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[2013] FCA 1014
Federal Court of Australia
2013-10-07
Gordon J
Original judgment source is linked above.
INTRODUCTION 1 The Applicant, the Acting Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, appointed pursuant to s 16 of the Fair Work (Building Industry) Act 2012 (Cth) (the FWBI Act), is entitled to bring this proceeding seeking orders pursuant to s 49(1) of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) (the BCII Act) by reason of ss 2.3(1)(b) and 2.3(3)(a) of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Amendment (Transition to Fair Work) Regulation 2012 (Cth). 2 The First Respondent (the CFMEU) is an association of employees registered as an organisation pursuant to s 26 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW(RO) Act) and, at all relevant times, was both an organisation and industrial association within the meaning attributed to those terms by s 4 of the BCII Act. 3 This proceeding concerned conduct engaged in by the individual named respondents in connection with certain construction projects in which Abigroup Ltd was engaged in 2010. The Applicant seeks declarations and the imposition of civil penalties against the CFMEU and each of the individual named respondents for breaches of the BCII Act. Each of the individual named respondents was both an employee organiser of the CFMEU and an officer of the CFMEU within the meaning given to that term by ss 4 and 69(3) of the BCII Act and was acting within the scope of his actual authority as an employee and officer of the CFMEU. Before trial, the Applicant and the respondents filed a statement of agreed facts and admissions. The agreed facts and admissions are set out in Annexure A.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 4 It is common ground that the Applicant, appointed pursuant to s 16 of the FWBI Act, is entitled to bring this proceeding seeking orders pursuant to s 49(1) of the BCII Act. 5 These proceedings concern alleged contraventions of ss 43(1)(a) and 38 of the BCII Act. Section 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act provides that a person must not organise or take action, or threaten to organise or take action, with intent to coerce another person to (relevantly) employ a person as a building employee. There are three necessary elements to make out a s 43(1)(a) contravention, namely: 1. the first person organise or take (or threaten to organise or take) "action"; 2. the action is organised or taken (or threatened to be organised or taken) with "intent to coerce" the second person; and 3. the intention is to coerce the second person to employ a third person as a building employee. 6 Section 38 of the BCII Act provides that a person must not engage in unlawful industrial action. There are four necessary elements to make out such a contravention, namely: 1. there be "building industrial action" (within the meaning of that term in s 36 of the BCII Act); 2. the building industrial action be "industrially-motivated" (within the meaning of that term in s 36 of the BCII Act); 3. the building industrial action be "constitutionally-connected action" (within the meaning of that term in s 36 of the BCII Act); and 4. the building industrial action not be "excluded action" (within the meaning of that term in s 36 of the BCII Act).
ANALYSIS 7 As noted earlier, the parties agreed certain facts and admissions: see Annexure A. 8 It is not unusual in modern litigation for proceedings commenced by a regulator against a defendant to be resolved and for the parties to jointly approach the Court with an agreed statement of facts. The beneficial consequences of such a resolution are well known: see, by way of example, NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 290-291. It has been suggested that cases which involve serious contraventions of the law cannot be "settled" by agreed facts that do not present a fair and accurate picture of the relevant offending to the Court: cf Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ingleby [2013] VSCA 49 at [31]. So much may be accepted. When this proceeding was settled, the only documents filed with the Court were the originating application and a statement of claim. As a result, in assessing whether the agreed facts and admissions present a fair and accurate picture of the offending conduct, the Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, must satisfy itself that it has sufficient facts and matters to enable it to assess and impose an appropriate penalty: cf Ingleby at [33] citing with approval Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72 at [79]. If the Court forms the view that it does not have sufficient facts and matters, it can and should request the parties to provide additional evidence or information: Mobil Oil at [79]. 9 Consistent with the exercise of judicial power, the first question to be asked is whether the Court does have sufficient facts and matters to enable it to assess and impose a penalty in the proper exercise of that judicial power? Subject to one matter that is addressed at [40]-[43] below, the answer to that question is yes. The agreed facts and admissions in this case place the Court in a position to properly discharge its constitutional responsibilities. The present case faced none of the problems identified in Ingleby: at [31]-[46]. 10 Here, the conduct occurred over a number of days in 2010 - 31 August, 26 and 27 October and 11 November 2010 - and at a number of sites. A number of the respondents were involved on more than one day. The conduct will be addressed chronologically, cross-referenced to the statement of agreed facts and admissions.
