HCX v Children’s Guardian

Texts Cited: None cited

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: HCX (Applicant)
Children’s Guardian (Respondent)

Representation: Applicant (Self represented)
Counsel:
A Zheng (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor (Respondent)

File Number(s): 2025/00236370

Publication restriction: Pursuant to section 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), with the exception of expert witnesses and officers of government agencies, the publication or broadcast (disclosure) of the name of any person mentioned in these proceedings or referred to in the documentary material lodged in these proceedings is prohibited.
Note: A reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. By an application made to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) on 19 June 2025 (Review Application), the Applicant seeks administrative review pursuant to s 27 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (WWC Act) of the decision (Decision) made by the Children’s Guardian (Respondent) on 23 May 2025 to refuse to grant him a Working With Children Check Clearance (WWCC Clearance).

2. Given the nature of the proceedings, an order was made by the Tribunal under s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) that the publication or broadcast of the name of any person mentioned in the proceedings or referred to in the material lodged in the proceedings is prohibited. The Applicant is referred to by the pseudonym “HCX”.

3. For the reasons that follow, based on a consideration of the evidence before the Tribunal, and having had regard to the matters in s 30(1) of the WWC Act, we are satisfied that the Applicant is a real and appreciable risk to the safety and wellbeing of children and young persons. We are also satisfied on the available evidence and pursuant to s 30(1A) of the WWC Act, that a reasonable person informed of all the relevant facts would not allow their child to have unsupervised contact with the Applicant while he is engaged in child-related work, and that it is not in the public interest to grant him a WWCC Clearance.

Background

Application for WWCC Clearance and Risk Assessment

4. On 30 September 2022, the Applicant applied for a volunteer WWCC Clearance. On 1 December 2022, the Applicant was sent a Notice of Risk Assessment which advised him that a risk assessment (Risk Assessment) was required under section 15(1) of the WWC Act. [1]

5. On 2 February 2024, the Applicant made a duplicate paid application for a WWCC Clearance. His previous application was closed, [2] and the new application (WWCC Application) was referred for a Risk Assessment.

6. On 4 March 2025, the Applicant was provided with a notice of a proposed refusal of the WWCC application. [3]

7. Following consideration of the evidence submitted on behalf of the Applicant, the Respondent made the Decision to refuse the WWCC Application. Having regard to a number of incidents identified in the Risk Assessment, and the factors set out in s 15(4) and s 15(4A) of the WWC Act, the Respondent was satisfied that the Applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.

Statutory scheme and 2025 amendments

8. The WWC Act establishes a statutory scheme the object of which is to protect children by not permitting certain persons to engage in child-related work and by requiring persons engaged in child-related work to have a WWCC Clearance: s 3, WWC Act. Section 4 of the WWC Act provides: “The safety, welfare and well-being of children, and in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration in the operation of this Act”.

9. The WWC Act was amended by the Child Protection (Working with Children) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 (NSW) (Amendment Act) which came into effect from 23 September 2025 (the date of assent). A key aspect of the changes brought about by the Amendment Act is the removal of external review of decisions made by the Respondent in relation to WWCC Clearances. A person who has been refused a WWCC Clearance no longer has the right to seek external review of the refusal by the Tribunal.

10. As noted above, the Review Application was made on 19 June 2025. This was before the amending legislation came into effect on 23 September 2025. The Amendment Act includes transitional and savings provisions that apply to applications that had been made but not determined at the date of effect: Schedule 3, WWC Act.

11. Relevantly, cl 25 of Schedule 3 provides:

An amendment made to a provision of Part 4 of this Act by the amending Act does not apply to or in respect of a review (or an appeal arising from a review) if the review commenced before that amendment and that provision, as in force immediately before that amendment, continues to apply to and in respect of any such review or appeal.

12. Clause 27 applies to applications for review that have been made to the Tribunal but not finally determined before the commencement date. If the relevant application was commenced before the introduction date, the application must be determined by the Tribunal as if the Amendment Act had not commenced: cl 27(2).

13. Clause 27(6) contains a number of relevant definitions. The “introduction date” is defined as meaning the date on which the Bill for the Amendment Act was first introduced into Parliament: see cl 27(6). That date was 5 August 2025. The “commencement date” means the date on which the clause commenced operation. Section 2 of the Amendment Act provides that the Act commenced on 1 December 2025 for the provisions relating to mutual recognition of negative notice but otherwise commences on 23 September 2025. It follows that applications lodged with the Tribunal under the WWC Act before 5 August 2025 will continue to be dealt with by reference to the legislation as it operated prior to the Amendment Act.

14. The Review Application was lodged before 5 August 2025 and was not finally determined before 23 September 2025. As such, in accordance with the transitional provisions, it is to be determined by the Tribunal with reference to the pre-Amendment Act legal framework.

Pre-Amendment Act legal framework

15. Section 5B of the WWC Act provides that a reference to a “risk to the safety of children” is a reference to a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.

16. By s 6(1) of the WWC Act, a person is engaged in “child-related work” if they are engaged in work that is specified in s 6(2) and which involves “direct contact by the worker with a child or children and that contact is a usual part of and more than incidental to the work”. A person is also engaged in “child-related work” if they are in a child-related role: WWC Act, s 6(3). Direct contact with children is defined in s 6(4) as meaning either physical contact, or face to face contact. Section 7 provides for “additional child-related work”.

17. Section 8 provides that a person must not engage in child-related work unless the person holds a WWCC Clearance of a class applicable to the work. By s 12, there are two classes of WWCC Clearances: volunteer clearances, authorising workers to engage in unpaid child-related work, and non-volunteer clearances, authorising workers to engage in paid and unpaid child-related work.

18. Section 13 provides that a person may apply to the Respondent for a WWCC Clearance. The application must specify the class of clearance applied for. A person who is refused a WWCC Clearance is not generally entitled to make a further application for a clearance until five years after the date of the notice of the refusal: s 13A, WWC Act.

19. Division 3 of Part 3 of the Act provides for risk assessments which the Respondent is entitled to undertake in a wide range of circumstances. Section 14 provides that a person is subject to an assessment requirement if any of the matters specified in Schedule 1 to the WWC Act apply to the person. Schedule 1 identifies a number of “assessment requirement triggers”. They comprise cases where there are proceedings and/or convictions against a person in relation to certain criminal offences, findings of misconduct against a person involving children, notifications of reportable conduct and negative notices in other jurisdictions.

20. Section 15(4) of the WWC Act sets out a range of matters that can be considered in a risk assessment. These include the seriousness of the matters that caused the assessment; the age of the people involved; the time the matter occurred; the seriousness of the person’s criminal history and their conduct since the matters occurred and the likelihood of repetition. By s 15(4)(k), the Respondent may consider “any other matters [it] considers necessary”. The matters listed in s 15 are broadly similar to those listed in s 30 which is set out in full below at [26].

21. By s 16 of the WWC Act, the Respondent is empowered to seek further information about an offence or related matter and may terminate an application or cancel an existing WWCC Clearance if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to provide that information.

22. Division 4 of Part 3 deals with determination of applications. By s 18(2) of the WWC Act, the Respondent must grant a clearance to a person subject to a risk assessment unless the Respondent is satisfied that the person poses a risk to the safety of children. If the Respondent proposes not to grant a WWCC Clearance, by s 19 the person concerned must be notified and given an opportunity to make a submission. Section 20 provides that a final decision must be made and notified to the person concerned. If the decision is not to grant a WWCC Clearance, there must be reasons for the decision, and the person must be notified of the right to seek a review of the decision under Part 4 of the Act.

23. Part 4 of the WWC Act provided for reviews and appeals. A person who has been refused a WWCC Clearance may apply to the Tribunal for review: s 27(1), WWC Act.

24. Sections 30 and 30(1A) of the WWC Act set out matters that the Tribunal must consider when exercising its jurisdiction under Part 4:

Determination of applications and other matters

(1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part—

(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar,

(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred,

(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred,

(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,

(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,

(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,

(g) the person’s present age,

(h) the seriousness of the person’s criminal history and the conduct of the person since the matters occurred,

(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition,

(i) any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person,

(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application,

(j) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A,

(k) any other matters that the Children’s Guardian considers necessary.

(1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the affected person) to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that—

(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and

(b) it is in the public interest to make the order.

Role of the Tribunal

25. Section 9(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act) provides that the Tribunal has administrative review jurisdiction over a decision if enabling legislation provides that applications may be made to the Tribunal for an administrative review. Sub-section 9(2) provides, “If enabling legislation makes provision for applications to be made to the Tribunal in respect of an administratively reviewable decision subject to certain conditions, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under the enabling legislation only if those conditions are satisfied”.

26. Section 63 of the ADR Act relevantly provides:

Determination of administrative review by Tribunal

(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(a) any relevant factual material,

(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.

(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

27. Section 28(1) of the NCAT Act provides that the Tribunal has such jurisdiction and functions as may be conferred or imposed on it by or under the Act or any other legislation. In relation to administrative review jurisdiction, s 30(1) of the NCAT Act refers in turn to s 9 of the ADR Act, which refers to jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by enabling legislation.

28. The relevant enabling legislation for the purpose of s 9 of the ADR Act is s 27(1) of the WWC Act, which provided that a person who has been refused a WWCC Clearance may apply to the Tribunal for review. While the primary decision is the decision under review, the Tribunal’s role is, as set out in s 63 of the ADR Act, to determine what is the correct and preferable decision having regard to the material before it. It follows that the Tribunal is not limited to reviewing the correctness of the primary decision.

29. For the purpose of determining an application for administrative review, the Tribunal exercises all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision: s 63(2) of the ADR Act. However, in exercising those functions, the Tribunal must not simply “stand in the shoes” of an administrator. As explained in DYH v Public Guardian [4] at [21], the Tribunal must conduct its review without any presumption as to the correctness of an administrator’s decision:

The effect of these two subsections is sometimes characterised as the Tribunal being required to “stand in the shoes” of the administrator who made the decision. But that is not entirely accurate. I must conduct this review without any presumption as to the correctness of the decision: McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] VR 521 at [530] and I am required to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material before me. It is clear that that may include material which postdates the making of the decision: YG and GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247 at [25], Drake v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1970) 2 ALD 60 at 77.

30. In making its decision, the Tribunal is not limited to considering only material that was before the original decision-maker, but may consider any relevant material, including, generally, material that post-dates the decision under review: see Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [5] at [37]-[38], [45]-[46], [99], [143]; Bilanenko v Commissioner of Police [6] at [10].

31. The Tribunal can exercise all of the functions of the person who made the decision: it can affirm the decision; vary the decision; set the decision aside and substitute for it a different decision, or set the decision aside and remit it to the decision-maker for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has held that an order under s 27 of the Act should not be made subject to conditions.

32. By s 38(2) of the NCAT Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice.

Burden of Proof

33. The WWC Act does not expressly provide for either party to carry an onus in an application for administrative review under Part 4 of the Act and it has been determined that neither party bears an onus of proof in relation to an application under s 27 of the Act: BJB v Office of the Children’s Guardian [7] (BJB) at [32] referred to by the Court of Appeal in Tilley v Children’s Guardian [8] (Tilley) at [23] and see Children’s Guardian v CHN [9] at [89] per Button J.

Evidence before the Tribunal

Documentary evidence

34. In support of his Review Application, the Applicant relied on:

(a) Bundle of documents filed on 19 September 2025 (AB) which comprises;

(i) document addressed “To the Risk Assessment Officer and Panel” containing the Applicant’s responses to allegations raised by the Respondent during the Risk Assessment process (AR); (ii) two printouts recording the Applicant’s attendance at two child safety seminars held by the Respondent in March 2026; (iii) five character references and a photo and ‘Thank You’ card from the cricket team the Applicant coached in 2022-23; and (iv) a Court Attendance Notice from 7 November 2005 with handwritten annotations.

