© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2011] VSC 589
Supreme Court of Victoria
2011-12-02
J FORREST J
Original judgment source is linked above.
TRADE AND COMMERCE - Misleading or deceptive representations - Sale of racehorse - Issue of veterinary certificate - Agency - Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) s 9.
NEGLIGENCE - Part X Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) - Duty of care - Risk of harm - Foreseeability - Not insignificant risk - Adequacy of response to risk - evidence of loss.
CONTRACT - Breach - Construction - Damages - Failure to effect and maintain Insurance - Whether damages limited to insurance payout - Interpretation of contract of sale - Principles of construction - Deferred payment - Terms providing for a future interest.
EQUITY - Fiduciary duty - Vendor and Purchaser - Existence of a Fiduciary Relationship.
2 Sound Action subsequently underwent a veterinary examination conducted by the third defendant, Dr Angus McKinnon, at the Goulburn Valley Equine Hospital.[3] On 10 March 2005, Dr McKinnon issued a Certificate of Examination for mortality insurance purposes.[4] The certificate did not identify any abnormality with the mare and Ultra subsequently paid $250,000 to Mr Ladhams pursuant to the agreement, which also provided that Mr Ladhams would receive half the proceeds of the sale of the mare's first two foals.
3 Unfortunately, within a short period of time, the mare developed problems with both her front feet, leading to the carrying out of a digital neurectomy[5] at the end of March 2005. Subsequently, things went from bad to worse. On 18 June 2005 notwithstanding further radical surgery, the mare died just prior to being placed on the operating table.
4 Ultra initially commenced proceedings against the first defendant, the underwriters[6] of the insurance policy covering the mare for mortality insurance. There was a protracted dispute with the underwriters which was resolved in January 2009.[7] Ultra subsequently amended its statement of claim to join Mr Ladhams and Dr McKinnon. It alleged that Mr Ladhams had engaged in false and misleading conduct by representing to Mr Buckley prior to the sale that the mare was sound in all respects - that is, for both breeding and racing. It made a similar allegation against Dr McKinnon on the basis of the insurance certificate, also alleging negligence in respect of the preparation of that certificate and the associated examination of the mare.
5 Mr Ladhams counterclaimed against Ultra, alleging breaches of the terms of the agreement to pay a further $250,000, as well as negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.
6 Essentially, Mr Ladhams asserted that the terms of the agreement provided for the payment by Ultra of $250,000 in the event of the death of the mare. Alternatively, he alleged that Ultra's reduction of the insurance cover of the mare from $500,000 to $250,000 was both in breach of the agreement as well as being negligent and in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by Ultra to Mr Ladhams. He also argued that Ultra's instruction to the veterinarian to carry out the neurectomy was negligent.
7 As will become apparent, it is important to identify precisely the case mounted by Ultra against Mr Ladhams, and for that matter against Dr McKinnon. The pleaded case is as follows:
PARTICULARS
The representations were oral and were made in discussions in or about February and March 2005 at meetings and over the telephone between the Second Defendant and Mr Sean Buckley of the Plaintiff. The substance of the representations was as alleged.
8 In the course of the opening, counsel for Mr Buckley confined the case against Mr Ladhams further. In response to a question from me, he accepted that the discussion and representation as to the soundness was confined to what was said by Mr Ladhams at the Oaklands Sale Complex[8] on 3 or 4 March 2005. When asked by me as to what was said about the mare's soundness, the following exchange took place:
JUDGE: Does he say anything about her soundness?
COUNSEL: Yes, he says she's sound, that the problem is one that has arisen from what he says is inadequate care on the part of the present trainer.[9]
9 Ultra's case against Mr Ladhams is therefore simple: Mr Ladhams, in conversations with Mr Buckley, at Oaklands represented to Mr Buckley that the mare was "sound in all respects". There was a good deal of evidence as to what the expression "soundness" means. I am not sure it was of great assistance as the expression is protean and depends on the particular horse, type of activity and its appearance at any given time. Ultra made it clear that for the purpose of its claim, the expression "sound in all respects" meant that the mare was able to engage in both racing and breeding. Ultra then asserts that in reliance upon the statement it entered into the agreement.
10 Mr Ladhams passed away in February of this year. I admitted into evidence under s 63 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) a record of an interview of Mr Ladhams that was conducted in 2005 and an affidavit of Mr Ladhams sworn earlier this year. Mr Ladhams denies the substance of the conversation alleged to have occurred at Oaklands. He contends that he told Mr Buckley of the problems associated with the training of the mare in the past and the difficulties with her racing in the future. Mr Ladhams had no intention of racing the mare himself; he says in addition that it was well known that the mare had significant hoof problems and equally well known that he intended to retire her from racing.
11 Ultra's claim against Dr McKinnon was pleaded as follows:
PARTICUILARS
A copy of the Sale Agreement is in the possession of the solicitors for the Plaintiff and may be inspected by prior arrangement.
PARTICULARS
A copy of the 1st Certificate of Examination is in the possession of the solicitors for the Plaintiff and may be inspected by prior arrangement.
c. Sound Action had a previous history of navicular disease;
d. Sound Action had a previous history of lameness;
e. Sound Action had a previous history of bilateral front food pain.
28A. Further or alternatively, the Third Defendant was negligent in his examination of Sound Action and his completion of the 1st Certificate of Examination in one or more of the following respects
PARTICULARS
(a) The Plaintiff repeats and adopts the particulars subjoined to paragraph 28 hereof.
(b) Failing to make inquiry as to, or seek the medical records of Sound Action at her previous treating veterinary surgeons.
(c) Failing to make inquiry as to, or see the medical history of Sound Action from her previous veterinary surgeons, in particular Dr Ian Fulton of the Colac Veterinary Clinic.
(d) Failing to make inquiry as to, or seek, the training history or racing history of Sound Action from her previous trainer (Ms Roberta McLeod) and the Second Defendant.
(e) Failing to exercise the care and skill expected of a veterinary surgeon in the circumstances.
PARTICULARS
A copy of the Sale Agreement is in the possession of the solicitors for the Plaintiff and may be inspected by prior arrangement.
12 The misleading and deceptive conduct claim against Dr McKinnon relates solely to his completion of the insurance certificate and the related examination on 11 March 2005. Ultra contends that the insurance certificate amounted to a representation by Dr McKinnon that the mare was sound in all respects - again this is said to mean that she was able to engage in both racing and breeding. It says that it relied upon the certificate in not exercising its option under the agreement to treat the sale as null and void in the event of the mare failing a pre-purchase veterinary examination.[10]
13 In the course of opening, counsel for Ultra confirmed that the misleading and deceptive conduct case turned solely upon the insurance certificate provided by Dr McKinnon on 11 March 2005 but contended that the certificate needed to be read in the light of all the circumstances of the mare's admission to GVEH.
14 Dr McKinnon responds that the insurance certificate means no more than what it says: that at the time of his inspection the mare was not lame. It is not, Dr McKinnon argues, meant to be anything other than a mortality insurance declaration - it was not an assessment for racing purposes and, he says, no such assessment was ever requested of him.
15 Ultra's negligence claim also turns on the certificate and the examination: the asserted inadequacies in the examination and certificate, as well as a failure by Dr McKinnon to make appropriate inquiries about the mare's history.
16 Dr McKinnon asserts that the certificate was accurate and that there was no obligation for him to make further enquiries given the nature of the certificate.
17 To understand some of the decisions made at various times during this saga, it is helpful to set out my imperfect understanding of several of the important veterinary terms used in the course of the trial:
18 Lameness is an abnormality of gait where a horse places increased (or decreased) weight when exercising, on a particular leg or legs. The abnormal leg or legs will have decreased weight placed on it; in contrast, the normal leg will take on more of the weight.
Laminitis is an inflammation of the lamini which are the sensitive tissues located under the hoof wall. The condition can result in acute lameness. It can have a variety of causes, including a disruption of the blood supply to the hoof.
Navicular syndrome or Navicular disease is a condition of the hoof. The navicular bone is located within the hood and sits adjacent to the coffin bone and is weight bearing. Adjacent to it are a number of other structures compendiously known as the navicular bursa. A description of a horse suffering from navicular disease or syndrome does not provide a precise identification of what is wrong with a horse. It may be that there is radiological evidence of damage to the navicular bone. It may also be that the area around the navicular bone has been disturbed or damaged and is productive of symptoms. It is also possible (somewhat like arthritis) that there can be damage to either the bone or the bursa with no clinical symptoms. The condition is generally not life-threatening and with reasonable care and farrier attention a broodmare will suffer no complications.
Palmer or plantar digital neurectomy is an operative procedure directed to the relief of pain in horses with signs of chronic lameness, including particularly those with navicular disease. The operation is carried out on the nerves in the hoof. The surgeon divides the nerves (with the aim of blocking out any feeling in the hoof). The procedure is one of some delicacy as the nerve is located only a millimetre away from the artery within the hoof.[11] Complications associated with the procedure are: (a) re-innervation: that is, the nerves re-attach; and (b) laminitis, which can develop after a second operation or (as is highly relevant here) injury to the accompanying blood vessels.[12]
19 Sound Action was foaled in 1999. She was unfashionably bred, yet Mr Ladhams in August 2002 had the good judgment (or perhaps the good fortune) to purchase her. Throughout her career she was trained at Birregurra by Ms Roberta Maguire.[13]
20 Sound Action had her first start at Ararat on 17 November 2002 as a three year old maiden which she won by a length and a half. Subsequently she won her next six starts, including four in the metropolitan area.[14] On 3 May 2003 at Morphettville she won the Group One Australasian Oaks by nearly three lengths. Two weeks later, she suffered her first defeat when she ran fourth, beaten 1.3 lengths, in the South Australian Oaks.
21 She had one run in the spring of 2003, a fourth in the weight-for-age Liston Stakes. Her autumn campaign of six starts resulted in a further Group One success in the Ranvet Stakes at Randwick on 20 March 2004; she had previously finished third and second, beaten half a length and 1.3 lengths behind Lonhro in the C F Orr and St George Stakes respectively. After the Ranvet she ran fourth, beaten nearly ten lengths in the BMW and had her final start in the Queen Elizabeth Stakes on 17 April in which she was beaten by nearly 14 lengths.[15]
22 After the Queen Elizabeth, the mare pulled up sore and was spelled for six to eight weeks with the idea of bringing her back in the spring. By this time she had developed symptoms of lameness in both front feet. Notwithstanding careful veterinary care, she did not race again.
23 Mr Pat Ladhams was a retired dairy farmer. He lived in Colac and had been intensely interested in racing over many years. He owned the mare, which was the subject of a nominal lease to some of his children and in-laws. However, he paid the bills, made all the decisions about the horse and followed her career and veterinary management closely. He was responsible for giving instructions in relation to the mare's racing career and it was his decision to retire her to stud. None of the other listed owners played any part in the management or in the negotiations for the sale of the mare. Sadly Mr Ladhams passed away in February of this year.
24 Mr Chris Ladhams is the son of Pat Ladhams. He accompanied his father to the Oakland sales where a meeting was held with Mr Buckley to finalise the terms of the sale.
25 Mr Sean Buckley was the managing director of Ultra. He was a relative newcomer to the racing/breeding industry. He initially purchased a controlling interest in the company which, at that time, had a stud at Macedon. He relocated the stud to Kilmore in 2004 on a property which had sophisticated training and breeding facilities. At this time there were three other directors of Ultra: Mr George, who had originally (via his company) owned the stud and remained on as a director. Mr Coleman, who was also a director of several of the Ultratune companies and had experience in racing; and Ms Gabrielle Suenza, Mr Buckley's partner at the time. Mr Buckley directed operations at the Baree stud[16] and was the driving force behind the purchase of the mare. He made the decisions in relation to the purchase of the mare and the various veterinary procedures carried out upon her.
26 Mr Terry Bolger was the farm manager at Baree. He had considerable experience in racing, initially as a jockey and then as a trainer. He reported to Mr Buckley, and with Mr Coleman, made the day to day management decisions at the stud.
27 Mr Paul Guy is an experienced bloodstock agent. He put the deal together for the sale of the mare and drew up the agreement ultimately signed by Messrs Buckley, Ladhams and Guy. Mr Guy and his wife Rebecca were the directors of Heritage Bloodstock Pty Ltd at the time of Sound Action's purchase.
28 Dr Len Fulton, a veterinary surgeon, practises at Ballarat. He is also a specialist in equine surgery and management and treated the mare between 9 August 2004 and 21 February 2005 shortly prior to her sale to Ultra.
29 Dr Angus McKinnon is a veterinary surgeon who specialises in equine reproductive management. He has been in practice at GVEH since 1998.
30 Dr Jim Vasey is also a veterinary surgeon and has been a partner with Dr McKinnon in the GVEH since its establishment in 1995. His speciality is equine surgery. He was contacted by Mr Buckley at the time of the purchase and asked to arrange examinations of the mare.
31 Drs Vasey and McKinnon are "partners" in the GVEH. It is located at Congupna, near Shepparton. In 2005, it employed between 12-15 veterinarians with 30-40 staff members.
32 Dr Sarah Jalim also worked as a veterinarian at GVEH and assisted in the lameness workup of Sound Action with Dr Vasey On 10 or 11 March 2005.
33 Ms Kate Bertoli worked as a nurse at GVEH and admitted the mare on 10 March 2009.
34 Dr Maxine Brain practices at Kilmore and was the on-call veterinary surgeon at Baree. She first treated the mare on 21 March 2005 shortly prior to the digital neurectomy being carried out at GVEH.
35 Dr Rick Redden is an American veterinary surgeon who practises in Versailles, Kentucky. He travelled to Australia and carried out radical surgery on the mare's front feet on 23 May . He returned to Australia to carry out further surgery on 18 June and was present when the mare died on the operating table. He did not give evidence at the trial.
36 Newmarket Insurance Brokers[17] were the agents for the underwriters, a Lloyd's syndicate, initially joined as the only defendant to this proceeding. Newmarket specialised in equine insurance. No representative of Newmarket or the underwriters gave evidence.
37 Three expert witnesses gave evidence at trial. Two on the veterinary management score relevant to the negligence claim against Dr McKinnon: Dr James Veneer (called by Ultra) and Professor Kannegieter (called by Dr McKinnon). In addition, an experienced thoroughbred valuer, Mr Heagney, was called by Ultra.
38 The summary which follows represents my findings of fact on mostly non-controversial matters. I shall, subsequently, deal with my findings of fact where there is dispute between the parties.
39 Towards the end of the autumn carnival in Sydney in 2004, Sound Action experienced problems with her front feet - not significant but enough to put an end to her campaign.[18] Prior to that, there had been no significant issues about her soundness. After a six week spell she was put back into work and showed consistent signs of lameness when asked to do foot work.[19]
41 During the latter months of 2004 and January 2005, the mare was sound enough to be got ready to race. She had special treatment plates fitted. She was also being given small doses of phenylbutazone (an anti-inflammatory drug) by Ms Maguire and occasional injections of cortisone under the supervision of Dr Fulton.
42 Bone scans and x-rays did not reveal damage to the navicular bone; rather the problem, degenerate in nature, was in the structures surrounding the bone.
43 On 24 February 2005, the mare was sufficiently fit to be taken to what is colloquially known as a "jump out trial" at Geelong. She ran third but this was disappointing; and, afterwards she pulled up "average".[22] It was apparent to Ms Maguire that she could not stand a further preparation in the absence of medication.[23] Mr Ladhams, after consultation with Ms Maguire, decided that he would retire the mare from racing.
44 Over the ensuing week, articles appeared in the press concerning the mare and it became public knowledge that she may be available for sale.[24] In the Herald Sun, it was reported that her hoof problems had recurred and she might be retired. Mr Guy, the bloodstock agent, contacted Mr Buckley suggesting that the mare might be of interest to him in his new venture.
45 Mr Buckley was, indeed, interested and in the days around the end of February and early March 2005 Mr Guy pursued enquiries in relation to the purchase of the mare. He spoke to both Mr Ladhams and Ms Maguire.[25] He went to Ms Maguire's property where he inspected the mare. He subsequently prepared a draft agreement for the sale of the mare to Ultra.
46 Mr Guy also arranged for Mr Ladhams and Mr Buckley to meet at the Inglis sales complex at Oaklands to finalise the terms of the deal. What was said at that meeting on 3 March 2005 is in dispute and I shall return to it later.
47 Putting to one side what transpired at the meeting, within a few days the terms had been settled upon and the agreement was in final form.
48 On 8 March 2005, both Mr Guy and Mr Ladhams signed the agreement.[26]
49 On 9 March 2005, Mr Buckley contacted Dr Vasey. There is a dispute as to what was said on that occasion and I will return to it later. It was not in dispute however that it was arranged that the mare would be taken to GVEH and a veterinary examination undertaken.
50 On 9 March 2005, Newmarket advised Ultra that it would provide mortality cover for the mare subject to receiving a veterinary certificate.[27]
51 On 10 March 2005, and notwithstanding that Mr Buckley had not signed the agreement, the mare was collected from Mr Ladhams' property by Mr Bolger and taken directly to GVEH for a veterinary examination.[28] Mr Guy had accompanied Mr Bolger to Mr Ladhams' property and assisted in loading the mare on to the float.[29] She was fit and in good condition.[30] She was not apparently lame.[31]
52 On 11 March 2005 (and perhaps the day before), Dr Vassey conducted his lameness examination of the mare and performed a number of tests on her.
53 On the same day, Dr McKinnon examined the mare and completed the insurance certificate. Of critical importance, according to Ultra, is the answer to the question "Is the horse lame at the walk or trot" - to which the answer "no" was given.
54 In the early evening, a copy of the insurance certificate was sent by GVEH by facsimile to the Ultra head office. In turn, it was sent by facsimile to Newmarket.[32] It was subsequently forwarded to Mr Buckley.
55 On the same evening, there was a discussion by telephone between Mr Buckley and Dr Vasey concerning Dr Vasey's examination. The contents of that discussion were in dispute (to which I shall return), as were those of a discussion on the following day concerning the mare.
56 In the late afternoon or early evening, Mr Buckley signed the agreement in the presence of Mr Guy and dated it 8 March.[33] Later that evening, after the conversation with Dr Vasey, Mr Buckley authorised Mr Guy to provide Mr Ladhams with a cheque Ultra had drawn for $250,000 and a cheque for $16,500 for Mr Guy as his commission.[34]
58 On 22 March 2005, there were further discussions between Dr Vasey and Mr Buckley concerning the mare and her treatment (again the substance of those discussions were very much in issue).
59 On 30 March 2005, Dr Vasey performed the neurectomy at GVEH.
60 On 31 March 2005, another mortality insurance certificate dated 9 March 2005 was apparently completed by Dr Arnott, a veterinary surgeon at GVEH and forwarded by facsimile to Ultra.[37] Contrary to Dr McKinnon's certificate, the answer to the question of lameness was "yes". This certificate also noted "[h]istory of bilateral front foot pain" and "[n]ot a mortality issue".
61 On 6 April 2005, the mare was discharged from GVEH back to Baree, but upon her return she was noted to have continuing problems with her feet and on 9 May 2005 she was re-admitted to GVEH with a purulent discharge from both front feet.[38]
62 On 13 May 2005, the mare was discharged from GVEH back to Baree.
63 On 20 May 2005, the mare was re-admitted to GVEH. Her left hoof was in a shocking state. Dr Vasey could see the pedal bone and he recommended to Mr Buckley that she be euthanased.[39] Mr Buckley did not accept this advice.
64 Mr Buckley had made contact with Dr Redden in the United States who proposed further surgery to the mare's front feet.
65 Although Dr Vasey advised against the surgery, the facilities at GVEH were made available to Dr Redden who, on 23 May 2005, operated on the mare. The procedure was radical: essentially the mare's front hooves were cut off, her legs placed in casts - it being hoped the hooves would regrow. Dr Vasey assisted in the operation and the mare was discharged back to Baree on the following day.
