[2024] QSC 2
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2024-03-04
Martin SJA
Original judgment source is linked above.
Johnston & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health); Sutton & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) [2024] QSC 2
KATARINA RUZH CARROLL APM, COMMISSIONER OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
JOHN WAKEFIELD, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND HEALTH
KATARINA RUZH CARROLL APM, COMMISSIONER OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
BS 11254 of 2021, BS 11258 of 2021, BS 12168 of 2021
30 and 31 May 2022, 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10 June 2022, Further
written submissions 5, 7, 14 and 24 April 2023, 24 November
September 2021 and Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 issued on 14 December 2021 were unlawful under s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019.
(a) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QPS Directions; and
(b) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QPS Directions.
(a) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QAS Direction; and
(b) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QAS Direction.
September 2021 and Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 issued on 14 December 2021 were unlawful under s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019.
(a) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QPS Directions; and
(b) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QPS Directions.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - POWERS OF COURTS UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW
LEGISLATION - DECLARATIONS - where directions were made requiring police and ambulance workers to be vaccinated - where the applicants claim the directions were invalid or unlawful - whether directions for mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 should be quashed and set aside - whether declaration should be made that the directions are invalid or unlawful
GENERALLY - where Police Commissioner empowered to give directions to police officers and staff members "necessary or convenient for the efficient and proper
functioning of the police service" - whether the Police Commissioner had the power to make directions requiring vaccination against COVID-19
GENERAL CONRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - IMPLIED TERMS - GENERALLY -
where the Director General of the Department of Health issued a direction to Queensland Ambulance Service staff to be vaccinated against COVID-19 - where the Director General claims the direction was made under an implied contractual term - whether the direction was able to be made pursuant to the implied term of the contracts of employment
HUMAN RIGHTS - HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION -
where directions were made requiring police and ambulance workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19 - where the applicants claim the respondents failed to give proper consideration to human rights relevant to the decision - whether the directions were unlawful and in breach of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)
HUMAN RIGHTS - HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION -
where directions were made requiring police and ambulance workers to be vaccinated - where applicants claim they are being discriminated against due to their political belief or activity - where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to recognition and equality before the law - where applicants claim they are being compelled to be vaccinated with a medicine that has potential life-threatening side effects
- where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to life - where applicants claim that full, free and informed consent to medical treatment cannot be given if an individual must choose between vaccination and employment - where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment - where directions included no exception for conscientious beliefs - where applicants claim the directions not compatible with right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief - where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to take part in public life - where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to privacy and reputation - where applicants claim directions not compatible with right to liberty and security of person - whether directions compatible with relevant human rights
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), ss 23(1), 24AA Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld), ss 13, 13(1), 13(2) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 7, 7(j)
Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I ('Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'), s 20
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 10
17(c), 20, 23, 23(2)(b), 25, 29, 48, 58, 58(1)(a), 58(1)(b),
58(2), 58(5), 58(6), 59
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), ss 8, 11
Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), ss 2.3, 4.8(1),
Public Health Act 2005 (Qld), s 362E
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered
into force 23 March 1976), arts 6(1), 18
UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36 - Article 6: right to life, 124th Session, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36
Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14
Amaca Pty Limited (Under NSW Administered Winding Up) v Roseanne Cleary as the Legal Personal representative of the Estate of the Late Fortunato (aka Frank) Gatt [2022] NSWCA 151, considered
Animals Angels' eV v Secretary, Dept of Agriculture (2014) 228 FCR 35; [2014] FCAFC 173, cited
Association X v The United Kingdom (1978) 14 Eur Comm HR 31, cited
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; [1990]
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi Compton (Vic) Pty Ltd (1985) 10 FCR 1, not followed Australian Education Union v Department of Education and Children's Services (2012) 248 CLR 1; [2012] HCA 3, applied
Bare v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (2015) 48 VR 129; [2015] VSCA 197, cited Boffa v San Marino (1998) 92 Eur Comm HR 27, considered British Medical Association v The Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201; [1949] HCA 44, considered
Buonopane v RMIT University (Human Rights) [2022] VCAT 146, considered
Burgess v Director of Housing [2014] VSC 648, considered Campbell and Cosan v United Kingdom [1982] ECHR 1, considered
Case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of
Languages in Education in Belgium" v Belgium [1968] ECHR 3; (1968) 1 EHRR 252, considered
Castles v Secretary of Department of Justice (2010) 28 VR 141; [2010] VSC 310, approved
Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children (No 2)
(2017) 52 VR 441; [2017] VSC 251, cited
CFMEU v Mt Arthur Coal Pty Ltd [2021] FWCFB 6059; (2021) 310 IR 399; [2021]
Four Aviation Security Service Employees v Minister of Covid-19 Response [2022] NZLR 26, considered
Grainger v Nicholson plc [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311; [2010] ICR 360; [2010] 2 All ER
Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA
Harding v Sutton [2021] VSC 741, considered
HJ (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-Based Anti- Corruption Commission [2021] VSCA 200; (2021) 64 VR 270; [2021] VSCA
Hunt & Ors v Gerrard & Ors [2022] QCA 263, cited Loielo v Giles (2020) 63 VR 1; [2020] VSC 722, cited Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard (2021) 393 ALR 664; [2021] NSWSC 1320, considered
Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard (2021) 106 NSWLR 520; [2021] NSWCA 299, cited
Kracke v Mental Health Service Board (2009) 29 VAR 1, considered
Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (2021) 286 FCR 412; [2021] FCAFC 129, cited
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2020) 271 CLR 550; [2020] HCA 46, cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden
(2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28, considered
Minister of Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18, considered
Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1, considered
Morton v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd [1951] HCA 42; (1951) 83 CLR 402, considered
Nugent v Commissioner of Police (Qld) and Anor (2016) 261 A Crim R 383; [2016] QCA 223, cited
NZDSOS Inc v Minister for the COVID-19 Response [2022] NZHC 716, cited
O'Brien v Cunard SS Co Limited 28 NE 266 (Mass. 1891), considered
Owen-D-Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services (2021) 9 QR 250; [2021] QSC 273, applied
PJB v Melbourne Health (Patrick's Case) (2011) 39 VR 373; [2011] VSC 327, applied
Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 427; (2002) 35 EHRR 1, considered Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 264 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 4, cited
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998)
[1998] HCA 35; 194 CLR 355, cited
R (Peters) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care
[2021] EWHC 3182, considered
R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 AC 100, cited
R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 AC 246, considered
R v AM (2010) 245 FLR 410; [2010] ACTSC 149, considered
R v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd; ex parte Sullivan (1938) 60 CLR 601; [1938] HCA 44, considered
Ralph M Lee (WA) Pty Ltd v Fort (1991) 4 WAR 176, approved
Roach v Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Culture) [1994] 2 F.C. 406, considered
Roads and Maritime Services v Desane Properties Pty Ltd
(2018) 98 NSWLR 820; [2018] NSWCA 196, cited
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218; [1992] HCA 15, cited
Shanahan v Scott (1957) 96 CLR 245; [1957] HCA 4, considered
Stambe v Minister for Health [2019] FCA 43; (2019) 270 FCR 173; [2019]
Stewart v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 196; (2020) 281 FCR 578;
[2020] FCAFC 196, considered
Thompson v Minogue (2021) 67 VR 301; [2021] VSCA 358, cited
Ulrica Library Systems NV v Sanderson Computers Pty Ltd
[1997] NSWSC 454, considered
United States v Davis [1973] USCA9 361; 482 F 2d 893 (1973), considered
Vavřička and Others v. The Czech Republic, applications 47621/13, 3867/14, 73094/14, 19306/15, 19298/15, and
VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (2003) 58 NSWLR 631; [2003] NSWCA 297, applied
Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43, cited
Yardley v Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety [2022] NZHC 291, distinguished
Yasmin v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (2015) 236 FCR 169; [2015] FCAFC 145, cited
Beyleveld, Deryck and Roger Brownsword, Consent in Law
DF Villa SC with PF Santucci and W Liu for the applicants MR Hodge KC with SA McLeod KC, BI McMillan, RH Berry and PH Nevard for the first respondent
CS Ward SC with PF Santucci and KA Morris for the applicants
MR Hodge KC with SA McLeod KC, BI McMillan, RH Berry and PH Nevard for the respondent
MR Hodge KC with SA McLeod KC, BI McMillan, RH Berry and PH Nevard for the respondent
The Attorney-General for the State of Queensland intervening in each matter:
The Queensland Human Rights Commission intervening in each matter:
In the Johnston (11254/21) and Witthahn (11258/21) matters: Alexander Law for the applicants
GR Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the respondents GR Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the first intervenor
Queensland Human Rights Commission for the second intervenor
GR Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the respondents GR Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the first intervenor
Queensland Human Rights Commission for the second intervenor
(a) The broad decision to be made is whether the particular directions were lawful.1
(b) The essential relief sought is an order that the directions should be set aside. The applicants rely on various grounds available under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (JRA) and other legislation, in particular, the Human Rights Act 2019 (HRA).
1 In the Johnston matter, relief sought against the Chief Health Officer (the third respondent) was not pressed in light of an appeal relating to the status of the directions he had made. See Hunt & Ors v Gerrard & Ors (2022) 13 QR 1; [2022] QCA 263.
2 (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 36.
4.8 and 4.9 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (PSAA) - the Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 (Direction No. 12). It was revoked and replaced by Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 of 14 December 2021 (Direction No. 14). The two directions (the QPS Directions) applied to all police officers appointed pursuant to s 2.2 of the PSAA and all staff members appointed under other sections of the PSAA and the Public Service Act 2008.
(a) receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 4 October 2021;
(b) receive a second dose of the COVID-19 vaccine by 17 December 2021;
(c) receive a booster dose of a COVID-19 vaccine no more than one month after they become eligible to do so, in accordance with the advice of the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) on the use of a booster dose of COVID-19 vaccine at that time, or if already eligible to do so at the time of the direction, no more than one month after the date of the direction; and
(d) provide evidence of receiving the COVID-19 vaccine if required by the Commissioner of Police (or delegate) to their direct report and record the information on Employee Self Service within two days of receiving the vaccine unless otherwise agreed with their direct report.
(a) if the employee was unable to be vaccinated "due to a medical contraindication" - the employee had to provide evidence of the condition and whether it was temporary in nature; or
(b) if the employee had a genuine religious objection or there were other exceptional circumstances.
(a) receive both the first and second dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 27 February 2022;
(b) maintain vaccine protection; and
(c) provide evidence of receiving the COVID-19 vaccine confirming that they have received the prescribed number of doses of the vaccine to their line manager or other designated person no later than seven days after receiving each dose of the vaccine (the QAS direction).
(a) where an existing employee had a recognised medical contraindication;
(b) where an existing employee had a genuinely held religious belief; and
(c) where another exceptional circumstance existed.
(a) section 30 of the JRA; or
(b) sections 43 and 47 of the JRA; or
(c) section 10 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011; or
(d) the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
(a) pursuant to s 30 of the JRA that the QPS Directions be set aside; or
(b) pursuant to ss 43 and 47 of the JRA that the QPS Directions be quashed; or
(c) pursuant to ss 43 and 47 of the JRA or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, restraining the First Respondent from acting in respect of the QPS Directions.
(a) declarations that pursuant to s 43 and s 47 of the JRA or, alternatively, s 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2011 or, alternatively, s 58 or s 59 of the HRA or, alternatively, the Court's inherent jurisdiction that the First Respondent's decision to make Direction No. 12 was made in a way:
(i) which was not compatible with human rights (ss 8, 17(c) and 58(1)(a) of the HRA); or
(ii) that failed to give proper consideration to human rights relevant to the decision within the meaning of s 58(1)(b) of the HRA; or
(iii) contravened s 20 of the HRA; and
(b) a declaration that Direction No. 12 is invalid and that it be quashed or set aside.
