DRY21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 59

1. Before the Court lies an application for an extension of time (pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act)) in which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 24 August 2021. As will be explained, before the Court can consider the substantive application for judicial review, the applicant must satisfy the Court that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that he be granted an extension of time.
2. For the reasons set out below, the Court has determined that an extension of time should not be granted.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia (Court Book (CB) 14, 38). He first arrived in Australia on 11 February 2015 as a holder of an Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) (UD-601) visa (CB 21, 55).
2. On 11 May 2015, the applicant's ETA visa expired, and he became an unlawful non-citizen (CB 55).
3. On 22 March 2019, the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the visa) (CB 1-38). In that application, the applicant claimed to have left Malaysia due to political and economic issues and feared he would be unable to find employment to support himself and his family should he be required to return to Malaysia (CB 32-33).
4. On 11 July 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 56-58). The delegate found that there was no evidence to suggest the economic hardship feared by the applicant upon his return to Malaysia amounted to significant harm. The delegate was therefore not satisfied the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as set out in ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act (CB 56-58). The applicant was subsequently notified of the delegate's decision on the same day via his nominated email address (CB 51).
5. On 14 August 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 63-65).
6. On 20 August 2019, the Tribunal informed the applicant that his Protection visa application was invalid due to not being filed within the prescribed timeframe, being seven days out of time (CB 72-73).
7. On 22 August 2019, the applicant lodged a second duplicate application (the duplicate application) for review of the same delegate's decision (CB 81-82).
8. On 23 August 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant confirming receipt of the initial application for review, whilst also acknowledging the applicant's duplicate application. The Tribunal invited the applicant to withdraw the duplicate application, noting he had already sought review of the same decision as stated above. The applicant failed to respond to the Tribunal's invitation to withdraw the duplicate application (CB 85-86).
9. On 24 August 2021, the Tribunal notified the applicant of its finding that it had no jurisdiction within which to review the delegate's decision as the application for review had been lodged outside the prescribed period (CB 79-80).
10. On 25 August 2021, the applicant received a second notification from the Tribunal in response to the duplicate application of the decision, which again stated that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction within which to determine the application (CB 88-90).
11. On 15 October 2021, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court pursuant to s 476 of the Act. Section 477 of the Act requires that an application for judicial review be filed within 35 days from the date of the Tribunal's decision. Accordingly, the applicant has filed his application for judicial review 17 days out of time. The applicant sought an order under s 477(2) that the time for making such an application be extended.

1. The Tribunal's decision in this matter is eight paragraphs long. Given the conciseness of the Tribunal's decision, it is beneficial to set out that decision in full (CB 90):

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is a repeat application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 11 July 2019 to refuse to grant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). This review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 22 August 2019.

2. An application for review of this decision had previously been lodged with the Tribunal on 14 August 2019 (Case 1922621 refers). For the following reasons, the Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision.

3. As the applicant was not in immigration detention on the day the applicant was notified of the decision, an application for review of the decision had to be made within 28 days, commencing on that day: r.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994.

4. The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 11 July 2019 and dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.

5. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 22 August 2019 advising him that this application seems to be seeking review of the same decision he asked the Tribunal to review in case number 1922621. It was suggested that he might consider withdrawing the application. No response was received from the applicant.

6. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant regarding the first application (Case 1922621) on 20 August 2019 advising him of its preliminary view that his review application is not valid because it was not lodged within the relevant time limit. No response was received from the applicant. The Tribunal found that the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 11 July 2019: s.494C of the Act. Therefore the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 7 August 2019. As the first application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 14 August 2019 it was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation. Earlier on this date, 24 August 2021, the Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction in relation to Case 1922621.

7. As this repeat review application was not received until eight days later, on 22 August 2019, it follows that it also was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal also has no jurisdiction in this matter.

DECISION

8. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 15 October 2021 contained two grounds of review as follows (without alteration):

1. The second respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 424A(read with section 424AA) of the Migration Act to give the applicant clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon, and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information.

