CRG v Children's Guardian

CRG

1. The applicant, who is employed as a real estate agent, has three teenaged children: two daughters and a son. He is divorced from the children's mother. The undisputed evidence before us is that despite an earlier acrimonious relationship, the applicant and his former wife now have an amiable relationship and successfully share the parenting of their children, with the children spending alternate weeks with the applicant and with their mother. The Tribunal accepts the applicant's evidence (also undisputed) that he is in a new relationship and that he and his former wife have worked together to address any health or other concerns experienced by their children.
2. A former rugby player, the applicant is a selector for the game and has been coach for junior rugby league teams for eight years. He needs a working with children check clearance to continue in this role. There was no dispute to his evidence that, as coach to the junior teams, he has become 'a bit of a father figure' for some of the children especially those from single parent families or with difficult family situations.
3. In response to requests from the Children's Guardian:

• the Chief Executive Officer of the applicant's rugby league association confirmed that the applicant had been involved as a selector since 2008 and that there had been no complaints or disciplinary proceedings or reports made against him;
• the vice-president of the applicant's son's rugby league club advised that no complaints or disciplinary actions had been brought against the applicant;
• the applicant's employer declared that during the years of his employment (over 10 years), there had been no complaints made or disciplinary action against the applicant.

1. According to documentation received from the NSW Police Force, there are 'no records from the NSW Police Force 'COPS' database that did not result in charges that refer to the applicant in the context of violence, child abuse or sexual offences.'
2. The only records held by the Department of Family and Community Services in relation to the applicant are dated 17 April 2007 and note that the applicant had been charged with common assault, malicious damage and intimidation. Despite a recommendation that the matter be further assessed, there are no subsequent entries for the applicant.

Disqualifying offence

1. In 2016, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of assault with an act of indecency for which he was placed on a twelve-month good behaviour bond, which expired in August this year. The applicant's evidence, which has not been disputed, is that he was so intoxicated at the time of the offence (which occurred in 2015) as to have little memory of it. He accepts, however, that he committed the offence as set out in the police facts.
2. The police facts state that the applicant had attended a wedding at a venue where he had booked to stay overnight. The victim of the assault was also a guest at the wedding and, together with her husband, was also staying overnight at the venue. Whilst in bed beside her husband, the victim felt a hand on her inner thigh then saw the applicant stroking her leg while he was lying on the ground beside her. He then stopped and left the room before returning to again lie on the floor beside the victim's bed and again reach up towards her. When the victim started to scream, the applicant apologised to her, saying that he didn't know what he was doing.
3. In a statement prepared for these proceedings, the applicant wrote that as well as consuming a large quantity of alcohol at the wedding reception, he had also been taking prescribed medication for anxiety and depression: I had been struggling with the breakdown of a six year de facto relationship and my doctor had prescribed to me medication to help me with the anxiety and depression that I was suffering. Although I was aware that I was not supposed to drink alcohol while on the medication I did so anyway. I realise that this was grossly irresponsible of me. I am not trying to excuse my behaviour. What I have done is totally unacceptable. What I have done is out of character for me…I believe that the combination of alcohol and prescription drugs taken by me contributed to my behaviour on this occasion. I accept that I am fully responsible for my actions because I chose to drink alcohol when I should not have. I am of the opinion that I would not have acted the way I did had I not consumed alcohol at the wedding reception. I respect women and have not previously acted in such a way towards a woman…as soon as I was told about what I had done I saw my doctor. I am no longer taking prescribed medication for anxiety/depression. I have also modified my alcohol consumption. I have not, at any stage, consumed a large quantity of alcohol since the incident occurred.
4. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to dispute the fact that the applicant had been taking anti-depressants prior to the wedding nor that his long-term relationship had broken down shortly before the wedding. Indeed, Ms Giacomo for the Children's Guardian described the applicant as a witness of truth who has shown genuine remorse for his behaviour. We also find the applicant to have been truthful and remorseful in his evidence.

2007 charges

1. In 2007, the applicant was charged with common assault, malicious damage and intimidation within a domestic relationship. It is not disputed that the charges arose in the context of the applicant's marriage breakdown and that the matters proceeded to hearing. We will consider each of these charges in turn.