(b) Applicant’s submissions dated 25 March 2025 (AS1); (c) Applicant’s closing submissions dated 13 April 2026 (AS2).

35. The Respondent relied on the following material:

(a) Bundle of documents filed on 31 July 2025, pursuant to s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (RB1); (b) Additional bundle of evidence filed 6 November 2025 (RB2); (c) Respondent’s submissions dated 19 January 2026 (RS1); (d) Respondent’s closing submissions dated 16 March 2026 (RS2).

Tribunal hearing

36. The matter was heard by the Tribunal on 23 February 2026.

37. The Applicant was self-represented, and he gave oral evidence and was cross-examined at the hearing.

Applicant’s background

38. The Applicant was born in 1975 and is currently aged 50 years. He has been married to his wife for 16 years, and they have a daughter aged 13 and a son aged 10 years.

39. The Applicant has completed an Advanced Diploma in Accountancy. He has worked as a security guard at licensed venues, and he was employed as a Sherriff’s Officer with the NSW Attorney-General’s Department from September 2003 to March 2006.

40. From 2009 to 2019 the Applicant was employed as a Rescue Communications Officer at the NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES). He was medically discharged from the NSW SES after suffering a workplace injury in September 2016 that caused severe damage to his cochlea. He now receives a Centrelink Disability Support Pension and is seeking paid employment.

41. From 12 February to 15 March 2024, the Applicant was employed at The Disability Trust in the Workskills department. Workskills is a Disability Employer Provider that assists clients with a disability, health condition or injury to find employment. The Applicant was unable to secure his NDIS Worker Screening Clearance and WWCC Clearance, and he thereby became ineligible to continue working at The Disability Trust.

42. The Applicant has had work stevedoring on a wharf, but it is not regular work. He applied for a job at a Council and was interviewed for the position, however he withdrew his application because a WWCC Clearance was required.

43. The Applicant is currently a first-grade soccer referee and has a long history as a cricket coach. The Applicant wishes to be granted a WWCC Clearance so that he can obtain employment in a customer service role, and coach his son’s cricket team and his daughter’s soccer team. [10]

Allegations leading to Risk Assessment

44. The Applicant’s application for a WWCC Clearance was referred for Risk Assessment based on the following criminal charges, allegations and complaints made against the Applicant between the period 1992 and 2023 (Allegations):

45. two counts of indecent assault as a child in 1992, which were dismissed (‘1992 Assault Charges’); [11]

46. one count of an aggravated indecent assault in 1998, which was dismissed following a hearing before the Local Court (‘1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge’); [12]

47. a record of a sexual harassment complaint made in the workplace in 2003, which resulted in two AVOs, but no charges laid (‘2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint’); [13]

48. a record of two teenage girls alleging that in 2005 the Applicant supplied them with alcohol and had sex with one of them, which did not result in any charges (‘2005 Underage Allegations’); [14]

49. a record for the offence of Unlawful entry on inclosed lands in 2005, for which the Applicant entered a guilty plea and was given a s 10 bond without conviction following an appeal (‘2005 Unlawful Entry Offence’); [15]

50. a record of a complaint in 2006 that the Applicant identified himself as a police officer, which did not proceed ‘(2006 Complaint’); [16]

51. records from 2008 and 2009 of disciplinary investigations into workplace allegations between 2004 and 2007, which ultimately resulted in the Applicant being permitted to resign from his position with the Sheriff's Office. The two specific allegations are those concerning the Applicant’s conduct in 2004 (‘2004 Workplace Allegations’); [17] and

52. complaints made in 2023 of threats and harassment made against an ex-wife of a friend of the Applicant, which were not substantiated (‘2023 Complaint’). [18]

53. The Respondent’s position in these proceedings is that it places no weight on the 2023 Complaint, nor does it not rely on the 2006 Complaint.

1992 Indecent Assault Charges

54. In 1992, when he was aged 16 years, the Applicant was charged with indecent assault of a 16-year-old female school student.

55. The material before the Tribunal regarding the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges is limited. It is contained in a single Crime Information Report which records: [19]

56. over the period 1 to 29 February 1992, the Applicant was alleged to have assaulted a female student by approaching her from behind while she was walking up a staircase at school, and putting his hand under her skirt and grabbing her on the bottom; and

57. on 8 May 1992, the Applicant was alleged to have assaulted the same 16-year-old female student by approaching her while she was seated in a classroom and grabbing hold of her left breast.

58. These allegations were reported to the Police on 25 May 1992, and the Applicant was arrested and charged on 2 June 1992. According to the Applicant’s criminal history report, the charges were heard in the Children’s Court on 21 August 1993, and each count was dismissed. [20]

59. In his written submissions, the Applicant explained why the charges were dismissed: [21]

This alleged incident occurred during school hours when the Applicant was 17 years old, and [the Applicant] believes the accuser was 18 years old at the time. Multiple witnesses testified that the Applicant was innocent and there were character references from teachers Mr [B] and Ms [B] in support of the Applicant. The matter was then dismissed.

60. The Applicant was questioned about these charges during cross-examination at the hearing. His evidence was that he was “shocked” by the allegations, and he believes that his behaviour was not anything “out of line”. When asked why he thinks the allegations were made by the female student, the Applicant said that he had been told by her close friend that the female student’s step-father had forced her to make the false allegations. The Applicant described the step-father as “sick” and “demented” and accused him of having made “racial slurs” towards the Applicant and his siblings. He said that he believed that the step-father wanted “compensation”.

61. The Applicant told the Tribunal that when the female student was cross-examined at the criminal trial, she was “caught lying” and she gave inconsistent answers to questions put to her. It was for this reason that the charges were dismissed.

62. When asked whether he had considered how his own behaviour may have led to the allegations, the Applicant said that he had not reflected on his behaviour, because he had “done nothing wrong”. The Applicant confirmed that “multiple witnesses” provided character references for him, and they gave oral evidence and were cross-examined at the criminal trial. These witnesses included two teachers, the principal and fellow students.

1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge

63. In January 1999, the Applicant was charged with Aggravated indecent assault – victim under authority of offender in relation to a 17-year-old female (victim), which was alleged to have occurred on 1 November 1998 in the carpark of the supermarket where the Applicant was employed as a security guard. [22] The matter proceeded to trial in the Local Court and was heard over two days, being 7 June 1999 and 13 September 1999, and then was stood over for judgment to 2pm on 15 September 1999. [23] The charges were dismissed by the Court, but the reasons for the dismissal are not included in the Court file which is incomplete.

The alleged incident

64. The facts as alleged by the victim were recorded by Detective W: [24]

The victim in this matter attended the [supermarket]. She selected a number of items including a frozen lasagne. While in the store she had a conversation with [the Applicant] who was employed by the store as a security officer. The victim had met [the Applicant] previously only knowing him by sight. The victim left the store paying for a number of items but not the lasagne. She had decided to steal this item.

She hid this under the jacket she was wearing. Outside the store [the Applicant] again spoke with the victim. The conversation was about the [Applicant] taking the victim out. He gave the victim a hug and at that time discovered the lasagne. He convinced the victim to get into his car.

After this he drove the victim to a quieter part of the car park of the store. He then placed his hand under the victim’s top and touched her breasts. He then placed his hands down her pants and placed his finger inside her vagina. The [Applicant] then removed his pants and placed the victim’s hand on it. He then asked the victim to perform oral sex on him.

The victim declined. The [Applicant] then drove the victim back to the rear of the store where she left and went to a friend’s place and informed her friend of what had happened. The [Applicant] was interviewed by way of ERSIP at the … police station on 7 January 1999. On advice of his solicitor … he declined to answer questions in relation to the matter. He was co-operative with police, attending the police station when requested.

65. Constable C spoke with the victim on 1 November 1998. [25] In his statement, Constable C stated that the Applicant disclosed the incident to him, and showed him a small piece of white paper with the Applicant’s name written on it and a mobile number, and several pages of notes in an exercise book describing the incident. [26] In his statement, Detective W states that on 24 November 1998, he spoke to the victim and obtained a statement from her, her mother, her friend, and the manager of the supermarket. [27]

Police interviews

66. Following two phone calls with the Applicant, Detective W spoke to the Applicant in person on 7 January 1999, during which the Applicant confirmed that he knew the name of the victim, and denied the assault. Detective W then placed the Applicant under arrest, conveyed him to the Police Station, and conducted an electronically recorded interview with the Applicant. The transcript of that interview records that the Applicant indicated that before he answered any questions, he wished to see his solicitor. [28] The interview concluded without any substantive discussion about the matters the subject of the charge.

67. The Applicant attended another interview with the Police on 9 February 1999, accompanied by his solicitor. The transcript records that the prior to the interview, the Applicant had been provided with a copy of the victim’s statement. [29] The matters set out in the victim’s statement were put to the Applicant during the interview. The transcript of interview records that the Applicant told Police that the first time he met the victim was on the date of the incident, 1 November 1998. [30]

68. During the interview, the Applicant gave a version of events which were inconsistent with the victim’s statement on a number of points including: [31]

69. whether the Applicant approached the victim in the store, or whether she approached him;

70. whether she introduced herself as K1 or as K2, and if she said she was 18 or 24 years old;

71. whether, when the Applicant stopped the victim outside the store on suspicion of theft, he stopped for a drink of water from his car; and

72. whether the victim verbally abused the Applicant during their confrontation.

73. The victim also alleged that when she was in his car, the Applicant made a number of references to the stolen lasagna, plainly using it a point of leverage during the incident. The Applicant denied this version of events during his police interview. He said that when he confronted the victim about the lasagna outside the store, she threw it at him, and then he took it back into the store and showed it to the store manager. [32]

Criminal proceedings

74. The victim gave oral evidence in person at the criminal trial and largely confirmed the version of the incident in her statement. [33] Her evidence was that the Applicant initially approached her in the store and started a casual conversation with her. She told him she was 18 years old (when in fact she was 17 years old but turning 18 years old in 17 days) and that her name was K1.

75. The victim’s evidence was that after she went through the check-out without paying for the lasagna in her possession, she and the Applicant had a conversation as they left the store, during which time he asked to her to walk over to his car with him. He grabbed her from behind when she went to get her bike, which was when he felt that she had the lasagna on her person. [34] He then touched her breast, and asked her to go for a drive in his car. She got into the Applicant’s car because she was concerned that she would get into trouble for theft of the lasagna. [35]

76. Consistently with the account in her statement, the victim’s oral evidence was that in the car the Applicant started to touch her breasts again. She disclosed her actual age, and the Applicant unzipped his pants and asked her to perform oral sex, while also digitally penetrating her vagina, and offering to let her keep the lasagna in exchange for oral sex. [36] The victim then exited the car, which was when the Applicant gave her the white napkin with his name and phone number on it.

77. In her oral evidence at the criminal trial, the victim’s mother corroborated the victim’s account that she made a contemporaneous disclosure of the assault to her mother around 5pm on 1 November 1998. [37] The victim’s friend corroborated the victim's account that the victim arrived at her apartment around 2pm on 1 November 1998, emotionally upset, and made a contemporaneous disclosure that she had been touched by the security guard at the supermarket, after which her friend encouraged her to write down what occurred in a note book. [38]

Applicant’s evidence in these proceedings

78. The Applicant’s evidence in the written submissions prepared by his solicitor on his instructions is that about six to nine months before the indecent assault allegations were made against him, he had detained a female shoplifter (the victim) as she left the premises and retrieved from her approximately six items that she had stolen and then instructed her to leave the property. At the time, he prepared a detailed incident report which he gave to the store manager. When the Applicant caught the victim shoplifting again some six to nine months later, she made the indecent assault allegations against him. [39]

79. The Applicant was questioned about the allegations during cross-examination at the Tribunal hearing. He confirmed that the version of events in his written submissions reflected his best recollection of what occurred at the relevant time. He added that he had previously encountered the victim with her boyfriend, whom he described as “her pimp”, prior to the incident, when he was working as a security guard at another supermarket. He said that she said to him “I’ll see you in court wog” and this was witnessed by staff and the store manager.