Particular: The Tribunal did not issue any written invitation under section 424A of the Act and, made no attempt to, and did not comply with the requirements set out in section 424AA of the Act.

2. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act.

1. As outlined above, the applicant also seeks an extension of time. The applicant was required by s 477(1) to file his application for judicial review in this Court within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal's decision. As the Tribunal's decision in this matter was made on 24 August 2021, any application was required to be made by 17 September 2021. The applicant did not file his application until 15 October 2021, and was therefore 17 days out of time.
2. Nevertheless, this Court may extend the time period within which an applicant may bring an application for judicial review if an application for an extension of time is made in writing specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary, in the interests of the administration of justice, that the Court may make an order extending time.
3. In this matter, the applicant has made an application for an extension of time in writing, setting out his grounds as follows (without alteration):
   1. On August 2021 I have got an email from AAT regarding my visa refusal. I don`t know how to apply federal court for review on my decision and also because of Covid19 thing, I can't go anywhere to get more information. I just knew that I can apply online last week when one of my friends told me. I don`t have enough money to use for the court fees because I can`t work with my visa condition, that's why I delayed more than one month to apply and I owed my friend money for the court fees.
4. The applicant appeared before the Court on 20 August 2025 and 20 October 2025, respectively, without legal representation but with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. At the first hearing of this matter, the Court raised with the applicant the claim of migration agent fraud which appeared to arise in his written submissions. In these circumstances, the Court was guided by the observations in SZRUR v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146. The Court explained to the applicant that if he wished to rely upon his assertions in respect of the conduct of a migration agent, he would need to put before the court evidence in support of those assertions. The applicant was advised that this should be by way of affidavit, but if he wished, he would be given the opportunity to give evidence from the witness box, and if he elected to do so, he may be subject to cross-examination from counsel for the Minister. The hearing was adjourned to allow the applicant time to file any further material he wished to rely upon. The Court further requested that additional written submissions be filed from both parties in relation to the allegation of fraud, and that the matter be relisted for hearing on a date to be fixed.
5. The matter resumed on 20 October 2025, and the applicant again appeared before the Court without legal representation but with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
6. The materials before the Court include:
   • The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 15 October 2021;
   • The affidavit's of the applicant filed on 15 October 2021 and 16 September 2025 (the affidavit's being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 20 October 2025);
   • A Court Book numbering 90 pages (marked as Exhibit 1);
   • Written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 6 August 2025 and 1 October 2025; and
   • Written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 7 August 2025 and 9 October 2025.
7. The Court took some time to explain that it would listen to whatever the applicant had to say in respect of why he said he should be granted an extension of time, but that the following matters were relevant (per Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579):

(a) the length of the delay;

(b) whether the explanation for the delay is adequate;

(c) whether the Minister would suffer any prejudice due to the delay; and

(d) whether the proposed substantive application for judicial review has merit.

1. The Court also explained to the applicant that it would consider whether the application for judicial review had merit at a "reasonably impressionistic level" (MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62]). It was explained to the applicant that the Court would consider whether the applicant had identified an arguable case, even if that case had not been fully developed.
2. The Court also took some time to explain that, in assessing the merits of the substantive application, the Court cannot undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) and can only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged by the applicant, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355, [2005] HCA 24 at [207]- [208]);

(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28, [2022] FCAFC 3 at [33]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; [2010] HCA 16 at [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445, [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44]).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list, and he should attempt to explain to the Court why he thought the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DDQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2013] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court; see, by way of recent example ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228 at [18]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
3. When invited to provide an explanation to the Court as to the reasons for not filing the application within the required timeframe, the applicant replied "I was depending on the agent to do everything, but in the end, he did not proceed. So, that is why the delay." The applicant said that he did not meet with his migration agent during the COVID-19 pandemic and wasn't sure what to do regarding his application, and following advice from a friend, was made aware that he could apply independently through the Federal Court.
4. When asked about whether there was anything further he wished the Court to consider in relation to what the Tribunal did wrong, the applicant stated "I feel like I'm being cheated by the agent" and ventured nothing further except a request to rely upon the material contained within his written submissions and the Court Book.