31 August 2010 11 The conduct on 31 August 2010 involved the Second Respondent (Stephenson), the Fifth Respondent (Doyle) and the CFMEU on two sites of the project to design and build the Peninsula Link freeway (the Peninsula Link Project) - the entrance to the Cranbourne-Frankston Road compound site (the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site) and the entrance to the main Peninsula Link compound (the Seaford Compound). 12 On 31 August 2010, Stephenson engaged in: 1. a blockade of the entrance to the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site of the Peninsula Link Project, thereby preventing access to and from the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site; and 2. a blockade of the entrance to the Seaford Compound of the Peninsula Link Project, thereby preventing vehicular access to and from the Seaford Compound - such conduct being engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (Abigroup Contractors) to employ particular members of the CFMEU on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members (four identified members). That conduct contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [33]-[40] of Annexure A. 13 Doyle also engaged in: 1. a blockade of the entrance to the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site of the Peninsula Link Project, thereby preventing access to and from the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site; and 2. a blockade of the entrance to the Seaford Compound of the Peninsula Link Project, thereby preventing vehicular access to and from the Seaford Compound - such conduct being engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members. That conduct contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [33]-[40] of Annexure A. 14 The CFMEU contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act by reason of being vicariously liable for the conduct referred to in [12] and [13] above: see [40]-[42] of Annexure A.
26 and 27 October 2010 15 The conduct on 26 and 27 October 2010 involved the Fourth Respondent (MacDonald), Stephenson, the Third Respondent (Powell) and the CFMEU at numerous sites. 16 MacDonald contravened s 38 of the BCII Act for being involved (within the meaning of s 48(2) of the BCII Act) in unlawful strike action by employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Truganina South Primary School Project Site at Federation Boulevard, Truganina (the Truganina Site) on 27 October 2010. His involvement having directed those employees to strike for the day: see [69]-[75] of Annexure A. 17 Stephenson, in directing: 1. on 26 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Southern Link Upgrade Alliance Project in Victoria (SLU Project) to strike for the day; 2. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Tooradin Primary School Project Site at Bayview Road, Tooradin (the Tooradin Site) to strike for the day; 3. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Mt Eliza North Primary School Project Site at Moseley Drive, Mt Eliza North (the Mt Eliza Site) to strike for the day; 4. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Derinya Primary School Project Site at Derinya Drive, Frankston (the Derinya Site) to strike for the day; and 5. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Dromana Primary School Project Site at McCulloch Street, Dromana (the Dromana Site) to strike for the day - such conduct being engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members, contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [43]-[68] and [76]-[78] of Annexure A. 18 Similarly, Powell in directing: 1. on 26 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the SLU Project to strike for the day; 2. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Tooradin Site to strike for the day; 3. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Mt Eliza Site to strike for the day; 4. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Derinya Site to strike for the day; and 5. on 27 October 2010, employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Dromana Site to strike for the day - such conduct being engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members, contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [43]-[68] and [76]-[78] of Annexure A. 19 The CFMEU contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act by reason of being vicariously liable for: 1. the conduct of MacDonald referred to in [16] above, such conduct being engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members, contrary to s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act; 2. the conduct of Stephenson referred to in [17] above; and 3. the conduct of Powell referred to in [18] above, see [76]-[78] of Annexure A.