Common assault

1. The applicant was convicted of one count of common assault against his former wife for which he received a good behaviour bond in the Local Court. No statement of facts has been provided in relation to this offence nor is there any evidence of the factual findings made by the magistrate. The only court documents before us in relation to the assault are a statement by the applicant's former wife and the transcript of the applicant's police interview.
2. The common assault charge related to an argument between the applicant and his former wife which occurred between 11pm and 11.30pm one night in 2007. According to the statement of his former wife: [The applicant] wrestled with me trying to get my mobile phone off me, He managed to get my mobile phone from me. He then walked outside and threw it into a blow up pool which was in our backyard. I then walked over into the pool to retrieve it and as I bent down [he] grabbed my right arm thrown [sic] me out of the pool and onto the grass. I stumbled and as I was stumbling [he] pushed me and I landed on the ground on my stomach. My daughter was saying 'stop daddy stop.' As a result of this my mobile stopped working and I had to get a new one.
3. In his police interview, the applicant was not questioned about whether his young daughter had been present at the time and denied pushing his then wife, telling the police that: Well basically we both went for the phone in the pool, I bumped like I never pushed or grabbed her arm….As we've both gone for the phone I've got it and then I ended up giving it back to her and then we both went…never grabbed her or pushed her or like, when two people are going for something.'
4. In cross-examination by the respondent, the applicant agreed that he had picked up his ex-wife's mobile phone and thrown it outside into a blow-up pool. He denied pushing his ex-wife or touching her at all. He said he didn't think his daughter was there at the time.
5. According to the applicant's written statement prepared for these proceedings: the offence of assault was found proven on the basis that I had recklessly assaulted [her] as opposed to intentionally assaulting [her]. The court accepted that I had accidentally knocked [her], causing her to fall to the ground in our backyard when we were both reaching to retrieve a mobile phone from a children's blow up swimming pool.
6. Although we accept that there was an argument involving the applicant and his former wife in which they collided over a mobile phone, there is insufficient evidence for us to be satisfied that the applicant intended to grab or push his former wife. On the evidence before us, we cannot be satisfied that the applicant's young daughter witnessed or was even present during the altercation which occurred between 11pm and 1130pm at night.

Malicious damage to property

1. The two charges of malicious damage to property were dismissed pursuant to section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
2. In his police record of interview, the applicant stated that on the night in question, the applicant's wife had left the family home after an argument with the applicant and that after she had left, the applicant went to turn the light off and hit the wall…I just walked back and turned the light off, I went to turn the light, hit the wall and turned the light off.
3. When asked if he'd intended to put a hole in the wall, he said 'No it was just frustration.'
4. There is no evidence that anyone witnessed the applicant punching the wall.

Intimidation

1. The charge of intimidation was dismissed.
2. In oral evidence before us, the applicant denied that he had intimidated his former wife. No further evidence has been put forward by the Children's Guardian in relation to this allegation, or to dispute the applicant's oral evidence in this regard. On the evidence before us, we cannot be satisfied that the applicant intimidated his wife and so give no weight to this allegation.