"[26] A requirement of legal reasonableness in the exercise of a decision- maker's power is derived by implication from the statute, including an implication of the required threshold of unreasonableness, which is usually high. Any legal unreasonableness is to be judged at the time the power is exercised or should have been exercised. It is not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness to the applicant. Instead, whether the implied requirements of legal reasonableness have been satisfied requires a close focus upon the particular circumstances of exercise of the statutory power: the conclusion is drawn "from the facts and from the matters falling for
consideration in the exercise of the statutory power"." (emphasis added, citations omitted)
6 Harding v Sutton (No 2) [2021] VSC 789.
8 [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 AC 100 at [30].
10 Ibid at [80].
11 NZDSOS Inc v Minister for COVID-19 Response [2022] NZHC 716 at [63].
12 [1998] HCA 35; (1998) 194 CLR 355.
13 At [93].
The alleged failure by each respondent to revoke the directions
"15A Further, or alternatively, pursuant to section 22 and/or Part 5 of the JRA, and/or the Court's inherent jurisdiction, from on or about the time of making the No 14 Direction, the First Respondent has acted unreasonably and/or contrary to her statutory obligations pursuant [to] s 4.9 of the PSAA, by failing to make a direction to revoke the No 14 Direction as the No 14 Direction is no longer necessary to assist in containing or responding to the spread of COVID-19."
"12 Further, or alternatively, pursuant to section 22 and/or Part 5 of the JRA, and/or the Court's inherent jurisdiction, from on or about the time of making the Second Direction, the First Respondent has acted contrary to her statutory obligations pursuant to s 4.9 of the PSAA, by failing to make a direction to revoke the Second Direction as the Second Direction is no longer necessary to assist in containing or responding to the spread of COVID-19 and was therefore not required for the efficient and proper functioning of the police service."
"15A Further, or alternatively, pursuant to section 22 and/or Part 5 of the JRA, and/or the Court's inherent jurisdiction, from on or about the time of making the Second QAS Direction, the Respondent has acted unreasonably and/or contrary to his statutory obligations by failing to make a direction to revoke the Second QAS Direction as the Second QAS Direction is no longer necessary to assist in containing or responding to the spread of COVID-19."
"(1) If -
(a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies; and
(b) there is no law that fixes a period within which the person is required to make the decision; and
(c) the person has failed to make the decision;
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the person to make the decision may apply to the court for a statutory order of review in relation to the
failure to make the decision on the ground that there has been unreasonable delay in making the decision.
(a) a person has a duty to make a decision to which this Act applies; and
(b) a law fixes a period within which the person is required to make the decision; and
(c) the person failed to make the decision before the end of the period;
a person who is aggrieved by the failure of the person to make the decision within the period may apply to the court for a statutory order of review in relation to the failure to make the decision within the period on the ground that the person has a duty to make the decision despite the end of the period.
The alleged failure to revoke the directions - the Johnston argument
(a) 9 February 2022 - when Professor Petrovsky's report was served;
(b) 25 March 2022 - when the ATAGI released advice that no longer recommended booster shots for healthy members of the population;
(c) 9 May 2022 - when Professor Petrovsky's supplementary report was served; or
(d) 20 May 2022 - when Professor Petrovsky's report of 29 March 2022 was served in these proceedings.
(a) if the applicants succeed on any of the Part 3 grounds then an order should be made quashing the decision to issue Direction No. 14 and setting aside the whole of that Direction (apart from the clause revoking Direction No. 12);
(b) if the applicants succeed only in respect of jurisdictional errors then a declaration should be made that the QPS Directions are invalid or unlawful and
that an order quashing them and setting aside the QPS Directions should be made; and
(c) in any event, the Commissioner should be restrained from acting in reliance upon the QPS Directions.
"If an Act authorises or requires the making of an instrument or decision -
(a) the power includes power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision; and
(b) the power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision is exercisable in the same way, and subject to the same conditions, as the power to make the instrument or decision."
proportionate or otherwise justified and "less restrictive and reasonably available" measures would be available - see s 13(2)(d) HRA.
"[113] ... it is a matter of statutory construction and as we have noted above, fixing on an approach that begins with a "presumption", or a starting point, may be unhelpful and apt to mislead. It is also unnecessary. The question whether when Parliament reposes a discretionary power in a person, it intends to repose with it a duty to consider and determine whether to exercise the power (favourably or unfavourably) is not to be resolved by reference to any rule courts can assume Parliament and its legislative drafters are constructively, or actually, aware of, such as the proposition that in the absence of some clear contrary intention, a legislative provision will not be construed so as to have a retrospective operation (see Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261 at 267;
[1957] HCA 7; [1957] ALR 231 at 232-3 ).
14 [2014] FCAFC 173; (2014) 228 FCR 35.
15 [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594.
16 Ibid at [22] (French CJ and Kiefel J), [91] (Heydon J), [92] (Crennan J).
17 Yasmin v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2015] FCAFC 145; (2015) 236 FCR 169.
decision covered by s 22(1). It follows that the usual situation applies - only the facts and circumstances which obtained up to the making of Direction No. 14 are relevant.
The alleged failure to revoke the directions - the Sutton argument
The alleged failure to revoke the directions - the Witthahn argument
The directions have been revoked - what is the effect?
The requirements of s 58 HRA
(a) to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or
(b) in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a public entity if the entity could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision because of a statutory provision, a law of the Commonwealth or another State or otherwise under law.
A public entity is acting to give effect to a statutory provision that is not compatible with human rights.
(4) This section does not apply to an act or decision of a private nature.
(5) For subsection (1)(b), giving proper consideration to a human right in making a decision includes, but is not limited to -
(a) identifying the human rights that may be affected by the decision; and
(b) considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.
(a) an act or decision of a public entity is not invalid merely because, by doing the act or making the decision, the entity contravenes subsection (1); and
(b) a person does not commit an offence against this Act or another Act merely because the person acts or makes a decision in contravention of subsection (1)."
(a) Substantive: not to make a decision in a way that is incompatible with human rights: s 58(1)(a); and
(b) Procedural: not to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right in making a decision: s 58(1)(b).
(a) whether the relevant act or decision placed a limit on the human right: s 8(a),
(b) if there is a limit, whether the limit is justified under the test of proportionality set out in s 13: s 8(b).
An act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if the act, decision or provision -
(a) does not limit a human right; or
(b) limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13."
19 See Re Kracke and Mental Health Review Board (2009) 29 VAR 1 at 31 [88], 33 [96]-[97] per Bell J ("Re Kracke").
21 Explanatory Note, Human Rights Bill 2018 at 16; R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 136-137 per Dickson CJ; Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 SCR 256 at 282 [43] per Charron J; R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at 42
[108] per Tipping J; Re Application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 [2009] VSC 381; (2009) 24 VR 415 at 448-449 [147] per Warren CJ; PJB v Melbourne
(a) The plaintiff/applicant for human rights relief need only establish prima facie incompatibility before the burden shifts to the defendant public entity to justify the limitations caused by their action/decision.
(b) The burden on the public entity to justify limitations is high, requiring a degree of probability commensurate with the occasion, and must be strictly imposed in circumstances where the individual concerned is particularly vulnerable.
(a) First, identify whether any human right is relevant to or engaged by the impugned decision or action of the public authority (the engagement question). A human right will be engaged if that right is apparently limited. A right may be engaged but not limited.
(b) Secondly, determine whether the decision or action has limited that right (the limitation question). A right will be limited (for the purposes of s 8 of the HRA) if it is restricted or interfered with.
Health; Patrick's Case [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373 at 441-442 [310] per Bell J ("Patrick's Case").
22 Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland [No 2] [2020] QSC 293; (2020) 5 QR 623 at [290];
23 Re Application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 [2009] VSC 381; (2009) 24 VR 415 at 434 [80] per Warren CJ; Re Kracke [97] per Bell J; Re Director of Housing and Sudi [2010] VCAT 328 at [93] per Bell J; Castles v Secretary, Department of Justice [2010] VSC 310; (2010) 28 VR 141 at 157-158 [55] per Emerton J ("Castles"); De Bruyn v Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health [2016] VSC 111; (2016) 48 VR 647 at 691 [126] per Riordan J; Certain Children by their Litigation Guardian Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for Families and Children (No 1) [2016] VSC 796; (2016) 51 VR 473 at 496 [143] per Garde J; Islam v Director-General, Department of Justice and Community Safety Directorate [2018] ACTSC 322 at [67]- [68] per McWilliam AsJ.
24 DPP (Vic) v Kaba [2014] VSC 52; (2014) 44 VR 526 at 556 [108] per Bell J; Re Kracke at 29 [79].
26 Sabet v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2008] VSC 346; (2008) 20 VR 414 at [108]- [109], Baker v DPP (Vic) (2017) A Crim R 318 at [56], Thompson v Minogue [2021] VSCA 358; (2021) 67 VR 301 at [96].
(c) Thirdly, consider whether the limit is under law, reasonable and demonstrably justified having regard to the matters set out in s 13(2) of the HRA (the proportionality or justification question).
"... for a decision-maker to give 'proper' consideration to a relevant human right, he or she must: (1) understand in general terms which of the rights of the person affected by the decision may be relevant and whether, and if so how, those rights will be interfered with by the decision; (2) seriously turn his or her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person's human rights and the implications thereof for the affected person; (3) identify the countervailing interests or obligations; and (4) balance competing private and public interests as part of the exercise of justification."
- proper consideration includes identification of the human rights that may be affected by the decision.
(a) the factors in [s 13 HRA] may provide a useful framework or reference point for the balancing of competing private and public interests which limb 4 of the HJ test requires;
(b) the phrase 'as part of the exercise of justification' in element 4 of the HJ test does not import into the procedural limb of [s 58(1)(b) HRA] the requirements of [s 13 HRA];
(c) a public authority may give proper consideration to a relevant human right without giving direct and express consideration to each of the matters set out in [s 13]. A construction that required such consideration would be contrary to the principle derived from Castles that the procedural limb does not involve a sophisticated legal exercise and that there is no formula for compliance with it;
(d) in giving proper consideration to a relevant human right in the manner required by the HJ test, a public authority will need to make a broad and general assessment of whether the impact that its conduct will have upon a relevant human right is appropriate in all the circumstances. That broad and general assessment is 'the exercise of justification' in element 4 of the HJ test. The
28 [2021] VSCA 358; (2021) 67 VR 301.
29 Kyrou, McLeish and Niall JJA.
matters in [s 13] may, in appropriate cases, assist a public authority in making that broad and general assessment; and
(e) the adjective 'proper' means that the standard of consideration must be higher than that generally applicable at common law to taking into account relevant considerations.