11 November 2010 20 The conduct on 11 November 2010 involved Doyle, MacDonald, the Sixth Respondent (Benstead), the Seventh Respondent (Parker), Stephenson, Powell and the CFMEU at numerous sites. 21 Doyle contravened s 38 of the BCII Act for being involved (within the meaning of s 48(2) of the BCII Act) in unlawful strike action engaged in on 11 November 2010 by: 1. employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Lyndhurst Primary School Project Site at 70 Brookwater Way, Lyndhurst (the Lyndhurst Site): see [79]-[86] of Annexure A; 2. employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Cranbourne East Primary School Project Site at 50 Stately Drive, Cranbourne East (the Cranbourne East Site), such involvement by Doyle being constituted by him having directed those employees to strike for the day: see [115]-[122] of Annexure A. In each case, Doyle directed those employees to strike for the day. 22 MacDonald contravened s 38 of the BCII Act for being involved (within the meaning of s 48(2) of the BCII Act) in unlawful strike action engaged in on 11 November 2010 by employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Truganina Site. MacDonald's involvement was directing those employees to strike for the day: see [87]-[94] of Annexure A. 23 Benstead contravened s 38 of the BCII Act for being involved (within the meaning of s 48(2) of the BCII Act) in unlawful strike action engaged in on 11 November 2010 by employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Aitken Creek Primary School Project Site at 51-81 Grevilla Street, Craigieburn (the Aitken Site). Benstead's involvement was directing those employees to strike for the day: see [103]-[110] of Annexure A. 24 Parker contravened s 38 of the BCII Act for being involved (within the meaning of s 48(2) of the BCII Act) in unlawful strike action engaged in on 11 November 2010 by employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working at the Drouin South Primary School Project Site at Westernport Road, Drouin (the Drouin Site). Similarly, Parker's involvement was directing those employees to strike for the day: see [95]-[102] of Annexure A. 25 Stephenson's conduct was in a different category. He engaged with others in a verbal altercation with representatives of Abigroup Contractors (such conduct including abusive language and the taking of photographs) with an intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members. That conduct contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [129]-[131] of Annexure A. 26 Powell's conduct was of two kinds. Like Doyle, MacDonald, Benstead and Parker, he directed employees of both Abigroup Contractors and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors working on the Mt Eliza Site to strike for the day: see [111]-[114] of Annexure A. He also engaged with others in a verbal altercation with representatives of Abigroup Contractors at the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site (such conduct including abusive language and the taking of photographs). In each case, his conduct was intended to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members. That conduct contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act: see [129]-[131] of Annexure A. 27 The CFMEU contravened s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act (see [131]-[134] of Annexure A) by being vicariously liable for: 1. the conduct of Doyle in [21] above, MacDonald in [22] above, Benstead in [23] above and Parker in [24] above. The conduct was engaged in with intent to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members; 2. the conduct of Stephenson referred to in [25] above; and 3. the conduct of Powell referred to in [26] above.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS 28 The principles to be applied are not in dispute. The overriding principle when fixing a penalty is to ensure that it is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct: Attorney-General (SA) v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 at 92-93. There are three purposes to be served by the imposition of a penalty - (1) Punishment, which must be proportionate to the offence and in accordance with prevailing standards, (2) Deterrence, both personal and general and (3) Rehabilitation: Ponzio v B&P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd (2007) 158 FCR 543 at [93] and Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2011] FCA 810 at [26]. 29 The Court's task, in general, is to weigh all relevant factors in reaching a conclusion that a particular penalty should be imposed: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [37] and the authorities cited. As the High Court said in Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at [74]-[76], "the task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes account of them all" - an "instinctive synthesis". 30 What then are the relevant factors? They include the nature and extent of the conduct, the circumstances in which the conduct took place, the period of the conduct, the nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the conduct, whether there has been similar previous conduct by the respondents, whether the contraventions arose out of one course of conduct, whether senior management was involved in the conduct, whether there has been any contrition exhibited, the cooperation of the respondents and the need for deterrence: Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357 at [57]-[58]. These factors are not mandatory: Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 at [91]. 31 Three other principles should be noted. First, the imposition of pecuniary penalties for contraventions of civil penalty provisions should give effect to the statutory purposes of the BCII Act: Stuart-Mahoney v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2008) 177 IR 61 at [56]-[57]. Second, any penalty imposed should not exceed that which is appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the contravention considered in light of the objective circumstances: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2012] FCA 189 at [21] (ABCC v CFMEU). Third, attention to the maximum penalty is necessary; the maximum penalty is reserved for the worst type of cases falling within the relevant prohibition: ABCC v CFMEU at [23].
