Deterrence
41 The predominant purpose of civil penalty provisions is deterrence, both specific and general: see Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482 at 506; [2015] HCA 46 at [55] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd (2006) ATPR ¶42-091 at 44,564; [2005] FCAFC 247 at [11] (Heerey, Finkelstein and Allsop JJ).
42 In the first of these cases the High Court emphasised the pre-eminence of deterrence as a guiding principle where the fixing of civil penalties is concerned. In their joint judgment, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ said (at 506 [55]) that:
No less importantly, whereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance:
"Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]. … The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act."
(Citations omitted.)
43 The comments of Keane J in the same case (at 523-524 [110]) also bear mention:
It is because the Commissioner may, on occasion, be too pragmatic in taking such a stance that the court must exercise its function to ensure that the penalty imposed is just, bearing in mind competing considerations of principle, including that of equality before the law and the need to maintain effective deterrence to other potential contraveners. In this latter regard, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd, French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ approved the statement by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission that a civil penalty for a contravention of the law:
"must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not such as to be regarded by [the] offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business."
(Citations omitted.)
44 More recently, in the Perth Airport Case, Dowsett and Rares JJ (at 481 [100]-[101]) made these general observations about the need for industrial laws to be obeyed and the penal consequences of breaches:
100 In a liberal democracy, it is assumed that citizens, corporations and other organisations will comply with the law. Such compliance is not a matter of choice. The community does not accept that a citizen, corporation or other organisation may choose to break the law and simply pay the penalty. The courts certainly do not accept that proposition. Such acceptance would pose a serious threat to the rule of law upon which our society is based. It would undermine the authority of Parliament and could lead to the public perception that the judiciary is involved in a process which is pointless, if not ridiculous.
101 The Parliament's purpose in legislating to provide that particular proscribed conduct will attract a civil penalty was to deter persons, including but not limited to trade unions or corporations, from engaging or continuing to engage in such conduct. A civil penalty would lose its utility if the person on whom it was imposed simply treated it as a cost of continuing to carry on with the very conduct that had just been penalised.
See also Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCAFC 113 at [98] (Dowsett, Greenwood and Wigney JJ).
45 The CFMEU is a large, asset-rich and well-resourced industrial organisation. It has regularly been involved in litigation in which it has been found to have contravened provisions of the Act. The Commissioner has provided the Court with a table which records contraventions by the CFMEU of industrial legislation on more than 100 occasions over the 15 years from 1999 to 2014. These contraventions have led to the imposition of pecuniary penalties totalling millions of dollars. The CFMEU may, therefore, be taken to be well aware of the constraints imposed upon it and its members by such provisions. Despite this the contraventions have continued. In 2016 the table discloses that the courts found, or the CFMEU admitted, 56 separate contraventions by the CFMEU of industrial laws, which contraventions occurred between February 2011 and June 2014. Of those, 36 were contraventions of s 500. Thirty-one of the 56 separate contraventions occurred prior to 27 February 2014. Eighteen of the 36 contraventions of s 500 were committed prior to that date.
46 The table disclosed one prior contested contravention of s 499, which occurred in 2013: see Director of the Fair Work Building Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1293 at [254]-[271] (White J); Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCA 413 at [161] (White J). Five contested contraventions of s 758(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), which was in a similar form to s 499, were also found to have occurred in 2008: see Darlaston v Parker (2010) 189 FCR 1 at 57; [2010] FCA 771 at [265] (Flick J); Darlaston v Parker (No 2) (2010) 200 IR 353 at 368-372; [2010] FCA 1382 at [65]-[66] (Flick J).
47 In relation to s 500 and its predecessor, s 767(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), the table discloses the following contraventions by the CFMEU:
(1) three (one admitted and two contested) contraventions of s 767(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) in 2008 and 2009 that were subject to judicial determination prior to 27 February 2014;
(2) four (three admitted and one contested) contraventions of s 500 in 2009 and 2010 that were subject to judicial determination prior to 27 February 2014;
(3) 19 (ten admitted and nine contested) contraventions of s 500 in 2012 and 2013 that occurred prior to, but were subject to judicial determination after, 27 February 2014; and
(4) 37 admitted contraventions of s 500 in 2014 and 2015. These contraventions occurred, and were subject to judicial determination as to penalty, after 27 February 2014.
