30 Strangely, there is no reference in the Hoffman line of cases to the Cehner line, and the reverse is true also. If there were any significant difference, for present purposes, between the two lines of authority such that I needed to choose between them, the choice would not be easy. Cehner is a decision of the Court of Appeal dealing directly with s 109. However there appears to have been no argument in Cehner directed to the present question. As already mentioned the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Game seems to indicate an assumption that the Hoffman approach applies under s 109. Much the same could be said about the reference to s 109 by Tadgell JA (with whom Charles JA agreed) in Green v Victorian Workcover Authority[49], a case referred to in Game. Moreover in Wong v Carter[50], a case arising directly under s 109, Tadgell JA, having noted that the section conferred a right of appeal "on a question of law" only, said that the "[t]he nature of an appeal of that character was considered in [Hoffman]." Winneke P associated himself with the observations of Tadgell JA concerning the nature of an appeal under s 109. However the main concern of Tadgell JA was not about the proper limits of a "no evidence" challenge under s 109 but about the impermissibility of complaining about alleged errors of practice and procedure. Chernov JA, who gave the leading judgment, considered and rejected the appellant's submission that the magistrate's decision had not been "open" to him. Chernov JA commented[51] that there was no indication that the magistrate's finding was "inconsistent with other facts found by him or with the weight of the evidence". However, as indicated below, I think that the weight of authority is against admitting grounds such as inconsistency of findings or that a finding was "against the weight of the evidence" in an appeal confined to a question of law. It is true that the detailed discussion in S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal about the distinction between a question of fact and a question of law was framed by reference to the issue in that case, namely whether the claimant came within a statutory description. By contrast, the present case involves an allegation of common law negligence. And it is true that many, if not all, of the cases in the Hoffman line, including all of the ones to which I have so far referred, have arisen under statutory provisions rather than at common law. However in Fidgeon v William Abbott & Associates[52] the Court of Appeal treated Hoffman and S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal as being applicable in the context of an appeal from the Legal Profession Tribunal in relation to a complaint against a solicitor of common law negligence. Moreover, the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law, as difficult as it may sometimes appear, is of central importance in many areas of the law, including "the detection of reviewable jury error under the old appellate processes of the courts of common law".[53] In S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal, although the context was statutory, Phillips JA appeared to be addressing this subject in general terms.