Psychological reports

1. Dr Rebecca Smith, forensic psychologist, prepared a report to assess the applicant's risk and likelihood of re-offending.
2. In her assessment of the applicant, Dr Smith found that he displayed some symptoms of reactive depression and anxiety. According to Dr Smith: [his] responses appeared sincere and.. he also appeared to display genuine reactions of guilt and shame when discussing his offence for assault with act of indecency and the impacts of his behaviour on his family.
3. Dr Smith administered the Static-99R test which is an instrument designed to assist in the prediction of sexual and violent recidivism for sexual offenders. The applicant was placed in the low risk category relative to other male sexual offenders.
4. Dr Smith also administered the STABLE-2007 and the ACUTE-2007 tests which are specialised tools designed to assess and track changes in risk status over time by assessing changeable dynamic risk factors. According to Dr Smith, both the applicant's STABLE-2007 and ACUTE-2007 scores fell into the low priority categories of sexual and general re-offending.
5. Dr Smith made the following overall assessment for the applicant: The offences for which he was disqualified from having a working with children check clearance appear to have been during a time in his life when he was poorly able to manage overwhelming emotional states associated with a relationship ending. This is true too for his previous charges in 2007, pertaining to assault and malicious damage, which occurred during the height of his marriage breakdown. It is likely thus, that [CRG] has some difficulties with emotional regulation and the management of his emotional experiences during stressful life events. This is no indication, however, that his difficulties with emotional regulation are related to sexually deviant or predatory behaviours. Further, there is no indication that he is, or has ever been a sexual or violent risk to children….[His] risk assessment places him in the low risk category for sexual recidivism.
6. Dr Smith outlined protective factors for the applicant with regards to recidivism. These include stable employment and supports, victim empathy and a lack of personality disorders. Factors that could be seen to increase his risk are 'demonstrated maladaptive skills for coping with stressors, particularly with reactive depression and impulsivity during periods of heightened emotion.'
7. In oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing on 13 February 2017, Dr Smith agreed that mixing anti-depressant medication with alcohol could increase depression and gave the opinion that the combination of alcohol, anti-depressant medication and his relationship breakdown had contributed to the applicant's offending behaviour. She also offered the view that the applicant might benefit from treatment to manage stressful issues in his life.
8. In her subsequent treatment summary report dated 27 June 2017, Dr Smith advised that since March 2017, she had been seeing the applicant on a monthly basis and on the basis of these sessions, provided the opinion that when considering both [CRG]'s psychometric assessment and clinical assessment pertaining to his interactions with children (including his own), it does not appear that [CRG] is a real and appreciable risk to children.
9. In oral evidence before the Tribunal on 18 August 2017, Dr Smith agreed that she had provided a supplementary report for the applicant to consider whether the applicant posed a more generalised (rather than sexual) risk to children and that she had been given access to additional documents in relation to the facts leading to applicant's conviction for assault. She agreed that she was aware of the ethical issues arising from being a prior treating therapist and then doing a risk assessment. She denied having an unconscious bias as a result and stated that the tests were 'standalone tests.' She denied that she could unconsciously become an advocate for the applicant when she was using objective psychometric tests.
10. In particular, Dr Smith found that there was no evidence to support the applicant as having psychopathical or additional variables often discussed in child treatment literature as being relevant to risk of harm, which included evidence of prior poor parenting, poor mental health and substance use.
11. She told the Tribunal that the applicant could now identify and compile a list of high risk factors for reoffending and understand how these factors led to his behaviour. She didn't feel that he needed any further professional assistance to deal with periods of stress although agreed that 'support would be good.'
12. Dr Smith gave evidence that the applicant was 'travelling well and had good insight into his offence and behaviour.' She thought that there was no necessity for intervention.
13. She denied that the applicant had poor mental health, simply that he had experiences period of depression and some poor emotional regulation. She denied that there was evidence of substance abuse, rather only one incident of drinking to excess - where substance abuse is using substances to self-regulate over an extended period of time. She reiterated her view that the applicant does not pose a real and appreciable risk to children.

Matters to be taken into consideration - section 30(1)

1. Subsection 30(1) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 sets out the following matters that the Tribunal is required to take into account for the purposes of determining an application made under s 28(1) of the Act.

(a) The seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar.

1. On 3 August 2016, the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of assault with an act of indecency in relation to an incident occurring in September 2015 for which he was placed on a bond to be of good behaviour for twelve months, which has now expired.
2. There is no dispute that the assault occurred at a wedding where the applicant and the victim were guests. It is accepted that the applicant drank a lot of alcohol at the wedding and that, at the time, he had begun to take anti-depressant medication to assist feelings of depression following the breakdown of a long-term relationship. We accept that the applicant entered the guest room where the victim and her husband were staying and that while lying on the room beside the couple's bed, the applicant began to stroke the victim's inner thigh before leaving the room and then returning again to once more lie on the ground beside the victim and reaching out towards her leg. We accept that the applicant then left again, waking the victim's husband in the process. When the victim's husband confronted the applicant, the applicant apologized and said that he didn't know what he was doing.
3. At hearing before this Tribunal, the applicant gave evidence that he couldn't remember the incident because he had been too intoxicated but accepted the victim's version of the events.
4. The offence is serious in that it involved an indecent assault on a sleeping woman. It forms part of Schedule 2 of the Act and results in the applicant being considered a 'disqualified person.'