66 The mare was kept at Baree but her condition, notwithstanding the surgery, continued to deteriorate.
67 Dr Redden, who had returned to the United States, was consulted again and agreed to return to carry out further surgery. The mare could not be moved from Baree and the operation was scheduled for 18 June 2005.
68 On 18 June, as the mare was prepared for the operation, she sustained a cardiac arrest and died.
69 Much of Ultra's case against both Mr Ladhams and Dr McKinnon turns upon my acceptance, or otherwise, of Mr Buckley's evidence. I will, in the course of my analysis of the contested factual issues, comment in detail as to a number of inconsistencies or improbabilities surrounding the evidence of Mr Buckley. I identify in particular the following matters which I have resolved adversely to Mr Buckley:
(a) Mr Buckley's denial of any knowledge of the mare suffering from navicular disease when contrasted with the evidence of Mr Guy;
(b) Mr Buckley's conversations with Dr Vasey on 11 and 12 March after he completed the lameness examination;
(c) Mr Buckley's conversation with Dr Vasey on or around 22 March concerning Dr Vasey's asserted disclosure to Mr Buckley of the mare's prior history and in particular the existence of a navicular condition;
(d) Mr Buckley's conversation with Dr Vasey at about the same time in relation to the carrying out of the digital neurectomy;
(e) Mr Buckley's determination to assert that Mr Guy was not his agent for the purpose of the purchase of Sound Action and, particularly, his answers to interrogatories on this issue; and
(f) Mr Buckley's discussion with Mr Ladhams at Oaklands.
70 The first and third matters go to a critical issue in the case, namely Mr Buckley's knowledge of the mare suffering from navicular disease. My findings[40] are consistent with Mr Buckley endeavouring to distance himself, by whatever means possible, from such knowledge. If I reject his account of these conversations I may infer that his false account of such lack of knowledge demonstrates that he had greater awareness of the condition of the mare's feet than he wished to disclose. These matters also go to his credit generally. The second matter goes to the exact nature of the advice given to Mr Buckley as a consequence of the lameness examination and the decision to proceed with the purchase of the mare (in the sense of not withdrawing from the agreement). The fourth matter, relating to the neurectomy goes to another important point - why the operation was carried out only twenty days after the purchase of the mare. The fifth matter, the nature of his relationship with Mr Guy, again reinforces the proposition that Mr Buckley is prepared to make any allegation which he perceives will support his case. Finally, his account of the discussions at Oaklands with Mr Ladhams relating to Ms Maguire also goes to an issue in the trial, namely, the reality of the mare ever returning to the racetrack and, accordingly, Mr Ladham's asserted declaration concerning her soundness.
71 I shall return to each of these matters in greater detail in due course. But suffice to say, that compendiously each of these matters (plus several others I shall advert to) mean there are many parts of Mr Buckley's evidence that I simply do not accept.
The condition of the mare prior to her sale to Ultra
72 Ms Maguire's evidence, which I accept, was that prior to puling up sore in the Queen Elizabeth Stakes the mare had experienced relatively minor episodes of lameness, which was essentially treated by a farrier working on her front feet.[41] Ms Maguire identified the problems as being related to foot abscesses in both feet.[42]
73 After the Queen Elizabeth Stakes at Randwick on 17 April 2004, the mare was spelled and brought back into work at Ms Maguire's stables at Birregurra in mid-to-late June.
74 It became clear to Ms Maguire that for the mare to have any chance of returning to racing she required expert veterinary treatment. She was taken to Dr Fulton's clinic at Ballarat on 9 August 2004 and he treated the mare until February 2005.
75 Dr Fulton diagnosed the mare as suffering from the condition of navicular bursitis and described her condition as one of "navicular syndrome". The navicular bones did not show any major abnormality, however the condition affected the tissues and structures surrounding the bone.[43] It is a difficult condition to treat if a horse is to compete at a high level in thoroughbred racing. Each of the horse's front feet can be sensitive to the jarring impact generated by the constant high velocity of the pressure of racing or working at fast pace.
76 Dr Fulton, after conducting a series of nerve blocks and bone scans, opted to treat the mare with regular doses of phenylbutazone and occasional injections of corticosteroids. He also gave advice as to appropriate farrier treatment.[44] The problem often facing racehorses with this condition is that at some point of time prior to racing it is necessary to withhold the administration of drugs as a horse must compete drug-free.
77 Despite multiple outpatient visits to Dr Fulton's clinic, the mare's preparation did not progress well. She was not handling work well, even on grass surfaces. She was sore when pushed to do pace work.[45] So in late October 2004, the mare was taken to Ballarat and admitted as an inpatient at the clinic for approximately one week.
78 After this visit, the mare returned to Ms Maguire's property and was treated with phenylbutezone and corticosteroids.[46]
79 On 2 December 2004, Dr Fulton injected the navicular bursa with long acting cortisone - a treatment designed to give the mare pain relief so she was able to be worked.[47]
80 On 21 February 2005, an injection with Kenacort (a form of cortisone) was given by Dr Fulton who described it as a "last attempt to try and maintain a level of soundness".[48]
81 The mare had improved sufficiently on this regime to run in a trial on 24 January at Geelong. She finished third but Ms Maguire described it as "average"[49] and "nowhere near what she would have expected from her". Ms Maguire's conclusion after the race was:
It was becoming apparent that even though we were able to work her on the drugs that Dr Fulton prescribed, when it actually was going to become able to race her it was not going to be able to happen.[50]
She took the view that the mare could not race again in a drug-free condition.
82 It should be noted that at the time of sale, apart from "navicular syndrome", the mare was in very good condition. She was a large, well conditioned mare and, as Ms Maguire described her at this time, as looking "fantastic".[51] Mr Bolger, when he picked up the mare from Mr Ladhams' property on 10 March 2005, described her as fine and looking healthy in the coat.[52] Mr Guy described her as having "no problems at all".[53] Neither Mr Bolger nor Mr Guy (who loaded the mare on to the float) suggested that at the time she left Mr Ladhams' property she was lame, or perhaps to put it more accurately, noticeably lame (bearing in mind that both Mr Guy and Mr Bolger had considerable bloodstock experience).
(a) the mare, by February 2005, was suffering from chronic hoof problems which resulted in Ms Maguire recommending that she be retired from racing;
(b) that otherwise she was in particularly good condition and, given her size, confirmation and performance was a very good broodmare prospect; and
(c) when taken from Mr Ladhams' property on 10 March 2005 the mare was not noticeably lame.
Mr Ladhams' intentions in relation to the future of the mare
84 Dr Fulton had told both Ms Maguire and Mr Ladhams (who usually went to the clinic with Ms Maguire) that the mare suffered from navicular disease and that was the cause of her problems.[54]
85 After the mare's trial at Geelong, Ms Maguire advised Mr Ladhams that her preparation should be curtailed and that she should be retired to stud. Dr Fulton was also consulted and concurred with this decision.[55] Mr Ladhams accepted the advice of both the veterinary surgeon and Ms Maguire and decided to retire the mare.[56]
86 Shortly afterwards, an article was published in the Herald Sun, under the by-line of Mr Tim Habel with the following sub-title and title:
Off to the paddock: Sound Action will not race this autumn and could be retired because of recurring hoof problems.
Unsound Action flares up again.
The article referred to recurring hoof problems sidelining the mare for twelve months and Ms Maguire stating that "[s]he shuffles a bit in front. She just can't take the workload".[57]
87 I am satisfied that Mr Ladhams knew of the mare's lameness when in work and was also aware, having sought the advice of Dr Fulton, that she suffered from navicular disease.[58] I am also satisfied that Mr Ladhams after the Geelong trial took the view that the mare should be retired and that her racing career had been ended by the condition of her front feet.[59]
88 I should add that I find that Ms Maguire had known as a result of her conversations with Dr Fulton, that the mare suffered from navicular disease.[60]
Mr Buckley's knowledge of the mare's condition and in particular the existence of navicular disease
89 Mr Buckley accepted that from his reading of the press reports he was aware that the mare had pulled up lame and that there was a problem with abscesses or a stone bruise.[61] He was adamant, though, in his denial of any knowledge of a navicular condition to the point that he was "the only person in town who didn't know this because I didn't know she had a history of navicular disease".[62] He specifically denied being told by Mr Guy of any navicular issue.[63]
90 However, Mr Buckley agreed that there was considerable discussion between himself and Mr Guy before her purchase about the mare's problems, including the need for corrective shoeing, the presence of abscesses, future methods of treatment such as the water wheel, hyperbaric chamber and swimming and the condition of the Maguire's property (located in a rain belt). Indeed everything except the existence of navicular disease.[64]
91 Mr Guy obtained details of Ms Maguire via the racing calendar. He made arrangements to visit her property at Birregurra and discussed the mare (who was still stabled at Ms Maguire's property with her after carrying out an inspection of Sound Action). He described the mare as a lovely big mare who would make a good broodmare.[65]
92 Ms Maguire's evidence, which I accept, was that she explained the mare's condition in detail to Mr Guy.[66] In particular, she told him the mare had "navicular" described her treatment of the mare and gave her opinion as to what she thought would be an appropriate level of care of the mare in the future in the form of medication and corrective shoeing.[67]
From the start of my contact with the agent I told him that Sound Action had become lame during preparations for racing and that she had had "abscesses". I told him that Sound Action had been treated for lameness from navicular disease.
He thought that he had met Mr Guy three or four times and had two or three telephone discussions with him prior to the signing of the agreement.[68]
95 On the way back to his home in Geelong, Mr Guy rang Mr Buckley. He described the conversation as follows:
I reported to Mr Buckley she was a good type of mare. She had a big frame, lots of capacity to be a good broodmare. That she wasn't perfect in front confirmation wise but was acceptable. Her feet weren't in great condition but a change of farrier might have some effect there. They had got very close to racing, she had only just pulled up sore after a trial. She was in pretty good condition - she was in good condition, the mare and mentioned that the history of foot troubles was predominantly the foot abscesses and that where she was based at Birregurra was very high rainfall and as we say you could bog a duck there. There had also been a mention of some navicular issues so if we were going to proceed that she would definitely require to get a proper veterinary examination, including x-rays to see where we stood there.[71]
96 In cross-examination he made the point, which has real force, that there was no advantage to him in concealing a disability in the mare if he wanted to build up a long term relationship[72] with Mr Buckley and Ultra.
97 Mr Guy accepted that he did not know whether Mr Buckley was aware of what navicular might mean but was adamant that he told him of that fact. He agreed that he recommended the purchase of the mare to Mr Buckley, notwithstanding the disclosure of navicular issues.[73]
98 In my view, Mr Buckley's account of his conversation with Mr Guy should be rejected. Mr Guy impressed me as a truthful and careful witness. He had been told by both Ms Maguire and Mr Ladhams of the horse's condition, including the presence of some form of navicular problem. There was no reason for him to not disclose this to Mr Buckley. There was no issue that all the other information about the mare, relating to abscesses, the condition of the property and the need for careful farrier treatment in the future, was disclosed by Mr Guy to Mr Buckley in that conversation. Why, one might ask, would he not tell Mr Buckley of that condition. On the other hand, there is a clear motivation for Mr Buckley to distance himself from such knowledge - it affects any argument that he may mount in relation to his reliance upon his discussion with Mr Ladhams and the insurance certificate as to the mare's condition.
99 Mr Buckley's knowledge of the nature of the mare's condition is also corroborated by Dr Vasey's account of his conversation with Mr Buckley around 9 April 2005 in which Mr Buckley told Dr Vasey the mare had a history of navicular disease.[74]
100 Whilst this evidence was somewhat equivocal (Dr Vasey later said he could not remember whether it was Mr Buckley or Mr Bolger who told him),[75] I think it likely that Mr Buckley was the source of this information. Mr Bolger denied any such knowledge and it leaves Mr Buckley alone as the source.
101 I am satisfied that as a result of the conversation with Mr Guy, Mr Buckley was aware that the mare had problems with her feet in the form of both abscesses and a navicular condition. I cannot be satisfied as to whether Mr Buckley had any greater knowledge as to the effect that that condition may have upon the mare, but at the very least he was aware that this was a problem from which she had suffered in the past.
102 Putting to one side the question of navicular disease, it is clear that Mr Buckley regarded the prospects of the mare ever making a return to the racetrack as remote. She was five years old; she had not raced for 12 months; she had ongoing problems with her feet and her preparation had been halted due to those problems. In answer to an interrogatory, he said as follows:
The horse was principally purchased for breeding. There was no real intention to race, however this had not been totally dismissed.[76]
103 I should deal with one other matter now. There was much argument about any inference to be drawn from an entry in GVEH's clinical records[77] concerning the first admission of the mare which read "previous history of navicular disease. Has been lame - Won 2 Group 1's".
104 Mr Ladhams and Dr McKinnon contended that the entry made in the records was, necessarily, the result of instructions given by a representative of Ultra - be it Mr Bolger who delivered the horse to GVEH or Mr Buckley by telephone.
105 Ms Bertoli, who admitted the mare, confirmed that she made a number of the entries at the commencement of the clinical records - particularly relating to the details of the ownership of the mare, but she did not make the entry in question. She had no recollection of any of the events surrounding the making of the entries in the hospital other than identifying her own writing.[78] She was, however, able to identify other handwriting in the records. In relation to the subject entry, she thought it was written by another nurse, Ms Crystal Mills.[79]
106 A number of the other entries on the page were made by Dr Jalim.[80] She recognised the subject entry as being the writing of one of the nurses at the hospital but could not nominate her identity.
107 The "lameness exam" worksheet completed during the course of Dr Vasey's lameness examination workup also referred to "navicular". Ms Bertoli thought it was also completed by Ms Mills,[81] who was not called as a witness.
108 For any inference to be drawn from the entry I would need to be satisfied, as a probability, that the entry was the result of a discussion with either Mr Buckley, or Mr Bolger.
110 Counsel for Dr McKinnon argued that whether it was Mr Bolger or Mr Buckley who told the staff at GVEH abut the condition was immaterial - the only source of that information was Mr Buckley. That may well be a possible scenario but it ignores two matters: Mr Bolger's denial on oath that he said anything about the condition and the absence of evidence from Ms Mills who probably made the entry.
111 Absent evidence from the author of the note, I am not satisfied that I can exclude the source being someone apart from Mr Buckley who had knowledge of the problems with the mare.
112 It follows that I am not persuaded that there was any a discussion between Mr Buckley or Mr Bolger with a member of staff of GVEH which led to the entry. However, as I have already said, I accept Dr Vassey's evidence that Mr Buckley spoke to him by telephone and described the mare as suffering from navicular disease.
Mr Buckley's dealings with Mr Guy and Mr Ladhams prior to the Oaklands meeting
113 It was common ground that Mr Guy initiated contact with Mr Buckley in late February 2005 having read one of the newspaper articles. Mr Buckley said that he was contacted by Mr Guy who asked him whether he had read the paper today and then said:
There's a mare in there I think you should look at buying. It's just won a barrier trial by ten lengths and its name is Sound Action...[84]
114 Pausing here, I have difficulty accepting this account - although it is a minor matter. Sound Action had not won any trial by ten lengths; to the contrary she had run third and performed in a mediocre fashion. The report in the Herald Sun confirmed the problems with her feet. Mr Buckley accepted that he was aware of the reports to the effect that the mare had pulled up lame after the trial and that there was a mention of abscesses in the article.[85]
115 Both Mr Buckley and Mr Guy agreed that it was Mr Guy who approached Mr Buckley in relation to making enquiries as to the availability of the mare, given what had appeared in the press.[86] It was also common ground that Mr Guy kept Mr Buckley informed of developments in the negotiations with Mr Ladhams.[87] Whilst Mr Guy drew up the agreement, the terms of the deal were discussed by him with Mr Buckley as reflected by the draft agreement and the agreement.[88]
116 The meeting at Oaklands, arranged by Mr Guy, came after a number of discussions and the production of the draft agreement which had been considered by Mr Ladhams in conjunction with Mr Guy.[89] With one exception, it was agreed that the meeting took place in early March 2000.
117 It was not in issue that both Mr Ladhams and Mr Buckley discussed matters relevant to the sale of the mare during the course of their meeting. It was also not in issue that Mr Guy was initially present at the meeting. What was in hot dispute was what was said about the mare's future, also whether Mr Chris Ladhams, Mr Ladhams' son, was present at the meeting. For reasons I shall set out in a moment, although I regarded Mr Chris Ladhams as an honest witness, I cannot reconcile his evidence with that of Mr Buckley and Mr Guy as to the participants at the meeting and accordingly have put his account of the conversation to one side.
118 Mr Buckley's account, in précis, was as follows: that the meeting occurred outside the parade ring at the sales complex, that the conversation covered a number of topics, including the commission payable to Mr Guy and by whom it will be paid. Mr Ladhams told him "he hated" Ms Maguire and identified the difficulties with her training setup at Birregurra, particularly its location and its dampness and the benefits that he thought would flow from having the horse trained with better facilities such as those at Baree. Later in his evidence Mr Buckley said that Mr Ladhams had an "angry demeanour" towards Ms Maguire and was involved in a fight with her.[90]
As to the "soundness" of the mare, the following was said:
COUNSEL: Did he say to you anything about the physical condition of the horse at that time?
ANSWER: No, just that the horse had abscesses.
COUNSEL: Did he say anything to you about what had previously caused the foot problems of the horse?
ANSWER: No. He did mention one thing, the horse had had a stone bruise at one stage but I'm not sure what time that was in terms of the whole scheme of things. He mentioned stone bruise, that's all.
COUNSEL: Was there any discussion about the newspaper articles?
ANSWER: I can't recall that, to be honest with you.
COUNSEL: Did you discuss with him at the time positive racing plans as to ---?
ANSWER: Yes
COUNSEL: Could you tell his Honour what was said in relation to racing plans for the horse?
ANSWER: He just talked about racing it in the spring carnival again and I knew the horse hadn't run after it had finished sixth or seventh out of eighth in the previous year, so '04, so it had been out for a while and that does happen with horses. Horses break down and have problems or have a spell. I've horses that haven't raised [sic] for a year and come back so to me it wasn't that bad. He was very bullish on the spring carnival and he felt we had a chance as long as we had the right trainer, right conditions and right environment, that was basically what he was saying to me.[91]
Mr Buckley went on to say that he had a further telephone conversation with Mr Ladhams shortly prior to 8 March 2005 in which Mr Ladhams rang and asked whether Mr Buckley had had any other thoughts about trainers to which he replied that the deal should be completed and the mare passed the vet before they considered the question of trainers.[92]
Subsequently, the discussion turned to the question of who might train the horse in the future. On Mr Buckley's account the only outstanding item to be resolved was the payment of the commission.[93]
119 Sadly, Mr Ladhams died before being able to give evidence; however, in his affidavit sworn in February of this year, he said as follows:
On or about 3 or 4 March 2005 I was introduced to Mr Sean Buckley ("Buckley") by the Agent and I discussed with Buckley and agreed upon the further conditions of the proposed Sale Agreement to the effect that I would be paid a further $250,000 if Sound Action did not produce foals after three years. This is reflected in clause 19 of the final Sale Agreement. In that discussion at Oaklands I did not say or indicate to Buckley that she was "sound in all respects". Indeed I said to Buckley that in my view Sound Action would struggle to race again because of the pressure she put herself under during fast work preparation which would cause her to go lame, and I that thought that she was not a racing proposition. That conversation at Oaklands was the only conversation I had with Mr Buckley prior to the sale on 8 March 2005.
120 Mr Guy, who had set up the meeting, said that it took place on 4 March at a mixed bloodstock sale.[94] He described the meeting as taking place in an area between the walking ring and the café and did not recall going into the café. As far as he could remember, the only person present with Mr Ladhams was a Western District trainer, Mr Daryl Cannon. He confirmed the evidence given by Mr Buckley that he, Mr Guy, did not stay for long and he left the prospective vendor and purchaser to discuss the mare. As far as he was concerned, it was for Mr Ladhams and Mr Buckley to shape the final details of the contract.[95] His recollection of the conversation at which he was present related to the mare racing in the future and the choice of stallions;[96] As far as he was aware there was no discussion about the question of his commission as on his account this had been resolved, with Mr Buckley being responsible for it.[97] When he rejoined the two of them the discussion was as to her prospects of returning to racing with an anticipation that by July or August they would know whether she should be retired to stud.[98]
121 I accept that Mr Guy's evidence as to the meeting at Oaklands. I reject the submission that he was "hostile" to Mr Buckley, as submitted by counsel for Mr Buckley. He was an impressive and, I thought, independent witness - much of his account of his dealings with Mr Buckley and others was corroborated by other evidence.