80. The Applicant was taken to the transcript of the Police interview where he referred only to the lasagne that the victim was alleged to have stolen. He said that she had stolen other items which she had hidden in her pocket, and he detailed this in the incident report that he prepared for the store manager. At the time of the incident, he made notes in his own notebook and then later prepared the written incident report.

81. During cross-examination at the Tribunal hearing, the Applicant gave further detail of what he says occurred during the criminal trial. The Applicant told the Tribunal that he had the full support of multiple witnesses, including the store manager. When the victim was cross-examined, she did not give the same account of the incident to that which she had provided in her written statement to the Police, and she admitted to lying about the indecent assault. The matter was adjourned so that the victim could get legal representation, because she could not understand what was going on in the court. The charge was subsequently dismissed. The Applicant said that the victim apologised to him about three or four years after the criminal proceedings.

2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint

82. The information before the Tribunal regarding this complaint is limited to a section 31 response from the Child Abuse and Sex Crimes Squad, [40] and a more detailed version provided by NSW Police. [41] These record a report made on 18 February 2003 by a 19-year-old female (complainant) who was a work colleague of the Applicant, who was then 27-years old. The Applicant and the complainant had sexual relations on two occasions over the Christmas break in 2022, after which she made it clear to the Applicant that she did not wish to pursue a relationship.

83. The complainant reported that following her ending of their relationship, the Applicant began to sexually harass her over the phone, in the workplace and at her residence, including following her around at work, touching her inappropriately at work, making sexual comments to her, turning up outside her home and calling out suggestive comments to her. The version of the report provided by the Police indicates that the complainant reported being afraid to go anywhere by herself, and she now resided with a female friend who worked at the same organisation. The Applicant’s behaviour was reportedly witnessed by several people in the workplace.

84. The Applicant was not charged in relation to these allegations. The Police successfully applied for two Apprehended Violence Orders (AVOs) on behalf of the complainant against the Applicant on 20 February 2003 and 6 March 2003, both of which expired on 11 April 2003. [42]

85. In his written submissions made to the Respondent, the Applicant denied the allegations, and claimed that it was he who was the subject of unwanted advances from the victim: [43]

I categorically deny the allegation of verbal harassment. My actions at the work Christmas party were entirely reactive to unwanted and very public advances from the [complainant] who was demonstrably intoxicated. She repeatedly grabbed and continuously tried grabbing my crutch throughout the entire time at the Christmas party. This also happened in the workplace especially after I made it clear I was not interested in pursuing a relationship with her. The events that took place at the work Christmas party was absolutely disgraceful.

Multiple witnesses, exceeding fifty colleagues, were present throughout the afternoon and evening. These included senior management like the General Manager and CEO, as well as my direct manager, team leader, and our colleagues. They all attested to the inappropriate behaviour directed towards me, and many did in their statements to the police including our direct work colleagues, manager and the General Manager. If the OCG is going to investigate this then I urge you to request the police witness statements from our colleagues (at the time). They are all there on file.

Despite my attempts to disengage, the [complainant] persisted in following me after I left the party. I departed the venue and used public transport as proof that I sought to avoid her and further interaction. Upon returning to my car, it is true she discretely followed me and got into my car. She apologised for her behaviour and asked if I could give her a lift home. I did so and while driving I explained to her that I wished to remain nothing but friends. I dropped her off at her foster parents’ house and then drove myself home to Wollongong.

Prior to the Christmas Party, the [complainant] knew I had a girlfriend, and it didn’t seem to bother her at the time. While I wasn’t engaged, I was definitely in a relationship. Shortly after, we fell into a casual fling and made a terrible decision. Yes, we had sex on two occasions. Once at my place of residence and once at her foster family’s residence. It was a foolish mistake, and I deeply regret a number of things including cheating on my girlfriend. Reliving this past mistake is certainly not enjoyable.

Upon returning to work shortly after the Christmas break, a short time later I was made aware of the [complainant’s] allegations and I cooperated fully with the investigation. Statements from numerous work colleagues as witnesses corroborated my account and supported my lack of culpability. Please investigate the matter thoroughly and seek police and witness statements to prove what I am saying to be true.

I understand that this incident occurred over 20 years ago, however, the clarity of the events and the number of witnesses present makes the details entirely verifiable.

From memory, I believe the police contacted me to advise that after [the complainant] heard and saw the witness statements that laid against her, the police confirmed she retracted her allegation and/or statement. This information was given to me directly from the police. I’ve heard nothing since and I have nothing further to add.

86. During cross-examination at the Tribunal hearing, the Applicant agreed that he and the complainant had a sexual relationship before she went “schitzo” at the Christmas party. He said the complainant was “crazy” and was attaching onto him and grabbing and mauling him during the party, and this was witnessed by 60-70 of his work colleagues.

87. The Applicant was taken to the Police Facts Sheet recorded on 18 February 2003 which records the account given by the complainant (described as the Victim) in relation to the harassment to which she was subjected to by the Applicant: [44]

The [Applicant] joined the Company about four months ago and has the same duties as the Victim. Over the Christmas period, the Victim and the [Applicant] had been intimate on two separate occasions. Since then, the Victim has made it quite clear to the [Applicant] that she did not wish to have a relationship with him. The [Applicant] has then started to sexually harass the Victim, both in the work-place, at her residence and over the phone by leaving messages on her mobile. The harassment in the work-place is continual and is on a daily basis. The [Applicant] follows the Victim into the meal room and tries to put his hands down her blouse or down her pants. He tries to rub himself up against her. He verbally harasses her calling her a slut and a prick teaser. The [Applicant] eats his lunch at his desk and whilst holding a Lebanese cucumber in his hand and holding it upright in his lap, says to the Victim, “Do you want some of this”. When the Victim declines, the [Applicant] replies, “Well, you didn't say no before”. The [Applicant] walks up behind the Victim and leans up against her. Most of this harassment occurs in full view of other employees. The Victim has made four separate complaints to her boss about the above incidents but as yet, the boss has not done anything about it other than giving the [Applicant] a verbal warning. The [Applicant] was moved from his desk to another but is still within full view of the Victim's desk. The [Applicant] has turned up out the front of the Victim’s home address at 3am on morning and yelled from his car, “Will you go down on me”. When the Victim has refused, the [Applicant] got verbally abusive calling the Victim such things as a “Prick teaser” and a “Slut”. The [Applicant] leaves messages and warnings on her mobile phone such as “You’re a slut” and “Don’t cross me”.

The Victim stated she was unsure as to whether to have the [Applicant] charged or not and was going to speak to … first to get some advice. The Victim has concerns for her welfare as the [Applicant] has made it known to the Victim that he owns a gun. Enquiries made via COPS has revealed that the [Applicant] has a rifle registered in his name and also holds a current Firearms Licence …

88. During cross-examination at the hearing, the Applicant said that the complainant “lied” about what had occurred in her statement to the Police. He acknowledged that at the time he had a girlfriend and said that he should not have cheated on his girlfriend with the complainant.

2004 Workplace Allegations

89. In 2008 and 2009, two investigations were conducted involving the Applicant’s behaviour in the workplace in 2004. The Woodhouse Investigation concerned a number of allegations regarding the Applicant’s interactions with women in the workplace, and in his role as a Sheriff’s Officer working in the Local Court. [45]

90. The allegations against the Applicant are detailed in the Woodhouse Investigation report. Four allegations of inappropriate conduct / behaviour / harassment of female officers were made against the Applicant, of which the following two were found to be substantiated: [46]

91. Allegation 1 - during October and November 2004, the Applicant was alleged to have sent between 40 to 50 inappropriate text messages, including those of a sexual nature to a junior female colleague (female officer) who worked two days a week at the Local Court where the Applicant was employed.

92. Allegation 2 - in November 2004, the Applicant made inappropriate comments about the female officer to her mother, who also worked in the same department.

93. It her statement to the investigator, the female officer described the harassment she was subjected to by the Applicant: [47]

As best I can recall I have known [the Applicant], Sheriff's Officer (SO) since I started doing the two days at [the Local] Court. On the day we met he had duties in Court while I was monitoring. During the day he passed me messages on pieces of paper. They were friendly messages like 'What's your name?, 'How old are you?' and 'How long have you been here?' I didn't think anything of it and responded to his questions.

Towards the end of the day [the Applicant] passed me a note with his mobile phone number on it. He wrote something like ‘If you need any help” or ‘If you need a lift home, just let me know.’ By this stage he knew [the location where] I lived. He left for the day and we didn't see or speak to each other that afternoon before I left.

I got my train as usual and it broke down ... After about an hour I thought to myself ‘How funny. He’d offered me a lift and her I am stranded’. I sent a text message telling [the Applicant] that I was stranded and saying how funny that was. I said that my girlfriend was coming to get me. [The Applicant] texted back saying that he was on his way home and was more than happy to collect me. I texted him back saying that there was no need.

From then on [the Applicant] started to text me on a regular basis. These texts probably started from the next day that I worked at [the Local] Court and went on for maybe two months. I’d guess that over that period, [the Applicant] would have texted me over fifty times. I showed my mum some of the text messages. [The Applicant] occasionally rang me on my mobile phone but I never answered his calls.

Some of the text messages that [the Applicant] sent were of a sexual nature. For example, in one text he said that he’d booked a 5-star hotel for us, that he'd take me out for dinner and that we’d spend the rest of the night having sex. I responded to this text and made it clear to him that I had a boyfriend and was not interested in him in any way possible. I sent this same message on many other occasions. In at least one text he called me a ‘ball breaker’. He would ask when I was working again and if I would meet him. At times I would reply to his texts, as long as I didn't find the text offensive. As best I can recall I didn't respond to the ‘ball breaker’ text. I didn't know what it meant at the time.

I was becoming increasingly freaked out by the constant messaging. I had made it clear to [the Applicant] about my boyfriend and that I was not interested...

One day when I was rostered to the Downing Centre, I was off sick and resting in bed at home. Sometime between around 11am and 12pm the home phone rang and I missed the call as I was asleep. When I got up I did *10# to check the number and it was [the Applicant’s] mobile number. I freaked out as I didn't know how he knew that I was off work and how he knew my home phone number. I rang mum and told her about the missed call. It was some time after this occasion that mum told me that she’d spoken to [the Applicant] about his contacting me and the text messages. Mum said that [the Applicant] was surprised when he found out that she was my mum.

94. The Woodhouse Investigation concluded that Allegation 1 was substantiated, based on the consistency of the descriptions of the text messages provided by the five witnesses who were interviewed, in addition to the female officer and her mother. The Applicant denied the allegations when interviewed for the investigation, and said: [48]

the mother and daughter, you’ve got to understand these people ... basically her mother and herself ... in their own sick way I guess you could say, especially her mother of all people, used to hit on me. Her mother used to tell me about her, if I remember correctly, 17 year old boyfriend. I don’t care, you know, whether she’s 50 odd years old, good luck to you. But you’ve got to understand the sort of people that I dealt with and that used to speak to me.

Like I said, it is totally untrue. These people had a bit of a history when they approached myself but not once, ever, did I ever act upon any of those invitations, ever. Lo and behold, a few certain circumstances that took place over the years, and my return to the … Sheriff’s Office back in February ’07, this is when this whole, well sort of started to unravel.

95. Regarding Allegation 2, the investigator noted that the available evidence was minimal, but that as Allegation 1 was substantiated, she concluded that Allegation 2 was also founded in part because the Applicant had made comments to the female officer’s mother referring to the female officer as “a little hottie” before being advised of their mother-daughter relationship. [49]

96. In cross-examination, the Applicant agreed that he was aware that the female officer had just finished high school and was employed as a junior clerical officer, but he did not know her age. He said that both she and her mother had tried to “hit on” him and had sent him text messages, and the allegations were retaliatory as a result of their failed attempts to attract his interest in them. The Applicant did not agree that there was a power imbalance between him and the female officer.

97. The Applicant told the Tribunal that he was subjected to racial harassment and bullying in the workplace. He made a complaint about this harassment and bullying, and he believes that the court staff wanted him “out of there”. He said that the allegations made by the female officer and her mother were connected to, or retaliatory for, complaints he had made regarding the workplace bullying on account of his race.

98. The Woodhouse Report contains a summary of the Applicant’s complaints of harassment by his work colleagues (Bullying allegations): [50]

... the staff variously made inappropriate and untrue statements concerning [the Applicant’s] character to other Court staff, inappropriately accessed his personal history on the Justice Link Service and/or inappropriately disclosed personal details in an open forum at [the] Local Court concerning [the Applicant’s] 2005 Court matter.

99. The findings of an investigation into the Bullying allegations made by the Applicant are summarised in a letter dated 14 October 2008: [51]

100. although the conversations alleged by the Applicant occurred, they may have been misunderstood or exaggerated;

101. the conversations may have been inappropriate, but were brought on, at least in part, by the Applicant’s actions;

102. the conduct of staff complained of did not meet the definition of bullying or harassment; and

103. a number of female court staff did not feel comfortable working with the Applicant and made a number of allegations which warranted investigation. [52]

2005 Underage Allegations

104. In August 2005, a Police report was made against the Applicant, who was 29 years old at the time, by two females aged 16 and 17 who had previously met the Applicant in his role as a security guard at a hotel. The Police record indicates that both girls made contemporaneous disclosures to their mothers, who brought them to the Police station. [53]

105. The young women alleged that the Applicant had made arrangements to pick them up in his car, and he had purchased a bottle of bourbon which he supplied to them. He then requested that the 17-year-old get out of the car prior to him initiating a sexual encounter with the 16-year-old who said she was “moderately to well affected” by alcohol at the time. [54] She accepted that the sex was consensual, in that she did not request the Applicant to stop at any point, and that he did not force himself. The Police considered that the incident did not “justify further action against the Applicant” because of the lack of evidence against him, and because both “victims could easily be judged to be older than they [were]”. [55]

106. The Police spoke to the Applicant, who claimed not to know that the two girls were underage, because they had come from the hotel and he therefore assumed they were adults.

107. In his submissions to the Respondent, the Applicant claimed that he was not subject to a formal police interview and maintained that he was unaware of the age of the girls, and denied that he bought alcohol for them and had sex with the 16-year-old: [56]

I did not go to the police station and was never asked to go to the police station. One male officer came to my place of residence. He asked me some questions and I answered him. This was not an interview. There was no taped recording or anything like that, and I was not given a copy of any statement either. I honestly cannot recall the exact conversation or what I said exactly. If I said to the officer at the time I met them coming out of a hotel, then naturally I assumed they were over 18 if they came out of a hotel/pub. I may have seen or met them before as I was most likely working security at this pub or hotel. I worked security on Friday and Saturday nights during that time. I honestly cannot recollect.

All I know is that I did not buy them alcohol. I have NEVER bought anyone under the age of 18, alcohol. I did not have sex with a 16yo female, let alone in front of her 17yo female friend while they were both in my car. This is ridiculous and a total lie. So much, that I do recall the police officer advising of the inconsistencies in their version of events when being questioned by police, or words to that effect. Hence, as the police report stated, ‘No further action was taken by police’. It’s been almost 20 years and I have heard nothing since.

108. The Applicant was questioned about these allegations during cross-examination. He did not deny meeting with the young women and said he does not believe he bought them alcohol or had a sexual encounter with the 16-year-old girl. He maintained that he assumed the women were at least 18 years old, as he met them as a security guard at a licensed venue. He accepted that meeting up with young women he met in his capacity as a security guard for a club was “not ideal”, but it was where he met people at that time.

2005 Unlawful Entry Offence

109. In November 2005, the Applicant was convicted of the offence Unlawful entry on inclosed lands in relation to his unauthorised entry into a property on 25 October 2005 when he was working as a Sheriff’s Officer for the NSW Attorney General’s Department. The Applicant pleaded guilty to the offence and was given a s 10 bond without conviction following an appeal to the District Court.

110. On 28 October 2005, the Applicant was suspended with pay pending the outcome of a disciplinary investigation by the Attorney-General’s Department, and a report of the investigation was produced (Investigation report). The Applicant’s suspension ceased on 10 March 2006, and he was reprimanded and demoted to Clerical Officer, Grade 1-2 (Group C) until 31 January 2007 as the penalty associated with the outcome of the disciplinary process. [57]

111. The facts of the Unlawful Entry Offence are outlined in the Investigation report and Police Facts Sheet. [58] On 10 October 2005, the victim was at the property filling out a tenancy application. Whilst she was there, she saw two Sheriff officers trying to gain entry. She allowed them in, and they went upstairs with the Property Manager. When the Property Manager returned, he informed the victim that she was “in trouble” with the Sheriffs and they wanted her phone number. In the following days the victim received text messages from the Applicant. [59] On 18 October 2005, the victim and the Applicant had a date and they also exchanged text messages.

112. On 25 October 2005, the victim returned home early from work and when she opened the door, she discovered flowers in front of the linen press with a card from the Applicant. According to the Police Facts Sheet, the victim contacted the Police when she discovered the flowers, and the Police then attended her apartment. [60] In the presence of the Police, the victim called the Applicant and put him on speaker phone. The Applicant admitted that he was doing an eviction close by, and that he asked for the locksmith tools, which he used to open her door and leave her the flowers. [61] In an interview with the investigator, the Applicant admitted that he said that on the call, but he denied that was in fact what happened, asserting that the victim’s door was open. The investigation was unable to verify that there were any locksmiths in attendance on 25 October 2005. [62]

113. The Applicant was charged with Stalk**ing or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm and Unlawful entry on inclosed lands. The Police withdrew the first charge on the day of the hearing. The Applicant was convicted of the unlawful entry offence by the Local Court, with the Magistrate finding that a “non-conviction” was not available because the Applicant’s conduct involved an abuse of his position. [63] On appeal to the District Court, the conviction was overturned, and the Applicant was given a good behaviour bond under s 10 without conviction. [64] The District Court accepted the findings of the Investigation report, and the Judge relevantly noted that the Applicant’s conduct involved:

114. entering the victim’s apartment without authority, which was unacceptable behaviour regardless of whether the door was open, or he opened a locked door using locksmith tools; [65]

115. being in uniform when he initially spoke to the victim which made his occupation clear to her; [66] and

116. although he did not break any rules while in uniform, he did exercise poor judgment in getting involved with the victim while in the course of his duty. [67]

117. The Applicant was questioned about this incident during cross-examination at the hearing. He told the Tribunal that part of what motivated him to enter the victim’s apartment was a concern that he thought the victim’s door was ajar because the previous tenant that he had evicted from that apartment had returned. He agreed that he did not mention this during the investigation into the incident by the Attorney-General’s Department, but he had mentioned it to his colleagues at the time. The Applicant denied that he used locksmith tools to open the victim’s apartment door and said that entry to the apartment was via swipe card. The Applicant agreed that he had no right to enter the victim’s apartment. He was unable to explain how his conduct may have impacted the victim.

Character references

118. The Applicant filed a card and photo he received from the children and their parents of his son’s Under 11 cricket team which he coached in the 2022-23 season. [68] The card is labelled “[The Applicant] is an awesome cricket coach” and contains messages from the children and their parents including: [69]

Dear Coach … thanks so much for teaching [child] so much, your dedication to the team and to the game is outstanding.

… thanks for coaching you are easily the best coach ever. I hope you can coach next year."

… if I had any other coach in the world I wouldn't love cricket so much.

119. The Junior Co-ordinator at the local Cricket Club provided a letter dated 1 September 2025, [70] and stated that he has known the Applicant for 25 years. He has worked with the Applicant in the past and has observed his “generous nature”. He has only ever received positive feedback from parents about the Applicant and his interactions with the teams, and the Applicant has always been “a strong advocate for the safety of teams” with which he has been involved.

120. In her undated character reference, [71] a female friend of 18 years of the Applicant, stated that he “has consistently demonstrated an unwavering integrity and an exceptional capacity for honour and compassion”. The Applicant has known her two daughters, aged 15 and 17, since their births and has “consistently stepped into a father-figure role, offering them a level of emotional support and guidance that has been invaluable.” The Applicant has “filled the void” of her daughters’ absent father, and he has been “a constant presence”, including escorting her eldest daughter to her year 10 formal, and taking her younger daughter “on individual outings”. The Applicant’s “caring nature has been crucial in helping her [daughter] heal and feel secure.” She is “aware of the allegations raised against” the Applicant, “including the two most recent in 2023 and 2024 that have led to the refusal” of his WWCC Application. As a “firsthand witness” to one of the incidents, she “can state with absolute certainly that these claims are entirely incorrect and appear to be a malicious fabrication.” She is “confident that a thorough investigation will reveal these allegations to be without merit.”

121. In a letter dated 14 September 2025, [72] a female friend of the Applicant states that her late husband worked with the Applicant for 20 years, and during this time she “gained deep insight in [the Applicant’s] character and integrity.” She is aware of the allegations made against the Applicant in 2023 and, based on her “personal knowledge of the circumstances and the individuals involved,” she believes the allegations “are without merit” and were made as “a result of personal animosity” and “do not reflect his true character.”

122. In a letter dated 23 April 2024, [73] the Business Manager of the Disability Trust where the Applicant was employed from 12 February to 15 March 2024, stated that during his employment the Applicant “consistently demonstrated respectful behaviour and professionalism in all interactions” with his colleagues and superiors. The Applicant became ineligible to continue working at the Disability Trust due to him not being able to obtain a WWCC Clearance, and the decision “was based solely on the requirements of employment” set by the Disability Trust and was “not a reflection of [the Applicant’s] character or work ethic.”

123. In a letter dated 11 February 2025, [74] the Applicant’s wife attested to his status as a highly regarded member of the community who is committed to community service. The Applicant is dedicated to continuing his volunteer roles within the community, and to pursue career opportunities to support his family.

124. In a letter dated 16 April 2024, [75] the Coordinator Duty Operations at NSW SES, who supervised the Applicant when he was employed as a Communications Officer at NSW SES from 2009 to 2019, attested to the Applicant’s integrity, commitment to child safety, and good standing within the community:

Throughout the years of working closely with [the Applicant], I have consistently witnessed his unwavering dedication to his duties and his genuine concern for others. [The Applicant] consistently exhibited respect and consideration towards all individuals, regardless of their background, position, gender or age. This made him a valuable asset to our team and an admired person.

Furthermore, [the Applicant’s] caring and thoughtful nature were evident in his interactions with colleagues and members of the community alike. He consistently went above and beyond to assist others and ensure the well-being of those around him. Importantly, [the Applicant] conducted himself with the utmost integrity at all times, earning the trust and respect of his peers, community members and supervisors alike. Many people have gained the benefit of his generous nature and unwavering support during their difficult times. This has made him a popular and loved figure.

Unfortunately, I have observed situations where [the Applicant’s] generosity and support have been taken advantage of and even cases where he has been inadvertently drawn in to the middle of conflicts and become a target of reprisal.