(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the applicant since they occurred,

1. The offence occurred just over two years ago. Since this time the applicant's good behaviour bond has finished and he has not come to the attention of the authorities. His evidence that he has not drunk to excess since the night of the offence and that he is no longer taking anti-depressant medication is undisputed.
2. We accept that, soon after the offence, the applicant consulted his general practitioner and discontinued his anxiety depression medication. He also modified his alcohol consumption and we accept his evidence that he has not drunk to excess since this time. The applicant has since consulted the psychologist, Dr Smith. While the primary purpose of that consultation was to obtain a report for the purpose of the current proceedings, we accept that, subsequent to the preparation of this initial comprehensive report, he has seen Dr Smith on several occasions for treatment.

(c) the age of the applicant at the time the offences or matters occurred,

1. At the time of the commission of the disqualifying offence, the applicant was 45 years old.

(d) the age of the victim and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,

1. The victim of the disqualifying offence was an adult although her age is not contained in the material before us. The victim was vulnerable in that she was asleep at the time of the offence and was therefore unable to take any measures to protect herself from the indecent assault.

(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,

1. The difference in age between applicant and the victim of the indecent assault is unknown.

(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,

1. The victim was not a child.

(g) the person's present age,

1. The applicant is now 47 years old.

(h) the seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred,

1. We accept that the disqualifying offence is a serious one involving an act of indecency upon a sleeping woman, although its circumstances were such as to place it towards the lower end of the scale, which is reflected in the sentence handed down in the Local Court.
2. Whilst the applicant was convicted of common assault in 2007, on the evidence before us, we cannot be satisfied that it was a violent offence directed at the victim - the applicant's former wife - but was rather a tussle for a mobile phone that the applicant has thrown into the children's swimming pool. We cannot be satisfied that the applicant's daughter witnessed the incident. As set out above, this is because neither the police facts nor the magistrate's findings are before us and because the applicant - described as a witness of truth by the respondent - has consistently denied that his daughter was present at the time. The only evidence that the daughter was present at the time of the altercation is contained in a statement by the applicant's former wife who did not attend the Tribunal proceedings and so was unable to be questioned. For this reason, we give less weight to her statement and greater weight to the evidence of the applicant who was subject to cross-examination before us.
3. We give little weight to the charges of malicious damage to property, which were dismissed pursuant to section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. On the evidence, we are satisfied that the relevant damage - a dent to the wall where the applicant punched it - was done when the applicant was alone and was not witnessed either by his then wife or by their children.
4. We give no weight to the allegations of intimidation against the applicant's then wife on the basis that the charges were dismissed and the applicant's now former wife was not available to give evidence in relation to the allegations.
5. We are satisfied that there has been no further offending behaviour since the disqualifying offence and accept the evidence of Dr Smith that the applicant has since gained insight into his offending behaviour and has developed strategies to prevent any future offending.

(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition,

1. According to Dr Smith, the applicant has gained good insight into his offence and behaviour, does not need further intervention and does not pose a real and appreciable risk to children.
2. We do not accept that caution should be given to these findings because Dr Smith conducted treatment sessions with the applicant subsequent to her risk assessment report dated 5 January 2017. Her treatment summary report dated 27 June 2017 simply documents her attendance on the applicant and describes the results of psychometric assessments given to him, confirming her earlier findings that the applicant does not pose a risk to children, and clarifying this to be a reference to a generalised risk rather than simply a sexual risk. We accept Dr Smith's evidence that, in administering this further test and in preparing the treatment summary report, she had been able to present her findings impartially without becoming an advocate for the applicant.
3. We were impressed by the evidence provided by the applicant and accept that, consistent with Dr Smith's findings, the applicant has insight into his offending behaviour and has adopted strategies to ensure he does not offend.
4. We also give weight to the evidence before us that no complaints have been made against the applicant either in his workplace or in his capacity as rugby league coach and selector.
5. On the evidence before us, we are not satisfied that the applicant has ever displayed offending or concerning behaviour around children and are satisfied that there is little likelihood of his offending in the future.

(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application,

1. The applicant's employer has not received any complaints about the applicant or has he had to take any disciplinary action against him. The applicant has been involved with his son's rugby league side since 2009 and has become more involved with the club since that time. The applicant has not been the subject of any complaint to the club and is not been the subject of any disciplinary action.