AGREED PENALTIES 32 The parties have agreed the penalties. The Court's approach to agreed penalties has been the subject of considerable judicial ink: see, by way of example, Mobil Oil at [47]-[60]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vizard (2005) 145 FCR 57 at [45]; and Ingleby. 33 In the end, the principles to be applied may be simply stated. First, the question of an appropriate penalty for a proven contempt or an established breach of a statutory prohibition is a matter for, and function of, the Courts in the exercise of judicial power. Secondly, contrary to statements in some cases, the role of the Court in addressing an agreed penalty is not to exercise an "appellate" role: Ingleby at [29] and [99]. The role of the trial judge is to give such weight to an agreed penalty as is appropriate and to treat the joint submission as it is - a joint submission - to be considered as a factor, an important factor, in the exercise of judicial power of fixing the appropriate penalty in the circumstances of the particular case. These principles are consistent with the observations of Lockhart J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-457 at 41,581-41,582. The role of the Court is to assess what it would do itself based on the facts. Whether the Court assesses for itself what is the appropriate penalty and then tests that against the agreed penalty, or the Court asks itself whether the agreed penalty is broadly in accord with what the Court would have done acknowledging that the fixing of quantum - the task is not an exact science. The role of the Court is the same - to impose a penalty that is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct. Much of the current debate about the appropriate approach has descended into a debate about which goes first - the Court assessing the penalty having regard to the agreed penalty or assessing whether the agreed penalty is within the appropriate range. For my part, that debate is distracting. It is distracting because it ignores the important role of the fundamental principles of sentencing that must be considered by a trial judge. 34 Pursuant to s 49(2)(a) of the BCII Act, the maximum penalties for a contravention of ss 38 or 43 of the BCII Act are $110,000 (1,000 penalty units) for a body corporate and $22,000 (200 penalty units) for an individual: s 4(1) of the BCII Act read with s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The CFMEU is a body corporate: s 27 of the FW(RO) Act.
Nature and extent of the conduct 36 First, the nature and extent of the conduct. Prior to June 2010, the CFMEU and Abigroup Contractors had been in dispute over whether Abigroup Contractors was required to redeploy its employees from projects which were finishing to new projects: see [26] of Annexure A. The CFMEU claimed that Abigroup Contractors, in the past, had redeployed the employees: see [26] of Annexure A. In June 2010, the CFMEU sought the redeployment of four identified members to the Peninsula Link Project. Abigroup Contractors did not accede to those requests. In August 2010, Abigroup Contractors began deploying or employing persons to work on the Peninsula Link Project. The unlawful conduct commenced on 31 August 2010 and continued on 26 and 27 October and 11 November 2010. 37 The unlawful conduct constituted a concerted and persistent attempt by the CFMEU and the individual named respondents to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ four identified members on the Peninsula Link Project. It could not be said that the contravening conduct was inadvertent or genuinely believed to be lawful. The respondents' conduct was part of a deliberate industrial strategy. The unlawful conduct occurred at various sites on various days. The unlawful conduct included blockading of sites, directing workers not to perform any further work at numerous sites and a verbal altercation at a site. That conduct, separately and collectively, was serious in nature. It is important to understand that the CFMEU had lawful means available to it to seek to have particular members employed on the Peninsula Link Project. The existence of alternative lawful means exacerbates the seriousness of the conduct. Taken together, those matters favour the imposition of a higher penalty: see Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Abbott (No 6) [2013] FCA 942 at [28].
Nature and extent of the loss or damage or other consequences of the conduct 38 Next, the nature and extent of the loss or damage or other consequences of the conduct. Three aspects should be noted. The first element of loss and damage comprised the inconvenience to Abigroup Ltd, Abigroup Contractors and the employees and sub-contractors of Abigroup Contractors caused by the fact that vehicles and deliveries were prevented from entering two sites during the 31 August 2010 blockades: see [135] of Annexure A. The second element was the delay to work on the various sites caused by the strike action on 26 and 27 October and 11 November 2010. As a result of the directions not to perform any further work, other than some nominal work, no further work was performed at the site from the time of the direction: see [136] of Annexure A. These events led to the third aspect - a requirement to reorganise work on each site for the following day: see [136] of Annexure A. There is no evidence of the "cost" caused by those matters although the facts provide a sufficient basis from which to infer that there would have been some cost: Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2006) 164 IR 375 at [52].