1. As outlined above, the length of delay in this matter is 17 days. The Court notes that an extension of time is not granted as a right, as per the principles in Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 64 ALJR 458 at [2]. Furthermore, the limitation periods specified in the Act are the "general rule" and any grant of an extension of time is an exception to that rule (per Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553).
2. The Court accepts that the length of delay is relatively short, and therefore does not weigh against the applicant in considering his application for an extension of time.

1. As specified in his written submissions filed on 7 August 2025, the applicant principally attributed the delay in filing his judicial review application to having a limited understanding of the Court's administrative processes and deadlines owing to having a low English proficiency. The applicant further stated in his written submissions that the delay in lodging an application for judicial review with this Court was further compounded by being confused and distressed after being left without representation, in addition to the restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 lockdown, in that they prevented him from seeking timely legal advice or the ability to engage new representation to assist him to lodge his application in a timely manner.
2. Whilst the Court acknowledges that Court processes can be confusing for unrepresented litigants (particularly those in which English is not their first language), the Court notes the comments made by the Federal Court in SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; (2012) 135 ALD 17 at [35] which states:

Whilst one may have considerable empathy for a litigant in person who does not know that he may have a capacity to bring a judicial review application in the Federal Magistrates Court and therefore fails to do so within the stipulated timeframe, ignorance of those requirements (without more) is generally not regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay. Accordingly, in the present case, it is fair to say that there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay of almost eight months.

1. In light of the above, the applicant at the hearing acknowledged that he had received a copy of the Tribunal's decision. The Court notes that a fact sheet was provided to the applicant alongside the Tribunal's notification letter of refusal, which details the applicant's rights with regards to reviewing a decision inclusive of specific timeframes within which to do so (CB 76- 78).
2. Regarding the applicant's reasons for delay in relation to being unrepresented, the Court is not persuaded that the explanations provided by the applicant are satisfactory. There remains no evidence before the Court that the applicant sought assistance from the Court about how to lodge an application for review nor endeavoured to enquire about options available to him in the event he disagreed with the Tribunal's decision.
3. Nevertheless, having regard to the modest extension required, the absence of a convincing explanation does not, of itself, militate against refusing an extension of time.

1. The Minister accepted that there would be no prejudice to him if the extension of time was granted, other than the cost of having to defend an unmeritorious application.
2. The Court accepts that the absence of prejudice does not in itself, justify the grant of an extension of time (see SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]).
3. Nevertheless, the Court does not view this factor as weighing against the grant of an extension of time.

1. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to remain alert to the possibility of an arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal which might support an extension of time being granted (MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 (MZAIB)).
2. As outlined above, the applicant raised two proposed grounds of review in his application for judicial review.

1. Ground one asserts that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Act by not issuing a written invitation to the applicant to comment on adverse information. Section 424A relevantly provides:

424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(2A) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.

(3) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

(c) that is non-disclosable information.

(4) A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 426A(1F).

1. The Court accepts the Minister's submission that this ground is misconceived. In this matter the Tribunal correctly identified it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, owing to it being filed out of time. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not required to engage with the applicant under s 424A.
2. In any event, the Tribunal informed the applicant by letter to his nominated address that it had formed the preliminary view that the first of his applications had been filed out of time, and gave him the opportunity to comment on the question of jurisdiction before reaching its decision. Furthermore, in relation to the duplicate application, the Tribunal informed the applicant that he had made a repeat application of the same decision of the delegate and provided him with an opportunity to withdraw the duplicate application, in which he declined to do. The applicant was thus on notice of the only salient issues in respect of his application.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of proposed ground one.