(k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary.

1. The Children's Guardian raised the concern that despite agreeing to provide a letter from his former wife to assist with his application, the applicant did not produce such a letter. The applicant gave evidence that he was embarrassed by his situation, and didn't want to have to involve his former wife in these proceedings, particularly as their current relationship is very good and given that their son has had some recent and serious health concerns.
2. Having considered the circumstances and in light of the evidence before us, we have decided that we do not require a letter from the applicant's former wife in order to determine this application.

Conclusion on section 30(1) matters

1. In accordance with s28 of the Act, it is to be presumed that, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, he poses a risk to the safety of children.
2. For the following reasons, we are of the view that the applicant has proven that he does not pose a risk to the safety of children.
3. The disqualifying offence, namely the indecent assault, involved unedifying behaviour from the applicant. So drunk he was unable to remember the event the next day, the applicant came into the woman's room, while she was sleeping, and stroked her leg. Whilst this reflects badly on the applicant, it does not, in our opinion, indicate that he is a risk to children.
4. On the evidence before us, we find that this was out of character behaviour by the applicant who, contrary to medical advice, had consumed large amounts of alcohol on the night, having recently also begun to take anti-depressant medication.
5. We accept the evidence that he had not previously taken anti-depressants and that, despite this medical advice, was not aware of the potential effect on his behaviour of alcohol combined with anti-depressant medication. We also accept that at the time of the offence his long-term partner had ended their relationship and that this had taken an emotional toll on him.
6. On the evidence before us, we accept that the applicant is unlikely to behave in a similar manner in the future. In making this finding, we accept his evidence that he has not drunk to excess for the past two years, is no longer taking anti-depressant medication and has, through counselling assistance, learnt how to manage stressful events in a constructive rather than a destructive manner.
7. There is no evidence before us that the applicant has ever displayed concerning behaviour towards his children and for the reasons set out above, we cannot be satisfied that his young daughter was present during the altercation which resulted in the applicant being convicted of common assault.
8. In particular, we give weight to the fact that the allegation that his daughter had been present at the time of the offence was not put to the applicant in his recorded police interview and that in cross-examination before the Tribunal, the applicant said he could not recall his daughter being present during the argument which, according to the court attendance notice, occurred between 11pm and 11.30pm at night. Furthermore, in the subsequent assessment record prepared by Family and Community Services, there is no mention of the daughter being present at the time of the incident.
9. In the absence of a facts sheet in relation to this matter, and without having been in a position to question the applicant's wife, we cannot be satisfied that the applicant pushed his wife to retrieve the phone.
10. Given that the charges were dismissed and there has been no further information in relation to the alleged intimidation by the applicant towards his this wife, we give no weight to these allegations.
11. It has not been disputed that the applicant and his former wife manage a shared custody arrangement with their children. There are no records of any concerns in relation to the children's welfare. Despite a note in the record by the Department of Family and Community Services recommending further assessment following the 2007 charges against the applicant, there are no further records. On this basis, the Tribunal infers that there has been no cause for concern in relation to the welfare of the applicant's children. Furthermore, and despite the fact that the applicant has worked with children as a rugby coach and selector for close to a decade, no complaints made against him.
12. There is no evidence before us that any child has been subjected to physical, sexual, emotional or psychological harm or neglect by the applicant.
13. The evidence of Dr Smith is that the applicant does not pose a real and appreciable evidence and, for the reasons above, we give weight to her findings and do not agree that she has risked becoming an advocate for the applicant.
14. On all the evidence before us and for the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that the applicant has proven that he does not pose a risk to children.

