Parsimony
48 Before turning to the question of the just and appropriate penalty, it is necessary to address a submission put by the respondents under the heading "Parsimony" by reference to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in R v Valentini (1980) 48 FLR 416 at 420. The relevant passage reads:
The judge must ensure that he imposes the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the relevant purposes of sentencing taking care that he punishes only for the crime or crimes before him.
49 The respondents submitted that this approach had been followed in civil penalty proceedings in an industrial context and required the Court to impose the "minimum" penalty: see Fair Work Ombudsman v Tiger Telco Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 479 at [20] and ABCC v CFMEU, at [23]. With respect to the primary judge in both Tiger Telco and ABCC v CFMEU, the passage cited from Valentini does not establish a principle of "parsimony" that required the court to impose the minimum. Valentini was a crown appeal against the sentence imposed on respondents who pleaded guilty to armed robbery and shooting with intent. The passage cannot be read out of context. The relevant passage reads:
The task of a sentencing judge is not an easy one. He is invested with a discretion which entails the balancing of the often competing alternatives of sentencing. It has been said many times that the dominant theme in sentencing is to provide protection to society. To achieve this, the sentencing judge must balance retribution - in the sense of the infliction of a just punishment to express the moral outrage of the community: deterrence - of the particular offender and others in the community who may consider similar action: and rehabilitation - ensuring that the sentence imposed is consistent, if possible, with the offender's returning to society as a contributing member. This delicate process is often complicated by the need to have regard for a uniform and national approach to sentencing, "a consistent correlation", while looking to society - with whose moral outrage and protection the judge is immediately concerned and the individual offender himself. The judge must ensure that he imposes the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the relevant purposes of sentencing taking care that he punishes only for the crime or crimes before him.
We would refer to the judgment of Brennan J in Channon v The Queen where his Honour cited R v Geddes, R v Goodrich and R v Cuthbert. There are many other cases attempting to analyse the task involved and debate has ranged constantly over the field of sentencing aims; whether punishment deters, whether "retribution" is a legitimate aim, whether rehabilitation should be the primary concern. But it is the interaction of the facts with the perception of societary circumstances that in each provides the sentence which the judge considers will best protect and reassure society.
(Citations omitted.)
Read in context, the Court was stating no more than that a sentencing judge's task is not easy and that the outcome of that task, at the very least, must impose the minimum term consistent with the attainment of the purposes of sentencing for the crimes committed. Put another way, a failure by the sentencing judge to do that will lead to the sentencing task miscarrying.
50 What role then does the principle of parsimony have in an industrial context? First, the principle and then its application.
51 The principle is established at common law. At common law, it requires the selection of the least severe sentencing option open to a sentencer which achieves the purpose or purposes of punishment in the case and therefore achieves the ultimate aim of protecting society: see, by way of example, R v Fyfe (1985) 40 SASR 120 at 129 and Crawley v R (1981) 5 A Crim R 451 at 456. It was judicially considered as early as the 1950s in Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65 at 66: see also Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 438. It also finds reflection in the various sentencing statues but expressed in different terms. For example, a narrower expression of the principle is set out in s 17A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As the Applicant submitted, the principle is primarily directed at mercy in the criminal context where a person's liberty is at risk: see, by way of example, R v Moyse (1988) 38 A Crim R 169 at 172-173.
52 Next, where then does the principle sit in the sentencing method? It has been suggested that the nature of the principle means that it is considered in the final stages of the sentencing process at the point where the sentencer has considered all relevant matters. One of those matters is, of course, the possible sentencing options that would meet the objective of protecting society. In those sentencing tasks involving the possibility of the imposition of a custodial sentence, it is unsurprising that the relevant statutes require the sentencing judge to be satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate before imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
53 It is important to note, however, that even where the principle of parsimony is required to be considered by a sentencing judge (eg s 5(4) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)), the sentencing judge is not required to give reasons for rejecting non-custodial sentences. In other words, although a sentencing judge is not formally relieved of a duty to consider all available sanctions, the sentencing task does not fall into error because the sentencing judge commences assessment of the appropriate sentence at a realistic point in the hierarchy of available sentencing options: R v O'Connor [1987] VR 496.
54 The sentencing task in imposing civil penalties in the industrial law context is substantially different from those involving the imposition (or the possibility of the imposition) of a custodial sentence. For example, the sentencing options in the present industrial law context are limited by the statute - a monetary penalty where the statute imposes a maximum penalty: cf Trade Practices Commission v Farrow (1990) 95 ALR 53 at 65 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Petsas (2005) 23 ACLC 269 at [16]. The liberty of the subject is not at risk in civil penalty proceedings under the BCII Act.
55 The task of the sentencer under the BCII Act is sufficiently described as fixing a penalty that is just in all the circumstances. Separate reference to notions of parsimony has the capacity to mislead if it distracts from the need to fix the just and appropriate penalty. It has the capacity to mislead because the reference to "parsimony" means different things in different contexts. In the current context, the common law principle (the selection of the least severe sentencing option open to a sentencer which achieves the purpose or purposes of punishment in the case and therefore achieves the ultimate aim of protecting society) adds little, if anything, to the task of the sentencer under the BCII Act of fixing a penalty that is just and appropriate in all the circumstances.
56 What then is the just and appropriate penalty? Having regard to all of the factors that have been mentioned, the following penalties are just and appropriate:
1. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 31 August 2010:
1.1 a penalty of $5,000 for Doyle.
1.2 a penalty of $6,500 for Stephenson.
1.3 a penalty of $35,000 for the CFMEU.
2. In respect of the contraventions of s 38 of the BCII Act on 27 October 2010, a penalty of $2,500 for MacDonald.
3. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 26 and 27 October 2010:
3.1 a penalty of $10,000 for Stephenson.
3.2 a penalty of $10,000 for Powell.
3.3 a penalty of $55,000 for the CFMEU.
4. In respect of the contraventions of s 38 of the BCII Act on 11 November 2010:
4.1 a penalty of $6,000 for Doyle.
4.2 a penalty of $2,500 for MacDonald.
4.3 a penalty of $2,500 for Parker.
4.4 a penalty of $3,000 for Benstead.
5. In respect of the contraventions of s 43(1)(a) of the BCII Act on 11 November 2010:
5.1 a penalty of $12,500 for Stephenson.
5.2 a penalty of $14,500 for Powell.
5.3 a penalty of $65,000 for the CFMEU.
57 The penalties are consistent with those jointly proposed by the parties.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon.