criminal conduct on a manifestly inadequate, unduly narrow or artificial basis. I do not intend the previous sentence to constitute a comprehensive statement of the circumstances in which the broad discretion vested in the sentencing judge by s33(1)(b) can be exercised. Nevertheless, the role of the Court must be constrained, to ensure that the independence of the judicial office in an adversary system is protected. (Cf Maxwell v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 501 esp at 513-514 and 534-535.)
68 Striking the appropriate balance between overloading an indictment and ensuring that the indictment - leading to conviction and to sentence for, and only for, matters on the indictment - adequately reflects the totality of the admitted criminality, is primarily a matter for the Crown. The decision of the Crown in this regard will, no doubt, be guided by the determination in this case that, when matters are 'taken into account' on a Form 1, the sentencing judge does not, in any sense, impose sentences for those offences.
69 The application of the Attorney General for a guideline judgment should be upheld to the extent of the above reasons.