23 August 2021 - on the subject of "Workforce risks and vaccination of our workforce". In that memorandum he provided a brief historical overview of the pandemic and set out excerpts from reports by the Queensland Chief Health Officer, the World Health Organisation and the Commonwealth Department of Health among others. He made the following points:
(a) that it was necessary to assess the current risk and potential impacts of Covid- 19 on the QPS especially the increase in threat caused by the Delta variant;
(b) that the US National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases had said that:
(i) the Delta variant is more contagious;
(ii) it might cause more severe illness;
(iii) the vast majority of hospitalisation and death caused by Covid-19 are in unvaccinated people;
(iv) unvaccinated people remain the greatest concern; and
(v) fully vaccinated people can spread the virus to others but appear to spread it for a shorter time;
(c) he summarised the effect of the information in this way:
(i) the risks to the workforce from Covid-19 and the Delta strain in particular are quite significant and would have a devastating impact on police personnel;
(ii) the risks can be significantly mitigated by the use of approved vaccines;
(d) he summarised his advice and recommendations in this way:
(i) the Commissioner of Police has the power to direct mandatory vaccination (dependent on the facts and circumstances at the time of giving the direction);
(ii) the Commissioner of Police must ensure as far as practicable the health and safety of the QPS workforce;
(iii) a mandatory direction by the Commissioner of police with exceptions for contraindications and genuine religious objections would not amount to unlawful discrimination;
(iv) a mandatory direction by the Commissioner of Police would fall within the scope of powers under the Police Service Administration Act;
(v) a mandatory direction by the Commissioner of Police would be compatible with human rights under the Human Rights Act;
(vi) such a direction can be an obligation in contracts for police recruits;
(vii) such an obligation can be made a condition of entry for police workplaces for non-police personnel such as contractors; and
(viii) a requirement can be made for all police personnel to provide proof of vaccination to ensure compliance with a mandatory direction.
(a) "The risks to the workforce from Covid 19 and the Delta strain in particular are quite significant and would have a devastating impact on our police personnel".
(b) "The risks can be significantly mitigated by the use of approved vaccines".
(c) "Evidence from other jurisdictions indicates that police officers in particular, but also front-line support staff who interact with and have contact with, or who are mission critical to the QPS, are very much at risk from the virus".
(d) "Modelling indicates that QPS personnel have over 2 million contacts ... With the community every year - not all of these in controlled circumstances with any degree of certainty around the health status of the people we are coming into contact with".
(a) a mandatory direction by her (with exceptions for contraindications and genuine religious objections) would not amount to unlawful discrimination;
(b) a mandatory direction by her would fall within the scope of powers under the PSAA; and
(c) a mandatory direction by her would be compatible with human rights under the HRA.
(a) all serving sworn police officers to be vaccinated;
(b) all serving sworn police officers to receive a first dose of a COVID vaccine in October 2021; and
(c) all serving sworn police officers to receive a second dose by 24 January 2022.
and that there would be some limited exceptions to the requirements which would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
"And can you tell his Honour when, prior to the meeting, the Commissioner conveyed to you that she had made a decision to issue a direction requiring sworn police officers to be vaccinated in the terms that we have just discussed?
- Yeah, she gave that indication that it was her intent on or about 23rd of August, after I delivered that report to the Commissioner."
"Can you tell his Honour which human rights you considered would be limited by the issuing of direction number 12?---There's actually a number of human rights. There's a right to life, there's discrimination, there's interference to your body. And there's a number of others. But when I get briefed, I get briefed by others and they take me through it. To sit here and remember exactly the minute detail of a briefing at that time, I can't do it."
"6. I confirm that in making my decision to issue Direction No. 12, I considered and adopted the human rights compatibility statement exhibited at pages 256 to 264 to exhibit DS-02 to the First Smith Affidavit.30
All right. Now, can I ask you, then, please, to turn to page 256, which is the Human Rights Compatibility Assessment?---Yes.
Now, do you recall when you first were provided with this document? It's not dated, I can - - -?---Yeah.
- - - indicate?---It would have been at the time that we were having the discussion to make the direction.
All right. Well, do I take it from that answer that you can't recall when you first were provided with this document?---Not the exact date.
All right?---Yeah.
Was it the day that you made the direction?---The document may have - I can't recall. You know, the - it was - this was part of many discussions, many briefings, and I can't recall the exact date.
All right. But you tell his Honour, do you, that you had firstly received this document before you made the decision to issue Direction No. 12?---Yes.
And do you tell his Honour that you read this document before you made your decision to issue direction number 12?---Sorry, I'm just trying to think, because so much was happening. So whether I received the document. But I would have
30 The affidavit of Deputy Commissioner Smith of 16 November 2021.
31 The affidavit of Deputy Commissioner Smith of 10 March 2022.
been briefed several times throughout this entire period. So there's a lot of difference between actually, your Honour, receiving the document but getting constantly briefed about what's occurring. So the exact date of receiving the document would be a very different date to all of the information and the discussion and the briefings that I was having leading up to actually signing the document. So from August onwards, when we became well aware of vaccines and the protection of vaccines, a lot of information was brought to me. A lot of briefings took place, and a lot of - obviously, you know, documentation was prepared. Conversations happened often. So it wasn't a case, your Honour, where I would get a document and there were not any briefings beforehand. In fact, briefings were quite - quite extensive. They commenced with, you know, briefing the executive leadership team. And then I would see my deputies two, three times a week on many issues, but this as well. So the conversation was constant, but the signing of the documentation doesn't necessarily take place when the conversation does.
Commissioner, I'm going to ask the question again, and I'll ask you to direct yourself to answering the question - - -?---Yep.
- - - and not make speeches. Is it the case that you, firstly, received this document before you made the decision to issue direction number 12?---I can't answer that because I don't know the date I signed this document.
Well, you didn't sign this document, Commissioner?---Well, the date I received the document, sorry, in - in document format.
(a) to the extent that there was an identification of the human rights that might have been limited by Direction No 12, that identification occurred by her being provided with HRCA No. 1;
(b) to the extent that there was consideration of the kind required by the HRA as to whether or not the limits were justified, that consideration was provided to her in HRCA No. 1;
(c) that she considered HRCA No. 1 and agreed with its contents; and
(d) that she understood that that was a process that had to be undertaken before making a decision to issue Direction No. 12.
"I do not know the exact date I received the document. The document is a formality at the end result of a - a large amount of conversations. So if I was briefed extensively by Deputy [Commissioner] Smith that this was compatible and that was in a conversation, the conversation might be that, "I will bring you the document". Then there's another conversation. The conversations are numerous, the conversations are extensive, and many of them over many periods of time."
"All right?---I knew from the very beginning that it would limit their rights. Definitely."
"12. Subsequently, he provided the memorandum, supporting materials and other documents, including the Human Rights Compatibility Assessment ..., to the QPS Commissioner. That occurred on 7 September 2021."
...". Soon after that, she was asked:
"You tell his Honour now that, apart from this material, you also relied on the contents of discussions that you had with other people in making your decision to issue direction 12? - - - I relied on this material. Your Honour, I sit around the table with the CHO for many, many months, and whilst I depended on this, in the back of my mind I am always exposed to other information. This material is brought in front of me and I rely on it, but to think that I've had all of this information, it probably affirms what I'm relying on. So it's a very difficult thing for me to just say I depended on this when I know I'm exposed to so much information on a daily basis over an extended period of time."
"Do you now tell his Honour that some of the evidence that you based your findings of fact on may have included discussions with the Chief Health Officer? - - - So I depended on the Chief Health Officer's report, but in addition to that, I had many discussions with the Chief Health Officer."
(a) the report was for the year 2019/2020;
(b) it said nothing about the health status of anyone in September 2021;
(c) it said nothing about vaccinations relating to COVID; and
(d) to the extent that it said anything about COVID, it related to an earlier variant than the one affecting Queensland in September 2021.
" ... There is nothing in that document that is remotely relevant to your consideration of issuing Direction No. 12, is there? - - - It may have been, because ... of the conversations and the briefings and the information that I got from my Deputy and we may have had a conversation about this and the relevance of it."
(a) whether any police officer who had contracted COVID-19 had transmitted the virus to another police officer;
(b) the numbers of police officers who had contracted COVID-19 and transmitted it to members of the community; and
(c) the numbers of police officers who had contracted COVID-19 from members of the community in the course of their duties.
"The nature and frequency of police officers' interactions with members of the community, particularly vulnerable members of the community, results in a significantly increased risk of police officers contracting or transmitting COVID-19".
"And you understood that your task in undertaking your compatibility assessment was to weigh the imposition on human rights against the potential benefits? - - - Yes.
... and it was important for you, wasn't it, to ensure that whatever the benefits were, were accurately quantified to enable that balancing to occur; correct? - -
- Quantified as accurately as possible."
"Well, that would depend, wouldn't it, on how many police officers contracted COVID-19? - - - Yes.
And for the purposes of your exercise, you have to consider how many police officers would contract COVID-19 if you did not impose the vaccine mandate; correct? - - - Yes.
All right. And you didn't attempt to quantify how many police officers that would affect, did you? - - - No."
(a) relied upon the material given to her by Deputy Commissioner Smith (which is listed in Ex DC 20 to his third affidavit);
(b) read and considered each of the Human Rights Compatibility Assessments provided for each of the QPS Directions; and
(c) made her own decision that the proposed directions were compatible with human rights.
"Commissioner, you can't provide his Honour with any reason why you did not think it appropriate to provide your evidence as to the material upon which you relied in Direction No. 14?---It was an oversight.
Is the reason, in fact, because you didn't know what material it was that you had relied on in making Direction No. 14?---I had an extensive amount of material in front of me constantly.
Is the reason you didn't identify the material upon which you relied in making Direction No. 14 in your affidavit because you did not know what that material is?-
" ... In undertaking the human rights assessment that you were required to undertake in issuing Direction No. 14, you did not revisit any of the factors that you had taken into consideration in deciding to issue Direction No. 12; correct?-
--I already knew what - you know? I already knew what the compatibility statement said in 12 and, to me, this was an extension of that.
Now, is the answer to my question - - -?---I think - - -
- - - "yes"?---I think that's - I'm - I think that's answering your question.
I will try again. Is it fair to say that the only things that you considered in undertaking the human rights assessment in issuing Direction No. 14 was the four changes identified at the bottom of page 1?---I'm just trying to get across it, but at the end of the day, I was satisfied with the one in 12 and for me, this was an extension of that."
"Now, the direction was signed by you, as I understand your evidence, on the 14th of December 2021?---Yes.
Are you able to tell his Honour when, prior to you signing that document, you made the decision that you would require Queensland Police officers and the staff 5 members described in the direction to obtain a booster dose?---It would be very difficult to give an exact date because it was a period of an extraordinary amount of information coming in in terms of the effectiveness of the booster dose. It may well have been a few days, a week before. I cannot give an exact answer on that.
All right. Is it fair to say that it is likely to be somewhere between the 7th and 10th of December?---Yes, yeah."
vaccination uptake for police officers and frontline staff had increased to the "high 90% range".
(a) the previously dominant Delta strain was being replaced by the Omicron strain;
(b) Omicron was highly transmissible; and
(c) the vaccines that had been mandated for members of the QPS had limited utility in preventing transmission of the Omicron variant.
deciding to issue Direction No. 14. Her evidence about considering either HRCA No. 1 or HRCA No. 2 was, at best, inconclusive and, at worst, unreliable.
(a) understood in general terms which of the rights of the persons affected by the decisions might be relevant and how those rights would be interfered with by the decision;
(b) had seriously turned her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person's human rights;
(c) had identified the countervailing interests and obligations; and
(d) had balanced competing private and public interests as part of the exercise.
(a) either identified the human rights that might be affected by the decision; or
(b) considered whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.
The Johnston and Sutton matters - what are the issues?
"statutory provision means an Act or statutory instrument or a provision of an Act or statutory instrument."
32 Thompson v Minogue (2021) 67 VR 270 at [91].
(1) All statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.
(2) If a statutory provision can not be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights.
(3) International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory provision.