Single course of conduct? 39 The next matter to be considered is whether the contraventions were distinct or arose out of a single course of conduct. This issue is not straightforward. First, the individual respondents. For each of Stephenson, Powell, Doyle and MacDonald, their purpose was the same - to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ four identified members on the Peninsula Link Project. However, the contraventions of the BCII Act took place on more than one day, at more than one site and necessarily involved different participants. Each contravention was a distinct contravention: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill (2010) 194 IR 461 at [36]-[41]. The positions of Parker and Benstead are different. They contravened the BCII Act on one day at one site. As the Applicant submitted, they were one off incidents. That leaves the position of the CFMEU. It is vicariously liable for the contraventions just described. Its conduct involved a coordinated course of conduct engaged in for a single purpose - to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ four identified members on the Peninsula Link Project. However, as we have seen, there was more than one incident at more than one site. The contravening conduct was spread over a period of months - 31 August, 26 and 27 October and 11 November 2010. And, no less importantly, the tactics adopted were different.
Position of responsibility and involvement of senior management? 40 In that context, it is necessary to turn to consider the positions held by the respondents within the CFMEU. Each of the individual respondents was an organiser. Each held a relatively senior role within the CFMEU's structure. However, their conduct was not unrelated. It was coordinated by the CFMEU. The Applicant submitted there is no evidence in the statement of agreed facts and admissions that any persons more senior than the individual respondents were involved in the contraventions. It is correct that the statement of agreed facts and admissions contains that omission. 41 Despite the lack of any direct evidence of the involvement of more senior CFMEU representatives, the Applicant submitted that the following matters support an inference that senior CFMEU representatives were involved in the contraventions: 1. The contraventions followed a meeting on 16 June 2010 attended by Mr Ralph Edwards (President of the CFMEU Construction & General Division, Victorian Branch (C & G Victoria)) and Mr John Setka (then the Assistant Secretary of C & G Victoria) where the CFMEU demands were first put to Abigroup Contractors: see [27]-[28] of Annexure A. 2. The contraventions involved six CFMEU organisers holding relatively senior roles within the CFMEU (as opposed to junior employees). 3. Between July and November 2010, Stephenson and Powell made the same demands to Abigroup Contractors' General Superintendent for the Peninsula Link Project as had been made at the 16 June 2010 meeting. 4. The intention of the individual respondents who participated in the unlawful conduct on 31 August 2010, 26 and 27 October 2010, and 11 November 2010 was the same, namely, to coerce Abigroup Contractors to employ particular CFMEU members on the Peninsula Link Project, including four identified members (such coercion also involving the same demands that had been made in the 16 June 2010 meeting). 5. The conduct on 26 and 27 October 2010 occurred at six different sites, and the conduct on 11 November 2010 occurred at seven different sites. The conduct would appear to be part of a co-ordinated strategy on the part of the CFMEU. This suggests the involvement of more senior management, or, at least, knowledge and approval by senior management. 6. Several CFMEU organisers were present at the Cranbourne-Frankston Road site on 11 November 2010, including a number of organisers from interstate who were present in Melbourne for a CFMEU meeting on that day: see [123]-[127] of Annexure A. This suggests a co-ordinated strategy, and the likely involvement and/or knowledge of senior CFMEU management. 42 In particular, the Applicant submitted that from these agreed facts the Court should infer that senior CFMEU management were either involved in the contraventions or, alternatively, aware of the contravening conduct and took no steps to prevent the contraventions being committed. I accept that submission. 43 It is well established that in a civil penalty proceeding, the Court may draw a Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 inference: see, for example, Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 at [664]-[669]. However, in the circumstances of the present case, it is unnecessary to do so. The agreed facts provide a sufficient factual basis from which to infer the direct involvement of senior management of the CFMEU in the contraventions.
Size of the CFMEU 44 The next consideration is the size of the CFMEU. The CFMEU is a large and well resourced trade union in a strong financial position. The CFMEU did not seek a mitigation of the penalty because of its size or financial position.
Contrition or corrective action 45 The respondents have not put forward any expression of contrition or any evidence of corrective action by the CFMEU. Lack of contrition is not an aggravating factor that might increase a penalty: Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) (2009) 189 IR 304 at [87]. But a failure to forward any expression of contrition or any evidence of corrective action means that there is no discount to be applied in the imposition of the penalty. Although there is no evidence of contrition or corrective action, the respondents have at a relatively early stage in the proceedings made significant admissions that have avoided the time and expense associated with what would otherwise have been a lengthy trial: Ponzio at [99].
