Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax
68 The contraventions of s 500 by Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax can conveniently be considered together.
69 The Director's allegation is that all the CFMEU officials, including Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax, entered the site for the purpose of holding discussions with workers, pursuant to s 484.
70 The respondents' counsel submitted that it had not been established that either Mr Kalem or Mr Lomax had entered the Flinders University site for such a purpose, with the effect that the Director had not established the second element of a s 500 contravention. He submitted that the evidence established instead that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had entered the site for the purpose of inspecting it generally, and referred in this respect to Mr Gava's statement when first challenged by Mr Crabb, "these guys are officials from interstate and they want to look around". This submission was consistent with the pleadings of Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax.
71 The purpose of a person's entry in the context of s 484 is to be assessed objectively having regard to all the surrounding circumstances. The statements made by the person at the time of the entry, or subsequently, may be relevant to that assessment but are not conclusive. The person's conduct and other circumstances after the entry may be more revealing of the person's actual purpose or purposes.
72 There is no reason to construe the word "discussions" in s 484 narrowly. To hold otherwise would be to confine the kinds of discussions which union officials generally may have in the course of their legitimate activities. The term should be given its ordinary meaning. That includes "talking something over". Even a brief conversation comprising little more than an introduction and an enquiry as to whether a worker has any concerns may constitute a discussion in the relevant sense. There is no reason to incorporate into s 484 a requirement that the discussions be of a formal kind, concern the pursuit of an agenda, or be of some minimum duration. The section itself contemplates that the discussions may be with one or more employees. A discussion with an individual employee may of necessity be brief. Section 480 contemplates that the discussions may be with potential members, as well as existing members. Discussions with such persons may be of diverse kinds, again indicating that the term should not be given a narrow meaning. Sections 132 and 194 indicate that Pt 3-4 is intended to be the only prescription with respect to workplace entry by union officials, an intention which may well be frustrated if the term "discussions" was construed narrowly.
73 In my opinion, a number of matters indicate that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had entered the Flinders University site for the s 484 purpose:
(a) upon entering, the CFMEU officials did not just "look around". All of them held discussions with workers on the site, at the least when walking around the site separately. Even if the CFMEU officials were making contact with the formworkers, introducing themselves and enquiring briefly as to any concerns which they had, their conversations constituted discussions of the requisite kind;
(b) further, all of the CFMEU officials followed the formwork workers into the lunchroom at the 9:30 smoko. Although there is no evidence as to what was said in the lunchroom, it is reasonable to suppose, and I find, that the CFMEU officials discussed matters with the formworkers at that time. I observe also that the lunchroom was a place in which discussions authorised by s 484 may take place (FW Act s 492);
(c) following the smoko, the CFMEU officials (by one of their number) asked to meet Mr Crabb and requested Mr Wallace and Mr Grindle, two employees concerned with safety, to join them at that meeting. The CFMEU raised at the outset of the meeting aspects of safety on the site. It is reasonable to suppose that they had been informed of at least some of these during the smoko meeting and were, accordingly, making representations on behalf of their members;
(d) the impression that the CFMEU officials were acting in the manner of union officials exercising s 484 rights is confirmed by the similarity of their conduct with that of officials on previous occasions when entering after giving s 487 notices;
(e) Mr Gava's explanation to Mr Crabb for refusing to comply with his direction that he leave the site is instructive. He said "this is the way it's done now", thereby impliedly referring to the way by which the CFMEU proposed exercising the right of entry and not to some new or different entitlement;
(f) the suggestion that the CFMEU organisers were present simply to look around, as though to satisfy their curiosity, is not plausible. The fact that they were there as a group during their own working hours, wearing clothing and hard hats with the CFMEU logos and insignia, suggests by itself that they were present as part of an organised activity, something seemingly not consistent with a wish to satisfy idle curiosity;
(g) the officials had no entitlement to be on site other than granted by ss 481 and 484 of the FW Act and by the WHS Act. They were no more entitled to enter the site to satisfy their curiosity than any other member of the public. In fact, once Mr Crabb had requested them to leave, they were probably committing the criminal offence of trespass: Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 17A. There may be a question, as counsel for the respondents submitted, as to whether the officials other than Mr Gava knew of Mr Crabb's request that they leave. But even if they did not, there is no basis upon which they could have thought, reasonably, that Mr Crabb had granted them permission to enter the site simply to look around or to satisfy their curiosity. The fact that they did not wait at the site office but entered the site without first speaking to Mr Crabb is also pertinent in this respect; and
(h) the CFMEU officials entered the site in the manner of persons entering as of right, and did not wait at the site office or otherwise seek approval to come onto the site. That is to say, the CFMEU officials behaved as though they were entitled to enter pursuant to s 484.