122 I should now mention two other pieces of evidence relevant to what occurred at the Oaklands meeting. First there is the evidence of Mr Chris Ladhams. Essentially it is to this effect - that the meeting took place within the cafeteria and was between his father, Mr Guy, Mr Buckley and a female friend of Mr Buckley's.[99]
124 My opinion at the time (which has not changed) was that Mr Ladhams endeavoured to give his evidence honestly and to the best of his ability. However, there are several major obstacles in accepting his evidence: On both Mr Guy and Mr Buckley's version, the conversation did not occur in the cafeteria; nor was there any other person present (such as the lady whom he said accompanied Mr Buckley). Further, in his father's account (by affidavit) there is no reference to Chris Ladhams being present in the discussions with Mr Buckley; moreover, Mr Ladhams' account of what was discussed differs markedly to that suggested by Mr Chris Ladhams.[102] Mr Guy could not recall seeing Mr Chris Ladhams in any conversation with Mr Ladhams or Mr Buckley.[103]
125 I have no reason to doubt that Mr Chris Ladhams accompanied his father to Oaklands and in all likelihood observed his father in the course of discussion with Mr Buckley. I am unable, however, to rely upon his evidence as to the substance of the discussions between his father and Mr Buckley given that it is at odds with the evidence of Mr Buckley and Mr Ladhams, as well as that of Mr Guy who had an immediate and direct interest in what was going on.
126 Second, there is the evidence of Mr George. He was an unimpressive witness and I have serious reservations as to whether his evidence was of any assistance on any issue in the trial. His evidence was that in February at the Premier Sale at Oaklands he had seen Mr Buckley with Mr Guy and another gentleman in discussion in the lawn area at the sales complex. Afterwards Mr Buckley told him that the other person was "the guy who owns Sound Action, Ladhams".[104]
127 The problem with Mr George's account is that the sale at which the conversations between Mr Buckley and Mr Ladhams took place was not the premier sale (which is a yearling sale) nor was it in February of that year. Mr Guy's evidence, which I accept given his knowledge of the industry and of the details concerning the sale of this mare, was that the sale was in fact a mixed sale (i.e. bloodstock of all ages) conducted on 4 March 2005.
128 I reject Mr Buckley's account that Mr Ladhams told him that he "hated" Ms Maguire. I do, however, accept Mr Guy's evidence that there was some disquiet on the part of Mr Ladhams with the conditions at Ms Maguire's property and the effect that it may have had upon the mare's feet. The suggestion of hatred is inconsistent with other evidence. If there was such enmity, then Mr Ladhams who appears to have been an independent minded man, would no doubt have removed the horse from Ms Maguire's care; in fact he continued to have at least one other horse trained by Ms Maguire both while Sound Action was in work (she was still trained by Ms Maguire when she trialled at Geelong on 24 February 200?) and after her sale.[105] On this score I accept the evidence of his son, Mr Chris Ladhams that there was no bad blood between the two, other than Mr Ladhams' desire to have his horses trained on a different property.[106] He had purchased a property close to the Colac racecourse and wanted his horses trained from there. Ms Maguire was not prepared to do so and accordingly, Mr Ladhams engaged the services of Mr Cannon. Ms Maguire also denied any enmity between herself and Mr Ladhams.[107]
129 Mr Guy's evidence that there was an apparent souring of the relationship between Mr Ladhams and Ms Maguire was merely an impression - what is clear from those who were closely involved with the Ladhams family and the mare was that Mr Ladhams would have preferred Ms Maguire to relocate closer to the Colac racecourse.[108] Understandably (given that hope springs eternal in racing), Mr Ladhams may well have thought, and said so, that a new training establishment with all its advanced facilities would assist if the mare were to have any chance of racing again - but this is light years away from a representation that to the effect that the mare was "sound in all respects"; particularly when Mr Buckley admitted that "there was no real intention to race her but this had not been totally dismissed".[109]
130 Further, Mr Buckley's account of the Oaklands meeting cannot stand with that of Mr Guy. On Mr Buckley's version, the major topic of conversation about the deal was that of Mr Guy's commission - whilst Mr Guy was not present at the discussion between Mr Ladhams and Mr Buckley, he says that this was simply not an issue;[110] it had been settled, rather the purpose was to arrange for the two to get together and finalise the deal.
131 I reject the submission made by counsel for Mr Buckley that a Jones v Dunkel[111] inference should be drawn against Mr Ladhams on the basis of his failure to call Mr Daryl Cannon, the trainer who was also present at Oaklands on the day of the conversation. It was not suggested by anyone that Mr Cannon was present at, or a witness to, the conversation and at best his evidence would be peripheral to the substantive issues in the case. In my view, one could not have expected Mr Ladhams to call Mr Cannon; moreover I doubt whether anything he could have said would have been of assistance in resolving the issues I have to determine.
132 What then of what was said at the meeting. I am satisfied that:
(a) there was a meeting between Mr Buckley and Mr Ladhams at Oaklands on 4 March at a mixed bloodstock sale;
(c) that they were introduced to each other by Mr Guy who then left the two to discuss the sale of the mare in an area outside the cafeteria;
(d) that there was discussion finalising the deal as to the foal share aspect of the agreement; and
(e) that there was a discussion between the two as to the future race prospects of the mare. This is confirmed by the terms of the sale agreement which envisages such a prospect. Although not referred to by Mr Ladhams in his affidavit, I accept Mr Guy's evidence on this issue. I conclude that there was a discussion about attempting to get the mare back to the racetrack, particularly given Mr Buckley's enthusiasm for the facilities at Baree, including the hyperbaric chamber. However, this was as far as it went.
133 As to the discussion concerning the alleged soundness of the mare and any representation to the effect that she was "sound in all respects", I am satisfied that notwithstanding that there was discussion about the mare's future racing prospects, Mr Ladhams' account that he told Mr Buckley the mare would struggle with the pressure of training because of her foot condition should be accepted. It is consistent with clause 6 of the agreement and particularly the words "should Sound Action (Aus) ever race" (emphasis added). Moreover, it is consistent with Mr Ladhams' own knowledge of the problems the mare had faced in the past.
134 I accept that there are some inconsistencies between his account given over the telephone to an investigator (tendered by Mr Ladhams).[112] However, these differences do not affect the substance of his evidence, particularly, that relating to the mare's ability to race. I should add that I have also taken into account Ultra's inability to cross-examine Mr Ladhams. Allowing for both those matters, I remain persuaded that Mr Ladhams' account of the conversation is to be preferred over that of Mr Buckley. Given what I perceive to be inaccuracies in Mr Buckley's account of the conversation and my general views as to his credit, I am not able to accept his evidence as to the discussion and particularly that relating to the future prospects of the mare. In my view, the account given by Mr Ladhams is a more probable account of what actually transpired between the two at the Oaklands meeting.
135 Finally, I should return to the alleged telephone conversation between Mr Buckley and Mr Ladhams subsequent to the meeting at Oaklands. Mr Buckley said that Mr Ladhams rang him and discussed who might train the mare.[113] Mr George, whose reliability I question, corroborated this account.[114] Mr Ladhams denies any such conversation.[115] As it transpires, I do not need to make any finding about this conversation as it was not relied upon by Mr Buckley - understandably so, as even on his account it was simply a discussion about possibilities and no more.
Mr Buckley's dealing with Dr Vasey prior to the mare's admission to the GVEH
136 Although Mr Buckley was only a relatively new player in the racing industry, he had used GVEH's services in the past, and particularly those of Dr Vasey:
He [Dr Vasey] was a man that I contacted, he was the man I spoke to with all my concerns and he was guy I communicated with at all levels. So I don't know what he did behind the scenes and who he delegated to, to get the result that I needed.[116]
whereas Dr Brain carried out "the basic run of the mill stuff".[117]
137 Mr Buckley said that on or around 9 March 2005 he contacted Dr Vasey to carry out a lameness check on the mare; Mr Buckley described his discussion with Dr Vasey as follows:
I've just bought a horse. I would like to do a veterinary exam on it, please. I would like you to do some reproductive work to make sure she can have some babies and work out some lameness issues...and I told him the horse had run a trial apparently she was having problems with abscesses and could he check out it for me please and let me know what was going to happen with her and he asked what was I buying it for and I said it was a racing and breeding proposition depending upon what comes back and he asked me whether I would be insuring it and I said I would be and I think that was about the level of the conversation.[118]
138 Before turning to Dr Vassey's account, it is appropriate now to mention the evidence given by a number of the veterinarians as to the type of veterinary examinations carried out on horses. Each of the experts agreed that a mortality insurance examination is a fairly basic type of examination involving limited observations of the horse's action and the completion of a fairly basic standard form certificate.[119] I shall return to it in more detail when considering Dr McKinnon's conduct. The next step up is a lameness examination which involves a specific series of tests with clinical examination and the use of nerve blocks to determine the level of lameness (if any) of particular horse. An example of this type of examination and its conduct is the lameness worksheet which form part of the mare's GVEH record.[120] Finally, there is a pre-purchase examination which had a comprehensive examination carried out using a detailed Equine Veterinarians Australia form.[121] The examination is not confined to lameness but is an all round detailed examination of the horse's physical condition and includes the provision of statements completed by both vendor and purchaser as to the horse's history and specifically any past history of lameness or medication.[122]
139 Dr Vasey confirmed, by reference to his hospital message book,[123] that he spoke to Mr Buckley on 9 March. However, he described a different conversation to that of Mr Buckley:
[Mr Buckley said] "I've purchased a mare by the name of Sound Action. She's done very well on the racetrack". The client's knowledge is that she has had some feet issues in the past and he would like me to assess those concerns. I then asked him, "Have you bought the horse or do you want us to do a pre-purchase examination on the horse?". He said "No, I've bought the horse, you do not need to carry out a pre-purchase exam..." the phrase "navicular disease" was mentioned... they have bought her, she had the history of navicular disease which is a feet issue, a subtle sort of foot problem. The discussion went along the lines that day the previous owners of the horse had been managing the problem, she had done well on the racetrack. I think in the history we received when she came in on the 10th that she had won two Group 1 races which is no mean feat.[124]
140 Dr Vasey said Mr Buckley's request was one to assess the subtle lameness in the feet and no more. In particular, he was not specifically asked to perform a pre-purchase examination, but rather, as he understood it, to carry out a lameness examination.
141 Although clause 9 of the agreement provided for a pre-purchase examination,[125] the contemporaneous evidence points to the arrangement being for a lameness examination, rather than a pre-purchase examination. The entry in the clinical records made by Ms Bertoli on admission of the mare refers to a "lameness exam".[126] An entry in GVEH message book asking Dr Vasey to ring Mr Buckley regarding a "lameness workup" is consistent with a lameness examination rather a pre-purchase examination being requested.[127] A diary entry also has the mare arriving on the Friday 11 March 2005 (although in fact she arrived on 10 March) and the words "Lameness w/up Baree."[128] There was no good reason for Dr Vasey to not carry out a pre-purchase examination if asked to do so. Indeed, in terms of income for the practice it was more rewarding. On Mr Buckley's own account, he did not ask specifically for a pre-purchase examination - in fact, he told Dr Vasey that he had "just bought" the mare.
142 It follows that I am satisfied that Mr Buckley's request was properly interpreted by Dr Vasey as a request for a lameness examination and it was just that examination which he performed with the assistance of Dr Jalim and a veterinary nurse.
The admission to GVEH and the examinations carried out by Dr Vassey - around 11 March 2005
144 It is probable that he spoke to Ms Bertoli who completed part of the clinic's card relating to the mare.[131] The card refers to "Terry", presumably a reference to Mr Bolger whose mobile number is also recorded. The date of admission is 12.45 on 10 March with the owner being noted as "Sean Buckley, Baree Stud." As I noted before, the Client Problem Entry is recorded as "lameness exam".
145 Dr Vasey could not say whether he carried out the examination on 10 or 11 March 2005.[132] He was assisted by Dr Jalim and a veterinary nurse.
146 The worksheet, which was completed by Dr Jalim (the nurse led the horse), was developed by the clinic and sets out various grades of lameness as observed by the veterinarian in the course of the examination.[133] The degree of lameness is rated from 0 (being no lameness) to 5 (being particularly lame).
147 The first step of the work-up is what is described as a hoof test or examination which involves the use of a large set of pinchers which tests whether there is any pain in the feet. This test was negative.[134] Then the mare was trotted on hard and soft surfaces in different ways. On a soft surface, the mare displayed no lameness to the trot. On a hard surface, there may have been some subtle lameness.[135] Then when the mare was lunged on a hard surface there were findings of lameness of two out of five when lunged to the left and 1.5 out of 5 when lunged to the right[136] - each in relation to the left foreleg. There was no right leg lameness when lunged.[137]
148 A series of nerve blocks were then carried out by Dr Vasey which confirmed that the problems with the mare were confined to her front feet - there being some evidence of lameness in the right foot as well during the nerve block examination.[138]
149 At the conclusion of the nerve blocks, having localised the problem to the front feet, x-rays were taken of the lower limb.[139] As I followed Dr Vasey's evidence, the x-rays, taken on the afternoon of 11 March 2005, were regarded as not definitive of any overt sign of navicular disease - similar to the view taken by Dr Fulton of the x-rays he had taken during late 2004.
150 The end result was that after the various clinical and radiological tests (taking between 2-3 hours) Dr Vasey could not make a definitive diagnosis of a navicular condition or navicular disease. Rather his diagnosis was generalised in that the mare "had some feet issues" and needed corrective shoeing and use of the water walker.[140] The recommendation as to treatment is contained in the GVEH records: "Corrective shoeing, water treadmill and re-assess".[141]
151 I accept the evidence of Dr Vasey and Dr Jalim as to the examination and I conclude that the whole work-up was completed by the afternoon of 11 March 2005.
Dr McKinnon's examination and certificate - 11 March 2005
• Please make sure that the horse is identified at least by name or breeding and owner's details if known
• It is important to include all clinical abnormalities encountered, not those you might consider a mortality risk - this is the barometer of the underwriter
• Record if the animal is under treatment for any condition or of any treatment or surgical procedure is anticipated
• Disclosure of history is the responsibility of the owner not the veterinarian.[144]
153 The evidence as to the carrying out of the examination comes solely from Dr McKinnon. There was no serious challenge to his description of the examination and I accept his account of the manner in which it was carried out and the completion of the certificate.
154 Dr McKinnon said that he was initially asked on 11 March 2005 to carry out a reproductive examination of the mare which he completed and recorded the results on the mortality insurance form - which was his practice.[145] For present purposes, it suffices to note that the reproductive examination demonstrated no abnormality in terms of breeding.
155 Dr McKinnon said that, after carrying out the reproductive examination, he had been asked by the veterinary nurse, Ms Barry, to carry out an examination[146] for the purposes of a mortality insurance certificate. This is, as I have mentioned, a basic examination for which a modest fee is charged.
156 The examination took place in the late afternoon. To determine the mare's level of lameness (if any) Dr McKinnon had her taken out into the car park area which has a gravel to dirt to sand surface.[147] He asked the nurse to walk the mare away and then to trot the mare away from him. His observations as to lameness were as follows:
The horse was fine relative to lameness. I didn't see - I mean typically one evaluating a lame horse looks for head carriage, like nodding of the head which indicates one leg to be more sore than another leg or to have pain associated with that leg and I did not detect any abnormalities in head carriage and lameness.[148]
157 The insurance certificate, signed by Dr McKinnon, identifies the mare and the time of the examination as 4.30pm. It is clearly labelled "CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION FOR MORTALITY INSURANCE PURPOSES". It then has a series of questions, all of which relate to a physical examination of the horse. The two relevant matters within the certificate are as follows:
Any physical evidence of laminitis---No
Is the horse lame at the walk or trot?---No
The form also contains a mistake - Dr McKinnon ticked the box which stated the "practice occasionally attended the horse."[149] It had not prior to its admission on 10 March 2005.
158 The following statement on the form just above Dr McKinnon's signature reads: "I have today performed a clinical examination on this horse in accordance with the AEVA insurance guidelines and accept as noted above that to the best of my knowledge and belief the horse is clinically normal and in a satisfactory condition".
159 Dr McKinnon did not have any history relevant to the mare's prior condition nor did he have the clinical records of GVEH. He had no knowledge of the lameness examination carried out by Dr Vasey.[150] He knew nothing of any navicular condition.[151] Dr McKinnon did not speak to either Mr Buckley, Mr Bolger, or anyone associated with the mare in the past. Dr McKinnon was unable to say what had happened with the certificate subsequent to him completing it.[152]
The circumstances surrounding Mr Buckley signing the agreement on behalf of Ultra on 11 March 2005
160 Both Mr Ladhams and Mr Guy had signed the agreement on 8 March 2005 with the mare being collected two days later on 10 March and taken to the GVEH.
161 When Newmarket wrote to Ultra on 9 March 2005 confirming cover, it stipulated the condition that "cover is subject to a current veterinary certificate stating the mare is fit and health for mortality insurance purposes."[153]
162 On the early afternoon of 11 March 2005, Ultra confirmed with Newmarket that GVEH was writing up the certificate and would send it that afternoon.[154] It was forwarded around 5.00pm to Ultra.[155] At 5.17pm (according to the fax header), Ultra sent the insurance certificate by facsimile to Newmarket.[156]
163 Mr Buckley said he did not see the insurance certificate until it was faxed to him at about 7.00pm or 7.30pm. According to Mr Buckley, "I thought the certificate satisfied what I was after, that I had asked Dr Vasey for. It covers reproduction and it covers lameness".[157]
164 In the late afternoon or early evening, Mr Guy took the agreement to Mr Buckley at his apartment in Southbank, Melbourne. Mr Buckley signed it and dated it 8 March and instructed Mr Guy to take the Ultra cheque for $250,000 to Mr Ladhams. Mr Buckley also gave Mr Guy his own cheque for $16,500. However, both Mr Buckley and Mr Guy were agreed that the cheques were not to be utilised until veterinary clearance was given.[158]
165 Turning now to the differing accounts I mentioned earlier as to advice received from GVEH and/or Dr Vasey that evening. In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Buckley said he received a phone call from GVEH:
I had a 30 to 35 second phone call from somebody there, either McKinnon or Vassey. It was a frantic call saying that the horse had passed the vet on reproduction and lameness. It was clear to go and they would fax me the certificate for insurance purposes that afternoon which came in at approximately 5 o'clock and once I got that certificate I rang Mr Guy and said "Paul, we've got the clearance from the vet. You can now give the cheque and the signed contract to Mr Ladhams".[159]
It was subsequently accepted by Mr Buckley that this conversation was between himself and Dr Vasey.
166 In other words the certificate gave the final tick for Ultra to proceed with the purchase. In my opinion, there are two immediate problems with this account, both of which are obvious. First, the certificate was a mortality insurance certificate which Ultra had been chasing and needed to provide to Newmarket. Second, it was absolutely clear that it did not come from Dr Vasey, who was the veterinarian who carried out the lameness examination and was the only expert Ultra relied upon.