Prior contraventions of similar legislation 46 Next, the prior relevant conduct. The CFMEU has engaged in a significant number of prior contraventions of similar legislation. These contraventions are relevant to an assessment of penalty: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v John Holland Pty Ltd (2010) 186 FCR 88 at [141]. They justify a heavier sentence although they cannot lead to the imposition of a penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the offence: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-478. The position of the individual respondents is different. MacDonald has no record of prior similar conduct. That factor warrants a discount from the maximum penalty. Doyle has one prior contravention. The other individual respondents have a record of prior similar conduct involving more than one prior contravention. Stephenson and Parker have three prior contraventions. Powell has six prior contraventions and Benstead has two prior contraventions.
Deterrence and totality 47 That leaves two final considerations - deterrence and the totality principle. Engaging in conduct with an intention to coerce an employer to employ a person as a building employee (which includes unlawful strike action) is objectively serious. The penalties must reflect the seriousness of the conduct and act as a deterrent to others likely to engage in similar contraventions: Ponzio at [93]. However, as we have seen, the penalty fixed by the Court must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the consideration of deterrence cannot be inconsistent with that principle. In addition, the Court must take into account the totality principle in determining the appropriate level of penalty to ensure that the aggregate penalties imposed are not oppressive or crushing: see Ophthalmic at [23], [66]-[71] and [94]-[102].
Parsimony 48 Before turning to the question of the just and appropriate penalty, it is necessary to address a submission put by the respondents under the heading "Parsimony" by reference to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in R v Valentini (1980) 48 FLR 416 at 420. The relevant passage reads: The judge must ensure that he imposes the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the relevant purposes of sentencing taking care that he punishes only for the crime or crimes before him. 49 The respondents submitted that this approach had been followed in civil penalty proceedings in an industrial context and required the Court to impose the "minimum" penalty: see Fair Work Ombudsman v Tiger Telco Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 479 at [20] and ABCC v CFMEU, at [23]. With respect to the primary judge in both Tiger Telco and ABCC v CFMEU, the passage cited from Valentini does not establish a principle of "parsimony" that required the court to impose the minimum. Valentini was a crown appeal against the sentence imposed on respondents who pleaded guilty to armed robbery and shooting with intent. The passage cannot be read out of context. The relevant passage reads: The task of a sentencing judge is not an easy one. He is invested with a discretion which entails the balancing of the often competing alternatives of sentencing. It has been said many times that the dominant theme in sentencing is to provide protection to society. To achieve this, the sentencing judge must balance retribution - in the sense of the infliction of a just punishment to express the moral outrage of the community: deterrence - of the particular offender and others in the community who may consider similar action: and rehabilitation - ensuring that the sentence imposed is consistent, if possible, with the offender's returning to society as a contributing member. This delicate process is often complicated by the need to have regard for a uniform and national approach to sentencing, "a consistent correlation", while looking to society - with whose moral outrage and protection the judge is immediately concerned and the individual offender himself. The judge must ensure that he imposes the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the relevant purposes of sentencing taking care that he punishes only for the crime or crimes before him. We would refer to the judgment of Brennan J in Channon v The Queen where his Honour cited R v Geddes, R v Goodrich and R v Cuthbert. There are many other cases attempting to analyse the task involved and debate has ranged constantly over the field of sentencing aims; whether punishment deters, whether "retribution" is a legitimate aim, whether rehabilitation should be the primary concern. But it is the interaction of the facts with the perception of societary circumstances that in each provides the sentence which the judge considers will best protect and reassure society. (Citations omitted.) Read in context, the Court was stating no more than that a sentencing judge's task is not easy and that the outcome of that task, at the very least, must impose the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the purposes of sentencing for the crimes committed. Put another way, a failure by the sentencing judge to do that will lead to the sentencing task miscarrying. 50 What role then does the principle of parsimony have in an industrial context? First, the principle and then its application. 