As a former Police Officer with 15 years of experience, I consider myself to be a discerning judge of character. Having known [the Applicant] for over a decade, both professionally and personally, I can confidently affirm that he is a man of unparalleled character and integrity. His reliability, trustworthiness, and honesty are beyond reproach, and I have the utmost confidence in his genuine character and moral fibre.

On a personal note, [the Applicant] has been a close friend of mine now for over a decade, and I have had the privilege of spending considerable time with him outside of work. Through our shared experiences and interactions, I hold [the Applicant] in the highest regard, as his character shines through in every aspect of his life. [The Applicant], his wife … and two children …, are like family to us. My wife and our children adore [the Applicant] and regularly comment on his amazing nature and character. I have also observed him coaching and children in sport and the children always love, respect and adore him.

[The Applicant] has advised me of the allegations he now faces with the [Respondent]. With my extensive observations of [the Applicant], I can categorically state that he would never act in an inappropriate, immoral or illegal manner. I would strongly question the validity of any allegations and the character of any accuser. I am confident that a proper investigation would affirm that [the Applicant] is not only innocent, but truly a man of the greatest morality.

Other supporting material

125. The Applicant filed details of the following current licences he holds: [76]

126. Security Licence;

127. Firearms Licence with the NSW Firearms Registry;

128. NSW Restricted Game Hunting Licence with the Department of Primary Industries.

129. The Applicant provided evidence of two child safety and protection seminars he attended in March 2026 delivered by the Respondent.

130. Developing a Child Safe Risk Management Plan webinar held 24 March 2026 from 3-5pm;

131. Child Safe Reporting Obligations and Processes held on 25 March 2026 from 3-3:45pm.

Submissions

Applicant

132. The material before the Tribunal does not support a finding that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children, namely, a risk that is objective and presently existing, as opposed to one that is speculative, fanciful, or inferred from unproven allegations. [77]

133. The Applicant accepts that, with reference to the principle in BKE v Office of Children’s Guardian [78] (BKE), the Tribunal is not required to make definitive findings of fact, and that it is sufficient if there is material capable of supporting a possibility of the relevant conduct having occurred. [79]

1992 Indecent Assault Charges

134. The possibility that an event occurred cannot be established by the fact of its allegation alone. To place significant weight on an allegation made over 30 years ago and unsupported by sufficient (if any) probative material would risk treating it as capable of supporting a finding of risk to children, when any such conclusion would be fanciful. [80]

135. Considering s 30(1)(b), this allegation is now over 30 years old. The Applicant has limited recollection of the incident, which is unsurprising given the passage of time. That lack of recollection does not advance the assessment of risk. [81]

136. With reference to s 30(1)(c) and (e), the Applicant was a 16-year-old child at the time of the alleged incident, and the alleged victim was of the same, or similar age. There was no age disparity, power imbalance, or relationship of a kind contemplated by the Act as giving rise to an increased risk to children. [82]

137. Even accepting the possibility that the allegation occurred as alleged (which is denied), when considered against the s 30(1) factors, it does not support a finding that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to children. [83]

1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge

138. The Applicant has consistently denied the allegations and maintains that the incident did not occur as alleged. [84] There are significant and irreconcilable differences between the Applicant’s account and that of the complainant. None of the defence evidence adduced at the hearing is before the Tribunal. [85] The Applicant’s recollection of the hearing is that the complainant’s evidence was found to be inconsistent and, in material respects, inconsistent with what she had said in her witness statement. The charge was dismissed following a hearing. There has been no adverse criminal finding against the Applicant, and the allegations therefore remain unproven and of should be given little weight. [86]

139. The Applicant accepts that the material may be considered in accordance with the BKE principle. It would be materially unfair for the Tribunal to afford substantial weight to the allegation or the complainant’s account in circumstances where the Applicant’s evidence, and the account ultimately accepted or at least preferred by the Judge in dismissing the charge, is not before the Tribunal and therefore cannot be properly tested or evaluated. [87] Any inference that the incident may have occurred is speculative, and should be given little, if any, weight in assessing the Applicant’s risk. [88]

140. The allegation is of limited probative value to the question of whether the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to children. In particular, pursuant to s 30(1)(b), the incident occurred over 25 years ago. According to the Applicant’s account, and having regard to s 30(1)(e), there is no factual basis upon which it could reasonably be concluded that he knew, or ought to have known, that the victim was a child, as he claims that she told him that she was 24 years old. [89] The Tribunal should find that the allegation is not made out and that the possibility that the incident occurred as alleged is not established, and it should be afforded little weight. [90]

2005 Unlawful Entry Offence

141. The facts of this offence are not contested by the Applicant, and he entered a guilty plea at the trial. [91] The Applicant further accepts that, for the purpose of assessing risk, it is sufficient that the occurrence of this offence has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the Applicant’s own admission. [92]

142. When the incident is properly assessed by reference to the matters set out in s 30(1)(d)-(f) of the Act, its relevance to any assessment of risk to children is minimal. [93] The complainant was an adult woman at the time of the incident. [94] There are no matters arising as to vulnerability in the sense contemplated by s 30(1)(d), nor does the incident involve a child or any child-related context. [95] With respect to s 30(1)(e), there was no meaningful difference in age, the parties were in a friendly, romantic or quasi-romantic relationship, and there was no imbalance of power or relationship of a kind that would give rise to concern in a child-related context. [96] The question under s 30(1)(f) of whether the Applicant knew, or could reasonably have known, that the complainant was a child does not arise, as the complainant was an adult.

143. The offence occurred in the context of an adult interpersonal relationship, does not involve a child, and is incapable of grounding any conclusion that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to children. It should be afforded no weight. [97]

Likelihood of Repetition

144. There is no real and appreciable likelihood of repetition of any of the conduct demonstrated by the Allegations made against the Applicant. [98] Even if all Allegations were accepted at their highest, it is significant that there has been no comparable conduct or police involvement in the period of more than 20 years since 2005. [99] Such a prolonged absence of any further incident is a powerful indicator against any real and appreciable risk of repetition and should be given significant weight by the Tribunal.

145. The Applicant is now over 50 years of age and is happily married with two young children. [100] Since 2005, the Applicant has undergone a fundamental shift in intrinsic motivations, now centred on his responsibilities to his young family and children. That change, together with the passage of time, eliminates any rational basis for concluding there is any real and appreciable risk, or likelihood, of repetition. [101] Pursuant to s 30(1)(i) of the Act, the Applicant submits there is no likelihood of any repetition of the alleged conduct. [102]

Reasonable person test

146. A reasonable person, apprised of all the evidence, would not conclude that the Applicant poses a risk to children. [103] The reasonable person test is to be applied objectively, having regard to the totality of the evidence, and not by reference to speculation or conjecture. [104] The reasonable person would not approach the task with a closed mind, thinking that once a person has offended, that he or she can never be redeemed. [105]

147. The objective evidence establishes that the Applicant has, over a sustained period, undertaken both employed and volunteer roles involving direct contact with children, including coaching young children in cricket and soccer. Importantly, these roles have been carried out consistently without incident or complaint. [106] That objective history is of considerable probative value. It demonstrates that reasonable members of the community have entrusted the Applicant with the care and supervision of children, including in unsupervised settings. [107] Having regard to s 30(1)(b), the substantial passage of time without allegations of conduct indicative of a risk to the safety of children would, to the reasonable person, support the conclusion that, to the extent any rehabilitation was ever required, it has already occurred. [108]

Public Interest Test

148. In circumstances where the material before the Tribunal does not support a finding that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to children, there is no countervailing public interest consideration that would justify refusing the WWCC Clearance. [109]

149. A WWCC Clearance would enable the Applicant to pursue employment opportunities and facilitate him finding work in his chosen fields. [110] The Applicant’s need for a WWCC Clearance is real and immediate. Over the past three years there have been dozens of jobs suitable and appealing to the Applicant, and he has been unable to apply because they require a WWCC Clearance. The letter from the Business Manager of the Disability Trust states that it was due to his inability to obtain a WWCC Clearance that the Applicant’s employment was terminated, and was not related to his performance, character or any other consideration. [111]

150. The Tribunal should consider, in accordance with the principle in ZZ, that a person has the right to engage in work. [112] The Applicant possesses significant experience in his field, and the ongoing inability to obtain a WWCC Clearance continues to have a substantial financial and familial impact, particularly given that the Applicant is responsible for providing for two young children and his wife. [113]

151. The Applicant has a long history as a cricket coach and is an established and well-regarded member of local cricket clubs. His demonstrated skillset as a coach would be usefully deployed in the advancement of the public interest, particularly in the promotion, development, and mentoring of children. [114]

152. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal should set aside the Decision and grant the Applicant a WWC Clearance pursuant to section 18(2) of the WWC Act. [115]

Respondent

153. The Respondent principally relies on the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge and the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence as bearing upon the assessment of the Applicant’s risk. The Respondent also relies, although to a lesser extent, on the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges, the 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint, the 2005 Underage Allegations, and one of the allegations substantiated in investigation into the 2004 Workplace Allegations, as relevant to the assessment of the Applicant’s risk.

1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge

154. There is sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to comfortably conclude that the incident as alleged occurred. [116] The Tribunal can reject the Applicant’s version of events as unreliable, and fanciful. It does not accord with the Applicant’s own version of the incident given to the Police in February 1999. In cross-examination, the Applicant attempted to distance himself from the account of the incident he gave in his written submissions. His evidence as a whole was unreliable and it should not be accepted. [117]

2005 Unlawful Entry Offence

155. The Applicant’s oral evidence at the hearing that he thought the victim’s door was ajar because the previous tenant he had evicted from the apartment had returned has no basis in any of the contemporaneous documents. [118]

156. Although the Applicant pleaded guilty to the charge and was remorseful at the time of sentencing, in cross-examination, he could not articulate why he was remorseful, other than because he had no right to enter into the victim’s apartment. He unable to explain how his conduct would have impacted on the victim, nor did he show any insight into what that impact could have been. [119]

1992 Indecent Assault Charges

157. The Applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was that he has never reconsidered his behaviour that led to these charges, because he had done nothing wrong. The Applicant said the victim had been forced by her step-father to make false allegations against him. This explanation is far-fetched and has never been previously given. It should not be accepted. [120]

2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint

158. The Applicant’s written and oral evidence in relation to this complaint is focused on the problematic behaviour of the complainant and demonstrates little reflection on his own behaviour (other than acknowledging that he ought not to have cheated on his then girlfriend). [121]

2004 Workplace Allegations

159. The Applicant denied the allegations and claimed they were connected to, or retaliatory for, complaints he had made regarding workplace bullying on account of his race which an investigation found not to be substantiated. [122]

2005 Underage Allegations

160. The Applicant does not deny meeting with the young women but denies he provided them with alcohol and engaged in sexual relations with the 16-year-old girl. He claims he assumed they were at least 18 years old, as he met them as a security guard at a licensed venue. He demonstrated his limited insight into the power imbalance which exists between an older male in a position of relative authority (as a security guard) and female patrons who are underage.