167 Even more significantly, Dr Vasey's telephone records indicate that he returned a call from Mr Buckley at about 7.05pm on 11 March 2005.[160] On his account, that evening he told Mr Buckley that there were:
...some feet issues with the horse. My suggestion was for him to firstly get shoes on the horse and to try some corrective shoeing and he has a water-walker and a treadmill sort of situation. That wasn't going to put any pressure on the horse's feet. He could continue with the horse in the water-walker, correctively shoeing it and then reassess it at a later date.[161]
169 Mr Guy said that during the course of the meeting at Mr Buckley's apartment Mr Buckley placed a call to the GVEH to see whether the assessment had been concluded.[164] As Mr Guy made his way home Mr Buckley rang him and according to Mr Guy said as follows:
He rang me and told me that he had spoken to the vets and they had given the horse the all clear and I was right to go and give the cheque to Mr Ladhams and pay for the horse... and the vet had said he could proceed with the sale.[165]
170 In cross-examination, Mr Guy added that Mr Buckley had told him that the sale was right to proceed and that they were:
...going to produce a written veterinary certificate for him or written veterinary report for him when it was convenient for them but we were right to proceed with the sale. The horse had come through the examination pretty well.[166]
171 Mr Coleman also said that Mr Buckley had rung him and said he had been advised by Dr Vasey that the mare "had passed the vet".[167]
172 Dr Vasey spoke to Mr Buckley again on the Saturday 12 March 2005. The entry in the phone log at GVEH reads as follows:
Jim please call Sean Buckley regarding lame horse.[168]
173 Dr Vasey and Mr Buckley both agreed there was a further conversation on Saturday 12 March 2005. Mr Buckley's recollection of the conversation was as follows:
I don't know who examined the horse but when I spoke to him [Dr Vasey] on Saturday morning he said "All good full steam ahead. That's fine. Pick up the horse on Monday" ... "It needs some corrective shoeing. I might get the farrier to look at the horse this weekend and do a bit of shoeing on it".[169]
174 Mr Buckley went on to say that "if I had heard anything wrong with this horse I would have cancelled the sale and like I said, bought another horse."[170]
175 However, Dr Vasey described the conversation as simply being along the same lines as the night before, no question of full steam ahead, rather a guarded recommendation about how to progress with the mare, including corrective shoeing.
176 According to Mr Guy, on that same day he had a further conversation with Mr Buckley who told him more about the veterinary examination; that the x-ray changes in the feet were minor and that there was no real issue and that what was needed was some corrective shoeing;[171] then there was a further discussion about her soundness as a broodmare and any potential for her racing career.[172]
177 Mr Guy's recollection of the Friday night conversation tallies with the phone message being left for Dr Vasey at 7.05pm and returned by Dr Vasey shortly afterward. The mention of corrective shoeing in the Saturday meeting discussion accords with the advice given by Dr Vasey to Mr Buckley.
178 There are three good reasons to reject Mr Buckley's account of this conversation and to accept that of Dr Vasey. First, there is no possible motive for Dr Vasey to have given the account which Mr Buckley insists that he received - i.e. a clean bill of health for the mare. Second, I think it inconceivable that Dr Vasey could have used words such as "all good-full steam ahead" when his own tests both with and without nerve blocks, showed signs of lameness in both feet. Third, on Mr Guy's account of the Saturday discussion, the question of foot issues and corrective shoeing had been raised by Dr Vasey.
179 I accept Dr Vasey's evidence on the substance of these discussions and reject Mr Buckley's account as being inherently improbable. In other words, I accept Dr Vasey's advice that he alerted Mr Buckley to the fact there were foot issues with the mare which needed attention and re-assessment.
180 I am satisfied that Mr Buckley was waiting for advice from Dr Vasey that the mare had passed a veterinary examination. I am inclined to the view that, notwithstanding what was said by Dr Vasey, Mr Buckley, as evidenced by his conversations with Mr Guy and Mr Coleman, perceived that the mare had received a veterinary clearance. I think that the explanation for this apparent conflict is that at the time Mr Buckley was primarily interested in breeding from the mare and that a return to racing was a distant hope. As far as breeding was concerned, the mare was a satisfactory prospect, given his discussion with Dr Vasey.
The mare's condition between 14 March and 30 March 2005
181 The mare was returned to Baree on 14 March 2005, but within a couple of days Mr Bolger (who was responsible for her care during this time) noticed that she was lame. He contacted Mr Buckley.[173]
Dr Vasey's discussions with Mr Buckley between 14 March and 30 March 2005
184 The mare was returned to Baree on 14 March 2005 and, according to Mr Buckley, within several days Mr Bolger told him that the mare was lame. Mr Bolger also told him that the mare was to be treated, on Dr Vasey's instructions, with phenylbutazone.[178]
185 Mr Buckley said that a couple of days later he rang Dr Vasey who suggested they take a blood sample from the mare. Dr Vasey disputes that he gave such advice - all that seems clear is that a blood sample of the mare was analysed by Dr Brain's clinic.[179]
186 Then on 24 March 2005, there was a conversation between the two. Mr Buckley's account is, according to Dr Vasey, a fabrication. According to Mr Buckley it was in the following terms:
Look we are not tracking too well here, what do you think is going on?", and he said to me he made some enquiries behind the scenes and that he had a colleague who worked at the treating vet where Sound Action used to be treated and that he had discussed the case with this particular colleague/associate, he didn't say who the person was, and that this horse had a very bad history of navicular disease and had been treated for that problem and I said to him, "Well are you sure about this?" and he said, "Well I've discussed it, we are not supposed to do this but on the cutesy [sic] I've done it. I've found out what's going on, I want to book this horse in next week. I want to do a neurectomy on this horse" and I said to him "Why would you want to do that? What is it?" and he explained to me what a neurectomy was and I said to him, "This is a bit radical isn't it?" and he said, "No, I've done a few of them over the time of my history, I've had a good success rate" and he said, "According to my colleague/associate or associate who works there the head vet has already recommended to Pat Ladhams that the horse should have a neurectomy" prior to me buying it and I had said to Vassey I said "How the hell". I got a bit angry with him, I said, "How the hell have I bought a horse in your vet report that I've now got to do this for it, this is crazy stuff" and he said, "I think you've been duped by the vendor".[180]
Did you ask him about how that might have been?"
ANSWER: Yes. He said to me the horse wasn't lame when they tested it and the only way it could have gone through and passed the lameness test would have been, it would have been on a medium to longer acting painkiller that would delay pain receptors for four or five days and I didn't even know what that would be but that's what he said.
COUNSEL: Did he make any mention to you in the course of the conversation about the implications for future racing of Sound Action?
ANSWER: Yes he said to me that, "if we do this operation and save the horse you can't race the horse anymore because it is against the rules of racing to race a horse that's had its nerve endings severed to stop the pain" because they can't feel their feet when they hit the ground.[181]
187 Dr Vasey denied point blank that a conversation of this sort ever took place. In particular, he denied ever making any statement referable to the mare's past condition or any discussions with a veterinary surgeon who had treated the mare in the past.[182] He denied recommending the neurectomy, although he accepted he eventually performed the procedure but as he put it, on Mr Buckley's instructions.[183] He agreed that he had a number of conversations with Mr Buckley during this period (as evidenced by the telephone records of the Clinic) but none were in the terms asserted by Mr Buckley.
188 I have no hesitation in accepting Dr Vasey's denial and Mr Buckley's account of this discussion as a fabrication for the following reasons. First, the only possible source of information of a veterinary nature could have been Dr Fulton, the treating veterinarian between August 2004 and February 2005, who diagnosed the navicular condition. Both he and Dr Vasey swore that there was no contact between them in March 2005 concerning the previous condition of Sound Action.[184] I have no reason to disbelieve Dr Fulton. Once Dr Fulton's account is accepted, Dr Vasey's account is corroborated and the version put forward by Mr Buckley cannot be accepted.
189 Second, on Mr Buckley's account, he was told by Dr Vasey that the previous veterinarian (presumably Dr Fulton) had not only diagnosed a "very bad history" of navicular problem but had also advised that the horse needed a neurectomy. Although Dr Fulton agreed that he had discussed a neurectomy with Mr Ladhams and Ms Maguire, he did not ever recommend such a procedure.[185] Nor as I follow his evidence, did he regard her as suffering from a "very bad" navicular condition; rather, the bone scan did not show any significant involvement of the navicular bones, although he diagnosed navicular syndrome.[186] He perceived that the mare's problems with the hooves were a combination of a number of factors including navicular syndrome, as well as a thin hoof wall and less than ideal farrier attention.[187] This tallies with Dr Vasey's diagnosis of front feet issues but no definitive navicular bone abnormalities.
190 Third, it is close to absurd to think that Dr Vasey would recommend a neurectomy without inspecting the mare to determine her clinical condition subsequent to her discharge from GVEH. On Mr Buckley's account he proposed the operation over the telephone, notwithstanding that when the mare left the clinic she was in a good condition. Although his work-up demonstrated lameness at the lunge it was not significant and his advice was confined to the corrective shoeing and water-walking. Dr Vanner, the expert witness called on behalf of Ultra, produced an extract from Abrah and Stick, Equine Surgery, edition 3. In relation to a digital neurectomy, it reads as follows:
A thorough clinical examination and proper case selection are critical.[188]
In my opinion it is implausible that Dr Vasey would, in effect, out of the blue and over the telephone, have recommended an operation (with its attendant risks and consequences) without examining the mare - particularly as he had not adverted to this possibility in his previous advice to Mr Buckley. True it is that Dr Vasey ultimately performed the neurectomy but he did so only as a result of Mr Buckley's insistence that he carry out the procedure. Moreover, Dr Vasey's evidence on this and other issues stood up to intensive cross-examination. I accept that it was Mr Buckley who directed Dr Vasey to carry out the operation which he was prepared to do - after examining the mare at GVEH on 30 March 2005.
191 Fourth, I do not accept Mr Buckley's protestation that he was, in effect, a babe in the woods in relation to veterinary matters. I do not accept the evidence of either Mr Coleman or Mr George (his fellow directors) on this account. As the evidence reveals, within weeks of the carrying out of the neurectomy Mr Buckley was in touch with other veterinary surgeons and eventually contacted Dr Redden in Kentucky arranging for him to perform radical surgery.
192 Finally, it is quite implausible that Mr Buckley, having been told by Dr Vasey that he had been duped by Mr Ladhams, would not have done something about it. If this scenario is to be accepted, one could readily have expected Mr Buckley, or one of his lawyers (he said he had four solicitors working for him) to be on the phone immediately to Mr Ladhams demanding to know what was going on and telling him that he had been "duped". Alternatively, following up with Dr Vasey and perhaps Dr Fulton, about the specifics of Mr Ladhams' conduct. He did none of these things. I reject outright his explanation that he was concerned about the mare's welfare at the time.[189] He had just paid $250,000 for the mare plus commission, and given the sums involved, the idea that a person of Mr Buckley's business acumen would sit by mute is not credible.
194 In summary, the version proffered by Mr Buckley of this conversation must be rejected. Rather, I accept Dr Vasey's account that nothing was said about the mare's history or prior veterinary treatment and it was Mr Buckley who directed that the neurectomy be carried out. Dr Vasey, at the end of the day, simply carried out the instructions of the owner of the mare.
195 On 31 March, the day after the mare had been admitted for the neurectomy, Mr Buckley received out of the blue a facsimile of another mortality insurance certificate relating to Sound Action.[192] It was forwarded from GVEH and signed by Dr Alison Arnott. It was numbered 84720 and dated 11 March 2005 with a time of 4.30pm. To the question "Is the horse lame to the walk or trot?" the answer "Yes" was given, as opposed to that in the insurance certificate to which Dr McKinnon had answered no. To the question "Please give your opinion as the significance of any abnormalities mentioned above" the following answer was given:
History of bilateral front foot pain not a mortality issue.[193]
196 Notwithstanding that the certificate was dated 11 March 2005, it was established, in effect beyond reasonable doubt, that it was completed on or around 31 March 2005. The copy of the certificate when examined from the rear had the date "31-3-05" which appeared to have been whited out and replaced by the earlier date. In addition, the booklet of AEVA certificates of examination for mortality insurance purposes was tendered.[194] It bore Dr Arnott's name and the entry for Sound Action and the date of the entry of Sound Action is located (the book being in chronological order) between an entry of 17 March and 1 April 2005 (numbers 84719 and 84721 respectively).
197 Dr Arnott was not called by Dr McKinnon. Both Dr McKinnon and Dr Vasey swore that they knew nothing of the preparation, completion or forwarding of the Arnott certificate. Dr McKinnon had made extensive inquiries and was cross-examined at length about the provenance of the certificate.
198 Dr McKinnon was a believable witness on this mysterious issue (or perhaps suspicious as suggested by Ultra). However, it is surprising that there is not an explanation for the provision of this certificate. It is also surprising that Dr Arnott was not called by Dr McKinnon - even he thought this would "be a lot easier".[195] Nevertheless, I am satisfied (particularly given that Dr McKinnon was subject to an extensive cross-examination on this issue) that he was telling the truth when he denied any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the provision of the certificate.
199 I am satisfied that Ultra received the certificate on 31 March 2005. I am also satisfied that the certificate was completed by Dr Arnott on or around that date. For the purpose of a Jones v Dunkel inference (which I shall deal with later) I am also satisfied that Dr Arnott was available to give evidence and could fairly be described as being in Dr McKinnon's camp - the evidence being that she was, in March 2005, a veterinarian employed by GVEH although now conducting her own practice at Wangaratta.[196]
200 The mare was bought back from Baree by Mr Bolger to GVEH on 29 March 2005. She had become increasingly lame. The operation was carried out on 30 March 2005 by Dr Vassey. The nerves in both front feet were resected.[197] The mare was kept boxed and treated with phenylbutazone whilst at GVEH.[198]
201 During the next five weeks she was managed at Baree by Mr Bolger who noted that when the mare returned, her feet were bandaged and for a while she was in a reasonable condition. However, according to Mr Bolger, after "one to three weeks", it was noted that there was a disgusting smell and pus in the bandages.
202 On 9 May 2005, the mare was returned to GVEH. Dr Vasey's evidence was as follows:
The right fore was okay until yesterday. Swollen pastern. The left fore was swollen for a few days. Abscess burst out the heel.[199]
203 The mare was kept at GVEH until 13 May 2005 and treated with antibiotics. Dr Vasey thought at this time that there was a possibility of getting on top of the problem although he could not identify the cause of the abscesses.
204 Upon her return, the mare's condition deteriorated dramatically during the following week and by the 20th she was in a terrible condition, described by Dr Vasey as follows:
She had discharge coming from her heels. The coronary band was separating and I remember picking up the near side foot and the pedal bone was there looking at me. The whole sole was necrotic, in other words dead lifting off and the pedal bone was there.[200]
206 According to Mr Buckley he spoke to a number of other veterinarians concerning alternatives to euthanasia.[204] He learnt of Dr Redden and then rang him and "checked him out". He had a history of treating horses with laminitis in both the United States and Australia. Indeed, he told Mr Buckley that if he could not fix the problem he could amputate the leg and put an artificial limb on the horse.
207 Dr Vasey counselled against Dr Redden's intervention and maintained that the mare should be euthanased.[205] Mr Buckley was not moved, with the end result being that Dr Redden came to Australia and operated on the mare at GVEH on 23 May 2005.
208 Although Dr Vasey assisted in the operation he maintained his position that the mare should be put down and in Mr Buckley's words "just put it out of its misery".[206] Given my impression of Mr Buckley as a forceful single minded businessman and bearing in mind what happened subsequently, I have no hesitation in accepting Dr Vasey's assessment of Mr Buckley's instructions on this point: "You've got to fix it".[207]
209 The surgery performed by Dr Redden was radical. The mare was put in a transfixation cast with holes drilled through the cannon bone for the insertion of the pins in each leg. The whole hoof capsule was then removed so as to leave some necrotic tissue and felt boot placed over the hoof. It was then bandaged and then both legs put in what was described as a transfixation cast, made of fibreglass and fixed by the pins.[208]
210 The concept behind this extraordinary surgery is that the pins are incorporated in the cast thus taking the weight off the feet with the hope that the coronary band and the hoof will grow back over a six to nine month period. As Dr Vasey explained, the immobility is:
horrific for the horse. You can see this is not what we would do and I in no way instigated it but I did not thwart him in doing that. I was happy to learn from this guy but really, it wasn't particularly nice to see what was happening to the horse and knowing that the horse was going to have a long protracted recovery that may or may not have a very good prognosis.[209]
211 Dr Vasey estimated that the rates of success of such an operation were in the region of 2% and that Dr Redden was "clutching at straws to save the mare".[210]
212 The mare was discharged on 24 May 2005 from GVEH back to Baree.
213 On 28 May 2005, when seen by Dr Williams from Dr Brain's practice, the mare was noted to be dehydrated.[211]
214 Dr Brain first saw the mare on 2 June.[212] At that time, the blood count was indicative of a fairly acute infection. The mare was in a very poor state during the first two weeks in June: She was distressed, she had low heart rate and she was struggling to stand and lie down. Mr Buckley again got in touch with Dr Redden who said that he would return to Australia and either clear up the problem or amputate.[213] Dr Redden recommended the removal of the pins which had been inserted through the two cannon bones.
215 No thought seems to have been given, even at this stage, to euthanasing the mare.
216 On 18 June 2005, as she was being prepared for the operation, the mare's breathing became erratic after being given an anaesthetic and within 15 minutes, she died.[214]
217 A preliminary point relates to Mr Guy's relationship with Ultra; although given my other conclusions the issue falls away, I should, however, deal with it briefly now.
218 In both the draft agreement and the agreement, Heritage, Mr Guy's company, is described as an "agent".
219 Of course it may be that the nomenclature "agent" within the agreement does not coincide with the legal definition of an agent. However the following factors all point to Mr Guy (through Heritage) acting as agent for Mr Buckley:
(a) he carried out the inspection of the mare and engaged in discussions with Mr Ladhams on behalf of Mr Buckley, having received his instructions to investigate the prospect of purchasing the mare;[215]
(b) he reported back to Mr Buckley in relation to the condition of the mare and the progress of negotiations;[216]
(c) he had authority from Mr Buckley to discuss the terms of the deal with Mr Ladhams and did so;[217]
(d) he drew up the sale agreement in order to further Mr Buckley's interests in the purchase of the mare;[218]
(e) he negotiated the deal with Mr Ladhams;[219]
(f) he arranged the meeting at Oaklands;[220]
(g) his commission was paid by Ultra;[221]
(h) he enabled Mr Guy to hold the cheques for both himself and Mr Ladhams awaiting further instructions[222] which were ultimately given; and
220 Against this, Mr Buckley maintains that Mr Guy was not his agent. He says that Mr Guy was, in effect, a facilitator of a deal, notwithstanding his description in the agreement. To reinforce this proposition, he asserts that a fellow director, Mr George, disliked Mr Guy and that he would have been "too scared" to raise the appointment of Mr Guy with Mr George.[223] Mr Coleman, another director, confirmed that this was Mr George's opinion and that it was well known.
221 The evidence of Messrs George and Coleman is not persuasive. If Mr George's view was so negative then Mr Buckley would have had nothing to do with Mr Guy. Moreover, Mr Buckley was the controller of the stud enterprise - it was he who had all the dealings concerning the mare and with Dr Vasey. He was his own man.
222 In my opinion, Mr Buckley was prepared to distance himself as much as he could from Mr Guy and any negotiations or discussions that Mr Guy may have had on his behalf with Mr Ladhams. This is demonstrated by an answer given by Mr Buckley to interrogatory 1:
Q. Prior to the execution of the sale agreement on or about 8 March 2005 as referred to in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim, did the plaintiff or any and if so what person on its behalf engage, retain or arrange for Heritage Bloodstock Pty Ltd and/or Paul Guy to:
(a) converse with
(b) make enquiries of
(c) negotiate with;
the second defendant or any and if so what person on his behalf concerning the proposed purchase of Sound Action
The answer was wrong or, to use Mr Buckley's words "totally inconsistent"[224] with the facts as he knew them to be. At the very least he had engaged Mr Guy to converse with and make enquiries of and negotiate concerning the proposed purchase of Sound Action.
223 Often answers to interrogatories can be taken out of context and may mean little in the general scheme of things. Here, this answer is a little more important. Mr Buckley is a highly successful businessman who at this time was setting up a large breeding enterprise. He had to know what the question was directed to and determined to answer it as he did. In my view, this was directed to him distancing himself from any relationship with Mr Guy which might ultimately be adverse to his case.
