In support of the appellant's contention it was initially argued that it was sufficient to enable him to escape liability if, as was held to be the case, Hearse's intervening act was negligent. Some support for this proposition, it was said, was to be found in a consideration of the so called "last opportunity" rule and by way of illustration it was pointed out that if Chapman had also been injured by Hearse's driving he would have been in a position to recover his damages in full against Hearse. That being so it would be anomalous if, having recovered his own damages in full, he should then be held liable to make a contribution to Hearse in respect of his liability to Dr. Cherry's executor. The whole of the damage, it was said, would have resulted from the same cause and it would be curious indeed if, in the final result, one part of it should be borne by Hearse alone and another part by Hearse and Chapman jointly. But, even assuming that the circumstances were, in general, appropriate to invoke the last opportunity rule, the argument is superficially attractive only. It assumes that notwithstanding the provision for apportionment of liability made by s. 27a (3) of the Wrongs Act that rule retains full force and effect in South Australia. In terms, what that section requires is an apportionment of damages where a person has suffered damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons. The appellant's argument must, therefore, be taken to assume that the last opportunity rule was devised as a test of causation so that whenever it was successfully called in aid by a plaintiff its effect was to brand the defendant's negligence as the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The so-called rule as "authoritatively" stated in Tuff v. Warman [1] and as accepted by this Court in Alford v. Magee [2] was that a plaintiff's negligence would not disentitle him to recover "if the defendant might by the exercise of care on his part have avoided the consequences of the negligence or carelessness of the plaintiff". It was, of course, pointed out that the qualification so stated was applicable only in appropriate cases. The statement, however, can have reference only to negligence on the part of a plaintiff which, apart from the so-called rule, would disentitle him to recover, that is to say, negligence which was, in fact, a cause of the damage. This view seems to flow naturally from the history of the development of the rule to which reference is made in Alford v. Magee [2] and which is fully traced by Professor Glanville Williams in his work on Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) p. 260 et. seq. We think that the observations in Alford v. Magee [2] are conclusive against the appellant on this point. That case regarded as preferable the view that contributory negligence means "negligence on the part of the plaintiff which has been a cause of damage in the same sense in which it is necessary for the plaintiff himself to prove that negligence of the defendant was a cause of the damage" [1] and it then asserted that "it seems more natural and appropriate to use the term as meaning negligence of the plaintiff which has been a cause of the damage in the above sense and then [apropos of the last opportunity rule] to consider what circumstances will preclude such negligence from affording a good defence" [2] . No doubt, in many cases, the rule has been treated as if it had assumed the role of a test of causation but not, as far as we can see, on any occasion when it was of importance to distinguish between its real and what may, perhaps, be called its apparent character.