51 The principle is established at common law. At common law, it requires the selection of the least severe sentencing option open to a sentencer which achieves the purpose or purposes of punishment in the case and therefore achieves the ultimate aim of protecting society: see, by way of example, R v Fyfe (1985) 40 SASR 120 at 129 and Crawley v R (1981) 5 A Crim R 451 at 456. It was judicially considered as early as the 1950s in Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65 at 66: see also Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 438. It also finds reflection in the various sentencing statues but expressed in different terms. For example, a narrower expression of the principle is set out in s 17A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As the Applicant submitted, the principle is primarily directed at mercy in the criminal context where a person's liberty is at risk: see, by way of example, R v Moyse (1988) 38 A Crim R 169 at 172-173. 52 Next, where then does the principle sit in the sentencing method? It has been suggested that the nature of the principle means that it is considered in the final stages of the sentencing process at the point where the sentencer has considered all relevant matters. One of those matters is, of course, the possible sentencing options that would meet the objective of protecting society. In those sentencing tasks involving the possibility of the imposition of a custodial sentence, it is unsurprising that the relevant statutes require the sentencing judge to be satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate before imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 53 It is important to note, however, that even where the principle of parsimony is required to be considered by a sentencing judge (eg s 5(4) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)), the sentencing judge is not required to give reasons for rejecting non-custodial sentences. In other words, although a sentencing judge is not formally relieved of a duty to consider all available sanctions, the sentencing task does not fall into error because the sentencing judge commences assessment of the appropriate sentence at a realistic point in the hierarchy of available sentencing options: R v O'Connor [1987] VR 496. 54 The sentencing task in imposing civil penalties in the industrial law context is substantially different from those involving the imposition (or the possibility of the imposition) of a custodial sentence. For example, the sentencing options in the present industrial law context are limited by the statute - a monetary penalty where the statute imposes a maximum penalty: cf Trade Practices Commission v Farrow (1990) 95 ALR 53 at 65 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Petsas (2005) 23 ACLC 269 at [16]. The liberty of the subject is not at risk in civil penalty proceedings under the BCII Act. 55 The task of the sentencer under the BCII Act is sufficiently described as fixing a penalty that is just in all the circumstances. Separate reference to notions of parsimony has the capacity to mislead if it distracts from the need to fix the just and appropriate penalty. It has the capacity to mislead because the reference to "parsimony" means different things in different contexts. In the current context, the common law principle (the selection of the least severe sentencing option open to a sentencer which achieves the purpose or purposes of punishment in the case and therefore achieves the ultimate aim of protecting society) adds little, if anything, to the task of the sentencer under the BCII Act of fixing a penalty that is just and appropriate in all the circumstances. 56 What then is the just and appropriate penalty? Having regard to all of the factors that have been mentioned, the following penalties are just and appropriate: 1. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 31 August 2010: 1.1 a penalty of $5,000 for Doyle. 1.2 a penalty of $6,500 for Stephenson. 1.3 a penalty of $35,000 for the CFMEU. 2. In respect of the contraventions of s 38 of the BCII Act on 27 October 2010, a penalty of $2,500 for MacDonald. 3. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 26 and 27 October 2010: 3.1 a penalty of $10,000 for Stephenson. 3.2 a penalty of $10,000 for Powell. 3.3 a penalty of $55,000 for the CFMEU. 4. In respect of the contraventions of s 38 of the BCII Act on 11 November 2010: 4.1 a penalty of $6,000 for Doyle. 4.2 a penalty of $2,500 for MacDonald. 4.3 a penalty of $2,500 for Parker. 4.4 a penalty of $3,000 for Benstead. 5. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 11 November 2010: 5.1 a penalty of $12,500 for Stephenson. 5.2 a penalty of $14,500 for Powell. 5.3 a penalty of $65,000 for the CFMEU. 57 The penalties are consistent with those jointly proposed by the parties. I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon.
Associate: Dated: 7 October 2013 ANNEXURE A - AGREED FACTS AND ADMISSIONS The Parties
Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
R v Moyse (1988) 38 A Crim R 169 R v O'Connor [1987] VR 496 R v Valentini (1980) 48 FLR 416 Stuart-Mahoney v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2008) 177 IR 61 Trade Practices Commission v Farrow (1990) 95 ALR 53 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584
[2013] VSCA 49
(1982) 30 SASR 84
(2008) 165 FCR 560
(2005) 145 FCR 57
(2009) 189 IR 304
(1978) 33 FLR 433
(2010) 194 IR 461
(2010) 186 FCR 88
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2006) 164 IR 375
(2005) 228 CLR 357
(1996) 71 FCR 285
(2008) 171 FCR 357
(2007) 158 FCR 543
(1985) 40 SASR 120
(1980) 48 FLR 416
(2008) 177 IR 61
(1990) 95 ALR 53
(1988) 164 CLR 465
(2001) 207 CLR 584