224 It may be that a "bloodstock agent" is an appropriate generic definition of Mr Guy's trade, however I reject Mr Buckley's explanation that the reference to agent in the agreement meant that he was simply a bloodstock agent who had been involved with procuring a deal.[225]
225 In Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Schmidt,[226] I set out my understanding of the principles of agency generally and particularly in drawing an implication that such a relationship exists given the conduct of one party in relation to another. It is not necessary to repeat these propositions other than to clarify the two core elements of the relationship: (a) the consent of both principal and agent and (b) the authority given to the agent to act on the principal's behalf.
226 The matters I have identified at [219] all point to Mr Guy being the agent of Ultra. I am prepared to infer that there was a consensual relationship between both Ultra and Mr Guy that Mr Guy act on its behalf in relation to the purchase of the mare. I am also satisfied that Mr Guy was acting with Mr Buckley's authority and subject to his control and direction on behalf of Ultra.
The claim against Mr Ladhams for misleading and deceptive conduct
227 At the relevant time, s 9(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic)[227] provides:
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
Section 9(2) then provides that nothing in the provision is to be taken as limiting by implication the generality of s 9(1). Section 9(1) of the Fair Trading Act was modelled on s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Although the two laws are not identical, in the construction and application of the provisions of s 9 there is often recourse to decisions concerning the application of s 52.[228]
228 The analysis of whether or not conduct is misleading or deceptive "must begin by identifying the conduct and the facts relied on to give it that character".[229]
229 In Lord Buddha Pty Ltd v Harpur,[230] Robson J said of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act:
For conduct to be misleading or deceptive, it is not necessary that it convey an express or implied representation. It is sufficient that the conduct leads or is likely to lead another party into error. In this case, however, Mr Harpur has relied on precise representations. Whether or not conduct amounts to a representation is a question of fact to be decided by considering what was said and done against the background of all surrounding circumstances. In order for conduct to contravene s 52, it is not necessary for the conduct to be the sole cause of a person being misled or deceived. Recovery under s 52 is.
'...founded by the applicant's actual reliance upon the misleading or deceptive conduct of the respondent although that conduct was not the only factor in the applicant's decision to enter a particular agreement, and although the applicant did not seek to verify the representation or did so inadequately and so failed to discover their falsity.'[231]
Whether or not a statement is false and misleading depends upon its text and its context. It will not be helpful to analyse words, phrases, sentences or passages without reference to the context in which they appear. It may be the text taken as a whole which reveals statements to be false and misleading in its context where an individual consideration of each sentence of a statement separately may show each to be true and accurate.[233]
The task in the context of s 9(1) of the Fair Trading Act, however, is not for the Court to sit in judgment of competing theories however wrong one may appear to be by reference to the other. The task is to ask more particularly whether the representations are false and misleading in the text and in the context in which they appear.[234]
231 Counsel for Dr McKinnon drew my attention to what was said by Fox J in Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd: [235]
but the question is not simply whether they (or he) were (or was) misled, whether the conduct was misleading or deceptive is a matter for the court... doubtless the audience to be considered can be classified as consumers.[236]
In other words, in looking at the conduct of either Mr Ladhams or Dr McKinnon, it is the actual conduct that is to be examined and determine whether, objectively (but bearing in mind the potential audience), the representation is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.
232 Counsel for Mr Ladhams argued that his alleged conduct (the representation at Oaklands on 4 March) was not made in the course of trade or commerce.
233 In Re Ku-Ring-Gai Co-Operative Building Society (No 12) Ltd[237], Deane J said:
The terms "trade" and "commerce" are not terms of art. They are expressions of fact and terms of common knowledge. While the particular instances that may fall within them will depend upon the varying phases of development of trade, commerce and commercial communication, the terms are clearly of the widest Import... They are not restricted to dealings or communications which can properly be described as being at arm's length in the sense that they are within open markets or between strangers or have a dominant objective of profit-making. They are apt to include commercial or business dealings in finance between a company and its members which are not within the mainstream of ordinary commercial activities and which, while being commercial in character, are marked by a degree of altruism which is not compatible with a dominant objective of profit-making...[238]
234 Then in the leading case on this point, the High Court decision of Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson,[239] the Court said of s 52:
What the section is concerned with is the conduct of a corporation towards persons, be they consumers or not, with whom it (or those whose interests it represents or is seeking to promote) has or may have dealings in the course of those activities or transactions which, of their nature, bear a trading or commercial character. Such conduct includes, of course, promotional activities in relation to, or for the purposes of, the supply of goods or services to actual or potential consumers, be they identified persons or merely an unidentifiable section of the public. In some areas, the dividing line between what is and what is not conduct in "trade or commerce" may be less clear and may require and identification of what imports a trading or commercial character to an activity which is not, without more, of that character.[240]
Therefore, in my opinion, if misleading or deceptive conduct occurs in the course of carrying on an activity or carrying out a transaction of trading or commercial character, the test imported by the phrase "in trade or commerce" is satisfied.[241]
235 Recently, Dixon J in this Court said in Alabakis v Boyd[242] of the expression "in trade or commerce":
The expression operates to limit the extent of the proscription of conduct by the section. It refers only to conduct with the character of an aspect or element of trading or commercial activities or transactions. While in most cases the focus will be on the nature of the business of the party making the representation, the terms of each Act are not so limited and in particular, do not refer to the trade or commerce of any particular corporation. Statements made by a person who is not engaged in trade or commerce may answer the statutory expression if, for example, the statements are designed to encourage others to invest, or to continue investments, in a particular trading entity [243](Emphasis added).
236 Mr Ladhams, in his affidavit, deposed to the fact that Sound Action was the fourth racehorse he had owned and that since her success, he had purchased several more horses to race with his family. He said that he had never engaged in racehorses as a business and did not race the mare or any other horse as part of a business. This was confirmed by his son, Mr Chris Ladhams. [244]
237 The test of whether someone is acting in trade or commerce in a particular transaction cannot be determined by solely looking at whether the person whose conduct is impugned carries on a particular business or, alternatively, is solely involved in a pastime or hobby. The question has to be answered by looking at the conduct in question and determining whether it has commercial or trading characteristics.
238 Here, counsel for Mr Ladhams contended that this sale was akin to that of a second hand car by a long-time private owner. But the focus must be on the actual conduct itself - in this case it was said to be the representation made by Mr Ladhams prior to the signing of the agreement. Although it can be readily acknowledged that Mr Ladhams was not in the business of buying and selling horses, that does not mean that the alleged conduct did not occur in the course of trade or commerce. The discussion at Oaklands took place as part of finalising the deal between Mr Ladhams and Ultra. The arrangement that had already been reached was that in effect after the payment of $250,000 to Mr Ladhams, he and Ultra would, as far as the first two foals were concerned, be in a joint venture for their putative sales. A large cash sum was paid to secure Ultra's investment and the commercial arrangement between the two was to endure, if the mare survived, for at least three years.
239 In those circumstances, any representations made by Mr Ladhams at Oaklands were of a patently commercial nature and consequently, engage the operation of s 9.
Was Mr Ladham's conduct misleading or deceptive?
240 Ultra's case was confined to the discussion at Oaklands between Mr Ladhams and Mr Buckley. It argues that there was an implied representation by Mr Ladhams that the mare was sound in all respects - namely for racing and breeding.
241 For reasons which I have set out at [113] to [135], I am satisfied that contrary to Mr Buckley's assertion Mr Ladhams made no representation as to soundness of the mare but rather adverted to problems that she would face in the future if she was to be put back into training with a view to racing.
242 I should mention here a number of other matters which militate against the acceptance of Mr Buckley's account.
243 First, the representation alleged by Mr Buckley would, in effect, mean that Mr Ladhams was an outright liar. He knew that the mare had navicular disease. He knew based on her history over the past 12 months that the mare could not continue with her race program because of her foot condition but nevertheless on Mr Buckley's account he represented at least by implication that she was a racing proposition. Simply put, for the reasons I have set out previously, I do not accept this proposition.
244 Second, Mr Buckley is a highly experienced businessman with considerable acumen in commercial matters. I repeat my observations at [192]. If he had been, to use the vernacular, "dudded" by Mr Ladhams' representation one would have expected him to make that loudly and abundantly clear from the time he appreciated he had been wronged. He took no such action; indeed for the next three years he made no allegation or complaint whatsoever about Mr Ladhams' conduct, notwithstanding that he had some personal contact with him during that time and, more significantly, his solicitors had dealings with Mr Ladhams' solicitors. It was only when the claim against the underwriters was close to settlement that Mr Buckley turned the guns on Mr Ladhams and for that matter Dr McKinnon. This conduct, in my view, is totally incompatible with the assertion that is now made.
245 Third, the idea that Mr Ladhams could represent that the mare was sound in all respects (racing and breeding) is contrary to Mr Buckley's own well founded expectations. He agreed that he purchased the mare primarily as a breeding proposition[245] but had not "totally dismissed" her racing prospects. She was an unlikely racing proposition because of her lameness issues, as reflected by the agreement: should the mare "ever race".
246 Fourth, it is important to place the alleged representation in context. Ultra's interest, through Mr Guy, was stimulated by reports that Mr Ladhams was considering, after twelve months of trying to get her back to the racecourse, retiring the mare due to her chronic foot condition - hardly the scenario for a representation that she was a genuine racing proposition.
247 Finally, on this issue, I should say that there is real doubt as to whether the version proffered by Mr Buckley as to Mr Ladhams' statements could, in any event, amount to a representation that "the mare was sound for both racing and breeding", but I do not stay to consider this.
248 In summary, I do not accept that any part of the discussion between Mr Buckley and Mr Ladhams at Oaklands amounted to a representation that the mare "was sound in all respects". Mr Ladhams' conduct did not lead, and was not likely to lead, Mr Buckley into error. It was neither misleading nor deceptive.
Has Ultra demonstrated reliance upon the representation?
249 Given my findings as to the conversation at Oaklands it is not strictly necessary to deal with the question of relevance. However, I will do so briefly.
250 Ultra need only to prove that Mr Ladhams' conduct was a cause of it entering into the agreement.[246]
251 Ultra's case is that the representation by Mr Ladhams was relied upon by Ultra in executing the agreement. For the reasons I have set out, there was no reliance by Mr Buckley or Ultra upon anything said by Mr Ladhams. Mr Buckley knew her race record and the fact she had not raced for 12 months owing to hoof problems. He knew from the press that Mr Ladhams was contemplating retiring the mare owing to her infirmity. He knew of the mare's navicular condition. In my opinion he was determined to buy the mare, primarily as a breeding proposition, subject to her obtaining a veterinary clearance - as demonstrated by the agreement and subsequent discussions with Dr Vasey. Nothing said by Mr Ladhams had any effect upon that decision.
The claim against Dr McKinnon for misleading and deceptive conduct
252 Throughout the trial, counsel for Ultra endeavoured to enlarge the case against Dr McKinnon beyond not only what was pleaded but what was legally tenable. Ultra chose not to sue its expert consultant veterinarian, Dr Vasey; it also chose not to sue GVEH although its precise legal relationship with Drs Vasey and McKinnon was never established. The evidence of both Mr Buckley and Dr Vasey was crystal clear: Dr Vasey was the mare's treating veterinarian and the expert with whom Ultra maintained a relationship for the treatment of its bloodstock. This was reflected by the numerous phone calls and discussions between Dr Vasey and Messrs Buckley and Bolger, both preceding and subsequent to the first admission of the mare to GVEH during this period.
253 Both the written and oral submissions of counsel for Mr Buckley demonstrate the conflation of the roles of Dr Vasey, Dr McKinnon and GVEH. In oral argument, counsel submitted:
Those circumstances are fundamentally that Mr Buckley has retained a specialist vet to advise whether or not the horse is suitable to purchase as a breeding/racing proposition and he gets the certificate as confirmation that it is, and whether he'd be misled in those circumstances.[247]
254 In the written submissions, the following was said:
The plaintiff retained the third defendant's practice to examine or "clear for purchase" the mare in the context of the sale agreement. The agreement was to become null and void if the mare failed to pass the veterinary examination contemplated by it.[248] (Emphasis added)
255 In reality, Dr McKinnon was a bit player. His only involvement was to examine the mare and provide the insurance certificate. He charged a modest fee for this service. This must have been apparent to Ultra well before it joined Dr McKinnon (and not Dr Vasey) to this proceeding. The extent of any liability owed by Dr McKinnon to Ultra relates solely to that examination and the provision of the certificate on the evening of 11 March 2005 to Newmarket.
256 I do not accept, as was argued by Ultra, that Dr McKinnon's role should in some way be characterised as one of overall responsibility (in partnership with Dr Vasey) for all veterinary matters concerning the mare. His evidence, which I accept, was that he had limited involvement confined to the provision of the insurance certificate. It is in that context only that his liability under either s 9 of the Fair Trading Act or in negligence must be examined.
Was Dr McKinnon's conduct misleading or deceptive?
257 I adopt and apply the principles set out at [227]to [231] concerning the claim under s 9 of the Fair Trading Act against Mr Ladhams.
258 In my opinion, for the reasons I will now set out, it is not possible to accept the allegation made by Ultra that the insurance certificate amounts to a representation that the mare was sound for all purposes.
259 First, it was an accurate statement of the mare's condition based on Dr McKinnon's examination: the answer to the question "Is the horse lame at the walk or trot?"- "No" - was a correct and truthful answer on the basis on the limited examination carried out by Dr McKinnon. In this regard it was consistent with observations that had been made of the mare by Ms Maguire around 6 or 7 March 2005 when the mare left her stables, on the morning of 10 March by both Mr Guy and Mr Bolger who detected no sign of lameness, nor did Mr Bolger when he collected the mare from GVEH on 14 March.
260 It is true that on a more extensive work-up conducted by Dr Vasey lameness was elicited. But this was when the mare was lunged on a hard surface as part of the lameness workup. When the mare was trotted on a soft surface there was no indication of lameness. I am satisfied that on the limited examination Dr McKinnon's assessment was correct. The mortality insurance form did not ask or require a detailed evaluation of the mare's condition. His opinion as to her lameness (or more appropriately lack of it) was based on his observation of the mare in the car park. The form and its contents made it clear that this was a limited clinical examination directed towards the question of mortality insurance - not that of soundness for a racing or breeding career.
261 It was not necessary for expert evidence to demonstrate that lameness is not always noticeable, particularly when relatively subtle. This was clear from the evidence of Dr Vasey as to the lameness workup, which elicited apparent lameness and no lameness, depending upon the type of activity performed by the mare. Nonetheless, counsel for Dr McKinnon relied upon the evidence of Professor Kannegieter to the effect that that lameness is a variable condition and it may be difficult to determine on a simple and basic clinical examination.[249]
262 Second, the contents of the insurance certificate were not misleading as alleged by Ultra. It could not, on its face, convey a misleading impression that the mare was sound for all purposes including racing. This was not a certificate relating to the overall soundness of the mare. It was clearly headed "Certificate of Examination for Mortality Insurance Purposes". It was readily apparent that it was prepared for the use of an insurer not a prospective purchaser. It was not a certificate which on its face resulted from a sophisticated lameness examination or an even more detailed overall examination such as a pre-purchase report. It was exactly what it purported to be - a certificate relating to mortality insurance not the horse's overall soundness and certainly not one relating to the mare's capacity to race.
263 Whilst it is clear that the insurance certificate also contained the results of the reproductive examination, that does not assist Ultra's case. It merely demonstrates that there were various tasks carried out by different members of the practice. The real question relates to the insurance certificate itself and its relevance to lameness: Did the insurance certificate convey to Mr Buckley and Ultra in some way that the mare was a viable racing proposition, bearing in mind that Dr Vasey carried out the lameness examination?
264 It is of significance that Ultra had arranged mortality insurance of the mare for on 9 March 2005 and Newmarket had requested that it provide a insurance certificate. In the course of cross-examination, it became clear that Mr Buckley was able to distinguish between the various types of examination which were to be carried out at GVEH - namely, a lameness examination, a reproductive examination and the provision of an insurance certificate.[250] Ultra had arranged for an examination for this purpose to be carried out and it was forwarded late on the afternoon of 11 March to Newmarket. I am satisfied that Mr Buckley knew it was what it was represented to be - a certificate related to mortality insurance not racing soundness or, for that matter, "soundness in all respects."
265 I do not see any scope to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference adverse to Dr McKinnon concerning Dr Arnott's certificate and the failure to call her. It is curious, and arguably suspicious, that the Arnott certificate bears exactly the same date as the insurance certificate. But absent a positive finding that Dr McKinnon played a role in the preparation and forwarding of the Arnott certificate it cannot be used to fill a gap in the evidence or to bolster an inference which is not available on the evidence. Whilst one might speculate as to why the certificate was backdated and forwarded to Mr Buckley, that is not a basis upon which an inference can be drawn. If there was evidence that Dr McKinnon had in some way played a part in its preparation and provision to Ultra, then the failure to call Dr Arnott would, I think, have attracted Jones v Dunkel inferences. However, the case against Dr McKinnon cannot be dealt with on suspicion. Absent evidence linking Dr McKinnon to the certificate, it is speculation to inculpate Dr McKinnon as playing a part in its preparation and dispatch. He denied any knowledge of it until he was appraised of its existence relatively recently. I accept his evidence on this issue and am not prepared to conclude that he took any role in its forwarding to Ultra. In these circumstances, the Arnott certificate, whilst mysterious, cannot be relied upon to advance the case against Dr McKinnon.
266 In summary the insurance certificate was neither misleading nor deceptive. There was no breach by Dr McKinnon of s 9 of the Fair Trading Act.
Has Ultra demonstrated reliance upon the insurance certificate?
267 As with the claim against Mr Ladhams, this point is moot, but I shall deal with it briefly.
268 It is, in my view, not possible to conclude that Mr Buckley relied upon the certificate in entering into the contract. First, as I have said, the certificate said nothing about the soundness of the mare for racing and merely related to mortality insurance. On its face, it is improbable that a purchase of a very expensive mare would involve reliance on such a document.
269 Second, and in my opinion critical in the context of Mr Buckley's decision to purchase the mare, was his discussion with Dr Vasey that late afternoon or evening.[251] It is not in issue that he had a conversation concerning the mare that evening prior to authorising Mr Guy to disperse the cheques. Dr Vasey was Mr Buckley's primary advisor;[252] he had no professional relationship with Dr McKinnon[253] and the insurance certificate was clearly signed by him not Dr Vasey. The reliance upon Dr Vasey is borne out by Mr Guy's description of the events of 11 and 12 March. Mr Buckley had rung Dr Vasey, not Dr McKinnon and it was Dr Vasey who returned the call. Mr Buckley told Mr Guy that he had "spoken" to the clinic when he authorised him to make payment to Mr Ladhams.[254]
270 As I have mentioned, subsequently Mr Buckley rang Mr Coleman, his fellow director, and said that he was advised by Dr Vasey that the mare had passed the veterinary examination.[255]
271 Evidence was adduced from Mr Buckley's two fellow directors, Mr Coleman and Mr George in relation to the necessity for a veterinary clearance before the sale proceeded. Each said[256] that they had insisted that Mr Buckley obtain a veterinary check of the mare. Mr Coleman specifically referred to the advice obtained from Dr Vasey.[257] This does not assist Ultra's case against Dr McKinnon, rather it reinforces the notion that Mr Buckley engaged Dr Vasey to carry out the lameness test and it was his advice that was relied upon in not terminating the agreement.
272 I am satisfied that it was the conversation with Dr Vasey that motivated Mr Buckley to continue with the purchase and to authorise Mr Guy to distribute the cheques.
273 Third, the insurance certificate was, as Mr Buckley acknowledged, "for insurance purposes."[258] Whilst I accept that the certificate was received by Mr Buckley that evening (it had already been sent to Ultra), it was merely part of the arrangements which had already been made to effect the insurance of the mare demonstrated by the dispatch of the certificate by facsimile that same evening to Newmarket.[259] It was, in effect, a discrete part of the multiple examinations carried out at GVEH.