48 The contraventions of ss 499 and 500 (and their predecessor sections) by the CFMEU which were the subject of judicial determination prior to 27 February 2014 are the most relevant to the task of determining penalty in this proceeding. Those that occurred prior to that date but were subsequently subject to judgment should be afforded less weight but are also relevant: see, eg, Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) (2009) 189 IR 304 at 314; [2009] FCA 1040 at [41] (Kenny J); Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v O'Connor [2016] FCA 415 at [115] (White J). Contraventions of s 500 that occurred after 27 February 2014 are not irrelevant although less weight should be given to them and the CFMEU should not be penalised twice for its later breaches: see Cahill (No 4) at 314 [41]; Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Upton [2015] FCA 672 at [55] (Gilmour J); Huddy (No 2) at [93].
49 The present case thus falls into a pattern of repeated disregard for the law. To adopt the language of Mortimer J in Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2016] FCA 436 at [142]: the ongoing misconduct evidences a willingness "by the CFMEU to engage in whatever action, and make whatever threats, it wishes, without regard to the law, and then, once a prosecution is brought, to seek to negotiate its way into a position in which the [penalties] for its actions can be tolerated as the price of doing its industrial business." See also Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Perth Childrens' Hospital Contraventions Case) [2017] FCA 491 at [83]-[90] (Barker J) and the authorities there cited and Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Parker (No 2) [2017] FCA 1082 at [30]-[32] (Flick J); Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 1269 at [34]-[38] (Reeves J).
50 The officials who constitute the councils of the CFMEU and those holding full-time office in the organisation are, or should be, aware, of the many decisions in which the union has been found liable for contraventions of the Act and related legislation. They are also aware, or should be aware, of the many judicial pronouncements about the gravity and unacceptability of this ongoing misconduct. They are, or should be, aware that millions of dollars of union funds, which could otherwise be utilised for the benefit of the members, have had to be expended in paying penalties for these persistent contraventions. They are, or should be, aware of the considerable advantages and responsibilities conferred on registered organisations by the Act and the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth). These include the right of officials, such as Messrs Myles and MacDonald who held entry permits granted under the Act, to enter construction sites.
51 Despite this knowledge the contravening conduct has continued. At no point has the CFMEU expressed any remorse for the misconduct of its officials. Nor has it undertaken to take any steps to ensure that there will be no repetition of the contravening conduct. At no point has it expressed any contrition for the misconduct which has led to liability findings.
52 In these circumstances an irresistible inference arises that the CFMEU, despite being well aware of the obligations which fall on it and its officials under the Act, has made a considered decision to continue to pursue its industrial ends by resort to conduct proscribed by the Act. Any resultant penalties are to be regarded as a "cost of doing business". The penalties, available under the Act, and imposed by the Court, have not been sufficient to persuade the union and its officials to obey the law. Such was the position when the contravening conduct, presently under consideration, occurred. Nothing has since changed.
53 In Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 at [63] I observed that the longer that the CFMEU's recidivism continued, the greater the weight which would be accorded to specific deterrence when fixing appropriate penalties.
54 Mr Myles has a deplorable personal history of offending. A table, which accompanied the Commissioner's submissions, disclosed that, prior to the events the subject of this proceeding, Mr Myles had been found to have been involved in two contraventions of s 500 occurring in 2010: see Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Myles [2013] FCCA 2229 at [143]-[145], [149] (Burnett J). Mr Myles's conduct which contravened s 500 involved addressing workers, which delayed their return to work, and swearing at and insulting the site foreman. Penalties were not, however, imposed on Mr Myles in relation to those findings until 28 February 2014: see Director of the Fair Work Building Inspectorate v Myles [2014] FCCA 1429. Although he was not a named respondent to the Director's application, Mr Myles was also found to have committed, in 2010, a breach of s 44 of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) ("the BCII Act") in Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCA 846 at [16] (Collier J) by organising employees not to commence work with the intent to coerce or apply undue pressure on an employer to accept a building enterprise agreement with the CFMEU. The prior contraventions of s 500 are particularly relevant to the assessment of penalty, albeit that the financial penalty was imposed the day after the contravening conduct in this proceeding: cf Draffin v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2009) 189 IR 145 at 158; [2009] FCAFC 120 at [92] (Goldberg, Jacobson and Tracey JJ); O'Connor at [115]. Less weight should be placed on the contravention of s 44 insofar as it concerns conduct of a different nature from that in this proceeding: see Stuart‑Mahoney v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2008) 177 IR 61 at 70; [2008] FCA 1426 at [44] (Tracey J); Cahill (No 4) at 314 [39]-[40], [46]; cf O'Connor at [139]; Perth Childrens' Hospital Contraventions Case at [32].