(a) an Act or provision of an Act that is not compatible with human rights; or
(b) a statutory instrument or provision of a statutory instrument that is not compatible with human rights and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
(5) This section does not apply to a statutory provision the subject of an override declaration that is in force."
(a) in a proceeding in the Supreme Court a question of law arises that relates to the application of this Act or a question arises in relation to the interpretation of a statutory provision in accordance with this Act; or
(b) a question is referred to the Supreme Court under section 49; or
(c) an appeal before the Court of Appeal relates to a question mentioned in paragraph (a).
(2) The Supreme Court may, in a proceeding, make a declaration (a declaration of incompatibility) to the effect that the court is of the opinion that a statutory provision can not be interpreted in a way compatible with human rights.
(3) However, the Supreme Court can not make a declaration of incompatibility about a statutory provision if an override declaration is in force in relation to the provision.
(4) If the Supreme Court is considering making a declaration of incompatibility, the court must give notice of that fact in the approved form to the Attorney-General and the commission.
(5) The Supreme Court must not make a declaration of incompatibility unless the court is satisfied -
(a) a notice has been given to the Attorney-General and the commission under subsection (4); and
(b) a reasonable opportunity has been given to the Attorney-General and the commission to intervene in the proceeding or to make submissions about the proposed declaration.
(6) For the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, section 62, a declaration of incompatibility is taken to be an order of the court in the Trial Division."
Did the Commissioner have the power to make the QPS directions?
"... the efficient and proper administration, management and functioning of the police service in accordance with law."
"... authorised to do, or cause to be done, all such lawful acts and things as the Commissioner considers to be necessary or convenient for the efficient and proper discharge of the prescribed responsibility."
(1) In discharging the prescribed responsibility, the commissioner may give, and cause to be issued, to officers, staff members or police recruits, such directions, written or oral, general or particular as the commissioner considers necessary or convenient for the efficient and proper functioning of the police service.
(2) A direction of the commissioner is of no effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with this Act.
(3) Subject to subsection (2), every officer or staff member to whom a direction of the commissioner is addressed is to comply in all respects with the direction.
(4) A direction issued under subsection (1) to officers about functions, powers or responsibilities that are also functions, powers or responsibilities of watch-house officers is taken to be also issued to watch-house officers.
(5) In all proceedings -
(a) a document purporting to be certified by the commissioner to be a true copy of a direction under subsection (1) is admissible as evidence of the direction; and
(b) a direction under subsection (1) is to be taken as effectual until the contrary is proved.
(6) In this section -
watch-house officer means a staff member who is appointed by the commissioner to be a watch-house officer."
"[unless it is inconsistent with the PSAA] every officer or staff member to whom a direction of the Commissioner is addressed is to comply in all respects with the direction."
The functions of the police service are the following -
(a) the preservation of peace and good order -
(i) in all areas of the State; and
(ii) in all areas outside the State where the laws of the State may lawfully be applied, when occasion demands;
(b) the protection of all communities in the State and all members thereof -
(i) from unlawful disruption of peace and good order that results, or is likely to result, from -
(A) actions of criminal offenders;
(B) actions or omissions of other persons;
(ii) from commission of offences against the law generally;
(c) the prevention of crime;
(d) the detection of offenders and bringing of offenders to justice;
(e) the upholding of the law generally;
(f) the administration, in a responsible, fair and efficient manner and subject to due process of law and directions of the commissioner, of -
(i) the provisions of the Criminal Code;
(ii) the provisions of all other Acts or laws for the time being committed to the responsibility of the service;
(iii) the powers, duties and discretions prescribed for officers by any Act;
(g) the provision of the services, and the rendering of help reasonably sought, in an emergency or otherwise, as are -
(i) required of officers under any Act or law or the reasonable expectations of the community; or
(ii) reasonably sought of officers by members of the community."
(a) the QPS directions do not relate to any of those defined functions; and
(b) the requirement that police officers be vaccinated is a matter that sits entirely outside the remit of a police officer's function in crime prevention and law enforcement.
(1) In discharging the prescribed responsibility, the commissioner may give, and cause to be issued, to officers, staff members or police recruits, such directions, written or oral, general or particular as the commissioner considers necessary or convenient for the efficient and proper functioning of the police service. ..." (emphasis added)
Is the power to make directions limited and, if so, in what way?
(a) whether the direction is proportional to the problem it is intended to deal with;
(b) whether it offends the principle of legality by interfering with fundamental common law rights and freedoms;37 and
(c) whether it needs to be considered in accordance with the provisions of the HRA.38
33 Morton v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd [1951] HCA 42; (1951) 83 CLR 402 at 410.
34 [1957] HCA 4; (1957) 96 CLR 245.
35 Ibid at 250.
36 Northern Land Council v Quall [2020] HCA 33; (2020) 271 CLR 394 at [33].
38 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1.
"[57] For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to reduce the relevant principles into a few short propositions. This short summary is not intended to supplant or derogate from the detailed analysis and explication of the relevant principles in Li, Singh and Stretton.
[60] Third, there are two contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness may be employed. The first involves a conclusion after the identification of a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the decision making process, such as failing to have regard to a mandatory consideration, or having regard to an irrelevant consideration. The second
involves an "outcome focused" conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Li at 350[27]-351[28] (French CJ), [72] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Singh at [44]; Stretton at [6] (Allsop CJ)." (emphasis added)
"[30] ... a disproportionate exercise of an administrative discretion, taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut, may be characterised as irrational and also as unreasonable simply on the basis that it exceeds what, on any view, is necessary for the purpose it serves. ..." (citations omitted)
(a) if the court is satisfied that a human right has been engaged and limited, and
(b) it is necessary to undertake the proportionality review in s 13 HRA, then
(c) that review may constitute (or go a long way towards constituting) consideration of the reasonableness of the QPS Directions as a reasonable way of attaining the proposed aims.
Is there a temporal limit on directions under s 4.9 of the PSAA?
Were the decisions to make the Directions affected by an error of law?
(a) they were not authorised by the enactment under which they were purported to be made (s 20(2)(d) JRA);
(b) they involved an error of law (whether or not it appears on the record of the decision) (s 20(2)(f) JRA); or
(c) were otherwise contrary to law (s 20(2)(i) JRA).
"The currently available scientific evidence is that vaccination against COVID- 19 helps to significantly reduce the risk of being infected and transmitting the virus to others."
Whether vaccination could achieve a significant reduction in risk was a matter for debate among the experts, but the Commissioner did not make the Directions on the basis that vaccination would stop transmission or infection.
"[65] The ground of judicial review known as 'legal reasonableness' derives from a statutory implication. The implication that a statutory power be exercised within the bounds of (legal) reasonableness arises through a common law presumption: ABT17 at [19]; Li at [29] per French CJ, [63] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ and [88] per Gageler JJ; SZVFW at [53] per Gageler J, [80] per Nettle and Gordon JJ and [131] per Edelman J. Where a statutory power is exercised in a manner that is legally unreasonable, the exercise of the power is beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon the repository of that power; that is, the repository committed a jurisdictional error: SZVFW at [51] per Gageler J and
[80] per Nettle and Gordon JJ. There are different ways of formulating the expression of legal reasonableness. These include that unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification (Li at [76]), and that reasonableness is the minimum to be expected of any reasonable repository of the power (SZVFW at [52] and [134]). It has been repeatedly emphasised that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent (Li at [108]; SZVFW at [108]). In ABT17 at [19] Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ said:
'[t]he implied condition of reasonableness is not confined to why a statutory decision is made; it extends to how a statutory decision is made [quoting Li at [91]] such that [j]ust as a power is exercised in an improper manner if it is, upon the material before the decision-maker, a decision to
43 [2020] HCA 34; (2020) 269 CLR 439.
44 [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332.
which no reasonable person could come, so it is exercised in an improper manner if the decision-maker makes his or her decision in a manner so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course [Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; 183 CLR 273 at 290, citing Prasad v Minister for
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 46; 6 FCR 155 at 169-170, cf Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123 at [20]-[25]].'
[66] Importantly for present purposes, French CJ held in Li as follows (at [30]):
'The requirement of reasonableness is not a vehicle for challenging a decision on the basis that the decision-maker has given insufficient or excessive consideration to some matters or has made an evaluative judgment with which a court disagrees even though that judgment is rationally open to the decision-maker.'" (emphasis added)
"In short form, the applicant submits that the same matters that mean the Direction cannot be justified as a proportionate limitation on human rights, will also render the Direction an unreasonable use of the delegated power."
Does s 4.9 of the PSAA allow for the making of directions which limit fundamental freedoms etc?
47 Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; (2011) 242 CLR 573 at [43].
fundamental common law rights, or the human rights protected by the HRA, as is done by the QPS Directions.
"[3] ... In exchange for exercising these extraordinary powers, QPS members voluntarily accept the curtailment of some freedoms enjoyed by the general public, for example, the regulatory scheme requires that QPS members obey lawful orders and be disciplined if those orders are disobeyed. This is an essential aspect of an efficient, effective police service in which the public can have confidence." (emphasis added)
(1) All statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.
(2) If a statutory provision can not be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights.
(3) International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory provision.
(a) an Act or provision of an Act that is not compatible with human rights; or
(b) a statutory instrument or provision of a statutory instrument that is not compatible with human rights and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
(5) This section does not apply to a statutory provision the subject of an override declaration that is in force."
51 (2011) 245 CLR 1 at [18].
empower a person to make directions which must be followed by others. In this case, the true issue is not whether s 4.9 is consistent with the HRA. It is not the source of the power which needs to be considered, it is the way in which it is exercised. It is whether a decision made pursuant to that provision is one which complies with the requirements of the HRA. That, in turn, requires consideration of whether the Directions comply with s 58 of the HRA. This process can be drawn from the terms of s 58 which refer to the acts or decisions of a public entity and the consideration which is to be given to human rights when making a decision.
(a) Witthahn Opening Submission - It is unclear what source of statutory power the respondent relies upon to justify the imposition of the employment declarations on the applicants and, in the absence of the respondent identifying a power for making the QAS Direction, the court would conclude it was beyond the power of the respondent and is invalid.
(b) Respondent's Opening Submission -
(i) The material before the respondent expressly identified his authority to make the QAS Direction by reference to the power (at common law) of an employer to give lawful and reasonable directions to employees; and to his authority under s 13 of the Ambulance Service Act 1991 (ASA) to impose conditions of employment for staff employed under that Act.
(ii) In respect of QAS employees employed under the ASA, the respondent was empowered to issue directions at common law and authorised by s 13 of the ASA to determine the conditions of employment of staff engaged under that statute.
(iii) Even if the applicants were to contend that the QAS Direction was outside the permissible limits of s 13(2), which is not conceded, the QAS Decision was nevertheless permitted at common law.
(iv) The QAS Decision does not satisfy the first limb of the test in _Griffith University v Tang_52 and, therefore, is not a decision "under an enactment" and is not amenable to judicial review under the JRA.
(c) Witthahn Closing Submission - Section 13 of the ASA does not provide a source of power to make the QAS Direction.
(d) Respondent's Closing Submission - The QAS Direction was a decision to exercise a power under contract and thus not a decision under an enactment, nor an exercise of public power, and consequently: (a) is not amenable to judicial review, and (b) is not subject to s 58 of the HRA.
"In acknowledgement of the connection between the risks posed by the virus and the work performed by the employees, it is appropriate that a reasonable and lawful direction be given to require vaccination. This will be achieved through the introduction of QAS policy requiring existing and prospective employees working in or entering a healthcare facility or healthcare setting to be vaccinated against COVID-19."
52 [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.
"The Chief Executive is authorised to give lawful and reasonable directions to QAS employees under the common law and s 13 of the Ambulance Service Act 1991."
"(1) The chief executive may appoint and employ on salary or wages or engage and employ under contracts such persons -
(a) as ambulance officers; and
(b) as medical officers; and
(c) as other staff members;
as are necessary for the effectual administration of this Act.
(2) Subject to any applicable decision within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, persons employed under subsection (1) (other than on contract) are to be paid salaries, wages and allowances at such rates and are to be employed under such conditions of employment (including conditions as to occupational superannuation and leave entitlements) as the chief executive determines." (emphasis added)
"[89] The determination of whether a decision is "made ... under an enactment" involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be "made ... under an enactment" if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice." (emphasis added)
power. The argument advanced was that the true basis for the Direction was statutory. Reliance was placed on the reasons of Bowen CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi Compton Pty Ltd,54 in particular, this statement:
"In my opinion, where an administrative body which states it is exercising a particular power in laying down a general rule lacks power on the stated ground, but could have laid down the rule validly under another head of power, it would generally be wrong for a court to uphold the rule as if it had been made under the unstated head of power, particularly where the consequences for the citizen of each exercise of power are different."
"[20] The reasoning of Bowen CJ in the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi, and the reasoning to similar effect of Fox J in that case, has been treated with considerable reserve in subsequent authorities. (See Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Securities Commission [1993] FCA 77; (1993) 40 FCR 409 especially at 412, 424-425 and 435-437; Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1989] FCA 191; (1989) 88 ALR 287 at 303-304; Canwest Global Communications Corporation v Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 147 ALR 509 at 530-531; Harris v
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority [1999] FCA 437; (1999) 162 ALR 651 at 654 [8]- [18].) In my opinion, the reasoning of Bowen CJ in the passage on which the appellant relies is stated too widely and should not be followed.
[21] The reasoning of Bowen CJ and Fox J in the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi stands in marked contrast to a number of other statements of a contrary principle." (emphasis added)
55 (1989) 18 NSWLR 481 at 489.
"[34] ... A mistake by an administrative decision-maker as to the source of his or her power to make a decision does not necessarily invalidate the decision if it is able to be supported by another source of power. Whether it can be supported by the other source of power will depend upon whether that power is subject to requirements which the decision-maker has failed to meet because of his or her belief as to the source of the power or for some other reason. As Heydon J said in Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT_)_:
If the maker of an administrative decision purports to act under one head of power which does not exist, but there is another head of power available and all conditions antecedent to its valid exercise have been satisfied, the decision is valid despite purported reliance on the unavailable head of power." (emphasis added, footnote omitted)
"If a command relates to the subject matter of the employment and involves no illegality, the obligation of the servant to obey it depends at common law upon its being reasonable. In other words, the lawful commands of an employer which an employee must obey are those which fall within the scope of the contract of service and are reasonable. Accordingly, when the award was framed, the expression "reasonable instructions" was adopted in describing the employees' duty to obey. But what is reasonable is not to be determined, so to speak, in vacuo. The nature of the employment, the established usages affecting it, the common practices which exist and the general provisions of the instrument, in this case an award, governing the relationship, supply considerations by which the determination of what is reasonable must be controlled. When an employee objects that an order, if fulfilled, would expose him to risk, he must establish a case of substantial danger outside the
contemplation of the contract of service (Bouzourou v. Ottoman Bank; Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian)."59 (emphasis added, citations omitted)
(a) any established usages affecting the nature of the employment;
(b) what, if any, common practices exist; or
(c) the general provisions of the instrument governing the relationship of the employees covered.
"If the object and purpose of such a direction is to protect the health and safety at work of employees and other persons frequenting the premises then such a direction is likely to be lawful. This is so because it falls within the scope of the employment and there is nothing illegal or unlawful about becoming vaccinated." (emphasis added)
60 [2021] FWCFB 6059; (2021) 310 IR 399.
power identified by the respondent has the necessary clear words or necessary intendment that would authorise the imposition of the vaccine mandate.
- the QAS Direction was not made pursuant to any statutory power.
If the Direction is a product of the implied term, does s 58(4) apply?
position was reversed at the end of the trial by the respondent contending that "[t]he QAS Decision was a decision to exercise a power under a contract, and ... is not subject to s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2011." But, in the same submission, the respondent accepts that he was, when making the QAS Direction, subject to the requirements of the HRA generally.61
(a) to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or
(b) in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.
"42 The meaning of the word "private" is not defined by the Charter. The Macquarie Australian dictionary relevantly defines the word "private" to mean "relating to or affecting a particular person or small group of persons; individual; personal... confined to or intended only for the person or persons immediately concerned." As a result, given the Decision only relates to the Applicant as an individual and not to the general public or any other persons and the Applicant has not alleged that the Decision was made under any statute or policy or the like, I am satisfied that, if the Respondent was a "public authority" that the Charter would not apply to the Decision because it is "of a private nature." (emphasis added)
61 Ibid at [185].
public or any other persons". The decision by Dr Wakefield affected all QAS employees.
The chief executive of Queensland Health is the employer of all persons employed within the QAS, under either the employment provisions contained in the Ambulance Service Act 1991 or the Public Service Act 2008 with the exception of honorary ambulance officers engaged by the QAS Commissioner under section 14 of the Ambulance Service Act 1991, however, are subject to the policies established by the Chief Executive in accordance with section 3E(2)(a) of the Ambulance Service Act 1991."
"SUBJECT: Approve a policy position requiring Queensland Ambulance Service employees (and honorary ambulance officers and work experience students/students undertaking clinical placements) identified as working in high-risk roles to be vaccinated against COVID-19."
(a) no evidence that Dr Wakefield considered the briefing note;
(b) no evidence that he read any of the documents referred to in the footnotes;
(c) no evidence that he undertook for himself the human rights compatibility assessment contained within the attachments; and
(d) no evidence that he was aware of any material other than what was put before him.
"[46] ... Jones v Dunkel ("Jones v Dunkel ") is authority for the proposition that two possible consequences may follow from a party's failure to call a
64 [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.
witness whom they might be expected to call. The first is that the Court may infer that the evidence of the witness who was not called would not have assisted that party's case (a "Jones v Dunkel inference"). The other consequence is that the Court may have greater confidence in drawing an inference unfavourable to that party (Jones v Dunkel at 308 per Kitto J; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd ; ASIC v Hellicar at [232] per Heydon J; "Hellicar"). This latter consequence can be put aside as no inference unfavourable to the Respondent was contended for by Amaca in this case.
[47] A Jones v Dunkel inference has relatively weak evidentiary value. It does not enable the trier of fact to infer that the absent evidence would have been positively adverse to the party (Hellicar at [168] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ and at [232] per Heydon J), and it does not enable a court to discount or diminish the value of the evidence that a party adduced (Hellicar at [164] to [170] and [233]). ..." (emphasis added, citations omitted)
"[66] The evidence is scant about how the Minister approached his decision- making task. The Minister gave no evidence. An officer of the Department swore two "institutional" affidavits, to which I refer below and which were taken as read in the proceeding. No-one who might have been present when the Minister made his decision gave any evidence about what the Minister said, or did, or how he approached his task. There was no evidence about how long the Minister took to make his decision (apart from that in the "institutional" affidavits referred to below at [140]). The evidence is that the Minister signed the briefing note and dated it "1 November 2017". I infer the date was entered by the Minister as it appears to be in the same handwriting as the signature. In the rest of the material this date is nominated as the date the power was exercised."
"[74] As a general principle, I consider it reliable and appropriate to infer, consistently with the purpose and practice of ministerial briefing notes, that a Minister reads a briefing note with which she or he is provided, where that briefing note is intended to provide the Minister with sufficient information to make a decision about whether or how to exercise a statutory power. Sometimes there may be evidence which assists the drawing of such an inference, such as
66 [2019] FCA 43; (2019) 270 FCR 173.
handwriting, or marks such as circles or underlining, by the Minister on the contents of a briefing note itself. Such evidence is not necessary for the inference to be available and drawn, but it may be persuasive.
[75] Of course, the drawing of such an inference may be actively contested by admissible evidence. If it is not, then it would tend to undermine the practice of executive decision-making at ministerial level if supervising Courts were to require direct evidence that the contents of each briefing note were read by a Minister. Whether an inference should be drawn in an individual case will remain a matter for each judge in the circumstances, but for my own part I consider this an appropriate general approach."
"18. Taking into account consideration of the daily transmission events occurring in health facilities in States, as well as other transmission events linked to Health Care Workers, there is a demonstrable level of risk associated with the work performed by QAS employees (and honorary ambulance officers engaged under section 14 of the Ambulance Service Act 1991 and work experience students/students undertaking clinical placements.)
19. Due to the highly transmissible and increasingly virulent nature of COVID- 19, particularly the Omicron and Delta variants, increasing numbers of employers have announced policies requiring employee vaccination, including QANTAS, SPC and New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australian Health departments."
67 [2021] FCAFC 129; (2021) 286 FCR 412 at [66] and [88].
68 See also CEU22 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2023] FCA 867 at [96].
" Health and aged care workers have been identified as being of particularly high risk due to the nature of their work, which involves the provision of care to unwell persons as well as an inability to practice [sic] public health prevention measures due to this work (e.g. inability to physically distance). In fact, research indicates that patient-facing health and aged care workers are at three times the risk of contracting COVID-19 when compared with the general population."
"Most studies to date, including Shah and colleagues' study, have evaluated risks to healthcare workers during the early phases of the pandemic. Advances since then may have reduced the risks, although further confirmatory studies are needed."
"Further, earlier this year, a recent Journal paper suggested that "the addition of routine asymptomatic surveillance to decrease transmission in healthcare facilities should not be pursued as a primary infection prevention strategy"."
70 Shenoy ES and Weber DJ (2021) Routine surveillance of asymptomatic healthcare personnel for severe acute respiratory corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): Not a prevention strategy. https://doi.org/10.1017/ice.2020.1429
71 Health Care Personnel.
Did the directions limit any of the rights identified in the HRA?
(a) a human right will be "engaged" if there is "a potential effect on the rights of a class of persons";73
(b) there is no need to identify a particular individual as having been affected by a decision concerning human rights in order to trigger the obligations imposed on public entities under the HRA;74 and
(c) an act or a decision will limit a human right if it "places limitations or restrictions on, or interferes with, the human rights of a person".75 A limitation short of removal is still a limitation.76
73 Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 2) [2020] QSC 293; (2020) 5 QR 623 at [291]- [292].
75 Owen-D'Arcy at [130]; PJB v Melbourne Health [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373 at [36].
76 Four Aviation Security Service Employees v Minister of Covid 19 Response [2021] NZHC 3012; [2022] 2 NZLR 26 at [29]; New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council [2018] NZSC 59; [2018] 1 NZLR 948.
(a) the QPS Directions engage with and limits a number of rights protected under the HRA;
(b) the limitation of these rights is not reasonable nor demonstrably justified; and accordingly
(c) pursuant to s 58 of the HRA, it was unlawful for the Commissioner to make a decision to issue the QPS Directions.
"And to the extent that there was consideration of the kind required by the Human Rights Act as to whether or not the limits were justified, that consideration was provided to you by Crown Law in this document; correct? - Yes.
And you then considered this document and agreed with that consideration? - -
- Yes."
"And is it fair to say then that to the extent that the Human Rights Compatibility Statement does not identify a right as being limited, that is not a right that you have considered in issuing direction number 12?---That would be fair to say that, because I depend on other people to obviously do that and come to me with that."
(1) A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) In deciding whether a limit on a human right is reasonable and justifiable as mentioned in subsection (1), the following factors may be relevant -
(a) the nature of the human right;
(b) the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(c) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose;
(d) whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose;
(e) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(f) the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right;
(g) the balance between the matters mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f)."
(a) the right to enjoy human rights without discrimination (s 15(2));
(b) the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination (s 15(4));
(c) the right not to be subjected to non-consensual medical treatment (s 17 (c));
(d) the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (s 20); and
(e) the right to privacy (s 25).
(a) the right to life (s 16);
(b) the right to take part in public life (s 23); and
(c) the right to liberty and security (s 29).
(a) the right to enjoy human rights without discrimination (s 15(2));
(b) the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination (s 15(4));
(c) the right to life (s 16);
(d) the right not to be subjected to non-consensual medical treatment (s 17 (c));
(e) the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (s 20); and
(f) the right of access to the public service (s 23(2)(b)).
"[185] ... Proper consideration need not involve formally identifying the 'correct' rights or explaining their content by reference to legal principles or jurisprudence. Rather, proper consideration will involve understanding in general terms which of the rights of the person affected by the decision may be relevant and whether, and if so how, those rights will be interfered with by the decision that is made. As part of the exercise of justification, proper consideration will involve balancing competing private and public interests. There is no formula for such an exercise, and it should not be scrutinised over- zealously by the courts.
[186] While I accept that the requirement in s 38(1) to give proper consideration to a relevant human right requires a decision-maker to do more than merely invoke the Charter like a mantra, it will be sufficient in most circumstances that there is some evidence that shows the decision-maker seriously turned his or her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person's human rights and the implications thereof for the affected person, and that the countervailing interests or obligations were identified." (emphasis added)
77 [2010] VSC 310; (2010) 28 VR 141.
78 [2015] VSCA 197; (2015) 48 VR 129 at [221], [288], and [535]-[538].
(2) Every person has the right to enjoy the person's human rights without discrimination.
(4) Every person has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.
"discrimination, in relation to a person, includes direct discrimination or indirect discrimination, within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, on the basis of an attribute stated in section 7 of that Act.
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, section 7, lists attributes in relation to which discrimination is prohibited, including, for example, age, impairment, political belief or activity, race, religious belief or religious activity, sex and sexuality."
(a) sex;
(b) relationship status;
(c) pregnancy;
(d) parental status;
(e) breastfeeding;
(f) age;
(g) race;
(h) impairment;
(i) religious belief or religious activity;
(j) political belief or activity;
(k) trade union activity;
(l) lawful sexual activity;
(m) gender identity;
(n) sexuality;
(o) family responsibilities;
(p) association with, or relation to, a person identified on the basis of any of the above attributes.
(a) the "haste" with which vaccines have been developed;
(b) concerns over the safety of the vaccine;
(c) doubts over the effectiveness of the vaccine;
(d) concerns over adverse reactions to the vaccine; and
(e) personal "research" and beliefs as to the severity of Covid 19.
"In my opinion a complainant alleging discrimination on the ground of his political conviction is required to show that the conviction possessed by him and shown to have been the ground for his disadvantageous treatment by the respondent, was a conviction which had to do with government - the policies of government, the structure, composition, role, obligations, purposes or activities of government. Convictions about these things and other things of that kind relating to government or the relationship between citizens and government may be properly described as political convictions." (Emphasis added)
81 At 183.
"It is well recognised that in legal documents "include" may be used to extend the meaning of the word defined beyond its ordinary meaning. Alternatively, "include" may be used not merely to add to the natural significance of the word defined, but to afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning to be attached to that word in the particular document; see generally Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps [1898] UKLawRpAC 56; [1899] AC 99 at 105-6 per Lord Watson. Again, in a given context, "the craftsman may have used 'include' not so much to extend the ordinary meaning of the defined term as to specify as falling within the definition that which might otherwise have been in doubt: Lillyman v Pinkerton (No 2) [1982] FCA 279; (1982) 71 FLR 135 at 138"; per Gummow J in Hepples v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 94 ALR 81 at 101."
"Under s 15(2) of the Human Rights Act, police officers and staff members have a right to enjoy their human rights without discrimination. As will be seen below, discrimination may include discrimination on the basis of conscientious belief. The direction distinguishes between people with a religious objection and people with a conscientious objection in the context of vaccination, by providing an exemption for religious objection only. This involves providing discriminatory enjoyment of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief in s 20 of the Human Rights Act."
82 Horsell International Pty Ltd v Divetwo Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 368 at [166].
"Under s 15(4), QPS personnel have a right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. Under sch 1 of the HRA, "discrimination" is defined inclusively, as including the attributes listed in s 7 of the AD Act. As indicated above, the attributes of impairment, religious belief and political belief in s 7 of the AD Act are unlikely to include a conscientious belief about vaccines or vaccination status. However, because the definition of "discrimination" in the HRA is inclusive, it may protect additional grounds that are analogous to those listed in s 7 of the AD Act. We consider that a "conscientious" belief will likely be sufficiently analogous to qualify as a ground of discrimination under the HRA, but vaccination status will not (because that status is not sufficiently "immutable")"
Every person has the right to life and has the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life."
death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity".84 The UNHRC is not a court, but I adopt what Bell J said in _PJB v Melbourne Health (Patrick's Case)_85 where he said that the Human Rights Committee's opinions
"... represent an important body of jurisprudence on the interpretation and application of the [ICCPR]. Australian courts of high authority have referred to and relied on the opinions and general comments of the committee when interpreting the provisions of the covenant or domestic legislation to which it is relevant."
"The Commission recalls that this Article primarily provides protection against deprivation of life. Even assuming that it may be seen as providing protection against physical injury, and intervention such as a vaccination does not, in itself, amount to an interference prohibited by it. Moreover, the applicant has not submitted any evidence that, in the particular case of his child, vaccination would create a real medical danger to life".87
85 [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373 at [72].
86 Association X v The United Kingdom (1978) 14 Eur Comm HR 31.
87 Boffa v San Marino (1998) 92 Eur Comm HR 27 at 33.
88 [2021] NZHC 3012; [2022] 2 NZLR 26.
89 At [31].
Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment - s 17
"17 Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
A person must not be -
(a) subjected to torture; or
(b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or
(c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person's full, free and informed consent."
"[29] ... Whilst persons in the position of the applicants are not being forcibly treated in the sense that they can decline to be vaccinated, they are required to be vaccinated as a condition of their employment and to decline to do so can, and has, led to termination. A right does not need to be taken away in its entirety before it is regarded as having been limited. A limitation short of removal is still a limitation. ...
[30] It is a matter of degree whether practical pressure to undergo a medical treatment will be taken to have limited the right to refuse that treatment. Here the level of pressure is significant and amounts to coercion. The employees are forced to be vaccinated or potentially lose their jobs.
This involves both economic and social pressure. I accept that the right is accordingly engaged, and that it is limited by the Order. The key question in this case is whether this limitation is demonstrably justified." (emphasis added)
(a) prevent "authorised workers" (a person who had had a Covid 19 vaccination) from leaving an affected "area of concern" in which they resided; and
(b) prevent some people from working in the construction, aged care and education sectors unless they had been vaccinated with an approved Covid 19 vaccine.
91 [2021] NSWSC 1320; (2021) 393 ALR 664.
92 [1992] HCA 15; (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 233.
of persons without their consent. Neither provision imposed a sanction for being unvaccinated per se. On its face these provisions impaired freedom of movement and not a person's autonomy over their own body."93
"[63] ... People may choose to be vaccinated or undertake some other form of medical procedure in response to various forms of societal pressure including a law or a rule, an employment condition or to avoid familial or social resentment, even scorn. However, if they do so, that does not mean their consent is vitiated or make the doctor who performed the vaccination liable for assault. So far as this case is concerned, a consent to a vaccination is not vitiated and a person's right to bodily integrity is not violated just because a person agrees to be vaccinated to avoid a general prohibition on movement or to obtain entry onto a construction site. Clauses 4.3 and 5.8 of Order (No 2) do not violate any person's right to bodily integrity any more than a provision requiring a person undergo a medical examination before commencing employment does."
[161] ... it is clear from the plaintiffs' affidavits that most if not all of them feel that the effect of the Vaccination Directions is to coerce them to consent to being vaccinated in order to be able to continue earning a living and keep their jobs, in circumstances where they would not otherwise consent to the treatment. On that basis I consider there to be an arguable case that the right in s 10(c) of the Charter is limited by the Vaccination Directions. Justice Beech-Jones' rejection of a similar argument in Kassam was based on the common law concerning consent to a trespass to the person. It is arguable that the concept of consent at common law is narrower than the 'full, free and informed consent' to medical treatment that is contemplated by s 10(c) of the Charter."
93 Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWSC 1320; (2021) 393 ALR 664 at [58].
94 Ibid at [59].
" ... determination of whether 'consent' has been given 'freely' is doubly complex: first, we need a stable and defensible conception of 'free' action; and, secondly, employing this conception, we need to be able to interpret actions with some confidence as 'free' or otherwise.
With regard to the first of these puzzles, we can probably agree that the more egregious forms of coercion, undue pressure, and influence are inconsistent with any plausible conception of free consent. There might also be support for the view (although perhaps less clearly so) that inducements and incentives can tell against free consent. Beyond such a core of minimal agreement, however, as Duncan Kennedy has argued, the concept of voluntariness is elastic, prey to ideological manipulation, and intrinsically unstable."97
96 Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2007.
97 Op cit at 8.
mandatory vaccine requirement on ambulance service officers "would put pressure on those officers to get vaccinated".
99 28 NE 266 (Mass. 1891).
100 [1973] USCA9 361; 482 F 2d 893 (1973) at 913.
102 [2021] NSWCA 299; (2021) 106 NSWLR 520.
103 Ibid at [171].
"[207] It may be accepted that an inevitable consequence of these provisions for payment of Medicare benefits is that it is very unlikely that a medical practitioner could establish or maintain practice as a general practitioner in a way that did not give patients any access to those benefits. Whether a
104 [1949] HCA 44; (1949) 79 CLR 201.
105 Ibid at 252.
106 Ibid at 253.
107 Ibid at 292-293.
108 [1980] HCA 30; (1980) 145 CLR 532.
practitioner could establish or maintain a practice without agreeing to accept assignments of the Medicare benefits in full payment for some or all of the services the practitioner renders to patients would be determined by many considerations. But even if it is possible to practise as a general practitioner without bulk-billing at least some patients, it may be accepted that there is little if any practical alternative to practising in a way that gives most patients the right to claim whatever Medicare benefits are lawfully available. In that sense there is practical compulsion to participate in the Medicare scheme.
Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief - s 20
"20 Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief
(1) Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, including -
(a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of the person's choice; and
(b) the freedom to demonstrate the person's religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, either individually or as part of a community, in public or in private.
(2) A person must not be coerced or restrained in a way that limits the person's freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief."
"[45] There is little authoritative jurisprudence on freedom of conscience under para. 2(a) of the Charter. However, the concurring reasons of Madame Justice Wilson in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 179, are instructive in their approach to freedom of conscience. She stated:
It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society "freedom of conscience and religion" should be broadly construed to extend to
110 [1982] ECHR 1.