275 Finally, the terms of the agreement itself. The agreement stipulated that Ultra would be entitled to, in effect, terminate the deal if the mare failed to pass a pre-purchase examination. The examination carried out by Dr McKinnon was not that type of examination. The examination that went the closest to the veterinary definition of a pre-purchase examination was the examination carried out by Dr Vasey, which was far more extensive and more thorough. The results of Dr Vasey's examination were communicated to Mr Buckley that evening.
276 In summary, I conclude that Mr Buckley did not rely upon the certificate. Rather, in the context of purchasing a broodmare with only a faint chance of returning to racing (the mare was, at best, an outside racing proposition), Mr Buckley relied upon Dr Vasey's advice. In reality, the mare was a breeding proposition, with a slight hope that she might race. Given her history (including navicular issues - of which Mr Buckley was aware) and Mr Buckley's acknowledged pessimism about her returning to racing, the idea that he was waiting for a written declaration that she was sound in all respects is untenable.
277 The question of the existence of a duty is to be determined by the application of common law principles.[262] Here the claim by Ultra is for pure economic loss. It is alleged that Dr McKinnon's negligence resulted in Ultra not terminating the agreement as it could and would have done pursuant to clause 6. Accordingly, any duty owed by Ultra will be determined by the application of the principles set out by the High Court in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd[263] as explained in subsequent decisions, such as Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd.[264]
278 The "salient features" relevant to the imposition of a duty of care for pure economic loss were recently summarised by Dixon J in Gunnersen v Henwood:[265]
Despite the different terminology used in each of the judgments in Perre v Apand, for the purposes of identifying a new or different principle applying in respect of negligence (other than misstatement) causing pure economic loss, there may be little practical difference between the members of the High Court in either methodology or end result. For my purposes, common themes emerge across all the tests suggested by each member of the Court, namely:
(a) Whether the loss was foreseeable;
(b) The relationship and connection between the plaintiff and the defendant, with attention to the particular connections between the parties, in determining the existence of a relationship of 'proximity' or 'neighbourhood';
(c) The defendant's actual foresight of the likelihood of harm;
(d) The defendant's knowledge of an ascertainable class of vulnerable persons;
(e) The control exercised by the defendant over the plaintiff's right, interest or expectation;
(f) The vulnerability of the plaintiff to the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's dependence upon the defendant; and
(g) The extent to which it was reasonably open to the plaintiff to take steps to protect themselves. [266]
279 In Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar,[267] the New South Wales Court of Appeal was required to consider whether a duty of care existed in relation to a wife who contracted malignant mesothelioma as a result of coming into contact with asbestos dust and fibres on her husband's work clothes in the family home and cars. This was said to be a novel case. After a comprehensive survey of the authorities, Allsop P (with whom Simpson J agreed), identified the relevant features of relationships which might give rise to a duty of care in a novel situation in the following way:
This rejection of any particular formula or methodology or test the application of which will yield an answer to the question whether there exists in any given circumstance a duty of care, and if so, its scope or content, has been accompanied by the identification of an approach to be used to assist in drawing the conclusion whether in novel circumstances the law imputes a duty and, if so, in identifying its scope or content. If the circumstances fall within an accepted category of duty, little or no difficulty arises. If, however, the posited duty is a novel one, the proper approach is to undertake a close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by references to the "salient features" or factors affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury.
(a) the foreseeability of harm;
(b) the nature of the harm alleged;
(c) the degree and nature of control able to be exercised by the defendant to avoid harm;
(d) the degree of vulnerability of the plaintiff to harm from the defendant's conduct, including the capacity and reasonable expectation of a plaintiff to take steps to protect itself;
(e) the degree of reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant;
(f) any assumption of responsibility by the defendant;
(g) the proximity or nearness in a physical, temporal or relational sense of the plaintiff to the defendant;
(h) the existence or otherwise of a category of relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff or a person closely connected with the plaintiff;
(i) the nature of the activity undertaken by the defendant;
(j) the nature or the degree of the hazard or danger liable to be caused by the defendant's conduct or the activity or substance controlled by the defendant;
(k) knowledge (either actual or constructive) by the defendant that the conduct will cause harm to the plaintiff;
(l) any potential indeterminacy of liability;
(m) the nature and consequences of any action that can be taken to avoid the harm to the plaintiff;
(n) the extent of imposition on the autonomy or freedom of individuals, including the right to pursue one's own interests;
(o) the existence of conflicting duties arising from other principles of law or statute;
(p) consistency with the terms, scope and purpose of any statute relevant to the existence of a duty; and
(q) the desirability of, and in some circumstances, need for conformance and coherence in the structure and fabric of the common law.
There is no suggestion in the cases that it is compulsory in any given case to make findings about all of these features. Nor should the list be seen as exhaustive. Rather, it provides a non-exhaustive universe of considerations of the kind relevant to the evaluative task of imputation of the duty and the identification of its scope and content.[268]
280 It is necessary to identify the nature of the duty owed at the outset so that questions of breach and causation can be appropriately considered.[269] However, the question of breach must be answered by reference to statute.[270] Ultra's claim (as well as Mr Ladhams' counterclaim in negligence) is covered by Part X of the Wrongs Act as it is a claim for damages resulting from negligence. The definition of harm, which is the central concept within the key provisions of the Part, is defined to include "economic loss".
48 General principles
(1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless -
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known); and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person's position would have taken those precautions.
(2) In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (amongst other relevant things) -
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
(a) insignificant risks include, but are not limited to, risks that are far-fetched or fanciful; and
(b) risks that are not insignificant are all risks other than insignificant risks and include, but are not limited to, significant risks.
49 Other principles
In a proceeding relating to liability for negligence -
(a) the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm includes the burden of taking precautions to avoid similar risks of harm for which the person may be responsible; and
(b) the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or affect liability for the way in which the thing was done; and
(c) the subsequent taking of action that would (had the action been taken earlier) have avoided a risk of harm does not of itself give rise to or affect liability in respect of the risk and does not of itself constitute an admission of liability in connection with the risk.
283 The first element of the three criteria stipulated by s 48 is foreseeability of the risk of harm. Garling J said:
In my opinion, the plaintiff must satisfy the Court that the defendant, at the date of the alleged negligence, knew of the alleged risk of harm, or else, by reference to other facts, matters and circumstances ought to have known it. Those other matters will vary from case to case but may include such things as the common knowledge and experience of others in the similar position of the defendant, public notoriety of a particular risk of harm, publications and academic knowledge which might be expected to be read by people in the defendant's position and the obviousness or the likelihood of the event happening when using common sense.[273]
284 The precise manner in which the loss or damage occurred does not need to be reasonably foreseeable. Rather, it is the nature of the particular harm which must be foreseeable.[274]
285 The next step for a plaintiff is to establish that the alleged risk of harm was "not insignificant". Again, returning to what was said by Garling J, "this must also be judged from the respect of a reasonable person in the defendant's position and in prospect not retrospect".[275] After a review of the authorities, his Honour concluded as follows:
I will now attempt to draw together this variety of sources to state what approach, in my opinion, is the appropriate one to interpreting the phrase "not insignificant":
(a) The assessment of the risk of harm is one made in prospect and not retrospect. Hindsight has no part to play;
(b) The phrase is of a higher order than the common law test, and this was intended to limit liability being imposed too easily;
(c) The phrase "not insignificant" is intended to refer to the probability of the occurrence of the risk;
(d) In the realm of tort law, the probability of an occurrence is both a quantitative measurement, which may, but does not necessarily reflect a statistical and numerical assessment, and also an evaluative measurement. The statutory phrase is a protean one which depends upon the context of facts, matters and circumstances for its meaning;
(e) Whether a risk is "not insignificant" must be judged from the defendant's perspective and must be judged on a broader base than a mere reductionist mathematical formula.[276]
286 In New South Wales, the Court of Appeal described the "not insignificant test" as being higher than that of the "far fetched and fanciful" common law, but "not by very much".[277]
287 The third element contained in ss 48(1)(c) and 48(2), requires an assessment of the response of a reasonable person to the perceived risk of harm. The s 48(2) list is non-exhaustive but must be taken into account[278] as must the matters contained in s 49 when examining the defendant's response as against that of a reasonable person in the defendant's position.
288 Part X also establishes the relevant test as to causation. Section 51 reads as follows:
General principles
(1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following elements -
(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (factual causation); and
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).
(2) In determining in an appropriate case, in accordance with established principles, whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm should be taken to establish factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.
(3) If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm (the injured person) would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent, the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances.
(4) For the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.
289 In Adeels Palace, the High Court said of the test imposed by s 51:
Next it is necessary to observe that the first of the two elements identified in s 5D(1) (Factual Causation) is determined by the "but for" test: but for the negligent act or omission, would the harm have occurred" It is not enough to show that the harm may or perhaps have been avoided, the test is more demanding. It is also necessary to ensure that the particular harm is identified with sufficient precision to enable a finding to be made as to whether the harm would have been avoided by an alternative response to that which occurred. [279]
290 At the outset, it is important to remember that the High Court has on a number of occasions reminded lower courts that it is necessary to identify with some precision the nature of the foreseeable risk in determining both the question of duty and breach at common law. (Section 48(1) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)[280] makes a similar requirement in relation to breach.) Identification of the risk enables a court to determine whether the risk is, indeed, foreseeable and then (if applicable) to identify the relevant considerations in relation to breach.
291 Dr McKinnon argued that in the circumstances surrounding the provision of the certificate, he owed no duty of care to Ultra. Part of his contention turned upon whether he should have had Ultra in contemplation at the time of preparation of the certificate and further that he had no knowledge that any act on his part would harm Ultra. In effect, the submission, when translated into negligence concepts, was that the risk of harm sustained by Ultra was not foreseeable.
292 This primary issue can be expressed this way: should Dr McKinnon have foreseen that Ultra would act on the contents of the insurance certificate in determining to proceed with the purchase of the mare (as opposed to exercising its option under clause 6 to declare the agreement null and void).
293 However, Dr McKinnon's relationship with Ultra was confined to the provision of the insurance certificate. He had no contact with Ultra or Mr Buckley. I accept that he had not been told anything concerning the lameness examination by Dr Vasey. He had not been told that the certificate had anything to do with the purchase of the mare. As far as he was concerned, the insurance certificate was solely for insurance purposes and designed to inform the underwriter as to whether the mare was a suitable risk, not for the owner to determine whether to terminate a potential agreement. Indeed, his belief was substantiated: upon Ultra receiving the certificate, it was forwarded to the underwriter. In my opinion, a reasonable veterinarian may well have foreseen that an underwriter would act on the certificate to its detriment, but not that the owner of the mare would rely upon the certificate in relation to her purchase (or, more relevantly here, to avoid the deal).
294 I do not accept Ultra's submission that Dr McKinnon had some overall responsibility to it in relation to the provision of a certificate relevant to the decision to proceed with the agreement. The evidence clearly discloses that it was Dr Vasey who took on the task of examining the mare for lameness. I accept Dr McKinnon's evidence that his task was particularly limited, namely a report for the purposes of the underwriter to determine whether the horse should be insured for mortality purposes.
295 Absent Dr McKinnon being alerted to the prospect of the insurance certificate being used in connection with the purchase of the mare, I do not see how he or a reasonable veterinarian in his position could have foreseen that it would be utilised for determining whether to purchase or not purchase the mare.
296 Without foreseeability of the alleged injury or harm, a duty of care cannot be established. However, in relation to the other considerations relevant to the imposition of a duty, the considerations cut both ways.
297 In favour of such a relationship is the fact that Ultra had a contractual relationship with Dr McKinnon and that there was no question of an indeterminancy of class - the only two recipients of the certificate were Ultra and Newmarket.
298 On the other hand, and in my opinion of greater significance, are the following matters: Dr McKinnon was not to know that any reliance was to be placed upon his opinion in relation to the purchase of the mare, nor did he have knowledge that his conduct would cause the type of harm alleged by Ultra. Ultra also had the benefit of Dr Vasey's advice as to the specific issue of the condition of the mare's feet.
299 Ultimately I am of the opinion that if the loss was foreseeable, then in these circumstances Dr McKinnon did not owe Ultra a duty of care.
300 Accepting for the moment that there was a duty of care, I am not satisfied that the criteria relevant to breach set out under s 48(1) and particularly s 48(1)(b) of the Wrongs Act are satisfied here.
301 The real point again is the nature of the examination which I have referred to on a number of occasions and need not repeat. The risk of Ultra relying on the certificate in relation to the purchase of the mare, if foreseeable, could not be said to be "not insignificant" as the sub-section requires. For the reasons I have already set out, a reasonable veterinarian in Dr McKinnon's position - dealing solely with a mortality insurance examination - could not have treated the risk of Ultra as acting on the certificate in relation to its rights under the agreement, as anything other than remote. Indeed, I doubt whether it would even pass the far less stringent Wyong Shire Council v Shirt[281] test.
302 Assuming against this conclusion that the foreseeability tests are satisfied, I would nonetheless have concluded that Dr McKinnon's conduct was that of a reasonable veterinarian in his position.
303 The first allegation of breach relates to Dr McKinnon's examination, i.e. that he should have detected that the mare was lame. I have dealt with this previously and repeat my conclusion that on the basis of the simple examination carried out by Dr McKinnon, that the mare did not demonstrate any sign of lameness. There was no lack of care given the nature of the examination and the purpose of the certificate.
304 I do not accept Ultra's contention that Dr McKinnon should have taken other steps to determine the extent of his retainer by Ultra. He was asked to perform a simple task: to report to the underwriters so that Ultra could obtain insurance cover for the mare. Neither Ultra nor Mr Buckley requested Dr McKinnon to do any more. As I have said repeatedly, the conflation of the roles of Dr Vasey and Dr McKinnon is simply not permissible in attributing fault.
305 Again, the submissions of counsel for Ultra demonstrate the conflation of the roles of the respective veterinary surgeons:
The fundamental point is that what his corporate practice was being asked to do was clear this horse for purchase.[282]
306 Returning to the allegation itself, there was a conflict in the opinions of the experts. Dr Vanner said that any test for insurance mortality purposes should include trotting the horse on a hard surface in a straight line and then lunging it in both directions.[283] Professor Kannegieter, however, opined that it was only necessary to trot and walk the horse in a straight line as Dr McKinnon had conducted the examination.[284]
307 Overall, I am inclined to accept Professor Kannegieter's view in light of both his expertise and the fact that this was a very basic examination directed to mortality insurance. I doubt whether it was necessary to do anymore than a simple test to elicit any noticeable signs of lameness in the context of the exercise. I should add, as was argued by counsel for Dr McKinnon, that if this be the case of two respectable competing opinions, then the provisions of ss 58 and 59 of Part X of the Wrongs Act are engaged. I accept that Dr McKinnon, in not lunging the mare on a hard surface, was acting in a manner "widely accepted in Australia by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field" as demonstrated by Professor Kannegieter's evidence. Therefore, this was not negligent.[285]
308 The second allegation of breach is that Dr McKinnon had not done anything to ascertain the previous history of the mare prior to completing the insurance certificate. It was accepted that he made no inquiries of the previous owner, the treating veterinarian and had no clinical records from either his own clinic or that of Dr Fulton. Again, at the risk of being repetitive, this criticism seems to me to ignore the very nature of the examination that was carried out, to whom it was addressed and its purpose, all directed towards the question of mortality insurance, not the questions of whether Ultra should purchase the mare nor her fitness for racing.
310 Dr Vanner also accepted that on an insurance certificate examination, if the horse was not seen to be lame to the walk or trot and no history of lameness was known to the veterinarian, then it was appropriate for the answer to be the lameness question to be given in the negative.[288]
311 The Equine Veterinary Association policy as reflected on the booklet form[289] is that a veterinarian is not required to elicit the history of a horse for the purpose of this examination. Not surprisingly, that is said to be the obligation of the horse's owner. Professor Kannegieter said that it was not the responsibility of the veterinarian carrying out the examination to obtain that history.[290] To a considerable extent, his view was not questioned by Dr Vanner, who agreed that in carrying out this type of examination, there is no requirement to ascertain or declare the veterinary history of the horse,[291] except where a veterinarian knows of a condition (such as navicular);[292] otherwise there was no obligation upon a veterinarian to search out the history of a horse for this type of examination.[293]
312 Dr Vasey also gave evidence that it was not his practice to obtain any information as to the mare's history when carrying out this type of examination. He also relied upon the policy of the EVA.[294]
313 I am not persuaded that a reasonable veterinarian in the position of Dr McKinnon should have taken any other steps to elicit information about the history of the mare. On this matter I perceive that there is no real division of the opinion between Professor Kannegieter and Dr Vanner. Absent positive knowledge of an infirmity, it is reasonable for a veterinarian carrying out this form of examination not to enquire into the horse's history. Notwithstanding that I may be accused of being repetitive, this again comes back to the basic nature of the examination that Dr McKinnon was carrying out and its anticipated recipient.
In short, I am not persuaded that Ultra has established the existence of a duty of care; assuming the existence of such a duty, it was not breached by Dr McKinnon.
314 Mr Ladhams contends that the deal to sell the mare to Ultra was, in effect, for $250,000 up front with a catch-all provision that in the event of a breach of any of the conditions of the agreement then Ultra was obliged to pay a further $250,000. Mr Ladhams argues that on its proper construction, particularly in relation to the insurance and live foal clauses,[295] this means that he is entitled to the outstanding balance.
315 Ultra says that the agreement on its proper construction, only entitles Mr Ladhams to half the insurance payout (which it says is $39,000 approximately) in addition to the $250,000 already paid and no more. It argues that Mr Ladhams did not agree to be paid an additional $250,000 for the mare; he took an interest in the first two foals protected to some extent by the terms of the contract as to live foals and mortality insurance.
316 There are other strings to Mr Ladhams' bow. First, he asserts that there was also a breach of contract by Ultra when it reduced the amount the mare was insured for to $250,000 (from $500,000) contrary to the terms of the agreement. Second, he contends that there was negligence or breach of fiduciary duty in relation to:
(a) the instruction given to Dr Vasey to carry out the neurectomy; and
(b) in the handling of the insurance claim by settling it for $100,000 inclusive of costs rather than for the full amount of cover provided by the agreement: $500,000.
317 Ultra argues that there was nothing unreasonable about the decision to have the neurectomy carried out as it was carried out on the advice of Dr Vasey. In relation to the claim based upon the insurance policy, it says that it did, in fact, arrange insurance for $500,000 and that the settlement of the insurance claim was reasonable.
318 The agreement[296] described Heritage, Mr Guy's company, as the agent with Mr Ladhams as the vendor, and the purchaser as Baree Stud Pty Ltd (now Ultra). There are 15 operative clauses of the contract, each of which needs to be set out as much turns upon construction of the agreement as a whole and the surrounding circumstances:
Principles as to the proper construction of the contract
319 The principles relevant to a construction of a contract such as this, were succinctly set out by Pagone J in Westgate Ports Pty Ltd v Port of Melbourne Corporation:[297]
In resolving that dispute the relevant contract is to be construed as a whole without individual clauses being considered in isolation. The meaning to be given to the terms of the contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean taking into account both the text and also the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction. The task of construction is not an inquiry of "what the parties intended to do, but of what the language which they employed showed that they did." In McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd Gleeson CJ emphasised the importance of the object intended to be secured by commercial contracts to their construction when saying:
Interpreting a commercial document requires attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances which the document addresses, and the objects which it is intended to secure. (citations omitted)
In Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd the High Court emphasised the principle of objectivity as the basis upon which the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract are to be determined. The Court said:
What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. (citations omitted)[298]
The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties, although, as we have seen, if the facts are notorious knowledge of them will be presumed.
It is here that a difficulty arises with respect to the evidence of prior negotiations. Obviously the prior negotiations will tend to establish objective background facts which were known to both the parties and the subject matter of the contract. To the extent to which they have this tendency they are admissible. But in so far as they consist of statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations they are not receivable. The point is that such statements and actions reveal the terms of the contract which the parties intended or hoped to make. They are superseded by, and merged in, the contract itself. The object of the parol evidence rule is to exclude them, the prior oral agreement of the parties being inadmissible in aid of construction, though admissible in an action for rectification.[301]
321 In addition to the matters I have set out at paragraphs [44] to [56] the following matters are relevant to the construction of the terms of the agreement and represent my findings of fact.