1. Ground two asserts that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction within which to make its decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived at in accordance with the Act.
2. The Minister submitted that this ground does not engage with the Tribunal's decision that it had no jurisdiction due to the late filing of the review application. The Tribunal was not required to reach any "reasonable satisfaction" in respect of the application for the visa as it was concerned solely with the threshold issue of jurisdiction. The Tribunal found that it simply did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review at all because the application for review was made outside the required timeframe imposed by the Act and Regulations. Once it had reached that conclusion that brought the Tribunal's task to an end.
3. The Court accepts that was the correct conclusion for the Tribunal provided that the applicant had been properly notified of the primary decision made by the Minister's delegate.

Was the Tribunal correct to find that it did not have jurisdiction in this case?

1. The Court has considered whether or not the applicant was properly notified of the delegate's decision.
2. Section 66 of the Act governs the notification of decisions made by the Minister when refusing to grant a visa as follows:

66 Notification of decision

(1) When the Minister grants or refuses to grant a visa, he or she is to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way.

(2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must:

(a) if the grant of the visa was refused because the applicant did not satisfy a criterion for the visa - specify that criterion; and

(b) if the grant of the visa was refused because a provision of this Act or the regulations prevented the grant of the visa - specify that provision; and

(c) unless subsection (3) applies to the application - give written reasons (other than non-disclosable information) why the criterion was not satisfied or the provision prevented the grant of the visa; and

(d) if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 or section 500 - state:

(i) that the decision can be reviewed; and

(ii) the time in which the application for review may be made; and

(iii) who can apply for the review; and

(iv) where the application for review can be made

...

1. The time within which an applicant who is not in immigration detention was required to file an application for review of a decision to refuse a protection visa is governed by s 412 of the Act and r 4.31 of the Regulations, which relevantly provide:

412 Application for review of Part 7 reviewable decisions

(1) An application for review of a Part 7 reviewable decision must:

...

(b) be given to the Tribunal within the period prescribed, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision; and

...

4.31 Time for lodgement of application with Tribunal

...

(2) For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7 reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision.

...

1. Section 494B and 494C outlined the methods by which the Minister could give documents to a person and when a person was taken to have received that document. With respect to a document sent to a person via email, s 494C relevantly provides:

...

(5) If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(5) (which involves transmitting the document by fax, email or other electronic means), the person is taken to have received the document at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted.

...

1. As the applicant in this case was notified by email of the delegate's decision on 11 July 2019, he was deemed to have received the notice at the end of that day. As submitted by the Minister, the deemed receipt of the notification letter is not rebuttable (per Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 377 at [17]). As a consequence, the prescribed period for review of 28 days expired on 7 August 2019. The applicant did not lodge his applications for review with the Tribunal until 14 August 2019 and 22 August 2019. As submitted by the Minister, the filing of an application within the prescribed timeframe was a prerequisite to enlivening the Tribunal's jurisdiction (per VEAN of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 2133 FCR 570; [2003] FCAFC 311 at [32]- [33]). The Tribunal therefore had no discretion to extend the length of time for filing an application for review (Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228 at [49]).
2. Accordingly, unless the applicant was not properly notified in the prescribed way, his application for review by the Tribunal failed to be lodged within the prescribed timeframe, and the Tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction to review his application.
3. In order to satisfy the notification requirements as set out in s 66(2)(d) of the Act (set out above), the notification was required to state:

(a) that the decision can be reviewed;

(b) the time in which the application for review was required to be made;

(c) who could apply for the review; and

(d) where the application for review could be made.