Reasonable person & public interest test - s30 (1A)

1. Section 30 (1A) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 provides that the Tribunal may not make an order which has the effect of enabling the affected person to work with children in accordance with the Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that: 1. a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in child-related work, and 2. it is in the public interest to make such an order

Reasonable person test

1. The reasonable person test was considered in VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VCAT 789 where it was said that the test requires: the application of an objective standard based upon the views of the reasonable person. The reasonable person would, in reaching his or her conclusions, acquaint himself or herself with all the matters that have been placed before me, giving the applicant for a positive assessment the right to be heard, as well as considering the material gathered by the secretary. A reasonable person would not approach the task with a closed mind, thinking that once a person has offended, he or she can never be redeemed. The reasonable person, however, would not put aside all scepticism and reasonable caution in this most difficult area in some over-optimistic attempt to facilitate rehabilitation.
2. In order to properly consider this test, a "reasonable person" would need know about the disqualifying offence, the circumstances surrounding the offence, the applicant's entire criminal history, the length of time since those offences occurred, his conduct since then and any expert assessment made for him.
3. Having regard to the material before us and for the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that a reasonable person with knowledge of the same information would allow his or her child to have direct, unsupervised contact with the applicant whilst he is engaged in child-related work. In this regard, the reasonable person would note the circumstances surrounding the offending behaviour, which did not relate to any child, and would accept that the applicant now has insight into his behaviour and the circumstances that led to it, which has enabled him to develop strategies to ensure such behaviour does not re-occur. The reasonable person would give weight to the applicant's strong work record both in his place of employment and as a rugby league coach and assessor, which demonstrate that no complaints have ever been made about him in either context.

Public interest

1. In Secretary, Department of Justice v L M B; Secretary, Department of Justice v P M Y [2012] VSCA 143, at [24]-[26] the Victorian Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the term "public interest" in the context of the equivalent provision in the Victorian Act. In those paragraphs the Victorian Court of Appeal said: "[24] As French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ stated in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51; (2009) 240 CLR 140]: The term 'in the public interest' is one of broad import. When used in a statute, the term classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute in question. [25] In the present instance, the Act itself plainly identifies the primary public interest to which it is addressed. The main purpose of the Act is stated to be to assist in 'protecting children from sexual or physical harm'. The Act does this by 'ensuring that people who work with, or care for [children] have their suitability to do so checked by a government body'. [26] The Act grants an administrative discretion to the Tribunal which requires the Tribunal, once the discretion has been enlivened by a finding that there is no unjustifiable risk, to consider for itself whether the giving of a notice will be in the public interest."
2. In ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267, Justice Bell of the Supreme Court of Victoria referred to the above decision and observed at [202] as follows "[202] While decisions of the tribunal have correctly emphasised that the main purpose of the Working with Children Act is the protection of children from harm, they have also acknowledged the relevance and importance of rehabilitating offenders, their right to work and other similar considerations. […] So, in MH [2008] VCAT 1514, her Honour Judge Harbison said the Working with Children Act did not prevent all persons with a serious criminal record from ever working with children again. Rather: "It is designed so that an informed assessment can be made in every individual case of the risk of harm to children arising out of his or her past behaviour. It places a heavy burden on the decision maker, to make an assessment as to what is likely to happen in the future, based on what is known to have happened in the past. The assessment must be rigorously made, given the aim of the legislation, which is the protection of very vulnerable children from sexual harm or violence. […]"
3. On the evidence before us, we are not satisfied that the applicant poses a risk to children. We are satisfied that the applicant has insight into his behaviour in 2015 and has not drunk alcohol to excess since the offence. On the evidence before us, we are satisfied that a repetition of such offending behaviour is very unlikely.
4. On the contrary, the evidence before us is that the applicant has given great service to the development of the sporting skills of children and young people in his longstanding role as rugby league coach and selector. In all the time he has been involved in this area of endeavour, there have been no complaints or adverse reports made against him. The evidence before the Tribunal is that the applicant is a good parent whose children have benefited from his role in coaching rugby as have the many other children and young people he has coached and supported in their sporting endeavours.
5. Having regard to material before us, we are satisfied that it is in the public interest to make the orders sought.

CONCLUSION

1. Having regard to all the above factors, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has proven that he does not pose a real and appreciable risk to children. On this basis, the applicant should not be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 in respect of his conviction in 2016 for the offence of assault with an act of indecency contrary to s61L of the Crimes Act 1900.

ORDERS 1. The Tribunal declares that the applicant is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 in respect of his conviction in 2016 for the offence of assault with an act of indecency contrary to s61L of the Crimes Act 1900. 2. Pursuant to subsection 28(6) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012, the Children's Guardian is to grant the applicant a working with children check clearance.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 October 2017