323 As far as the deal was concerned, Mr Guy summarised the discussions between himself and Mr Ladhams as follows:
You then, I presume, get back to Mr Ladhams, do you?--- I went to see Mr Ladhams again and we chatted about what we thought was the value of the horse. His value exceeded what we thought the horse was worth and we talked about, in general, how to proceed and one of the sort of ideas that started to generate itself, almost, in the conversations - Mr Buckley wanted to try and conserve his cash flow and mentioned if there was any way we could extend the payment terms of the horse over some period of time and Mr Ladhams was - obviously loved his horse deeply and was not that keen to let go but realised he had a pretty valuable asset so he was unsure and at the time there was lots of friction between Pat and Roberta Maguire. He had taken other horses off her based on things that had happened with Sound Action that he was unhappy with so he was unsure they had made the right decision about retiring the horse but also wanted to be - liked the idea of trying to be involved with her breeding career. So over the next couple of discussions we had the idea of paying a sum up front and then allowing Pat to become a partner in the horse, maintain his interest in the horse so that they could be involved with the yearlings going to the sales and be involved with the mare and be consulted about breeding decisions and be kept in the loop with the horse that he loved dealing with.[304]
324 Between the time of Mr Guy attending Mr Ladhams' property in late February and the meeting at Oaklands on 4 March, Mr Guy had worked on the production of a draft agreement.[305] Mr Guy's evidence, which I accept, was that he had taken the draft as drawn by him to Mr Ladhams on one of the three or four visits he made to his farm during this time.[306]
325 The draft agreement[307] contains handwritten annotations made by Mr Guy as a result of these discussions with Mr Ladhams. The two material differences between it and the agreement were:
(a) the insertion of clause 7 to give Mr Ladhams 50% ownership of each of the potential first two foals; and
(b) the insertion of clause 19 to provide for the payment of $250,000 in the event of the mare not producing a live foal within three seasons at stud.
326 The discussion at Oaklands on 4 March between Messrs Buckley, Ladhams and Guy, as I have found, related primarily to the racing and breeding of the mare in the future, not to the terms of the deal which had been, in effect, settled.
328 It was Mr Buckley's recollection that the figure of $500,000 as the asking price for the mare had been put on the table by Mr Ladhams.[310]
329 Ultra accepted that the mare at the time of purchase had a market value of around $500,000. In response to Dr Vasey's counsel Mr Buckley said as follows:
I knew that I bought this horse for a lot of money and I needed to get a vet certificate to make sure I was protected. This was the most valuable horse at that time that I had in my property by far. This is like a $500,000 mare. My other mares were worth $10,000 and $15,000. They were just bottom end feeders. This thing was a substantial mare so I was more nervous about insuring her and making sure that I was protected.[311]
330 In cross-examination, Mr Buckley agreed that the negotiated price of the mare was $500,000. In describing the discussions at Oaklands he said as follows:
COUNSEL: You say that the price had been agreed, the $500,000, is that right?
MR BUCKLEY: I believe so, yes. We had an understanding of the overall value of the horse.[312]
Mr George, a fellow director of Ultra, said as follows:
I said to Sean "Look he's a bloodstock agent. We have to through our own vets to make that any vet check on anything, not just Sound Action, on any horse is spot on". Especially in this case, we were paying $500,000 for a horse as a racing and breeding proposition.[313]
And similarly Mr Coleman, another director, said of Mr Buckley:
COUNSEL: He took a particular interest though in Sound Action didn't he?
MR COLEMAN: I think as the owner and director of the company if you had spent $500,000 on a horse you would certainly taken an interest in it.[314]
Indeed in cross-examination, counsel for Ultra referred to Sound Action as "a $500,000 brood mare".[315]
331 Mr Peter Heagney, an experienced bloodstock agent and valuer, was called to give evidence as to the value of the mare at the time of the sale. He expressed the opinion that the mare's value was approximately $350,000 as a broodmare and $500,000 as a racing and broodmare proposition, based on other sales conducted at the time.[316] Notwithstanding that no contradictory expert evidence was led, I have reservations in relation to this evidence. Mr Heagney was not asked to express an opinion until February 2011, nearly six years after the sale and had no involvement in the sale process.
332 I do not doubt that Mr Heagney's opinion may be correct in that when analysed six years later and taking into account sales both before and after the sale of Sound Action, the value of the mare as a broodmare may, through the prism of hindsight, be $350,000. But that is not the proper basis on which to carry out the analysis. The question is what was the mare's value, viewed contemporaneously, at the time of her sale. At that time there was considerable interest in the purchase of the mare and she had only recently won two Group One races beating high quality opposition. Mr Buckley accepted that the price had been agreed at $500,000: "We had an understanding of the overall value of the horse".[317]
333 It is of some significance that despite calling Mr Heagney no reference was made to his evidence by counsel for Ultra in the course of closing addresses. I see no reason to doubt the valuation put on the mare, as a breeding prospect by Ultra's directors (as well as Mr Ladhams), was close to the mark; her value was what the market would pay for her at the time not what an expert six years later may say drawing upon sales both before and after March 2005.
334 In my opinion, the evidence supports a valuation of the mare at $500,000.
The claim in contract in relation to the failure of Ultra to insure the mare for $500,000 (clause 15)
PARTICULARS
The second defendant has lost the benefit of the one half share of the proceeds of the insurance required to be taken out and maintained over Sound Action under the Sale Agreement, namely $250,000.00.
336 In the course of the trial, both in opening and closing addresses, counsel for Mr Ladhams argued that the construction of the contract and particularly clause 20 provided, in effect, a guarantee of the payment of a further $250,000 to Mr Ladhams in the event of a breach of any other terms of the agreement such as clause 15. In Mr Ladhams' written submissions, clause 20 was described as a "catch all" provision. The proposition was summarised as follows:
The contract taken as a whole does not permit of a construction that allows the plaintiff to breach its obligation under clause 15 and then seeks to limit its exposure under clause 16 to half of what is in fact paid out. The contract overall, including the catch all, at clause 20 required the plaintiff to make good the deferred payment of $250,000 in the circumstances. The contract does not of its intentions seek the defendant to take on any risk of any adequate insurance arrangements.
337 In Ultra's defence to Mr Ladhams' claim, it merely denied the allegations I have just set out. At trial, it contended that clause 20 was, in effect, a standalone provision dealing solely with the situation of a live foal not being produced within three years at stud - in those circumstances Ultra was obliged to pay Mr Ladhams $250,000. It was necessarily implicit, Ultra argued, that the mare would survive several breeding seasons for the clause to be operative.
338 The following represents my findings of fact on matters specific to the policy of insurance (and comes primarily from the correspondence between Ultra and Newmarket).
339 On 9 March 2005, Newmarket confirmed with Ultra that it would provide cover of all risk mortality insurance for $500,000 from that day for a period of twelve months with a premium of $19,772.50. The cover was subject to "a current veterinary certificate of health stating the mare is fit and healthy for mortality insurance purposes".[318] Newmarket, in turn, placed the insurance with the underwriter.
340 On 11 March 2005, as I mentioned earlier, Dr McKinnon's certificate was forwarded by Ultra to Newmarket.[319]
341 On 14 March 2005, a tax invoice was forwarded by Newmarket to Ultra (under the name of Baree Stud) confirming insurance of the mare for $500,000 and setting out the pre-existing illness/injury exception to the policy.[320]
342 On a facsimile bearing the date "6 April 2004",[321] Ultra wrote to Newmarket seeking to alter the policy's cover to $250,000. The writer, Amanda McQueen, stated that "She had been advised by the directors at Baree Stud" to alter the level of cover. In fact it is clear from a reading of the document and other contemporaneous correspondence that the facsimile was sent on 12 May 2005.
343 On the following day, 13 May, Newmarket reduced the sum insured to $250,000 and sent a premium statement for $11,665.00 - the original payment apparently not having been made. A tax invoice to similar effect was also forwarded.[322]
344 In evidence, Mr Buckley said that the reduction occurred because Mr Ladhams wanted the policy "split in two."[323] However there was no evidence that Ultra took any steps to arrange such cover for his interest. Moreover, Mr Ladhams in his affidavit said:
I was not involved in the insurance of Sound Action, and I was not provided with any insurance documents or certificates. I always assumed that she had been insured by the plaintiff for AUS$500,000, as was required under the sale agreement.[324]
As I have said, I was not involved in taking out insurance on the horse and at no time did I request Mr Buckley or the plaintiff to place my name on the certificate of insurance. Further, I was unaware of the changes made by the plaintiff for the insurance indicated by documents referred to above and I was not consulted about those changes or communications. I always believed that the horse was insured for $500,000 and that if it died before it produced a foal I was to be paid half of the insurance payout, namely $250,000.[325]
345 In any event, Ultra's defence did not assert that Mr Ladhams had agreed to any variation of the terms of the agreement.
346 On 20 May, Ultra forwarded payment of $19,772.50 to Newmarket. When queried by Newmarket its notation reads:
347 On 23 May 2005, Ultra sent a facsimile to Newmarket in the following terms:
We advise that the mare known as "Sound Action" has fallen ill over the weekend. Under vet advice the mare is undergoing emergency operation on its feet today by Dr Redding of Kentucky.[328]
348 On the same day an undated bloodstock mortality insurance proposal form in the name of Baree Stud was received by Newmarket.[329] It referred to veterinary attention "as per vet report"; the box dealing with physical defect or deformity had an asterisk placed in it and to the question asking for "information of which you are aware that may affect our decision to accept your insurance proposal" the answer given was "She is currently being treated for" with no further details.
349 On 22 June 2005, Newmarket purported to refund the amount of $8,107.40 being the difference between the premium for the insured sum of $500,000 and that of $250,000.[330]
350 On 17 November 2005, Ultra, through Mr Buckley, completed a Bloodstock claim form which was lodged with Newmarket on 24 November 2005. Mr Ladhams was described as having a financial interest in the mare.[331]
351 On 5 October 2006, the solicitors for the underwriters wrote to Ultra denying liability and setting out the basis for the denial.[332]
352 On 2 May 2008, Ultra issued proceedings against the underwriters.
353 In January 2009, Ultra's proceeding against the underwriters was settled for $100,000 inclusive of costs.[333]
354 Notwithstanding that the mare had a value of $500,000 at the time of sale, the agreement had six core components:
(a) the payment of $250,000 immediately by Ultra to Mr Ladhams;
(b) an equal split of any potential race winnings of the mare;
(c) an equal split of the proceeds of the sale of the first two foals of the mare;
(d) the mare passing a pre-purchase veterinary examination;
(e) insurance cover of the mare for mortality purposes of $500,000 (which also provided for the foals to be insured); and
(f) a payment of a further $250,000 by Ultra to Mr Ladhams if the mare did not produce a live foal in her first three seasons at stud.
355 The agreement did not provide for the payment of $500,000, nor did it by its terms provide for the payment of a further $250,000 at any set point of time or in the event of death of the mare. The only time at which a further sum of $250,000 became payable was if the mare failed to produce a live foal in her first three seasons at stud.
356 Objectively, and taking into account the commercial context of the sale, it is clear that a number of the provisions were directed at safeguarding Mr Ladhams' interest against the most obvious adverse contingencies facing a broodmare - infertility or death. So the death of the mare was covered by creating an obligation upon Ultra to keep the mare insured for $500,000 (clause 15). In the event that the mare died, Mr Ladhams was to receive "half the insurance payout" (clause 16). If the parties had wished, the agreement could have stipulated that Mr Ladhams receive a cash payment of a sum certain, but they did not. The terms of the deal on this point are clear; Mr Ladhams would receive his proportion of the insurance payout.
357 The other eventuality, that of the mare being infertile, was covered by clause 20. If the mare failed to breed at stud (within three seasons) then Mr Ladhams was entitled to $250,000. In my opinion, this clause is directed solely to that scenario, namely, the mare remaining alive and being unable to breed. So just as the insurance provisions, dealt with the consequences of death, this separate provision dealt with the consequences of infertility. This is made clear by the use of the words "within 3 seasons" as the time in which the mare was required to produce a live foal. In my view this presupposes the mare surviving these three seasons.
358 I am reinforced in this conclusion by the need to look at the agreement as a whole. It sets out, in effect, a scheme by which the various adverse contingencies that may be met in the life of a broodmare were to be dealt with.
359 Whilst I accept that the agreement was drawn up by Mr Guy, an expert in bloodstock matters and not in legal drafting, it cannot, in my view, yield to the construction urged by Mr Ladhams. If it was intended that a payment of $250,000 was to be made in the event of the death of the mare then this was not a difficult matter to address; there is no sophistication involved in the drafting of such a clause.
360 Even if it is accepted that there is an ambiguity in the agreement in relation to the interpretation of clause 20, there is nothing in the surrounding circumstances that I have set out that leads to any different construction of the terms of the agreement. Mr Ladhams, after discussion with Mr Guy, was prepared to accommodate the idea of taking a half-share in the first two foals rather than payment of the full amount in cash. There was, of course, a degree of speculation in this venture. Whatever type of foal was produced (and by that I mean whether it was a reasonable type or had some abnormality) it had to be sold at auction. The two foals may have realised a total of, say, $800,000 and in that situation Mr Ladhams had backed a winner. On the other hand, if there was some abnormality or deformity in even one of the two foals then he may have struggled to attain a figure approximating $250,000. All this, of course, is speculation but demonstrates that whatever the situation, this was the risk Mr Ladhams was prepared to take by, in effect, entering into a joint venture with Ultra for the sale of the first of two foals. He also had the advantage of not meeting any of the costs associated with the mating of the mare and the rearing and preparation for sale of the foals; ultimately the value of his remaining interest would be determined by the sale ring. In summary, if there is an ambiguity in clause 20 (which I doubt) there was no evidence from Mr Guy or Mr Ladhams as to any discussions or matters which would prevent clause 20 being given what I consider to be its commercial objective.
361 I conclude, therefore, that the death of the mare engaged clause 16 but not clause 20. There was no obligation under the agreement to pay $250,000 by reason of clause 20 in the event of the death of the mare. Rather, absent any breach of a term of the agreement, Mr Ladhams is entitled to half the insurance payout of $100,000, from which is to be deducted the costs associated with Ultra obtaining the payout. I accept the evidence of Mr Sirianni, Ultra's solicitor, that this amounted to $17,565.35.[334] I do not accept Mr Ladhams' argument that the costs incurred should be discounted or ignored. These costs were legitimately incurred in procuring the payout. Accordingly, pursuant to the agreement, Mr Ladhams is entitled to the sum of $41,117.00.
362 But this conclusion does not resolve the question of Mr Ladhams' entitlement, if any, to damages over and above that of the insurance payout occasioned by Ultra's unequivocally clear breach of clause 15 which is: Ultra was required to keep Sound Action insured for $500,000 until such time that she produced two live foals.
363 Ultra did not comply with this condition of the agreement. When it altered the cover to half that amount on 13 May 2005, it breached its obligation, notwithstanding that it endeavoured to rectify the breach by its actions a week later in purporting to reinstate the policy cover to $500,000.
364 As I mentioned earlier, it is to be noted that Ultra does not contend that there was any agreement between itself and Mr Ladhams as to a variation of the amount for which the mare was required to be insured, or some other variation to give effect to Ultra's actions. Rather, Ultra argued that it:
took reasonable steps to obtain insurance of $500,000 and invited the second defendant to join in recovery against the insurer. The steps taken by the plaintiff were reasonable in the circumstances. The second defendant's entitlement does not extend beyond the actual insurance payout.[335]
365 In other words, it contends that no loss was sustained by Mr Ladhams over and above his entitlement to half of the insurance payout of $82,235.00 resulting from the settlement of the insurance claim. This approach, in my view, is too simplistic and ignores Ultra's conduct in effecting the reduction of the cover by one half.
366 The following matters are germane on the point:
(a) at the time that the Ultra took out the policy (9 March 2005) the mare, apart from her navicular issues, was in good health, as attested to by Mr Bolger and Ms Maguire. The navicular problem at that time was a minor consideration in relation to her longevity as a broodmare (as opposed to her racing prospects), and to her risk of mortality generally. The veterinarians were in heated agreement that with reasonable care she would live a long and productive life as a broodmare[336] as navicular disease does not inhibit reproduction and with appropriate farrier attention problems experienced in terms of movement can be minimised;
(b) for the purpose of mortality insurance, the mare did not suffer from a disability which would have prevented mortality insurance being taken out. The examination carried out by Dr McKinnon was adequate and the report as compiled by him at that time was accurate. This report, one can readily assume given that it is prepared for the insurance industry and the form has been in use for a considerable time, was the primary basis upon which the underwriter would take on the risk - indeed that is just what happened. The underwriters requested such a report and when provided with it did not refuse cover;[337]
(c) no evidence was led from the underwriters, Newmarket, or any person experienced in insurance law and practice to suggest that the underwriters would have denied cover or, alternatively, that they would have been able to maintain a denial of indemnity on the basis of either failure to comply with the terms of the policy or non-disclosure of the mare's pre-existing condition and in particular, the navicular condition. The solicitor's letter simply contains an array of assertions and moreover, it deals with the situation after Ultra had reduced the level of cover.
367 As I have just mentioned, the position in May 2005 when Ultra sought to reinstate the cover to $500,000 was totally different to that which had obtained in early March:
(a) the mare had experienced a disastrous course after undergoing the neurectomy which, as I have found, led to the necrosis of the structure of the hoof which in turn led to her death. From the 13th to the 20th of May the mare's condition deteriorated markedly and by 20 May she was in a parlous condition, to the extent that Dr Vasey recommended that she be euthanased;[338] and
(b) there was no prospect that a veterinary surgeon would have certified the mare as fit for mortality risk insurance on 20 May 2005 thus enabling the policy to be reinstated for $500,000 meaning that the reduction to $250,000 maximised the level of the underwriters' obligation at that figure.
368 Ultra's contention that, in effect, the insurance payout of $100,000 inclusive of costs reflects the extent of its obligation for any breach of clause 15 lacks evidentiary foundation. As far as I can determine, the only evidence as to the considerations taken into account in reaching resolution of the claim is the solicitor's letter. It contains a series of assertions made by the underwriters - a number of which were not made out at trial: for instance, the allegation that Dr McKinnon's veterinary certificate was false or misleading was not proved; the allegation that the policy only covered an animal which was "in sound health and free from any illness, disease, lameness, injury or physical disability whatsoever" was not properly substantiated either in an evidentiary or in a practical sense. Whilst the existence of such a condition is confirmed by the tax invoice,[339] the whole of the policy was not produced. Moreover, I doubt whether, as a matter of practice, effect could ever be given to this provision as almost every thoroughbred has a problem of one sort or another. The key to obtaining mortality insurance, one could well surmise, is the existence of an appropriate veterinary certificate relating specifically to that form of cover. This assumption is reinforced by Newmarket's letter accompanying its acceptance of the cover in which the following was said:
Cover is subject to a current veterinary certificate of health stating the mare is fit and healthy for mortality insurance purposes. You should note that coverage is restricted to death or humane destruction due to accidental external injury only and excludes any pre-existing conditions until such time as our office receives the certificate, when death from sickness and disease will be included.[340]
369 Further, no evidence was led in the course of the trial to sheet home the suggestion that an underwriter would, in the event of non-disclosure of the existence of navicular disease (producing mild lameness affecting its racing career but not its breeding potential) have refused mortality cover as opposed to, at most, adjusting the premium.
370 The only point of substance in the solicitor's letter about which one could be satisfied is that the underwriters would not have increased the risk from $250,000 to $500,000 on 20 May 2005, given the mare's condition at that time. Indeed Mr Buckley's evidence on this issue was illuminating:
COUNSEL: That's paragraph 28. You had no discussions with him about insurance until after the horse actually did you?