74 These matters give rise to an inference that each of the CFMEU officials had entered for the s 484 purpose. That inference can be drawn with greater confidence given that neither Mr Kalem nor Mr Lomax gave evidence: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308; Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11, (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [63]-[64].
75 Counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence did not establish that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had entered the site for the purpose of discussions with employees whose industrial interests the CFMEU was entitled to represent and, therefore, for the s 484 purpose. He contended that the evidence disclosed that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had spoken only with management; that even if they had spoken to other persons, the evidence did not establish that those persons were employees and not contractors; and that, even if they had spoken to persons who were employees, the evidence did not establish that they were persons whose industrial interests the CFMEU was entitled to represent. Part of this last submission was to the effect that the Director had not proven the CFMEU membership eligibility rules.
76 It is appropriate to keep in mind that the second element of a s 500 contravention requires proof that the permit holder was exercising, or seeking to exercise, rights in accordance with Pt 3-4 of the FW Act. This means that the second element will be established if the permit holder was, as a matter of fact, exercising (relevantly) the s 484 right or seeking to exercise that right. Permit holders may seek to exercise the s 484 right even though they are mistaken in their belief that there are employees on the site at the time of the entry, or that there are on the site employees whose industrial interests the permit holder's organisation is entitled to represent, or that persons answering that description do wish to participate in discussions with them. Proof that each of the elements listed in s 484 pertained at the time of the official's entry is not required, at least in respect of an allegation that the permit holder was seeking to exercise rights under Pt 3-4.
77 Accordingly, even if the respondents' submissions on this topic were accepted, it would not mean necessarily that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax were not entering for a s 484 purpose.
78 However, the evidence does not support the CFMEU submission at a factual level. Contrary to counsel's submission, there is evidence that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax spoke to persons other than management personnel. Mr Crabb described "the officials" holding separate discussions with 6-8 different formworkers as they moved about the site. It is true that Mr Crabb did not specifically mention Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax in this regard, as he referred only to "the officials". However, there is no suggestion that Mr Crabb was referring only to some of the officials. Further still, all of the officials went with the formworkers into the lunchroom at the morning smoko. As indicated earlier, although there is no evidence as to what occurred in the lunchroom, it is reasonable to suppose that the officials, including Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax, had discussions with the formworkers.
79 Counsel's submission seemed to rest on the proposition that the possibility that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had remained mute during the lunchroom meeting could not be excluded. That may be so, but that would not mean, to my mind, that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax were not, as part of the larger group, holding discussions of a relevant kind. It is common experience that discussions may take place involving three or more persons even if one of the participants remains silent. It is an ordinary incident of the holding of discussions that those present listen to what others have to say. It is also common experience that in group discussions some persons participate by allowing others to be their spokespersons. In my opinion, it is improbable, in the context of the lunchroom meeting, that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax did not hold discussions with the formworkers who were present either by speaking themselves, or at least to listening to the statements of the other CFMEU officials made on behalf of the group and to those of the formworkers. The Jones v Dunkel principle adds to the confidence with which this conclusion may be drawn.