Section 30(1) considerations

161. The 1992 Indecent Assault Charges, the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge and the 2005 Underage Allegations are serious allegations of sexual assault (in the first two instances) or sex with an underage girl whose ability to meaningfully consent would have been comprised by the alcohol supplied to her by the Applicant. [123]

162. The 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint, the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence and the 2004 Workplace Allegations are objectively less serious matters, considered on their own. However, they are serious allegations of inappropriate behaviours engaged in by the Applicant either in the workplace, or in social situations associated with his work, which demonstrate problematic behaviours by the Applicant toward young women and girls. [124]

163. The evidence is that, since the Unlawful Entry Offence in October 2005, no further criminal allegations or workplace complaints have been made against the Applicant. [125] However, the Tribunal would not be satisfied that the mere passage of time mitigates any potential risk posed by the Applicant to the safety of children which arises from evidence of his conduct over the thirteen-year period prior to October 2005. The Tribunal would be concerned to ascertain that the Applicant now has a better understanding of maintaining appropriate boundaries around children and young women over whom he may be in a position of power or authority, before reaching such a conclusion. [126]

164. The Applicant was 23 years old when the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge was laid, and 30 years old when he was charged with the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence. [127] The remaining allegations, span from February 1992 when the Applicant was 16 years old, through to November 2004 when the Applicant was 30 years old. [128]

165. The victim of the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges was 16 years old. [129] The victim of the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge was 17 years old. She was six years younger than the Applicant who was then aged 23, of indigenous heritage, and by inference from her theft of the lasagna, suffering some degree of socio-economic deprivation. She was vulnerable vis-à-vis the Applicant because she had been apprehended and detained by him on suspicion of theft, and he held a position of authority as a security guard. [130]

166. The work colleague who made the 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint was 19 years old, about eight years younger than the Applicant who was then 27 years old. [131] The age of the female officer who made the 2004 Workplace Allegations is unknown, however the evidence is that she had recently finished school and held a junior position at the Court. The Applicant was employed in a more senior role as a Sheriff’s Officer and was 29 years old at the time. [132] The girls who made the 2005 Underage Allegations were 16 and 17 years old. The Applicant was at the time almost 30 years old and employed as a security guard at a hotel the girls frequented. Both girls were intoxicated as result of alcohol supplied to them by the Applicant, which increased their vulnerability. [133] The age of the victim of the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence is not known, but she presumably was an adult. She was aware that the Applicant worked as a Sheriff’s Officer, and she was vulnerable in that he had demonstrated he could obtain entry into her home without her knowledge or consent. [134]

167. There is a real and appreciable likelihood of repetition by the Applicant of the type of conduct demonstrated by the Allegations made against him. [135] While the passage of time since October 2005 reduces the risk to some extent, it does not necessarily extinguish it in circumstances where the Applicant has not demonstrated any discernible insight into his conduct. [136]

168. In weighing all the evidence before it, the Tribunal should conclude that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children, and in particular, older teenage girls, with whom he may come into contact with should he be granted a WWCC Clearance. [137]

Reasonable person test

169. The Respondent contends that the Tribunal would not be satisfied that a reasonable person who is apprised of all the information before the Tribunal, would allow the Applicant unsupervised access to their children, especially to girls in their mid to late teenage years. [138]

170. In circumstances where the Allegations cannot be disregarded as baseless, the reasonable person would not be satisfied that the Applicant ought to be allowed unsupervised access to children. This is particularly so where the Applicant denies all the Allegations other than the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence. [139]

Public interest test

171. If the Tribunal considers that the Applicant poses a risk to the safety of children, and in particular, that the Applicant may act in a sexually inappropriate manner towards a child, then it follows that the public interest test could not be satisfied. It would not advance the public interest to permit a person found to pose such a risk access to children. [140]

172. The Tribunal should affirm the Decision of the Respondent to refuse to grant the Applicant a WWCC Clearance. [141]

Consideration

Legal principles

Tribunal’s protective jurisdiction

173. Having regard to the paramount consideration in section 4 of the WWC Act being the safety, welfare and well-being of children, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s 27 is protective, and not punitive, in nature: BJB at [110] AYU v NSW Office of the Children*’s Guardian [142] (AYU) at [34]; Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [143] per Young JA at [61] and R v Commission for Children and Young People [144] at [130]. The object of the Act is not to impose additional punishment on a person, but to eliminate possible risks to children: CYY v Children’s Guardian (No 2) [145] (CYY)* at [26].

174. The protective jurisdiction of the WWC Act was emphasised by Simpson AJA in CXZ v Children’s Guardian [146] (CXZ) at [58]:

It is plain that in some cases this will be the cause of potential injustice to the applicant for a clearance. A person entirely innocent of any allegations may be refused a clearance because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that the allegations are without foundation and the inability to reach such a conclusion leaves open sufficient possibility that the risk exists. Analysis of the relevant provisions of the Child Protection Act satisfies me that the legislature preferred the risk of injustice to an applicant to risk to the safety of children.

Meaning of “risk to the safety of children”

175. The meaning of “risk to the safety of children” is defined in s 5B of the WWC Act to mean a “real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.” The meaning of the word ‘risk’ was considered by Young CJ (in Equity) in Commission for Children and Young People v V [147] (V) at [42]:

One does not define risk as meaning minimal risk. One would… exclude fanciful or theoretical risk but what one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word ‘risk’ with the words that follow, namely ‘to the safety of children’…

176. His Honour’s consideration of the meaning of risk has been cited with approval by the Tribunal and the NSW Supreme Court: CTE v Children’s Guardian [148] at [30]; BKE at [26] and AYU at [39]. Ultimately, the Tribunal must consider whether a clearance, if granted, will create a “real and not fanciful” risk to the safety of children: CXZ per Basten JA at [26].

177. In BKE, Beech-Jones J, as his Honour then was, considered at some length the nature of a “real and appreciable risk”. His Honour referred to the decision of the High Court in M v M [149] (M v M), where the Court considered the relevance of an allegation of sexual abuse to the determination of what is in the best interests of a child under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Specifically, the High Court considered the nature of the proof required in a case where an allegation of sexual abuse had been made but had not been the subject of a criminal conviction. The High Court unanimously held that a conclusion that the allegation was not made out on a civil standard did not determine the “wider issue” which confronts a court when it is called upon to decide what is in the best interests of the child. The Court explained at [23]:

No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive finding that the allegation is well founded. In all but the most extraordinary cases, that finding will have a decisive impact on the order to be made respecting custody and access. There will be cases also in which the court has no hesitation in rejecting the allegation as groundless. Again, in the nature of things there will be very many cases, such as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual abuse has taken place. And there are strong practical family reasons why the court should refrain from making a positive finding that sexual abuse has actually taken place unless it is impelled by the particular circumstances of the case to do so.

In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk...

178. In BKE, Beech-Jones J held that, subject to matters not presently relevant, the reasoning of the High Court in M v M “is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes” under the WWC Act. His Honour explained at [33] the relevance of the reasoning of the High Court in M v M:

… [T]he reasoning in M v M is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes. Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.

179. This approach was approved by the Court of Appeal in Tilley at [34]-[35] and CXZ at [7(a)] and [28]. In CXZ, the Court of Appeal outlined the test to be applied under s 18(2) of the WWC Act which can be summarised as follows:

(a) the correct test is that set out in Tilley at [34]-[35], adopting the test as explained by Beech-Jones J in BKE citing M v M at [7(a)]; [28]; (b) the Court expressly rejected the proposition that when assessing risk based on disputed allegations of past conduct, the Tribunal is required to adopt a three-step process to consider each allegation in turn; and (c) the language of “lingering doubt and suspicion” has no legal force or significance and is “unhelpful”: at [7(e)]; [29], [79].

180. BKE, Tilley and CXZ establish that the correct approach to dealing with unproven allegations in circumstances where the Tribunal is not satisfied that the allegations (on the available evidence) are proved but also could not disregard the allegations on the basis they are groundless, is to address the question of risk by reason of the possibility that the conduct the subject of the allegations occurred: see CXZ at [57]. We have adopted this approach to the Allegations made against the Application.

181. Of the Allegations against the Applicant, only the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence was proven, and the Applicant was found guilty of the offence. One of the 2004 Workplace Allegations was found to be substantiated following an investigation. The 1992 Indecent Assault Charges and the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge were dismissed, and no charges were laid in relation to the 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint or the 2005 Underage Allegations.

182. In accordance with the approach endorsed in BKE, Tilley and CXZ, with the exception of the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence and one of the 2004 Workplace Allegations, we cannot be satisfied on the available evidence that Allegations are proved. However, we cannot disregard the residual Allegations on the basis they are groundless. Accordingly, we have addressed the question of risk on the basis of the possibility that the Applicant’s conduct the subject of the residual Allegations occurred.

183. In making the assessment as to risk, the Tribunal has had regard to the matters set out in s 30(1) of the Act.

Section 30 (1) considerations

184. When undertaking a review under Part 4 of the WWC Act, the Tribunal is required to consider the matters set out in s 30(1)(a) of the Act. These are mandatory relevant considerations in the sense described by Mason J (as his Honour then was) in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend*.* [150] However, while they must be taken into account, the weight to be attributed to them is a matter for the Tribunal which, for the purpose of conducting the review, can exercise all the powers of the primary decision-maker. [151]

(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar

h) the seriousness of the person’s criminal history and the conduct of the person since the matters occurred

185. These sub-paragraphs are not limited to offences but include any “matters” that caused a refusal of a WWCC Clearance. Accordingly, the fact that the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges and the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge were dismissed, and no charges were laid in relation to the 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint, the 2004 Workplace Allegations, and the 2005 Underage Allegations, does not preclude consideration of the seriousness of the conduct the subject of the Allegations.

186. The 1992 Indecent Assault Charges and the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge are serious allegations of sexual assault against two girls aged 16 and 17 years respectively. The 2005 Underage Allegations are also serious allegations of a sexual encounter between the Applicant and a 16-year-old girl, whose ability to meaningfully consent would have been compromised by the alcohol she had consumed, which was supplied to her by the Applicant.

187. The 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint, the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence and the 2004 Workplace Allegations are objectively less serious allegations when considered in isolation. Nevertheless, they are serious allegations of inappropriate and/or unwelcome sexualised behaviour engaged in by the Applicant either in his workplace, or in a social or other setting associated with his workplace, toward young women and teenage girls.

188. The Applicant denies that he engaged in the behaviour the subject of the Allegations, with the exception of his conduct in relation to the Unlawful Entry Offence of which he was found guilty. The Applicant consistently maintained in his responses to the Respondent during the Risk Assessment, and in his oral evidence when recounting his version of the events that gave rise to the Allegations, that he was the wronged victim of multiple young women, who either lied about what occurred, or had ulterior motives to make false accusations, or were motivated by racism to accuse the Applicant of inappropriate or unlawful behaviour towards them.

189. For the Applicant’s denials of the Allegations to be credible, the Tribunal would have to accept that six young women made similar allegations against the Applicant over a period spanning more than a decade, in circumstances where there is no objective evidence substantiating any of the explanations given by the Applicant as to why the Allegations were false. We find that it is more likely that it was the Applicant’s behaviour that led to the Allegations being made against him by the six young women, than that the Applicant was the subject of similar false allegations made by half a dozen young women, who were unknown to each other, over a period of 13 years.

190. We acknowledge and accept that, with the exception of one of the 2004 Workplace Allegations and the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence, the Allegations made against the Applicant were not proven to have occurred. However, for the purpose of assessing the seriousness of the matters that led to the refusal of the WWCC Clearance, we have considered it as possible that the conduct the subject of the Allegations occurred.

191. We find that there is a consistent pattern of inappropriate behaviour towards young women and teenage girls which emerges from the Allegations made against Applicant. The Applicant’s alleged conduct demonstrates that he invariably does not maintain appropriate boundaries with young women to whom he is sexually attracted in his workplace, or with women he has met in a workplace context. His behaviour toward young female colleagues, or young women he has met through his work, and with whom he wishes to pursue sexual and/or romantic opportunities is persistent and predatory. [152] Further, when allegations of inappropriate or illegal behaviour are made against the Applicant his consistent response is to portray himself as the true victim, denigrate the accuser, or paint them as a liar or a racist.