1. In DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64; (2019) 270 FCR 492 at [58], Perram J concluded that the word 'state', when used in s 66(2) of the Act, meant that the relevant information must be set out in a way that is both complete and clear.
2. Furthermore, in Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 at [51]- [52] (Sandor), Markovic J found that, where notification is sent to an authorised recipient, the use of the words "you are taken to have received" were not clear as it required the recipient of the notification to "piece together the facts which would allow [them] to know the time in which an application may be made."
3. As submitted by the Minister at the hearing, the delegate's notification letter was sent to the email address provided by the applicant on his visa application, which identified the decision, the reasons and the timeframe within which to seek a review in the Tribunal. The email was sent to the applicant directly, as there was no other authorised recipient detailed within the visa application.
4. The Court therefore accepts that the error identified in Sandor fails to arise in this matter because the notification was sent directly to the applicant and not to an authorised recipient. Furthermore, the notification letter was set out in a coherent and easily understandable structure which did not require the applicant to "piece together" information to determine when an application was required to be made.
5. The Court accepts that notification on behalf of the delegate to the applicant was done so in accordance with the authorities and legislative requirements as outlined above, and therefore agrees with the Minister's submission that ground two stems from an incorrect assertion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to conduct the review. The Tribunal was correct to find that the applicant's application for review was filed out of time, and subsequently did not have jurisdiction within which to consider the matter.
6. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground two.

1. As outlined above, the applicant claimed he had been the victim of serious misconduct in relation to two migration agents, of whom one of which was later found by the applicant to be unregistered.
2. In relation to the first migration agent, the applicant alleged that the agent:

(a) had exclusive access to the applicant's email account used for correspondence with the Tribunal;

(b) failed to communicate important correspondence from the Minister's delegate (including the outcome of the visa application); and

(c) ceased all communications with the applicant with no apparent forewarning.

1. The applicant claimed that following regaining access to his email account and discovering the Tribunal's refusal, he appointed a second migration agent with a friend's assistance. The applicant further claimed that he was misled by the second migration agent, in that he failed to respond on the applicant's behalf to the Tribunal's invitation requesting a response as to the validity of the applicant's application and subsequently learned that the agent was himself on a refugee visa, and was therefore not a registered migration agent.
2. In response to claims of agent misconduct, the Minister submits that taken at its highest, the applicant's claim of migration agent fraud constitutes negligence rather than fraud. This is owing to the agent's failure to duly inform the applicant of both the Minister's refusal of his protection visa and the invitation to comment on the validity of the application.
3. It is well-established that negligence on the part of a migration agent (as compared to fraud or dishonesty) will not be sufficient to give rise to a denial of procedural fairness or jurisdictional error (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SVFDE [2006] FCAFC 142; (2006) 154 FCR 365 at [129]; SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189 at [53]; Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46l (2020) 271 CLR 550 at [15]).
4. As confirmed by the Full Court in SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 222 FCR 73; [2014] FCAFC 40 at [52]:

It is well settled that mere negligence, inadvertence or incompetence on the part of an agent representing a visa applicant will not constitute fraud so as to warrant judicial intervention.

1. Accordingly, in order to satisfy the threshold of an allegation of fraud, the applicant is required to put to the Court sufficient evidence that there was fraud committed by the agent against him, and that he had refrained from colluding with the agent in that fraud, and there was no evidence to support a finding that the applicant was indifferent as to whether the agent uses unlawful or dishonest means to obtain a visa (see Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 142 at [50]).
2. The Court agrees with the Minister in that only actual fraud or dishonesty that distorts the decision making process may warrant judicial intervention. Nothing in the material before the Court would support any such finding.
3. In any event, there is simply no evidence before the Court that there was ever any migration agent acting for the applicant. Certainly, at no stage was the tribunal ever on notice that the applicant had engaged a migration agent. Further, the applicant has provided the same email address to the department, the Tribunal and this Court. In the absence of any evidence that indicated a migration agent was on record or formally engaged with the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant at any point during the proceedings, the Court is not satisfied that any fraud was committed. The applicant's submission in this respect cannot succeed because there had been no contact with the Tribunal from anyone other than the applicant.
4. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider that there is any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, or consequently, any merit to the substantive application.

1. The Court finds that it is not in the administration of justice for the Court to grant the applicant an extension of time in this matter.
2. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.