80 The possibility that the workers to whom Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax spoke were not employees, or did not include employees, is so remote as to be able to be ignored. Mr Crabb said that there were some 40-50 persons working on site on 30 October 2013. It can be inferred that most of these persons were formworkers as Mr Crabb also said that they were the only workers on the site at the time. Mr Crabb acceded in cross-examination to counsel's proposition that "a significant number" would have been contractors and subcontractors. Counsel did not ask him to elaborate on this answer. In context, I would not regard a "significant number" as equivalent to "nearly all" the workers, or even to a majority of them. It is much more likely to mean only an appreciable number. It is reasonable to suppose, and I find, that many of the formworkers were employees and not subcontractors. Put slightly differently, it is improbable that they were all subcontractors.
81 The probability that the workers on site comprised a large number of persons who were not only employees, but employees whose industrial interests the CFMEU was entitled to represent, is supported by the evidence of the CFMEU's own activities and demands. CFMEU officials had attended at the site on a number of previous occasions. The inference that they had attended to service the interests of persons (employees) whom the CFMEU was entitled to represent is strong, as they had no obvious interest in servicing the interests of other persons. So also is the inference arising from the CFMEU's demands on 30 October 2015, and in the previous weeks, for a permanent CFMEU delegate on the site. It is improbable that the CFMEU would have made such a demand if it did not have members, or potential members, working on the site.
82 It is true that the Director did not prove the CFMEU's membership rules. However, it was not necessary for him to do so given that each of the respondents had admitted the following plea in the Further Amended Statement of Claim (FASC):
At all material times, the CFMEU's eligibility rules allowed membership by persons whose employment consisted of, or included, any of the following activities:
3.1 The construction, alteration, restoration, repair, demolition or dismantling of buildings, structures or works that form or are to form part of land;
3.2 Any operation part of or preparatory to those activities, such as site clearance, earthmoving, excavation, the laying of foundations or the erection or maintenance of scaffolding.
83 For these reasons, I do not accept the respondents' submission as to the purpose of Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax.
84 Exercising the restraint which s 140 of the Evidence Act makes appropriate, I consider that the evidence, taken as a whole, indicates that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax, like the other CFMEU officials, were asserting an entitlement to enter for the s 484 purpose without having to give the notice of entry required by s 487. The alternatives, namely, that they were entering simply out of curiosity, or in the manner of persons committing a criminal trespass, are so improbable as to be able to be disregarded.
85 I am satisfied that the conduct of Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax was improper. They entered the site without having provided a notice of entry and without having obtained permission to do so and remained there for an hour and 40 minutes. I am satisfied that they knew at the time that they were not entitled to enter the site simply for the purpose of looking around. The circumstance that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax distracted workers by speaking to them as they worked adds to the impropriety of their conduct.
86 Counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence did not show that Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax had heard Mr Crabb's request to Mr Gava that they leave the site. I accept that submission, as Mr Crabb said that Mr Kalem, Mr Lomax and Vern were some seven to ten metres away at the time of his request. Although he thought that they were within earshot, he did not point to any aspect of their behaviour which indicated that they had heard the request.
87 However, I do not accept counsel's further submission that the conduct of Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax was not improper because they did not know of Mr Crabb's request that they leave. Neither Mr Kalem nor Mr Lomax could have thought that they had permission to enter or remain on the site and, accordingly, to conduct themselves as though they were present as of right. A sign at the entrance told visitors to report to the site office. Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax could not have thought, as counsel submitted, that merely because they were accompanying Mr Gava, they could ignore this direction. Their conduct does not avoid the characterisation of being improper only because they were not aware that Mr Crabb had made the request or direction that they leave. Ignoring such a request or direction may, in some circumstances, add to the impropriety, but it is not essential for such a finding.
88 As previously noted, the Director did not rely on the conduct of Mr Kalem and Mr Lomax in their return to the site in the afternoon for the alleged contravention of s 500.
89 Accordingly, there will be declarations as to the contraventions of s 500 by Mr Gava, Mr Kalem, Mr Lomax and the CFMEU as sought by the Director.