55 Judicial determinations delivered in 2015 and 2016, record that Mr Myles committed nine contraventions of industrial laws in 2012 and 2013. In Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2016] FCA 436, Mortimer J imposed penalties on Mr Myles following his admission that, in May 2013, he contravened s 348 three times by organising a vehicle blockade and by threatening to prevent a concrete pour with the intent to coerce an employer to put a CFMEU delegate on a particular project: see at [7]. In Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (The Mitcham Rail Case) [2015] FCA 1173, penalties were also imposed by Jessup J on Mr Myles after he again admitted that he contravened s 348 twice in August 2013 by threatening to disrupt normal work and by organising employees not to work with intent to coerce an employer to engage a CFMEU delegate on a site: see at [3]. In Director, Fair Work Building Inspectorate v Cradden [2015] FCA 614, Logan J imposed penalties on Mr Myles for four admitted contraventions of s 44 of the BCII Act in March 2012 whereby he parked vehicles to impede access onto a site and intimidated employees with intent to coerce and apply undue pressure on an employer to agree to make a building enterprise agreement.
56 Some of Mr Myles' prior conduct recorded in these three cases is broadly similar to that in this proceeding (in particular the threatened prevention of a concrete pour) and may be taken into account in the assessment of penalty. Those contraventions are, however, to be accorded less weight because, although the conduct occurred prior to the contravening conduct at issue in this proceeding, penalties were only imposed subsequent to 27 February 2014: see Draffin at 158 [92]; Cahill (No 4) at 314 [41]; O'Connor at [115].
57 Mr MacDonald has previously been penalised for contraventions of s 38 of the BCII Act, which penalty was imposed in September 2013 prior to the events at issue in this proceeding: see Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCA 1014. Justice Gordon found that Mr MacDonald had contravened that section by being involved in unlawful strike action in October 2010 constituted by directing employees to strike for the day. This prior conduct should be given less weight because it concerns conduct of a different nature to that at issue in this proceeding: cf Stuart‑Mahoney at 70 [44]; Cahill (No 4) at 314 [39]-[40], [46]. Nevertheless, it is relevant insofar as it confirms that Mr MacDonald does not have a "clean record": cf O'Connor at [139].
58 In April 2014, Messrs Myles and MacDonald were involved in a picket line which was maintained by the CFMEU in contempt of court, although they were not named respondents to the Director's application: see Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 226. This conduct occurred after the commission of the contravening conduct in this proceeding. For this reason, and for the reasons summarised at [57] above, it should be afforded substantially less weight: cf Huddy (No 2) at [82; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v McCullough (No 2) [2017] FCA 295 at [41]-[45] (Barker J).
59 At the time of the hearing, neither Mr Myles nor Mr MacDonald held valid entry permits. Mr Myles' permit had apparently expired in March 2014 and he had not applied for a new one. Mr MacDonald's entry permit expired in June 2016 and his application for the issue of a new permit was refused in May 2016: see Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union Construction and General Division, Victoria-Tasmania Divisional Branch [2016] FWC 3190.
60 Again, specific deterrence must weigh heavily in the determination of penalties to be imposed on both Messrs Myles and MacDonald. Their contravening conduct on 27 February 2014 was arrogant and dismissive of warnings given to them that they were acting unlawfully. They abused their rights as permit holders and they impeded the concrete pouring which was planned for that afternoon. While espousing an interest in ensuring safety on the site, they deliberately placed themselves in dangerous positions in order to obstruct the movement of trucks carrying concrete to the site. The fact that these respondents no longer hold entry permits does not, the Commissioner submitted, remove the need for specific deterrence because of the possibility that they may still attend work sites when invited: cf Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Bolton (No 2) (2016) 261 IR 452 at 468; [2016] FCA 817 at [52] (Collier J). The need for personal deterrence is, nonetheless, reduced: see O'Connor at [127].
61 There is, of course, also a need for general deterrence to discourage others who might be minded to contravene provisions of the Act.