192. We find that, when considered holistically, the seriousness of the Applicant’s alleged conduct with respect to the Allegations which, when considered in isolation are objectively less serious, is considerably heightened. We make this finding based on the Applicant’s ongoing denials of the inappropriate behaviour that gave rise to the Allegations, his tendency for victim-blaming, and his derogatory descriptions of the women who made the Allegations.

193. We further find that the seriousness of the matters that led to the refusal of the WWCC Clearance is compounded by the lack of insight or reflection the Applicant has displayed in relation to the conduct that gave rise to the Allegations. He disclaims the need to reconsider or evaluate his past behaviour, either because he did not do what the Allegations allege, or what he did was not wrong or inappropriate. The Applicant appears not to recognise or accept that behaviour, while not amounting to criminal assault, can nevertheless cross boundaries and create an uncomfortable and harmful environment for young women and girls. The Applicant’s lack of willingness to reflect on how his behaviour may have contributed to the multiple Allegations made against him over a period of more than a decade demonstrates that the Applicant has not gained any awareness or insight into his conduct in the two decades that have elapsed since the most recent Allegation was made against him.

194. We also find that the seriousness of the matters that led to the refusal of the WWCC Clearance is exacerbated by the Applicant’s lack of appreciation of, or refusal to accept, that some of the young women and girls who made the Allegations were obviously in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Applicant. He denied the existence of a power imbalance between him and the victim of the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault, whom he apprehended for shoplifting in his position as a security guard. Nor did he acknowledge the vulnerability of the junior work colleague who had recently left school and joined the workforce, whom the Applicant allegedly unrelentingly pursued and messaged, despite her making it very clear that she did not wish to develop their relationship.

195. We find that these matters are relevant to the seriousness of the conduct that led to the refusal of the WWCC Clearance and to the current risk the Applicant poses to young women and teenage girls. They indicate that the Applicant did not have at the time of the Allegations, and has not since developed, the ability to assess a situation in which a young woman, or a teenage girl, may be vulnerable due to his position or by virtue of his age and respond appropriately. Accordingly, we find that there is the real risk that in similar situations to those which gave rise to the Allegations, that Applicant will not maintain appropriate boundaries, posing a risk of sexual, emotional, psychological or physical harm to young women and teenage girls.

(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred

196. The matters that led to the refusal of the WWCC Clearance application span a period of 13 years from the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges (34 years ago) to the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence (21 years ago).

197. Since the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence which the Applicant committed in October 2005, no further criminal allegations have been made against the Applicant. Nor have there been any allegations made against the Applicant in respect of his conduct in the workplace or in any other context since the 2004 Workplace Allegations were made. We acknowledge that for more than two decades, there has been no reported incidents or complaints of the Applicant acting inappropriately towards young women or girls. This is obviously to the credit of the Applicant. His evidence is that he is focussed on his responsibilities as a husband and father of two young children, coaching his children’s cricket and soccer teams, and finding rewarding paid employment in a customer service role.

198. The favourable character references provided in support of the Applicant attest to him being a well-regarded member of his local community who is committed to community service and to him being a man of integrity. His long-standing role as a coach, including of his children’s sporting teams, demonstrates his commitment to the development of young people, and the respect he has gained from the children he has coached and their parents.

199. We acknowledge that there have been no allegations or complaints made about the Applicant since October 2005 and that this is a significant period of time. However we find that the Applicant’s unblemished record over more than twenty years, during which time he has held employment and interacted with numerous young girls and boys, is not a consequence of the Applicant having developed insight into his behaviour and changed the way he interacts with, and his attitude towards, women. As mentioned above, the evidence given by the Applicant during cross-examination and in response to the Respondent during the Risk Assessment demonstrates that he has little or no awareness of or insight into how his behaviour may have been perceived by the young women and girls who made the Allegations.

200. For this reason, we cannot be satisfied that the passage of time alone has mitigated the risk posed by the Applicant to young women and girls. We are not satisfied that the Applicant currently understands the importance of maintaining appropriate boundaries and has adequate knowledge of how to appropriately respond and act protectively when required, when interacting with young women and girls, particularly those with respect to whom he holds a position of power or authority.

201. In considering the issue of the risk currently posed by the Applicant to children, we have reminded ourselves that a WWCC Clearance, once granted, is granted for all purposes, and that no conditions can be placed on the WWCC Clearance.

(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred

(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim

(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person

(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,

202. With respect to the 1992 Indecent Assault Charges, the victim was 16 years old, and the Applicant was also a 16-year-old student at the same school at the time. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the victim was vulnerable otherwise than by virtue of her having been a child. The Applicant would have been aware of the victim’s age as they were students as the same school.

203. With respect to the 1998 Aggravated Indecent Assault Charge, the victim was 17 years old. She was younger than the Applicant who was six years older, being 23 years old at the time. The victim is of indigenous heritage and apparently was experiencing some degree of socio-economic deprivation, given that she had stolen a lasagne from a supermarket at the time of the incident. She was also vulnerable vis-à-vis the Applicant because she had been apprehended and detained on suspicion of theft by the Applicant, who was employed as a security guard at the store. The Applicant was initially unaware that the victim was a child as she informed him that she was 18 years old (or 24 years old according to the Applicant). On the victim's account (which is contested), she informed the Applicant that she was 17 years old when she was in the car with him during the alleged assault.

204. With respect to the 2003 Workplace Sexual Harassment Complaint, the complainant was 19 years old and about eight years younger than the Applicant, who at the time of the alleged conduct was one month shy of his 28th birthday. There is no evidence that the complainant was vulnerable vis-à-vis the Applicant, as it appears they worked at about the same level within the company where they were both employed at the time.

205. With respect to the 2004 Workplace Allegations, the age of the victim is unknown, although the evidence is that she had recently finished school and was a new entrant into the workforce and held a junior position (Clerical Officer Grade 1/2). The Applicant was 29 years old and held a more senior position as a Sheriff’s Officer at the Court where they both were employed.

206. With respect to the 2005 Allegations, the victims were underage girls aged 16 and 17 years. The Applicant was almost 30 years old at the time and was employed as a security guard at a hotel where the girls frequented. The girls were intoxicated at the time of the alleged incident, having consumed alcohol supplied to them by the Applicant, which increased their vulnerability. The Applicant’s evidence is that he was unaware the girls were minors, and the victims do not claim that they informed him they were not adults.

207. With respect to the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence, the age of the victim is not known. She was aware that the Applicant was a Sheriff’s Officer as he was working in that role when she first met him and he obtained her phone number. The victim was vulnerable, in that the Applicant had demonstrated he could obtain entry into her home without her knowledge or consent.

208. We note that the Allegations made against the Applicant involved young women in their teenage years or young adults. The Applicant was aged in his early to late twenties at the time of the Allegations and he was 30 years old in 2005 when the Unlawful Entry Offence occurred. To the extent that the age of the women is known, they were either in their late teens or on the cusp of adulthood.

(g) the person’s present age,

(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition

209. The Applicant is now almost 51 years of age.

210. If each Allegation is considered on its own, the likelihood of its occurrence, and of it being repeated by the Applicant, is low. [153] However, the consistent pattern of similar Allegations being made by young women and girls who are unknown to each other increases the likelihood both of the inappropriate behaviour having occurred, and of it being repeated by the Applicant.

211. We find that the consistent pattern of allegations of inappropriate and sexualised behaviour by the Applicant towards young woman and girls provides a reasonable basis upon which it may be inferred that the Applicant did engage in the conduct complained of, and that he did so on a number of occasions over the 13-year period from 1992 to 2005. We further find that, for the reasons outlined above, the lack of any awareness or insight demonstrated by the Applicant in relation to the inappropriate nature of the alleged conduct, is such that it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that he would not repeat the behaviour. The risk of repetition by the Applicant of inappropriate sexualised behaviour towards young woman and girls is real and appreciable.

212. The repetition by the Applicant of inappropriate sexual behaviour toward children, including young women in their late teens, would be harmful, especially if perpetrated by the Applicant, who is now a significantly older man and in a position of authority vis-à-vis such women by his age alone, if not by conferral of other office or duties. [154]

Conclusion on section 30(1) considerations

213. Our substantive role is to assess risk, and specifically whether the Applicant poses a risk to the safety and well-being of children and young people. We have based our consideration on all the evidence before the Tribunal, including the oral evidence at the hearing and in documentary form.

214. As the task of the Tribunal is to determine risk, consideration of allegations and the need to make findings about them is relevant only to that task. Risk is to be assessed in respect of the present and future, not an applicant’s past risk to children. However past behaviour can be an indicator of future behaviour being a concept accepted by criminal courts in sentencing.

215. We conclude, in weighing all of the evidence before the Tribunal, that the Applicant poses a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children, in particular girls in their mid to late teens, with whom he may come into contact with should he be granted a WWCC Clearance.

216. We are satisfied that the facts which support this conclusion include the persistent pattern of inappropriate and sexualised behaviour exhibited by the Applicant in the Allegations made against him, which cannot be disregarded as baseless. This persistent pattern of behaviour raises a real and appreciable risk of sexual or psychological harm to children if the Applicant were again to engage in the same sexually inappropriate conduct. While this risk is lowered, it is not extinguished, by the passage of time.

217. We note that the authorities are clear that a “real and appreciable” risk in this context is a risk which is not “fanciful or theoretical” and which is “greater than the risk posed by any adult preying on a child.” (V at [42). We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence that the Applicant does pose a risk of engaging in sexually inappropriate behaviour towards young women in a workplace context, or towards teenage girls over whom he exercises some authority, or where there exists a power imbalance between him and the young woman, that is greater than the risk posed by any adult preying on a child.

218. Accordingly, having had regard to the evidence before the Tribunal and the mandatory considerations in section 30(1) of the WWC Act, we are satisfied that the Applicant currently poses a “risk to the safety of children” as defined in s 5B of the WWC Act, and as described by Young CJ in V set out at [147] above*.*

219. In reaching this conclusion, we have had regard to the Tribunal’s protective jurisdiction, the approach set out in the authorities cited in [145]-[152] above, and the paramount consideration recognised in section 4 of the WWC Act being “the safety, welfare and well-being of children, and in particular, protecting them from child abuse” which overrides any other interest.

Section 30(1A) considerations

220. Having found that the Applicant does currently pose a risk to the safety of children, we are not required to address the considerations in section 30(1A). However, for completeness, and for the reasons detailed in the following paragraphs, we find that based on the evidence before the Tribunal the reasonable person and public interest tests in s 30(1A) of the WWC Act have not been met.

Reasonable person test - s 30(1A)(a)

221. The Tribunal must not make an order that has the effect of enabling a person to work with children unless it is satisfied that a “reasonable person” would allow their own child to have direct, unsupervised contact with the Applicant while engaging in any child-related work. This is an objective test: PQR v Secretary, Department of Justice and Regulation (No 2). [155]

222. The “reasonable person” is taken to have knowledge of any criminal offending, the circumstances surrounding the offending, the applicant’s criminal history (if any) and the length of time since the offending. While the “reasonable person” would “not approach the task with a closed mind, thinking that once a person has offended, he or she can never be redeemed”, the reasonable person also would not “put aside all scepticism and reasonable caution in some over-optimistic attempt to facilitate rehabilitation”: VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice [156] cited in DAI v Children’s Guardian [157] and CGR v Children’s Guardian. [158]

223. We are satisfied, for the reasons that follow, that a reasonable person, apprised of all the information before the Tribunal, would not allow the Applicant unsupervised access to their children, especially girls in their mid to late teenage years.