111 113 D.L.R. (4th) 67; [1994] 2 F.C. 406.
conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion or in a secular morality. Indeed, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "conscience" and "religion" should not be treated as tautologous if capable of independent, although related, meaning.
It seems, therefore, that freedom of conscience is broader than freedom of religion. The latter relates more to religious views derived from established religious institutions, whereas the former is aimed at protecting views based on strongly held moral ideas of right and wrong, not necessarily founded on any organized religious principles. These are serious matters of conscience. Consequently the appellant is not limited to challenging the oath or affirmation on the basis of a belief grounded in religion in order to rely on freedom of conscience under para. 2(a) of the Charter. For example, a secular conscientious objection to service in the military might well fall within the ambit of freedom of conscience, though not religion. However, as Madame Justice Wilson indicated, "conscience" and "religion" have related meanings in that they both describe the location of profound moral and ethical beliefs, as distinguished from political or other beliefs which are protected by para. 2(b)."
112 [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 AC 246.
113 At [23]-[24], [31].
114 [2009] UKEAT 0219_09_0311; [2010] ICR 360; [2010] 2 All ER 253.
others.115 It was necessary for the belief to have a similar cogency to a religious belief but it need not be shared by others.116 If a person could establish that a philosophical belief was held which was based on science as opposed, for example to religion, there was no reason to disqualify it from protection.
"There is a strong sense that freedom of conscience, unlike freedom of religion, is limited to the beliefs and mental processes of an individual and that it does not necessarily protect any action motivated by the conscience of the person."118
115 Ibid at [24].
116 Ibid at [27].
117 [2010] ACTSC 149; (2010) 245 FLR 410.
118 At [46].
119 (Applications nos. 47621/13 and 5 others) 8 April 2021.
(1) Every person in Queensland has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without discrimination to participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Every eligible person has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without discrimination -
(a) to vote and be elected at periodic State and local government elections that guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors; and
(b) to have access, on general terms of equality, to the public service and to public office."
A person has the right -
(a) not to have the person's privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and
(b) not to have the person's reputation unlawfully attacked."
120 (2009) 29 VAR 1.
121 [2002] ECHR 427; (2002) 35 EHRR 1.
grant him immunity from prosecution. That decision was upheld, but the court described the scope of the right to private life in these terms:
"As the court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of 'private life' is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by art 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as being contained in art 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees."122 (emphasis added, citations omitted)
"[219] It is unnecessary for me to decide whether the rights set out in s 13125 are also engaged. I note that the interference with a person's family or home has to be unlawful or arbitrary in order to infringe the right. It is not enough, it appears, that it is unlawful only because of s 38 - that is, it has to be unlawful independently of the Charter."
- does not involve the same analysis necessary under s 13. It is, instead, a broad and
122 At [61].
123 Thompson v Minogue [2021] VSCA 358; (2021) 67 VR 301 at [49].
124 [2014] VSC 648.
125 The cognate provision to s 25 HRA.
126 [2021] VSCA 200; (2021) 64 VR 270.
127 At [152].
general assessment of whether any interference extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose being pursued.129
(a) the privacy right is expressed with the internal limitation that only interferences with privacy that are unlawful or arbitrary are protected;
(b) a person who alleges a limit on the right to privacy bears the onus of showing that the interference with their privacy was either "unlawful" or "arbitrary";
(c) the evidence that will be required to discharge the onus will depend upon a number of factors, including the nature and scope of the human right that is said to be limited and the nature and availability of information that may inform
132 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135].
that question. In the case of a human right with internal limitations which are informed by matters that are solely in the knowledge of a public authority, a person alleging that his or her human right has been limited may be able to discharge the onus by pointing to objective circumstances which, in the absence of information from the public authority, are capable of giving rise to an inference of limitation;
(d) an "unlawful" interference is "one which infringes an applicable law";
(e) an "arbitrary" interference is one which is capricious, or has resulted from conduct which is unpredictable, unjust or unreasonable in the sense of not being proportionate to the legitimate aim sought;133 and
(f) the proportionality that inheres in non-arbitrariness is not the same thing as proportionality for the purposes of s 13 of the HRA.
(a) the requirement to take a vaccine is unrelated to the capacity of a QPS employee to carry out his or her duty;
(b) for that reason, the making of the Directions were disproportionate and unjustified in circumstances where the vaccines had little to no effect on reducing transmission of the Omicron variant; and
(c) the continued enforcement of the Directions without a proper review having been undertaken renders the Directions disproportionate to the risk and therefore unjustifiable.
Both the Commissioner and Dr Wakefield argue that as the term "unlawful" requires infringement of an applicable law and an infringement which arises independently of the HRA, that limb of the requirement has not been demonstrated. I agree.
133 See also Explanatory Note, Human Rights Bill 2018, s 22.
(1) Every person has the right to liberty and security.
(2) A person must not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
(3) A person must not be deprived of the person's liberty except on grounds, and in accordance with procedures, established by law.
(4) A person who is arrested or detained must be informed at the time of arrest or detention of the reason for the arrest or detention and must be promptly informed about any proceedings to be brought against the person.
(5) A person who is arrested or detained on a criminal charge -
(a) must be promptly brought before a court; and
(b) has the right to be brought to trial without unreasonable delay; and
(c) must be released if paragraph (a) or (b) is not complied with.
(6) A person awaiting trial must not be automatically detained in custody, but the person's release may be subject to guarantees to appear -
(a) for trial; and
(b) at any other stage of the judicial proceeding; and
(c) if appropriate, for execution of judgment.
(7) A person deprived of liberty by arrest or detention is entitled to apply to a court for a declaration or order regarding the lawfulness of the person's detention, and the court must -
(a) make a decision without delay; and
(b) order the release of the person if it finds the detention is unlawful.
(8) A person must not be imprisoned only because of the person's inability to perform a contractual obligation."
"[664] The purpose of the right to liberty and security is to protect people from unlawful and arbitrary interference with their physical liberty, that is, deprivation of liberty in the classic sense. It is directed at all deprivations of liberty, but not mere restrictions on freedom of movement. It encompasses deprivations in criminal cases but also in cases of vagrancy, drug addiction, entry control, mental illness etc. The difference between a deprivation of liberty and a restriction on freedom movement is one of degree or intensity, not one of nature and substance.
[665] The fundamental value which the right to liberty and security expresses is freedom, which is a prerequisite for individual and social actuation and for equal and effective participation in democracy."
134 Re Kracke (2009) 29 VAR 1 at [621]-[628].
relevant evidence as it becomes available so that it may inform their decision making. This was a trial about the lawfulness of certain directions not about the effectiveness of vaccines against COVID-19 and its variants.
(a) Professor Nikolai Petrovsky - called by the applicants; and
(b) Associate Professor Holly Seale and Associate Professor Dr Paul Griffin - called by the respondents.
(a) the Court cannot be satisfied that the opinions that Professor Petrovsky expressed were based on the application of his expertise and experience; and
(b) the Court cannot be satisfied that he has acted as an independent expert who has complied with his duty to the Court.
135 An adjuvant is a substance which enhances the body's immune response to an antigen.
"Leveraging my prior experience in developing SARS and MERS coronavirus vaccines as well as pandemic influenza vaccines, my team designed and formulated a recombinant protein-based vaccine incorporating our Advax adjuvant technology to create a COVID-19 vaccine known as Covax-19 or Spikogen. This vaccine was shown to be highly protective and prevent transmission in relevant animal models of infection. It has subsequently successfully completed Phase 1, 2 and 3 clinical trials where it demonstrated protection against symptomatic infection with the SARS-CoV-2 delta variant and on this basis the vaccine I developed has received emergency use authorisation from the Iranian FDA."
(a) he believed that there was a conspiracy which led to the South Australian Government changing their vaccination mandate exemptions to "deliberately sabotage" his own vaccine trials;
(b) he believed that there was a conspiracy involving CSL Limited, an Australian company engaged in the production of the AstraZeneca vaccine, and companies which Professor Petrovsky described as "potential competitors" which have lobbied against him with the federal government - this was not disclosed in his reports;
(c) he believes that influential millionaires in Sydney and Melbourne (who accumulated wealth by reason of the privatisation of CSL in the 1990s) are working against him and, by virtue of their influence, have been preventing his company getting "traction" in Australia;
(d) he makes comments about the provisional approval processes of the Therapeutic Goods Administration but does not disclose that he had received an infringement notice from the TGA;
(e) he believes that the TGA (the organisation responsible for approving vaccines for use in Australia) which had provisionally approved vaccines developed by his "potential competitors":
(i) had unjustifiably targeted to him, possibly at the behest of his potential competitors;
(ii) is unaccountable; and
(iii) is operating outside the rule of law; and
(f) he believes in the possibility of a conspiracy between the manufacturers of provisionally approved vaccines in Australia (being vaccines about which he expresses views in his reports) and the TGA, which has led to the TGA targeting him.
"And do you believe that some connection between the manufacturers of approved vaccines in Australia and the TGA led the TGA to targeting you? - -
- Again, I was raising that as possibilities. I wasn't saying that, you know, we had strict evidence of that. I was just saying you have to ask the question, given those relationships, of whether that might be the case.
Do you believe that both of the major political parties in Australia are acting to advantage the vaccines that've already been approved in Australia because of money flowing back to them from the international companies that manufacture those vaccines? - - - Do I believe that?
Yes? - - - I believe that, you know, obviously, there's a large amount of money that's being spent by the government on - on those vaccines and we know that, you know, the companies that are - are receiving that money employ large numbers of lobbyists. And, obviously, the role of those lobbyists is to influence government to ensure that those funds continue to flow. So in - in that sense of a loop, yes, I - I do believe that ..."
"And is it also your view, Professor Petrovsky, that: 'mRNA vaccines are the new opioids'?
--- No, I don't [sub]scribe to that.
I see. Let me hand you a document. See, this is another tweet from your Twitter account, Professor Petrovsky? - - - Yes.
And you see it says:
'mRNA vaccines are the new opioids'?
--- Yes.
Did you post this tweet? - - - Again, I don't recall posting this. It - it appears to be from, as I say, my Twitter account and again, linking to another article.
And you see it goes on to say:
136 Now "X".
'Once hooked, you will find it very hard to get off without severe consequences. The indirect evidence of vaccine-enhanced infection with these types of vaccines is increasing'?
--- Yes.
And is that a view you hold? - - - It's certainly a concern of mine that we - we have seen evidence of, you know, increased infection in people who have had these vaccines, and we have also seen a need to keep administering them, I think, when they are in many jurisdictions, up to 5 or 6 booster doses, so that - it indirectly, does look to be a problem if - if the only way to keep being protected is to have to have something on a very regular basis, so - so that could be a concern, if you were at high risk, if you stopped, then if you had to keep going."
(a) There are two commonly used measures or "metrics" used to describe a virus:
(i) transmissibility - the ability of pathogens to pass from one person to another; and
(ii) virulence - the likelihood of disease caused by the passing of that pathogen. It is also used as a simple measure of the likely severity of a case.
(b) Since the initial identification and classification of COVID-19 in early 2020, numerous variants had emerged and circulated globally.
(c) A "variant of concern" is a variant of COVID-19 which demonstrates an increase in transmissibility, or more severe disease (for example, increased hospitalisations or deaths), or a significant reduction in neutralisation by antibodies generated during a previous infection or vaccination, or any combination of those matters.
