South-West Forest Defence Foundation Inc v Executive Director, Department of Conservation & Land Management

One of the particular considerations in Oshlack which led to confirmation of Stein J's order in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, to the effect that a successful local government body not have its costs against an individual seeking to enforce environmental legislation, was the existence in that case of special legislation in New South Wales facilitating an "increased opportunity for public involvement and participation in environmental planning and assessment" [2] and enlarging the standing rules to permit that to be done. [3] No similar legislation existed in the present case. To the contrary, the respondents always contested the standing of the applicants and mounted a major challenge in this Court against the decisions below on that question. I see no basis in the first argument of the applicants for a departure from the ordinary rule.

1. Land and Environment Court Act 1979 NSW, s 5(c). 2. Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 NSW, s 123.

7. The second argument was that, if the court had refused special leave when the matter was heard by Brennan CJ, Toohey and Hayne JJ by video-link from Perth on 8 December 1997, the applicants would not have been put to the costs (considerable as I would surmise) of proceeding to Hobart where more than two days were set aside for the hearing of their applications as on a full appeal. The difficulty with this argument is that the proceedings from Perth could indeed have concluded in the ordinary way. However, it was with the consent of the applicants that the exceptional course was taken of affording them the opportunity to advance the many elements of their application as on a full appeal. It must be assumed that they accepted that opportunity, despite the costs and inconvenience of a hearing venue in Hobart. Presumably they did so in the hope that the larger facility to persuade the court would bear fruit. Although it did not, this was a risk which the applicants ran. They were doubtless advised of the cost implications. There is no basis in the second reason advanced for a departure from the ordinary rule as to costs.

8. The applicants then ask that they not be rendered liable for the respondents' costs of the application for special leave to cross-appeal which was not considered by the court in the way in which the hearing in Hobart concluded. However, the respondents were entitled to defend themselves in answer to the applicants' claims. The cross-appeal sought to raise the question of standing which I have mentioned. It was properly raised as a matter of counter-argument. Accordingly, upon conventional principles, the costs so incurred are part of the respondents' costs. To the extent that they are reasonable they must therefore be paid by the applicants.

9. Finally, the applicants asked that they be relieved of the costs of their application for orders that the respondents provide 14 days notice of any proposed logging operations in the relevant forest areas of Western Australia pending the conclusion of the special leave applications before this Court. Applications to that effect were heard in Perth on 19 January 1998 by Toohey J. An arrangement was made between the parties which was recorded. His Honour reserved the costs of the applications. It is possible that the undertakings sought, and eventually given, could and should reasonably have been dealt with by agreement between the parties without troubling the court. Such a question, if still in contest, should be resolved on taxation of costs according to established principles. It does not affect the general orders which the court makes.

10. I therefore agree with the costs order proposed.