MR BUCKLEY: No. that's not true. Totally false. When the vet certificate came in that went to the insurance company and we had a quote or an offer of insurance for $500,000 and the quote for that was $19,000, $20,000. After that and prior to the operation with the neurectomy Mr Ladhams requested for me to split that policy into two; one for me of $250,000 and one for him, for him as beneficiary of $250,000. That caused me a cavalcade of disasters in relation to the insurance by trying to change it because by the time I tried to change it and there was an administrative error at the office the horse had to go back in and was lame and could no longer pass a prepurchase examination as no pre-existing illness because it was already lame and that's where the fight with the insurance company was. So by trying to change the insurance policy caused me a lot of grief.[341]
371 This answer is significant in two ways. First, there is no evidence that Mr Buckley endeavoured to take out a policy on behalf of Mr Ladhams for $250,000. Rather, for reasons that were never addressed in the course of the trial, Ultra simply sought to reduce the level of cover. Second, in my view Mr Buckley was correct in identifying the contest with the insurance company as relating to the mare's condition at the time Ultra endeavoured to reinstate the insurance because, as he put it, she was already lame.
372 Apart from asserting that the settlement was reasonable, no evidence was led by Ultra to demonstrate that the settlement, in effect, reflected what would have, as at 9 March 2005, transpired had clause 15 been complied with. It would have been open to Ultra to adduce evidence from its solicitor (who was called in the trial) to give evidence as to the matters that influenced the resolution and the reasonableness of the settlement. No such evidence was led. In any event, as I have already mentioned, this was not determinative as the settlement involved consideration of the conduct of Ultra subsequent to March 2005.
373 It follows that reliance by Ultra upon the settlement figure (with adjustment for costs) as being the proper measure of damage occasioned by its breach of condition 15 is misplaced.
(a) that mortality insurance cover was available for the mare as required by the agreement at $500,000;
(b) that the certificate of mortality insurance relied upon by the underwriters was an accurate description of the mare's condition provided in the appropriate form;
(c) that Ultra breached the terms of the agreement by varying the cover under the policy; and
(d) that the mare's value was approximately $500,000 (if this finding be necessary; the policy was not produced at trial).
375 Further, I am satisfied that but for the breach by Ultra in reducing the cover to $250,000 the underwriters would have been obliged to pay the sum of $500,000 pursuant to the policy. I do not accept that any of the defences asserted by the underwriters, other than that as to the reduction of the cover, could have been sustained.
376 In summary, Ultra was obliged to maintain insurance cover at $500,000. It failed to do so. I am not satisfied that any of the matters which appear to have influenced the settlement of the claim demonstrate that the insurance payout should have been any less than the sum insured of $500,000 - of which Mr Ladhams is entitled to his share of $250,000.
The claim for breach of fiduciary duty in relation to insurance cover
377 This part of Mr Ladhams' claim is pleaded as follows:-
PARTICULARS
The second defendant refers to and repeats paragraph 41 thereof.
PARTICULARS
The second defendant refers to and repeats paragraph 41 hereof and clause 15 of the Sale Agreement.
If, as is alleged by the insurer, in taking out the insurance on Sound Action the plaintiff and/or its servants and agents failed to disclose to the insurer matters entitling the insurer to avoid the insurance, the plaintiff was negligent and/or breached the fiduciary duty and/or the general duty of care that it owed to the second defendant.
378 The first, (and in my view determinative) question is whether the relationship between Ultra and Mr Ladhams was one that gave rise to a fiduciary duty.
379 The relationship between Ultra and Mr Ladhams does not fall into any of the established categories of fiduciary relationships. Consequently, the nature of the relationship needs to be examined to determine whether such a relationship existed.
380 In Hospital Products v United States Surgical Corporation[342], Dawson J said that, notwithstanding the existence of clear examples, no satisfactory single test has emerged which will serve to identify a relationship which is fiduciary. His Honour went on to say that it is usual that in such a relationship one party should place confidence in another in acting on his behalf or in his interest in some respect, but not every case where that happens will result in a fiduciary relationship.[343]
381 Also in Hospital Products, Mason J stated that:
...every such transaction must be examined on its merits with a view to ascertaining whether it manifests the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship.[344]
The categories of fiduciary relationships are infinitely varied and the duties of the fiduciary vary with the circumstances which generate the relationship... it is now acknowledged generally that the scope of the fiduciary duty must be moulded according to the nature of the relationship and the facts of the case.[345]
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense.[346]
His Honour then said that the relationship between the parties was therefore one which gives the fiduciary:
...a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position. The expressions "for", "on behalf of", and "in the interests of" signify that the fiduciary acts in a "representative" character in the exercise of his responsibility...[347]
As to the relationship between contractual obligations and fiduciary duties said to arise under a contract, his Honour said that the contract provides the foundation for any fiduciary relationship:
In these situations it is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction.[348]
Although Mason J was in the minority on the facts as to the existence of a fiduciary relationship, these principles have been applied in subsequent cases.[349]
382 In a similar vein, Gibbs CJ held that it is critical to determine what is the subject matter of the fiduciary obligation,[350] after referring to what had been said by Dixon J in Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd,[351] His Honour held that a fiduciary relationship can exist in respect to a particular aspect of a relationship and not others:
The subject-matter over which the fiduciary obligations extend is determined by the character of the venture or undertaking for which the partnership exists, and this is to be ascertained, not merely from the express agreement of the parties... but also from the course of dealing actually pursued by the firm.[352]
Gibbs CJ found that this principle was of general application and that it applied in relation to every fiduciary relationship.
383 Here the contractual obligation of Ultra to Mr Ladhams is said to be the subject matter of the fiduciary obligation. That of itself would not be enough to establish such a relationship. There is no evidence that Ultra was under an obligation to treat Sound Action in a way that elevated the interests of Mr Ladhams above its own. The agreement, as I have already mentioned, contained a number of safeguards of Mr Ladhams' interests in the mare. He was protected by the fact that to a large extent the interests of both himself and Ultra were contiguous. In accepting partial consideration in the form of a portion of Sound Action's net prize money (if any) and a portion of the net sale proceeds of the mare's first two foals (if any), Mr Ladhams also accepted the risk that no such property would ever come into existence.
384 I do not consider that Ultra owed a fiduciary duty to Mr Ladhams to act for and on behalf of him in respect of the treatment of Sound Action or in relation to the requirement under the sale agreement that Ultra keep Sound Action insured.
385 The obligations of Ultra to Mr Ladhams in relation to the treatment of Sound Action were contractual and not fiduciary, as was the requirement that Ultra keep Sound Action insured. It may well be that the obligations created under the contract gave rise to an implied term that Ultra take reasonable care in relation to the health of the mare - however this does not need to be considered as it was not alleged against Ultra.
Negligence in relation to the carrying out of the neurectomy
386 I adopt and apply here the principles I set out at [277] to [289] in relation to Ultra's claim in negligence.
387 Although denied in the defence, it was not argued at trial that Ultra did not owe a duty of care to Mr Ladhams in relation to keeping the mare in good health whilst he retained an interest in the two putative foals. It could hardly have contended to the contrary. It was foreseeable as I shall explain that the mare would be exposed to the risk of injury in the course of the operation. There is no question of an indeterminate class. The contract gave Mr Ladhams an interest in the two foals but the control of the mare and her management passed to Ultra; Mr Ladhams had no say in how she was to be looked after; his economic interest in the two foals was entirely dependent upon Ultra maintaining the mare in a proper way; he was vulnerable insofar as he had no ability to protect his own interest given that Ultra had total control over the mare.
388 The first issue to be identified is that of the precise risk of harm: it was the risk of injury or death as a result of Ultra, through Mr Buckley, authorising the carrying out of the neurectomy.
389 Next is the question of foreseeability. Here, Mr Buckley had been given specific advice by Dr Vasey as to the risks and benefits of the operation. As I have already indicated, I accept Dr Vasey's account of those conversations rather than that of Mr Buckley. Ultra, through Mr Buckley, knew that there was a risk of adverse consequences as a result of the surgery.
390 Dr Vasey, having been asked by Mr Buckley to carry out the neurectomy, explained the complications, which included the development of a neuroma, the inability of the horse to feel its feet and the prospect that the nerves would, in any event, rejoin.[353] Mr Bolger described the mare as being marginally lame.[354] Dr Vasey was of the view that the horse, given its condition, did not need to undergo neurectomy;[355] such a procedure was not necessary for the welfare of the horse at that time.[356]
391 It was, therefore, foreseeable that there were adverse risks associated with the surgery and that the cutting of the nerve carried a risk of morbidity, if not mortality. Whilst I accept that the risk of death was not one of the consequences referred to by Dr Vasey, it was nonetheless clear that there were potential adverse health consequences to the mare if this operation went ahead.
392 Next it is necessary to determine whether the risk of the operation was not insignificant. What needs to be borne in mind here is the condition of the mare at this time. She had some lameness; Dr Vasey had recommended corrective shoeing. She was generally in good health and had a full and productive future ahead of her as a broodmare. Whilst Dr Vasey did not in terms refuse to carry out the operation or strongly advise against it, there was no suggestion by him to Mr Buckley that the mare needed the procedure. Mr Buckley did not seek a second opinion from his local veterinarian Dr Brain, nor did he seek any other veterinarian advice. The procedure was entirely Mr Buckley's idea but one that ultimately Dr Vasey was prepared to go along with.[357]
393 I am satisfied that, notwithstanding that death was an unlikely result of the surgery but given that injury was a potential consequence, exposing the mare to the surgery in a situation where it was unwarranted did create a not insignificant foreseeable risk to her health generally, her morbidity and her mortality.
394 Finally, there is the question of the adequacy or otherwise of Mr Buckley's response to the risk (s 48(2) and s 49 of the Wrongs Act. The answer is straightforward - the operation should not have been carried out until the mare's condition warranted it or veterinary advice recommended that it be carried out. It was Mr Buckley's idea to carry out the surgery, which I infer may have been directed (misguidedly) to his belief that he might be able to get the mare back to the racetrack. But his motivation is not to the point. Dr Vasey would not have recommended the surgery; no other opinion was sought by Mr Buckley. An appropriate response, given the mare's condition, was not to rush into surgery without acting on the advice of an experienced surgeon. Moreover, Ultra had to be conscious of the position of Mr Ladhams who maintained an interest in the putative foals. It was, in my view, quite unreasonable for Ultra to proceed to major surgery with no veterinary support, in effect, within 20 days of the purchase of the mare.
395 As to causation, the evidence, as I have already observed, is overwhelming that the neurectomy led to the death of the mare. Dr Vasey thought that it was most likely that the problems from which the mare suffered were related to the neurectomy.[358] The two expert witnesses Professor Kannegieter and Dr Vanner, although describing the end condition as laminitis were in heated agreement that compromise of the vascular supply to the hoof caused by the neurectomy led to the mare's death.[359] Therefore the surgery was a necessary condition of the death of the mare.
396 I am satisfied that Mr Ladhams' case in negligence is made out. The more difficult consideration is the assessment of damages. Counsel for Mr Ladhams contends that the appropriate assessment of damages is $250,000, being the balance outstanding under the agreement. But that does not represent Mr Ladhams' loss. His loss is, in effect, the opportunity to obtain half the proceeds of the sale of the first two foals. No evidence was led at trial to establish what the likely value of the foals was.
397 I accept that any such estimate would necessarily have involved a degree of speculation. Undoubtedly the foals would have had significant value, but that value would have been affected by any number of considerations, for instance the identity of the sire of the foals, the popularity of the sire at the time of sale, the buoyancy of the market at the time of sale, the foals' confirmation and size, the sex of the foals and the particular sale to which the foals were consigned; indeed there are probably many other considerations. None were addressed in the course of the trial.
398 I am simply unable at the present time to form a view as to what is the likely loss sustained as a result of Ultra's negligence. I propose to give Mr Ladhams and Ultra the opportunity to make any submissions relating to the evidence concerning the assessment of damages under this head should they wish. From a practical point of view this assessment would only have relevance if it exceeded the award of damages for breach of agreement, assuming I permit evidence of such loss to be adduced.
Negligence in relation to the reduction in cover under the insurance policy
399 Again, I adopt and apply the principles that I have set out earlier in these reasons at [277] to [289].
400 Notwithstanding the breadth of the particulars of negligence contained in the counterclaim, it was apparent that the thrust of Ultra's claim was collateral to that mounted in respect of breach of the agreement, namely that Ultra was negligent in not maintaining the policy at the stipulated level of $500,000. In my view, Mr Ladhams' claim is also made out on this basis.
401 As to existence of duty, I repeat the considerations I set out in relation to Ultra's duty to Mr Ladhams to act reasonably in keeping the mare in good health. Similar considerations apply to this aspect of this claim. Mr Ladhams was reliant upon Ultra to insure his interest in the mare. There is no question of an indeterminate class; the insurance of the mare protected his interest in the event of death. Admittedly he may have been able to insure his interest in the mare separately (although this may be open to doubt given the terms of the agreement as to the ownership of the mare), but nevertheless he relied upon Ultra to take out the policy and cover as it promised. In effect, Ultra, by reason of the agreement, assumed the responsibility, on behalf of Mr Ladhams, for the insurance of the mare.
402 The foreseeable risk on this point can be clearly identified - namely, that if the cover was reduced then the mare would be underinsured and in the event of her death the payout would be necessarily reduced.
403 The questions of foreseeability and the assessment of the degree of risk are also answered affirmatively in Mr Ladhams' favour. It was patently foreseeable that in the event of the death of the mare Mr Ladhams would be out of pocket as the insurance payout would be necessarily less given the reduction in cover. Ultra owed Mr Ladhams a duty of care.
404 On the issue of breach, that risk, in the context of the purchase of the mare , was not insignificant. Potentially, the mare was at risk of death at any time (be it from the consequences of the neurectomy or a bolt of lightning). If she was insured for less than had been agreed then there was a not insignificant prospect that the payout would diminish accordingly.
405 The answer to the question of adequacy of the response is self-evident. A reasonable vendor with Ultra's obligations would not have reduced the cover. Ultra had an obligation to insure the mare for $500,000 and that is what it should have done. By reducing it to $250,000, without any credible explanation being proffered, its response was inadequate and constitutes a breach of duty.
406 The failure to insure the mare for an appropriate amount was, on the findings I have made previously, a necessary condition of the loss of $250,000 occasioned to Mr Ladhams who would have been entitled to the payment of that amount pursuant to the agreement. The assessment of damages in respect of that figure at $250,000 is appropriate. I should add that no argument was put by Ultra that this loss was to be characterised as one of the loss of a commercial opportunity and therefore required a discount on that sum.
(a) Ultra has not established that Mr Ladhams engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 9 of the Fair Trading Act. There should be judgment for Mr Ladhams on the claim;
(b) Ultra has not established that Dr McKinnon was either negligent or engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 9 of the Fair Trading Act. There should be judgment for Dr McKinnon on the claim;
(c) Mr Ladhams has established that Ultra breached the terms of the agreement by reducing the cover under the policy to $250,000. He is entitled to an award of damages of $250,000 plus interest;
(d) Mr Ladhams has established that Ultra was negligent in subjecting the mare to the neurectomy. I am unable to determine the quantum of the damages on the material adduced at trial. Bearing in mind the award of the damages for breach of agreement it may not be necessary for this question to be agitated further; and
(e) Mr Ladhams has established that Ultra was negligent in reducing the cover from $500,000 to $250,000. He is entitled to an award of damages of $250,000 plus interest.
408 I will give the parties the opportunity to consider these reasons and submit minutes of the appropriate orders.
[7] Notice of Discontinue dated 6 March 2009.
[10] See clause 9 of the agreement (exhibit UTR1).
[12] Exhibit UTR12. Extract from Ava and Stock, Equine Surgery, Edition 3.
[13] Ms Maguire has since remarried and is now known as Roberta McLeod. I have however referred to her by her previous name - as she is described by the witnesses.
[14] One of her victories was somewhat fortuitous. She ran second but the winner returned a positive swab.
[39] Exhibit AM18.; T 151, T 206, T 835.
[66] T 565, T 566, T 573, T 578, T 619, T 643.
[76] T 251, Exhibit AM5. Answer to interrogatory 13.
[88] T 89, T 171, T 596-597, T 617-618.
[109] T 251. Answer to interrogatory 13. Exhibit AM5.
[119] E.g. Professor Kannegieter T 925, Dr Vanner, T 429, Professor Kannegieter's report, Exhibit AM 21.
[142] Australian Equine Veterinary Association.
[184] T 809, T 834 - Dr Vassey, T 298 - Dr Fulton.
[227] "Fair Trading Act". The Act underwent significant amendments in 2010 which are not relevant in this proceeding.
[228] Houghton & anor v Arms [2006] HCA 59; (2006) 225 CLR 553 [32].
[229] Russell V Miller_, Miller's Annotated_ Trade Practices Act (32nd ed, 2010) 568; Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 25; (2009) 238 CLR 304, 321 (French CJ); Noone, Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Operation Smile (Australia) Inc & Ors (No 2) [2011] VSC 153.
[245] Reply to Mr Ladhams' defence; T 251.
[246] Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52; (2001) 206 CLR 459, 469, 490.
[248] Paragraph 8 of the written submissions.
[259] Exhibit UTR4A, T 223-224, T 228.
[262] See Adeels Palace v Movbarah [2009] HCA 48; (2009) 239 CLR 420 "Adeels Palace".
[264] [2004] HCA 16; (2004) 216 CLR 515. See also Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 217.
[269] Shaw v Thomas [2010] NSWCA 169 [34].
[270] Bader v Jelic [2011] NSWCA 255; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak [2009] HCA 48; (2009) 239 CLR 420.
[271] Gunnerson v Henwood [2011] VSC 440 [360].
[272] [2010] NSWSC 1039, "Benic".
[274] Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46; (1961) 106 CLR 112, 120-121; Doubleday v Kelly [2005] NSWCA 151, [11].
[275] Benic [93]. See also Stojan v Kenway [2009] NSWCA 364 at [136].
[277] Shaw v Thomas [2010] NSWCA 169 [44].
[279] Adeels Palace [41]-[44]. See also Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest) [2011] NSWCA 63,[ 132].
[285] Section 59 Wrongs Act (1958).
[286] Dr Vanner - T 429; Professor Kannegieter - T 925.
[287] Professor Kannegieter - Exhibit AM4. Dr Vanner - T 395.
[299] Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 279 ALR 212 [98]-[99]; Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd [2011] HCA 45.
[302] I have already set out the tenor of the discussions which took place between Mr Guy and Ms Maguire at her Birregurra stables (T 591). I have previously referred to the evidence concerning any discussion as to the condition of the mare.
[321] Exhibit UTR4D. The facsimile bears the date of 6 April 2004 but the transmission date is 12 May 2004.
[335] Ultra's written submissions of 22 August 2011.
[336] See for instance Professor Kannegieter: "The foot problems she had as a result of race training were extremely unlikely to impact on her career as a broodmare". Exhibit AM21.
[342] [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 ("Hospital Products").
[350] Also see the principles referred to in Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) [1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 436-437 referred to in Elecon Australia Pty Ltd v Brevini Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1327; (2009) 263 ALR 1.
[352] Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd [1929] HCA 24; [1929] 42 CLR 384, [408].
Ultra Thoroughbred Racing Pty Ltd
Those Certain Underwriters & Ors [2011] VSC 589
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2006) 225 CLR 553
(2009) 238 CLR 304
(1981) 53 FLR 340
(1978) 22 ALR 621
(1990) 169 CLR 594
(2001) 206 CLR 459
(2009) 239 CLR 420
(1999) 198 CLR 180
(2004) 216 CLR 515
(2003) 215 CLR 217
(2009) 75 NSWLR 649
(1961) 106 CLR 112
(1980) 146 CLR 40
(2011) 279 ALR 212
(1982) 149 CLR 337
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(2010) 241 CLR 1
(2010) 278 ALR 487
(2011) 276 ALR 646
(1984) 156 CLR 414
(2009) 263 ALR 1