(d) Professor Griffin described (in his report) the means of transmission in this way:
"7. Transmission occurs via small particles containing the virus that can be expelled from an infected person's mouth and/or nose when they cough, sneeze, speak, sing or even breathe. Another person can contract the virus when particles containing the virus that travel through the air are inhaled (or come into direct contact with the eyes, nose or mouth). These particles can only typically travel relatively short distances hence this process is referred to as short-range aerosol or short-range airborne transmission and why the virus spreads mainly between people who are in close contact with each other, for example at conversational distance.
8. In poorly ventilated and/or crowded indoor settings these particles can remain suspended in the air and/or travel farther than the typical conversational distance. This is often called long range aerosol or long- range airborne transmission.
10. Hence the setting most conducive to transmission is prolonged indoor close contact in poorly ventilated spaces."
(e) A person infected with COVID-19 may (for differing periods of time) exhale those particles which may then be inhaled by another person and, potentially, lead to transmission.
(f) One of the most important factors influencing transmissibility is the person's "peak viral load" and level of "viral shed". The term "viral load" refers to the amount of virus detectable in an individual's test samples - they being the samples obtained by tests such as the PCR and RAT tests. The term "viral shed" refers to the amount of virus that is being disbursed by an infected person, that
is, the shedding of the aerosolised particles that may transmit the disease to another person.
(g) A person with COVID-19 can shed the virus, for a short period of time (that period can differ from person to person) usually at about the time of the onset of symptoms but it is also possible for asymptomatic people to shed the virus and, thus, transmit the disease. It is only while people are "shedding" that they can transmit the disease to others. The likelihood that a particular person will transmit the disease to another person depends on several factors and is highly variable - those factors include the particular variant and any protective measures taken by those persons.
(h) The Delta strain was classified as a variant of concern by WHO on 11 May 2021 and became the dominant strain of COVID-19 by mid-2021. It became the dominant strain because it had a higher transmissibility than earlier variants. It was also a highly virulent strain.
(i) The Omicron strain was first reported on 24 November 2021 and was declared by WHO to be a variant of concern on 26 November 2021. The variant was present in Australia from about that time and became the dominant strain in mid-December 2021. It was the dominant global strain by the end of January 2022. Omicron peaked in Queensland on 18 January 2022 and began to decline from that time but was still circulating widely in the community.
"It is important to point out that while Omicron may be relatively more mild than Delta, it is by no means a mild infection, and many have contended that the reduced disease we are now seeing is also largely contributed to by increased rates of vaccination. Further, even though it is less severe, with the magnitude
of increased cases the burden is actually greatest with Omicron as evident by the following table:
"While the majority of cases recover without clinical intervention, approximately 20% of global cases result in more severe outcomes, including shortness of breath and pneumonia that require hospital admission, oxygen therapy and possibly even mechanical ventilation ... . Risk factors for more severe disease include increasing age and comorbid conditions however this does [not] mean those who do not possess these risk factors are free of the possibility of severe disease, it is just less likely in this group."
for the Omicron variant. Data which became available after the relevant period suggested that a booster dose of mRNA vaccine restored the effectiveness against symptomatic disease to 50 - 75% for the first three months and then 40 - 50% between four and six months after the booster dose.
achieved through vaccination or isolation of patients, and the least effective was the use of personal protective equipment. She said it was essential that a range of measures be implemented to reduce the risk of transmission and that should include vaccination.
"These measures are typically viewed as complementary with no one single method having 100% efficacy and the extent to which they are applied needs to consider the epidemiological risk at the time with the unintended consequences of the intervention. Unfortunately to achieve a sufficient level of risk reduction, typically a number of the above strategies would need to be applied in parallel and relatively rigorously enforced to ensure they are done at a sufficient level such that the unintended consequences of such a strategy are likely to be prohibitive. Particularly when this is considered in relation to vaccination which has been proven safe and effective."
(1) A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) In deciding whether a limit on a human right is reasonable and justifiable as mentioned in subsection (1), the following factors may be relevant -
(a) the nature of the human right;
(b) the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(c) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose;
(d) whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose;
(e) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(f) the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right;
(g) the balance between the matters mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f).
(a) the court's approach to an issue of proportionality under the HRA goes beyond that traditionally adopted for judicial review;
(b) but there is no shift to a merits review;
(c) the intensity of review is greater than applies in the absence of the application of s 13; and
(d) the court must make an evaluation by reference to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time.
137 [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 AC 100 at 116.
"[316] The difference between judicial reviewing for unlawfulness against applicable human rights standards and doing so for unlawfulness against the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard was explained by Lord Steyn in his "justly-celebrated and much-quoted" judgment in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept . In his Lordship's view, the proportionality criteria "are more precise and more sophisticated than the traditional grounds of review". Lord Steyn went on to identify certain differences between the two standards of review, of which these are relevant to us:
'First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision-maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review in as much as it may require attention to be directed to the relevant weight accorded to interests and considerations.'
[317] It can be seen that, by its very nature as a standard of review, proportionality draws the court more deeply into the facts, the balance which has been struck and the resolution of the competing interests than traditional judicial review. This gives rise to the issue of how the court is to provide effective judicial protection for human rights while at the same time respecting the administrative function of the public authority under its legislation and not drifting into merits review. One important way of addressing that issue is by
140 [2010] VSC 310; (2010) 28 VR 141 at [145].
affording weight and latitude to the acts and decisions of primary decision- makers." (emphasis added, citations omitted)
"[98] It is sometimes said that, even though a greater degree of scrutiny is involved in assessing whether a public authority has acted compatibly with a human right, because the Court is undertaking its judicial review function, it is not entitled to enter upon the merits of the public authority's decision-making and second-guess it: the Court's jurisdiction is supervisory, not substitutionary. The task of the Court is to determine whether the impugned conduct of the public authority is unlawful because it did not comply with its human rights obligations under the Charter.
141 [2021] VSCA 358; (2021) 67 VR 301.
case of the Commissioner, concluded that some interference with rights was justified. It is sometimes contended that a degree of deference should be afforded a decision- maker who has a highly developed appreciation of the make-up, structure and operations of a particular workforce. Both the Commissioner and Dr Wakefield would fall into that category. But what constitutes the appropriate weight to be afforded the decision-maker's conclusion remains a matter for the court and "what matters in any case is the practical outcome, not the quality of the decision-making process that led to it."142
Section 13(2)(b) - nature of the purpose of the limitation.
Section 13(2)(c) - relationship between the limitation and its purpose and whether it helps to achieve the purpose.
recognised. There was evidence that the vaccinations had an effect in protecting against serious infection. The necessary relationship has been demonstrated.
Section 13(2)(d) - whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose.
strategies. She said that multiple control strategies should be implemented at the same time and follow on from each other. In her opinion, based upon the reports to which she referred, vaccination ranked as the most effective control measure to prevent transmission of COVID-19 and the use of personal protective equipment ranked as the least effective measure. The studies upon which she relied emphasised the problems with personal protective equipment. They were almost entirely concerned with a failure to use the equipment in the proper way rather than the equipment itself being inadequate.
Section 13(2)(e)-(g) - the balance between the importance of the purpose of the limitation, and the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation.
As was said in Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd:143
"[28] The function of an order in the nature of certiorari is to remove the legal consequences, or purported legal consequences, of an exercise or purported exercise of power which has, at the date of the order, a discernible or apparent legal effect upon rights." (citation omitted)
"[25] The function of an order in the nature of certiorari is to remove the legal consequences or purported legal consequences of an exercise or purported exercise of power. Thus, an order in the nature of certiorari is available only in respect of an exercise or purported exercise of power which has, at the date of order, an "apparent legal effect". An order in the nature of certiorari is not available in respect of an exercise or purported exercise of power the legal effect or purported legal effect of which is moot or spent. An order in the nature of
143 [2018] HCA 4; (2018) 264 CLR 1 at [28] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ.
144 Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43; (2013) 252 CLR 480.
certiorari in those circumstances would be not simply inutile; it would be unavailable." (citation omitted)
"[100] ... Although an act done in contravention of s 160 is not invalid, it is a breach of the Act and therefore unlawful. Failure to comply with a directory provision "may in particular cases be punishable". That being so, a person with sufficient interest is entitled to sue for a declaration that the ABA has acted in breach of the Act and, in an appropriate case, obtain an injunction restraining that body from taking any further action based on its unlawful action." (citation omitted, emphasis added)
145 Johnston & Ors v Carroll (APM, Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Ishiyama & Ors v Aitken & Ors; Hunt & Ors v Gerrard & Anor [2024] QSC 6.
146 [2017] VSC 251; (2017) 52 VR 441.
147 [1998] HCA 35; (1998) 194 CLR 355.
148 [2018] NSWCA 196; (2018) 98 NSWLR 820 at [289].
and the entitlement of the applicants not to be subjected to or concerned about proceedings related to alleged breaches of the directions can best be recognised by making the following orders.
(a) In Matter 11254/21
(i) The Court declares that Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 issued on 7 September 2021 and Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 issued on 14 December 2021 were unlawful under s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019.
(ii) The Commissioner of Police be, and is, restrained from:
- (A) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QPS Directions, and
- (B) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QPS Directions.
(b) In Matter 12168/21
(i) The Court declares that Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 12 issued on 7 September 2021 and Instrument of Commissioner's Direction No. 14 issued on 14 December 2021 were unlawful under s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019.
(ii) The Commissioner of Police be, and is, restrained from:
- (A) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QPS Directions, and
- (B) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QPS Directions.
(c) In Matter 11258/21
(i) The Court declares that Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements Human Resources Policy is of no effect.
(ii) The Director-General of Queensland Health be, and is, restrained from:
- (A) taking any steps with respect to enforcement of the QAS Direction, and
- (B) taking any disciplinary proceedings against any of the applicants based upon the requirements of the QAS Direction.
Johnston & Ors
Carroll
(2014) 228 FCR 35
(1990) 170 CLR 1
(1985) 10 FCR 1
(2012) 248 CLR 1
(2015) 48 VR 129
(1949) 79 CLR 201
(2010) 28 VR 141
(2017) 52 VR 441
(2021) 310 IR 399
(2005) 221 CLR 99
(2021) 64 VR 270
(2020) 63 VR 1
(2021) 393 ALR 664
(2021) 106 NSWLR 520
(2021) 286 FCR 412
(2020) 271 CLR 550
(2016) 240 FCR 158
(2013) 249 CLR 332
(2011) 245 CLR 1
(1951) 83 CLR 402
(2011) 39 VR 373
(2018) 264 CLR 1
(2010) 245 FLR 410
(1938) 60 CLR 601
(1991) 4 WAR 176
(2018) 98 NSWLR 820
(1992) 175 CLR 218
(1957) 96 CLR 245
(2019) 270 FCR 173
(2020) 281 FCR 578
(2021) 67 VR 301
(2003) 58 NSWLR 631
(2013) 252 CLR 480
(2015) 236 FCR 169
(2011) 39 VR 327
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1957) 96 CLR 261
(2011) 241 CLR 594
(2009) 24 VR 415
(2016) 48 VR 647
(2016) 51 VR 473
(2014) 44 VR 526
(2008) 20 VR 414
(2021) 67 VR 270
(2020) 271 CLR 394
(2015) 256 CLR 569
(2015) 90 ALJR 197
(2020) 269 CLR 439
(2018) 264 CLR 541
(2011) 242 CLR 573
(1993) 40 FCR 409
(1989) 88 ALR 287
(1997) 147 ALR 509
(1999) 162 ALR 651
(1989) 18 NSWLR 481
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1982) 71 FLR 135
(1990) 94 ALR 81
(1980) 145 CLR 532
(2009) 236 CLR 573
(2007) 230 CLR 89