224. That reasonable person would be concerned by the consistent pattern of sexually inappropriate behaviour exhibited by the Applicant towards girls in their mid to late teens, having regard to the Allegations made against the Applicant. In circumstances where those Allegations cannot be disregarded as baseless, the reasonable person would not be satisfied that the Applicant ought to be allowed unsupervised access to children. This is particularly so where the Applicant denies all the Allegations other than the 2005 Unlawful Entry Offence. The reasonable person could not take comfort from the fact that the Applicant has demonstrated insight into his past inappropriate relationships arising in the workplace context, or in circumstances where he had some authority or power over the victims, when it is clear from his evidence that he has not.

225. The reasonable person would be aware that the criminal charges against the Applicant that were a consequence of some of the Allegations were dismissed. They also would know that the Applicant has not been accused of inappropriate behaviour or charged with any criminal offence in the past two decades, that he has lived a pro-social life since 2005, including coaching his children’s sport teams, and held ongoing employment at the NSW SES from 2009 to 2019.

226. The reasonable person would be cognisant of the favourable character references provided by friends, family and former work colleagues that assert that the Applicant has lived an upstanding life since 2005. Two of the references refer to allegations made against the Applicant in 2023 and 2024 and claim that these are ‘without merit”. None of the references mention the Allegations on which the Respondent relied in making the decision to refuse the WWCC application which suggests that the authors are unaware of the Allegations.

227. Further, as the Applicant accepted in cross-examination, the version of events of the Allegations he has conveyed to his friends and family is that which is set out in his written submissions and provided in his oral evidence. As outlined above, the Applicant’s version of his behaviour which resulted in the Allegations, with the exception of the Unlawful Entry Offence, paints him as the victim. For this reason, we find that the reasonable person would give little weight to the character references which are based on the Applicant’s self-exonerating version of his conduct that led to the Allegations.

228. We are satisfied that the reasonable person would, after careful consideration of the Allegations and the available evidence, reach the same conclusion as the Tribunal, namely that the Applicant does currently pose a risk to the safety of children. The reasonable person would also find that any risk posed by the Applicant is real and appreciable.

229. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the reasonable person would not allow his or her child to have direct contact with the Applicant that is not directly supervised by another person whilst engaged in child-related work.

230. We are therefore satisfied that the reasonable person test in s 30(1A)(a) of the WWC Act has not been met.

Public interest test - s 30(1A)(b)

231. The Tribunal, in applying the public interest test, must do so by reference to the particular statutory framework, and have regard to the subject matter, scope, and purpose of the WWC Act. In particular, it is necessary to consider the object in section 3, which is to protect children, and the paramount consideration in section 4 which is the “safety, welfare and well-being of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse”. That requires a consideration that errs on the side of caution.

232. In Secretary, Department of Justice v LMB; Secretary, Department of Justice v PMY*,* [159] the Victorian Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the term “public interest” in the context of the equivalent provision in the Victorian Act at [24]-[26]:

As French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ stated in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51; (2009) 240 CLR 140:

The term ‘in the public interest’ is one of broad import. When used in a statute, the term classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute in question.

In the present instance, the Act itself plainly identifies the primary public interest to which it is addressed. The main purpose of the Act is stated to be to assist in ‘protecting children from sexual or physical harm’. The Act does this by ‘ensuring that people who work with, or care for [children] have their suitability to do so checked by a government body’.

The Act grants an administrative discretion to the Tribunal which requires the Tribunal, once the discretion has been enlivened by a finding that there is no unjustifiable risk, to consider for itself whether the giving of a notice will be in the public interest.

233. The Court’s reasoning in PMY has been endorsed in several recent Tribunal decisions: see GBQ v Children*’s Guardian, [160] GSZ v Children’s Guardian, [161] and GYV v Children’*s Guardian. [162]

234. The Tribunal has accepted that the broader interests of the community will take priority over the interests of the individual. In CYY at [75] the Tribunal stated:

The concept of public interest has been determined on the basis of giving priority to the broader interests of the community over private interests; see Smith v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 184.

235. See GJM v Children’s Guardian, [163] GTN v Children’s Guardian, [164] GYV v Children’s Guardian, [165] GVD v Children’s Guardian, [166] and GPC v Children’s Guardian. [167]

236. The Tribunal has recognised that the “public interest” is the interest of the public at large, and not the interest of a section of the public or the interest of an individual which does not overlap with the public interest: Sinclair v Maryborough Mining Warden [168] per Barwick CJ at [480]. However, matters which may be described as private interests may still be considered as part of the public interest test insofar as they attract a broader public interest. It is the broader public interest aspect of those matters which the Tribunal should consider when applying the test.

237. The statutory concept of the public interest encompasses other considerations that are accorded less weight than the paramount consideration of children's safety. The private interest of a person to work in their chosen field of employment is a factor to be taken into consideration insofar as the private interest also has a broader community benefit. In ZZ, Bell J explained at [203]:

In the context of the right to work, the tribunal has (in my view, correctly) taken into account the public interest in enabling persons to engage in their chosen field of employment or in the field in which they are most suited to work, in not lightly turning people away from their commitment to a chosen career and in encouraging people to use their qualifications, experience and expertise for the benefit of others.

238. While there is a public interest in individuals being engaged in work for which they have appropriate skills and experience, an applicant’s own private interest in obtaining particular employment is not a factor relevant to the public interest.

239. The Applicant has demonstrated skills as a coach of children’s sports teams, and these skills could be deployed in the advancement of the public interest, particularly the development of sporting ability in children. The Applicant also has experience working in roles which serve and protect the public, including as a Sherriff’s Officer and security guard. The Applicant’s evidence is that he wishes to work in a customer service role where he can engage with members of the public.

240. While there is a public interest in qualified individuals obtaining positions which will serve and protect the public, and develop sporting ability in children, we find that these must be accorded less weight than the paramount consideration of children's safety. Having found that the Applicant poses a risk to the safety of children, in particular that he may act in a sexually inappropriate manner towards girls in their mid to late teens, we find that the public interest test is not satisfied.

241. We are satisfied that the public interest test in s 30(1A)(b) of the WWC Act has not been met.

Conclusion

242. For the reasons set out above, based on the evidence before the Tribunal and having regard to the mandatory considerations in s 30(1) of the WWC Act, we are satisfied that the Applicant poses a risk to the safety and well-being of children.

243. We are also satisfied, in accordance with s 30(1A)(a) of the WWC Act, that a reasonable person would not allow his or her child to have direct contact with the Applicant that is not directly supervised by another person while the Applicant is engaged in any child-related work. Further, we find in accordance with s 30(1A)(b) of the WWC Act that the granting of a WWCC Clearance to the Applicant would not be in the public interest.

244. It therefore follows that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the Respondent’s Decision dated 23 May 2025.

Order

1. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

**********

Endnotes

RB1, Tab 1.

RB1, Tab 5, 45.

RB1, Tab 3.

[2021] NSWCATAD 136.

(2008) 235 CLR 286.

[2022] NSWCATAD 76.

[2014] NSWCATAD 164.

[2017] NSWCA 174.

[2017] NSWSC 1228.

AR, 8 in RB1, 114.

RB1, 179.

RB1, 163-164, 179; and RB2, Tab 1-10.

RB1, 160, 165 and 173-174.

RB1, 159.

RB1, 316.

RB1, 172-173

RB1, Tab 55.

RB1, 169-170.

RB1, Tab 29.

RB1, Tab 30, 179.

AS1 at [12].

RB2, 5.

RB2, 79ff.

RB2, 163.

RB2, Tab 5C.

RB2, Tab 5C.

RB2, Tab 5A.

RB2, Tab 5B.

RB2, Tab 5D, 34.

RB2, Tab 5D, 34.

RB2, Tab 5D, 34ff.

RB2, Tab 6, 47-59.

RB2, Tab 6, 87ff.

RB2, Tab 6, 93.

RB2, Tab 6, 103.

RB2, Tab 6, 105-107.

RB2, Tab 6, 127.

RB2, Tab 6, 129.

AS1 [13].

RB1, Tab 22.

RB1, Tab 29, 174-175.

RB1, Tab 24, 165.

AR at RB1, 108.

RB1, 160.

RB1, Tab 55. The context to the Woodhouse Report appears to have been that the Applicant had also made complaints, some of which were substantiated in another investigation, about Court staff making inappropriate and untrue statements about him following his return to work after the 2005 Unlawful entry, and his own successful claim for a psychological condition (depression and anxiety) suffered as a result of rumours and comments made about him. The allegations investigated in the Woodhouse Report were in fact first raised as counter allegations during investigation of allegations the Applicant had made that he was being bullied and harassed by Court staff.

RB1, Tab 55, 386-393.

RB1, Tab 55, 389-390.

RB1, Tab 55, 391.

RB1, Tab 55, 380.

RB1, Tab 55, 380.

RB1, Tab 48, 340.

It appears that these allegations are what led to the Woodhouse investigation.

RB1, Tab 22, 159.

RB1, Tab 22, 159.

RB1, Tab 22, 159.

AR at RB1, 107-108.

RB1, 332.

RB1, 249ff.

RB1, 197, 249.

RB1, 250.

RB1, 250.

RB1, 202.

RB1, 252-255.

RB1, 314-317.

RB1, 315.

RB1, 315-316.

RB1, 315-316.

The Applicant was permitted to continue to undertake his role as a cricket coach while the Respondent’s assessment was conducted as he was not subject to an Interim Bar pursuant to the WWC Act.

RB1, 144-145.

AB.

AB.

AB.

RB1, 153.

RB1, 146-147.

RB1, 151-152.

RB1, 155-157.

AS2, [12].

[2015] NSWSC 523.

AS2, [38]

AS2, [43].

AS2, [39].

AS2, [40].

AS2, [44].

AS2, [14].

AS2, [18].

AS2, [17].

AS2, [21].

AS2, [23].

AS2, [24].

AS2, [25].

AS2, [27].

AS2, [28].

AS2, [30].

AS2, [31].

AS2, [32].

AS2, [33].

AS2, [36].

AS2, [19].

AS2, [21].

AS2, [20].

AS2, [24].

AS2, [23].

AS2, [47].

AS2, [48].

AS2, [53] citing VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VCAT 789.

AS2 [49].

AS2 [50].

AS2 [57].

AS2 [60].

AS2 [59].

AS2 [66].

ZZ v Secretary of the Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267.

AS2 [71].

AS2 [77].

AS2 [10].

RS2 [8].

RS2 [10].

RS2 [12].

RS2 [13].

RS2 [14].

RS2 [16].

RS2 [17].

RS1 [80].

RS1 [81].

RS1 [83].

RS1 [85].

RS1 [86].

RS1 [87].

RS1 [88].

RS1 [89].

RS1 [90].

RS1 [91].

RS1 [92].

RS1 [93].

RS1 [102].

RS1 [106].

RS1 [113].

RS1 [116].

RS1 [117].

RS1 [118].

RS1 [120].

[2014] NSWCATAD 69.

[2011] NSWCA 111.

[2002] NSWIRComm 101.

[2017] NSWCATAD 262,

[2020] NSWCA 338.

[2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476.

[2018] NSWCATAD 28.

(1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68.

(1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40.

Peko Wallsend at 42.

RS [103].

RS [104].

RS [107].

[2017] VSC 514 at [57].

[2013] VCAT 789 at [36].

[2017] NSWCATAD 308 at [90].

[2017] NSWCATAD 295 at [94].

[2012] VSCA 143.

[2024] NSWCATAD 324 at [103].

[2025] NSWCATAD 206 at [93].

[2025] NSWCATAD 20 at [49].

[2025] NSWCATAD 48 at [72]-[73].

[2025] NSWCATAD 197 at [63].

[2025] NSWCATAD 20 at [47]-[48].

[2025] NSWCATAD 251 at [72].

[2025] NSWCATAD 222 at [146].

(1975) 132 CLR 473.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar